


# **seminar**




**269  
ANNUAL**

14

January 1982

CUR-406236-14-KP 3846



A wide spectrum of  
consultancy services.

Tata Consultancy Services, Air India Building, Nariman Point, Bombay 400 021, India  
Telephone 234827 • Telex 011-3733 TCSB IN • Cable TATCOMP

Sista's-T.C.S 512/81-R



# improve ht.



← 86cm →



**British  
airways**

The British have made 747 flights even more comfortable.

In 'Crown' first class our new Sleeperseats recline to a near horizontal position enabling you just to lie back and drift off.

There's more room for passengers in the Club cabin, too.

The seats line up in a spacious 3-3-3 formation. If the next seat is vacant, fold

fly the  
**British**  
way

back the armrests, pull down the table hidden in the seat back and you've got the widest airline seats in the world.

There's a choice of menus, complimentary drinks and headsets for the in-flight music and film

Don't be given any short measures on your next trip, fly the British way. For further details and bookings, contact your travel agent or British Airways

FCB/OBM/5583

We'll take more care of you.

**Now convenience takes on a new name—**



Centralcard—a new convenience card from Central Bank. The first of its kind to be launched by a nationalised bank.

You can use it at hotels, restaurants, retail and department stores in fact at a number of Member Establishments in all important cities of the country. It's convenient because you don't have to pay cash down.


For further information, get in touch with Centralcard, Central Bank of India, Kasturi Building, J. Tata Road, Bombay-400 020. Phone 242312, 242331 Telex 6929.

**Centralcard** Carry it wherever you go.



**Central Bank of India**  
(A Government of India Undertaking)

# Centralcard



(Interpub/CBI/2/80)

## Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Limited, Vadodara

*Manufacturers of*

**Low Density Polyethylene (Indothene)**

**Polypropylene (Koylene)**

**Polybutadiene Rubber (Cisamer)**

**Acrylic Fibre (Cashmilon)**

**Dimethyl Terephthalate (DMT)**

**Ortho & Mixed Xylenes**

**Paraxylene**

**Solvent CIX**

**Ethylene Glycol**

**Ethylene Oxide**

**Polyethylene Glycol**

**Hydrocyanic Acid**

**Acrylonitrile**

**Linear Alkyl Benzene**

**Polyalkyl Benzene**

**Heavy N-Paraffins**


**Benzene and Carbon Black feedstock.**

# the Peugeot a new of advance

**Mahindra** meets the challenge of the oil crisis, with a standard lightweight high performance diesel engine-the **PEUGEOT XDP 4.90** with greater fuel efficiency


This world-famous engine is now being assembled at the Mahindra plant

The **PEUGEOT XDP 4.90** will be fitted initially on the **Mahindra NC 665 DP Mini Truck**, Pick-up Van and Ambulance



## Specifications

Number of Cylinders	4
Bore-mm	90
Stroke-mm	83
Bore/Stroke ratio	1.08
Displacement-cc	2112
Compression Ratio	22.4:1
R P M (max)	4500
Max B H P.	75
Max Torque Kg m	13.3
	@ 2000 r.p.m.
Weight Kg	184



The Mahindra NC 665 DP Mini Truck fitted with Peugeot XDP 4.90 diesel engine



Pick up Van




Ambulance



**Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.**

# Have a wild holiday with us



Expect some really wild and fascinating company at our Forest Lodges

## Sasan Gir Forest Lodge

The last refuge of the Asiatic lion. Other wild-life that roam the Gir forests include boar, hyena, the four-horned antelope, the chowsingha and the blackbuck. Sasan Gir is easily accessible by rail from Ahmedabad. Or by road from Veraval.

## Bharatpur Forest Lodge

Close to Agra, lies the famous bird sanctuary in Bharatpur, a veritable haven for the bird

watcher. Egret, grey heron, white ibis, spoonbill, the Siberian crane. The variety is endless.

You can reach Bharatpur in just 5 hours from Delhi. By road or by rail.

## Kaziranga Forest Lodge

Home of the great Indian one-horned rhinoceros. Elephants carry you through the marshy grassland to give you a glimpse of some of the richest species of wildlife in the world.

The nearest airports from Kaziranga are Jorhat and Gauhati. Furkating is the nearest railhead, from where you can take a bus to the sanctuary.

Forest Lodges at Sasan Gir, Bharatpur and Kaziranga provide you with comfortable accommodation. A choice of A/C and non-A/C rooms with attached baths, restaurants, bars and a highly personalized service make sure your stay is a pleasant one.

If you need more information on these places and how you can get there, just call us.


The Manager  
Bharatpur Forest Lodge  
Bharatpur Bird Sanctuary  
Bharatpur 321001 Rajasthan  
Tel 2260 2322 2864

The Manager  
Kaziranga Forest Lodge  
P O Kaziranga Sanctuary  
Distt Sibsagar 785109  
Assam Tel 29

The Manager  
Sasan Gir Forest Lodge,  
Sasan Gir, Distt  
Junagadh 362135 Gujarat Tel 28

## Ashok Reservation Service

Delhi	Tel 350070	Telex 031 2468 Cables CENTRES
Bombay	Tel 233343 232722	Telex 011 4171 Cables TOURISM
Madras	Tel 88520	Telex 041-7262 Cables TOURISM
Calcutta	Tel 440901 440922	Telex 021-2307 Cables TOURISM



India's largest hotel chain

India Tourism Development Corporation



**Now convenience takes on a new name—**



Centralcard—a new convenience card from Central Bank. The first of its kind to be launched by a nationalised bank.

You can use it at hotels, restaurants, retail and department stores in fact at a number of Member Establishments in all important cities of the country. It's convenient because you don't have to pay cash down.


For further information, get in touch with Centralcard, Central Bank of India, Kastur Building, J. Tata Road, Bombay-400 020. Phone 242312, 242331 Telex 6929

**Centralcard** Carry it wherever you go.



**Central Bank of India**  
(A Government of India Undertaking)

# Centralcard



(Interpub/CBI/2/80)

## Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Limited, Vadodara

*Manufacturers of*

Low Density Polyethylene (Indothene)  
Polypropylene (Koylene)  
Polybutadiene Rubber (Cisamer)  
Acrylic Fibre (Cashmilon)  
Dimethyl Terephthalate (DMT)  
Ortho & Mixed Xylenes  
Paraxylene  
Solvent CIX  
Ethylene Glycol

Ethylene Oxide  
Polyethylene Glycol  
Hydrocyanic Acid  
Acrylonitrile  
Linear Alkyl Benzene  
Polyalkyl Benzene  
Heavy N-Paraffins  
Benzene and Carbon Black feedstock.

# **the art of good management...**



**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**

Shriram seminars and courses are part of this moulding process . which involves executives in a ceaseless interchange of ideas, discussion of modern techniques, evaluation and reconsideration of policies So that the Shriram organisation is constantly infused with fresh dynamism and our resources are utilised to the optimum.



**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**

# Have a wild holiday with us



Expect some really wild and fascinating company at our Forest Lodges

## Sasan Gir Forest Lodge

The last refuge of the Asiatic lion. Other wild-life that roam the Gir forests include boar, hyena, the four-horned antelope, the chowsingha and the blackbuck. Sasan Gir is easily accessible by rail from Ahmedabad. Or by road from Veraval.

## Bharatpur Forest Lodge

Close to Agra, lies the famous bird sanctuary in Bharatpur, a veritable haven for the bird

watcher. Egret, grey heron, white ibis, spoonbill, the Siberian crane. The variety is endless.

You can reach Bharatpur in just 5 hours from Delhi. By road or by rail.

## Kaziranga Forest Lodge

Home of the great Indian one-horned rhinoceros. Elephants carry you through the marshy grassland to give you a glimpse of some of the richest species of wildlife in the world.

The nearest airports from Kaziranga are Jorhat and Gauhati. Furkating is the nearest railhead, from where you can take a bus to the sanctuary.

Forest Lodges at Sasan Gir, Bharatpur and Kaziranga provide you with comfortable accommodation. A choice of A/C and non-A/C rooms with attached baths, restaurants, bars and a highly personalized service make sure your stay is a pleasant one.

If you need more information on these places and how you can get there, just call us.

The Manager  
Bharatpur Forest Lodge  
Bharatpur Bird Sanctuary  
Bharatpur 321001 Rajasthan  
Tel 2260 2322 2864

The Manager  
Kaziranga Forest Lodge  
P O Kaziranga Sanctuary  
Distt Sibsagar 785109  
Assam Tel 29

The Manager  
Sasan Gir Forest Lodge  
Sasan Gir, Distt  
Junagadh 362135 Gujarat Tel 28

Ashok Reservation Service			
Delhi	Tel 350070	Telex 031 2468	Cables CENTRES
Bombay	Tel 233343 232722	Telex 011 4171	Cables TOURISM
Madras	Tel 88520	Telex 041-7262	Cables TOURISM
Calcutta	Tel 440901 440922	Telex 021-2307	Cables TOURISM




India's largest hotel chain

India Tourism Development Corporation



CAS-ITDC-398 R



**An "impossible dream"  
turns into a silver-jubilee success.**

**You'll find reasons to celebrate.**

State trading That 'impossible dream' of 25 years ago is today's silver jubilee success. And you'll find reasons to celebrate

For today, the State Trading Corporation has placed India on the trade map of the world. And in the process, emerged as a sophisticated international trading house, responding with skills and speed to the needs of competitive world markets. Backing this experience has been a history of consistent success

First as an importer of crucial developmental inputs to aid India's drive for self sufficiency. Next, as an exporter of a variety of goods. And more recently, in the open, fiercely tough world of competitive trading

And yet, STC takes on new challenges. At home, turning the concept of 'service through imports' into a reality, with a country-wide network of distribution depots that stock imported items of mass consumption, like edible oils

Donning new mantles, as a direct trader in selected goods, as a partner in joint ventures in capacity creation projects. In short, a partner in progress

State Trading completes 25 years in India. You'll find reasons to celebrate



**THE STATE TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD.**



ASP STC/A



# **the art of good management...**




**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**

Shriram seminars and courses are part of this moulding process . which involves executives in a ceaseless interchange of ideas, discussion of modern techniques, evaluation and reconsideration of policies So that the Shriram organisation is constantly infused with fresh dynamism and our resources are utilised to the optimum.



**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**



*You've got what you wanted*

## The new CP 32A ROCK DRILL with all the improvements which construction engineers have been asking for in rock drills.

- ☐ Better sustained performance
- ☐ Higher penetration rates
- ☐ Extra durability
- ☐ Low maintenance costs
- ☐ Low air consumption

It has the fine unbeatable features for which CP is famous.

Other project-proved products from CP's expanding range

Hand Drills, Feedlegs, Pumps, Concrete Vibrators, Tampers, Coal Drills

Drills, Grinders, Sanders, Chippers, Riveters, Impact Wrenches, Rammers Plus a wide range of air compressors



## CONSOLIDATED PNEUMATIC TOOL CO. (INDIA) LTD.

301/302, L B S Marg, Mulund, Bombay 400 080

Branches Bangalore, Calcutta, Delhi, Goa, Madras, Jamshedpur

® Authorised Stockists and Dealers Raipur, Secunderabad

GJA 458

## EVEREST

- A.C. SEMI-CORRUGATED AND CORRUGATED ROOFING SHEETS
  - For Pent roofs and Lean-to roofs
- A.C. CORRUGATED CURVED SHEETS
  - Self supporting Roofing Sheets
- A.C. PLIBESTOS FLAT SHEETS
  - Ideal for false ceilings, internal partitions, cupboards etc.
- A.C. WATER TANKS
  - Non-corrosive, hygienic
  - Require no maintenance
  - Can be easily connected to the house water supply.
- A.C. SEPTIC TANKS
  - For 10 to 20 Users.

## ASBESTOS CEMENT LIMITED

(A Member of the TURNER & NEWALL Group)

"Ashok Bhawan",  
63, Nehru Place, NEW DELHI-110 019


### Sales Offices at:

Block 'D' Shivsagar Estate,  
Dr Annie Besant Road,  
Worli,  
BOMBAY-400018

Everest House,  
948, Napier Town,  
JABALPUR-482001.

Everest House,  
Garden Reach,  
Taratolla Road,  
CALCUTTA-700024

Podanur, P O,  
COIMBATORE-641023



**An "impossible dream"  
turns into a silver-jubilee success.**

**You'll find reasons to celebrate.**

State trading. That 'impossible dream' of 25 years ago is today's silver jubilee success. And you'll find reasons to celebrate.

For today, the State Trading Corporation has placed India on the trade map of the world. And in the process, emerged as a sophisticated international trading house, responding with skills and speed to the needs of competitive world markets. Backing this experience has been a history of consistent success.

First as an importer of crucial developmental inputs to aid India's drive for self sufficiency. Next, as an exporter of a variety of goods. And more recently, in the open, fiercely tough world of competitive trading.

And yet, STC takes on new challenges. At home, turning the concept of 'service through imports' into a reality, with a country-wide network of distribution depots that stock imported items of mass consumption, like edible oils.

Donning new mantles, as a direct trader in selected goods, as a partner in joint ventures in capacity creation projects. In short, a partner in progress.

*State Trading  
completes 25 years in India.  
You'll find reasons  
to celebrate.*



**THE STATE TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD.**



ASP STC/A

# FORHAN'S—the toothpaste created by a dentist



**helps strengthen your gums  
while it cleans your teeth**

## Gum troubles could mean loss of healthy teeth




Dentists say that if teeth are not cleaned properly a thin layer of bacteria called plaque, which forms around your teeth and gums, starts accumulating. This leads to tartar which weakens and pushes away gums causing even healthy teeth to fall out. Gum troubles can also harm health in general.

## Forhan's protection for the gums




Dr. Forhan's exclusive formula with its special astringent strengthens gums to help you resist gum troubles. So brush your teeth and massage your gums with Forhan's Toothpaste and Forhan's Double Action Toothbrush.



**Forhan's** For the gums

Regd. T.M. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Ltd.

267 (-203)



*You've got what you wanted*

## The new CP 32A ROCK DRILL

with all the improvements which  
construction engineers have been  
asking for in rock drills.

- ☐ Better sustained performance
  - ☐ Higher penetration rates
  - ☐ Extra durability
  - ☐ Low maintenance costs
  - ☐ Low air consumption
- It has the fine unbeatable features for which CP is famous

Other project-proved products from CP's expanding range

Hand Drills, Feedlegs, Pumps, Concrete Vibrators, Tampers, Coal Drills

Drills, Grinders, Sanders, Chippers, Riveters, Impact Wrenches, Rammers Plus a wide range of air compressors



## CONSOLIDATED PNEUMATIC TOOL CO. (INDIA) LTD.

301/302, L B S Marg, Mulund, Bombay 400 080

Branches Bangalore, Calcutta, Delhi, Goa, Madras, Jamshedpur

® Authorised Stockists and Dealers Raipur, Secunderabad

GJA 458

## EVEREST

- A.C. SEMI-CORRUGATED AND CORRUGATED ROOFING SHEETS
  - For Pent roofs and Lean-to roofs
- A.C. CORRUGATED CURVED SHEETS
  - Self supporting Roofing Sheets
- A.C. PLIBESTOS FLAT SHEETS
  - Ideal for false ceilings, internal partitions, cupboards etc.
- A.C. WATER TANKS
  - Non-corrosive, hygienic
  - Require no maintenance
  - Can be easily connected to the house water supply.
- A.C. SEPTIC TANKS
  - For 10 to 20 Users.

## ASBESTOS CEMENT LIMITED

(A Member of the TURNER & NEWALL Group)

"Ashok Bhawan",

63, Nehru Place, NEW DELHI-110 019

*Sales Offices at,*


Block 'D' Shriyagar Estate,  
Dr. Annie Besant Road,  
Worli,  
BOMBAY-400018

Everest House,  
948, Napier Town,  
JABALPUR-482001

Everest House,  
Garden Reach,  
Taratolla Road,  
CALCUTTA-700024

Podanur, P O,  
COIMBATORE-641023

Show them that  
the sun can rise  
in the west  
as well.



They need a miracle. You.


Some have never seen a sunrise.  
Others have never heard the birds chirp.  
Some have to write with their feet  
Others must learn to walk  
with their hands.  
And for some, the mind is a thing  
that never was.

Who cares?  
We should.



TEXTILES, SUGAR,  
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS,  
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,  
VINASPATI, PVC, RAYON TYRE CORD,  
FERTILIZERS,  
ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS,  
IRON CASTINGS.

IN THE  
SERVICE OF  
THE NATION



**DCM** THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD., DELHI

# FORHAN'S—the toothpaste created by a dentist



**helps strengthen your gums  
while it cleans your teeth**

## Gum troubles could mean loss of healthy teeth




Dentists say that if teeth are not cleaned properly a thin layer of bacteria called plaque, which forms around your teeth and gums, starts accumulating. This leads to tartar which weakens and pushes away gums causing even healthy teeth to fall out. Gum troubles can also harm health in general.

## Forhan's protection for the gums



Dr Forhan's exclusive formula with its special astringent strengthens gums to help you resist gum troubles. So brush your teeth and massage your gums with Forhan's Toothpaste and Forhan's Double Action Toothbrush.



**Forhan's** For the gums

Regd T M Geoffrey Manners & Co Ltd

Economic prosperity is the harbour light that beckons us. We try to reach it by developing technological expertise and manufacturing skill in every field of engineering.

We launched on this activity way back in 1938 and emerged as pioneers in manufacturing dairy equipment in India. Today, we design, manufacture and instal plant and equipment for every major national project covering vital human needs like food, chemicals, petrochemicals, fertiliser, cement, steel, paper, nuclear, power ..


We have even extended the limits of our capabilities to cover space technology in order to support the nation's plans to establish effective satellite communication systems. Right now, we are embarking on a totally different activity—cement manufacture.

Our efforts keep us moving towards a definite harbour—economic prosperity through technological development. All 10,000 of us in the L&T Group are prompted by the same sense of direction. And our capabilities are enriched by the experience and know-how of our collaborators—world renowned manufacturers in every field of engineering.




**LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED**  
where technology moves with time  
P.O. Box 278, Bombay 400 038

*When a man does not know what harbour  
he is making for, no wind is right* —Seneca





Show them that  
the sun can rise  
in the west  
as well.



They need a miracle. You.

Some have never seen a sunrise.  
Others have never heard the birds chirp.  
Some have to write with their feet.  
Others must learn to walk  
with their hands.  
And for some, the mind is a thing  
that never was.

Who cares?  
We should.



**REACH OUT  
WITH LOVE**




**Grindlays  
Bank  
Limited**

Incorporated in the United Kingdom  
The liability of members is limited


TEXTILES, SUGAR,  
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS,  
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,  
NASPATI, PVC, RAYON TYRE CORD,  
FERTILIZERS,  
ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS,  
IRON CASTINGS.

**IN THE  
SERVICE OF  
THE NATION**



**THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD., DELHI**





## Why people trust Godrej more than any other refrigerator.

In the Godrej tradition of fine quality, only the Godrej refrigerator has solid steel vitreous enamelled inner walls.

They do not scratch, chip or crack like plastic walls do. And they're more hygienic.

Plus other features yet unmatched:

- A full depth vegetable tray.
- Two extra wide, extra deep shelves—more storage space, more space between shelves.
- Withstands voltage fluctuations over a wider range.
- Largest freezer in its size.
- The first with automatic defrosting.
- Efficient after sales service at your doorstep.

Great things come from *Godrej*

GB 3072

It was a philosophy  
...before it became  
a Tata Trust...



Many years ago, Jamsetji Tata conceived of philanthropy as a nation-building activity, to equip the most gifted to serve the Nation best.

Today, this philosophy finds fulfilment in the various Tata Trusts like the Sir Dorab Tata and Sir Ratan Tata Trusts and the J N Tata Endowment which provides the gifted and the talented, regardless of other considerations, with the facilities to develop their talents further.

Thus, a philosophy, which went beyond merely clothing the ragged and feeding the poor, is today providing a strong technical and intellectual base for national development.

**TATA ENTERPRISES**

FOR DURABLE  
AND  
ATTRACTIVE  
FABRICS  
TRY

**The Bombay Dying  
and  
Manufacturing Co. Ltd.**

**Money sounds beautiful  
...when  
Bank of India sets  
the rhythm.**



daCunha-BOI-42

# STEEL: design for progress

Steel spells progress and steel plants are vital to India's continued economic progress

DASTURCO has been closely involved since its inception in 1955, in the planning, design and engineering of steel and allied projects in India, for the Central and State Governments as well as the private sector

Pioneer of self-reliance in steel plant engineering in India, DASTURCO is in the forefront of new technologies


- direct reduction
- pelletizing
- electric arc steelmaking
- continuous casting
- OBM steelmaking
- vacuum degassing
- electro-slag remelting
- alloy and special steels
- superalloys etc.

DASTURCO is consultant to the Government of India for

- India's first coast-based steel plant at Visakhapatnam
- Special Steels Plant, Salem
- Alloy Steels Plant, Durgapur (expansion)
- CRGO/CRNO plant of Rourkela Steel Plant
- Superalloys Plant, Hyderabad
- Bokaro Steel Plant (expansion) etc

It is also consultant for India's first sponge iron plant, Kothagudem and for TISCO modernisation

As in India, DASTURCO is actively participating in steel development in the Arab countries, South-east Asia and Latin America. It is the principal consultant to the Misurata Iron and Steel Complex—the first large integrated steel plant in Libya. In Venezuela, it is providing engineering services for the expansion of the SIDOR steel plant at Matanzas, in specified plant areas. In Peru, it is consultant to SIDERPERU at Chimbote for its expansion. In South-east Asia, DASTURCO is assisting ASEAN member countries in planning their steel development strategies and programmes.




**DASTURCO**

*Total Engineering—  
Concept to Completion*

**M. N. DASTUR & CO (P) LTD**


CONSULTING ENGINEERS  
CALCUTTA

# PRODUCT QUALITY



Satyadev Chemicals are widely used in the processing of Colour and Black and white Motion Picture Films, and in the Textile, Jute, Leather and Chemical Manufacturing Industries. Also in the manufacture of Paints, Pharmaceuticals, Dyestuffs, Polymers.

Our customers include some of the world's leading manufacturing and trading concerns. The secret of this world-wide acceptance lies in our policy of product quality—the only sacred cow in our fast developing organisation.



**SATYADEV CHEMICALS LIMITED**



Pratapnagar Road, VADODARA, 390 004, India

KP 3846

# ESCORTS PROFESSIONALISM SUCCEEDS EVEN IN OTHER COMPANIES



**Manufacturing world-class automotive ancillaries which are fitted as original equipment in over 70% of Indian vehicles.**



Escorts' preoccupation with precision finds its best example in automotive ancillary products

That is why the components marketed by Escorts (MAHLE Pistons, GOETZE Rings & Cylinder Liners, ESCORTS Piston Pins, Shock Absorbers, Wheel Rims, etc.) are used as original equipment in over 70% of the vehicles made by India's automotive industry. These include leading names like TATA, Kirloskar, Bajaj, Premier Automobiles, Tempo, Hindustan Motors, Ashok Leyland, Ford, Mahindra & Mahindra, and Eicher.


Escorts is also planning for the future and is geared up to produce, for the first time in India, a range of large diameter pistons and rings for marine, industrial and locomotive applications. Also, a sophisticated range of ring carrier pistons and profile ground rings, etc. to meet the needs of India's rapidly advancing automotive technology.

HTD-ESC-4960-E

**Adapting advanced technology relevant to India's core needs.**

**ESCORTS LIMITED**

11 Scindia House, Connaught Circus, New Delhi 110 001



Escorts Automotive Shock Absorbers—the popular choice of leading original equipment manufacturers

Automotive Ancillaries • Tractors and Farm Equipment • Motorcycles • Industrial and Construction Equipment • Railway Ancillaries • Heating Elements

**BETTER COVERAGE AND A SOFTER FABRIC  
FEEL IS AN ASSURANCE FROM  
BARODA RAYON**

Baroda Rayon offers innumerable and very  
versatile varieties in  
Polyester Texturised, Polyester  
Nylon and Viscose Filament Yarns.

**S U P R E M O**

Supremo tangled Polyester Yarn. A better  
alternative to twisted yarn, comes in  
76/32 denier.

**S A N G A M**

Sangam yarn for shirtings — a unique blend  
of Nylon and Polyester tangled filament  
yarn in 120/34 denier.

Baroda Rayon,  
the House of Quality Yarns.

**The Baroda Rayon Corporation Limited**

Hoechst House, 193, Nariman Point,  
BOMBAY - 400 021.

Phone : 232030/230734

Telex : 011 3436/4719

Regd. Office : P. O. Baroda Rayon,  
Udhna, Dist. Surat 394 220

Telex : 0178 217

Phone : 88371.

# The Delhi Airport announces the timely arrival of The Centaur Hotel just 3 km away.



## Opening October '82

Please note its all-star amenities:

- 416 well-appointed Air-conditioned Rooms.
- An exclusive Restaurant and Bar.
- A 24-hour Coffee Shop.
- A trendy Disco.
- Swimming Pool
- Health Club.
- 24-hour courtesy transport service from Airport to hotel.
- 24-hour check out time.

For more details and advance reservations please contact.

Central Reservation System  
C/o Sales & Marketing Manager  
Hotel Corporation of India,  
The Centaur Hotel  
Bombay Airport,  
Bombay 400 099  
Tel 535431  
Cable HOCORIND



## THE CENTAUR HOTEL

Also opening soon  
Centaur Lakeview Hotel at Srinagar  
Centaur Hotel at Juhu Beach Bombay



# **Seminar**

**3 MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI-1**

al which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every  
of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single  
m is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions.  
ns expressed have ranged from janata to congress, from  
aya to communist to independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it has  
been possible to answer a real need of today, to gather  
the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people  
arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity in  
facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture

r/ROMESH THAPAR

managing editor/RAJ THAPAR

production/TEJBIR SINGH

circulation/C B. KUMAR


ed from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1. Telephone: 46534 Cable Address: Seminar New Delhi. Single copy: Rs. 4,  
nce; \$ 1 50 Yearly Rs 40, £ 7; \$ 16, Three yearly Rs 100 £ 20, \$ 40 Reproduction of material prohibited unless permitted

**EXT MONTH: NATIONAL SECURITY**


# Elegant looks



## Versatile features




Attractive Sleek Two-toned USHA Streamlined—the sewing machine that outclasses any other in its price range. With features that others can't match. And a 5-year guarantee too.




Patch Darning for easy darning and quick adjustment of pressure on cloth



3-position drop feed for easy adjustment of feed-dog position



Dial-type stitch regulator with lever for forward and reverse stitch control and locking arrangement



Thread tension adjuster for regulating positive thread tension.

**USHA Streamlined** feature for feature a better machine

# 269

## INDIA 1981

a symposium  
on the  
year that was

**symposium participants**

### **TOWARDS INTERVENTION**

Rajni Kothari, Professor of Political Science, Delhi University

### **SOCIAL BASIS OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS**

D L. Sheth, Fellow, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi

### **THE HINDU PROBLEM**

Nirmal Mukarji, former Union Cabinet Secretary, now Professor, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

### **CONVERSIONS**

Dev Dutt, journalist and commentator

### **IMF LOAN AS A MIRROR**

Mrinal Datta-Chaudhuri, Professor, Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi

### **THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY**

Srikant Dutt, a young scholar who wrote this article for us just before his tragic death in an accident

### **WHITHER FOREIGN POLICY?**

Romesh Thapar, Editor, 'Seminar'

### **THE STATE OF THE STATE**

Ashis Nandy, Fellow, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi

### **MISUSE OF MEDIA**

Iqbal Malik, former Deputy Director General of Doordarshan

### **SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN IDEOLOGY**

P.R.K. Rao, K.S. Gandhi, R.S. Misra and P.N. Kaul, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur

### **IN THE AREA OF ENVIRONMENT**

Sri Madhav Ashish, lives in the Kumaon Hills in charge of the ashram founded by Krishna Prem

### **THE DEMANDS OF OUR ERA**

D.C. Home, journalist and novelist, both in English and Bengali

### **INDEX**

A complete index of the twelve issues of 1981 and Seminar's titles from one to two hundred and sixty nine

### **COVER**

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury Associates

# RALLIS INDIA LIMITED

(A GOVERNMENT RECOGNISED EXPORT HOUSE)

Established Exporters of Products of Reputable Quality

*Address :* Ralli House  
21 D S Marg  
Fort  
BOMBAY-400 001

*Exporters :* Textiles including Made-ups, Garments,  
Marine Products, Engineering Goods  
including Fans and Portable Electrical  
Tools, Pharmaceuticals, Finished Leather  
and Leather Goods

*Telephone :* 26 82 21  
*Telegram :* RALLI  
*Telex Nos. :* 011-2357 RALLI  
011-4355 MDRIL

This may well lead to a war psychosis

The political response to this situation of a repressive State structure that is, however, unable to hold and hence resorts to external stimuli and to a strategy of dividing and isolating various movements will need to take all this into account. It will call for a decisive intervention in the form of a large spectrum of actions, based on a counter-strategy which, while recognizing the complexity of the social mosaic, is able to forge a common front against the emerging fascist State and for a workable and durable alternative to it.

The politics of building such a front will have to be composed of a number of strategic dimensions, based on a corresponding set of understandings of both the overall reality that we face and its main specifications at this point in our history.

There is first the dimension of fighting the growing oppression and vandalism of the present system, and with these its deceitful character provided by the politics of populism. The various micro movements operating among the poor and the oppressed that have been growing all over the country provide the basis for this.

However, they suffer from two serious handicaps. First, they are highly localised and fragmented, permitting the system to deal with them either by isolating and marginalising them if they happen to remain strident and uncompromising in their orientation to struggle, or by coopting them through the seemingly just and egalitarian postures of official policy. Second, they have to contend with the populist politics of the ruling party whose greatest asset still is the 'saviour' and 'benefactor' image of Mrs. Gandhi who at the same time also inspires a strange mixture of awe and fear among large sections of the rural masses.

It will be necessary to build and project alternative organisational identities and platforms among the *dalits*, the tribals, the minorities and the lower castes and wherever

possible forge common fronts across those segments that have so far been forced to remain isolated. Neither will be easy — building alternative political platforms among these various strata and forging common fronts across them — especially under the impact of the fire power of the police and *mafia* elements that constitute the new infra-structure of the ruling party. But it will have to be done, for without that the diabolic challenge of populist politics will not be met.

The second major dimension is one of decentralization. It is necessary to understand that the reason behind the present erosion of institutions and the general decline of the Indian State, including the decline of central authority and the rise of power of State satraps and the *mafia* structures that support them, is the decline of democratic and federal structures of the polity. It is necessary to restructure the polity along an even more decentralized basis than before, given the considerable awakening and turmoil among the people and the need to satisfy their urges and demands.

However, the concept of decentralization has to be freshly conceived. It cannot any longer be put either in terms of delegation of power and resources from the centre through legislative or constitutional means (for moving towards, for instance, a three-tier federal polity) nor in terms mainly of politico-administrative arrangements leaving economic and technological issues as derivative of a decentralized State apparatus. It will rather have to be conceived in terms of movements from below, a process of decentralization to be initiated by the people themselves, taking advantage of a tottering State structure.

This will entail joining forces with those demanding greater State autonomy and a more self-reliant and sustainable techno-economy for the so-called 'backward' regions.<sup>3</sup>

3 I should like to stress that not all such movements are for real autonomy. One must distinguish between, for instance, the demand for Khalistan which is basically a demand for a rich and pros-

perous community to have it alone and the regional aspirations of Assam, the North-east, Kashmir and Tamilnadu as well as the demands for greater autonomy by the large number of tribal and 'backward' areas which will continue to be exploited until they have autonomy in their own homeland. The former type is indefensible, the latter type fully defensible.

There is, third, the imperial dimension whose concrete manifestation is to be found in the corrosive urban metropolitan structures within India, maintained by and dependent on the larger metropolises abroad, and in turn making the rural areas a colonial hinterland, ravaging the forests and the resource base of the people and turning land over to produce for urban consumption and export, in the process recolonising the whole country and making it a dependency.

It is still a moot question whether the various Kisan movements can rise above their immediate economic interests and be guided by this larger perspective of arresting the debilitating consequences of modernization which has strengthened the narrow urban-based, English educated, *babu* class with its corrosive lifestyle and servile values.


It is also not clear how far a common front can be forged between the leaders of these movements and the radical groups working among the lower peasantry, a front that sorts out both the immediate and the ultimate conflicts of interest within the peasant community and is able to see the common enemy in the existing Indian State and challenge it.

There is some evidence to suggest that such a political process of forging a common front by transcending immediate interests is under way in some regions, both in the south and in the north, but it is too early to say how effectively the conflicts will be resolved, especially in the face of the highly oppressive behaviour of the State apparatus against the landless and the lower castes in

perous community to have it alone and the regional aspirations of Assam, the North-east, Kashmir and Tamilnadu as well as the demands for greater autonomy by the large number of tribal and 'backward' areas which will continue to be exploited until they have autonomy in their own homeland. The former type is indefensible, the latter type fully defensible.

Blending products,  
processes and technology  
with people,  
their needs, and the  
environment at GKW,  
these are the priorities that  
define our purpose.

Our range of  
products have evolved out  
of these needs,  
and today constitute vital  
intermediates, integral to  
almost every area  
of industry and life. In  
India, and even overseas.



**Our speciality:  
fusing technology  
with needs**



GUEST KEEN WILLIAMS LTD  
**The Engineers' Engineers**

SAA/GKW/14

the rural areas, often in league with and frequently at the initiative of local landlords

It is also not clear how the class-based militancy of the radical groups working among the landless and the *dalits*, for instance, will be able to veer round to such a strategy, putting aside the suspicions and distrust that have been there for so long. And yet it seems that this may turn out to be an historically necessary common front, to work at in dealing with the decidedly neocolonial character of the Indian State

Finally, there is the dimension of stopping this country from becoming a prey to the process of global militarization and a victim of the chauvinistic urges of its own elite, insecure and unsure of itself at home and looking for a way out externally. There is need to gather together the dispersed feeling against our getting embroiled in a war and even more against building up a national scare around the theme of the 'nation in danger'.

Ironically, as with the case of a centralized polity leading to its own undermining, the very proponents of a militarily strong and self-reliant State are making this country dependent on overseas deals and rather unexplainable collaborations of all kinds as, for instance, with the French (The same is the case with those who want to obtain for this country abundant energy in the form of nuclear breeder reactors and other hazardous technologies)

Again, the issue needs to be understood at both levels. At the level of the people it is clear that the more militarily mighty the country becomes, the more beneficial it will be to the rich and the more corrosive it will be of the resource base and living standards of the poor

At the level of the country as a whole, it involves becoming part of the global military structure, on the one hand dominated by military R&D on which we have no control and which lives on built-in obsolescence which means continuous dependence for us, and on the other hand forcing us economically to go for more and more indebtedness and

a pattern of trade flows that will make us a colonial economy once again. The process has already begun

All this has to be resisted through building up a powerful anti-war movement in the country. An 'anti-war movement' does not refer to any specific war but simply to preparations of going to war. It will entail a struggle against the dangerous doctrine of supporting the government and especially Mrs Gandhi because national security is supposedly in danger. And it will entail joining forces with similar movements against militarism and war preparedness in the neighbouring countries, Pakistan for instance, and strengthening the culture of resistance to authoritarianism, there as well as here

The point is to join these various movements along all these dimensions — the grassroot struggles against oppression and the fascist State order, the movements for local autonomy and decentralization, the anti-imperial movement within India based on the new rural awakening and aimed against the dominance of and ravaging by urban metropolitan centres, including the movements of ecological components, and the movement against war and militarism, here as well as elsewhere. Together, they will provide the basis for a comprehensive intervention in India's historical process, lay the foundations of an alternative polity as well as an alternative paradigm of development, and *on that basis, for it can be on that basis only*, provide a framework for a truly democratic Indian State

Various action groups are involved in such a joining of forces. These range from the large spectrum of social and political activists operating close to the people, to the band of journalists, jurists and intellectuals committed to democratic values, to the relevant political groups willing to support the combination of strategies laid out above. The overall strategy of intervention involves them all. It is a strategy of a common front — from the village base to the national capital

Attention Steel Mills  
Foundries  
Exporters of World Famous Sandur Manganese ore  
Offer  
Ex-stock  
Very Low Phos. Pig Iron  
and  
Low Aluminium Ferrosilicon  
Produced in Their Plant at Vyasanakere

*Please Contact :*

# **The Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Limited**

**"Ohadri Bhavan"**  
**Yeshwantnagar-583 124**  
**Via Sandur, Bellary Dt.**  
**Karnataka**  
**INDIA**

Cable : Smiore, Yeshwantnagar

Telephone : Sandur	33
Bangalore	28262
Delhi	42758
Calcutta	: 435010
Bombay	365085
Goa	: 2849
Nagpur	: 22062

Telex .	
Bangalore	0845-427
Delhi	031-3709
Calcutta	021-7875
Bombay	: 011-5787
Goa	0191-278
Nagpur	0715-330



to be widely accepted as justification for the mandate to rule. This is because a complete dissociation has occurred between the electoral process that produces the mandate and the governmental process that is subject to pressures and interests which transcend the mandate.

These pressures are rooted in the established and continuing macrostructures of political and economic dominance (comprising the national political elite, the bureaucracy, the technocracy and big-business) which have made the State their instrument. But these macrostructures are not regarded as sacrosanct by the people, for they are seen to have lost the capacity even partially to process the mandate. Hence, the political authority has been finding it increasingly difficult to gain legitimacy from the people.

The weakening of the legitimization process began in the late sixties and has continued unabated since.<sup>4</sup> The starting point was the 1967 elections when governmental performance became, for the first time, a live issue in Indian politics. Since then, acts of omission and commission by the government have been seen by the people as directly those of the 'party in power' rather than of an anonymous entity called the government.

In the public mind as well as among the politicians, the identification of the government with the party in power grew stronger in the early seventies when the ruling party began increasingly to rely on populist slogans as a means of securing legitimization for its rule. It was the failure of the ruling party especially on the economic front, soon after it came to power in 1971 with a massive electoral majority, which

4 'Legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a political order's claim to be recognized as right and just'. In this sense, Habermas further elaborates 'legitimacy is a contestable validity claim, and legitimization is a process in which one side denies and the other asserts legitimacy'. This is how legitimization becomes a permanent problem for a political order (Habermas, *op cit.*, pp 178-179). We speak of the weakening of legitimization process when the situation arises in which the supply of legitimization to the political authority becomes more and more scarce and it can no longer take its claim to legitimacy for granted.

pushed it increasingly towards assuming a populist stance.

The legitimization losses incurred on account of the failure to perform in the economic sector were thus sought to be made good by the use of populism in the political arena.<sup>5</sup> This eventually turned out to be a short-sighted strategy for the system, if not temporarily for the ruling party itself. For, substituting populism for performance results in laying bare the face of the socio-economic groups which wield power in the macrostructure, the face that otherwise remains concealed behind the anonymity of the 'government' and keeps the issues of legitimization away from the wider public and within the confines of the political-bureaucratic arena.<sup>6</sup> But, as soon as the issues of success and failure become alive in the wider public realm, legitimization must be secured on a new plane, i.e., through the substantive democratic processes and not merely through the forms.

5 The persistent failure to solve economic problems severely exposes the political authority's claim to legitimacy. When the ruling elites realize that the economic problems cannot be solved without endangering their own established interests, the legitimacy ploy they resort to is the politicization of economic issues. They then take recourse to radical rhetoric in order to hide their incapability — in fact unwillingness — to take drastic administrative and economic measures which might harm the established interests.

6 Since the domain of application of the legitimization process, as Habermas rightly holds, is the political order, the supply of legitimization to the political authority has to come from two levels of the polity: from the political-bureaucratic-economic elites and from the wider public. Legitimation problems arise when the political authority's claim to legitimacy is disputed at one of the two or at both the levels. The legitimization problem assumes the proportion of a crisis when the political authority is compelled to secure legitimization from both the arenas and yet its grounds for securing legitimization do not hold good simultaneously for both the arenas: the elites and the masses.

7. This is a crucial point at which the supply of legitimization to the political authority from the elite circles ceases to be adequate to justify its claim to legitimacy. At this point, the legitimization problem often assumes the proportion of a crisis, for the simple reason that legitimization now needs to be sought simultaneously from among the elite circles as well as from the wider public. In so far as the political authority fails to respond to this new situation and does not change its grounds

and procedures within the political-bureaucratic arena. The 'buffer' disappears!<sup>7</sup>


The legitimization problems of the political authority are, thus, simpler when the structural differentiation of the economy and the political awareness of the public are at relatively a low level. This was, broadly, the situation till the mid sixties. The legitimization strategies of the political authority in this phase were to keep the economy and the wider public realm structurally separate, so that the contest for legitimacy remained confined, by and large, to this political elite. In this phase, elections served as instruments of inter-elite competition or, at best, as political education of the masses. But, at no event did they become vital means of settling the validity claims of the political authority itself.

It was in the second phase, in the late sixties and the early seventies that, with the increased political awareness and economic differentiation, the structural separation between the political-bureaucratic arena and the public realm broke down. The issue of legitimization now began to be widely contested in both the arenas. The political authority faced a new type of legitimization problem for which popular appeals to the electorate acquired great importance. In this sense, the 1971 mid-term poll represented the ruling elite's attempt to introduce new themes and break new ground for seeking legitimacy. In this it achieved success.

But this success, secured on the promise of removal of poverty, was interpreted by the ruling elite as no more than an endorsement by the

for securing new legitimations the normal legitimization process comes to naught. It is then either overtaken by the *ad hoc* power groups that manipulate political power rather than seeking loyalty of the people, or by the political-bureaucratic elites that attempt to make good the legitimization losses by progressively relying upon the use of the coercive mechanisms of the state which they still control. A third possibility but which is nowhere in sight today is that a popular revolutionary movement that has been latently countering the validity claims of the established political authority comes to the fore and secures legitimization, and consequently political power, for itself.

# PRODUCT QUALITY



Satyadev Chemicals are widely used in the processing of Colour and Black and white Motion Picture Films, and in the Textile, Jute, Leather and Chemical Manufacturing Industries. Also in the manufacture of Paints, Pharmaceuticals, Dyestuffs, Polymers

Our customers include some of the world's leading manufacturing and trading concerns. The secret of this world-wide acceptance lies in our policy of product quality—the only sacred cow in our fast developing organisation.



**SATYADEV CHEMICALS LIMITED**

Pratapnagar Road, VADODARA, 390 004, India

KP 3846

people in favour of the continuation of their rule. Consequently, the grip of the macro-structures over the governmental process was re-established as before. The actions of the government, therefore, now began to be seen by all concerned not as dispensations of a just and fair political authority, but as advancement of a specific *power-group*. As such, they were accepted, resisted or confronted, depending on what sources of power were available to the counter-groups.

This marked the third, the present phase, which began with the Emergency and has been deepened by two successive elections. The Emergency represented the ruling elite's desperate bid to put down the counter-validity claims of the Opposition by the use of force when its own legitimacy was seriously questioned in the public realm. Two successive elections exposed the incapacity as well as the unwillingness of the *entire* political elite to counter the power of the macro-structures in processing the electoral mandates through public policies.

**T**his created a situation in which the legitimacy claims of the political authority ceased to remain confined to the elite circles in the society. They now needed to be validated in the wider public realm. The outcome of elections had bearing on the process of government functioning and policy-making and the legitimacy claims began to be contested outside the electoral and legislative framework. *It is this, in my view*, that is the defining feature of the present crisis. Its poignancy is indicated by the fact that while in all the three elections during the seventies, one or the other political party received *massive* majorities, none succeeded in restoring legitimacy to the political authority. Elections have thus been rendered ineffectual for performing their basic function, viz., to settle validity claims of the political authority.

Although the nature of the legitimization problem has radically changed, the political authority continues to rely on manipulations of the power process rather than on building anew loyalties of the people through ensuring their

participation in the decision-making processes, at least at the local and intermediate levels of the polity. It relies more on its ability to manipulate casteist and communal sentiments in the name of a pro-poor stance rather than on improving performance on the economic front and restricting the opulent life-styles of the rich. There is no pro-poor programme, there are only pro-poor slogans.

In brief, the political authority refuses to recognize the bottlenecks in the social structure, bottlenecks which transform policies for the uplift of the poor into instruments serving the entrenched interests of the urban and new rural elite. The bottlenecks simply do not allow any benefits to percolate down to the poor.

**E**ven when the ruling elite is concerned about legitimization of the regime in power, it tends to treat the problem not in terms of aiding the process of transformation of the social structure, forces of which are already surging at the ground level, but as a problem of tightening up the law and order situation, of mounting rescue operations through securing foreign investments and international loans. The farthest it is prepared to go is to improve administrative efficiency and managerial skills.

The result is an ever widening gap between the middle classes and the vast majorities of the 'poor', which now divides them not only economically and socially but also culturally, they are no longer bound by a common meaning system or norms in public life. The political authority's grounds for securing new legitimacy, therefore, no longer hold good simultaneously for both the elite and the masses.

In order to understand the nature of the present crisis in a deeper way it is useful to look back and reconstruct the state of non-crisis that was enjoyed by the Indian political system for a relatively long stretch of time, longer than it could have normally been permitted by the objective forces of change in the society. This exercise will also illustrate the role of a deliberative political leader-

ship in forestalling or altogether avoiding crisis situations and thereby negating the pre-determination embedded in the theory of class-polarisation.

## II

### Legitimacy of the Congress System

Historically, what I call the state of non-crisis in the Indian polity can be identified as the period of the Congress system. As I have clarified at the beginning of this essay, the absence of crisis does not mean that problems, even legitimization problems, do not exist in the system. What is meant is that whatever problems exist appear to be solvable or they at least lend themselves to postponement within the overall framework of the system.

In this sense, the Congress system could successfully handle problems because it kept the public realm structurally separated from the bureaucratic and legislative process and maintained, in the former, a low level of politicization. This gave the political authority an autonomy in making administrative and legislative decisions which could not be directly affected by the demands in the public realm. The public realm, thanks to its low level of politicization, offered a diffused loyalty to the political authority and thus ensured its legitimacy.

Of course, a divergence of interests did take place in the public realm, but the consciousness of such divergence among different groups was quite low. Under the Congress system, interests were believed to be generalizable for the purposes of State action. And, insofar as the decision-making processes within the legislative-bureaucratic arena followed the procedures and forms sanctioned by the objectified democratic norms, the administrative and legislative autonomy of the regime was not disturbed. The plea of protecting this autonomy in 'public interest' was conceded both in the Parliament and outside it in the public realm whenever the issue of public accountability of governmental actions was raised. In this sense, the Congress system, although ridden with problems, did not face

**BETTER COVERAGE AND A SOFTER FABRIC  
FEEL IS AN ASSURANCE FROM  
BARODA RAYON**

Baroda Rayon offers innumerable and very  
versatile varieties in  
Polyester Texturised, Polyester  
Nylon and Viscose Filament Yarns.

**S U P R E M O**

Supremo tangled Polyester Yarn. A better  
alternative to twisted yarn, comes in  
76/32 denier.

**S A N G A M**

Sangam yarn for shirtings — a unique blend  
of Nylon and Polyester tangled filament  
yarn in 120/34 denier.

Baroda Rayon,  
the House of Quality Yarns.

**The Baroda Rayon Corporation Limited**

Hoechst House, 193, Nariman Point,  
BOMBAY - 400 021.

Phone : 232030/230734

Telex : 011 3436/4719

Regd. Office : P. O. Baroda Rayon,  
Udhna, Dist. Surat 394 220

Telex : 0178 217

Phone : 88371.

tractors, there is very little debate about the consequences of maintaining this system. In fact, the government recently turned down the offer of a soft IDA loan to the cement industry in order to maintain its current method of cement distribution.

Finally, of course, there are the costs of buying those strike aircrafts, tanks and submarines. Since the midseventies, when our foreign exchange reserves attained a comfortable position, successive governments have been using this foreign purchasing power to satisfy the demands of our military establishment. Now, after the conclusion of the US-Pakistan arms deal, our purchase of military hardware will no doubt increase.

Apart from the rise in the price of oil, these are the reasons why India started sending distress signals to the international financial agencies. Was it avoidable? Can the Bihar and the West Bengal State Electricity Boards be made to perform better? Can the steel industry produce more? Could the Assam agitation be resolved or at least be prevented from imposing such economic damage? Could the farmers' lobby be tamed? Could one have a growing cement industry? And, finally, could we do with fewer tanks, fewer strike aircrafts and fewer submarines?

What are likely to be the main economic consequences of obtaining the IMF loan? It is inconceivable that any government in the world can get a loan of this magnitude from the IMF without giving a promise of pursuing a deflationary economic policy. Given the rigidities of the various categories of government expenditures and given the strengths of the different lobbies, it is not difficult to guess where the axe will fall. It is the same everywhere in the world. The various welfare programmes (e.g., food-for-work, subsidies on foodgrains distribution etc.), the grants to education and social services will certainly get severe cuts in the future.

Given the economic philosophy which guides the activities of the Fund, it is also fairly easy to guess

that there must have been a promise on the liberalisation of economic policies. But in India's case it is unlikely to be anything of great significance, because the aim of such reforms is to make the functioning of private enterprise easier. But the Indian industrialists do not want a freer foreign trade regime. Some of them might prefer the removal of some of the industrial licensing procedures, but the government is anyway gradually moving in that direction.

The IMF must have given a close examination to the exchange rate. But in these days of floating rates, exchange rate revisions are never anything dramatic. In recent months the French franc and the British pound have fallen considerably, relative to the US dollar. The Reserve Bank of India is constantly altering the position of the rupee vis-a-vis the major currencies. Whatever might have been agreed upon, it is unlikely that the value of the rupee will be altered to the extent of restoring the parity that existed with respect to the pound a year ago.

In short, the economic reforms, which are consistent with the guiding principles adhered to by the IMF, would be of the kind that (a) reduce domestic demand by restricting the flow of purchasing power through the marginal State supported programmes and (b) seek to improve private profitability for domestic producers and exporters. Whatever preferences one may have about trade regimes, no serious analyst can argue that in the short or even the intermediate run, Indian exports can go up substantially in response to price incentives, particularly in today's depressed world market. The problem is one of generating operational flexibility, quality consciousness, marketing skill, and the organizational linkages which tie domestic producers to the larger international market.

The environment in which the industries in India function is quite different from what is needed for that kind of development. Incentives through exchange rate revisions and the removal of certain kinds of barriers cannot do much now or in

the near future. Therefore, the net effect of this kind of conservative fiscal reform will fall on the domestic programmes which provide jobs to the rural poor and consumption subsidies to the various categories of people.

There is one area where the impact of the IMF loan will be clear-cut. The relatively easy credit facilities will lower the cost of the ONGC projects in the field of developing new oil fields.

We have outlined briefly the reasons why India went in for distress borrowing abroad this year as well as the principal economic consequences of obtaining such a loan from the IMF. Now let us see what emerged as the main debating points in the heated political controversy which developed in this context.

I think it is fair to say that the political controversy in the country over the IMF loan has largely centred on the questions of sovereignty and national honour. It has aroused a great deal of anger against the IMF as an instrument of domination employed by neo-imperialist forces in the world. There has been hardly any discussion about the management of the infrastructure, the procurement of foodgrains or the desirability of arms purchase. Nor has there been any analysis of the distributional or the developmental consequences of the reform measures which are consistent with the traditional conditionalities associated with the IMF lending operations.

Of course, the subject of the framework in which the International Monetary Fund operates is a fascinating one. At the time of the setting up of the IMF, there was a controversy over the alternative proposals submitted by Keynes and the US Treasury. It is well known that Keynes' proposal was rejected in favour of the more conservative doctrines of fiscal and monetary management. I would argue that it was bad economics which won and would like to see more enlightened economics informing the operations of the IMF. But it is important to underscore the principle that institutions, whether

# **Seminar**

3 MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI-1

al which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every  
of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single  
m is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions.  
ns expressed have ranged from janata to congress, from  
aya to communist to independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it has  
been possible to answer a real need of today, to gather  
the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people  
arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity in  
facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture

r/ROMESH THAPAR

managing editor/RAJ THAPAR

production/TEJBIR SINGH

circulation/C B. KUMAR

ed from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1 Telephone 46534 Cable Address: Seminar New Delhi Single copy Rs. 4,  
nce; \$ 1 50 Yearly Rs 40, £ 7; \$ 16, Three yearly Rs 100 £ 20, \$ 40 Reproduction of material prohibited unless permitted

## **EXT MONTH: NATIONAL SECURITY**

national or international, must continue to follow the guidelines on the basis of which they were established until such time as these principles are revised

Secondly, India did not get this year, by all accounts, the kind of harsh treatment which the U K, Italy or Turkey got when they sought loans from the IMF. The reasons are obvious. In spite of massive poverty and stagnation, the Indian economy is generally regarded to be eminently credit-worthy according to the limited standards used by conservative bankers anywhere in the world. There are no fundamental problems afflicting the country's balance of payments and India's record in loan-repayment is excellent. Moreover, unlike the U K or Italy on earlier occasions, India did not approach the Fund for assistance at the last stage of a crisis. India went there when she still had a great deal of room for manoeuvre.

**O**n the question of autonomy, it is important to recognize that any act of borrowing involves restrictions on the borrower's degrees of freedom in certain spheres and added opportunities in other spheres. To the extent that a borrower has to take as given the behaviour of the different kinds of lenders, the essential question to which he should address himself is what is an acceptable trade-off so far as he is concerned. One can illustrate this point by drawing a stylised picture of the present-day international credit market in order to pose the choice problem facing a borrowing country.

Assume that the only source of loanable funds are the oil-rich countries of West Asia. Funds are channelled either through the private banking institutions or through the IMF or else they can be lent directly from the source. The costs attached to each of these options vary along different lines. Private banks will charge 18 to 20 per cent interest on loans and bear the various risks associated with them. The IMF will charge 8 to 10 per cent interest on conditions which it perceives to be important for ensuring the borrower's ability to

repay. Alternatively, one may imagine that the country can obtain the loan directly from the source free of interest on condition, say, that it agrees to introduce interest-free banking in the country or *chadai* for its women. Finally, of course, there is the option of tightening one's belt and doing without the loan. Is there a clear *a priori* answer to the choice problem facing the borrower?

**S**o far we have discussed the problem in terms of the causes and consequences which are primarily economic in nature. It is useful to do this, because it helps us to identify the different variables pertinent to the problem. But, as every one knows, the decision to seek the loan and the decision of the important member-governments constituting the executive board of the IMF to grant the loan application, have had powerful political motivations behind them.

The Government of India asked for the loan this year, because it did not want to face the problem of possibly alienating the powerful interest groups in the country, should the worsening economic situation demand a restructuring of its priorities and a tightening of its economic and political management. In the IMF board, the powerful West European countries did not want to see a decline in India's foreign purchasing power because that might hurt the armament industries in their own countries, which are hoping to fill up their order-books from the Indian shopping list. The Americans had nothing to gain from India's shopping for military hardware, but they did not want to hurt the interests of their European allies. Hence, they made a long speech on the hard-nosed economic philosophy of their President and abstained.

These seem to be the essential elements constituting the drama of India's seeking and receiving the largest single loan ever given by the International Monetary Fund. Who are the gamers and who are the losers? There has been a debate in the country on this. Is it possible to sort out the participants according to who was for what in this debate?

# 269

## INDIA 1981

a symposium  
on the  
year that was

symposium participants

### TOWARDS INTERVENTION

Rajni Kothari, Professor of Political  
Science, Delhi University

### SOCIAL BASIS OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS

D.L. Sheth, Fellow, Centre for the  
Study of Developing Societies, Delhi

### THE HINDU PROBLEM

Nirmal Mukarji, former Union Cabinet Secretary,  
now Professor, Centre for Policy Research,  
New Delhi

### CONVERSIONS

Dev Dutt, journalist and commentator

### IMF LOAN AS A MIRROR

Mrinal Datta-Chaudhuri, Professor, Delhi  
School of Economics, University of Delhi

### THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Srikant Dutt, a young scholar who  
wrote this article for us just before his tragic  
death in an accident

### WHITHER FOREIGN POLICY?

Romesh Thapar, Editor, 'Seminar'

### THE STATE OF THE STATE

Ashis Nandy, Fellow, Centre for the  
Study of Developing Societies, Delhi

### MISUSE OF MEDIA

Iqbal Malik, former Deputy Director General of  
Doordarshan

### SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN IDEOLOGY

P.R.K. Rao, K.S. Gandhi, R.S. Misra and P.N. Kaul,  
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur

### IN THE AREA OF ENVIRONMENT

Sri Madhav Ashish, lives in the Kumaon Hills  
in charge of the ashram founded by Krishna Prem

### THE DEMANDS OF OUR ERA

D.C. Home, journalist and novelist, both  
in English and Bengali

### INDEX

A complete index of the twelve issues of 1981  
and Seminar's titles from one to two hundred  
and sixty nine

### COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury Associates



sophisticated radars and bombs. One major reason for the failure of India's efforts to develop its own models of sophisticated arms has been that the over-all level of the industrial economy has simply not been up to the level needed despite all efforts at upgrading.

This factor also affects arms produced under license in India as well. This fact is notwithstanding India's huge technically trained manpower pool. India, despite some research and development expenditures, remains relatively backward in a large number of high technology fields, some of which are indispensable to modern weapons systems. Thus, India is simply unable to produce many of the materials of a high enough standard to be used. For example, even after the setting up of Mishra Dhatu Nigam, India is still lacking in many of the special alloys which high speed aircraft airframes need. Electronics is another field which remains behind.

It is, thus, debatable whether short of more all round industrial growth, a poor country like India, despite all its efforts, can really produce high quality, high technology items on a mass scale for defence, even with the skilled manpower available. Any examination of the history of a number of defence units' projects such as HAL's Marut Fighter or the Main Battle Tank project at Avadi should convince many of this fact.

There are also more organizational reasons for India's failure to become self-sufficient in sophisticated arms. Each defence service has its own research and development wing. This leads to confusion, overlap and a general lack of coordination in weapons development. Thus, the Air Force has its Directorate of Technical Development and Planning, and the Navy its Directorate of Operations and Research. At least in these two services there is only one organization in each, as a result, standards are not totally sub-standard. In the army, however, beneath the Directorate of Weapons each important unit within the army has its own separate research and development organization linked to its training school, where wea-

pons training-cum-research and testing goes on. Thus, the Armored corps has its own R & D as does Artillery and so on down the line.

Added to this picture is the fact that many defence production units maintain their own R & D units and confusion becomes legion. Even more deadly however are the conflicts between civilian scientists and defence personnel over pay and conditions in each organization which leads to low morale and poor quality of research. A recent example took place in the Army's Directorate of Inspection because of civilian employees' jealousy of army officers' perks. Scientists working in defence research are not allowed to take out their own personal patents and constant bickering and bureaucratic interference destroys many programmes. Scientists of quality generally migrate to the private sector leaving the dullards behind.

This brings us to square one in terms of India's defence needs. Domestic efforts having failed, India today still imports 90 per cent of its sophisticated defence support equipment from abroad, or at least 18 per cent of the total value of indigenous defence production. At the same time, it should be stressed that these imports are of high value but low volume, whereas the bulk of India's defence needs, high volume and low individual value and perhaps more mundane, are met totally from domestic sources.

Countries from which India currently imports defence equipment include Czechoslovakia, France, Britain, Soviet Union, Italy, Spain, Portugal, USA, Belgium and West Germany. Huge arms deals are currently being concluded with the Soviet Union and France for aircraft (Mirage 2000s and MIG-25s and MIG-27s).

One may ask the question — where does the money come from to import all this equipment if India already spends so much supporting its own defence industries? The defence services each year receive a blanket foreign exchange account with which to buy arms from abroad, a pragmatic response to the fact that the domestic defence industry

cannot meet all the country's needs. This of course generates its own vested interest to buy abroad, with the lucrative commissions involved. Yet, if one is looking for strong foreign arms lobbies in India one will have to look hard. With the exception of the French ambassador who is the major promoter of French arms sales to India, other countries are far less organized or at least have been so up to now. British Aerospace has an office in India but other countries generally depend on local Indian agencies which are often fly by night operators in for a big killing, rather than well organized groups. These Indian agents are almost all Delhi based and civil service or politically connected. They operate both as agents to clinch arms buying from abroad as well as promoters of India's own arms exports.

Here we enter the realm of the realities behind the current round of arms buying by India. India's existing defence industry and its success in the field of conventional arms is directly helping to underwrite the cost of importing sophisticated arms. In the field of military software and ammunition, India had earned after 1970 between 400 and 500 crores from exports. Countries to which such materials have been sold include Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Tanzania, USSR and Ethiopia. With the rise in tension in West Asia and East Africa over the last three years, India, according to some, has generated an additional 4,000 crores in arms exports, almost 1/10 the value of the entire defence budget in 1980-81. This money is being deliberately kept abroad in special accounts which are being used in turn to purchase sophisticated defence equipment which India needs.

The final answer then to the question set out at the outset, how effective has India's goal in defence self-sufficiency been, is twofold, a failure in most high technology fields while a success in all the basics. Unwittingly, however, this last success has created the conditions (through arms exports) with which to partially rectify the failure of the sophisticated side of India's defence industries.

# Towards intervention

RAJNI KOTHARI

WE seem to have run out of all options within the existing politico-economic framework. The politics of 'garibi hatao' raised expectations and released powerful forces from the bottom of the society at the same time as it exposed the inadequacy of an institutional framework that was fashioned in a period of incremental growth and slow diffusion of political consciousness. It also produced a political style that undermined the in-built thermostats provided by the Congress system and a functioning federal polity that *might* have enabled the system to respond to the new demands and mediate in the new conflicts that came to the surface.

The idea of moving from a wide spectrum consensual polity ordered through a factional interplay of diverse interests to a more cohesive governing team provided by a hand-picked secretariat and a 'radical' council of ministers didn't work either. Instead, it produced extraneous pressures that disturbed the fine balance of the Congress system.

The latter conception, catalysed by growing discontent and a more daring Opposition, of a disciplined democracy tailored to the needs of 'development' and of forcing acquiescence from the people on unpopular subjects proved disastrous both for

# Whither foreign policy?

ROMESH THAPAR

AS a supposedly non-aligned India flits from one international conference to another, the question does form: what is the policy being pursued, or the perspective that helps discipline it? National security could be a solid middle class answer, but even that is in doubt as we begin to surrender increasingly to the hysteria over armaments, nuclear and otherwise. Quietly forgotten is the disruption this wastage of resources causes, apart from the internal political pressures generated by the growth of military and para-military organisations during a phase of transition and confusion.

A certain clarity in relationships and inter-connections was developing during the Janata Party rulership despite the contrary pulls inherent in an artificial coalition. It was becoming possible to align and re-align, to assert certain flexibilities particularly in our relations with neighbours, and seriously to debate the new textures of confrontation between the super powers. What has followed since then has been a reversal. The rigidities have returned. The stress is on a competition in acquiring more modern armaments

to highlight a major regional role.

Inevitably, the tension on the sub-continent has increased. Pakistan gets priority attention, and its nuclear ambitions have sparked deep fears in India. If one group of activist opinion urges a redoubled effort to outstrip the 'revanchist Pakistanis', another speaks *soto voce* about the need for a pre-emptive strike in the manner of the swash-buckling neo-colonialist Israelis. The diplomatic effort is somehow to isolate Pakistan — yes, even through a working compact with the Soviet Union to establish Baluchistan and to reduce Islamabad to controlling a 'buffer zone'.

President Reagan and his advisers have been largely instrumental in creating this imbalance in the sub-continent. In their effort to respond to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, they have sought to turn Pakistan into a 'frontier State', forgetting that Pakistan is an India-baiter and not fool enough to grapple with the USSR. But the way the game has been played by the US State Department has certainly persuaded Indian policy planners to fall back on the old stratagem of

the country and for the Congress system

The attempt in 1977 to substitute the Congress system by a coalition of governance appeared at first sight more suited to the democratic crystallisation of India's diversified mosaic. There is no doubt that the Janata period produced a series of moves designed to take the country towards a more truly federal political framework as well as a more people-oriented economic programme, despite the unfortunate decision to hand over the effective reins of governance to old Congressmen who were too steeped in the old ways and despite the continuing hold of the bureaucracy on day-to-day affairs.

The reason why this first real attempt at coalitional politics in a national setting did not work was not the internecine conflicts between key leaders — often unbecoming no doubt and which ultimately led to its loss of credibility. But it also represented a stage in the building of a collective structure of decision-making in which diverse elements could participate.

The Janata period also saw some rather new and interesting processes of reconciliation and holding together despite all the differences. Nor was the failure due to serious conflicts as between the upper and the lower peasantry. These were all there in the Congress system too; only they were expressed more openly. Nor was it due to the irreconcilable differences over the RSS and the former Jana Sangh; as a matter of fact the real challenge before Janata was to bring the Jana Sangh within the democratic framework just as the Communists had been under Nehru. It would have made it but for other real failings.

**T**he real reasons for the failure of the Janata experiment were twofold. One, it, too, failed to build a party and, like Mrs Gandhi's Congress before and since, focussed far too much on the administrative arm of government. Failing this, it was not able to carry various elements that could not be accommodated in the administration. Nor was it able to draw on the enormous energy that had been released

in the 1977 election and soon thereafter.

The second, though subsidiary, reason was the phenomenal success achieved by Sanjay Gandhi in sowing seeds of discord close to the top of the Janata leadership and in the virtual 'stabbing in the back' that resulted therefrom. The repentance today of those who fell for this expressed in diverse ways, from Raj Narain to Charan Singh to Madhu Limaye, is testimony to this success of Sanjay Gandhi in turning the tables on Janata.

**W**ith the failure of the Janata experiment the pendulum swung to the opposite end, namely, the search for an even more unitary and centralized government and one that no longer suffered from any visionary drives (like 'garibi hatao' or socialism), an amoral government whose only promise was that it would 'work'. Little did the propagandists of this restoration of a controlled democracy, or for that matter the voters that rallied round the call, realize that a government based on personalities and unwilling to operate the political process through institutions — which necessarily involves sharing of power and a degree of decentralisation — can ever work in a country like this.

Of all the governments that we have had since Independence, this one seems to work the least. In the meanwhile, the institutional vacuum is being filled by lumpen elements on the one hand, with an accent on corruption, criminality and repression, and the police and paramilitary forces on the other who, too, seem less keen on maintaining order and more on oppressing the people, ravaging the countryside and making a fast buck exactly like the ministers and chief ministers.

What we face, then, is a rather unnerving situation. We have a government that was elected to power with a massive majority of seats in Parliament and all but four of the State assemblies, elected not so much to provide a democratic alternative to Janata but rather to provide a firm and unified administration, a regime of law and order and security for the citizens, a government that performs, unifies

the country and makes it strong and self-reliant.

Instead, we have a government that is fast losing control, in which regional chieftains are a law unto themselves and local *mafias* have replaced the party, and in which the people — especially the poor and the deprived among them — are suffering from not just growing economic insecurity and social disorder but, in point of fact, a virtual reign of terror let loose by corrupt politicians and local *dadas* (often indistinguishable from each other), aided or abetted by police and paramilitary forces.

The growing sense of insecurity that is spreading among the people is only matched by the insecurity of politicians in power who, unsure of their innings and engaged in a politics of survival,<sup>1</sup> are busy squeezing the State and the economy of whatever flesh there is left in them. The national elite, which too is not free from corruption — it is in some ways the cause of it all — is unable to stop this rampage by regional and local politicians and the smugglers and hoarders that support them, and is therefore bound to seek redress from abroad, in the process making the country deeply dependent and vulnerable to the worst manifestations of global corporate capitalism.

**B**oth the economic and the ecological consequences of this are a recolonisation of the country, this time at the hands of increasingly rampant and ruthless corporate enterprises, hungry for resources, markets and cheap manpower.<sup>2</sup> Caught between the rampage and massacre of regional and local *mafias* and the rampage of global *mafias* in the form of tough

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed analysis of the politics of survival, see my 'Where Are We Heading?', *Indian Express*, 29 November 1981.

<sup>2</sup> The recolonisation is not limited to the capitalist enterprises. There is growing evidence of our turning large numbers of our farms and factories (including free-trade zones and public undertakings) for the supply of primary and secondary consumer items to the Soviet Union for fulfilling the growing consumer demand in that country. In the process the basic needs of our own people remain neglected and they are asked to pay ever increasing prices for their subsistence as human beings.

competitiveness of the West, and the variety of socialist models being sought in eastern and western Europe, tend to leave the super powers confronting each other in isolation. The massive campaign against nuclear armament, and the growing desire to face whatever consequences peaceful co-existence has to offer, strengthen the passion for independent thought

The non-aligned movement cannot but draw sustenance from this changing political and economic environment, but leadership is needed to speed these developments and to consolidate them. It is here that India must stir to assert a role. The dividends of the past cannot sustain us any more.

Whether it is the economic debate between the North and the South, or the tenuous search for development relationships between the countries of the South, and the East and West, we have to help in setting in motion processes which will retexture the debate on world problems. This effort is long overdue. In fact, the extraordinary refusal to face the political and economic nihilism which has surfaced in our countries is behind the drift in thinking. Maybe, we are aware—and it is the qualitative change we are reluctant to undertake for fear of possible repercussions over which we have not done the required amount of study and research. Whatever the explanation, the time has come to act.

India, at this juncture in her history, is sufficiently harassed by internal and external problems to begin the re-texturing of relationships with neighbours, the reduction of military machines within the region and the general defusing of the tensions, insecurities and anxieties in the region. These happen to be shared perspectives and even a steady movement towards them would have a healthy stabilising influence. But, there has to be a determination to maintain a certain aloofness from the calculations of the super powers.

In this respect, India is terribly suspect. The Soviet connection is seen as a dominating influence. It is an impression that has to be dissolv-

ed by positive regional collaborations and careful initiatives to bring the super powers into some kind of rapport.

This is the direction that India's non-alignment might well take if the present 'warring' with Pakistan is seen as rather empty and futile — particularly so when pressures are building to compel Pakistan to change her attitudes to India. Friendlier noises would immediately release the kind of *detentist* mood which alone can prepare us to salvage the resources and potential of this sub-continent. This is not a marginal consideration for India and Pakistan now that problems are sharpening and all manner of complexities with serious ramifications could develop. We are teetering on the edge of explosive situations which could defy even mature political management. A sobering thought for those who are invariably roused on the simplistic slogans underpinning foreign policy these days.

More than even before we should keep reminding ourselves of internal realities as we create our external postures. Too long have we used external postures as a dramatic diversion. This will not do any more. In a sense, during 1981 we have been repeatedly reminded — and even monotonously! — that the play must end. It has no dividends. It only postpones the profound and wide-ranging changes that a new consciousness calls for and, thereby, intensifies the complexities. Indeed, if we have learned anything over the past years of freedom, it is that there are points of no-return in economics and politics.

It is now imperative that we in the developing world grasp the point of no-return in foreign relations — the point which, if passed, leads to uncontrolled arms races, emotional confrontations, an incredible waste of vital and scarce resources, the destruction of democratic functioning, and to a life of fear and subterfuge. There are examples of this all around us. We have to alter these dimensions and earn the respect which would help us to persuade the non-aligned to cut new paths to the future.

bargainers from abroad, the State in India is fast losing both its independence and its distinctive identity and has ceased to provide a framework of order and security for its people. Strange though it may sound, the very search for a hard State, centralized and domineering and all that, has proved to be a source of its erosion and, lacking determined intervention on the part of those who care for the country, of its eventual dissolution.

**N**or does such intervention seem very easy to accomplish. The institutional erosion that has taken place over the last fifteen years (1967-1982) applies also to Opposition parties, movements of organised groups (trade unions, professional organisations, the youth movement) and organisations of deprived and minority groups (the 'harijans', the tribals, the Muslims). The very process of accession to State power by almost all the Opposition parties in the late seventies seems to have deprived them of their capacity to oppose in a sustained and effective manner. For one thing, they seem to have lost faith in each other and in putting up a joint front against the threats to democratic politics and the life and security of the people. This is even more true of the rank and file of the parties than of the leadership (which, too, in most parties including the Left parties, remains divided).

Moreover, the stance of the ruling Congress to the Opposition parties has undergone a marked change. Until the Congress remained a dominant force and the only national force on the Indian scene, the Opposition (with the exception of the 'extremist' parties) was treated with respect in parliamentary politics while they were also able to emerge as forces to reckon with at State and local levels.

Now, following the successful Janata challenge in 1977 and with an increasingly insecure leadership at the helm of affairs in the ruling Congress — itself split and splintered many times — the latter is found to have become increasingly exclusivist and unwilling to share power, including at lower levels of

the federal structure. This in turn has produced a politics of survival in the Opposition too — witness the vacillations of the CPI(M) and its increasingly status quo-ist politics, the opportunism of the Congress(S) in Kerala, the erosion of the party machines of AIDMK and DMK in Tamilnadu and both the virtual handing over of the State apparatus to the police and the competition for winning favour with the Congress(I) among both the parties. Each of these parties shows signs of nervousness and panic under the onslaught from the Congress(I) and is found to be less than fully participating in competitive politics.

Finally, and most importantly, almost all the Opposition parties, like the ruling party itself, have lost touch with the ground forces and are increasingly found to be taken unawares by dramatic developments at the grassroots in the form of various movements for regional autonomy and home rule for tribal and other backward regions, the powerful Kisan movements during 1981 and the various 'uprisings' of the landless which are then mercilessly suppressed by the authorities before any political party has even reached the scene.

Discussions with activists working among the weaker sections in different States reveal that when it comes to the problems of the really oppressed, no political party takes up their cause except in a fitful manner here or there, they are either too tied up in their legislative and electoral preoccupations or (as in the case of the Left parties) are found to be both too hierarchical and too sectarian in their functioning to be any asset whatsoever to the struggling groups.

**P**art of the reason for all this is that almost all political parties have strayed away from the task of building their parties as mass organisations with a diversified social base and a decentralised functioning of the party organisations which alone can suit the Indian landscape and its political culture.

The Congress was able to do this till the early sixties though it never could permeate the lower strata,

given the nature of its leadership, the communists did this in certain regions though following a rather alien model of party organisation; so did the erstwhile Jana Sangh in certain urban and tribal areas and the DMK or the Akalis, all of them based on powerful but limited appeals. Nearly all of these have been swept over by the current of mass politicisation that spread during the seventies and the growing stakes in electoral and parliamentary politics and the struggle for survival by the various parties in the same period. Today they are all caught up in a crisis situation.

**T**he same is the case with organisations and 'movements' based on various interests and front organisations of major parties — trade unions, student bodies, youth movements. Groomed too much in the culture of 'trade' organisations bargaining mainly for immediate economic gains, deeply fragmented by partisan and sectarian conflicts and, over the last several years, steam-rollered by the 'dada' phenomenon which terrorizes the mass of the membership, these associations have become either too timid and opportunistic or too isolated and marginalised to be of much consequence. They have, by and large, failed to make common cause with the people and have rarely been contending against State power as such. The politics of populism has succeeded in defining the 'enemy' either on a class or generational or a caste basis. System change has rarely ever been their forte.

The response, for instance, to the anti-strike ordinance on the part of the trade unions is instructive. They have all (except for the official faction of INTUC) protested but each of them is so caught up in its own politics of survival that they have failed to mount a real movement against the ordinance. As regards the call for the unions, the youth and the intelligentsia making a common cause utilising such a draconian measure, it failed to make a dent. There is some evidence of the growth of independent trade unionism as well as of workers getting fed up with existing union leadership, but this is still in small pockets.

# The state of the state

ASHIS NANDY

## I

DURING the last one hundred and fifty years, the culture of Indian politics has been dominated by three concepts or images of the Indian State. These images have sometimes supplemented each other; sometimes they have acted as competing stereotypes, sometimes they have even sought to destroy each other. (One can never be sure, but one suspects that these images have also dominated the political cultures of most non-western societies with a colonial past. There is something inescapable about the images in such societies.)

The first image is that of *the State as a protector* of the Indian society. The Indian State is expected by many Indians to protect the society against arbitrary oppressors and marauding outsiders. Like many other societies in the world, this society has lived with oppression for centuries and it is used to it. And like the oppressed everywhere, this society, too, has always felt more comfortable with predictable, structured or institutionalised oppression. It has often chosen a greater degree of predictable oppression in preference to lesser but more arbitrary oppression.

This is understandable. Non-arbitrary oppression always gives its victims better play. It always gives more scope for finding loopholes and more time to devise

strategies of survival and/or escape. It is arbitrary, random, unpredictable oppression which is difficult to contain. The Indian State is expected to eliminate, control, make rule-bound or manageable primarily the second kind of oppression.

Corollary-wise, the State is expected to protect the native life style. Both the ultra-nationalists (who bemoan the frequency with which throughout history Indians of all hues have collaborated with foreign political authorities, after such authorities have established themselves in India) and the ultra-Hindus (who lament the fact that the ordinary Hindus have often sung, on the least provocation, paeans to their non-Hindu rulers) miss the widespread expectation in the ordinary citizen that the State authority, in exchange for their political loyalty, would either leave them alone culturally or protect them in their everyday life.

Take for instance the colonial experience. The Raj recognised the expectation from the State as a part of its 'mandate' and it sought to legitimise itself by living up to the image of the State as a protector.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Queen Victoria's proclamation, while taking over the rulership of India from the East India Company, is ample evidence of this. In that proclamation the British were trying, belatedly, to go back to the first phase of colonialism when the culture of the ruled was respected and, even, feared.

As regards the youth, it is too rootless and too rudderless—except for the impact of Sanjay Gandhi in reducing them to a lumpen class—to offer any prospect of an alternative to the aged and aging leadership of the existing parties. Here too there are simmerings of a new consciousness—among various segments of the erstwhile socialists, the Sangharsh Vahini and some new and dynamic elements in the Naxalite movement—but there is as yet no sign of their transcending their basic anaemia arising out of extreme fragmentation and sectarian conflicts.

When it comes to the organisations of the large social peripheries—the *dalits*, the tribals, the poorer castes among the Muslims, the landless and the urban poor and unemployed—among whom political consciousness has been spreading and who ought to be providing the greatest challenge to the system, their plight seems to be the worst. They have become victims of both the politics of populism which has taken them for a ride for so long, pinning all their faith in Mrs Gandhi and her government, and the politics of law and order which has made them the target of massive repression and criminal assaults by the newly prosperous castes backed by the State machinery and its *mafia* infrastructure. The militant political groups that take up their cause—the Marxist-Leninist, the Ambedkarites, the former socialists, the Chhatra Sangharsh Vahini cadres and the other radicalised groups from among the Sarvodaya movement, as well as a number of civil liberties groups and a growing number of individual sympathisers (ranging from journalists to lawyers)—are persecuted, killed in fake ‘encounters’, their wives and sisters raped, their houses raided and parents and relatives humiliated and pressurised.

This is the new face of Indian authoritarianism which has learnt its lessons from the Emergency. Rather than direct repression on Opposition politicians (who have been rendered harmless through parliamentary politics) it is directing it against the challenge from

the bottom, in the process still trying to persuade the latter that its fate is best left in the hands of the governing elite.

Meanwhile, this elite itself is losing control (Mrs Gandhi above all) and in large parts of the country the State apparatus is passing into the hands of local satraps and their hoodlums who pay their homage to the ‘Great Leader’ but are in fact really in command. While they have no love lost for the poor and the oppressed they have reaped one great advantage from projecting her as the saviour of the poor. She has successfully fragmented the bottom strata of the population, isolated each of them—the tribals, the Muslims, the *dalits*—and reduced them to separate electoral constituencies which are then made to rely on the ruling party and its managers for small crumbs of mercy. A potentially revolutionary coalition is thus rendered impotent and powerless and dependent.

This is what has made the traditional Marxist alternative unworkable in India apart, of course, from the crucial fact that traditional class analysis and class-based struggles have serious limitations in the multi-ethnic, multi regional and multi-caste (non-polar, antagonistic at micro levels but difficult to aggregate into macro confrontations) social landscape of India.

The organisational strategy called for by such a cultural and geographical context will have to be very different. For, we deal here with a whole range of ‘contradictions’ which are not amenable to a linear strategy based on the assumption of there being a primary contradiction to which all other contradictions are subsidiary, so that the resolution of the primary (viz, class) contradiction will automatically solve other (e.g., caste, communal, tribal, regional) contradictions. The different arenas of struggle need to be accepted as valid, including also conflict of interest between them, necessitating the pursuit of a variety of goals and strategies in diverse arenas while still identifying common points of cooperation and convergence between them at a particular historical juncture.

The only valid approach to such cooperation is as between different organisations of struggle, accepting authenticity of each but evolving a unified organisational strategy to deal with a given situation. Such a strategy will also entail a partnership in arenas of struggle other than one’s own and, through such partnership, engaging in an overall framework of transformation.

Here there is need to distinguish between the inherent differentiations of a multi-segmental society (the western concepts of pluralism based on multiple associations and interest groups is not relevant here) and the fragmentation of the *political* process fomented by the divisive strategies of a dominant elite keen on isolating and marginalising various segments while centralizing power precisely by undermining the institutional and social complexity of a rich civilization and reducing it to a diffuse and maleable ‘mass’.

The situation is complicated by the dangerous doctrine of the ‘nation in danger’ and the need to tighten our belts, sink our differences and unite and rally behind Mrs Gandhi. It is a call meant to halt the erosion of authority of an elite which because it is unwilling to share resources and power at its command—there is growing evidence of more and more of this being pocketed by a handful of people—to deal with a situation of rising economic discontent, is asking for ever more sacrifices from the people for the sake of ‘national honour’ and ‘security’ even if this means further destitution of the poor and diversion of scarce resources for an arms build-up.

The ‘unity’ that such an appeal calls for is the unity of the elite, not of the people who will, in fact, be further divided by rallying to the chauvinistic urges of the middle classes and the national security commitments of Opposition parties (especially, ironically, the Left parties) to a government that is otherwise fast losing legitimacy with these groups. The fragmentation of the political process and organisation of the people will get further accentuated by such a ploy on the part of a battered leadership.



aspects of Indianness. The demands of the State are no longer conditional in India, the State is the norm. That is, everybody and everything can now be evaluated from the point of view of the State and its survival. But, the estimates of the State from the point of view of culture or life style, when such evaluations are allowed to be made at all, are conditional. Such estimates are expected to accept the hegemony of the State and to strengthen it further through 'informed criticism'.

In other words, a fully corrupt, totally inefficient and ruthlessly exploitative State, too, is supposed to have our allegiance, because even such a State is supposed to protect the Indian civilisation from total annihilation by its dedicated enemies outside. If in the process the civilisation itself is altered beyond recognition or destroyed, it is no longer the concern of the State. Echoing that very clever American general in Vietnam, many of our politicians, intellectuals and journalists are willing to say that to protect Indian culture and society and, for that matter, the Indians, it may be necessary to destroy them altogether.

One of the pornographic dimensions of such a view of the Indian State is the ideology behind Indian foreign policy which, in the name of protecting Indian interests, is willing today to subvert everything Indian about India. Indian foreign policy — more so the ideology behind it — is no longer a reflection of or an adjunct to Indian domestic policy, it now determines Indian domestic policy. And because the world of international politics is now controlled by the dehumanised culture of modern statecraft and by absolute Machiavellianism, that is the culture we are not only learning but also selling within India as the 'State of art' in politics and as an indicator of our new-found 'maturity' as a nation.

60 Actually, there is no longer any Indian foreign policy. There is only a foreign policy of the State called India, which supposedly protects the gullible Indians from the bad wolves all around. This was not the case in

the days of Jawaharlal Nehru who, ignoring all accusations of faint-hearted sanctimony and woolly-headedness (and in spite of his own Eurocentric world view and charming Edwardian whimsicalities), did attempt to bring into international politics something of the civilisational perspective of this society.

The fatheaded Brown Sahibs who swear by Nehru today, on grounds of political expediency, have forgotten that Their foreign policy is totally contemptuous of the everyday Indian and Indian concepts of India's needs. In the pages of this journal itself, Giri Deshingkar has elegantly analysed the content of such a policy and I could only direct the reader to that article if he is interested in the present philosophy of the country's external affairs.<sup>3</sup>

To give another example, the roots of the dishonest, inefficient, heartless State capitalism that we see in India can be directly traced to the image of the Indian State as a protector and liberator. This is not an indirect argument *contra* State-ownership or nationalisation. This is a direct argument against a State ownership which, while using the slogan of socialism, leaves the content of an industry, an institution or a system intact.

Most nationalisation in India till now has, apart from pleasing the middle class radicals and their academic counterparts, only managed to nationalise red-tapism, gigantism and corruption. And, to the extent the intellectuals of the Left have given legitimacy to the belief that the choice is only one between State and private ownership, and to the extent they have not thought of alternative forms of decentralised public ownership, or small scale private ownership, they have collaborated with the ruling elites.

The late Sanjay Gandhi was merely taking to its logical conclusion this process by trying to nationalise politics itself. He knew what he was doing. Those who resisted him did not know what they were resisting. It is remarkable

that State-ownership has come to mean bureaucratisation, gigantism, mega-technology, organised exploitation and reification of social relationships to everyone, including the ones who plead for it. The idea is that nationalised corruption or gigantism or alienation is better than its private version. What remains unstated is that the ills of State capitalism are actually its goals and the exceptions in this instance only prove the rule that even the most egalitarian ideology can be used to extract the usual surplus from the usual sources.

Both the ideologies of liberalism and Leninist democratic centralism have been used in India to contain the politics of groups which as groups have most to gain from active, fullscale political participation. If the masses are ignorant—or devoid of revolutionary consciousness—and the State has the responsibility of bringing them into the modern world, then there have to be some limits on the politics of those without historical sensitivities. After all, there are always the willing teachers and the secular rationalists with their scientific temper, the scientific Marxists with their superior political consciousness and superior cognition of history, and the myriad minions of Indira Gandhi with their greater understanding of India's external enemies on the one hand and the internal fifth columnists on the other.

In each case, beyond a certain point, the legitimacy of the collective politics of those unconcerned about the fate of the State is not granted. The Indian as an immoral sinner, the Indian as an ahistorical primitive, the Indian as a gullible sucker are images which constitute the underside of the images of the Indian State as a liberator, as a moderniser and as a protector of the Indian people. They all militate against understanding the predicament of this society in terms which pay respect to the ordinary citizen's understanding of this predicament.

### III

Let me summarise and further clarify what I have been trying to say. May be, in the process I shall

3 'Civilisational Concerns', *Seminar*, December 1980, No. 257.

This may well lead to a war psychosis

**T**he political response to this situation of a repressive State structure that is, however, unable to hold and hence resorts to external stimuli and to a strategy of dividing and isolating various movements will need to take all this into account. It will call for a decisive intervention in the form of a large spectrum of actions, based on a counter-strategy which, while recognizing the complexity of the social mosaic, is able to forge a common front against the emerging fascist State and for a workable and durable alternative to it.

The politics of building such a front will have to be composed of a number of strategic dimensions, based on a corresponding set of understandings of both the overall reality that we face and its main specifications at this point in our history.

There is first the dimension of fighting the growing oppression and vandalism of the present system, and with these its deceitful character provided by the politics of populism. The various micro movements operating among the poor and the oppressed that have been growing all over the country provide the basis for this.

However, they suffer from two serious handicaps. First, they are highly localised and fragmented, permitting the system to deal with them either by isolating and marginalising them if they happen to remain strident and uncompromising in their orientation to struggle, or by coopting them through the seemingly just and egalitarian postures of official policy. Second, they have to contend with the populist politics of the ruling party whose greatest asset still is the 'saviour' and 'benefactor' image of Mrs Gandhi who at the same time also inspires a strange mixture of awe and fear among large sections of the rural masses.

It will be necessary to build and project alternative organisational identities and platforms among the *dahls*, the tribals, the minorities and the lower castes and wherever

possible forge common fronts across those segments that have so far been forced to remain isolated. Neither will be easy — building alternative political platforms among these various strata and forging common fronts across them — especially under the impact of the fire power of the police and *mafia* elements that constitute the new infra-structure of the ruling party. But it will have to be done, for without that the diabolic challenge of populist politics will not be met.

**T**he second major dimension is one of decentralization. It is necessary to understand that the reason behind the present erosion of institutions and the general decline of the Indian State, including the decline of central authority and the rise of power of State satraps and the *mafia* structures that support them, is the decline of democratic and federal structures of the polity. It is necessary to restructure the polity along an even more decentralized basis than before, given the considerable awakening and turmoil among the people and the need to satisfy their urges and demands.

However, the concept of decentralization has to be freshly conceived. It cannot any longer be put either in terms of delegation of power and resources from the centre through legislative or constitutional means (for moving towards, for instance, a three-tier federal polity) nor in terms mainly of politico-administrative arrangements leaving economic and technological issues as derivative of a decentralized State apparatus. It will rather have to be conceived in terms of movements from below, a process of decentralization to be initiated by the people themselves, taking advantage of a tottering State structure.

This will entail joining forces with those demanding greater State autonomy and a more self-reliant and sustainable techno-economy for the so-called 'backward' regions.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> I should like to stress that not all such 'movements' are for real autonomy. One must distinguish between, for instance, the demand for Khalistan which is basically a demand for a rich and pros-

perous community to have it alone and the regional aspirations of Assam, the North-east, Kashmir and Tamilnadu as well as the demands for greater autonomy by the large number of tribal and 'backward' areas which will continue to be exploited until they have autonomy in their own homeland. The former type is indefensible, the latter type fully defensible.

It is within and as an integral part of this redrawing of India's regional and ecological mosaic that the struggle for democratic decentralization will have to be launched.

There is, third, the imperial dimension whose concrete manifestation is to be found in the corrosive urban metropolitan structures within India, maintained by and dependent on the larger metropolises abroad, and in turn making the rural areas a colonial hinterland, ravaging the forests and the resource base of the people and turning land over to produce for urban consumption and export, in the process recolonising the whole country and making it a dependency.

It is still a moot question whether the various Kisan movements can rise above their immediate economic interests and be guided by this larger perspective of arresting the debilitating consequences of modernization which has strengthened the narrow urban-based, English educated, *babu* class with its corrosive lifestyle and servile values.

It is also not clear how far a common front can be forged between the leaders of these movements and the radical groups working among the lower peasantry, a front that sorts out both the immediate and the ultimate conflicts of interest within the peasant community and is able to see the common enemy in the existing Indian State and challenge it.

**T**here is some evidence to suggest that such a political process of forging a common front by transcending immediate interests is under way in some regions, both in the south and in the north, but it is too early to say how effectively the conflicts will be resolved, especially in the face of the highly oppressive behaviour of the State apparatus against the landless and the lower castes in

perous community to have it alone and the regional aspirations of Assam, the North-east, Kashmir and Tamilnadu as well as the demands for greater autonomy by the large number of tribal and 'backward' areas which will continue to be exploited until they have autonomy in their own homeland. The former type is indefensible, the latter type fully defensible.

the rural areas, often in league with and frequently at the initiative of local landlords

It is also not clear how the class-based militancy of the radical groups working among the landless and the *dalits*, for instance, will be able to veer round to such a strategy, putting aside the suspicions and distrust that have been there for so long. And yet it seems that this may turn out to be an historically necessary common front, to work at in dealing with the decidedly neocolonial character of the Indian State

**F**inally, there is the dimension of stopping this country from becoming a prey to the process of global militarization and a victim of the chauvinistic urges of its own elite, insecure and unsure of itself at home and looking for a way out externally. There is need to gather together the dispersed feeling against our getting embroiled in a war and even more against building up a national scare around the theme of the 'nation in danger'

Ironically, as with the case of a centralized polity leading to its own undermining, the very proponents of a militarily strong and self-reliant State are making this country dependent on overseas deals and rather unexplainable collaborations of all kinds as, for instance, with the French. (The same is the case with those who want to obtain for this country abundant energy in the form of nuclear breeder reactors and other hazardous technologies).

Again, the issue needs to be understood at both levels. At the level of the people it is clear that the more militarily mighty the country becomes, the more beneficial it will be to the rich and the more corrosive it will be of the resource base and living standards of the poor

At the level of the country as a whole, it involves becoming part of the global military structure, on the one hand dominated by military R&D on which we have no control and which lives on built-in obsolescence which means continuous dependence for us, and on the other hand forcing us economically to go for more and more indebtedness and

a pattern of trade flows that will make us a colonial economy once again. The process has already begun.

**A**ll this has to be resisted through building up a powerful anti-war movement in the country. An 'anti-war movement' does not refer to any specific war but simply to preparations of going to war. It will entail a struggle against the dangerous doctrine of supporting the government and especially Mrs Gandhi because national security is supposedly in danger. And it will entail joining forces with similar movements against militarism and war preparedness in the neighbouring countries, Pakistan for instance, and strengthening the culture of resistance to authoritarianism, there as well as here

The point is to join these various movements along all these dimensions — the grassroot struggles against oppression and the fascist State order, the movements for local autonomy and decentralization, the anti-imperial movement within India based on the new rural awakening and aimed against the dominance of and ravaging by urban metropolitan centres, including the movements of ecological components, and the movement against war and militarism, here as well as elsewhere. Together, they will provide the basis for a comprehensive intervention in India's historical process, lay the foundations of an alternative polity as well as an alternative paradigm of development, and *on that basis, for it can be on that basis only*, provide a framework for a truly democratic Indian State

Various action groups are involved in such a joining of forces. These range from the large spectrum of social and political activists operating close to the people, to the band of journalists, jurists and intellectuals committed to democratic values, to the relevant political groups willing to support the combination of strategies laid out above. The overall strategy of intervention involves them all. It is a strategy of a common front — from the village base to the national capital

# Social basis of the political crisis\*

D L SHETH

IT has become commonplace over the years to talk of any problem facing the country as a *crisis*. Once the characterization of a problem or a set of problems becomes such a *cliche*, it ceases to be a conceptual tool for any serious analysis. This is what seems to have happened with the concept of political crisis. It has become a convenient means of labelling away a threatening problem-situation by wrapping it up in a terminology that does not call for any further thought or action to alleviate it.

Such practice comes easily to us, a people used to fatalistic modes of thought: even the intellectuals among us tend to reify a problem by labelling it as a crisis. We are thereby freed from our responsibility of contributing to its occurrence and the action to deal with it. For, if any problem-situation is labelled as a crisis, the natural response of our people is to think of it as a natural disaster, the doing of some capricious will beyond us that comes upon us suddenly and without warning. This leads us to expect that it will pass just as it came and there is little one can do about it. No one knows who will survive and who will perish when it is all over.

A *crisis* is much more than the many problems which continuously

arise in any political system and get accumulated at a point of time. Problems are specific, isolatable situations which can be defined in terms of agencies and actions required for their solution. In a state of crisis, specific problems are not amenable to solutions, for these are not isolatable from each other for the purpose of taking action. Crisis is the manifestation of a deeper malaise which engulfs the *whole* system. It is, thus, a global, system-level problem which arises from changes in the basic principle of the system's organization.

In a crisis situation, attempting a solution of specific problems amounts to no more than fire-fighting. The total alleviation of crisis requires radical rearrangements of the relationships between the institutions, structures and values in accordance with the emerging principle of system-organization. Action to solve problems then remains no longer administrative-managerial. It requires sustained political interventions, often from outside the established institutional networks in the existing political system.

I believe that, by this definition, the Indian political system is facing a crisis and this crisis is closely related to the long-term changes in the economic and social structures; this is a point which is as obvious as the fact that it is generally disregarded. In much of the discussion and analyses of the political situation since the Emergency, prominence has been given to personalities and short-term and transient political events or to emotional and moral

\*This is a revised version of the paper presented at the 'National Seminar on the Changing Party-System: Perspectives and Challenges', held at the Department of Political Science, University of Gujarat, Ahmedabad, 24-28 March 1980. I am deeply indebted to my colleague, Giri Deshingkar, for his valuable comments on the earlier draft and his help in finalizing this version.

issues. It is as if politics has little to do with the allocation of values and power in a society and as if it is all about who among the politicians gets what and how. Gossip about personalities, behind-the-scenes events and the moral lapses of leaders may be an important datum to the political analyst but by itself it tells us little about the nature of the crisis<sup>1</sup>

There is, however, another stream of political analysis which loftily rejects day-to-day politics as so much distraction focussing attention away from the historically determined process of social and economic change. This mode of analysis views politics as an epi-phenomenon of the social and economic structure. The discussions and writings produced by this mode are replete with global generalizations which only deductively elaborate a certain theoretical and ideological perspective, one which can broadly be described as vulgar-Marxist<sup>2</sup>

It ignores the substantive empirical process of Indian politics (for the simple reason that it does not fit into the preconceived categories of analysis and explanation) and produces merely a litany of disembodied concepts. A mechanical and hackneyed application of cut and

dried concepts to the Indian reality reduces the political problem purely to social and economic relations. It refuses to focus on the dialectics of the empirical forces within politics, forces which constantly impinge on the economic and social structures.

Vulgar-Marxists, thus, detract away from and even distort the problematique of the 'revolutionary change' understanding which is avowedly the prime concern of their brand of analysis. They have little to contribute by way of generating new formulations or insights into the nature of the political crises even within the theoretical and ideological perspective on which their analyses are based. Instead, they end up by making a series of abstract statements about the mostly undefined relationship between the base and the superstructure, as if the reality of India and the historical time in which actions are taking place is of no consequence.

Often, their statements are derived from a very carefully done historical and empirical analysis of another society at another time and then applied to India as if this country is re-enacting the historical past of that society. So, in these analyses, we come across the same processes, events and even characters, albeit in a different garb, which we had met before, say, during Europe's transi-

(iii) It derives all historical interpretations from the maxim 'the history of all societies is the history of class-struggle' — a view borne out of a simpleminded reading of the *Communist Manifesto*.

(iv) It reduces higher-level and long-term generalizations about the Laws of History to a mechanical determinism, suggesting that there were no alternatives in history.

(v) In its choice of subject-matters and investigation it relies on issues and themes that were of interest to Marx. But it has a scarce regard for the methodology used by Marx to study these. In its interpretation it relies on casual remarks made by Marx, and not on the integral whole of Marxian thought.

According to Hobsbawm, although vulgar-Marxism has performed a historical role in providing 'concentrated changes of intellectual explosive, designed to blow-up crucial parts of the fortifications of traditional history', its influence on Marxian historiography is now on the decline. He therefore, pleads for separating the influence of vulgar Marxism from what he calls the 'mature thought of Marx'.

tion from feudalism to capitalism. The only concession made to the Indian reality is to prefix apriori categories with the term 'semi'. So we have 'semi-feudal', 'semi-capitalist' or 'semi-compradore' or 'semi-class relations'. All these verbal gymnastics become necessary because India, unlike Europe, has a caste system and the intellectual caste of Brahmins is constantly obfuscating the basic categories of its analysis. One is tempted to call this 'semi-Marxism'.

What is needed is political analysis which empirically examines the interaction between the socio-economic structures and the political process while avoiding both the narrowly moralistic and the deductively deterministic view of these relationships. One way of going about this task is to begin by describing the nature of the present political crisis and then to see how and to what extent the changes in the social and economic structures have contributed to its eruption in its present form and at the present time. This will enable us also to understand how the processes within politics can exacerbate or contain the crisis depending on how the polity deals with the changes in social and economic structures.

## I

### In an Historical Perspective

The present political crisis, in a fundamental sense, is the crisis of legitimacy of the political authority<sup>3</sup>. No political party today, even if returned to power with massive electoral majorities obtained through the open electoral process, is in a position to command the loyalty of the people on a sustained basis. Electoral success by itself has ceased

3 The present analysis uses the concepts, 'legitimation problems' and 'legitimation crisis' as developed by Habermas. Habermas' analysis of the legitimation problems facing the modern state represents a significant advance over Max Weber's concept of political legitimacy, and as such provides a more fruitful frame of analysis to understand the problems of political authority in crisis. (Jurgen Habermas, 'Legitimation Problems in the Modern State', in *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, pp 178-205, Heinemann, London, 1979). See footnotes 4, 5 and 6 below for an elaboration of Habermas' concepts of 'legitimacy' and 'legitimation problems'.

1. The massive amount of literature on the Emergency illustrates this point.

2. The term vulgar-Marxism is used here to describe that genre of Marxist analysis which bases its interpretation of history on the superficial, self-evident contradictions which arise in the process of socio-economic transformations, rather than on the changes in the internal principles of organization of society that lie behind these contradictions. Such an analysis is often motivated more by purely ideological considerations than those of scientific analysis. It is precisely in this sense that Marx uses the term 'vulgar' to criticize the political economy whose interpretation of history serves us as an apologia for an ideology rather than as an instrument of scientific analysis.

EJ Hobsbawm, in his article 'Karl Marx's Contribution to Historiography' (in Robin Blackburn, ed, *Ideology in Social Science*, pp 265-305, Fontana/Collins (Paperback) London, 1972) identifies the following characteristics of vulgar-Marxism (pp 270-271):

(i) It considers the economic factor as the fundamental factor on which all other factors are dependent.

(ii) It projects a simple relation of dominance and dependence between the 'economic base' and the 'superstructure'.

to be widely accepted as justification for the mandate to rule. This is because a complete dissociation has occurred between the electoral process that produces the mandate and the governmental process that is subject to pressures and interests which transcend the mandate.

These pressures are rooted in the established and continuing macrostructures of political and economic dominance (comprising the national political elite, the bureaucracy, the technocracy and big-business) which have made the State their instrument. But these macrostructures are not regarded as sacrosanct by the people, for they are seen to have lost the capacity even partially to process the mandate. Hence, the political authority has been finding it increasingly difficult to gain legitimacy from the people.

The weakening of the legitimization process began in the late sixties and has continued unabated since.<sup>4</sup> The starting point was the 1967 elections when governmental performance became, for the first time, a live issue in Indian politics. Since then, acts of omission and commission by the government have been seen by the people as directly those of the 'party in power' rather than of an anonymous entity called the government.

In the public mind as well as among the politicians, the identification of the government with the party in power grew stronger in the early seventies when the ruling party began increasingly to rely on populist slogans as a means of securing legitimization for its rule. It was the failure of the ruling party especially on the economic front, soon after it came to power in 1971 with a massive electoral majority, which

4 'Legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a political order's claim to be recognized as right and just. In this sense, Habermas further elaborates, 'legitimacy is a contestable validity claim, and legitimization is a process in which one side denies and the other asserts legitimacy'. This is how legitimization becomes a permanent problem for a political order (Habermas, *op cit*, pp 178-179). We speak of the weakening of legitimization process when the situation arises in which the supply of legitimization to the political authority becomes more and more scarce and it can no longer take its claim to legitimacy for granted.

pushed it increasingly towards assuming a populist stance.

The legitimization losses incurred on account of the failure to perform in the economic sector were thus sought to be made good by the use of populism in the political arena.<sup>5</sup> This eventually turned out to be a short-sighted strategy for the system, if not temporarily for the ruling party itself. For, substituting populism for performance results in laying bare the face of the socio-economic groups which wield power in the macrostructure, the face that otherwise remains concealed behind the anonymity of the 'government' and keeps the issues of legitimization away from the wider public and within the confines of the political-bureaucratic arena.<sup>6</sup> But, as soon as the issues of success and failure become alive in the wider public realm, legitimization must be secured on a new plane, i.e., through the substantive democratic processes and not merely through the forms.

5 The persistent failure to solve economic problems severely exposes the political authority's claim to legitimacy. When the ruling elites realize that the economic problems cannot be solved without endangering their own established interests, the legitimacy play they resort to is the politicization of economic issues. They then take recourse to radical rhetoric in order to hide their incapability — in fact unwillingness — to take drastic administrative and economic measures which might harm the established interests.

6 Since the domain of application of the legitimization process, as Habermas rightly holds, is the political order, the supply of legitimization to the political authority has to come from two levels of the polity: from the political-bureaucratic-economic elites and from the wider public. Legitimation problems arise when the political authority's claim to legitimacy is disputed at one of the two or at both the levels. The legitimization problem assumes the proportion of a crisis when the political authority is compelled to secure legitimization from both the arenas and yet its grounds for securing legitimization do not hold good simultaneously for both the arenas: the elites and the masses.

7 This is a crucial point at which the supply of legitimization to the political authority from the elite circles ceases to be adequate to justify its claim to legitimacy. At this point, the legitimization problem often assumes the proportion of a crisis, for the simple reason that legitimization now needs to be sought simultaneously from among the elite circles as well as from the wider public. In so far as the political authority fails to respond to this new situation and does not change its grounds

and procedures within the political-bureaucratic arena. The 'buffer' disappears.<sup>7</sup>

The legitimization problems of the political authority are, thus, simpler when the structural differentiation of the economy and the political awareness of the public are at relatively a low level. This was, broadly, the situation till the mid sixties. The legitimization strategies of the political authority in this phase were to keep the economy and the wider public realm structurally separate, so that the contest for legitimacy remained confined, by and large, to this political elite. In this phase, elections served as instruments of inter-elite competition or, at best, as political education of the masses. But, at no event did they become vital means of settling the validity claims of the political authority itself.

It was in the second phase, in the late sixties and the early seventies that, with the increased political awareness and economic differentiation, the structural separation between the political-bureaucratic arena and the public realm broke down. The issue of legitimization now began to be widely contested in both the arenas. The political authority faced a new type of legitimization problem for which popular appeals to the electorate acquired great importance. In this sense, the 1971 mid-term poll represented the ruling elite's attempt to introduce new themes and break new ground for seeking legitimization. In this it achieved success.

But this success, secured on the promise of removal of poverty, was interpreted by the ruling elite as no more than an endorsement by the

for securing new legitimations the normal legitimization process comes to naught. It is then either overtaken by the *ad hoc* power groups that manipulate political power rather than seeking loyalty of the people, or by the political-bureaucratic elites that attempt to make good the legitimization losses by progressively relying upon the use of the coercive mechanisms of the state which they still control. A third possibility but which is nowhere in sight today is that a popular revolutionary movement that has been latently countering the validity claims of the established political authority comes to the fore and secures legitimization, and consequently political power, for itself.



people in favour of the continuation of their rule. Consequently, the grip of the macro-structures over the governmental process was re-established as before. The actions of the government, therefore, now began to be seen by all concerned not as dispensations of a just and fair political authority, but as advancement of a specific *power-group*. As such, they were accepted, resisted or confronted, depending on what sources of power were available to the counter-groups.

This marked the third, the present phase, which began with the Emergency and has been deepened by two successive elections. The Emergency represented the ruling elite's desperate bid to put down the counter-validity claims of the Opposition by the use of force when its own legitimacy was seriously questioned in the public realm. Two successive elections exposed the incapacity as well as the unwillingness of the *entire* political elite to counter the power of the macro-structures in processing the electoral mandates through public policies.

This created a situation in which the legitimacy claims of the political authority ceased to remain confined to the elite circles in the society. They now needed to be validated in the wider public realm. The outcome of elections had bearing on the process of government functioning and policy-making and the legitimacy claims began to be contested outside the electoral and legislative framework. *It is this, in my view*, that is the defining feature of the present crisis. Its poignancy is indicated by the fact that while in all the three elections during the seventies, one or the other political party received *massive* majorities, none succeeded in restoring legitimacy to the political authority. Elections have thus been rendered ineffectual for performing their basic function, viz., to settle validity claims of the political authority.

Although the nature of the legitimization problem has radically changed, the political authority continues to rely on manipulations of the power process rather than on building anew loyalties of the people through ensuring their

participation in the decision-making processes, at least at the local and intermediate levels of the polity. It relies more on its ability to manipulate casteist and communal sentiments in the name of a pro-poor stance rather than on improving performance on the economic front and restricting the opulent life-styles of the rich. There is no pro-poor programme, there are only pro-poor slogans.

In brief, the political authority refuses to recognize the bottlenecks in the social structure, bottlenecks which transform policies for the uplift of the poor into instruments serving the entrenched interests of the urban and new rural elite. The bottlenecks simply do not allow any benefits to percolate down to the poor.

Even when the ruling elite is concerned about legitimization of the regime in power, it tends to treat the problem not in terms of aiding the process of transformation of the social structure, forces of which are already surging at the ground level, but as a problem of tightening up the law and order situation, of mounting rescue operations through securing foreign investments and international loans. The farthest it is prepared to go is to improve administrative efficiency and managerial skills.

The result is an ever widening gap between the middle classes and the vast majorities of the poor, which now divides them not only economically and socially but also culturally, they are no longer bound by a common meaning system or norms in public life. The political authority's grounds for securing new legitimacy, therefore, no longer hold good simultaneously for both the elite and the masses.

In order to understand the nature of the present crisis in a deeper way it is useful to look back and reconstruct the state of non-crisis that was enjoyed by the Indian political system for a relatively long stretch of time, longer than it could have normally been permitted by the objective forces of change in the society. This exercise will also illustrate the role of a deliberative political leader-

ship in forestalling or altogether avoiding crisis situations and thereby negating the pre-determination embedded in the theory of class-polarisation.

## II

### Legitimacy of the Congress System

Historically, what I call the state of non-crisis in the Indian polity can be identified as the period of the Congress system. As I have clarified at the beginning of this essay, the absence of crisis does not mean that problems, even legitimation problems, do not exist in the system. What is meant is that whatever problems exist appear to be solvable or they at least lend themselves to postponement within the overall framework of the system.

In this sense, the Congress system could successfully handle problems because it kept the public realm structurally separated from the bureaucratic and legislative process and maintained, in the former, a low level of politicization. This gave the political authority an autonomy in making administrative and legislative decisions which could not be directly affected by the demands in the public realm. The public realm, thanks to its low level of politicization, offered a diffused loyalty to the political authority and thus ensured its legitimacy.

Of course, a divergence of interests did take place in the public realm, but the consciousness of such divergence among different groups was quite low. Under the Congress system, interests were believed to be generalizable for the purposes of State action. And, insofar as the decision-making processes within the legislative-bureaucratic arena followed the procedures and forms sanctioned by the objectified democratic norms, the administrative and legislative autonomy of the regime was not disturbed. The plea of protecting this autonomy in 'public interest' was conceded both in the Parliament and outside it in the public realm whenever the issue of public accountability of governmental actions was raised. In this sense, the Congress system, although ridden with problems, did not face

any serious crisis of political legitimacy

It is, however, not enough to say the Congress system owed its legitimacy only to the relatively low level of politicization in the public. The level of politicization is always associated with the level of structural differentiation within the society. Having said this I must confess that very little analysis of the Congress system is available which directly examines this relationship for explaining the sources of its legitimacy. We do have some good descriptive accounts of how the Congress system functioned as also some seminal analytical contributions revealing the internal *political* dynamic of its functioning<sup>8</sup>. But little is known about how the system grew in the ambience of the social and economic structures and the process through which it obtained legitimation. Some scholars and ideologues of political parties have, from time to time, commented upon the sources of legitimation of the Congress system and, for the present, we will have to be content by taking account of these

One such view held that the Congress system was a political superimposition on the feudal social and economic structure and as such it provided political legitimation for the traditional (caste-based, ascriptive) social authority and feudal relations of production. This, in my view, is a questionable proposition. No political authority could have legitimized itself on this basis without responding to the empirical processes of change in the social and economic structures at the time of Independence. It is through embedding itself in this process of change that the Congress system could acquire the legitimacy it did

Accordingly, the Congress system created a new socio-economic base

8. See Rajni Kothari, 'The Congress "system" in India' *Asian Survey*, 4 (12) December 1964, 'The Congress System on Trial' *Asian Survey* 7 (2), February 1967; 'The Congress System Revisited: A Decennial Review' *Asian Survey* 14 (12) December 1974. Also see, Ramashray Roy, 'Dynamics of One Party Dominance in an Indian State', *Asian Survey* 8(7), July 1968; Gopal Krishna 'One Party Dominance: Development and Trends', *Perspectives* 12 (1), 1966

of power by directly undermining the feudal elements in the society. It consolidated the new power base and then sought to legitimize it through the political process. This was a political response to two kinds of structural change that had already taken place in the society

The first pertained to the weakening of the *hierarchical* (as against interest-group) aspect of the caste structure, it was accompanied by loosening the normative hold of the *karma* theory. This change set into motion the process of the break-down of the caste *system* as an all-India ideology of social organization. The break-down transformed castes into regional power groups and promoted the emergence of individual achievement and performance as the new ideology of social stratification.

The second kind of change was in the occupational structure. This structure was expanding because of the emergence of a wide range of occupations not bound to any caste, making horizontal occupational mobility possible at a significant scale both in the rural and urban areas

The Congress system identified its support bases in these *growing structures* the peasant proprietors (not the feudal landlords) in the rural areas and the growing tertiary sectors in the urban areas. Beyond these, agricultural labourers, ethnic minorities and the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes were brought within the political fold partly through the governmental policy process and partly through the political mobilization of these groups in the party structure

The other view rejected the feudal-structure basis of the Congress. It held that the Congress system derived its legitimacy by becoming the political instrument of the emergent capitalist class. In my opinion, this is too neat a view of a very complex process. The fact is that the prime concern of the Congress system was to avoid close identification with the interests of any one class if only because the divergence of interests had not yet made itself felt in the public realm

Congress policies, if anything, had negative consequences for the growth of the capitalist class; neither the industrial or business entrepreneurs in the urban areas nor the capitalist farmers in the rural areas derived any significant benefits. The Congress policy, on the contrary, explicitly protected a few big and established industrial and business houses by restraining the natural market process on the one hand and curbing capitalist farming on the other through such measures as food-zones and control of prices of foodgrains

The ideological expression of such policies was the socialist rhetoric. Indeed, the Congress was so wary of the emerging capitalist entrepreneurs, both urban and rural, that production was not allowed to have even its natural growth. Control, rather than expansion, was considered the best policy to put off the pressures that were expected inevitably to grow in the public realm if full-fledged capitalist development were allowed to take place. The dampening of the production process was disguised by the policies of 'import-substitution'. This amounted mainly to the production of consumer durables under the monopolistic control of the big industrial houses

In the agriculturist sector, the dampening of production was managed through food imports mainly under the PL-480 contract programme, even in economically difficult years. In this way, the Congress succeeded in maintaining stability. In brief, over the years, the Congress system perfected a bureaucratic model of development which was neither socialistic nor capitalistic. If one must describe such a model in such terms, it may be said to be capitalist by default and socialist by fraud

The legitimation programme of the Congress system, thus, was clearly not based on any long term perspective. Such a perspective would have aimed at consolidating the liberal democracy by curbing economic monopolies and promoting land reforms and progressive democratization of the decision-making structures of the party and



the government. The Congress did not do any such thing. All it did was to successfully keep the public realm structurally delinked from the legislative-bureaucratic arena, thereby not allowing legitimation pressures to arise either at election times or through political movements.

It did so with finesse and probably for a longer period than the growing forces of differentiation within the economic and social structures would have otherwise allowed. This programme, moreover, deflected the process of polarization of the classes into an elite-mass dichotomy. It did, for a long period, maintain social and national integration as the central issue of politics and thereby prevented governmental performance from becoming a real issue. Moreover, it politically absorbed the emergent conflicts in the rural society within the party as factional structure. In brief, the Congress system maintained its legitimacy by insulating the political system from the change in the economic and social structures which had come about and was continuing to take place.

Two points emerge from the above discussion. First, the Congress system rooted its legitimation process not in the traditional authority system and the feudal structure but in the mobilization consequent to the Independence movement in the political arena and the changing hierarchical and occupational structure in the socio-economic system. In so doing it succeeded in insulating the political system from being prematurely over-loaded by the growing demands in the public realm and consequently it was not encumbered by the issue of legitimation.

Put differently, it maintained, on the one hand, the democratic procedures and forms of decision-making in the bureaucratic-political arena, a very necessary step for establishing the legitimacy of the new political system. And, on the other hand, it avoided the substance of democracy being determined and validated in the public realm. Thereby, it could, to a significant extent, prevent the changes in the social and economic structures from affecting the legitimation process in the wider public realm.

The second point pertains to the nature of the Indian political-bureaucratic elites that managed the Congress system. To identify them as a 'class' which represented the feudal or the capitalist interests is of limited explanatory value. In fact, it can be totally misleading. These elites had neither the expansionist capitalist character nor the work-ethic of capitalism, nor did they show any feudal sense of power. They were a political conglomerate that had inherited a long and distinct tradition, the cultural tradition of Brahminism, whose genius lay in compartmentalization, control and containment rather than expansion and subjugation.

The Indian political elites were, thus, adept at using their rule for compartmentalization of the potentially conflicting interests and exercising a parental control which curbs rather than promotes initiative. Indeed, they were averse to expansionism of any kind including that which was believed to be necessary for the system's survival. They were equally averse to direct subjugation of the elements believed to be constituting a threat to the system they managed. Instead, they preferred to devise various mechanisms of overall containment and accommodation with a great tolerance for inconsistencies and contradictions. In this lay both the strength and the weakness of the Congress system.

In sum, the Congress system was a political miniaturization of the Hindu social system. The historical Hindu system, for example, constantly diffused the counter-validity claims to its legitimation that arose from time to time (for instance, Buddhism) in the system and it avoided direct subjugation of its peripheries (say, through the institution of slavery), instead, it controlled the peripheries with the all-India ideology of the *varana-jati*.

### III

#### Structural Basis of the Crisis

The process of legitimation of the political authority perfected by the Congress system has now ceased to operate. Along with it, the Congress system has met its natural death. It

is no longer possible to insulate the political system from the changes that have since occurred in the public realm. Only if the crisis is recognized to be not merely of the political-bureaucratic system but of the system as a whole can adequate political and economic responses to deal with it become possible. We must recognise that the Congress system was essentially a stalling operation, successfully carried out so long as the changes in the social and economic structures did not spread and acquire a magnitude sufficient enough to introduce differentiations in the public realm. But the impact of these changes began to become visible in the public realm towards the late sixties and the early seventies, this marked the beginning of the disruption of the legitimation process in the Indian polity. In what follows we shall quickly review these changes, again in an illustrative manner, with a view to showing their implications for the legitimation process.

Changes in the demographic figures that have occurred during the fifties and the sixties are quite suggestive in this respect.<sup>9</sup> Despite the high rate of growth in population, literacy went up by about 16 per cent from (18 to 34 per cent) during the period 1951 to 1971. More importantly, the proportion of literates in the population (above 4 years of age) almost doubled for the rural areas (from 14 to 27.3 per cent) and tripled for the rural females (from 5 to 15 per cent). Overall urban literacy today is over 60 per cent compared to 40 per cent in 1951 and 54 per cent in 1961. About 70 per cent of the urban males and 48 per cent of the urban females were literate by 1971. The increase in the absolute numbers of the literates in the population, not revealed by these percentages, are enormous. As against 83 million literates in 1961, the number increased to 160 million in 1971.

<sup>9</sup> The data in this section are used in rounded figures only for illustrative purposes. Except the electoral data all other statistics used in this section are drawn from a very useful recasting of data done by Ashish Bose from various sources (mainly the census hand-books). See Ashish Bose, *India's Urbanization 1901-2001* (second edition), Tata McGraw-Hill Ltd., New Delhi, 1978.

While, as a percentage of the total population, the urban population registered only a two per cent growth (from 18 per cent in 1960 to 20 per cent in 1971), in absolute numbers the increase was from 80 millions in 1961 to 109 millions in 1971. More significant have been the changes in the *pattern* of urban and rural settlements. The number of cities with a population of over 20,000 increased from 735 in 1961 to 913 in 1971.

The population growth during 1961-1971 remained consistently higher for the bigger urban settlements: 52 per cent for the cities with a population above one hundred thousand, 45 per cent for cities with a population of between twenty and fifty thousand and 20 per cent for towns with a population of between ten and twenty thousand. For the smaller urban settlements with a population below ten thousand, the growth rate was negative: 8.8 per cent for towns with a population of between five and ten thousand and as low as -22.9 per cent for the smaller towns below 5,000.

**S**imilar changes took place in the rural settlement patterns. The number of bigger villages greatly increased while the smaller ones remained static or declined in number. Today, over fifty per cent of the rural population lives in villages with a population above one thousand and only one sixth of it lives in villages with a population below five hundred. As against this, in 1951 about one third of the rural population lived in villages with a population below five hundred.

Add to the above picture the changes that have occurred in the composition of the Indian electorate since the first election of 1952.<sup>10</sup> In sheer numbers, the electorate has grown from 173 million voters at the First General Elections in 1952 to 360 millions in the last election. The electorate today is very different from that of the fifties and the early

10 The observation that the social demographic character of the Indian electorate has radically changed having long-term implications for the political process, was first made by Bashiruddin Ahmed. See his, 'The Electorate', *Seminar*, April, 1977. The data on changes in the electorate are from this article.

sixties. Three-fourths of the electorate today consists of voters who either reached the voting age or were born in the post-Independence period, in fact one fourth of them were born after 1947. Put together, this is the picture of a change that represents a radically different constellation of socio-economic and political forces. It is clear that the structural assumptions that have informed the political analyses so far need to be appropriately revised to arrive at a better understanding of the present political process.

**T**he above point would become clearer if we focussed our attention directly on the nature of the structural changes in the society. Firstly, the rural social structure has been becoming progressively identifiable in terms of the relationship between wage-labour and capital. In 1961, for example, 60 per cent of the rural work-force accounted for cultivators and only 19 per cent for agricultural labourers. This situation had radically changed by 1971 with agricultural labourers registering an increase of 12 per cent and cultivators suffering a decline of 10 per cent. Thus, by 1971, over 82 per cent of the rural work-force belonged to the categories of cultivators and agricultural labourers of which about 52 per cent accounted for the former and 31 per cent for the latter.

The other occupational categories of the rural work-force that are generally dependent on the feudal occupational structure — here we ignore the urban industrial occupational categories that account for negligible percentages in the rural areas — such as household industry, livestock, forestry and fishing, and other services accounted for about 16 per cent of the rural work-force in 1961, their percentage declined to 10 per cent by 1971. Thus, the occupational structure that was once characterized by the social organization of the village system has been shrinking progressively, making room for an economy based on the relationship between wage-labour and capital.

Secondly, the traditional *jajamani*-based relations of production have, by and large, become monetized. The supportive service sector of arti-

sans and others which operated within the social organization of the village system, with its relationship of social obligation and dependence on the patron caste, has now been detached from the social matrix of the village.

The service sector in the rural economy is, thus, no longer agriculture-dependent but is fast growing into an independent sector of the economy with its links not with the village system but with the national economy. The occupational relationships in this sector are now more those between *employers* and employees than between patrons and clients. For example, if we look at the non-agricultural work-force in the rural areas, about 44 per cent of the workers in this sector were covered by the employer-employee relationship in 1961. The percentage increased to about 60 in 1971.

Further, among them, 3 per cent were employers and 42 per cent were employees in 1961. But, by 1971, the percentage of employees rose to 55 while that of the employers remained constant. The remaining two categories of single (self-employed) workers and family-workers in the non-agricultural rural work-force also registered significant changes: the percentage of single workers fell from 45 to 34 and that of the family workers from 11 to 8.

**E**ven more significant is the fact that the proportion of wage-earners has been growing at a faster rate in the rural economy. While the percentage of employers remained constant in both urban and rural areas during the period 1961 to 1971, the increase in the percentage of employees in the urban areas was only 5 as against 15 in the rural areas. It should, however, be pointed out that in terms of industrial categories of work-force, the percentages of urban workers declined in the categories of mining, household industry and other services but increased in manufacturing, trade and commerce, thus indicating a significant change in the urban industrial occupational structure.

Although some of the differences described above in the work-force

are to an extent influenced by changes in the definition of 'workers' and classification of the occupational categories in the 1971 census, the trend towards an emerging contradiction of wage-labour and capital in both the rural and urban economies is unmistakable

The structural changes of the above kind have been accompanied by changes in social and political consciousness. For example, a recent study by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi<sup>11</sup> of post-1971 political attitudes of Indian citizens, based on a representative national sample of 3800 citizens, showed that about a quarter of the sample population attributed the causes of their deteriorating living conditions to the policies of the government and to the groups which they thought were opposed to their interests (rather than to fate or acts of God)

From the sample population having opinions on various political issues (about 70 per cent of the total sample), 26 per cent showed a strong preference for direct action, both against the government and the socio-economic groups who they thought were opposed to their interests. Another 27 per cent, although they rejected direct action as a proper means of influencing government policies, strongly pleaded for structural changes through legislative measures. Such a radical orientation was found to be strongly associated with poverty (measured in terms of monthly household income). The poor, regardless of the differences in caste, religion etc., showed unmistakable radical tendencies. But the probability of their acquiring a radical orientation in terms of political and social consciousness of the structures that came in the way of improving their living conditions was found to

<sup>11</sup> The data on political attitudes presented here are from the data files of the 1971 Elections study of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. The study, financed by the Indian Council of Social Science Research, was jointly directed by Bashiruddin Ahmed and D.L. Sheth. The report has been submitted to the Council and a monograph entitled, 'Poverty, Social Consciousness and Radicalism' based on these data is being prepared for publication by the present author.

increase greatly with literacy, urbanization and the economic development of the areas they lived in

The above review of changes in the social and economic structures and the political consciousness of citizens, although very sketchy, is sufficiently suggestive of the fact that by the beginning of the seventies the Congress system was faced not merely with changes in the political process, but in the principle of organization of the society as a whole

Not being able to understand the import of these changes or perhaps due to unwillingness to accept them, the issues thrown up by the structural changes were approached by the political leadership as if they lent themselves to purely political manipulation or to law and order arrangements. The inability of the political leadership to make adequate political and economic responses to changes hastened the loss of legitimacy and pushed the system into a state of real systematic crisis

#### IV

##### Dimensions of the Crisis

The processes of structural change that undermined the legitimation process of the Congress system are, if anything, growing both in spread and magnitude. I draw the following implications for understanding the present crisis and for finding ways to deal with it

1 The relationship between the centre and the periphery which once existed as between a political establishment and a traditional social cultural system is now being redefined as one between the periphery and the national economy. Politics has now become a pressure-zone of the whole system and is expected to mediate in the process of furthering such a redefinition. It will, therefore, be a mistake to view 'Sons of the Soil' movements, linguistic, caste and communal tensions, growth of ethnic identities and of various kinds of sub-nationalisms, and the visitation of violence on the weaker sections as sudden eruptions of non-secular or obscurantist sentiments in the society. Instead, they should be viewed as *political* expres-

sions arising from the process of redefinition and as demands for renegotiation of the terms of relationships among the socio-economic groups made necessary by the changes in the national economy. The crisis, in this sense, is characterized by the failure of the political system to cope with the legitimation pressures generated by the change. Since party politics has lost the initiative to mediate in this process, the issues of redefinition and renegotiation are being settled outside the pale of the electoral-party system. The need, therefore, is to view the issues of social and national integration not as problems of emotional integration but as a part of the general problem of integration of the whole system based on the emerging character of the national economy

2 The earlier *assumptions* about the Indian political system as a pluralist democracy needs to be modified in the light of the structural changes in the economy and the society. While it is true that the forces of polarization have emerged only at the base of the polity and the mediation role of politics is far from being exhausted to deal with these changes, the forces released have the potential for fragmenting, if not polarizing, the political system, if not attended to in time. A complete polarization of the class-structure accompanied by the consciousness of such polarization may seem today only a theoretical possibility. But what has already occurred is the dichotomization of the pluralities. Thus such dichotomies as Hindu-Muslim, Sikh-Hindu, rural-urban, Sons of the Soil and the outsiders, tribal, non-tribal, and Caste-Hindus and Dalits have acquired bases in the divergence of objective economic interests, although their political expressions may still be in subjective socio-cultural and ethnic terms. Although these dichotomies have yet not acquired a character of the polarized class-structure, — in the absence of a widespread revolutionary movement they may not in the foreseeable future—they can no longer be viewed as several pluralities competing for a share in power within the broad framework of a liberal democracy. With the erosion of the legitimation process on the

one hand, and the non-emergence of a nationwide revolutionary movement that can successfully stalk the legitimacy claims for itself on the other, such dichotomization of the pluralities, in fact, threatens the system with another crisis, namely disintegration. The old habit of dealing with legitimization issues newly arising from the economic realm, not by means of concrete measures of economic policy but by use of populism, ad-hocism and arbitrary centralism is likely to push the system from the present crisis of legitimacy to a more severe crisis of integration, i.e., India's existence as one nation.

3 Finally, the structural changes have implications for the party system as well. It should be, by now, clear that the alternative of reconstructing anything like the Congress system or a system of one party dominance is no longer available. This, notwithstanding the fact that at elections one or the other party may receive massive majorities. This is because the structure and the character of the public realm has radically changed. Interests are no longer 'generalizable' and the politicised people now press for divergent interests to be served by the political-bureaucratic authority.

**E**ven if elections continue to remain free and open, the pattern that has emerged since 1967 is likely to continue whatever the nature of immediate election issues, there will be a see-saw pattern of alternation of regimes between the Congress and the non-Congress parties. The moot question is for how long can the system withstand the legitimization pressures that are generated through this process. The possibility of such alternation getting stabilized in a durable party system depends on how the larger issues of the system as a whole are tackled by the party in power. So far there is no indication either of a will or of having acquired the ability to tackle these issues. Some tinkering with the problems will go on. But that cannot assure stabilization of the political process into anything like a one-party dominance system.

Nor is the possibility of a coalition of parties forming government

and surviving in power for long any more real. A successful working of coalition is possible only in politics which do not face economic crises or have basically solved the primary problems of the economy so that politics is freed from pressures arising from the economy and where the economy more or less takes care of itself. In other words, coalitions can succeed only when conditions are ripe for decoupling the economic system from the political system. Such conditions are too far away from the reality of Indian politics today.

**I**n the circumstances, the party in power has one of two choices. It can go on spouting the populist rhetoric particularly at election times, while resorting to increasing repression of the demands from below and their political expressions. The populist rhetoric could take the form of cries of 'threat to national security' when the familiar slogans begin to fall on deaf ears. The repression could take the form of an 'external Emergency' and/or large-scale action against the 'extremists'.

The other choice is to sit up, take note of the structural changes which have cumulatively taken place in the Indian society and polity and concentrate on the performance which will enable the regime to meet economic demands in the sphere of the economy itself (Greater employment and releasing pressure on land, reasonable wages, higher returns for agricultural produce and consequently the break-up of monopoly houses and big business).

All such economic measures, however, will come to naught if the social-structural bottlenecks that have stopped the percolation of developmental benefits to the vast population below the poverty line are not removed. The removal of these bottlenecks would require a new socio-economic policy embodying bold initiatives aimed at democratization and decentralization of the existing political and economic structures.

In other words, this would be a charter of radical socio-economic changes through the intervention of the State-power, a capacity that the

Indian State has already lost. Considering the nature of the present State wherein crime and corruption are no longer outside problems to be tackled by the State, but have themselves become the bases of the State power, such an expectation has hardly any basis in reality.

**T**here is a second possibility inherent in the situation. It is that the new forces released by the structural changes discussed in this essay may throw up political counter elites outside the present party system. In a manner of speaking, the generation of counter-elites has already been under way for about a decade in the form of voluntary activists, independent trade union leaders, the activists of the newly emergent non-electoral political groups and the various civil-liberties groups, social workers who are party drop outs, and such others from religious bodies.

They are barely visible on the scene largely because they suffer from 'localities', they are separated from one another by the micro problems with which they are grappling. They cannot come together as a political force simply because no general theory for political action which is based on the Indian reality is available to organize them. They can assert their counter-validity claims only by organizing themselves into a nation-wide political formation that might eventually take the shape of an alternative national political party. The existing 'revolutionary' parties by themselves are unlikely to become such a political formation — even if they stop fracturing and come together. For this to happen, a widespread revolutionary movement has to come into existence.

The bases of a new political formation that could successfully assert the counter-validity claims to the political authority will have to be sought in the new politics of empowering the poor of India and in joining together the activists and organizations involved in this process. They will have to operate in a much wider space and have to address themselves to the issues arising from the crisis of the whole political system.

# The hindu problem

NIRMAL MUKARJI

THIS paper seeks to put forward a line of thought stemming from reflections over the growing social tensions and conflicts in national life. Its central theme is that a great deal depends on how Hindus face the challenges of today and tomorrow. It is in this sense that the existence of a Hindu problem is perceived.

Such a perception implies that cultural and religious identities are important for analysing the interplay of forces between social groups. There could be, and are, other valid and useful approaches. But no approach can claim to provide more than a partial explanation of the phenomenon it deals with, and no more is claimed for the one used here. The aim is to draw attention to certain groupings and forces which seem to be of crucial importance at the present juncture, especially in the context of national integration.

It is suggested that the governing class in India in cultural and religious terms may be characterised as Hindu, for Hindus are the largest group making for 82.7 per cent of the country's population. Numbers, of course, are not the only guide to influence and power. Command over material and other resources is also important. But even by the test of resources, Hindus are way ahead of others. To extend, in M. N. Srinivas' concept of dominant caste, used in the local context of village and district, Hindus are clearly the dominant group at the national level. Their overwhelming predominance, in fact, makes India virtually a Hindu country.

If the description of the Hindu as the dominant leadership group is correct, India's future largely depends on where Hindus are minded to take this country. They are the governing variable, outweighing other factors by far. If we go forward — morally, politically, economically — it will be mainly because Hindus want it that way. If the converse happens, or if

there is stagnancy, it will be because Hindus let the country down. All Indians consequently have a stake in what Hindus think and do. Do they have a proper vision of the country's future? Do they have the capacity to remould Indian society and take it to the desired future? How Hindus reorganize themselves and re-order their relations, within Hindu society as well as with non-Hindus, becomes in this context a matter of prime national importance. What non-Hindus do with themselves or how they reorder their relations, internal or external is no doubt important. But they cannot, by virtue of their numbers or resources at their command, shape the destiny of the nation the way Hindus alone can.

The role Hindus are called upon to play as the dominant group casts a heavy responsibility on them. There is in this sense a very real Hindu problem. The centrality of this came to the fore suddenly when India became independent. For centuries before that Hindus had been governed by others. They had all but lost the memory of rulership, especially in the northern regions of the country. Independence transformed them into the governing group. It is part of universal human experience that, while events may take place cataclysmically, attitudes change slowly. The essence of the Hindu problem is the need to shed centuries' old attitudes of a governed group and to develop new attitudes appropriate to the task of governing a great country.

Defined thus the Hindu problem is far from being solved. Old attitudes are still very much there. For instance, a journal recently carried a six-part article titled 'Hindu society under siege', the burden of which was that Hindu society was 'in mortal danger as never before'. Again, a newly formed body called the Vriat Hindu Samaj organized a large meeting in New Delhi on the 18th October, 1981. The working president invited people to become

members of the reception committee with the comment that 'the day will not be far off when the Hindus will be in a minority in their own dear motherland. And that will be the end of Hinduism in India.'

A siege mentality is hardly consistent with a preponderantly majority status, nor is the kind of nervousness displayed by the working president. Hindus sometimes give the impression of a majority community suffering from a minority complex. The Hindu problem clearly calls for serious introspection by Hindus.

Hindus, of course, are not a homogenous group. They are divided vertically by language and region and horizontally by caste and now, increasingly, by class. And yet transcending all these divisions is a shared 'Hinduness', moulded by a common historical experience of success and travail. As a result, the Hindu orientations to personal life and society, and the mode of response to issues and events in the country, are strikingly similar across the various divides that characterize the community.

Even while taking note of their cultural oneness, it is necessary to recognise that there is among the Hindus a 'core and periphery' phenomenon. No community can escape from this whatever be the principles determining its social organisation. Groups as large as the Hindus cannot but be characterised by differentials in the distribution of all kinds of resources and, therefore, in power and influence. It is those favoured in such a distribution who constitute the 'core' while the others form the 'periphery'. When the community is virtually coterminous with the country, as are the Hindus in India, then it is the core of that community which sets the pace and leads, not only the community, but the country as well.

The core Hindus were at one time — not so far back — the upper castes only. The political process has brought the middle castes also into the core area. As a perceptive writer has observed, we have the rule of the middle castes in the states and an alliance between the

middle and higher castes at the Central level. Therefore, the core Hindus now comprise the upper and middle castes, the periphery being occupied by the lower castes, the Scheduled Castes and some of the Scheduled Tribes. In terms of power and influence the former are unquestionably supreme, though in numbers they may be a fraction of the Hindu population.

It is these core Hindus who constitute the real governing class of the country. The fact that there is some degree of cooptation into the governing process from peripheral Hindus and from the minorities makes little difference. Nor does the support in terms of votes which one faction or the other of the core Hindus manages to secure from excluded groups such as Harijans and Muslims at elections. As of now, it is the core Hindus who count, and it is they whose perception of the Hindu problem is going to make or break this country.\*

Two basic concepts thus emerge. The Hindu problem and a Hindu core. The task to which core Hindus must address themselves is immense, for it ultimately amounts to nothing less than shaping the future of India. They possess inestimable assets being, on the one hand, the inheritors-in-chief of India's 'great tradition' and, on the other, the effective repositories of political power at all levels — central, State and local. So far these enormous assets appear to have been utilised primarily for maintaining the elite status of this group, despite all talk of planning and social changes.

But there is, happily, another trend also. It is after all the core Hindus who, along with others, adopted the Constitution with its emphasis on adult suffrage and human rights. And it is the process

\*Gandhi's remarks are relevant. 'How is this Union to behave? Already the taunt is being levelled against the Union that the much-maligned caste Hindus will ostracize the millions of the Scheduled Castes and (I will add) an equal number of Shudras and the so-called aboriginal tribes. And then, what of the other insignificant minorities? The so-called caste Hindus are on their trial. Will they recognize and do their obvious duty and give place to the least in the Union by affording them all the facilities to rise to the highest status?'

of elections and the rest initiated that has resulted in the politicisation of the masses. Core Hindus have thus been instrumental in generating new and powerful forces ranged mostly against themselves.

This is not at all an undesirable outcome. But it is an outcome which calls for new relationships being worked out between core Hindus and the newly emerging forces. These other forces, though qualitatively new, fall under familiar categories: Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Muslims and other minorities.

The Chinese flag has a large star and four small ones ranged around representing the dominant Hans and the four ethnic minorities. The Indian situation is not too different: the dominant Hindus and the four categories mentioned. The Chinese saw their problem, first and foremost, as one of thoroughly overhauling Han society and, secondly, fashioning new links with the four minorities. Here, too, there is a parallel for us. The core Hindu society could do with an overhaul, especially in attitudes, so that thereafter there could be a fresh approach in dealing with each of the four categories.

How does a dominant group in a plural society overhaul itself? The Hans in China accomplished this feat through a revolution led by Hans. Is there a way by which core Hindus may perform a similar feat but without a revolution?

It is instructive to see how Gandhi dealt with this problem. Before his arrival on the Indian scene, there had, in modern times, been significant reform movements led by Ram Mohan Roy, Swami Vivekananda and Swami Dayananda. There had also been Tilak's revolutionary reinterpretation of the *Bhagwad Gita* linking the way of action to the struggle against foreign rule. These movements had caused a ferment but, by and large, Hindu society still lay in the withdrawn and fragmented state which survival strategies had forced upon it over the centuries.

One of Gandhi's great contributions was that he mobilised



Hindus throughout India — the intelligentsia as well as the masses — and gave them a common purpose. He did so as a devout Hindu, using religious idioms and symbols. In the process, he stressed values such as truth, non-violence, tolerance and concern for the poor and the oppressed, thus elevating Hindu thinking to a high plane. Here was an overhaul job done on the dominant group without revolution.

The essence of the method employed was a charismatic leader *plus* a worthy goal—freedom—*plus* a value system distilled from the best in Hindu tradition. The enlightened attitudes that were generated evoked confidence amongst Harijans, Adivasis and all minorities except, regrettably, Muslims. That the Gandhian method could not prevent the emergence of the two-nation theory and its inevitable consequence, the partition of India, was as much due to the overhaul of Hindu attitudes not having gone far enough as to the inability of the Muslims to throw off the burden of historical memories.

**W**ith independence and the passing away of Gandhiji, the mantle fell on Nehru. He was not a Hindu of the traditional mould but his credentials were impeccable, for he was from the top-drawer caste and, further, had Gandhiji's own sponsorship. Thus, although he was un-Gandhian in many ways with his stress on modernisation through science and technology, he was acceptable to core Hindus.

In his time they went through a second phase of overhaul. The exhilarating early years of Nehru's prime ministership, when ambitious development plans were launched and India shone on the world stage, gave them hope and self-confidence. They acquired experience of governance and of the political power game. It was during this stage that they established themselves as the governing class.

Nehru's liberal and thoroughly secular outlook kept them, by and large, away from communal extremism. Consequently, the relationship of this class with groups outside the core was generally marked by

tolerance and moderation. Nehru, as Gandhi before him, proved to be a good manager of Hindus, for he led them into higher responsibilities and maturer attitudes.

The technique he employed was a mix of personal charisma *plus* the vision he projected of a new India *plus* a modern value system. It had much in common with Gandhi's approach, and yet had the stamp of his modern, secular mind. The country's polity could not possibly have been handled without the sober leadership that these two great men provided to the governing class, namely, the core group among Hindus.

The reinvigorating thrusts imparted to this previously dormant group during the Gandhi and Nehru eras have kept the country going, in howsoever disappointing a fashion, in the last two decades. But the momentum seems to be petering out just when problems of an almost unmanageable kind and intensity have begun to crop up. The concerned citizen sees an alarming mismatch between the nature and extent of these problems and the capacity of the governing class to deal with them.

For most of the years since Nehru, Indira Gandhi has been at the centre of the stage. She has served as a rallying point, even allowing for the divisiveness in the ranks of the governing class which has come to be associated with her times. Mainly, hers has been a holding role, while the country wrestles with itself to cope with the powerful new forces of change that have emerged. Meanwhile Indian society, of which Hindu society comprises the main bulk, gives the impression of floundering without a sense of direction.

Are we sliding back to pre-Gandhian lack of purposiveness? Or are we in a 'melting-pot' state of dissolution preparatory to being shaped anew?

**W**hether we slide back or are shaped anew, primordial groupings are unlikely, in the foreseeable future, to yield their primacy to any other way of classifying society. In plain language that means India

will still remain a predominantly Hindu country and the Hindus that matter, in the 'command and control' sense, will still be the core group of upper and middle castes, though in course of time they may come to include some of the uppermost of the lower castes.

Two aspects of the Hindu problem will remain naggingly the same one, the reform of the Hindu core, whatever its new contours, and, two, the reordering of relations between the Hindu core and the various 'out' groups.

**I**n the absence of a Gandhi or Nehru, the stimulus for reform of the Hindu core may have to come from a source other than messianic in nature.

Reform means progressive change. A stimulus like the Meenakshipuram conversions of some Harijans to Islam, however, seems to unleash regressive forces. The near-hysteria shown by core Hindus in reacting to this event is indicative more of their fear — wholly unjustified as it happens — of losing their governing status than of a genuine desire for reform. The president of the Virat Hindu Samaj called for 'a determination to reform Hindu society and specially to eradicate all traces of untouchability.' A noble enough exhortation, but vitiated a good deal by his working president's explicitly worded and absurdly unrealistic apprehension that Hindus might soon become a minority, followed by the non-sequitur that this would mean the end of Hinduism in India.

The mental process which treats becoming a minority as inevitably leading to extinction is highly significant. For, underlying it is a refusal to accept that India is a plural society in which minority groups need not, indeed, do not, face extinction. Unfortunately, the notion is widely prevalent amongst core Hindus, even those whose self-image is that they are secular and tolerant, that national integration means the total assimilation of the minorities by the dominant group.

Not unless Hindus accept the logic inherent in a plural society, that each group must have scope

to express its identity in social and cultural terms, of course within an integrated political and economic structure, and that strategies of assimilation must give way to those of accommodation, can progressive change begin to take place in Hindu society

**T**he concept of assimilation is close to authoritarianism, both rely on the maxim that 'Papa knows best'. On the other hand, the concept of accommodation constitutes the essence of democracy. The prospects of core Hindus wholeheartedly adopting the democratic alternative of accommodation as their guiding principle are not very bright, at least in the near future.

But the extraordinary change that has come about in the attitude of some of the leaders of the BJP, making them more moderate and tolerant, certainly provides reason for cautious optimism. The remarkable success achieved by the Left Front government in West Bengal in maintaining communal harmony and also in giving a fair deal to the down-trodden in the villages is another hopeful sign. Both ends of the political spectrum seem to be contributing, howsoever marginally, to the reform of attitudes in dominant circles.

These and other straws in the wind suggest that the system does not lack the capacity to regenerate from within. May be the reform of the Hindu core is not a lost cause.

The other aspect of the Hindu problem is the need to reorder relations with 'out' groups. Here the prospects are not so bleak, not because of any significant change of heart on the part of core Hindus, but on account of the rising tide of political awareness in these groups resulting in the former being put under pressure as never before.

Whether it is Harijans or Adivasis or Muslims or any other minority — Sikhs, for instance — the pattern is the same: increased politicisation, followed by assertion of identity followed by demands on or clash of interest with the dominant group. The result all too frequently is violence, atrocities in the case of Harijans and Adivasis, communal

riots in the case of Muslims and so on. The interesting feature is that, despite enormous suffering at the hands of the repositories of power, the assertion of identity continues unabated.

Sooner rather than later, core Hindus will need to face up to what is becoming a realpolitik situation. Their undoubted superiority in power is being matched by the steadily increasing power of these other groups. Political wisdom demands that the superior power should, in its own interest and in the larger interest of the country, stop treating these other powers as adversaries and negotiate with them for a just and peaceful accommodation within the framework of a plural society.

**T**he alternative may be a marked increase in violence and a prolongation of the transitional phase we are going through. This would harm all, but the superior power having the biggest stake by far will naturally stand to lose more than others.

The key to the problem thus seems to lie in accommodation. One needs to be clear about the meaning to be assigned to this word. Accommodation should not be construed as concessions given by the power group to others, but rather as an approach in which Harijans, Adivasis, Muslims and the rest are accorded equal rights and treated as equal partners.

Policies of accommodation would, in the case of Muslims and other minorities, be facilitated if there were to be moderation and tolerance on all sides. Equally, they would be hampered in the face of extremism on any side. Unfortunately, extremism breeds its counterparts in other groups, somewhat like induced magnetism. Consequently, it needs to be eschewed by all groups.

And here it is for core Hindus as the dominant group to provide the lead by giving up extremist attitudes once and for all. This would be entirely consonant with the best in their 'great tradition' heritage. They should come into the moderate centre and deal with others from there in a spirit of genuine tolerance and respect, equality and justice.

This kind of strategy would lose credibility if there were to be departures in the event of occasional lapses on the part of any of the minorities. Persevered with, the strategy could in time be expected to evoke adequate reciprocal responses from others.

It needs to be stressed that the minorities too have a role and a responsibility to avoid extremism and move towards fully participative Indian citizenship with all that that involves.

**T**he assumption underlying this paper is that it is pre-secular or primordial factors that hold sway at present. This is not to belittle the importance of secular factors such as the democratic process and political parties, economic development and economic interest groups, the modernisation process and science and technology and, not the least, the international setting.

The Constitution has placed high value on India being a secular State and for three decades we have functioned and developed under that dispensation. Secularism and secular factors of the type mentioned have discernibly taken root. In time they may grow to prevail over factors such as community and caste. Public policies must in any case aim to bring this about as soon as possible.

But today's reality and that of the foreseeable future is that primacy belongs to primordial factors. This reality informs the foregoing analysis.

Altogether new forces may emerge in time, rendering the primordial coordinates used in this analysis obsolete. Women, for instance. Or youth. And, of course, the dynamics of the democratic and developmental processes are such that slowly but surely the poor of all communities and castes are getting organised. We may not have to depend entirely on the unlikely possibility of the power-wielding section of Hindus becoming enlightened enough while there is still time. The rules of the game may in that case change. But to believe that, you have to be an optimist like this writer.



# Conversions

DEV DUTT

IT has been generally admitted that at a particular stage of mankind's spiritual and moral development, mass conversions, following the rise of new religions, marked a significant movement in the direction of higher forms of freedom, equality and solidarity

The Indian mind, particularly in the past, endorsed large scale conversions under certain circumstances. First, when an individual underwent a spiritual metamorphosis regardless of material or objective conditions and came to the conclusion that a change of faith was unavoidable for achieving self-realization. Second, when a large cross-section of people belonging to different sects adopted a new faith under the inspiration of a spiritual leader or savant. Third, when a leader, who had a deep historical perspective, advised his followers to change their religion.

The article 25 (1) of the Indian Constitution which grants the followers of all religions the freedom to profess, practise and *propagate* the tenets of their respective religious faiths and to exercise individual freedom of conscience, too, has

created a climate of opinion favourable to a change of faith.

In so far as Tamil Nadu is concerned, Meenakshipuram is not a beginner in blazing the trail of conversions. In fact, conversions are a part of the social scene in that State. The ethos of Muslims in Tamil Nadu, according to Mattison Mines, is more egalitarian than that in north India. And, since the caste-system is rigorous and rigid in this area, Harijans have quite often changed their faith and adopted Islam.

Moreover, the statistics of conversions in Meenakshipuram are unspectacular. According to government reports, about 2,000 people have changed faith during the past few months in Tamil Nadu. These along with the mass conversions elsewhere in India after 19 February 1981 ought to have gone unnoticed—considered a non-event. But, they did not.

The content of the entire debate on conversions is unimpressive in the sense that there is little fundamental difference among the different schools of opinion in regard to the consequences. But, a pre-emi-

nently significant feature of the Meenakshipuram episode is the way the spokesmen of the reactionary and backward-looking elements, the leaders of conservative and traditionalist public opinion who, all these years, were forced to lie low and to adopt an extremely defensive posture, suddenly recovered their confidence, they beat their opponents, and exploited the Meenakshipuram episode to revive and renovate, refurbish and rake up, strengthen and sharpen, the fading images and memories of traditional theological approaches to life and living in the mind of a large cross-section of people, including even the Nehruvian secularists. With an impressive repertoire, consisting mainly of star-performers among the godmen and the guardians of priest-craft, they managed to put up a great show

**H**aving pressed into service all the visual, verbal and material resources of modern and traditional mass communication methods—demonstrations, conventions and conferences, ritual and ceremony—they mounted a massive propaganda offensive which, by virtue of its extravagance and spread, is unprecedented. Except in 1967, when a massive India-wide campaign was mounted by the forces of reaction in favour of a ban on cow slaughter, never since 1951 when India proclaimed itself a secular State, have the audiovisual faculties of our people been treated to such a rich feast of revivalist imagery and language through ceremonies, pomp, pageantry and ritualistic extravaganza as they were during July 1981 and October 1981

The religious showmanship with which our people were regaled to the detriment of whatever secular ethos may have existed, deserves to be recalled

Impressive ceremonies of Swamis prostrating before Harijans, e.g., *Namboodari* brahmins and *kshatriyas* of the former Cochin royal family went to the *Sri Andavar temple* to be anointed with holy water by Kuppuswami, a temple priest who is a Tamil Harijan. The occasion was the visit to the shrine of Sri Jayendra Sarawati of Kanchi

Kamakot Peeth. The high-born prostrated themselves before Kuppuswami just as Adi Shankara was reported to have prostrated himself before Chandala

Ostentatiously organised conversion rituals in the presence of hundreds and thousands of observers, *havans* and *yagnas* in which Muslims and Christians were re-converted to Hinduism. Crowds chanting the *Kalima*, and mass prayers under gaily decorated *shamianas*, exuding musk, where groups of Harijans in black Muslim caps and clean shirts and colourful *lungis* where initiated to Islam by *maulvis* and *mullas*

In 5,000 temples in one State, the government and temple authorities organized *Sambandhi bhojanams* (community feasts). The Chief Minister himself feasted with the Harijans

Lakhs of people attended the spectacular Virat Hindu Sammelan rally at which were presented a galaxy of godmen and gurus, pujaris and priests, *swayam sevaks* and social workers, Arya Samaj demagogues and Sanatani pundits and several other representing sixty and odd distinct sects. Some of the personages were beturbaned, some bare-bodied, some wrapped up in saffron, some decked with traditional religious marks

**W**e are told that the four *Shankaracharyas* met and deliberated about the issues raised by the Meenakshipuram conversions. Other intellectuals and scholars also held discussions. But the result was disappointing. The Hindus, usually known for their perception, responded this time rather mechanically, dogmatically and hysterically against conversions and untouchability and in defence of a theological and religious view of life and society at scores of *sammelans* all over India. There, people were given refresher courses in conservatism and that, too, in a language reminiscent of the heyday of the RSS and Hindu Sabha in pre-Independence India

They simply high-lighted one casual factor, one generalized mo-

tive, and one aspect of the entire episode and viewed it as an 'assault' or an 'invasion' of the minority on the majority—and also as an 'anti-national act' against national security and integrity and culture

**T**hese champions of Hinduism represented by the RSS, the Arya Samaj, the Rama Krishna Mission and Sarva Seva Sangh were obsessed with memories of partition 34 years ago, but had failed to notice the recent happenings in Kelvenmeni, Villupuram, Belchi, Pipra, Bistrampur, Narainpur, all examples of atrocity against the Harijans

The mass conversions were attributed to the *appeasement* policy of the political parties—a fact which, they argued, had emboldened the Muslims to abuse the liberal provisions of the Constitution. It was a demographic threat to the majority—an attempt to upset the balance of communal forces in India. There was an excessive concern about the upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism in the neighbouring countries. Consequently, the large inflow of petro dollars in the coffers of several Islamic organizations in India was interpreted as a part of a conspiracy against the Hindus

If the characterization of Meenakshipuram based on fear, diffidence and bigotry was unrealistic and superficial, then the prescriptive aspect of the intellectual response of the Hindu leaders was jejune and ridiculous. With unusual ardour, many religious overtures were made to the Harijans—programmes of construction of temples in areas where Harijans live, adoption of Harijan villages by the temple managements, distribution of uniforms to the poor children attached to the temple schools, marriages of poor Harijans to be conducted by the Hindu temple managements—as if the Harijans' sole concern was to gain equal access to religious institutions and to assuage the hunger for being considered ritually pure

The response of the non-RSS Hindu and other secularists, including the progressives was a contrast to the impassioned, loud and

spectacular response of the RSS-Hindus: it was feeble, muted, pale and limp, simplistic and superficial; uninspiring, conventional and stereotyped. In terms of attitudes, the non-RSS Hindus were either indifferent or showed disdain or calculated reticence.

**I**n the first instance, the non-RSS Hindus and other secularists did not care to consider all the facts about the conversions. In this respect, their analysis suffered from the same type of selective perception as that of the RSS-Hindus. Secondly, they also established an incorrect co-relation between the facts. Thirdly, they did not see the facts in the larger perspective.

Concretely stated, the thinking of the non-RSS Hindus was also conditioned by (i) the use of foreign funds, (ii) the allegedly conspiratorial propensities of the Islamic fundamentalists within and without India, (iii) memories of partition in 1947 and the recent Hindu-Muslim tensions, (iv) the state of India-Pak relations, (v) a lurking suspicion about the bonafides of Muslims in India and (vi) opportunistic political considerations.

If the RSS-Hindus were revivalistic and chauvinistic, (in addition to being un-Hindu in a fundamental sense), the non-RSS Hindus were inspired by an equally dangerous consideration, viz., to justify the status quo. They completely exonerated the present power elite from the direct responsibility for creating a situation in which mass conversions took place.

In fact, the Meenakshipuram conversions revealed that the leaderships of the non-RSS secular forces (excluding the progressives) and that of the RSS-Hindu forces were political cousins who together bemoaned the conversions. Instead of coming out openly and effectively against the attempts of the RSS-Hindu opinion leaders who exploited the situation, they showed considerable sympathy and gave indirect support to what RSS-Hindu leaders did in response to Meenakshipuram.

Take the role of the Congress(I) in regard to the Hindu Virat Sam-

melan. Here is a report which speaks for itself regarding the avowed protagonist of secularism in India. 'The fervour created by the formation of the Samaj will not go unnoticed among politicians. In fact, Congress(I) leaders from as far as West Bengal, Orissa, Kerala and Maharashtra attended the rally. Veer Bahadur, the Uttar Pradesh transport minister and Surender Singh, the minister of state for home, had come along shepherding their supporters. Two Congress(I) MPs from Delhi reportedly organized about 60 buses. A Haryana Congress(I) MLA persuaded a few thousand workers at the Faridabad industrial belt to attend the rally.

'For Congress(I), which claims that its main support base is among the Harijans as well as the Muslims, the involvement with the Sammelan, naturally, had to be discreet. The Harijans constitute 15 per cent of the electorate in India. But, for the RSS, it provided a unique opportunity to broaden its base and to win support from a population group which always looked upon it with suspicion.

'Nevertheless, the rally was interpreted by most observers as an attempt at renewal of communication between caste Hindus and the Harijans. To that extent, it cannot but go against the strategic interest of both Congress(I) and Congress(J) — the parties that are wont to utilise the Harijans as well as the Muslims as one composite vote bank.'

**H**ere are a few more instances which illustrate the thinking of Congress(I) men. A Congress(I) MLA in Tamil Nadu eulogized the RSS in public and described it as a saviour and protector of Harijans. B V Desai, a Congress(I) M P in the Lok Sabha introduced a private member bill entitled 'Prohibition of All Foreign Missionaries Functioning in India on Religious Basis 1981'.

The Bill sought to ban 'preaching of all religions and helping in conversion of the poor from one religion to another'. But the bill was withdrawn by Desai at the suggestion of some MPs during the debate which followed the introduction of the bill in the Lok Sabha.

In this connection, there is one more point which casts further doubt on the Congress(I). The government has asked several official agencies to make enquiries about the main cause for conversion, but none of the findings have been disclosed. Why? Also, why such discreet silence about the role of foreign funds? Why has government not taken effective steps to remove the factors which contributed to the mass conversions? Or if the mass conversions were justified, why did government not come out against the communal forces trying to exploit them?

**T**ake also the case of equivocation in the BJP and its front organization. The youth wing of the BJP described conversions as 'organised subversion' and called upon government to act boldly to thwart the international conspiracy. But the party took a neutral stand in public and yet sent a representative to the Virat Hindu Sammelan. One of the BJP members in the Lok Sabha actually drafted a bill providing for a ban on conversions, but there were differences within the party on this, so he did not press the point. The episode is, nevertheless, revealing.

The Janata Party failed even to pass a resolution on mass conversions because of serious differences within the National Executive. Their leaders have been expressing themselves differently on the issue. For example, take Shahabuddin and Ram Dhan. While the former endorsed mass conversion, the latter attended a rally against mass conversion, viz., the Virat Hindu Sammelan in Delhi.

Though not explicitly stated, two principles are supposed to determine the attitude of the CPI (M) to the general issue of conversions, mass or otherwise. First, like all other political parties who profess secularism, in principle the CPI (M) considers conversions unobjectionable. Secondly, it believes that the liberation of the communal minorities will come when they join the mainstream of democratic struggle and free themselves from the bondage of a minority community outlook.

One wonders why the CPI (M) has desisted from examining recent conversions in the light of these two principles? Why has it not taken a public stand against the attempts of the RSS-Hindu to extract the maximum advantage out of the Meenakshipuram episode? Why has it been silent? Moreover, if the CPI (M) considers the mass conversions in Meenakshipuram as unique, why has it not come out with an authentic secular interpretation of these conversions?

In fact, one gets an impression that the CPI (M) has not even maintained a position of equidistance between Hindu fundamentalism and Islamic fundamentalism in so far as Meenakshipuram is concerned. It seems to be soft on the former and rather harsh on the latter. Like other parliamentary political parties which claim commitment to secularism, the CPI (M) seems to have allowed the politics of the vote to dictate its social commitments, by so doing it has not only failed the cause of secularism in India, but allowed the RSS-Hindu-led reaction to take over. This goes for all the political parties formally committed to secularism.

Since the RSS has entered the field of social action in a big way, particularly the eradication of untouchability, it should see no reason for not accepting the support of any political party, including the Congress(I). And there are indications that a shift has taken place in the attitude of the RSS towards the Congress(I). As if encouraged by the attitude of the Congress(I) leaders to the Virat Hindu Sammelan, it has begun to think of Congress(I) as an ally in the defence of Hinduism against what it calls the onslaught of Islamic fundamentalism. And there are also indications that for reasons of its own, the Congress(I) leadership is inclined not to disappoint the RSS. It is understood that the lines of communication between Congress(I) and RSS leaders in the top echelons of the parties have been established. As regards the RSS and BJP, there is some suggestion that the former no longer wishes to put all its political eggs in one basket. It does

not want the latter to be its sole front organization.

Decades ago, the leadership of the secular parties took upon the responsibility of working for secularism, socialism and democracy, for, it was believed that these values alone could ensure unity and integrity for a plural society. During the recent period we have seen how even socialistic values have been scuttled or quietly modified. We have also seen how democracy has been surreptitiously distorted. Though we cannot endorse this betrayal, we can understand the compulsions and constraints of the leadership of the parties to come *together*, yet not act unitedly in this respect. But we fail to understand why the secular parties have betrayed secularism — a social value which is the basis of their very existence — and why they have abetted the forces of reaction and conservatism.

It is difficult to say how much concrete political advantage has been derived by the forces of reaction during the past six months. But one thing is clear. They have succeeded in rendering the political mind of India quite sympathetic — and receptive — to the philosophy of communalism as propagated by the RSS. Even some progressive and Nehruvian secularists have been converted.

In the past, the Hindus never considered the political or the communal to be primary or primordial for survival. The Indian mind, as such, has been traditionally less concerned with the State or with the community than with the personal and the individual salvation or *Nirvana*. The concept of collective consciousness, in the modern sense, has been alien to the Hindu mind. Particularly Hindu individuals have no doubt laid down their lives for their faith. But they generally did not think primarily in terms of a 'collective' pan-Indian response to religious aggressions. In fact, as a 'community', they did not bother to protest or to feel angry. They remained generally unaffected as a community to the various assaults by other religions and cultures.

This attitude was based on a supreme self-confidence. It was also rooted in the realization that all manifestation of fervour and commitment cannot be maintained at boiling point for long, that it is unwise and uneconomical to expend human resources in mobilizing countervailing forces against this kind of assault. A better strategy is to let the frenzy of the assault exhaust itself in time and if anything of it still remains, to use its own momentum for beating it down.

But by dexterously exploiting the fact of the flow of petro-dollars in the area, by emphasizing the role of 'Islamic fundamentalists' in the mass conversions, the RSS and others have not only deviated from this approach but they have in a sense got Islamized, as it were.

Mohammad established the first Muslim State with well-defined civil and penal laws. It is quite in order for Muslims to feel the need to have a State which can pass just laws in conformity with the *Koran* and which can promote a feeling of solidarity among them. No wonder, then, if the Muslim world is again astir with fundamentalist upsurge and the clergy are out to dominate the political culture and religious life of the Muslim.

The RSS has achieved in six months what they failed to do during the past 55 years, viz., intensification and creation of a feeling of 'community-mindedness'. Now, more and more Hindus have begun to think the Islamic way — viz., seek the support of State power for its survival, build up a political consciousness based on religion and theology. It is not only un-Hindu, but is tantamount to creating Hindu fundamentalism which certainly is un-Hindu.

This tendency toward fundamentalism is un-Indian in a basic sense. The Indian mind has an extraordinary accommodative capacity. It is all inclusive. It is a mind that has refused to be 'shocked and surprised'. On the basis of its long history it has had to comprehend and reckon with all varieties of human predicaments. Now the Hindu

chauvinists are working to deprive the Indian mind of this ineffable quality.

In their eagerness to make a 'psychological break-through', the leaders of Hinduism failed to face many fundamental questions raised by the Meenakshipuram conversions. First, can you change the social order by reverting to *Sanatan Dharma*, when religion has ceased to be an instrument of social change?

Secondly, the question is 'Why should Harijans remain Hindus?' One might well ask, 'why should lions remain lions?' In other words, does it mean that you are Hindu by birth and change of religion means uprooting one-self culturally. Hindu leaders have not faced this question. They assume that Harijans are still committed to Hinduism, hence the attempts to pacify their religious sensibilities regarding temple entry and ritual purity.

Thirdly, Hindus refuse to face the critical question whether it is time that Hindu philosophy be delinked from Hindu ritualism and social structure?

Fourth, if religion and social structure are inseparable parts of the Hindu polity, how will the *adivasis*, the Harijans and others be adjusted within Hinduism?

Both the RSS Hindus and the non-RSS Hindus along with other secularists seems to have uncritically accepted that Hindu society is *solely* responsible for the state of affairs which forced the Harijans to ultimately decide to opt out and embrace Islam. But, this is not the whole story. Political advantage, financial considerations, economic conflict, police excesses all play a part.

Further, it appears that the phenomenon of conversions from one religion to another (and reconversions) is the symptom of a fundamental malady in the Indian polity. For example, how can we explain only in terms of 'weaknesses of Hinduism' the fact (1) that in many parts of India Harijan and Christians have embraced Hinduism, (2)

while harassment and humiliation forced the Harijans in Tamil Nadu to change their faith, the atrocities in Bihar led the Harijans towards Naxalism.

Perhaps, the people are groping. Be it a fundamentalist secular panacea like Marxism or be it a fundamentalist religious panacea like conversion or be it the process of internalization of corruption, they clutch at any alternative to the prevailing system which is becoming dysfunctional.

Political corruption, administrative inefficiency coupled with religious bigotry, general criminalization of society, imbalance and disharmonious social, economic and cultural development, arrested secular development, break-down of moral values and erosion of the spirit of solidarity, if all these factors have jointly operated in Meenakshipuram and elsewhere, how can we hope that reform within Hindu society and resolution of certain inner contradictions and removal of the lacunae in Hinduism alone will help.

In short, Meenakshipuram is a microcosm of the national situation which is itself a culmination of the developments during the past thirty four years. For example, who is responsible for the inordinate delays in implementing the provisions of reservations and similar other welfare programmes formulated for the upliftment of Harijans? Who is responsible for failure of the political and criminal judicial system in the rural areas? Who is responsible for the general lawlessness and spread of thuggery in the districts, partly due to slack implementation of laws relating to fire arms?

During an epidemic, it is the weakest and the most vulnerable sections which suffer the most, in the same way, in a sick, moribund and corrupt system the Harijans, the tribals and other weaker sections are likely to be more seriously affected. It would be wrong to pick up statistics of mortality and morbidity of these sections and relate them to their religion.

Finally, the Meenakshipuram conversions can be seen in a larger historical perspective. In a fundamental sense, India is involved in a process of moving out of one type of civilization and culture into another type of civilization and culture. To put it concretely, it is being compelled and impelled to move out of a traditional-religious-humanist structure (*dharmic* culture) into a secular-humanist structure (secular culture).

In the past *dharma* (for which there is no English equivalent and which is not a synonym of religion and theology) served as a basis of harmony and unity and solidarity. In other words, *dharma* was the cause and consequence of the compositeness of the Indian society.

No doubt Indian history is punctuated by episodes or interludes of clashes and tussles and conflicts; but on the whole, it originated and grew up to maturity in an environment of conciliation, cooperation and coexistence. It was a product of three cultural streams. Now we are, at short notice, moving from complementarity to conflict, from cooperation to confrontation, from aggregation and fusion to atomization and fission, from restraint to expression, from collective consciousness to individualism. But at the same time we are trying to discover and create secular bases of unity. In other words, a civilization is being transformed into a nation-State, which is the secular focus of collective allegiance, stability, unity and security.

In a basic sense, the Meenakshipuram conversions express the agony of a leaderless people taking a quantum leap from *dharmic* culture into a secular culture. They do not know the bases of unity of the alternate secular culture. They have not acquired a new idiom of expression to understand the new culture. They are painfully trying to interpret and understand, on their own, the new in terms of old idioms. The tragedy is that the secular forces in India, instead of helping the people, have become the allies of the conservative forces.

# IMF loan as a mirror

MRINAL DATTA-CHAUDHURI

POLITICAL controversies over important macro-economic policy questions provide valuable materials to the social scientists who are interested in the process of growth or stagnation of an economy. That is because any economy is an inter-dependent system of relationships connecting thousands of variables affecting different sectors, different regions and different social classes. Any perturbation in the macro-economic sphere — i.e., the balance of payments, budget, deficit money supply etc., — typically affect activity levels throughout the economy and thereby the welfare of the different groups of people in the society.

When such a measure generates heated political debates, it throws an important light on the perceptions of the different categories of the political elite regarding the desirability or the undesirability of the changes in the different variables

constituting the political economy of the country. Changes in the macro-economic sphere typically affect thousands of variables and relationships in the economy. But the contestants in any political debate need to be selective, they have to pick up a few of the issues and ignore others. This inevitable process of selectivity reveals the priorities attached to the different spheres of the political economy by the different categories of the political elite jointly responsible for shaping the future of the society.

The recent controversy in the country over India's seeking and eventually receiving about 5 billion U S dollars of medium term loans from the International Monetary Fund is, therefore, a rare event of immense significance to social scientists. It is worth going over the familiar grounds of the IMF loan controversy in broad outline in order to see why India wanted

this loan, what variables are affected by it and why India eventually got this loan, which is the largest ever granted by the IMF to any country. Could India have done without it?

Any borrowing anywhere is an act of augmenting the availability of goods and services today at the cost of the consumption possibilities in the future. Why are we living beyond our means today for which our children will have to pay? Will they blame us or thank us for this? These are the obvious questions which one asks when a family or a nation goes in for massive borrowing. What questions are the leaders of our political culture asking today? What bothers them? And what leaves them cold?

First of all, it is important to see what kind of borrowing it is. Not all external borrowings are acts of 'mortgaging' the future, while some obviously ought to be classified as such. Most successful businesses and developed economies have sustained their growth processes by outside borrowings. Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union are classic examples of this phenomenon. Even today, the U.S.A. is a large borrower from the international money market. So are South Korea, Mexico, Brazil, Italy, Spain, Poland, Zaire and Turkey, to name only a few of the big borrowers in the international scene today. It would be absurd to describe all of them as engaged in the act of 'mortgaging' their future. The distinction may become somewhat blurred but conceptually useful.

Some borrowers borrow because they feel they can generate a higher return in their own businesses than the cost they have to pay to the lender. The massive borrowings abroad by the South Koreans certainly fall in this category. They have over the last fifteen years sustained a phenomenal rate of economic expansion by combining their own resources with substantial external loans. In the case of Poland or Turkey, external loans are sought to avoid an economic disaster or a collapse. It is the fate of this second category of people, the borrowers-in-distress, which moved Prophet Mohammed and St. Thomas Aquinas when they

spoke against usury. Admittedly, India today is a borrower-in-distress.

For better or for worse, India has never wanted to be an aggressive borrower in the external market, our goal has always been one of self-reliance. In fact, given the performance of the economy regarding the productivity of investable resources, it would have been extremely irresponsible to choose any other strategy. These goals and the desire to keep ourselves insured against the vagaries of the international markets and our reluctance to go out in the cold in search of possible gains in the sphere of international commodity exchange still remain the guiding principles of our industrialisation programme. Our achievements in these respects are not negligible. Barring the Soviet Union, few countries in the world today can claim such a high measure of self-reliance for their economies. The Indian economy can hold a siege far better than most economies in the world.

Why then are we sending distress signals abroad and why are we seeking a distress loan? The reason advanced by the Government of India is the recent hike in the price of imported oil. It is true that the import bill on account of petroleum constitutes today a very large fraction of our export earnings. But it is also true that the dependence of the Indian economy on oil as a source of energy is nearly the lowest in the world. Over the last twenty-five years we have systematically tried to keep in check the share of oil as a source of commercial energy from rising by promoting coal, nuclear energy and hydel power. Moreover, we do produce some oil. Compared to Japan or those growing economies of East Asia, the measure of our dependence on oil is quite small. Why then are we in distress whereas they are managing reasonably well?

The principal reason, of course, is that those economies are designed to withstand fluctuations in the external markets much better than we are. Moreover, in our case a number of internal factors contributed to the worsening of the balance of payments position. A number of domestic problems, large-

ly related to the management of the economy, contributed to higher imports or curtailment of exports since domestic production capacities could not be utilized. In other areas the failure of political management led to additional imports, which are unnecessary in the context of the overall resources or availability position within the country. And, finally, the perceived need for military build-up generated the demand for the purchase of arms abroad.

A decline in the performance of the metallurgical and the engineering industries of Eastern India led to a higher net import of iron and steel and a shrinkage in our share of the export trade in engineering goods. For years, experts and expert committees have been trying to identify the principal villain of that story: the railways or the collieries or the power stations or the steel mills; the managers or the trade union leaders or the political bosses. Clearly, a system of behavioural relations linking the agents in the different sectors of the infrastructure and commodity production has created a condition of industrial morbidity. The co-existence of the frequent power-cuts and the very low rates of capacity utilization in the power-plants only illustrates this phenomenon.

This year, despite the fact that the production of foodgrains has been sufficiently high with respect to the aggregate demand in the country, the government is importing a large quantity of grains. It is being done because in the face of the strong opposition from the farm lobby, it cannot procure enough foodgrains from within the country to maintain the urban distribution network. To take another example, the political agitation in Assam took its toll by costing the economy a few hundred crores of rupees worth of additional imports of petroleum products.

The import of cement on a substantial scale is likely to go on for some years. Given price control, the producers do not find it worthwhile to expand production. In spite of the angry debates sparked off by Antulay's method of distributing cement to the builders and the con-



tractors, there is very little debate about the consequences of maintaining this system. In fact, the government recently turned down the offer of a soft IDA loan to the cement industry in order to maintain its current method of cement distribution.

Finally, of course, there are the costs of buying those strike aircrafts, tanks and submarines. Since the midseventies, when our foreign exchange reserves attained a comfortable position, successive governments have been using this foreign purchasing power to satisfy the demands of our military establishment. Now, after the conclusion of the US-Pakistan arms deal, our purchase of military hardware will no doubt increase.

Apart from the rise in the price of oil, these are the reasons why India started sending distress signals to the international financial agencies. Was it avoidable? Can the Bihar and the West Bengal State Electricity Boards be made to perform better? Can the steel industry produce more? Could the Assam agitation be resolved or at least be prevented from imposing such economic damage? Could the farmers' lobby be tamed? Could one have a growing cement industry? And, finally, could we do with fewer tanks, fewer strike aircrafts and fewer submarines?

**W**hat are likely to be the main economic consequences of obtaining the IMF loan? It is inconceivable that any government in the world can get a loan of this magnitude from the IMF without giving a promise of pursuing a deflationary economic policy. Given the rigidities of the various categories of government expenditures and given the strengths of the different lobbies, it is not difficult to guess where the axe will fall. It is the same everywhere in the world. The various welfare programmes (e.g., food-for-work, subsidies on foodgrains distribution etc.), the grants to education and social services will certainly get severe cuts in the future.

Given the economic philosophy which guides the activities of the Fund, it is also fairly easy to guess

that there must have been a promise on the liberalisation of economic policies. But in India's case it is unlikely to be anything of great significance, because the aim of such reforms is to make the functioning of private enterprise easier. But the Indian industrialists do not want a freer foreign trade regime. Some of them might prefer the removal of some of the industrial licensing procedures, but the government is anyway gradually moving in that direction.

The IMF must have given a close examination to the exchange rate. But in these days of floating rates, exchange rate revisions are never anything dramatic. In recent months the French franc and the British pound have fallen considerably, relative to the US dollar. The Reserve Bank of India is constantly altering the position of the rupee vis-a-vis the major currencies. Whatever might have been agreed upon, it is unlikely that the value of the rupee will be altered to the extent of restoring the parity that existed with respect to the pound a year ago.

**I**n short, the economic reforms, which are consistent with the guiding principles adhered to by the IMF, would be of the kind that (a) reduce domestic demand by restricting the flow of purchasing power through the marginal State supported programmes and (b) seek to improve private profitability for domestic producers and exporters. Whatever preferences one may have about trade regimes, no serious analyst can argue that in the short or even the intermediate run, Indian exports can go up substantially in response to price incentives, particularly in today's depressed world market. The problem is one of generating operational flexibility, quality consciousness, marketing skill, and the organizational linkages which tie domestic producers to the larger international market.

The environment in which the industries in India function is quite different from what is needed for that kind of development. Incentives through exchange rate revisions and the removal of certain kinds of barriers cannot do much now or in

the near future. Therefore, the net effect of this kind of conservative fiscal reform will fall on the domestic programmes which provide jobs to the rural poor and consumption subsidies to the various categories of people.

There is one area where the impact of the IMF loan will be clear-cut. The relatively easy credit facilities will lower the cost of the ONGC projects in the field of developing new oil fields.

**W**e have outlined briefly the reasons why India went in for distress borrowing abroad this year as well as the principal economic consequences of obtaining such a loan from the IMF. Now let us see what emerged as the main debating points in the heated political controversy which developed in this context.

I think it is fair to say that the political controversy in the country over the IMF loan has largely centred on the questions of sovereignty and national honour. It has aroused a great deal of anger against the IMF as an instrument of domination employed by neo-imperialist forces in the world. There has been hardly any discussion about the management of the infrastructure, the procurement of foodgrains or the desirability of arms purchase. Nor has there been any analysis of the distributional or the developmental consequences of the reform measures which are consistent with the traditional conditionalities associated with the IMF lending operations.

Of course, the subject of the framework in which the International Monetary Fund operates is a fascinating one. At the time of the setting up of the IMF, there was a controversy over the alternative proposals submitted by Keynes and the US Treasury. It is well known that Keynes' proposal was rejected in favour of the more conservative doctrines of fiscal and monetary management. I would argue that it was bad economics which won and would like to see more enlightened economics informing the operations of the IMF. But it is important to underscore the principle that institutions, whether



national or international, must continue to follow the guidelines on the basis of which they were established until such time as these principles are revised

Secondly, India did not get this year, by all accounts, the kind of harsh treatment which the U K, Italy or Turkey got when they sought loans from the IMF. The reasons are obvious. In spite of massive poverty and stagnation, the Indian economy is generally regarded to be eminently credit-worthy according to the limited standards used by conservative bankers anywhere in the world. There are no fundamental problems afflicting the country's balance of payments and India's record in loan-repayment is excellent. Moreover, unlike the U K or Italy on earlier occasions, India did not approach the Fund for assistance at the last stage of a crisis. India went there when she still had a great deal of room for manoeuvre.

**O**n the question of autonomy, it is important to recognize that any act of borrowing involves restrictions on the borrower's degrees of freedom in certain spheres and added opportunities in other spheres. To the extent that a borrower has to take as given the behaviour of the different kinds of lenders, the essential question to which he should address himself is what is an acceptable trade-off so far as he is concerned. One can illustrate this point by drawing a stylised picture of the present-day international credit market in order to pose the choice problem facing a borrowing country.

Assume that the only source of loanable funds are the oil-rich countries of West Asia. Funds are channelled either through the private banking institutions or through the IMF or else they can be lent directly from the source. The costs attached to each of these options vary along different lines. Private banks will charge 18 to 20 per cent interest on loans and bear the various risks associated with them. The IMF will charge 8 to 10 per cent interest on conditions which it perceives to be important for ensuring the borrower's ability to

repay. Alternatively, one may imagine that the country can obtain the loan directly from the source free of interest on condition, say, that it agrees to introduce interest-free banking in the country or *chadai* for its women. Finally, of course, there is the option of tightening one's belt and doing without the loan. Is there a clear *a priori* answer to the choice problem facing the borrower?

**S**o far we have discussed the problem in terms of the causes and consequences which are primarily economic in nature. It is useful to do this, because it helps us to identify the different variables pertinent to the problem. But, as every one knows, the decision to seek the loan and the decision of the important member-governments constituting the executive board of the IMF to grant the loan application, have had powerful political motivations behind them.

The Government of India asked for the loan this year, because it did not want to face the problem of possibly alienating the powerful interest groups in the country, should the worsening economic situation demand a restructuring of its priorities and a tightening of its economic and political management. In the IMF board, the powerful West European countries did not want to see a decline in India's foreign purchasing power because that might hurt the armament industries in their own countries, which are hoping to fill up their order-books from the Indian shopping list. The Americans had nothing to gain from India's shopping for military hardware, but they did not want to hurt the interests of their European allies. Hence, they made a long speech on the hard-nosed economic philosophy of their President and abstained.

These seem to be the essential elements constituting the drama of India's seeking and receiving the largest single loan ever given by the International Monetary Fund. Who are the gainers and who are the losers? There has been a debate in the country on this. Is it possible to sort out the participants according to who was for what in this debate?

# The defence industry

SRIKANT DUTT

RECENT months have seen the headlines filled with news of huge arms import deals, of Mirage 2000s, MIG-25s and many others. At the same time we are told that India contains one of the Third World's largest arms industries. Does this mean that India's aim of self-sufficiency in defence production pursued since the late 1950s has been a failure? Or have there been other factors at work spurring on these imports?

India today has the third largest armed force in the world, 1,104,000 men under arms in 1979. Its defence expenditure in 1980-81 is Rs 3,600 crores out of a total government outlay of Rs 35,211 crores. Defence expenditure, while only 3.5 per cent of India's GDP in 1977, was however generating much wider industrial activity in the economy. These quantitative factors alone would indicate that India's yearly peacetime defence procurements, irrespective of their source, are many times greater than most other States in the Third World. It is this, for example, which makes India currently the second largest buyer of military aircraft in the Third World. If one accepts that India needs to maintain a defence establishment of such a great size, and no debate has ever been held on this matter, then huge annual procurements become an unalterable

fact. The source of equipment then, whether from indigenous sources or of foreign manufacture is a separate issue altogether from procurements per se.

India's first ordinance factory was built by the British as long ago as 1793. Over the next 150 years, the British, followed by independent India, set up a large network of ordinance factories. In 1947 these defence factories constituted, along with the railways, one of the bases for India's public sector. By 1979 India had over thirty ordinance factories and twenty more defence industrial units, which together employed over 280,000 persons and had an annual turnover of at least 1024 crores. Defence industries also generate over 1.5 million other jobs.

India which has according to some the tenth largest industrial base in the world, finds its defence industries constituting the second largest industrial sector in the country. In other words, the defence industry in India (reserved to the public sector) has since 1947 become an integral part of its all round industrial growth.

There are two arguments concerning the building of defence industries in any country's economy. One posits the view that it is a wasteful expenditure which diverts

budgetary resources that could otherwise be used for more viable industrial and economic development schemes. This view has some validity in ideal situations where countries maintain small armies or, more importantly, have the will independent of defence to build large scale heavy industries with little short term prospects of profitability.

The second view does not deny the wasteful aspects of defence expenditure but sees defence, and particularly the setting-up of defence industries, as an integral part of all round industrial development, particularly in the foundation stages of industrial growth. This is of course irrespective of short term social welfare considerations. This second view clearly has some historical validity if one examines almost every industrial economy that has built a heavy industrial base. The counter examples of Japan and Germany have little validity if one considers the pre-World War Two period (60 per cent of Japan's industrial base was still intact in 1945).

**C**learly, India has shared some of these features in its defence industries, having poured money into defence which in turn has generated some industrial activity, no matter how inefficient and underutilized most industries may be. While it is still debatable just how much defence spending has contributed to industrial growth in India, the evidence tends to support the view that it has hardly acted as a drag as some maintain. What the Indian defence industry has clearly been lacking in order to fulfill the prerequisites of the 'defence-economy' model, has been the defence sector's less than complete integration with the rest of the economy. This does not mean however that the defence sector has not generated some of its own energy which has been felt elsewhere. Procurements, sub-contracts or the spin-off effects have occurred. In 1979, in a sample of 28 defence project contracts with private sector firms, procurements were worth 321 crores. At the same time this was only a fraction of the real potential that defence contracts have for private industry.

Domestic procurements for defence is a factor in measuring the degree of success that India has had in defence self-sufficiency. There are today many situations in which India's private industrialists are simply not interested in becoming linked-up to the defence sector. These industrialists supply defence procurements if they have an item on hand but they are largely unwilling to tailor their production lines to specific defence needs. Some recent examples include a particular type of steel plate used in the manufacture of tanks at the Heavy Vehicles Plant at Avadi. No domestic producer, either in the private or public sector, was willing to manufacture this item as per defence specifications. The result was that it had to be imported.

Some reasons which industrialists put forward for this lack of interest is that the time and paper work for defence items is not worth the trouble, the specifications are too exacting for their taste and contracts are frequently subject to last minute changes. Most importantly, the market demand of defence for many items is not constant and is usually small, often for a specific, small part. Because Indian industry as a whole spends relatively a small amount on research and development, this too acts as an inhibiting factor on domestic defence procurements.

Two more recent examples will suffice to show this picture. India's civilian explosive industry has no interest in developing production lines for serial bombs, nor, for some reason, India's ordinance factories. The net result is that these items have to be imported from Portugal and Spain. Another example concerns thermo-electric technology which is already available to the civilian sector but which the four manufacturers refuse to produce for the Defence Ministry. Cases such as these help to explain why India has to continue to import many vital parts for its defence despite the fact it has the capability to manufacture many of them.

**I**ndia's efforts at self-sufficiency in defence production have been, therefore, a mixed success. Generalising, we can say that in low and

medium technology, that is, in the field of conventional arms and military software, India's policy of building an indigenous arms industry has been a success. The remaining problems are the lack of integration with the rest of industry and a vast underutilized installed capacity which is partly being solved by export. India today manufactures all its own needs in small arms, ammunition, grenades, fieldguns, several types of ships, such as frigates, patrol craft and naval support ships. In the air, India is self-sufficient in training aircraft, short-range interceptors, ammunition and gunnery.

This success in conventional arms production has been the single most important factor in spurring the growth of India's arms exports. This activity began in 1967 and by the late 1970s arms exports had grown tremendously. On India's defence export lists are over 450 items, including field guns, tanks, aircraft, armored vehicles, radars and electronics. It is also true however that some of this equipment is obsolete scrap which India wishes to discard and therefore it is not always Indian manufactured equipment.

**I**n the field of non-conventional weapons, or those in the high technology field, India's policy of fostering indigenous production has been a dismal failure. Domestically produced models of several complex weapons systems have simply not gotten off the ground. On the other hand, sophisticated arms produced under license have been costly to produce and have contributed little to lessen India's overall dependence on foreign suppliers for advanced weapons. Often, key components remain imported from the licensor.

Some of the weapons for which India remains dependent on imports are in the army, tanks, long-range guns, anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank missiles and land mines (plastic). In the navy, submarines, aircraft carriers, long-range naval aircraft, naval surveillance aircraft, naval ammunition such as depth charges, and mines and electronic radar operated guns. In the air force, deep penetration strike aircraft, electronic warfare, heavy bombers, air to air missiles, various

sophisticated radars and bombs. One major reason for the failure of India's efforts to develop its own models of sophisticated arms has been that the over-all level of the industrial economy has simply not been up to the level needed despite all efforts at upgrading.

This factor also affects arms produced under license in India as well. This fact is notwithstanding India's huge technically trained manpower pool. India, despite some research and development expenditures, remains relatively backward in a large number of high technology fields, some of which are indispensable to modern weapons systems. Thus, India is simply unable to produce many of the materials of a high enough standard to be used. For example, even after the setting up of Mishra Dhatu Nigam, India is still lacking in many of the special alloys which high speed aircraft airframes need. Electronics is another field which remains behind.

It is, thus, debatable whether short of more all round industrial growth, a poor country like India, despite all its efforts, can really produce high quality, high technology items on a mass scale for defence, even with the skilled manpower available. Any examination of the history of a number of defence units' projects such as HAL's Marut Fighter or the Main Battle Tank project at Avadi should convince many of this fact.

There are also more organizational reasons for India's failure to become self-sufficient in sophisticated arms. Each defence service has its own research and development wing. This leads to confusion, overlap and a general lack of coordination in weapons development. Thus, the Air Force has its Directorate of Technical Development and Planning, and the Navy its Directorate of Operations and Research. At least in these two services there is only one organization in each, as a result, standards are not totally sub-standard. In the army, however, beneath the Directorate of Weapons each important unit within the army has its own separate research and development organization linked to its training school, where weapons

training-cum-research and testing goes on. Thus, the Armored corps has its own R & D as does Artillery and so on down the line.

Added to this picture is the fact that many defence production units maintain their own R & D units and confusion becomes legion. Even more deadly however are the conflicts between civilian scientists and defence personnel over pay and conditions in each organization which leads to low morale and poor quality of research. A recent example took place in the Army's Directorate of Inspection because of civilian employees' jealousy of army officers' perks. Scientists working in defence research are not allowed to take out their own personal patents and constant bickering and bureaucratic interference destroys many programmes. Scientists of quality generally migrate to the private sector leaving the dullards behind.

This brings us to square one in terms of India's defence needs. Domestic efforts having failed, India today still imports 90 per cent of its sophisticated defence support equipment from abroad, or at least 18 per cent of the total value of indigenous defence production. At the same time, it should be stressed that these imports are of high value but low volume, whereas the bulk of India's defence needs, high volume and low individual value and perhaps more mundane, are met totally from domestic sources.

Countries from which India currently imports defence equipment include Czechoslovakia, France, Britain, Soviet Union, Italy, Spain, Portugal, USA, Belgium and West Germany. Huge arms deals are currently being concluded with the Soviet Union and France for aircraft (Mirage 2000s and MIG-25s and MIG-27s).

One may ask the question — where does the money come from to import all this equipment if India already spends so much supporting its own defence industries? The defence services each year receive a blanket foreign exchange account with which to buy arms from abroad, a pragmatic response to the fact that the domestic defence industry

cannot meet all the country's needs. This of course generates its own vested interest to buy abroad, with the lucrative commissions involved. Yet, if one is looking for strong foreign arms lobbies in India one will have to look hard. With the exception of the French ambassador who is the major promoter of French arms sales to India, other countries are far less organized or at least have been so up to now. British Aerospace has an office in India but other countries generally depend on local Indian agencies which are often fly by night operators in for a big killing, rather than well organized groups. These Indian agents are almost all Delhi based and civil service or politically connected. They operate both as agents to clinch arms buying from abroad as well as promoters of India's own arms exports.

Here we enter the realm of the realities behind the current round of arms buying by India. India's existing defence industry and its success in the field of conventional arms is directly helping to underwrite the cost of importing sophisticated arms. In the field of military software and ammunition, India had earned after 1970 between 400 and 500 crores from exports. Countries to which such materials have been sold include Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Tanzania, USSR and Ethiopia. With the rise in tension in West Asia and East Africa over the last three years, India, according to some, has generated an additional 4,000 crores in arms exports, almost 1/10 the value of the entire defence budget in 1980-81. This money is being deliberately kept abroad in special accounts which are being used in turn to purchase sophisticated defence equipment which India needs.

The final answer then to the question set out at the outset, how effective has India's goal in defence self-sufficiency been, is twofold, a failure in most high technology fields while a success in all the basics. Unwittingly, however, this last success has created the conditions (through arms exports) with which to partially rectify the failure of the sophisticated side of India's defence industries.

# Whither foreign policy?

ROMESH THAPAR

AS a supposedly non-aligned India flits from one international conference to another, the question does form: what is the policy being pursued, or the perspective that helps discipline it? National security could be a solid middle class answer, but even that is in doubt as we begin to surrender increasingly to the hysteria over armaments, nuclear and otherwise. Quietly forgotten is the disruption this wastage of resources causes, apart from the internal political pressures generated by the growth of military and para-military organisations during a phase of transition and confusion.

A certain clarity in relationships and inter-connections was developing during the Janata Party rulership despite the contrary pulls inherent in an artificial coalition. It was becoming possible to align and re-align, to assert certain flexibilities particularly in our relations with neighbours, and seriously to debate the new textures of confrontation between the super powers. What has followed since then has been a reversal. The rigidities have returned. The stress is on a competition in acquiring more modern armaments

to highlight a major regional role.

Inevitably, the tension on the sub-continent has increased. Pakistan gets priority attention, and its nuclear ambitions have sparked deep fears in India. If one group of activist opinion urges a redoubled effort to outstrip the 'revanchist Pakistanis', another speaks *soto voce* about the need for a pre-emptive strike in the manner of the swash-buckling neo-colonialist Israelis. The diplomatic effort is somehow to isolate Pakistan — yes, even through a working compact with the Soviet Union to establish Baluchistan and to reduce Islamabad to controlling a 'buffer zone'.

President Reagan and his advisers have been largely instrumental in creating this imbalance in the sub-continent. In their effort to respond to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, they have sought to turn Pakistan into a 'frontier State', forgetting that Pakistan is an India-baiter and not fool enough to grapple with the USSR. But the way the game has been played by the US State Department has certainly persuaded Indian policy planners to fall back on the old stratagem of

choosing the opposing super power, and with few regrets about hurting non-aligned positions. Even a 'no war pact', an old Indian panacea now proposed by Pakistan, is more-or-less spurned with an unbecoming and ill-conceived *hautier*.

**T**he contradiction is, of course, not far to seek. China in the north, seeking a settlement of 'border issues' and anxious to restore friendly relations within Asia, is closely involved in US strategic aims because of her own complex anti-Sovietism. A *detente* between India and China, within the global game of spheres of influence and physical hegemony, would certainly disturb the USSR, and might even activate those in Moscow who seek positive regional results from a growing partnership with an Islamic Pakistan. During 1981, India has had to walk warily, but little has been done to work out a policy argumentation that does not smack of opportunism.

The US-China-Pakistan axis, if it can be so-called, creates all kinds of tangles in the mind of India's security scenario specialists. For example, a sympathetic response to Islamabad's no-war pact could be construed as collusion. So, too, any lessening of confrontation with Pakistan would tend to lend strength to the view that India is assisting an anti-Soviet consolidation. What we are forgetting, of course, is that there are too many contradictions in the opportunist diplomacy of this 'axis' to permit such conclusions — that is, so long as Indian interests are spelt out unambiguously.

This is not being done. Even in a general way there has been no attempt to stress the need for a Sino-Soviet *detente*. Most political parties, and their spokesmen, take a special pleasure in stressing their anti-Soviet or anti-China credentials in the debates that take place about a more realistic foreign policy. We are not even able to speak of a normality in India-China relations without crowing about its implications for the Kremlin! The Indian interest, if these gentlemen wish to work it out, is precisely around an adjustment of suspicions and animosities in Moscow and Beijing — and it is

necessary to pursue this objective with care and sensitivity despite the rather tedious posturings of the lobbyists.

India and China are lurching towards one another, both behaving as if they are not really sure of each other. Traditionally, both countries enjoy the effort to stretch the process of normalisation by an interminable exchange of irrelevant delegations mouthing the sort of platitudes which really have no place in hard-headed negotiations. This process is unlikely to end. It helps to soften sensitivities about sovereignty and to make the final compact of territory swaps acceptable. No one loses face.

This scenario, good, bad or indifferent, will be gone through. The signals are positive. But Delhi knows that the Russians are a pig-headed lot with all manner of primitive suspicions about the possibility of an Indian betrayal. Much more work has to be done in this particular area of our diplomacy, and it cannot be done by sychophantic ambassadors.

**T**he making of foreign policy in India is not to be envied, particularly when those in charge get emotionally over-charged on matters which are largely national and fail to see the global inter-connections. These inter-connections are the keys to an understanding of the confusions which presently assail us in our relations with the world and prevent us from seeing the emerging challenges and potentialities.

When we were mobilising the non-aligned in the company of Tito's Yugoslavia, Nasser's Egypt and Sukarno's Indonesia, we had understood fully the dangers inherent in polarising the world into two hostile blocs. Our effort was to prevent these blocs from finding adherents and to soften the commitments of those who were already bloc members. The effort, scoffed at by those who tend to embrace simplistic ideas, was eminently successful. The nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America were brought into some kind of working relationship to crusade against a partially warring, fully polarised world. If the con-

cepts of non-alignment were increasingly diffused, that did not matter. It was important to get peoples and nations thinking differently.

When the mutually hostile blocs began to disintegrate, because of their inner contradictions and the recognition of the growing futility of war games such as those in Vietnam, the leading elements among the non-aligned were very slow to understand the historic importance of what was happening and to extend the sweep of non-alignment. The rise of the independent power of Japan and Europe was not integrated into our thinking. Indeed, we are groping towards an understanding of this new phase in international relations where the super powers are being pushed into a significantly meaningful isolation. Even now, the understanding of these trends is very mechanical. We are still inclined to see blocs — yes, despite the Japanese economic presence and the 'socialist wave' in western Europe (underlined by the symptoms of fascistic revival in Germany, Italy and Spain).

The non-aligned, in other words, have to understand these developments in the context not only of their own political and economic needs, but in terms of the pressures that are building in both Europe and Japan to compel a revision and restructuring of their relations with the vast developing world. For instance, the forces that are pushing President Mitterrand of France to study the markets of India and China, apart from Africa, and beyond the cynical arms dealing with the Arab States, have to be made to react to new frameworks of equal cooperation. Anything less than a qualitative change in economic relations will be short-lived and counter-productive. We failed to see this during the recent exchanges.

**T**hese, however, are very complex objectives and require sustained thinking and re-thinking. Priority has to be given to this effort because it contributes directly to the softening up of the 'empires' of the super powers and their contraction. Those who do not close their eyes can see this happening in regions once dominated by the calculations of Moscow.

and Washington. And it is not just the 'peace sentiment' that has to be noted, but something profounder and deeper.

If the 'empires' of the super powers have fallen or are falling — and we should be fairly clear about what this means — the effort continues to establish 'bastions'. If the Soviet Union is building muscle in pockets as far apart as Vietnam-Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola, Cuba and East Germany, the USA is trying to reinforce its uncertain NATO military alliance in Europe with a network of bases for rapid deployment and deterrence in the underbelly of the USSR — Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan — and there is renewed interest in the Pacific area now that China is seen as an 'ally'.

It is significant that most of these super power bastions are tense and troubled. Increasingly, military expenditures will inflate as attempts are made to stabilise these bastions in the matrix of the new balance of power. The USA's military budgeting alone during the next five-year period is to cross the figure of 1.5 trillion dollars. Globally, some 500 billion dollars are now being spent annually on these kill and over-kill preparations.

**T**he critical nature of the global situation does not need underlining. Wherever the super powers are establishing their so-called 'frontier States' or bastions, there is danger of prolonged and spreading conflicts. The military strengths of the super powers are so equally balanced that it is immature to imagine that one can snuff out the other, given certain conditions. Admittedly, this kind of thinking prevails on both sides and feeds the appetites of the military machines.

Take West Asia and the Persian Gulf, for example. A threat to the major sources of oil, upon which the whole of the affluent West's prosperity is built, is leading to a concentration of super power warring capacity in the region which is frightening. Any development in the area is automatically linked to this balance of capacities — yes, very much in the same way as Afghanis-

tan has been. In other words, it is possible to think of a scenario unrelated basically to super power hegemonies and interest sparking a disastrous conflagration very near home.

Move to the black strongholds around South Africa. View them from the standpoint of the Soviet leadership caught holding the embarrassments of Kampuchea, Afghanistan and Poland. Where would a diversion swamp the USA in a Vietnam-type conflict. Around South Africa, of course Namibia? Angola? The whites (not those with communist commitments) would be pitted against the Blacks. The pressures in West Asia and the Persian Gulf would assume a different quality in the context of the survival of the West. A conflict, with a wide sweep, would crystallise within days, something more devastating than Vietnam and with profound repercussions for the western world.

**T**here are many other scenarios which could plunge our world into the kind of cataclysm from which there is no return. India and the non-aligned have to move with remarkable intelligence and flexibility in such an environment. During 1981, there has been no sign of such a stirring. The Iranian events were followed by the Iran Iraq conflict, and in the background the Camp David Accords developed new dimensions to the Arab-Israeli struggle, but the non-aligned continued to be led by events over which they had no control. A recent halting Saudi initiative on Palestine was able to change the pattern — a pointer to the possibilities we have refused to recognise in our miserable defeatism. We must stir more consciously, and ahead of the manipulations of the super powers.

Against this background, and in the context of the critical calculations which dominate the thinking of the super powers, it would be naive on the part of India to continue to design her foreign policy within the narrow parameters of national excitement. A wider view, cutting across the compulsions of several regions, has to be developed — and despite the traditional reluctance to do so.

The super power linkages of Pakistan — and of China! — should encourage us to activate ourselves in the current effort to lessen super power tensions, and in so doing assist a speedier resolution of border problems in our region. We seem to be blind to this linkage and still imagine that there is some profound non-aligned wisdom in crudely playing one super power against the other.

**W**hat is advocated is not some melodramatic intervention in the super power debate, but quiet, sustained initiatives which seek to remove some of the obvious hurdles in the way of these parleys. Such interventions reduce polarisation at several levels and have a way of softening the diplomatic exchanges over a wide spectrum. Certainly, an India active in the global effort to reduce super power tension would discover a more accommodating mood in matters concerning Pakistan, Bangladesh and China. The initial effort to turn foreign policy in this direction requires courage and imagination. These essential qualities are in a state of suspense at the moment. They have to be revived.

To reduce our concerns to the Kashmir cease-fire line and Aksai Chin is to betray a parochialism which baffles those who would like to see India moving as in the fifties. There is enormous potential to clear the dialogues between the USSR and the USA, between the USSR and China, between the USA and Vietnam, and so on.

The movement of non-aligned nations is caught in a monotonous repetitiveness on secondary issues because it has not been encouraged to grapple with the real confrontations which are continuing to paralyse, confuse and bankrupt our world. Their dissolution is essential to freeing a global will towards some kind of collective actions to salvage our planet. We cannot allow ourselves to become the victims of paranoias released by those who happen to head the super power hierarchies.

The growing capacity of Japan to hold her own against the industrial



competitiveness of the West, and the variety of socialist models being sought in eastern and western Europe, tend to leave the super powers confronting each other in isolation. The massive campaign against nuclear armament, and the growing desire to face whatever consequences peaceful co-existence has to offer, strengthen the passion for independent thought.

The non-aligned movement cannot but draw sustenance from this changing political and economic environment, but leadership is needed to speed these developments and to consolidate them. It is here that India must stir to assert a role. The dividends of the past cannot sustain us any more.

Whether it is the economic debate between the North and the South, or the tenuous search for development relationships between the countries of the South, and the East and West, we have to help in setting in motion processes which will retexture the debate on world problems. This effort is long overdue. In fact, the extraordinary refusal to face the political and economic nihilism which has surfaced in our countries is behind the drift in thinking. May be, we are aware—and it is the qualitative change we are reluctant to undertake for fear of possible repercussions over which we have not done the required amount of study and research. Whatever the explanation, the time has come to act.

India, at this juncture in her history, is sufficiently harassed by internal and external problems to begin the re-texturing of relationships with neighbours, the reduction of military machines within the region and the general defusing of the tensions, insecurities and anxieties in the region. These happen to be shared perspectives and even a steady movement towards them would have a healthy stabilising influence. But, there has to be a determination to maintain a certain aloofness from the calculations of the super powers.

In this respect, India is terribly suspect. The Soviet connection is seen as a dominating influence. It is an impression that has to be dissolv-

ed by positive regional collaborations and careful initiatives to bring the super powers into some kind of rapport.

This is the direction that India's non-alignment might well take if the present 'warring' with Pakistan is seen as rather empty and futile — particularly so when pressures are building to compel Pakistan to change her attitudes to India. Friendlier noises would immediately release the kind of *detentist* mood which alone can prepare us to salvage the resources and potential of this sub-continent. This is not a marginal consideration for India and Pakistan now that problems are sharpening and all manner of complexities with serious ramifications could develop. We are teetering on the edge of explosive situations which could defy even mature political management. A sobering thought for those who are invariably roused on the simplistic slogans under-pinning foreign policy these days.

More than even before we should keep reminding ourselves of internal realities as we create our external postures. Too long have we used external postures as a dramatic diversion. This will not do any more. In a sense, during 1981 we have been repeatedly reminded — and even monotonously! — that the play must end. It has no dividends. It only postpones the profound and wide-rangings changes that a new consciousness calls for and, thereby, intensifies the complexities. Indeed, if we have learned anything over the past years of freedom, it is that there are points of no-return in economics and politics.

It is now imperative that we in the developing world grasp the point of no-return in foreign relations — the point which, if passed, leads to uncontrolled arms races, emotional confrontations, an incredible waste of vital and scarce resources, the destruction of democratic functioning, and to a life of fear and subterfuge. There are examples of this all around us. We have to alter these dimensions and earn the respect which would help us to persuade the non-aligned to cut new paths to the future.



# The state of the state

ASHIS NANDY

## I

DURING the last one hundred and fifty years, the culture of Indian politics has been dominated by three concepts or images of the Indian State. These images have sometimes supplemented each other, sometimes they have acted as competing stereotypes, sometimes they have even sought to destroy each other. (One can never be sure, but one suspects that these images have also dominated the political cultures of most non-western societies with a colonial past. There is something inescapable about the images in such societies.)

The first image is that of *the State as a protector* of the Indian society. The Indian State is expected by many Indians to protect the society against arbitrary oppressors and marauding outsiders. Like many other societies in the world, this society has lived with oppression for centuries and it is used to it. And like the oppressed everywhere, this society, too, has always felt more comfortable with predictable, structured or institutionalised oppression. It has often chosen a greater degree of predictable oppression in preference to lesser but more arbitrary oppression.

This is understandable. Non-arbitrary oppression always gives its victims better play. It always gives more scope for finding loopholes and more time to devise

strategies of survival and/or escape. It is arbitrary, random, unpredictable oppression which is difficult to contain. The Indian State is expected to eliminate, control, make rule-bound or manageable primarily the second kind of oppression.

Corollary-wise, the State is expected to protect the native life style. Both the ultra-nationalists (who bemoan the frequency with which throughout history Indians of all hues have collaborated with foreign political authorities, after such authorities have established themselves in India) and the ultra-Hindus (who lament the fact that the ordinary Hindus have often sung, on the least provocation, paeans to their non-Hindu rulers) miss the widespread expectation in the ordinary citizen that the State authority, in exchange for their political loyalty, would either leave them alone culturally or protect them in their everyday life.

Take for instance the colonial experience. The Raj recognised the expectation from the State as a part of its 'mandate' and it sought to legitimise itself by living up to the image of the State as a protector.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Queen Victoria's proclamation, while taking over the rulership of India from the East India Company, is ample evidence of this. In that proclamation the British were trying, belatedly, to go back to the first phase of colonialism when the culture of the ruled was respected and, even, feared.

The results were spectacular. Even a nationalist like Bankimchandra Chatterji suggested in his *Anandamath* — and the suggestion was not very indirect either — that the British rule protected the Indian life style from India's erstwhile Muslim rulers. Attempts have been made to explain this attitude away, either as open communalism or as a camouflage for Bankimchandra's true anti-British feelings.

The fact remains that this attitude towards the State was widespread throughout the colonial period and survived it as an important force within Indian politics. The Raj at least tried to live up to Bankim's stereotype the hard way. In the case of every major social or religious reform movement in British India, the initiative was taken by Indian leaders and the British Indian government dragged its feet.

Often, government support for reform in the form of new laws came after decades of pressure from the Indian leadership (as in the case of *sati*, infanticide, human sacrifices and child marriage). Add to this the fact that missionary activities in India were banned for the first sixty five years of the Raj, English law was not introduced till the mid-1920s, and English education till about the same time, and you get an idea of the kind of State protection of culture I have in mind.

There might have been political motives as well as hypocrisy behind each British refusal to interfere with Indian culture. Nonetheless, the fact remains that a large part of the Indian society did expect the rulers to play the game they played, namely, to ensure, on the payment of some protection money, that the Indian life style was not unduly disturbed. That this strategy neither protected the Indian life style nor kept the protection payment at a level at which it did not become daylight robbery is besides the point.

In our times, many of the arguments for a hard State in India, given by the liberal democratic observers of our politics, derive their appeal from this image of the State. You must first have a proper central authority, the argument

goes, before you can think of secondary needs such as democratic freedoms and cultural authenticity. There must first be a powerful State capable of protecting the weak, gullible Indian before the latter can be given the luxury of having a full-fledged participatory democracy.

Similarly, the Indian State must guard the Indians first, the other part of the argument goes, before it begins to think of the citizens of other polities. If, therefore, the citizens of this society can be protected by exporting violence, oppression or authoritarianism — as shown by some democratic societies elsewhere — the Indian citizens should be so protected. The same argument is applied to internal social relationships. Today, you can 'justifiably' snuff out small groups and individuals to protect larger collectivities without any sense of guilt or remorse, if such groups or persons stand in the way of the central authority of the State.

The second image of the State has dominated the political consciousness of mainly the Indian elites, though it is now very much a part of the awareness of the urban middle classes, too. It is the image of the State as a moderniser or liberator.

Traditional Indian culture and modernity are seen here as virtual antonyms and it is presumed that the State would introduce Indian society to the modern world. Though a few elements of the culture are seen as congruent or compatible with the modern world, it is assumed that most of it is not. And the expectation is that the traditions incompatible with modernity will be gradually eliminated by enlightened statecraft and the modern Indian State would gradually create a modern Indian culture, fully capable of sustaining a modern polity.

I have already given the example of British non-interventionism during the first phase of the Raj. Even then, as opposed to those who saw the British as good rulers because they did not intervene in religion and society, there were the disgruntled Indian leaders who attacked such non-interference. The job of

the State, they felt, was to intervene socially. Rammohun Roy, for instance, entered into virulent theological disputes with the Christian missionaries but he also forged a coalition with them to fight official non-interventionism.

This image has remained an important element in the culture of Indian politics till today. From the extreme Right to the extreme Left there are people to whom the main function of the Indian State is to change the Indian culture and the Indian mind, to set things right in the organised sector as well as in the unorganised traditional sectors, and act as the liberator of the underprivileged Indians. Controlling the State and using it for directing social change, and for that very reason, perceiving the State as the nerve centre for all that is interesting going on in the Indian polity, are important parts of this image of the Indian State.

This image, I have already said, stresses the contradiction between the State and culture. If the State is the phalanx or bastion of progress and the culture an 'object' waiting to be retooled, rebuilt, renovated or repaired, the latter is bound to become associated with something which is hide-bound or retrogressive.

Many of those who change sides overnight after the fall or rise of a regime, many of the hangers-on of the party in power within the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, and many of those pathetic radicals willing to adorn even the smallest offices of power under the control of New Delhi, justify themselves with reference to this widely shared image of the Indian State. They may be lick-spittle, seedy hangers-on to us, not so to themselves. They remember, however dishonestly, the hoary traditions of what was once a part of a grand and romantic strategy for altering the civilisational face of India. They feel that by being close to power and by having the ears of the powerful, they somehow can contribute to political sanity and good governance, and make the best of a bad situation. The perversities and the vulgar versions of the strategy

should not blind us to what was once a genuine vision

Let us also not forget that it is only in our times that this image of the State has become a major means of justifying internal violence, oppression and bureaucratic centralism. Though some sections of Indian leaders did see, during the colonial period, the Indian steeped in his culture as a child weighted down by childish superstitions, they did not see it as the bounden duty of the 'true' leader to drive the citizens like cattle towards a better future. It is only in our times that a little bit of 'repressive developmentalism' or forced 'conscientisation' à la Paulo Freire, look like unavoidable minor hazards on the way towards a new Indian society.

Finally, there is the image of the Indian State as a small but significant and well-defined part of the Indian society and politics. The image sees the Indian State as an arena where social relationships can be renegotiated. The State in this image is delimited — the image has obviously something to do with the frequently observed marginality of organised politics in the traditional Indian life-style — and it is seen as a kind of a market place.

Such an image has both creative and noncreative possibilities. To give a well-known example of the creative side, when the politics of mass mobilisation first came into Indian society in the 1920s, in three or four decades it did things which a century and half of highly vociferous social reform movements had not done.

Particularly within the Hindu social order, mass politics consummated the changes that had been initiated in the early nineteenth century. In some ways, it unleashed a force comparable in strength to the *bhakti* movement by changing social mobility patterns dramatically. The traditional unit of social mobility in India was the group, not the individual. But such upward group mobility generally took decades and, sometimes, even centuries to actualise. Now mass politics speeded up the process. Taking advantage of their political participation, many caste groups changed

their socio-economic status within a generation or two.

Overtly, this underscored traditional caste divisions, because the unit of mobility still remained the caste. Covertly, it did exactly the opposite. It democratised the social order. After all, what is so traditional about a competition for power between, say, Brahmins and Marathas in Maharashtra when they compete on the basis of numbers, without reference to their two thousand years of unequal ritual status?

On the non-creative side, the image of the State as a delimited market place for the renegotiation of traditional social relationships has made the Indian State exactly that a market place. Those who have entered politics for the first time — relatively speaking, they are the poor and the weak — have lesser awareness of, or commitment to, the 'rules' of statecraft and specially the conventions which must define the limits of statecraft in a society. They thus contribute to the classical picture of 'political decay', in that they push political participation to overtake the institutionalisation of politics and to outstrip the growth of system legitimacy.

In the pages of this periodical, I have once discussed the problems this has created in this polity (by encouraging a limitless politics or *matsyamyay* which does not allow one to build even a new basis for alternatives) and the possibilities it has now opened up (because of the growing self-assertion of a large number of people seeking to express their politics outside the jungle of the present political system, but within the limits of the culture of contemporary Indian politics).<sup>2</sup> I will not repeat myself here.

## II

It is my contention that the balance among these three images had once given the culture of Indian politics its distinctive flavour. It is also my contention that the last image of the Indian State — that of the State as a limited area within

the public realm where terms for new transactions among traditional social groups are settled — has been badly eroded by the first two images of the Indian State. In fact, it is possible to affirm that today the first two images are being used by the Indian elites to throttle the socially regenerative use of the third image.

As a consequence, the pathology of the State as a market place has over-shadowed the creative possibilities of the use of the State as a means of cultural self-assertion and cultural renewal through the open renegotiation of social relationships. In other words, the demands of the first two images of the State have, for reasons not fully clear to me, brought the worst out of the third image of the State.

I am not denying the role of the first two images of the State in India. Nor am I ignorant of the creative functions these images have performed in Indian society over the last one hundred and fifty years, during which they sometimes have justifiably enjoyed a certain salience at the expense of the third image. Of course, the State can protect Indian culture and it is supposed to do so. Of course, the State can be a liberating force and in some areas of Indian life it has been so.

But I suspect that we have reached a stage when Indian culture can be better protected without the loving care of the Indian State, and the forces of social change can work better without the intervention of the formal State apparatus. In fact, I suspect that all emphasis on the protective and liberating roles of the State has now become an over-emphasis. Such emphasis only acts as a dangerous weapon in the hands of the Establishment to subvert dissent and to find a national consensus tilted in favour of that same Establishment.

First, the State as a protector of Indian society has seemingly given itself full rights to reorder the Indian civilisation for purposes of the State. This has removed all cultural or normative restrictions on the State and allowed it to set absolute standards to judge all

<sup>2</sup> 'Limits to Politics', *Seminar*, Annual Number (257), January 1981.

aspects of Indianness. The demands of the State are no longer conditional in India, the State is the norm. That is, everybody and everything can now be evaluated from the point of view of the State and its survival. But, the estimates of the State from the point of view of culture or life style, when such evaluations are allowed to be made at all, are conditional. Such estimates are expected to accept the hegemony of the State and to strengthen it further through 'informed criticism'

In other words, a fully corrupt, totally inefficient and ruthlessly exploitative State, too, is supposed to have our allegiance, because even such a State is supposed to protect the Indian civilisation from total annihilation by its dedicated enemies outside. If in the process the civilisation itself is altered beyond recognition or destroyed, it is no longer the concern of the State. Echoing that very clever American general in Vietnam, many of our politicians, intellectuals and journalists are willing to say that to protect Indian culture and society and, for that matter, the Indians, it may be necessary to destroy them altogether.

One of the pornographic dimensions of such a view of the Indian State is the ideology behind Indian foreign policy which, in the name of protecting Indian interests, is willing today to subvert everything Indian about India. Indian foreign policy — more so the ideology behind it — is no longer a reflection of or an adjunct to Indian domestic policy, it now determines Indian domestic policy. And because the world of international politics is now controlled by the dehumanised culture of modern statecraft and by absolute Machiavellianism, that is the culture we are not only learning but also selling within India as the 'State of art' in politics and as an indicator of our new-found 'maturity' as a nation.

Actually, there is no longer any Indian foreign policy. There is only a foreign policy of the State called India, which supposedly protects the gullible Indians from the bad wolves all around. This was not the case in

the days of Jawaharlal Nehru who, ignoring all accusations of faint-hearted sanctimony and woolly-headedness (and in spite of his own Eurocentric world view and charming Edwardian whimsicalities), did attempt to bring into international politics something of the civilisational perspective of this society.

The fatheaded Brown Sahibs who swear by Nehru today, on grounds of political expediency, have forgotten that Their foreign policy is totally contemptuous of the everyday Indian and Indian concepts of India's needs. In the pages of this journal itself, Giri Deshingkar has elegantly analysed the content of such a policy and I could only direct the reader to that article if he is interested in the present philosophy of the country's external affairs.<sup>3</sup>

To give another example, the roots of the dishonest, inefficient, heartless State capitalism that we see in India can be directly traced to the image of the Indian State as a protector and liberator. This is not an indirect argument *contra* State-ownership or nationalisation. This is a direct argument against a State ownership which, while using the slogan of socialism, leaves the content of an industry, an institution or a system intact.

Most nationalisation in India till now has, apart from pleasing the middle class radicals and their academic counterparts, only managed to nationalise red-tapism, gigantism and corruption. And, to the extent the intellectuals of the Left have given legitimacy to the belief that the choice is only one between State and private ownership, and to the extent they have not thought of alternative forms of decentralised public ownership, or small scale private ownership, they have collaborated with the ruling elites.

The late Sanjay Gandhi was merely taking to its logical conclusion this process by trying to nationalise politics itself. He knew what he was doing. Those who resisted him did not know what they were resisting. It is remarkable

that State-ownership has come to mean bureaucratisation, gigantism, mega-technology, organised exploitation and reification of social relationships to everyone, including the ones who plead for it. The idea is that nationalised corruption or gigantism or alienation is better than its private version. What remains unstated is that the ills of State capitalism are actually its goals and the exceptions in this instance only prove the rule that even the most egalitarian ideology can be used to extract the usual surplus from the usual sources.

Both the ideologies of liberalism and Leninist democratic centralism have been used in India to contain the politics of groups which as groups have most to gain from active, fullscale political participation. If the masses are ignorant—or devoid of revolutionary consciousness—and the State has the responsibility of bringing them into the modern world, then there have to be some limits on the politics of those without historical sensitivities. After all, there are always the willing teachers and the secular rationalists with their scientific temper, the scientific Marxists with their superior political consciousness and superior cognition of history, and the myriad minions of Indira Gandhi with their greater understanding of India's external enemies on the one hand and the internal fifth columnists on the other.

In each case, beyond a certain point, the legitimacy of the collective politics of those unconcerned about the fate of the State is not granted. The Indian as an immoral sinner, the Indian as an ahistorical primitive, the Indian as a gullible sucker are images which constitute the underside of the images of the Indian State as a liberator, as a moderniser and as a protector of the Indian people. They all militate against understanding the predicament of this society in terms which pay respect to the ordinary citizen's understanding of this predicament.

### III

Let me summarise and further clarify what I have been trying to say. May be, in the process I shall

be able to tease out some of its other implications

One, the images of the State-as-a-protector and the State-as-a-liberator have cannibalised the image of the State-as-a-negotiating-counter in India. (The last is a somewhat misleading description of the third orientation to the Indian State but I must request the reader to bear with this terrible expression for the time being)

Two, this cannibalisation has paradoxically set the context to a State which neither protects nor liberates. It sanctifies a State which, in turn, underwrites existing hierarchies by promoting millennial ideologies of the Left and the Right and by vesting all hopes in the emancipatory role of the State.

Three, while the third image also has its perversities (for instance, the unrestrained, pure politics that I have discussed in the pages of this periodical once<sup>4</sup>), some versions of it can probably underwrite a free polity which will not restrain mass politics from finding a new equation with Indian traditions.

Four, though overtly India may seem to have a surfeit of politics, that politics is of a special kind. It gives almost unlimited scope to politicking around the State, to statecraft and, even to 'official' dissent (particularly if that dissent speaks of capturing the State over the next few years or over the next few hundred). But it tries to restrict the politics which challenges the hegemony, within Indian politics, of those who hover around the Indian State.

As the scope of the Indian State has increased over the last three decades, the scope of politics has increased for those who orient their politics to the State. But those who challenge the centrality of the State find their politics restricted. They can have their freedom if only they are willing to use the State as their political reference point or, at a more trivial level, use their political links with people inside the universe of the Indian State.

Five, the State is now trying to be independent of the larger political processes. The legitimacy of the political order now depends partly on the performance of sectors outside politics but related to the State. Thus, the regime has to often get its actions legitimised by referring to the needs of the defence establishment, to some spectacular technical feats of scientists and the technocrats, and even to the export performance of the 'monopoly capitalists' whom the regime has to attack on other occasions.

Finally, the Indian State was once expected to be an instrument of the needs of this civilisation and an agent of social change. To subserve this need, the State was expected to be slightly autonomous of culture and the Indian culture, with its highly sophisticated plural structures, allowed the State this freedom. But the State has now become almost fully autonomous and contemptuous of the needs of this civilisation. It has begun to see the civilisation as its instrument and as its subject. I wonder if the State — and to those whom the interests of the State are paramount — are not writing thus the death warrant of the State they so dearly love. A civilisation cannot only sustain a State, it can also subvert it for its own purposes if the need arises.

I must end this pessimistic note by asking those who want to provide a fundamental critique of Indian politics to consider if, in the changed culture of Indian politics, they might not like to take a second look at the role of the State, whether to save the Indian State they would not like to give the State a more attenuated role and give culture and culture-oriented politics (politics which could be for that reason outside the formal political system) a greater role in the renewal of this society.

At one time, I would have considered this a sure prescription for the collapse of this society and a conspiracy against the deprived. I now believe that even the slogan about 'capturing the State power' only stresses the role of the State in Indian politics and so indirectly

sabotages new efforts in politics. Such slogans sound more and more like calls to take over the Mafia to control crime in society.

Such an attenuated role of the State is not unknown to Indians. Throughout the nineteenth century and during the first half of this century, we lived with the concept of a 'distant' State. True, the distance was then imposed on the society and the society had the right, on attaining freedom, to give a more central place to the State in the Indian life style. But let us not forget that we were socially and politically quite creative during the colonial period. We certainly were not passive collaborators with the Raj.

The great Indians who have shaped our political consciousness were all produced in a period when the State was peripheral to the society. They worked with a State which was controlled by outsiders. Their political interventions do not look that political in retrospect because our concept of politics has meanwhile changed. Only that which is initiated by the State or that which is a response to State initiative is considered politics now. So, protests against dowry deaths or child marriage does not look like a political act, but an angry editorial against defection in legislatures looks terribly relevant to politics.

I suspect that the days of politics outside State-initiative have returned. As the foibles of the State have begun to pall on us, the expectations from the State, too, are fast declining. It is even possible that the State, given the people who are controlling it, will now be expected to respond only to demands from outside and adjust to them, but only if powerful initiatives for politics come from outside. The only fear is that, as we recognise the triviality of the men who run formal politics in the country today, we may foolishly delegitimise all politics — including all politics outside the sphere of the State. That way lies authoritarianism. The need of the hour is to learn to live with and, even, play the politics which marginalises those who are formally called politicians.

4 'Limits to Politics', *op. cit.*

# Misuse of media

IOBAL MALIK

THE following opening sentence is common to the annual reports (for 1979-80 and 1980-81), presented to Parliament by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, since Congress (I) assumed power

'The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting is charged with the responsibility of keeping the people of the country informed about the policies, plans and the programmes of the Government'

Both reports add that, 'in the discharge of its responsibilities, the Ministry is assisted by its media units ..' Fourteen media units are then named, two of which are Akashvani and Doordarshan

The second para in the introductory part of the 1979-80 report ends with, 'Each media unit plays a distinct role and the Ministry coordinates their activities' In the 1980-81 report the words 'and controls' are added after 'coordinates', perhaps to emphasise not only the coordinating but also the controlling authority of the ministry, lest anyone be in doubt about the supremacy of its power

The section on All India Radio in the 1979-80 report opens with, 'All India Radio informs, educates and entertains the people through its balanced and objective programmes' It is reworded as, 'in keeping with its (AIR's) high traditions of informing, educating and entertaining the masses with objectivity and balance ..', in the 1980-81 report.

In the 1979-80 report, the section on Doordarshan also claims, 'to

inform, entertain and educate the public ...', though it does not specifically refer to 'balance or objectivity' The chapter on Doordarshan in the 1980-81 report does not make any opening para claim, but later does state that, during the year, it had been concentrating on 'nation-building and developmental activities' It goes on to say that a major objective of Doordarshan has been to show the efforts being made for the betterment of the economically weaker sections of our society.

Within months of assuming office, the government, through the I & B report for 1979-80, stated apropos the Prasar Bharati Bill which had lapsed due to dissolution of Lok Sabha

'The Government has decided not to set up an autonomous body of AIR and Doordarshan as recommended by the Verghese Group because such an organisation is not considered necessary to enable these mass media to discharge their basic objective of serving the people who are not served by other media'

This excess of quotations is only to show formal professions, made about the use of broadcast media by those who control them, i.e., use of broadcast media as considered proper by the present government What emerges is a contradiction in terms On the one hand, it is asserted that the responsibility of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting is to provide information about the policies, plans and programmes of the government That makes it a total government mouth-piece, regardless of the needs and preferences of the recipients

On the other hand, it is asserted that through two of the media units, the functions of information, education and entertainment are discharged with objectivity and balance, which definitely implies that the ministry, at least in the case of radio and television, will take into account all responsible and representative interests, including the general public interest to whom broadcast programmes are directed

The ministry falls between two stools in claiming to be exclusively representative of government as well as equally concerned with the people, specially the weaker sections. Someone could say, as was said in Parliament during the Emergency, that the government is chosen by the people and therefore in whatever it does, it has the consent of the people. That however would be a specious argument, the political and social reality of the people's choice during elections being one thing, and the functioning of a government while in office quite another

These contradictions are inevitable in a country like ours where there is no consensus on a communication policy either on a governmental or a non-governmental level. The ground is therefore fertile for any oligarchy to sow the seeds of its own choice, to create confusion or order, balance or imbalance, objectivity or a relentless information machine to promote a personality cult. Pursuit of culture, strengthening the national sinews, concern for the poor dear people, the downtrodden, the abducted, the blinded, the murdered, the homeless, the clotheless, the waterless then can become slogans and labels under which the primary objective is of keeping a particular party or person or family in power till doomsday comes

Because the problems are perennial, it is being argued that a particular dynasty should also be everlasting to solve them because the people trust it. And this message is coming forth stridently through the broadcast media, specially since 1980, though we are no longer in an internal emergency and are sup-

posed to lead our existence according to true democratic norms. There is therefore cause for concern about the state of broadcasting which is actively promoting the divine right to rule in the year 1981. This is the main misuse of broadcasting at the moment—almost reminiscent of the Emergency days

For the first time in the history of broadcasting in India, the Dass Committee report, published in August 1977, provided definitions and concrete evidence of the misuse of mass media under government control. The full extent of the manipulation was not known even to those working in broadcasting. In a high level meeting in the ministry of I&B, someone from a media unit said that there had been a serious disturbance in Turkman Gate. The presiding officer looked surprised. Of course the newspapers were debarred from publishing the news. But the surprise of the presiding officer was gratuitous. He must have known of Turkman Gate through PIB and the news agencies, as also that the news had been censored

The same presiding officer said at another meeting that M. Karunanidhi at that point of time was an evil to be destroyed. The same Karunanidhi is very much a source of support to the Centre now. It was also advocated those days that intellectuals of the Vinoba Bhawe type should be publicised. One presumes that the same yardstick of intellectual eminence holds good now

This is not to indulge in retrospect. As a prominent journalist, Kuldip Nayar, once asked 'was there ever an Emergency?' Within three years of the event we are supposed to have lost our memory but it certainly comes flooding back when we are told that external dangers loom large on the horizon. Broadcast media must follow this line, along with the assertion at the highest levels that corruption and inflation are universal phenomena

We live in the best as well as the worst of times, according to our rulers, and we must reconcile ourselves to this state of affairs and official broadcast media must im-

print this reality on our minds. The rest should be silence.

According to the data presented by the Dass Committee, broadcast media could be manipulated, twisted and turned upside down in a ruthless exercise of political power, unheard of in a democracy. Goebbels' importance as a master of black propaganda has been unnecessarily inflated. You have to read the Dass report to realise how in the so-called Coordination meetings, every single detail with a bearing on the dissemination of information was sedulously taken care of. As most of the media people themselves had no access to full information, they were like so many babes in the wood, permitting seen and unseen manipulators to direct their actions

More specifically, the hopes of broadcasters had become tied up with the assurances of freedom of broadcasting given to them from time to time at the highest levels, beginning with Nehru, on to the Chanda Committee, followed by the Verghese Group. They know now that to ask for freedom of broadcasting whether from a Congress or a Janata government is to ask for the moon. Meanwhile, bread and butter matter. Shorn of all trappings, this is the reality of broadcasting in India—a government monopoly, which prohibits movement, promotes inertia, breeds sycophancy, servility, in the name of loyal service to a particular government because it is in power.

The 'parameters' emerging from the Dass report determining the misuse of mass media, could be classified as

- (i) Absolute control of the media by the government for the government, served up in a ruling of the ministry (Sept 12, 1975), 'being a government department, there was no question of AIR or Television adopting an attitude of neutrality, or be concerned about their credibility.' Three days earlier (9.9.75), the Prime Minister in person had asked the station director of radio TV 'who is credible?'
- (ii) Continuous efforts to build up the image of the Prime Minister



with a relentless pursuit of a personahty cult centering round not only the PM, but also Sanjay Gandhi and his Youth Congress

- (iii) Abrogation of the AIR Code which among other 'don'ts' forbade attacking the integrity of the judiciary
- (iv) Special projection of those in broadcast programmes who unhesitatingly could commend the order of the day and eulogise the rulers by name along with a few mildly dissenting voices carefully thrown in to demonstrate 'balance' and 'objectivity' (collaborators, please note!)

These are 'parameters' for the destruction of the broadcast media which are actually meant to stimulate positive thought, enjoyment and awareness, if not action

**T**he interregnum between 1977-79 was filled in by the Janata. One may blame the Janata as much as one likes for the hesitant step towards freedom of the broadcast media which the proposed Prasar Bharati Bill revealed. One can castigate them for promising genuine autonomy, but when in power showing unwillingness to grant it in full constitutional measure. It is a slip which the Janata as it then was should always regret. An Act of Parliament would not have been easy for anyone to dilute or disregard. But on the credit side, the Janata (i) restored the AIR Code and (ii) prohibited by express orders the cult of personality.

Since the period of Emergency represents the classic example of misuse of mass media, the point to consider is whether any or all of the 'negative' parameters mentioned earlier, are operational now or not. The case here is that they are discernible, overtly or covertly, the total effect being the same as one experienced during the Emergency.

True that the Janata Government's orders have not been rescinded formally, but in actual fact their violation takes place practically every day on radio and television. If in the examples which follow, television is mentioned more often,

it is not that radio is immaculate. The sound recording of programmes, specially relating to the Prime Minister, gets repeated in full or in edited form on radio. The pool copy of television news originates in the radio's news room. For example, the disregard of the AIR Code and the building-up of a cult of personality are common to both radio and television, as news reporting centres round the Prime Minister. Opening every news bulletin with 'The Prime Minister said' which had become a joke is back with us.

**O**n April 6 this year, a major step toward infringement of the AIR Code, which expressly forbids criticism in the nature of a personal tirade against any State government was taken. That day Doordarshan devoted 40 minutes of its four-hour transmission in doing just that. Sheikh Abdullah was mentioned in the Prime Minister's speeches in Kashmir. His government was called communal, undemocratic and ungrateful to Cong(I). These were political speeches by the Cong(I) president, broadcast as being made in her capacity as Prime Minister to justify their screening, with no right of reply by those criticised. On AIR and Doordarshan, the distinction between Party President and Prime Minister stands destroyed.

The inquiry report's findings on the Pitt's crash as adapted for broadcast news on August 6 suggested the main cause being the loss of Sanjay Gandhi's glasses during flight, and the absence of corrective glasses with Subhash Saxena. The fact that Gandhi was in command was not mentioned. Gandhi has since, on his grandfather's birth anniversary, been given its highest award of 'Bharat Sapoot' by the 'National Integration Assembly'. Poor Captain Saxena for his lack of corrective glasses must suffer ignominy. The I & B Ministry had already put Sanjay Gandhi's birth and death anniversary in the list of official observances by the broadcast media.

After the tragic death of Sanjay Gandhi, the names of his 'successors' started being mentioned, including that of his wife written up as Durga, reminding us of paintings by the celebrated Hussain exhibited to

the PM in the company of D K. Barooah with a Doordarshan camera following the sequence. There was no mincing of words about who was to succeed whom. It was explicit that a successor to the Prime Minister was being proffered. Doordarshan seized on the realities of the situation earlier than anyone else by shadowing Rajiv Gandhi, who was then still a pilot, and his son, even at school theatricals. By now Rajiv Gandhi is an M P and has expressed himself on the virtue of the people's faith being placed in a family, as well as on other matters of national and international importance. Therefore, if his pronouncements now receive respectful attention on radio and television, there should be no surprise. After all, even the foreign correspondents consider him important enough copy, which amounts to legitimizing the personality and succession cult.

**A**nother glaring example of the misuse or abuse of television is the special appointment of a former film story writer as Additional Director General of Doordarshan. He is the *enfant terrible* that has been brought in by the government to 'improve' programmes. The post requires knowledge, at a senior level, of the medium, its management, administration and finance through which a TV network operates. The qualification of the holder of this post is that he used to present the 'Parikrama' programme from Bombay.

One is not concerned about the additional director general as a person. He may be an excellent man. But as a viewer, one is concerned about his insistence on frequent appearances on television, of his own volition, which seems to be his only contribution, and which being a public fact is subject to comment. His performance in itself sums up what may be described as misuse of broadcasting without let or hindrance.

Three strands are visible in the image that the ADG created of himself on television.

First and foremost, it is the use of 'I', the first person singular, through which we must acknowledge



that we are face to face with a self proclaimed genius who considers the viewers his captive flock. It is personal publicity in the most blatant fashion, strictly forbidden to any member of the staff

Secondly, and only secondly, he chooses to publicise the Prime Minister in the true melodramatic manner of a Bombay film writer

Thirdly, he seeks to publicise the government's and his own alleged concern for the poor, the handicapped, the abducted and even the pigeon-fanciers, like a magician producing rabbits out of a hat and wanting applause

Margaret Thatcher's visit becomes an occasion for the ADG to compare and contrast her with Indira Gandhi to prove that one represents capitalist values, and the other the aspirations of the common people. The ADG has used the birthday of the PM to reach mixed-metaphorical heights 'Sixty Crore Doors', the title of his programme, was to mean a door each for every citizen of India at 1, Safdarjung Road through which he could enter for succour. This beats the *qasidahs* that poets composed to please Mughal emperors, but it is derived from the same tradition, apparently acceptable in the eighties in India. Isn't Rajiv Gandhi supposed to have remarked that feudalism is not dead in India, yet

The ADG surpassed himself in his concern to uproot social evils by bringing a five-year-old boy to face the camera for a full 25 minutes in the TV studio on October 22, the story-line being that the boy's father had killed his mother and therefore the boy wanted to kill his father. Obviously, it was the father, if he is a convicted killer, who should be the subject of interview, whereas the boy should be in the care of a psychotherapist

People say they cried when they saw the boy being brutalised in the studio. Anyone else would have got the sack for perpetrating such a horror of a programme which might well damage the psyche of the child irreparably. It was unethical broadcasting in the extreme, and the man

responsible for it is supposed to improve Doordarshan's programmes as a whole!

It is clear that the ADG enjoys unlimited ministerial patronage. The I & B Minister took the unprecedented step of inviting a newspaper reporter on September 25 to 'defend' the ADG against some news stories that had appeared about malpractices directly attributed to the ADG (the minister had already defended the ADG in Parliament). The report of the meeting, first with the minister and the ADG, and then with the ADG alone, published in a national daily on September 26 and 27 makes fascinating reading for those interested in the misconduct of broadcast media at the highest level to shield a protegee

Assuming for a moment that the ADG is a genius one still wonders how he can get away with the statements he makes in public. Soon after he joined, in an interview to a Bombay magazine in December 1980, among other things, he said

- (i) He had been station director in Delhi and the present Director General Doordarshan used to be his assistant. This is untrue. The ADG used to be a script writer and the present DG used to be his boss as an Assistant Director
- (ii) 'If the income tax people will excuse me, I was already making tons and tons of money.' This point about the ADG being excessively loaded with money came up again in the daily newspaper interview published on September 27

All this notwithstanding, according to a report published in a Delhi fortnightly on October 1, the minister for I & B, is 'willing' to 'oblige' the ADG by making him DG. That should really fill the cup of joy, in recognition of proven professionalism and integrity. Though what is the obligation which should be rewarded is not clear

The minister himself is not averse to using television to publicise himself at the slightest opportunity. The thinking seems to be that those engaged in yeoman service to build a personality cult for the Prime

Minister have every right to use television for their own ends. Gone are the days when an I & B minister gave instructions that his picture should not appear on Delhi television but it should be used at other stations — the fear being that the minister's own appearance on the screen might be noticed at the PM's house

Sathe, during a telecast not long ago, told a group of newspaper editors that the PM desired that broadcasting should be in contact with the people. The novel method that Sathe has evolved is to preside every three months over a one hour TV programme with the local station's teleclub members, thereby usurping the jurisdiction of the local director

According to the news broadcast on November 15, Sathe has since met members of the Madras TV Clubs on television. If about 50% of Indians are below the poverty line and cannot afford a TV set, which segment of the population is Sathe reaching? And even when he does reach anyone what has he to say? Perhaps something like what he said when opening the Bangalore TV link on November 1 'Mrs Gandhi is the most popular communicator in the world, the hope of developing countries and respected by the developed world'

The general impression is that Mrs Gandhi does not disclose her mind unless and until she wishes to. What does Sathe gain by making such a statement? That it will be put up to the PM as evidence of fervent loyalty, or as an analysis of the state of communication in the world made by the Information and Broadcasting Minister of India?

Misuse of broadcast media is inherent when the organisation is controlled by a government, however benign and democratic it may profess to be. Anyway, in today's world no government professes to be authoritarian. Not even Pakistan's or Iran's. Everything that is done by any government is in the interest of the poor. Loud expressions of sympathy for the downtrodden are the hallmark of all rulers, black or white, capitalist or socialist

# Science and technology as an ideology

P. R. K. RAO, K. S. GANDHI, R. S. MISRA AND P. N. KAUL

CURRENT enthusiasm to subordinate modern science and technology (S&T) to societal interests is likely to be frustrated if it is not accompanied by a critical evaluation of the ideological perceptions involved. This article contends that two basic reorientations have to occur in the prevailing conceptions of S&T and of education for societal development. The first of these requires a rejection on the one hand of the claim that no problem is beyond the reach of S & T and on the other of the pursuit of S & T to meet any and all unmediated needs of a society. The second reorientation calls for an educational pattern that rejects the present professional readiness to surrender the right of participation in the specification of goals in

favour of achievement-oriented tasks in total disregard of the necessity for recognising the existence of limits on the needs themselves.

## 1

Every society presses into its service whatever artefacts it can command to meet its necessities. The recognition that technology can play a useful role in human betterment is commonplace. Every technological invention that has been subordinated to that interest attests to this recognition. Any criticism of the failure of a science and technology policy in meeting societal needs and aspirations must, therefore, ultimately reduce to the following assertion:

The policy adopted fails to subordinate S&T to societal interests because its makers and executors do not either possess the requisite competence and understanding, or lack the integrity demanded of them. Possibly both. In either case, appropriate political action and formulation and implementation of an alternative S&T policy are the obvious remedies to look for.

Every political action seeks its justification in terms of an underlying political theory. The two together constitute an ideology. It would suffice for our purposes to identify an ideology with its adherents' perception of reality and their desire to transform the reality so perceived into certain preferred patterns. Competing ideologies, then, are those project-centered human thoughts and actions which are generated in human aggregations in their efforts to resolve ambivalences and conflicts in thought and action that relate a human being to himself, to others and to his physical environment.

Ideologies, in attempting to resolve existing ambivalences and conflicts create new ambivalences and conflicts. Ideologies, in so far as they are perceptions of reality, make claim to knowledge and, in so far as they strive to modify reality, they seek power. The claim to knowledge and the contention for power by an ideology acquires legitimacy in proportion to its ability to resolve existing ambivalences and conflicts and to obviate newer ones. An ideology is reflexive if it continually and critically evaluates its own presuppositions, and can modify its perceptions and aspirations in the light of that evaluation. An ideology is dogmatic if it is not reflexive.

## 2

With the rise of classical civilisations, the instinctive desire of human beings to place themselves above the acceptance of an ultimate irrationality found an expression in a philosophy that sought an order of things, in particular, an order of nature. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is this instinctive desire for ration-

ality that, at least in part, accounts for their faith in the existence of an order of things. What lent validity to their faith was their observation of a broad recurrence of a great many events too insistent to escape their attention. But those civilisations neither had the knowledge of the detailed unfolding of events nor did they attempt, with any vigour, to pursue such knowledge within the framework of rationality. They expected the sun to rise but thought that the wind bloweth where it listeth. Their desire for and faith in rationality, it would seem, was matched by a recognition of the limits on rationality as an avenue for the pursuit of knowledge.

Perhaps they knew that reason can err and faith can be misplaced. The predominantly speculative character of their philosophies, their preoccupation with why rather than how things happen, their concern for an inquiry into the final causes rather than 'original' or 'efficient' causes, their visions of a remorseless, indifferent fate, their fatalistic behaviour as perceived by us, their lucid, logical and deductive thinking in mathematics and matters of law are but ambivalent expressions of their simultaneous affirmation and rejection of a faith in rationality.

But, beginning with the sixteenth century there gradually emerged in the West an ideology which distrusted every pursuit of knowledge that did not base itself on 'irreducible and stubborn facts'.<sup>\*</sup> Science constituted the theory and technology the praxis of that ideology. Lest we sound nostalgic, let it be stated explicitly that the admirable combination of a passionate interest in concrete facts and patient inductive generalisation which we characterise as the scientific temper did

<sup>\*</sup>That adorable genius, William James, when he was finishing the book 'Principles of Psychology' wrote to his brother, Henry James, 'I have to forge every sentence in the teeth of irreducible and stubborn facts'. Also, concerning the appropriateness of the term, 'irreducible and stubborn facts', as characterising modern S & T, see the article 'The Values of Science' by Jacob Bronowski in *New Knowledge in Human Values* edited by Abraham H. Maslow, Harper & Row Publishers 1959.

contribute immensely to human knowledge, happiness and power over nature. As such, our complaint against S&T is not about the quantum of its contributions to human knowledge. It is about its unreflexive, god-like claims to knowledge and power, and its exploitative and monopolistic character.

S&T as an ideology is monopolistic and exploitative to the extent that it forgets that it is only one of the many claimants to knowledge and abrogates to itself the role of an arbiter in laying down criteria as to what constitute 'irreducible and stubborn facts'. This partisan role allows science to proclaim what it does as the only valid knowledge and technology to prescribe the goods it makes as the only ones worthy of possession. The anxiety of sociologists and economists to fashion their disciplines on the lines of physical sciences, the unceasing efforts of technologists to produce goods which leave genuine needs unfulfilled is evidence enough of S&T's monopolistic and exploitative character.

This built-in feature of the ideology of S&T whose activities require no legitimation from the 'lay' public when seen in conjunction with the rise of colonialism account for the many 'exploits' of S&T — vulgar consumption in some societies at the expense of humiliating poverty in several others, threats of global annihilation, pervasive pollution, singular failure to establish communication with fellow beings in spite of spectacular growth in information technologies and means of transportation, increasingly organised individual and collective violence, to name a few.

The monopolistic and exploitative character of S&T stems from its presuppositions concerning the nature of knowledge and the method of acquiring that knowledge. Modern science makes the declaration that only that which is based on 'irreducible and stubborn facts' can constitute knowledge. Everything else is pseudo-knowledge if not downright falsehood.

If a problem of human aggregations cannot be posed in terms of

'irreducible and stubborn facts', then it is not a problem of knowledge in the first instance. Our understanding of human suffering and happiness, our appreciation of the arts, poetry and beauty, our conceptions of justice, love and fraternity, our feelings of jealousy, hatred, affection and fear are not problematic to science. They simply do not exist unless we are prepared to reduce social relations to an absurd jungle of correlation coefficients, human behaviour to an excessive or inadequate discharge of hormones, human intelligence to IQ, life to zero-sum games. And this reduction to 'irreducible and stubborn facts' and the subsequent 'nothing-but', non-sequitur explanations can always be made in the cause of science through the time-tested practices of inductive generalisation and deductive argumentation.

If at a given stage of development of science, we are not quite happy with the existing 'irreducible and stubborn facts' and explanations we can always discover new 'irreducible and stubborn facts' and this process can go on *ad infinitum*. This tireless collapsing of the infinite dimensional richness of life into a partially ordered set of numbers constituting 'scientific explanation' is the inner dynamic of modern science. The ideology of S&T not only rejects the wisdom of 'The Heart has its reasons' but also asserts that if reasons exist, it can find them in principle. And how does S&T determine whether reasons exist? By its faith in rationality as the only source of knowledge.

This uncritical, arrogant, god-like claim of S&T to all knowledge, perhaps, has its origin in human history and the western conception of man and nature which pits one against the other. Our ancestors, unable to cope with the vagaries and fury of nature sought an order of nature and discovered gods who controlled their destinies. We dispensed with gods and nearly succeeded in mastering nature by imposing some of the human like qualities on the non-human world — forces of attraction and repulsion, interactions, uncertainties, pluralistic nature, affinities, pressure, growth,

decay, charge, flow etc. The analogical scientific vocabulary betrays the origins of 'irreducible' facts. For sure we made them 'stubborn' by measurement.

Carried away by our successes with models of the non-human world, and our ability to manipulate that world into what we consider to be to our advantage, we ambitiously reversed the process and explained away human phenomenon in non-human 'irreducible and stubborn facts' — a few Newtons of force, a few grams of this or a few litres of that, a movement of a needle this way or that, GNP, per capita income, coefficient of correlation between obesity and obedience to authority or what have you.

Dismissing all this as a romantic rejection of S&T will not do. Nor will the assurance that these 'mistakes' will be corrected. For, the objection is not against 'these' mistakes but against the uncritical nature of the ideology of S&T that engages itself in the alienating effort of replacing 'this' set of incomplete and mistaken explanations by another *ad nauseam*.

If an unbridled faith in rationality and a refusal critically to evaluate its own presuppositions leads the ideology of S&T to claim that no problem, in principle, is beyond its reach, the ideology, in its praxis through technology, is compelled to seek unlimited power. Thus, when its earlier technological triumphs over nature have begun to reveal the dark side of the moon and have generated new ambivalences in regard to ecological balance and pollution, it seeks to resolve these ambivalences — in consonance with its belief that no problem is beyond its reach — through an ever expanding net of 'technological fixes'.

If the technologically produced and promoted consumption patterns of a society get threatened by fast depleting global resources, the ideology of S&T seeks to expand its mastery over nature through the pursuit of renewable resources. But, as an unreflexive ideology, it will not attempt critically to evaluate its premises about consumptive abundance.

If its ideological obsession for the search for efficient causes and efficient technologies lead to capital-intensive production, multi-nationals, corporate activity, increasingly centralized systems, and dehumanized individuals, the ideology of S&T vainly tries to resolve the ambivalences and conflicts so generated through efficient information-technologies that fail to establish communication or even to entertain. But it will not halt its onward march against nature and man alike.

How is it that S&T as an ideology survives in spite of its patently dogmatic character is a question that is both as intriguing and exasperating as the question, 'How is it that a major segment of humanity suffers in silence every conceivable indignity, injustice, denial and deprivation?' After all is said and done, any ideology to survive either needs to acquire some degree of legitimacy or has in it the potential which makes it increasingly independent of the process of legitimation. It would seem that S&T as the most 'modern' of ideologies does possess such a potential. Every ideology seeks to change the existing structure of power relationships in its favour through a process of legitimation by the public at large.

What distinguishes S&T as an ideology from other ideologies is that its ever new and increasingly sophisticated technologies provide a potential for substantially expanding the aggregate power of those in control of technology by the production of alarming quantities of unrivalled instruments of violence and gadgets for mindless indulgence. A few dominant men or societies can thus subjugate large publics into silence through an efficient and controlled combination of terror and titillation. Of course, all this is done in the name of peace, progress, freedom and autonomy for the individual to unfold himself to his creative best.

This ominous capacity of modern S&T to acquire illegitimate and unrestricted power can abort every well-meaning attempt of its critics for the adoption of 'appropriate' or

'alternative' technologies unless supplemented with concurrent efforts to rid modern S&T of its uncritical ideological presuppositions. To counter so awesome a power, as a first step nothing seems to be more in order than the creation of an equally powerful but informed public opinion that demands the subordination of S & T to societal interests.

In this context, it is important to note that even many of the advocates of 'appropriate' technologies implicitly share the ideological beliefs of modern S & T in so far as they seek to create a consumer-based society. Not only does S&T require to be subordinated to the needs of a society, but such an S & T to be truly scientific and appropriate must also critically examine the needs themselves through the processes of mediation and education. For, otherwise, both the S&T and the society will be destroyed in the conflagration of consumption whose flames they fan with homicidal compulsiveness.

The contemporary consumptive and mindless indulgence-seeking western societies demonstrate this relentless march to destruction. The imploring but feeble voice of the truly educated men in those societies is simultaneously a measure of the value of education and the ruthlessness of the irrational. Science is nothing if it is not educative and technology is a monster if it is not an aid to creative living.

### 3

**H**ow is S&T to be subordinated to the needs of a society? How are needs to be mediated in a society in which a few indulge in vulgar consumption, while many cannot even eke out a subsistence diet, and all aspire to consume more and more, thanks to a global information network? How can vast majorities be educated so that they can restrain and limit the potential of those in control of technology to exercise illegitimate power? How is the myth of all knowing S & T to be exploded in the face of its cumulative triumphs? These are some of the many problems whose solutions have to be found through a multi-pronged attack if societies are to escape the ideological fall-out of modern S&T.

Considering their crucial role in such a challenging undertaking, nothing seems to be more imperative than educating the educator, the scientist, the technologist, the philosopher and the sociologist of their roles and responsibilities.

**A** profoundly distressing feature of contemporary educational institutions is that they turn out a large number of skilled conformists. They have lost their autonomous role as centres for intellectual entrepreneurship and as agents of mediation between the past and the future. If their autonomy is being increasingly eroded, it is not because they are radical or non-conformist, but it is due to their unabashed acquiescence in the present.

This pathetic surrender is largely an outcome of the highly differentiated roles a society based on the ideology of S&T prescribes to its various institutions. Technological efficiency calls for specific role assignments. Within such a framework, education is no longer an integrating and liberating experience, but is merely an efficient process for the transmission and acquisition of specific skills.

The educational institution is another assembly line. Its products are professional men with specialised skills who are available at a price to render service. As a commodity, they are encouraged and even trained to believe that they have neither the responsibility nor the right of participation in the specification of societal goals. As professionals the only concern is to perform the specialised services required of them for a payment. Whoever pays most gets the best service.

While such an alienating pattern of education is common to all technologically founded societies, the precise nature and consequences of non-participation in the specification of societal goals are different in developed and less developed countries.

In developed countries which have already achieved a high level of economic well-being, non-participation leaves the decision-making functions entirely in the hands of

corporate interests whose exclusive concern for profits increasingly drives those societies towards greater and greater levels of consumption and dissipation. Generation of needs rather than their fulfilment becomes the goal of society. And in such a society, S&T's ideological dream of equating human betterment with technological change finds its fullest expression. Human life becomes a technological determinant.

**O**n the other hand, in less developed countries, where even the minimal necessities of life are a distant dream to many, refusal of the responsibility and surrendering of the right for participation by the educator and the educated alike accentuates existing ambivalences and conflicts whose resolution becomes more difficult. For a country like India, securing a modicum of economic and social well-being for its 500 million rural population locked up in a complicated web of debasing poverty, oppressive tradition and shocking illiteracy, should be an aspiration and primary goal. An unconvincing combination of sincerity and pressure of the ballot-paper has even elicited from the politician a declaration to that effect.

But, the educated and the predominantly urban segment of the country is indifferent to that goal and insensitive to that aspiration. Their indifference and insensitivity to so human a concern is a measure of the alienating influence of an education founded on 'irreducible and stubborn facts', even in a society in which the S&T culture has not yet taken a strong foothold. With their inherited colonial minds and their 'privileged' access to a westernised education, the educated in general and those with higher education in particular, have a perceptual framework in which the rural millions and their aspirations have no place. Through their education, they uncritically embrace the values and technologies of western technological societies.

With nothing but these tenuous connecting links between them and the rest of the society, their eagerness to protect their disproportionately advantageous economic and social position succeeds only in

augmenting the existing ambivalences and conflicts which they seek to resolve by strengthening the links that fail to connect values and technologies of the western technological societies. As scientists, technologists, administrators, artists, economists, sociologists, salesmen, media men, teachers or what you will, they are prepared to render services — of course for payment — that cannot accomplish the societal goals to which they are indifferent.

With their failure of perception that equates modernisation with westernisation, they blame the political and social system for their failures, forgetting that they constitute important determinants of the political and social system even if it is by default. More importantly, they fail to recognise that their failure stems from their uncritical acceptance of the ideology of modern S&T that seeks to make human life a technological determinant.

The universal validity and the power of integration of modern scientific knowledge is at best a one dimensional truth. Technologies' ability for human liberation is partial and contingent. Modernisation is not the process of pulverisation of pluralistic cultures into a monolithic S&T culture. Education, to be a truly integrating and liberating experience, should be critically aware of the presuppositions of every ideology and, in our times, of the ideology of modern S&T. Societies decay if this basic precaution for the survival of human aggregations is not observed. In a decadent society the connections with the past are ruptured, the future is still-born and the present perpetuates. The claim to an ahistorical universality of modern scientific knowledge and technological determinism are the greatest threats of our time to human survival.

4

In the following we suggest some measures for the subordination of S&T to Indian societal interests. Evidently, any suggestion to be made should take into account the constraints that are present. In a world divided into nation States with con-

flicting economic and territorial interests, a third-world country like India is unlikely suddenly to reverse its policy of balance of payments and defence oriented R&D and industrial production founded on modern S&T. Nor should India, in its efforts of countering the ideology of S&T, expose itself to the danger of failing to tap the benefits of S&T. That would be throwing the baby out along with the bathwater.

Our suggestions are premised on the belief that subordination of S&T to societal needs and rejection of S&T as an ideology can occur only when the vast majorities of Indian society are educated about the true nature and role of S&T, and its elite — in particular, the practitioners of S&T — are rooted in their society. We hold that the creative potential of a society can be harnessed through institutional structures that provide for informed participation and exercise of power by its collective.

The very dynamics of informed participation and exercise of power will give birth to a new generation of intelligentsia rooted in their society. Contemporary Indian society is characterised by an 'intelligentsia' who are pathetic and inglorious imitations of their counterparts in the West, and by its vast majorities that hope to survive by a suicidal combination of ignorance, apathy, escapism and anarchy. In such a degenerate society, we are aware that efforts for wider participation will be resisted by its intelligentsia, and the creation of inappropriate institutional changes for wider participation and exercise of power by vast majorities may merely result in a 'tyranny of the masses'.

The task is challenging and calls for the utmost collective understanding and individual courage than we seem to possess. But, in no case should an apprehension or the 'tyranny of the masses' of our expert incapacity to establish appropriate institutional mechanisms mean perpetuation of violence, deprivation and every conceivable human indignity, and calling it progress and knowledge as the ideology of S&T would have us believe.

We limit our suggestions in this article to the area of education. If the ideology of modern S&T is to be countered, higher educational and R&D institutions which are its nerve centres must cease to be replicas of those obtaining in the West. If S&T is to be subordinated to societal needs, a new generation of intelligentsia rooted in their environment should be created. To do so we must catch them young and provide for their primary and secondary level of education that is radically different from what obtains now.

The present practice of doling out large amounts of abstract and dry scientific information unrelated to the pupil's environment only succeeds in driving the bright student away from his community into the orbit of modern S&T, while turning the not so bright into a school drop-out without any productive skills. On the other hand, what is needed is a decentralised education which will help a young mind to identify resources in his environment, to formulate the needs and problems of his community and to learn those scientific principles and acquire those technological skills that are relevant to finding solutions to the needs and problems of the community. We list below some suggestions to bring about these transformations.

### I. Higher Educational and R & D Institutions

- (a) Existing higher educational and R&D institutions should be phased out if they do not transform themselves into centres of S&T subordinated to societal needs and creators of knowledge for human betterment.
- (b) To make the existing institutions strive for such a reorientation, funds that are presently allocated to them should be gradually decreased and they should be asked to earn the balance of their budgetary requirements by
  - (1) directing their activities towards meeting the needs of export oriented or large-scale industrial and

defence R & D, all of which rely heavily on modern S & T,

- (ii) working on task oriented projects for improving the living conditions of people in rural regions,
- (iii) carrying out research projects for an understanding of and improvement in traditional/survival-technological practices of rural India, and
- (iv) conducting intensive literacy programmes and campaigns about the role of S&T for societal development, in rural regions

## II Primary and Secondary Educational Systems

A major objective of primary and secondary education should be to train a large number of young men and women so that they can translate their native creative talents into constructive productive activities suited to local needs. Towards this end, we suggest the following

- (i) Primary and secondary education should be regional and vocational in nature
- (ii) Instruction should be imparted in vernacular languages.
- (iii) Educational material on physical and natural sciences should be centered around
  - problems of health, hygiene, sanitation,
  - identification, utilization and development of specific local resources; familiarisation with various tools used in the extraction and processing of those resources
- (iv) Educational material on Humanities and Social Sciences should help.
  - understanding of socio-historical and cultural forces that characterise their society,
  - identify the needs, problems, beliefs and practices of the community, and
  - develop a spirit of identification with one's environment.

- (v) Eighty per cent of the outlay of funds for education should be spent in rural areas
- (vi) Special rural educational services should be created in each region. Teachers, educational experts, managers etc should be recruited through these services
- (vii) Schools should be run by village/panchayat level committees of the community assisted by experts and managers drawn from the rural educational services

## III People Oriented S&T Movements

As we have observed elsewhere in this article, to counter the ideology of modern S&T and to subordinate S&T to societal interests, public opinion must be mobilised. Towards this end, village, town and district level people-oriented S&T cells should be created with the following functions to perform

- (i) To educate the public about the nature and role of science and technology through lectures, seminars and presentation of case studies.
- (ii) To organise mass movements to bring into focus the dis-benefits of an insufficiently regulated industrial society
- (iii) To organise consumer societies for boycotting all indigenous/imported inessential and dissipative goods and activities that are paraded as symbols of modernity

## 5

If truth were merely a matter of empirical facticity, the truth of the unhappiness of fellow-beings could be rendered false by wiping them out of existence. Every dominant ideology through its institutional arrangements creates its brand of institutional inequities and injustices. In civilisational terms, one measure of progress could be the sharpened sensitivity with which human beings respond to those inequities and injustices. It is not clear whether by that yard-stick S&T can be considered to have made a significant contribution to human progress.

# In the area of environment

SRI MADHAV ASHISH

THE environment is, simply, the totality of the world around us, including ourselves and our domesticated animals. It is a foolish mistake to think, as many people seem to, that the environment means only rocks, rivers, vegetation, wild animals and industrial pollution — the things which have been publicised. It is everything. The ecological saying that everything is related to everything else is the foundation stone of environmental studies. The environmentalist must always keep a vision of the whole within which the many parts are related. He must not specialise too much. The scale on which he operates is the scale of man and what can be seen with the unaided eye. The further he goes below this, the more his vision narrows, until he loses sight of the wholeness which contains the part he examines. He must be able to call on specialists for information, and he must have enough general knowledge to be able to communi-

cate with them, but he need not be an expert in the many departments of knowledge to which he must refer.

The second point to be emphasised is that the present problems of the environment have been created by human beings. This stems from human ignorance — ignorance of the fact that if we take more from nature than nature can reproduce, then we destroy nature and, in destroying it, we destroy ourselves. From ignorance of this have sprung both the excessive growth of population and the greedy exploitation of natural resources whose disastrous consequences are now threatening the human race with extinction. If the race can learn from its mistakes, then it may be able to survive. The law of evolution is that a species perishes if it cannot adapt to changing circumstances.

The problem of over population has to be stressed because, in itself,



it is responsible for most of the physical problems of the environment and many of the social problems. Acceptable methods of controlling population growth have such delayed results that our problems are going to get worse before they get better. Environmental programmes in India can produce no lasting results unless the population component of the problem is tackled with as much vigour as reafforestation, waterlogging of irrigated land, or any other component.

**O**ne hundred or even fifty years ago, the self-destruction inherent in over-breeding and the greed and selfishness inherent in over-exploitation of resources were not apparent. A man could pursue his personal interests without knowing that his activities might threaten the stability of the environment. Now, with the hugely increased world population and the accelerating consumption of resources, the total picture has changed. There is very little resilience left in the environment's power of recovery, so that any further disturbance of the equilibrium may start an irreversible process of deterioration.

I am not moralising when I speak of greed. It has now become a simple and evident fact that if we do not tailor our needs to the restricted sources of supply, then we stand to destroy the very basis of human life. Since there is only one life-support system, the environment, any intelligent man can see that if he harms what supports another, he harms what supports himself. We can no longer afford to think of ourselves as a loosely knit collection of individuals, each pursuing his private interest. Everything and everyone is related to everything and everyone.

The problem of the environment is thus rooted in the human mind in human attitudes towards the world, in exaggerated expectations of what life should provide. These expectations are not merely the luxurious standards of living projected by modern advertising. The village father's expectation that his two sons will get government jobs and each send him at least twelve hundred rupees a year, and that four

sons would send twice as much, is also an expectation that stems from ignorance of the limits to population growth and economic growth set by the limited size of the earth and its resources.

The common belief that science and technology will provide solutions to all our problems is another exaggerated expectation. The steady increase in scientific discoveries and their technological application permits us to assume they will continue in the future. However, this assumption is no proof either that specific problems will be solved or, even if they are, that their solutions will come in time to be effective, or that their utilisation will be socially acceptable, or that they will not have unforeseen consequences which are worse than the problems they solve.

The concept of limitation must not be confused by issues of social justice. Even in regard to replaceable resources, the earth can sustain production of much less than is now being taken from it, although improved management could result in increase in some areas. The share that goes to the village farmer and landless labourer must be increased. But, if there is going to be anything to share, the labourer, like everyone else, must share the cost in terms of understanding and self-restraint.

**T**his brings us to one of the most important aspects of environmental regeneration in a country where almost every square centimeter of land is directly contributing to someone's livelihood. Any steps taken to restore the environment will simultaneously disturb the people whose livelihood is intimately linked with the particular area under treatment.

The ecological approach views these people, not as alien marauders who must be driven out in order to save the land, but as one community in the ecosystem which has increased itself at the expense of the others — one of the many communities which make up an ecosystem, the well-being of whose parts depends on the well-being of the whole. Since the numbers of the people cannot be intentionally re-

duced, the ecological balance can be restored only by restoring the earth's capacity to produce the quantities of food, fodder and fuel which it originally produced, but which have decreased due to careless and wasteful land management customs and inequitable systems of land distribution.

**W**e can still do this in India, because we have millions of hectares of 'waste' land where restored productivity may be as much as ten times the present yield. However, if the population continues to increase, even this will not suffice. On the assumption that this will not happen, the aim must be to restore the wastelands with the sorts of vegetation which will supply the needs of the majority, and not with commercially valuable crops which primarily benefit the small industrial and business communities. Economists and planners sometimes need reminding that people eat food and their cattle eat fodder — not money. On the other hand, if commercial interests are to be withheld in favour of supplying the basic needs of the people on the land, then the people on the land must exercise restraint to allow the vegetation to grow. The incentive for the exercise of restraint is a rapid and demonstrable increase in supplies of fuel and fodder, with consequent increase in food. The price of the restraint can usually be measured in terms of not more, but more profitable, labour.

Ecology — the economics of the environment — has different norms from those of the economics of profit-oriented industry. The environmentalist should therefore examine his own outlook on life. He will probably find that his view has been formed on the model of the current social and economic system which is leading the world to disaster. Here a reminder is needed that it makes no difference who owns the means of production, if they are all driven by the same greedy life expectations. If the environmentalist does not understand the inherent falsity of the system and the mental attitudes from which it has sprung, he will not understand why, when planning for reafforestation, the

prevention of floods and erosion, or the reorganisation of land and cattle management, he must simultaneously deal with the mental attitudes and expectations of all the people affected by the plan, and he will not understand why his beneficial proposals get blocked by politicians and the pressure groups which fund politicians

It is a relatively easy matter to allot funds, plan the administration of an afforestation programme and give orders for its implementation. But how is one to get fuel and fodder plantations established when the administrative institutions at the grassroots are controlled by local politicians whose interests lie in exploitable cash returns from commercial species? How is one to ensure that planted trees will be allowed to grow, if one has not taken into account the attitudes and needs of the people who for generations have been using the land for their own purposes? How is one to persuade millions of farmers not just that there are not, but that there cannot be enough jobs for all their sons, and that there cannot be sufficient forests to supply their grandsons with fuel and timber if they continue producing children at the present rate?

The answers to these questions are not found only in economics. They also lie in the human mind first in understanding local problems in the entirety of their inter-relatedness, then in conveying that understanding to the entire local population through school and adult education, and through carefully and intelligently produced communications programmes. Even this will not achieve the object unless the people have majority control of their local administration, are themselves involved in an ongoing analysis of their situation, and the feedback from them is included in the programme. People who are not aware of the issues at stake, even to the extent that they are affected in the immediate future, will never co-operate in the steps needed to put things right. The message has to reach not only village people, but also industrialists, businessmen and politicians. Even research specialists need to

understand how their specialised subjects fit into the total pattern

This does not mean that attempts to improve the material environment should not be begun at once. It means that educational programmes should also be begun at once. It also means that one cannot isolate an environmental problem from its social, political and economic repercussions.

A specialised study, like the eutrophication of a lake, will ramify into agriculture and industry, the economics of local labour and raw materials, and into municipal and State politics. If the study is interpreted as posing a threat to vested interests, any programmes which emerge from it will be blocked, for the unselfishness demanded by a balanced view of the environment is not commonly found amongst people dedicated to and mentally conditioned by the current economic outlook. The protection of vested interests can go to extremes: a proposal for a course in environmental education which aimed to teach U P hill students about their own environment was said to have been blocked by what is known as the 'forest lobby'. It appears that the involvement of students in the Chipko movement's agitation to ban the felling of trees led these people to fear that school education would increase these threats to their interests.

E F Schumacher, author of *Small is Beautiful*, once wrote, 'Our task is to look at the world and see it whole'. If we are to have development plans which fulfil the need for environmental regeneration, the task of the planners is to see the environments of the Indian continent in their entirety, and not to lose sight of their wholeness in a welter of detailed specialisations. This is not just a policy. It demands a capacity of the human mind which not everyone possesses, but which can be developed. It is imperative that the men who plan for the environment should have this capacity. But unless steps are taken to spread awareness of the holistic concept of the environment to every corner of India, the gap between planning and implementation will not be closed.

# The demands of our era

D C H O M E

CIVILIZATION is at an undreamt of new apex. With its flags on the moon, satellites orbiting the planet, spacecraft probing the great beyond, researches very near unravelling the mystery of life, and so on, its mystery over nature seems complete.

But, there are seers and savants who suspect that having stormed the very heavens, *homo sapiens* are turning *homo insapiens*. And many of the things happening before our own eyes seem to lend validity to their macabre misgivings.

Thanks to the conquests of science and technology, the productivity of labour has been augmented to such lengths that it is now possible to perform what will be the noblest of human achievements: an anti-poverty revolution leading to the establishment of a global egalitarianism which ensures abundance for everybody everywhere, albeit limitedly at the beginning but unlimitedly before very long.

As early as 1972, Yugoslavia's Ales Beblar in the Azad Memorial Lecture in New Delhi took occasion to push home the same idea. 'The level of scientific knowledge and technological knowhow reached at the present moment forms the prospect of a prosperous and happy life for the entire human race, free from hunger and all kinds of want, with adequate housing, clothing, food, schooling, medical assistance, and a high level of culture.'

Beblar was not saying anything new, however. Twelve years before him, Great Britain's historian,

Arnold J. Toynbee, said as much in his Azad Memorial Lecture. 'technical advance,' said he, 'has gone to lengths which are making it feasible to give a fair share in the amenities of civilization to the whole of mankind.'

The fact is that the splitting of the atom signified an unprecedented spurt in scientific and technological progress which has enabled man to perform miracles. But the anti-poverty revolution is still as far off a cry as ever. Crocodile tears are no doubt being shed now and then in profusion, sometimes even with a bit of breast-beating, over the two-thirds of humanity still abjectly poor with 800 million living below the subsistence level, which in plain words means starvation. But what is given top priority by civilization is a programme that is liable to end in the self-annihilation of the species, the arms race. It robs the human race or, rather, the toiling majority which is the creator of wealth, one million dollars a minute amounting to about 500 billion dollars a year to produce horror weapons that are not only devoid of any use value whatsoever, save in a war, but are liable to bring an end to the world.

Only the other day, a U.N. fact sheet let drop the bit of news that the roughly 40,000 nuclear warheads of the great powers have a total explosive strength of one million Hiroshima bombs or more than three tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on earth. It is also said that horror weapons stockpiled in the arsenals of — not all the great powers — but just the two super powers are more than enough to turn into a mass of radio-active

rubble a planet a few times bigger than the tiny one we inhabit Is a thermo-nuclear holocaust the panacea for the ills mankind is now such a prey to?

The ceaseless creation of artificial wants that tend to get more and more sophisticated as well as costlier and costlier, and the diversion of another huge quantum of civilization's industrial energy to their manufacture are indicative of myopic thinking There is no denying that until recently consumption was a great incentive to progress It kept the life-style reflective of progress, stimulated inventiveness in the realm of productive activities, subserved the emergence of a world personality through cosmopolitanization of certain wants, and gave dignity to the species that were out to conquer nature

**B**ut with science and technology in a position to help labour generate abundance for egalitarian distribution, the cult has turned a roadblock to further progress which the logic of history assumes will be routed via the anti-poverty revolution The rationale of it is not too far to seek When mankind's historical development has entered the phase of a global anti-poverty revolution, the main task before civilization is to turn people away from consumerism

Today, individuals, classes and also countries, whether feudal, capitalist or socialist, have cornered the global purchasing power to the maximum, this cult, together with the obsession with armaments cannot but pervert the role of the world's productive forces, both material and social, as it indeed has The abundance includes not only horror weapons that are unavoidably destructive when used and accumulated waste when in stock-piles, but also luxury goods and services which the affluent few alone are in need of

This is not all Although only the very rich can afford the luxury goods and services the market is always flooded with, everybody — even a town dwelling beggar — falls a ready dupe to their lure, with the result that the desire to have as

many of them as possible is today one of the main incentives to hard work What is more, it is perhaps the strongest stimulant to the acquisitive mentality, which history has reduced to an anachronism by creating the material foundation of an abundance economy on the global plane

The rich-poor syndrome was not nature-created On the contrary, at a certain level of its historical development in deep antiquity, the species attained a stage known as primitive communism to which perhaps the popularly believed golden age refers Poverty was born during the inchoative phase of civilization and congealed into a semi-eternalized condition of progress by the advent of slavery

The begetter of it was not human perversity, however It was the price the overwhelming majority of the species had to pay for general progress The division of labour it had entailed set afoot a whole range of processes of which the present level of scientific and technological advance is the latest culminating point The time is now for civilization to redeem the debt it owes to the multitude, historically, morally, logically

But what had originated under the dictates of history did not take long to breed the toughest of human failings the acquisitive mentality The cult of consumerism and invented wants, which is substituting religion as a social force, provides this anachronism with a lavish source of nourishment The fact that the cult has penetrated the socialist comity of nations without meeting any spontaneous resistance from the people has a moral that merits special attention For socialism is as much indebted to the global multitudes for its inchoation and success as capitalism is

**I**t is history which has assigned top priority to the global anti-poverty revolution When this happens the wheels of progress get moving inexorably and irresistibly Millions and millions are as a matter of fact already thrown into the throes of it The majority of them

are from the former colonies But those who constitute the other contingent belong to the rest of the world and embrace not only the but also the liberal intelligentsia In have-nots other words, the anti-poverty revolution is already a global phenomenon

**B**ut the situation is not without its snags, some of them of the first magnitude The millions involved in it do not exactly know what they are fighting for Worse still, although what they are involved in is the noblest of all the tasks humanity has ever performed, the philosophy without which it is impossible to perform any task of such magnitude, is lacking The late Jack Woddis, a British Marxist, threw the point into bold relief when he said in his *New Theories of Revolution* published in 1972.

'On a total global scale millions are involved in political struggle They are awakened as never before, and naturally bring with them their own ideas as to what is wrong with the world and what needs to be done We are faced with so many new and acute problems that we cannot afford to adopt a rigid, dogmatic attitude towards new ideas as if everything had long ago been settled by Marx and Lenin'

It is, however, lamentable that Woddis blinked at one point of sovereign importance. The new ideas he spoke of have one point in common which is as old as the hills: belief in violence 'The world', says Bertrand Russell in his *Has Man a Future?* 'in which we live has been shaped by some 6,000 years of organized warfare' And organized warfare means violence in its naked form

But even the immortal seer and savant has omitted to mention a more pertinent fact about the violence organized warfare brings into full play In the civilized world its immutable, omnipresent and all-powerful embodiment is the State Not a single one of the new ideas with which the realm of insurgent thought is surfeit offers an even remotely tangible suggestion of how the anti-poverty revolution can be conducted without relying on the

sovereignty of violence over human society today?

It is this global spectrum that prompts one to try to puzzle out whether or not any logic of history was behind the emergence of Gandhism in the wake of Marxism's greatest achievement, the October Revolution, marking the onset of socialism which now has one-third of the world under its flag

**M**arxism was not an historical fortuity. It was the offshoot of a new phase in the endless self-evolution of the species. The capitalist revolution fought victoriously under the banner of 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' but was overtaken by a curious crisis, the crisis of success, which took only a little over a quarter century after 1789 to come about. The metropolitan West was giddy with prosperity and power but there was also unspeakable poverty among its masses, especially among the workers, who refused to accept their fate submissively. They grew particularly rebellious in England, then famous as the workshop of the world. Luddism, the machine smashing movement that marked the inchoation of the labour movement in the West, rocked the country for over half a decade that saw Napoleon's fall at Waterloo. The 'Peterloo Massacre', the Chartist movement combined, as did several other kinds of agitation to form the embryonic stage of trade-unionism. These had their echo in the continent also, especially in France, leading to the birth of what is known as Utopian Socialism of which Robert Owen, Saint-Simon and Fourier were the tallest advocates.

Marxism arose in the process of turning socialism from an utopia into a science orientated insurgency. Says J.D. Bernal in his *Science in History* 'By the middle of the (nineteenth) century it appeared that their (workers') struggles and sufferings were in vain. Owenism, Chartism, or Utopian Socialism, for all the enthusiasm they generated, failed to effect any significant change. What was needed in the nineteenth century was a *science of society* that would be effective... in securing the control of society by the people who formed part of it

'To create that science of society was to be the great achievement of Marx and Engels'

That Marxism is socialism made scientific is proved to the hilt by its success. The fifteen countries now under the socialist flag took and are taking their guidance from it. If they are a house divided against itself and if, to come to an issue more fundamental in the challenge it poses to civilization as a whole, the sovereignty of violence in human affairs is, instead of getting attenuated one jot, made ever more omnipotent and obtrusive, it is no refutation of the scientific thrust of Marxism. The two great founders of the philosophy, Marx and Engels, especially the latter, took occasion on times without number to hammer home that 'nothing is final, absolute, sacred', that 'a perfect society, a perfect "state", are things which can only exist in imagination', and, finally, that 'science mounts from lower to ever higher levels... without ever reaching a point at which it can proceed no further and where it would have nothing more to do than fold its hands and admire the absolute truth to which it had attained' (Engels in *Ludwig Feuerbach*)

To put it in a nutshell in Engels' own words nothing endures 'except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher' (ibid). Because everything that happens is transitory, and in a constant state of flux, and it must show 'the transitory character of everything and in everything', to quote Engels again, every new situation either must have or develop imperfections in consequence of its inevitable mutability. The onset of the era of socialist transition was, therefore, nature bound to have its failings.

**T**his being the case, what is lamentable about the realities of socialism in the process of expansion is not that some of it has gone awry, but that the movement seems to be falling short of its obligation to its philosophy. The most distinguishing aspect of Marxism is that it not only enjoins upon its adherents to think dialectically but

has equipped them with an unfailing method of doing it correctly, which is to be eternally on the alert to detect whatever is in the process of either appearing into or disappearing from any given situation or any of its constituents and, having done so, find out the cause-and-effect principles involved in it, decide the scientifically imperative course of action, and follow it, keeping vigilant about what results from doing so.

Unfortunately, Marxists today do not seem to be obeying this principle. For they are prone to rationalize whatever happens to go wrong, be it Stalinism, the disarray in the socialist camp, the failure of the proletariat of the western world to herald the socialist transition, leaving it to find its cradle in partly capitalist and partly non-capitalist regions of the Euro-Asian Orient, such as Czarist Russia, China, Viet Nam, etc.

**T**he most disturbing symptom of this preference for practical politics to dialectical thinking is the way Marxists seem to rest content with denouncing capitalism but failing to find out how capitalism has extended its life almost at will. For, it perpetuates the coexistence between these two antagonistic social systems, which seems to reflect some undetected logic of history. It has to be remembered that the material foundations of both is almost the same, they being reliant on identical forces of production which in their turn thrive on constantly advancing scientific knowledge and technological knowhow. What is more, the global forces of democracy are not exclusively concentrated in either. Indeed, the anti-fascist war was fought to a stupendous victory under a banner that threw them together against the common enemy.

Lastly, a third world war, which is bound to be thermo-nuclear, will not leave either of the two systems unscathed. In fact, both are likely to be exterminated along with the planet itself. All of which means that capitalism and socialism will have to learn not only to coexist but also to turn the coexistence into a source of creative impulses in short, to make the completion of

the anti-poverty revolution a success in an all-embracing unity on a global scale

It is in the crystalization of this perspective governing the latest phase of historical development that one can see glimpses of the logic behind the emergence of Gandhism. Here are some of the more striking facts in which they are reflected: biding faith in change of heart as an instrument of solving social antagonism, resistance to the cult of consumerism and ceaseless creation of artificial wants, opposition to unjust and predatory wars, striving after the ideal of Ramrajya which in modern terminology should mean penetration of politics, economics and statecraft by principles of ethics and morality, promotion of the anti-poverty revolution and the egalitarian ideal through effective injection of the altruistic motive in all spheres of life, that of production, distribution and consumption of goods and services in particular, total abjuration of violence in the resolution of antagonisms of all categories, changing the world outlook of society and individuals in order to make it consonant with the demands of the anti-poverty revolution and the egalitarian ideal, enriching civilization's spiritual heritage and resistance to its impoverishment due to excessive consumerism and indulgence in permissive culture, secularization of the concept of truth and religious pursuits, cultivation of discipline and self-analysis at all levels of life, and family-planning through controlled continence.

**T**he relevance to the contemporary era of the philosophy these and many other teachings of Gandhism throw into relief is almost self-evident today. Gandhi himself was unable to drive it home and he often confessed to his inability in all sincerity and candour. Fortunately, as Louis Fischer, his American biographer, has told the world, 'Gandhi advanced to greatness by doing', and all his deeds were performed in the full glare of the Indian summer, and they bear out our claim. What is more, the philosophy these points throw into relief does seem to owe its origin to the

intuitive but correct grasp of what exactly was going to be at stake by the last quarter of our century of cataclysmic change. In spite of acknowledgedly not being a seer, savant or historian, his intuition, which he called his Inner Voice, was incisive enough to have expressed in his actions and teachings that aspect of historical logic which was either invisible or too inchoate to look believable during his life. This can be seen if we try to visualize the effect of something he had proposed to have the country do but held back from it either in deference to opposition or the right situation.

**D**uring the Second World War, his idea was that India should resist non-violently should Japan invade her shores or boundaries. It evoked laughter as being too hair-brained to be taken seriously. Some people saw in it the menacing shadow of his pro-axis sympathies. No one saw any merit in it. We are now told that some thinkers in Europe have come round to feeling that it was worth trying. Be that as it may, would it not have galvanized the whole world if one of our political leaders, towering in stature with a big national following, had got the idea that as the birthplace of positive pacifism, Panchashila type diplomacy, the non-alignment movement and, above all, Gandhism, India must offer non-violent resistance to the Chinese invasion in 1962 and done so on a massive scale in creative emulation of the principle of satyagraha?

Would it not have eclipsed the pacifist and spiritual impact of the example set by Ashoka after the Kalinga armageddon if this leader was Jawaharlal Nehru defying the bullets showered from power-spouting Chinese guns?

Suppose before embarking on this first ever non-violent resistance to an invader, who happened to be of Titanic strength, Jawahar had resigned the Prime-Ministership in emulation of Gandhiji whose fond and hand-picked spiritual heir he was, and made the action truly and immaculately popular, would it not have had a global effect with a deep secular significance?

In 1920, at the height of the Khilafat-Noncooperation Movement Gandhiji said 'I believe absolutely that she (India) has a mission for the world' (*Young India* 11 8 1920)

In 1929 he elaborated this idea in reply to some of his critics among European Pacifists in an article in *Young India* in the course of which he said 'This I know that, if India comes to her own demonstrably through non-violent means. . . If her self-consciousness rises to the height necessary to give her a non-violent victory ... the world victory will have changed and most of the paraphernalia of war would be found useless' (*YI* of 5 9 29)

In a radio talk to America across the Atlantic from London during the Round Table Conference in 1931 'The world is sick unto death of blood-letting. It is seeking a way out, and I flatter myself with the belief that perhaps it will be the privilege of the ancient land of India to show that way out to the hungry world' (*Mahatma* by D G Tendulkar, Vol III, p 118).

Would not have India's self-consciousness risen to the height Gandhiji had wanted it to soar, if Jawaharlal had chosen to be the inaugurator of non-violent resistance to militarism by man against man?

**T**oday the lust for profit and power has impregnated India's national ethos to saturation point. Indeed, it will not be very wrong to say that nothing conspicuous happens in the country that stirs our nobler instincts. Everything is done to suit personal, partisan or particularist ends. Would not have this trend met with popular resistance, if it had not been nipped in the bud altogether, had Nehru set that example? Let all of us ponder dispassionately over it.

In the meantime let all of us try to see the logic of history involved in the emergence of Gandhism in the wake of the socialist transition and find out how its relevance to the contemporary era can be made meaningful not only to our nation but to humanity at large.

# Index

## SEMINAR ISSUES 1981

SEMINAR 257 January 1981, **India 1980** a symposium on the year that was

Bose, Pradip	Farmer agitations
Indian Institute of Public Opinion	Assam crisis
Jha, Prem Shankar	Lessons of agriculture
Kothari, Rajni	Building the state
Kumar, Radha	Evils to the fore
Kurien, C T.	Socialism from below
Nandy, Ashis	Limits to politics
Paranjape, H K.	Dimensions of tragedy
Roy, Bunker	Paper reforms
Ramesh, Jairam	Technology '80
Shahabuddin, Syed	Back to the old grooves
Thapar, Romesh	Management of transition

SEMINAR 258 February 1981, **A Failed Science**. a symposium on the state of our technological establishment

Banerjee, B	Research institutions
Bhagavan, M R	Innovations in industry
Bhargava, P.M	Deficiencies and corrections
Ganesh, S.R.	Training patterns
Mohan, Dimesh	A sea of mediocrity

SEMINAR 259 March 1981, **The Politicians**: a symposium on the state of a key profession

Jha, Chetkar	Two-way exploitation
Kumar, K N.	Party organisation
Pattanyak, Kishan	Radicals livelihood
Prasad, R C.	Professionalization
Sen, Lalit	A defence
Singh, Ram Jee	A mission
Varma, Vishwanath P.	Ideological streams

SEMINAR 260 April 1981, **Parliament**: a symposium on the core structure of our democracy

Alva, Margaret	Instrument of change
Dandavate, Pramila	Future prospects
Parashar, N C	The system works
Raju, V.B	Correctives needed
Ramamurti, P.	The workings
Shahabuddin, Syed	Necessity for reform
Singh, Jaswant	The problem

SEMINAR 261 May 1981, **Concepts in Change**: a symposium on some emerging frameworks of thought

Ghosh, Suleen	Secularism and socialism
Krishna, Raj	Piece-rate education
Manor, James	Nehru remembered
Nandy, Ashis	Science, authoritarianism, culture
Thapar, Romesh	Social uses of time

SEMINAR 262 June 1981, **Levels of Consciousness** a symposium on the effort to enlarge perception and understanding

Ashish, Sri Madhav	Wisdom
Ghorpade, M.Y	The human quest
Krishnamurti, J.	The mind and renewal
Roze, Janis A.	An historical imperative
Stange, Paul	Mysticism
Thakar, Vimala	Sadhana

SEMINAR 263 July 1981, **The World of Microprocessors**: a symposium on the revolutionary impact of a new technology

Bhargava, Pradeep	Indian environment
Friedrichs, Gunter	Dimensions of change
Lee, M R.	The chip
Rada, Juan S.	Impact on developing countries
Shiva, Vandana	The potential
Yanai, Hisayochi	Historical development

SEMINAR 264 August 1981, **Search for Consensus**. a symposium on the basic themes of the Agenda

**The Agenda**  
H N Bahuguna, George Fernandes, Ram Niwas Mirdha, E M.S. Namboodiripad, Chandra Shekhar, Devraj Urs, A B. Vajpayee

SEMINAR 265 September 1981, **The Soviet Connection** a symposium on the dimensions of a relationship

Banerjee, Jyotirmoy	Security relations
Gujral, I K.	Strengthening relations
Jayashekhar	Economic links
Josh, Nirmala	Regional situations
Nayar, Kuldip	Russia, right or wrong
Sen Gupta, Bhabani	The communist factor

SEMINAR 266 October 1981, **Confusion in Economics** a symposium on the disarray of a science

Jha, L K	Need for rethinking
Kurien C T.	The inner paradox
Mitra, Ashok	The practitioners
Rao, V K.R V	A depressing scenario
Sethi, J D	Disarray or betrayal

SEMINAR 267 November 1981, **Peasants and Prices**: a symposium on a major incentive to agriculture

Fernandes, George	A beginning
Jha, Prem Shankar	Strategy for the eighties
Kumar, Nitish	Political will
Roy, Sanjit	Despotism
Surjeet, Harkishan Singh	Upsurge
Young India Project	A class analysis

SEMINAR 268 December 1981, **Reservations**: a symposium on the ramifications of a policy

Beteille, Andre	The problem
Mukarji, Nirmal	Perspectives of a policy
Ram, Nandu	The limited education
Sharma, S.L	Conversions
Tilak, Jandhyala B G	A new criterion
Urs, Devaraj	The only way

## BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Josh, A K	Levels of Consciousness
Kumar, Devendra	Peasants and Prices
	Parliament
Limaye, M.S	Reservations
	A Failed Science
Nayar, M.P.	Confusion in Economics
	The Politicians
	The Soviet Connection

## SEMINAR ISSUES

1	The Party in Power	September	1959
2	Food	October	1959
3	Freedom and Planning	November	1959
4	Changing Village	December	1959
5	Co-ops	January	1960
6	Two Sectors	February	1960
7	Our Universities	March	1960
8	Corruption	April	1960
9	Films	May	1960
10	Indians in Africa	June	1960
11	Language	July	1960
12	Health	August	1960
13	The Third Plan	September	1960
14	Tribal India	October	1960
15	Into Space	November	1960
16	Artists and Art	December	1960
17	Socialism Today	January	1961
18	The Census	February	1961
19	Our Foreign Policy	March	1961
20	Waste	April	1961
21	The Writer at Bay	May	1961



22	Administration	June	1961	103	Recession	March	1968
23	North and South	July	1961	104	Future of Asia	April	1968
24	Communalism	August	1961	105	The Budget and the Plan	May	1968
25	Philosophy	September	1961	106	Minority in Crisis	June	1968
26	Science	October	1961	107	Politics and Society	July	1968
27	Advertising	November	1961	108	Agricultural Revolution	August	1968
28	Music	December	1961	109	Management Challenge	September	1968
29	Your Vote	January	1962	110	Our Security	October	1968
30	Our Democracy	February	1962	111	The Centre and the States	November	1968
31	U.N.	March	1962	112	Academic Colonialism	December	1968
32	On Stage	April	1962	113	The New Left	January	1969
33	Population Control	May	1962	114	Resources	February	1969
34	Election Analysis	June	1962	115	Nationhood	March	1969
35	India's Defence	July	1962	116	Violence	April	1969
36	The Scientist	August	1962	117	Pakistan	May	1969
37	Our Neighbours	September	1962	118	Gerontocracy	June	1969
38	Indian Agriculture	October	1962	119	Our External Relations	July	1969
39	Past and Present	November	1962	120	Educated Unemployed	August	1969
40	Romanisation	December	1962	121	The Congress Party	September	1969
41	The Emergency	January	1963	122	Mahatma Gandhi	October	1969
42	The Press	February	1963	123	Conservation	November	1969
43	Taxation	March	1963	124	Our Political Parties	December	1969
44	Crisis on the Campus	April	1963	125	Secularism in Crisis	January	1970
45	Non-Alignment	May	1963	126	Our Libraries	February	1970
46	Gandhism	June	1963	127	India's Left	March	1970
47	Censorship	July	1963	128	Modernisation	April	1970
48	India and Pakistan	August	1963	129	The Rural Base	May	1970
49	Panchayati Raj	September	1963	130	Population Planning	June	1970
50	China	October	1963	131	Foreign Technology	July	1970
51	Emerging Leadership	November	1963	132	Nation and Community	August	1970
52	Indian Women	December	1963	133	The Super Powers	September	1970
53	The Coming Crisis	January	1964	134	The U.N. at 25	October	1970
54	Worker's Share	February	1964	135	Two Neighbours	November	1970
55	Scientific Attitude	March	1964	136	The Constitution	December	1970
56	India in the World	April	1964	137	INDIA 1970	January	1971
57	Needs and Resources	May	1964	138	Your Vote	February	1971
58	Kashmir	June	1964	139	Political Pointers	March	1971
59	Jawaharlal Nehru	July	1964	140	Land Hunger	April	1971
60	Prohibition	August	1964	141	The Blue Revolution	May	1971
61	Energy	September	1964	142	Bangla Desh	June	1971
62	The Consumer	October	1964	143	The Economic Agenda	July	1971
63	Nehru and the Ism	November	1964	144	The 1971 Elections	August	1971
64	Our Changing Values	December	1964	145	China Today	September	1971
65	The Bomb	January	1965	146	A Nuclear India	October	1971
66	Parliament and Crisis	February	1965	147	Crisis in the Press	November	1971
67	Secularism	March	1965	148	Acapolitics	December	1971
68	Language	April	1965	149	INDIA 1971	January	1972
69	Goa	May	1965	150	Impact of Bangla Desh	February	1972
70	Caste	June	1965	151	Secret Societies	March	1972
71	At School	July	1965	152	West Bengal	April	1972
72	Public Sector	August	1965	153	State Elections	May	1972
73	Indo-Soviet Link	September	1965	154	Permits and Licenses	June	1972
74	Money in Politics	October	1965	155	India in Asia	July	1972
75	The War and After	November	1965	156	Decentralisation	August	1972
76	Politics of Language	December	1965	157	The Social Sciences	September	1972
77	We and the World	January	1966	158	New Education	October	1972
78	The Plan	February	1966	159	Clean Elections	November	1972
79	Our Cities	March	1966	160	The Mass Line	December	1972
80	Elections & Power	April	1966	161	INDIA 1972	January	1973
81	Farms and Food	May	1966	162	Mass Housing	February	1973
82	Science in Afro-Asia	June	1966	163	Calcutta	March	1973
83	India's Defence Pattern	July	1966	164	Federal Reorganisation	April	1973
84	The I.C.S.	August	1966	165	The Status of Women	May	1973
85	The Administrative Jungle	September	1966	166	Our Paralyse Universities	June	1973
86	Aid or Trade	October	1966	167	Garibi Hatao	July	1973
87	State Politics	November	1966	168	A Committed Civil Service	August	1973
88	Students in Turmoil	December	1966	169	Science Policy	September	1973
89	Your Vote	January	1967	170	No-Cost Reform	October	1973
90	Our Union	February	1967	171	Mass Transport	November	1973
91	The Economic Crisis	March	1967	172	The Indian Economy	December	1973
92	Our Brain Drain	April	1967	173	INDIA 1973	January	1974
93	The Cow	May	1967	174	Indian Muslims	February	1974
94	Election Outcome	June	1967	175	Population Threat	March	1974
95	Power Patterns	July	1967	176	The Students Speak	April	1974
96	Asian Security	August	1967	177	The Untouchables	May	1974
97	Books	September	1967	178	Marxism and India	June	1974
98	Mass Communication	October	1967	179	The Multinationals	July	1974
99	Design for Living	November	1967	180	The Architect in India	August	1974
100	Seminar on Seminar	December	1967	181	The Indian Ocean	September	1974
101	Prices	January	1968	182	The Energy Crisis	October	1974
102	Unctad	February	1968	183	Growing the Food	November	1974



EVERY WEEK  
IS  
COURTESY WEEK  
AT  
**UNION BANK**

Union Bank has wide network of branches spread out all over India. More branches to serve you better—with greater efficiency, more courteous service.

Union Bank caters to people from all walks of life. We have Credit and Deposit Schemes to suit everybody. Loans for different types of needs. Savings Schemes designed in your interest.

All Banks deal with money. Union Bank deals with PEOPLE too. That's why every week is COURTESY WEEK at Union Bank.

We help you to help yourself

**UNION BANK OF INDIA**  
(A Government of India Undertaking)

**AVAIL OF OUR SPECIALISED JOURNALS SUBSCRIPTION SERVICE FOR  
YOUR REQUIREMENTS OF FOREIGN JOURNALS FROM ANY  
PART OF THE WORLD AND ON ANY SUBJECT.**

**PLEASE CONTACT:**



**CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY PVT. LTD.**

**23/90, Connaught Circus,  
New Delhi-110001.**

**Phone : 344448, 523153**

**SERVING OVER 300 LIBRARIES INCLUDING UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES AND  
LIBRARIES OF RESEARCH INSTITUTES FOR OVER 4 DECADES.**

## **CAPITAL**

(Published since 1888)

Capital's incisive reports and analyses have given it prestige and a position unequalled by publications of its kind, making it India's premier business weekly. Which means it reaches the men who influence public policy decisions and actions.

A Management Research finding points out that Capital's reputation makes it a reliable guide for Government leaders and corporate executives. And a host of influential subscribers abroad read Capital to keep abreast of Indian developments.

**CAPITAL**

19, R.N. Mukherjee Road,  
Calcutta-700 001

### **SOME OUTSTANDING TITLES FROM NBT**

DWARKANATH TAGORE by Krishna Kripalani, 25.00

"...skilfully presents a balanced picture of a *bon viveur* and shrewd entrepreneur, a philanthropist of heroic proportions, a pioneer in banking, shipping and insurance...a legend in his time..." — *The Hindustan Times*

"...a great and lasting memorial to one of the great sons of modern India..." — *Amrita Bazar Patrika*

TRADITIONAL INDIAN THEATRE—  
MULTIPLE STREAMS by Kapila Vatsyayan; Rs 32.00(PB), Rs 42 00(HB)

"...deals with nearly twenty styles of traditional Indian theatre that evolved between the 10th and 19th centuries..." — *Indian Express*

A GUIDE TO KATHAKALI by David Bolland; Rs 30 00(PB), Rs 45 00(HB)

"The book gives in a nutshell the main features of the Kathakali art—characters, make-up, costume, stage, etc." — *The Hindu*

**Latest :** BANGLA DESH by Subrata Banerjee, Rs 8.75

Traces the genesis of a nation from its history, culture and socio-economic developments.

And many more interesting titles in various series such as 'India—The Land and the People', 'National Biography', 'Popular Science', 'Folklore of India', 'Young India Library', 'Aadan Pradan', and 'Nehru Bal Pustakalya'

Available with leading booksellers

**NATIONAL BOOK TRUST, INDIA**

A-5 Green Park, New Delhi-110 016

184.	The Cinema Situation	December	1974
185	INDIA 1974	January	1975
186	Foreign Policy	February	1975
187	A Changed India	March	1975
188	Inflation	April	1975
189	Prices and Procurement	May	1975
190	Medicines for the Masses	June	1975
191	Urbanisation	July	1975
192	The System	August	1975
193	The Economists	September	1975
194	The Legacy of Gandhi	October	1975
195	Global Problems	November	1975
196	Judgments	December	1975
197	INDIA 1975	January	1976
198	The Economic Debate	February	1976
199	New Trends	March	1976
200	Life and Living	April	1976
201	Changing Communism	May	1976
202	A Military View	June	1976
203	Where Do We Go From Here	July	1976
SEMINAR Issues, 204 to 209 were not printed			
210	Fear and Freedom	February	1977
211.	Images of the Emergency	March	1977
212	The Elections	April	1977
213	The Correctives	May	1977
214	Atrocities	June	1977
215	Rethinkings	July	1977
216	The Janata Phase	August	1977
217	External Alignments	September	1977
218	The Police	October	1977
219	Action Agendas	November	1977
220	Bengal Scenario	December	1977
221	INDIA 1977	January	1978
222	Indian Intellectuals	February	1978
223	Economic Imperatives	March	1978
224	Populist Politics	April	1978
225	Defence and Detente	May	1978
226	Federal Power Balance	June	1978
227	The Rural Challenge	July	1978
228	The Sixth Plan	August	1978
229	New Dialogues	September	1978
230	The Administrator	October	1978
231	Trauma of the Triangle	November	1978
232	Another TV	December	1978
233	INDIA 1978	January	1979
234	Grassroots Democracy	February	1979
235	The Village and the Communicator	March	1979
236	Emerging Questions	April	1979
237	Threatened Environment	May	1979
238	Profiles of Science	June	1979
239	The Autonomy Myth	July	1979
240	The Muslim Condition	August	1979
241	The Election Business	September	1979
242	Our Fractured Politics	October	1979
243	Harijans	November	1979
244	Economic Scenarios	December	1979
245	INDIA 1979	January	1980
246	External Action	February	1980
247	The Planets	March	1980
248	Transition Politics	April	1980
249	Development Dimensions	May	1980
250	The Violent Present	June	1980
251	Debating an Agenda	July	1980
252	Policing	August	1980
253	The Dangerous Decade	September	1980
254	Studying our Society	October	1980
255	Raw Power	November	1980
256	Alternatives in Foreign Policy	December	1980
257	INDIA 1980	January	1981
258	A Failed Science	February	1981
259	The Politicians	March	1981
260	Parliament	April	1981
261	Concepts in Change	May	1981
262	Levels of Consciousness	June	1981
263	The World of Microprocessors	July	1981
264	Search for Consensus	August	1981
265	The Soviet Connection	September	1981
266	Confusion in Economics	October	1981
267	Peasants and Prices	November	1981
268	Reservations	December	1981
269	INDIA 1981	January	1982

#### Encounters :

#### The Westerly Trade of the Harappa Civilization SHEREEN RATNAGAR

This study provides an overall view of the bronze age cultures, including those of Sumer, Akkad, Elam, Barbar and Umm an Nar, Yahya and Helmaud cultures, spreading from the Lower Mesopotamian plains to the Indus Valley, and the evidence for trade links between them and the Indus Valley civilization. The author draws on both archeological and literary sources for evidence of extensive trading patterns that existed in this period.

Rs 120

#### Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat Kheda District 1917-1934

DAVID HARDIMAN

This book examines the peasant base of the nationalist movement in India, by concentrating on events in Kheda District of Gujarat, which was a major centre of rural nationalism in the early twentieth century. To understand the extent and nature of peasant involvement in the Gandhian movement, the author examines the complex local politics of Kheda at that time, analysing relations between the Congress, Gandhi, Vallabhbhai Patel and the peasants, as also between sections of the peasantry themselves.

Rs 110

#### Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy 1947-72

A APPADORAI

The force with which independent India made her views on international affairs known and acted upon in the period 1947-72 deserves close and critical study. The author has isolated five specifically Indian elements: the traditional belief in non-violence, India being a secular state, the strongly socialist bias that the Indian National Congress has evinced from the 1930s onwards, the impact of federalism on the foreign policy of a state, and finally, and perhaps of greatest significance, the personality and ability of Jawaharlal Nehru himself. The book as a whole provides a comprehensive survey of Indian foreign policy.

Rs 80

#### A History of Sri Lanka

K M DE SILVA

This book, the first comprehensive general survey of the island's history to appear since the middle of the nineteenth century, provides a synthesis of the major forces — political, economic, social and cultural — which have shaped her destiny from legendary origins over 2,500 years ago to the present day. It begins with her classical age when a Buddhist culture in combination with a complex irrigation system formed the basis of a vibrant civilization.

Rs 150



**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj,  
New Delhi 110002

Bombay Calcutta Madras

**MUKAND**

**IS**

**STEEL**



**MUKAND IRON & STEEL WORKS LTD.**

*Registered Office:*

Lal Bahadur Shastri Marg,  
Kurla, Bombay-400 070.

**Guess who is riding  
high around  
the world?**



**The Bankura horse of course!**

The Cottage is going places  
All over the world. With  
exquisite handicrafts and  
high-fashion ready-to-wear  
garments

Our one-stop Indian shop has  
almost everything you need  
under its roof  
Crafts and handlooms, carpets  
and furniture, jewellery and  
accessories. All in the best  
Indian tradition

Small wonder then, that the  
Bankura horse is riding high!



**Central  
Cottage  
Industries  
Emponum**

A Govt of India Undertaking  
New Delhi Bombay Calcutta Jaipur

CAS555

# **J A G S H I P S**

**At Your Service**

**For quick and efficient carriage**

**entrust your shipments**

**TO**

# **The Great Eastern Shipping Company Limited**

**Registered Office .  
Mercantile Bank Building,  
60, Mahatma Gandhi Road,  
Bombay - 400 023.**

**Telephone No. 274869  
(10 Lines)**

**Telex : 2719, 2824  
2217, 2092**



## Selecting an airline is your privilege

Serving you  
is ours.



**REGD. OFFICE :**  
F-12 Connaught Place  
New Delhi-110001  
Phone : 43103, 44023

**KANPUR :**  
18/53, The Mall  
Phone : 68171, 52989

GK&E, D81.1298

## GIFT A GIFT THAT APPRECIATES — IOB CASH CERTIFICATES

You can buy one for as little as  
Rs. 37.20 which will grow to Rs. 100/-  
in ten years.


Drop in at any of our branches. Five  
minutes is all it takes to buy an IOB  
Cash Certificate.



**Indian  
Overseas  
Bank**


Good people to grow with

# The finest hotel chain in India...




## The Taj Mahal Inter-Continental, Bombay

Combining old world panache with 20th century splendour. Quite simply, like few others in the world.



## Hotel President, Bombay

Situated close to the city's business, shopping and entertainment area, offering excellent service.



**The Taj Mahal Hotel, New Delhi**  
The latest addition to the Taj chain. A splendid abode of grace, created to accentuate the magnificence of India's capital.



**Taj Coromandel Hotel, Madras**  
The finest hotel in Madras, mere minutes from the city centre. A serene reflection of the age-old Taj tradition.



## The Rambagh Palace, Jaipur


Created at the height of the graciousness and splendour of Jaipur. Now offered to you as a hotel. A delicate fusion of the medieval and the contemporary.



**The Lake Palace, Udaipur**  
Once upon a time the Ranas of Mewar held court here. Now it is a unique hotel. Complete with all manner of 20th century fittings and amenities.




**The Taj Holiday Village, Goa**  
Adjacent to the Fort Aguada Beach Resort. A variety of cottages landscaped to create a typical Goan environment.



## The Fort Aguada Beach Resort, Goa

Where a gentle sea beats an old Portuguese ruin presides over a beautiful poem in brick and wood—The Fort Aguada Beach Resort.



**The Fisherman's Cove, Madras**  
Located on a secluded casuarina-fringed beach like a golden secret. Just a 32 km drive from Madras.



**Hotel Taj Ganges, Benares**  
Centrally located and close to the great holy river—the Ganges. The most beautiful way to see Benares.



**Pandyan Hotel, Madurai**  
In the heart of Madurai where transcendent architecture and sculpture are living monuments from the past.

## For reservations contact:

• Central Reservation Service, The Taj Group of Hotels, The Taj Mahal Inter-Continental, Apollo Bunder, Bombay 400 039, India. Tel. 243366, 242524. Telex. 11 2442 TAJB IN, 11 6175 TAJB IN. Cable TAJ GROUP.

## THE TAJ GROUP OF HOTELS, INDIA.

# UCOBANK presents its most important asset:

## YOU



**United Commercial Bank** Helping people to help themselves

UCO/CAS-93/81

You mean more than just a specimen signature to us

You are an invaluable asset making vital contributions in each and every area of our activities.

Without you, we would not have been able to develop our services, our abilities, our position. In essence, ourselves

Your diverse needs have initiated 'imaginative financing'. Your deposits provide much needed inputs to serve people—particularly the weaker sections of our society. Without you, our joint family that transcends customs and creeds would be incomplete

You are our most important asset. Even though you don't appear on our Balance Sheet

## RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS

A few facts you should know.

Garlic has been well-known from earliest times for its medicinal properties. Medical authorities have accepted the value of garlic in correcting various health problems. Garlic can be taken raw or cooked or in capsule form. But to derive the maximum medicinal benefits from garlic, it should be taken in the most effective way.

**The natural way to all-round health.**

### Why not raw Garlic?



Raw garlic cloves have to be chewed before the extract acts inside the body. But when chewed, they leave an unpleasant smell. When swallowed, they are difficult to digest. And the extraction is incomplete.



### Why not cooked Garlic?

On cooking, the effective medicinal properties of garlic are lost.

### Why RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS?

Ranbaxy Laboratories, a trusted name with the medical profession, now gives you all the benefits of raw garlic—without the smell. Ranbaxy's Garlic Pearls contain the pure extract of raw garlic in easy-to-digest, soft gelatin capsules—the most effective way of deriving the medicinal properties of garlic.

#### RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS

- ☞ Help relieve gas and indigestion, ease heartburn
- ☞ Reduce high cholesterol levels
- ☞ Help ease disabling joint pains
- ☞ Prevent and control recurring coughs and colds


Take Ranbaxy's Garlic Pearls—everyday  
It's a healthy habit



Take two pearls twice daily regularly.



**If these walls  
could speak, we'd hear  
how history is made.**



On 30th October this year, the Ashok Hotel completed its first twenty-five years. A quarter century of being India's "official host" and of being a witness to history.

Over the past quarter century, the Ashok has

welcomed the guests of the nation. Names that form a veritable 'who's who' in politics, the arts, the sciences, sports, the business world, even monarchy. The walls of the Ashok have echoed the words that make headlines all over the

world. In state banquets, receptions, meetings of heads of state and government.

The Ashok has been a part of many momentous occasions. And shared India's privilege of welcoming the world.



**Ashok Hotel**  
New Delhi

India Tourism Development Corporation (T)

# DANFOSS (INDIA) LIMITED

706-707 Surya Kiran  
19, Kasturba Gandhi Marg,  
New Delhi-110 001

Telephones : 35 20 73/35 21 73  
Telex : 031-2132

## **Jyoti has designed and developed circulating and condensate pumps and high tension switchgear exclusively for thermal power stations**

This is just one of Jyoti's several exclusives, rendered possible by Jyoti's research-oriented philosophy. Others include India's largest 360,000 l p m vertical propeller pumps for dry docks, 33 kV outdoor minimum oil circuit breakers, arno converters for electric locomotives, sophisticated pumps for nuclear power stations, micro-hydel generating sets, centrifuge motors and steam turbine driven generators and process pumps for sugar industry, high tension motors, epoxy resin insulated instrument transformers up to 33 kV, solid state power converters and inverters, as well as research projects on solar energy, laser technology and fluidics.

This then is Jyoti's bigness — measured by its creative, innovative, inventive and futuristic dimensions — not size and turnover alone.

WHERE RESEARCH BRINGS RESULTS



# **Jyoti Ltd.**

BARODA

 **HYDRAULICS**  **ELECTRICALS**  **POWER ELECTRONICS**

---

# A Rs. 3000 crore investment rests on the shoulders of the lowly bullock


## IMAGINE

There are 15 million bullock carts in India

Providing employment to an estimated 20 million people, accounting for two-thirds of rural India's transportation needs And embracing an investment of Rs 3000 crores

## THINK


A little innovative thinking and the bullock cart could more than double its load-carrying capacity, raise the overall animal output to 4 million horsepower, increase



the working life of the bullock And improve the well-being and standard of living of the cart owner —and the rural community at large

## LOOK AHEAD


Dunlop India pioneered the modernisation of the bullock cart and helped develop improved ADV equipment. Besides quality ADV tyres. Much more needs to be done By Dunlop By others If only everybody put their shoulders to the wheels of the bullock cart



 **DUNLOP**  
helping those who help the nation

ADV/CAS-1/81

# Closed Die Forged Wheel Blanks for Cranes



**A new introduction  
from Tata Steel  
that is far superior  
to conventional  
cast products.**

These blanks can be supplied  
to meet the requirements of  
Inter Plant Steel Standard  
(IPSS) - 1-08-001/1975, Types  
630 A & B, 710 A & B and  
800 A & B

*For further information and your requirements, please  
write to any of the following*

Chief Marketing Manager  
The Tata Iron and Steel Co Ltd  
43 Chowringhee Road  
Calcutta 700 071

Jt. Chief Marketing Manager  
The Tata Iron and Steel Co Ltd  
Jamshedpur 831 001

Sr Application Engineer  
The Tata Iron and Steel Co Ltd  
Bank of Baroda Building  
16 Parliament Street  
New Delhi 110 001

Sr Application Engineer  
The Tata Iron and Steel Co Ltd  
New India Assurance Building  
87 Mahatma Gandhi Road  
Fort, Bombay 400 023

Sr Application Engineer  
The Tata Iron and Steel Co Ltd  
20J Mahatma Gandhi Road  
Bangalore 560 001

Sr Application Engineer  
The Tata Iron and Steel Co Ltd  
Park Centre, 24 Park Street  
Calcutta 700 016

Application Engineer  
The Tata Iron and Steel Co Ltd  
"ELDORADO" Building,  
2nd Floor  
112 Nungambakkam High Road  
Madras 600 034



## **TATA STEEL**

HTC-TIS-4239R 1



When you're on the move...

Move in comfort Move in style.  
In the Ambassador Mark 4.  
Fashionable Reliable Economical.  
Styled to match your changing lifestyle.  
Ambassador Mark 4  
The good car for those who've  
made it good.

**Ambassador  
Mark 4**


The car to take you places.



HINDUSTAN MOTORS LIMITED



# THE TECHNOLOGISTS' SUPERMARKET



That's one way of describing the broad spectrum of IOL's technologies.

The technologists' supermarket is IOL where under one roof a wide range of products and services are available

IOL's technological hamper includes gases for anaesthesia, welding; cutting, inerting, cryogenic applications and furnace enrichment, special gases for the electronics industry, for diving and off-shore operations, for metallurgy, calibration of instruments and research, anaesthetic equipment, welding and cutting equipment and consumables of every kind to meet needs as diverse as

those from the wayside welder to the shipbuilder, the small tool manufacturer, the giant heavy engineering sector, petrochemical, fertiliser and refinery complexes plus entire gas plants, associated cryogenic equipment, and liquid oxygen explosives for mining


Backing this hardware is a package of services—consultancy and advisory, after-sales, and training

IOL's leadership in all its activities is the leadership of technology. Cross-fertilising latest trends with existing knowledge to breed a new generation of products and services. For progress.




**IOL offers the best in technology**

17X/CAS-7/80



To create, preserve and promote

**Purolator**  
INDIA LIMITED



Filtration for every known fluid.

ULKA-PIL-1118

## A note from **seminar**

Dear Subscriber,

We post SEMINAR on the 1st of every month. If your copy does not reach you by the fifteenth of that month, please inform us immediately so that we can send a replacement. Complaints of non-receipt of copies at a later date makes it impossible for us to do anything in the matter.

Circulation Manager  
SEMINAR, P.B. No. 338  
New Delhi-110001




## **seminar**

Seminar brings you a discussion each month on the problems which agitate all serious people. Subscribe to it today and participate actively in the thinking life of India . . . .

Rates :

Rs. 40 for 1 year    Rs. 100 for 3 years  
US\$ 16 for 1 year    US\$ 40 for 3 years





# NHPC

## The common factor between water and energy

### Carriers of a brighter tomorrow

With the earth's fast depleting fossil fuels, the energy crisis becoming more acute, the rivers now spell as perennial assets for producing power

This is for two obvious reasons.

One Our country is a land of rivers. Harnessing this tremendous potential means making optimum use of our natural resources

Two It is the cheapest, cleanest (relief for environmentalists) and most important of all a replenishable source of energy.

#### Hydroelectric Power

Yes The answer today for our socio-economic integrated development programmes


And NHPC is creating a new portrait of growth in hydel power generation

Salal, J & K (345 MW), Baira Siul (180 MW), Loktak, Manipur (105 MW), Devighat, Nepal (14.1 MW) Koel Karo, Bihar (710 MW), Dulhasti, J & K (390 MW) are the important Projects in hand


NHPC has also made entry in the field of investigation. Work has been initiated vigorously on the 640 MW Chamera Project in H P. A few more projects in H P like the 600 MW Kol Dam Project the 1900 MW Parbati Project and five projects in the Sarda Vally in U P are to be taken up shortly

The total transmission net work of the Corporation is spread over 3 400 Circuit KM

The Corporation has a total work of over Rs 1,000 crores in hand and a huge employment potential




**National Hydroelectric  
Power Corporation Ltd.**  
CLEAN POWER FOR EVERY HOME.



My

# ROUTES

to over 40 cities in 5 continents



A  
thrilling  
voyage of  
discovery.

On board my gleaming jets.  
It's a network to remember.

**AIR-INDIA**

MTB-AIR-62 67-8

# Seminar

## The Arming Of A Sub-Continent

270

February 1982



# With the Compliments of

## **KEC**

**KAMANI ENGINEERING CORPORATION.**

Pioneers in transmission line engineering  
in India;

making a major contribution to build  
a powerful country; and a powerful world too.  
KEC. Largest in Asia, Second in the World  
in power transmission.

## **IK**

**KAMANI ENGINEERING CORPORATION LIMITED**

Kamani Chambers,  
32, Ramjibhai Kamani Marg,  
BOMBAY-400 038.

STUSA

# Mahindra


## now brings you the Peugeot XDP 4.90- a diesel engine of advanced design

**Mahindra** meets the challenge of the oil crisis, with a superb new, lightweight high performance diesel engine-the **PEUGEOT XDP 4 90** with greater fuel efficiency

This world-famous engine is now being assembled at the Mahindra plant


The **PEUGEOT XDP 4 90** will be fitted initially on the **Mahindra NC 665 DP Mini Truck**, Pick-up Van and Ambulance

By far the most vital factor is the greater fuel efficiency of this lightweight, high performance engine



#### Engine Specifications .

No. of Cylinders	4
Bore-mm	90
Stroke-mm	83
Bore/Stroke ratio	1.08
Displacement-cc	2112
Compression Ratio	22.4:1
R P M (max)	4500
Max B H P.	75
Max Torque Kg m	13.3
	@ 2000 r p m.
Weight Kg.	184



The Mahindra NC 665 DP  
Mini Truck fitted with  
Peugeot XDP 4 90 diesel engine



Pick-up Van




Ambulance



Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.

---

# PRODUCT QUALITY



Satyadev Chemicals are widely used in the processing of Colour and Black and white Motion Picture Films, and in the Textile, Jute, Leather and Chemical Manufacturing Industries. Also in the manufacture of Paints, Pharmaceuticals, Dyestuffs, Polymers

Our customers include some of the world's leading manufacturing and trading concerns. The secret of this world-wide acceptance lies in our policy of product quality—the only sacred cow in our fast developing organisation.



**SATYADEV CHEMICALS LIMITED**

Pratapnagar Road, VADODARA, 390 004, India

---

# FORHAN'S—the toothpaste created by a dentist



## helps strengthen your gums while it cleans your teeth

### Gum troubles could mean loss of healthy teeth




Dentists say that if teeth are not cleaned properly a thin layer of bacteria called plaque, which forms around your teeth and gums, starts accumulating. This leads to tartar which weakens and pushes away gums causing even healthy teeth to fall out. Gum troubles can also harm health in general.

### Forhan's protection for the gums



Dr Forhan's exclusive formula with its special astringent strengthens gums to help you resist gum troubles. So brush your teeth and massage your gums with Forhan's Toothpaste and Forhan's Double Action Toothbrush.



**Forhan's** For the gums

Regd T M Geoffrey Manners & Co Ltd



## **FOUR SWAN FABRICS**

**FOR ENCHANTING SHADES  
IN COTTON AND BLENDED TEXTURES**

**Pamper your every whim and fancy with Four Swan Fabrics  
in cotton and Polyester/cotton blends. Crease-resistant  
Four Swan fabrics come in a wide range of colours and prints.**

*Manufactured by:*

**THE VICTORIA MILLS LTD., BOMBAY.**



**MANGALDAS  
GROUP MILLS**

MSB-MGM-033 A

**ATTENTION STEEL MILLS  
&  
FOUNDRIES  
EXPORTERS OF WORLD FAMOUS SANDUR MANGANESE ORE  
OFFER  
EX-STOCK  
VERY LOW PHOS. PIG IRON  
AND  
LOW ALUMINIUM FERROSILICON  
PRODUCED IN THEIR PLANT AT VYASANKERE**

*Please Contact*

**THE SANDUR MANGANESE & IRON ORES LIMITED**

**"LOHADRI BHAVAN"**

**Yeshwant Nagar-583124:**

**Via Sandur, Bellary Dt.**

**Karnataka INDIA**

**Cable: SMIORE, SANDUR (INDIA)**


**Telephone: SANDUR 33, 61, 91;**

**Telex: BANGALORE 427**


**Bangalore: 32175 ;  
28262 ;**




# Elegant looks




Attractive Sleek Two-toned USHA Streamlined—the sewing machine that outclasses any other in its price range With features that others can't match And a 5-year guarantee too




Patch Darning for easy darning and quick adjustment of pressure on cloth



3-position drop feed for easy adjustment of feed-dog position



Dial-type stitch regulator with lever for forward and reverse stitch control and locking arrangement



Thread tension adjuster for regulating proper thread tension.

**USHA Streamlined** feature for feature a better machine

"A royal umbrella, a wheel, footprints .. for if He had attained 'Nirvana' and escaped the wheel of life altogether, He could not be pictured as a man like other men"

I V Vincent, 'India The Many Storeyed House'



Sanchi stands alone, in silent peace, away from the ancient and beaten paths of India's many invaders. Here, on the serene banks of the Betwa River stand the Buddhist stupas, of which the finest is the Great Stupa.

Started in Asokan times, these Buddhist shrines and monasteries were carved by craftsmen from Vidisha, who once worked with ivory. And in some strange way the stones seem touched with an almost unreal, translucent quality. Look closely — you will see that no two pillars are quite the same.

The 'toranas' or gateways are carved to represent the life and teachings of the Enlightened One, and the richness of life in the Sunga period. As you see and 'read' the carvings, you find yourself in hushed

silence — for you now commune with the Holy One.

Walking the path of righteousness to the Great Stupa which stands like an inverted bowl under a turquoise sky, you feel the awe that Asoka felt before going forth to spread His teachings to the world.

You feel a presence. Not of loneliness or emptiness — but of solitude, peace — and serenity that is hallowed.

Near Sanchi, you can also visit the Udaigiri caves, Heliodorus' pillar, the Vidisha Museum and the exquisite

temple at Udayeshwar.

#### BHOPAL

#### The city set around a lake

Picturesque Bhopal (the state capital) is 46 kms from Sanchi, and stands on the site of an old city founded in the 11th century by Raja Bhoj, a great patron of art and learning.

Visit Bhimbetka, which has the richest group of rock shelter paintings in the world, Bhopur, with its massive, incomplete Saivite temple, picnic spots like Islamnagar, and the majestic fort of Ginnorgarh.

# SANCHI

## MADHYA PRADESH

### The very heart of India.

#### Useful Information

**Best season** Throughout the year

**How to reach** **Air** The nearest airport is Bhopal.  
**Rail** Sanchi is a station on the Jhansi Itarsi section of the Central Railway.

**Bus** Sanchi is well connected with bus services to Bhopal, Indore, Sagar, Gwalior and Vidisha.  
M.P. State Tourism Corporation operates conducted tours to Sanchi from Bhopal.

Sanchi is 46 kms from Bhopal.

#### Bhopal

**Best season** Throughout the year

**How to reach** **Air** Indian Airlines operates daily flights to Bhopal from Delhi, Gwalior, Indore and Bombay. Bhopal is also

connected with tri weekly flights to Raipur and Jabalpur.  
**Rail** Bhopal is on the Delhi Madras main line. Major trains going from Bombay to Delhi via Jhansi also pass through Bhopal.  
**Bus** Bhopal is well connected by bus services to Indore, Mandu, Ujjain, Sanchi, Gwalior, Shivpuri, Jabalpur, Pachmarhi, Khajuraho, Nagpur and Jaipur.

**Bhopal is** 542 kms from Agra, 739 kms from Bombay, 746 kms from Delhi, 187 kms from Indore, 540 kms from Kanha, 387 kms from Khajuraho, 290 kms from Mandu, 210 kms from Pachmarhi and 424 kms from Gwalior.

**Where to stay** Panchanan Hotel (M.P. Tourism Corporation).  
Tariff A/C — Rs 70 single, Rs 100 double.  
Non A/C — Rs 40 single, Rs 60 double.

**For reservations, contact** Manager Panchanan Hotel, New Market Bhopal. Telephone 63047.


Madhya Pradesh State Tourism Development Corporation, Gangotri, T T Nagar, Bhopal 462003

HTD-MID 7212

# ESCORTS MOVES THE EARTH



**Building up a powerful task force  
with the minimum 'ownership and operating'  
costs, to suit Indian conditions.**




HTD-ESC-6963-E

Escorts is deeply involved in India's nation-building activity. And it shows in the widest and most relevant range of industrial and construction equipment: Front End Loaders, 3 to 8 ton Cranes, Industrial Tuggers and Haulers, Shunters, Garbage Handling and Container Carrier Systems, etc. All manufactured specially by Escorts, to fill specific needs in medium duty applications.

To put mechanical excavation within reach of the smaller buyer, Escorts has also introduced a unique dual purpose Escorts JCB 3C Excavator-Loader which gives him versatility at a price he can now afford. This is the largest selling machine of its type in 52 countries, made in India by Escorts.

**Today, there are over 4000 such units at work building the nation.** Apart from its own diversified product range, Escorts represents earthmoving and construction equipment of Fiat Allis, North West and J.C. Bamford for bigger projects.



India's first fully Hydraulic Mobile 8-Tonne Crane, fitted with Hydraulically actuated Telescopic Boom and quick Hoisting and Winching devices.

**Adapting advanced technology  
relevant to India's core needs.**


**ESCORTS LIMITED**

11 Scindia House, Connaught Circus, New Delhi 110001

Industrial and Construction Equipment • Tractors and Farm Equipment • Motorcycles • Automotive Ancillaries • Railway Ancillaries • Heating Elements

TEXTILES, SUGAR,  
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS,  
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,  
VINASPATI, PVC, RAYON TYRE CORD,  
FERTILIZERS,  
ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS,  
IRON CASTINGS.

IN THE  
SERVICE OF  
THE NATION



**DCM** THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD. DELHI

A note from

**seminar**

Dear Subscriber,

We post SEMINAR on the 1st of every month. If your copy does not reach you by the fifteenth of that month, please inform us immediately so that we can send a replacement. Complaints of non-receipt of copies at a later date makes it impossible for us to do anything in the matter.

Circulation Manager  
SEMINAR, P.B. No. 338  
New Delhi-110001

**MUKAND  
IS  
STEEL**



**MUKAND IRON & STEEL WORKS LTD.**

*Registered Office:*

Lal Bahadur Shastri Marg,  
Kurla, Bombay-400 070.

# seminar

THE MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI

a journal which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every shade of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single problem is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions. Opinions expressed have ranged from janata to congress, from sarvodaya to communist to independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it has been possible to answer a real need of today, to gather the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture.

publisher/ROMESH THAPAR

managing editor/RAJ THAPAR

production/TEJBIR SINGH

circulation/C B KUMAR

110001

Published from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1 Telephone. 46534 Cable Address: Seminar New Delhi Single copy: Rs 85 pence; \$ 1.50 Yearly Rs 40; £ 7; \$ 16; Three yearly: Rs 100 £ 20, \$ 40 Reproduction of material prohibited unless permitted

NEXT MONTH: A VIEW OF INDIA

# 270

## ARMING A SUBCONTINENT

a symposium on  
the defence scenarios  
of a region

symposium participants

### THE PROBLEM

A short statement of  
the issues involved

### WHAT PRICE DEFENCE?

G C. Katoch, former Finance Advisor  
of the Union Ministry of Finance (Defence)

### MANPOWER VERSUS SOPHISTICATION

Lt. General Harbakhsh Singh, was Army Commander,  
Western Command at the time of the 1965 Indo-  
Pak war, and is now retired

### U.S. ARMS FOR PAKISTAN

Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal, now retired

### A BROAD SURVEY

Lt. General M.L. Thapan, was Vice-Chief of  
the army and is now retired

### NEED FOR GREATER COORDINATION

Amar Vikrant, formerly of the  
Indian Navy

### BOOKS

Reviewed by Ashok Jaitly, R.K. Srivastava  
and Rjta Manchanda

### FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography  
compiled by M.S. Limaye

### COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury Associates

# The problem

IT is a time of great agitation in our part of the world. The decision of the Reagan Administration to push massive armaments into the region via Pakistan disturbs the balance of power. Invariably, Pakistan sees India as the main enemy — not the Soviet Union as her US mentors imagine. And she plans a nuclear bomb. These trends set in motion all manner of responses in India.

- There is the *confrontation lobby*, obvious and noisy, which demands a parallel military effort on the part of India to preserve the balance of power. This lobby is naturally backed by large sections of the military establishment. For, after all, there is nothing like growth to excite support. The *silent lobby* is for a pre-emptive strike, as soon as possible, to incapacitate Pakistan as a potential aggressor. It is possible that a strike of this kind, inspired by Israeli activities, would also hit Pakistan's nuclear base. And there is the *detentist lobby* which would intensify our diplomacy to seek out ways of settling our problems with neighbours, stressing peace and regional viability, defusing tensions and cutting wasteful expenditures on confrontations. We have seen the beginnings

would only be for a short duration. One or other lobby has to win out for effectiveness. In a sense, all of us are involved in deciding which one will become the main thrust in our policy. Secondary and tertiary thrusts would depend on the success of the initial thrust.

We should not be in panic, despite the media. We have a very powerful military machine at our disposal. Our neighbours, including China, are well aware of this. The exploding of a nuclear device by Pakistan might have been worrying but for the realisation that nuclear *capacity* is something quite different — and deterrents need not be confined to the nuclear. It should take anything up to three years before Pakistan is ready to use her new military toys — some of them 'grounded' at the moment. And, finally, equipment alone is not decisive — our wars have proved that. Remember the deadliness of our very own Gnat fighter and the fate of Pakistan's Patton tanks. Utilisation is a critical factor. Front-line States like Israel are not made by proclamation alone.

The pre-emptive strike is a childish aberration and dangerous at every diplomatic level which even the Israelis have finally understood. Why not be smarter, if you *must* have an aberration. Use the

While it is true that a skilful mix of all the tactics of these lobbies might help preserve our security, it



Soviet predicament in Afghanistan, and its interest in the Persian Gulf, to spark the creation of Pukhtoonistan and Baluchistan and reduce Pakistan to a miserable strip of territory! But there are serious repercussions here, too — and directly for us. A powerful Soviet presence in South Asia through Afghanistan, Pukhtoonistan and Baluchistan could be an inspiration for secessionism on the Indian sub-continent. Balkanisation?

All things considered, the *detentist* scenario should be the base of our security. All the factors are favourable. China is in the throes of a deep correction and there is growing respect for India's military capacity. Pakistan is dependent on China and likely to respond to her prodding. Bangladesh wants to fit into the South Asian picture — and Sri Lanka, too. The beneficial effects for the region would be considerable, ASEAN, Indian Ocean *et al*.

Of course, there is a serious danger for India in the *detentist* posture because the Soviet Union could misunderstand the move in view of China's obsessive anti-Sovietism. This could persuade Moscow to begin a flirtation with Pakistan. We have to prevent this by working for some normalisation on Tibet and a Sino-Soviet normalisation. India is suited to play this positive role, but doesn't due perhaps to a

curious lack of sovereign thinking.

Critical to the India-China dialogue is the need for a package which accepts control lines as they are today, arranges territory swaps to 'save face' on both sides, and reviews past agreements to ease tensions and misunderstandings—distortions, too. Such an approach would impact Pakistan's postures on Kashmir and compel the recognition of an existing situation with some modifications.

Once the mechanics of these agreements are on the anvil, a number of other issues directly connected with war and peace, with tension and confrontation, with insurgency and disruption, can be taken care of. Somehow, the heritage of colonialism has to be dissolved. If the *detentist* thrust fails, then other stratagems can be considered. We have at least three years.

The scenario of *detentism* is difficult and painful, but it will save us enormous resources — political, economic and social — which we will be able to mobilise for the strengthening of the internal base of our country, now gravely threatened by all manner of crises. We must think upon these issues with seriousness, for we cannot afford any more to make mistakes.

# What price defence?

G. C KATOCH

IT is axiomatic that defence and national security go together. As commonly understood, the essential basis of defence preparedness is the threat assessment and the building up of adequate capability to counter the threat. To the popular mind, a visible measure of the response to security threats is the magnitude of defence expenditure, that is, the more you spend on defence the stronger you are. This is, of course, a misconception. It ignores the quality of spending: how the money input is actually utilised on personnel, logistics, weapon systems and other ingredients of military power. Victory in war does not always favour the side with the more bloated budget.

The size of our defence budget can also be deceptive from another angle. About 60-65% of the allocations are meant for paying salaries and for maintaining existing force levels, and a further 10-12% relate to items like pensions, R & D and civil works which do not directly reflect changes in combat readiness. Even the balance is not as flexible as might be assumed since unfinished commitments of earlier years are also catered for.

It is with this reservation that one should see the picture emerging from the table below.

Unprecedented budgetary deficits in recent years and escalating costs of oil imports explain the reduced share of defence in the Central budget. It will be seen, however, that the growth of defence expenditure — which accounts for the largest single chunk out of Central revenues — has more or less kept pace with both GNP and annual Plan allocations.

Military top brass as well as defence bureaucrats are fond of saying that compared to several countries, including Pakistan, Indian defence spending is too modest as a percentage of GNP. They would accordingly like the allocations to be stepped up. Others ask: do we count the cost where the nation's security is concerned? The rhetoric, one supposes, derives its legitimacy from Adam Smith's oft-quoted precept that defence was 'the first duty of the Sovereign'. Security, it is argued, is too precious not to be given absolute precedence over every other requirement.

Year	Defence Budget (Rs. crores)	% of GNP	% of Total Budget	Ratio Plan Budget
1970-71	1151.51	3.17	21.57	1:2.9
1975-76	2274.00	3.54	21.12	1:2.6
1979-80	3355.63	3.46	18.11	1:2.1
1980-81	3866.77	3.56*	18.01	1:2.2
1981-82	4200.00	3.58*	16.88	1:2.3

\*Estimated.

and funds must be found for whatever the military considers it needs.

This you'd - better - afford - the-money-or-else attitude overlooks the fact that total resources are not unlimited and that the competing demands of economic development and social justice cannot be assigned a back seat altogether. National security is an objective certainly most cherished, and one that must be allowed to jump the queue when directly threatened. Even so it is one of the many objectives — developmental, social, political — having legitimate claim on available resources. One cannot therefore go entirely by the requirements worked out by defence experts without a good look at the bottom figures and at other hands reaching for the purse strings. No one can ignore the inflationary impact of excessive defence spending in a developing economy. Building sinews of war involves mostly unproductive employment and there is little addition of goods and services except marginal fall-out of defence production. The economic utility of acquiring military hardware is, if not quite the same as dumping it in the ocean, hardly very significant.

It is not that the armed forces have been asking for the moon or that defence expenditure has been allowed to go out of control. While Pakistan was busy rapidly expanding its forces after the Bangladesh war, the Apex I and Apex II Groups examining defence plans had sought to impose definite monetary ceilings, the later five-year plan drawn up during the Janata period also had in view the containment of overall outlays as an objective.

What has seemingly been the bane of our defence planning is a question of attitudes, a reluctance to draw a line between what is essential and what is desirable; in other words, the absence of clear-cut priorities. 'Our boys must have the best', the best in this context often meaning the newest and costliest toys procurable. What could be missed out in lieu is seldom given thought to. Simultaneously, there is unrelenting pressure (which can't fairly be faulted in an inflationary situation) for better pay and perks and career

prospects. These are said to affect the morale of all ranks.

Constant awareness of some of our obvious limitations might be useful in tempering grandiose notions about defence spending. Everyone knows of the constraints on financial resources, the recurring deficits, dwindling foreign exchange reserves, the strain of oil prices and so forth. And we do not have access to Arab money to pay defence bills nor the open commitment of a superpower to underwrite our shopping lists. The maxim that 'the shorter one is of money the longer one should think before spending it' applies, one should imagine, as much to defence as to anything else.

A welcome realisation that defence and development make an uneasy pair is reflected in what the Prime Minister recently told Pakistan's Ambassador-at-large, A.K. Brohi, that the two countries, engaged as they were in implementing development programmes, 'could ill afford the additional burden of military expenditure' which, it was asserted, would be 'detrimental to the interest of the people'. This is particularly relevant at a time when personnel costs are rising steadily and each new generation of weapons is becoming more and more prohibitively expensive. 'It is an inescapable fact of defence life', to quote David E. Greenwood of the University of Aberdeen, 'that for a given money outlay ... progressively less and less can be obtained in terms of the main quantitative indications of military strength: warships, field formations, military aircraft ...'

Against this background, any suggestion to reduce or contain defence expenditure need not be met with shocked frowns. Even a country like China, never a devotee of pacifism but deferring to its needs of development, is reported to have effected cuts in defence spending for the third year in succession, the reduction since 1979 being of the order of 25 per cent. At the same time, no one will propose denying or curtailing essential outlays. It can comfort only the enemy if allocations do not match vital security needs. What must be stressed, how-

ever, is the imperative of stretching the use of funds, getting the best value for money in terms of manpower efficiency and combat potential, and avoidance of waste.

The annual audit reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General on the Defence Services and reports of the Public Accounts Committee thereon are full of instances of faulty planning, losses due to negligence or worse, abnormal delays and incompetence in execution of projects resulting in cost over-runs, etc. The quantifiable items alone of wasteful and avoidable expenditure brought to light year after year amount to several crores of rupees.

Many production units, departmental and in the public sector, are run inefficiently and produce only a fraction of their capacity, the heavy vehicles factory at Avadi and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. are notable examples that readily come to mind. In the Kanpur unit of the latter, for instance, hundreds of workers have for some years now been paid idle wages for want of work while skills wither and excess costs are passed on to the air force. Fleet availability in the navy is only about half of what it should be, despite heavy investment in spares. The air force, similarly, has never quite been able to get over the problem of a high proportion of unserviceable aircraft (AOG).

Better inventory management in the three Services could release or cut down crores worth of surplus and obsolete stores held, purchase programmes could likewise be optimised. Many other areas of activity, such as inter-service duplication of training and maintenance facilities, are known to have ample scope for cost reductions.

Leaving aside the question of wasteful expenditure and economies, what exactly are the essential defence needs that must be met? One answer could be that the Services experts are the best judges of what they should have. This, however, is too simplistic a view and would rule out discussion on whether, through a process of hard-headed introspection and reappraisal, the defence forces can acquire — organisationally, functionally and

equipment-wise — the requisite punch without pushing up financial commitments beyond the present trend. It is in this vein that a critical look at the state of the armed forces is attempted here.

**I**n our higher defence organisation, it is time that we discarded the obsolete model of Lord Ismay vintage. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a Ministry of Defence more unsuited to the role it has taken on. Its wholly civilian composition, lack of necessary expertise at most levels, absence of even a data bank of its own, the routine manner of functioning, all combine to make it a blunt and rather annoying instrument of bureaucratic control. One recurring complaint of the Services is that their proposals do not receive at the hands of an ignorant ministry the kind of intelligent scrutiny and understanding that might be expected.

Another grievance is that proposals made even at the level of Chiefs of Staff do not always receive due attention at the proper Secretariat level and a feeling of master-suppliant relationship is allowed to develop. Inter-Service coordination, again, is not easy for a ministry organised sectorally, almost section for corresponding section of each Service Headquarters. In matters having a financial bearing, the Ministry is in the majority of cases content to function as a kind of transit post office between the Service Headquarters and the Ministry of Finance (Defence) with little contribution of its own.

An ineffective Defence Finance, owing allegiance more to North Block than to the organisation for which it exists and, in the process, gaining confidence of neither, completes the somewhat murky picture at the top. The Finance role has gradually been emasculated to a degree when, while retaining the potential for delaying or making petty cuts in routine proposals, in things that should really matter it is reduced to rubberstamping or often just sidestepped.

An important gap is the absence of an effective mechanism for pro-

fessional coordination among the Services without which integrated planning and decision-making are not normally possible. India is probably the only major country which, for reasons into which we need not go here, remains without the institution of a common Chief of Defence Staff to ensure overall direction and integrated functioning in peace and war. The bulky spread of the Services' Headquarters secretariats could also do with a lot of hard pruning and shedding of authority to lower formations. As things stand, no system could have been better organised to foster delays and degrading of human effort. If any important measure can be decided upon and implemented in less than two or three years, it is widely acclaimed as something of a record. Delays cost money. They can lead to redundancy, obsolescence, and a rusting of the cutting edge.

The cost effectiveness of Indian defence and its sub-systems must be subjected to a detailed expert study. It should also be objectively determined if, in principle, the nation really requires, and how long it can afford, a full-spectrum air force and a multirole navy with blue water pretension, in addition to the fourth largest army anywhere. Even relatively affluent nations in the West, except for the two superpowers, are beginning to realise that maintaining and equipping this kind of combination of forces involves an increasingly unacceptable drain on their exchequers.

**T**raditionally, our defence planners have seen Pakistan, rather than China, as the main adversary. After all, it has waged war against us thrice since independence; it has doubled its land and air forces and tank strength during the last decade; it has received a billion dollars worth of weapons from China and a like quantity from Europe; a further massive dose of sophisticated arms is being supplied by Washington in furtherance of a global strategy, it has built a string of military airfields to facilitate offensive operations against this country, and the bulk of its land army continues to be deployed within booming distance of our

western border. Our response has tended to be mostly reactive: trying to match weapon with weapon, manpower with manpower.

On the evidence, a limited and unacknowledged arms race has been on in the subcontinent for quite some time. In addition, we have continuing commitments arising from the unsolved border dispute with China. There are also inescapable internal needs. All these circumscribe the nature of our defence effort and must be kept in mind in any reappraisal of the functional roles of the respective Services.

**T**ake first the air force. To a layman, as to many an expert analyst, the emphasis in recent years on deep penetration strike (DPSA) capability is somewhat mystifying as any offensive strike from our side has no depth problem in Pakistan territory whereas they have in ours. This seems too much of a case where glamour and being one up on the Joneses have influenced strategic judgement. The decisive factor should have been the relative cost effectiveness of missile systems and manned aircraft, taking into account the nature, location and war potential of intended targets, the damage likely to be inflicted and the growing sophistication and effectiveness of air defence.

Unfortunately, the F 16 phobia that prevails at present is fed and nourished by both air force and government spokesmen who surely know better than that a squadron or so of this aircraft, whatever its advanced features, will create such havoc as to make us squirm, or that the still untried Mirage-2000 is necessarily the best counter measure. What one is apt to forget is the distortion which the heavy payment schedule of the Rs 3000 crores deal will cause to the pattern of funds allocation for other roles in future years.

The more immediate worry of Vayu Bhawan should be whether our air defence is adequate against the attack weapon systems available to Pakistan. This calls for a review of the ADGES project (air defence ground equipment systems) but

without panicky overspecifications, and speeding up the remaining phases. The LTREP (long term equipment plan) also needs to be recast with reference to the essentially supportive role of the air force. After all, the outcome of a future war with our neighbour will be decided primarily by land and armour battles and not by independent aerial sorties. It may indeed be preferable to have a lesser number of combat squadrons which are better equipped, better maintained, fully operational, and more relevant to their actual role in war.

**L**ikewise, let us take a hard look at what the navy is for. It is being built up as if we intend to become a bully sea power policing the entire Indian Ocean and perhaps in due course colonising some of the islands and a few littoral States as well. Its top admirals bemoan that they have only one sea control vessel, that the total number of warships has shrunk in the last decade or more, that the frigates being built, even the improved Godavari version, are no match for the US-built Gearing class frigates the Pakistanis have, that their French-origin Agosta and Daphne submarines are far superior in range and kill capacity to anything we possess. But are we planning in terms of a naval war with Pakistan deep in the ocean? Or is it realistic to expect the navy to hold its own in the Indian Ocean in the presence of superpower armadas and strong military bases like Diego Garcia? Are our interests, such as the offshore oil platforms, the economic zone, the guarding of trading vessels, anti-smuggling operations, etc., going to be protected near the East Africa coast, and the Gulfs of Malacca and Aden, or nearer home?

If an adversary relationship with either superpower is ruled out, as also any intent to destroy the Indonesian navy, then apart from looking after coastal defence and the Andamans the only likely role to be considered is in a future Indo-Pak war. The record book says that in the 1965 war the navy played no part, in 1971 it was able to bombard Karachi with spectacular daring. But that kind of surprise is unlikely to be repeated, and the 'carrier-

based' aircraft taking part in the raid did not in fact operate from the Vikrant. Apart from the submarine threat, there is nothing in the Pakistan navy that our shore batteries and shore-based IAF strike aircraft cannot tackle.

The aged aircraft carrier, Vikrant, is good for a few years more after its recent facelift. Proposals for a new one are on the anvil. The flaw in the 'advanced airfield' concept is that one is not clear against whom it will be used. And once you have it, a good deal of naval and air capability has to be diverted just to protect it. Any serious questioning of its *raison d'être* is however strictly taboo, it is the most sacred of cows even if to an outsider it looks more like the white elephant that it is.

Strategic, practical and cost-benefit considerations notwithstanding, the navy continues to plan in terms of blue water capability without saying so in so many words. The investments and the lead time for building credible bases and naval vessels are so large that government must squarely define the precise role of the Indian navy before deciding on a second aircraft carrier, the nature of the submarine fleet and ASW capability, strengthening of the naval air arm and related questions.

**T**he army for its part has long been addicted to the simple game of numbers: so many men, guns, tanks, armoured brigades, infantry divisions to match Pakistan's so many, against China's so many in Tibet. There is not the same concern for upgrading human material, firepower, equipment and combat potential. The reported modernisation consists mainly of replacing what we have with later generation items, only feebly mindful of changes in technology and warfare concepts that have overtaken world armies.

The 'man behind the gun that counts' would however be a more deadly man behind the gun if provided with a superior gun, better air defence capability, more powerful anti-tank weapons, modern

night vision devices, and the like. But the army is used to planning for more, not for better; for quantity, not quality. In doing so, equipment availability is apt to lag behind but this scarcely inhibits new raisings. In a fight between more manpower and superior weapons it is not difficult to guess which side gets destroyed. Yet, the whole edifice continues to be propped up on obsolete manpower ratio doctrines.

Judging from the reported contents of the American arms package, Pakistan is concentrating on attack helicopters and ATGMs (anti-tank guided missiles). It already has a few armoured regiments equipped with anti-tank TOW missiles and is also raising some electronic warfare regiments. If the would-be aggressor is to be held at the border, and that presumably is what the army's preparedness is mostly about, there has to be increased emphasis on mechanisation. Projects like ALH (armed light helicopter), MBT (main battle tank) and ICV (infantry combat vehicle) should be shaken out of their lethargic pace. The calibre and firing rate of our guns must be upgraded. The 105 mm gun, among the finest weapons of the day, is in danger of being outclassed by the new 154 mm gun which we have in view but perhaps not made much headway with. Our attack helicopter fleet must be quickly built up as an integral part of the army's thrust capability. Forming of the army helicopter wing is thus a step so patently overdue that the puzzling indecision on it cannot be condoned on the ground that it will displease the air force.

**T**he challenging situation facing the guardians of India's security calls for neither breast beating over the US decision to strengthen Pakistan's military machine nor periodic spurts of buying sprees abroad. An appropriate response will have to be based on a systems approach with due regard to an overall coordinated strategy for countering the threat and cost of the means employed.

In this context a crucial area requiring urgent improvement is command, control and communications

(C<sup>3</sup>). The wherewithal to provide timely and reliable information to commanders and immediate, secure transmission of command decisions to the concerned units can have a 'force multiplier effect'. In a recent Adelphi Paper published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Desmond Ball states that effective C<sup>3</sup> has been estimated 'to produce a two-to-four factor of improvement in the effectiveness of combat forces'. This is in fact a sector practically driven by the technology momentum and it is difficult to go by any operational criteria to decide where to stop.

To begin with, we could do something about the dependence of the military communications network on circuits leased from the P&T Department. It should be possible for example to obtain from our Soviet friends one geo-stationary orbit satellite to carry the bulk of military traffic. Satellites are positively more dependable, and assure greater security of transmitted matter, than cable or microwave systems. Structurally, adoption of the universally accepted concept of common theatre commanders could make, as much as a Joint Chief of Staff, a big difference to the conduct of operations by ensuring unified command and control.

Many other questions agitate defence observers. Why do our defence services cling to the outmoded procurement procedures which with their numerous checks and routing points consume months and years before even urgent operational demands can be met? Why can't inventory control in all the major depots be computerised for the thousands of items held? Can we not quicken the pace of indigenisation of equipment? Is it not time that mounting investments in defence R & D started yielding worthwhile results? Are we serious about getting rid of the formidable lobby of arms peddlers and their Indian agents with their tentacles in decision-making echelons? Are our personnel management policies dynamic and modern enough for the well being of a million strong force? Finally, do the authorities consider these and similar questions as relevant to national security as the ac-

quisition of weapons and equipment?

Security is in the end not a matter only of military preparedness. It is closely linked with factors like the country's foreign and economic policy, industrial and technological strength and the extent of dependence on foreign sources. Of these, the most significant interaction is with foreign policy. Admittedly, diplomacy can be no substitute for defence; neither should one be trapped into believing that military preparedness per se is enough. Foreign policy must provide equal support for security. It follows that if the two are together to develop an integrated thrust, suitable institutional arrangements should exist enabling them to do so. The Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs is not quite the forum for hammering out coordinated policies. It is also not serviced by a technically competent body to examine complex inter-related issues.

Given the mechanism, any such exercise has to begin by identifying our national interests and objectives. (If these have ever been formally defined, the paper must be carrying a Top Secret label.) What now goes for national objectives are doctrines like non-alignment, their perception ranging from a sort of holy mantra of the Nehru era to 'genuine' non-alignment of the Janata variety and to the equivocal flexibility more recently evident. It is also a cause for misgiving that the formulation and conduct of foreign policy depend so much on a single person, just as defence strategies and choices depend on the individual predilections of the Chiefs of Staff handicapped by a short tenure.

Self-reliance is another of the shibboleths we swear by. Yet, in the manufacture of military hardware, having succeeded in setting up a vast industrial complex after decades of effort, the cold reality is that we continue for a good part of its Rs 1000 crores plus turnover to operate on license production basis for a variety of items and are still dependent on foreign technology and experts and on imports of

materials, components and spares for the so-called indigenous production.

Ideally, military and economic dependence on foreign countries has to be totally rejected. In practice it may not be easy to shake it off altogether. With determined effort, and some luck, it will take up to ten or fifteen years to minimise our dependence on the West for economic growth and on the USSR for military supplies and technology transfer, at present more than we care to admit. In the transition period we would have to start forging stronger links with third world countries, the EEC, and our neighbour nations. Meanwhile, one practical option is to intensify, rather than weaken, our relationship with the Soviet Union and derive the maximum benefit from it. The political price to be paid need not frighten anyone and will not be beyond our capacity. Others like China and Egypt have shown that you can always jump off when the time comes. There should also be no fear of being absorbed in the Soviet system. Even tiny Afghanistan cannot be easily assimilated, and India is no Afghanistan.

The claims of development will remain with us in the foreseeable future and it is unrealistic to expect a proportionately larger share of total resources for defence in the coming years. The question is not whether we are spending enough on security but whether within the present level of defence spending the combat potential of our forces can be moved a few notches higher. As has been shown, this can be achieved not by increasing manpower but by a systems approach assigning realistic and purposeful roles to each Service, streamlining the decision-making apparatus, carefully weighing the cost effectiveness of new weapon systems and improving command and control, in short, by a process of upgrading based on modern management concepts and technology. As one sees it, therefore, the defence scenario for the next few years ought to be one of introspection and qualitative consolidation rather than mindless expansion.

# Manpower versus sophistication

HARBAKHS SINGH

THE 'arms race' is upon us again. It has become a recurring phenomenon repeated at the end of each decade since Independence 1952, 1962, 1971 and now 1981. The reason, as I see it, is that we have not planned our country's security on a realistic basis or from a long-term point of view. We have failed to realize, ever since the security of the country became our responsibility, that what was good for the goose, so far as the role of defence forces was concerned during the British days, need not be good for the gander, i.e., independent India.

In fact, the requirements of security, and thus the role of the defence forces, were then entirely different, thereby calling for a complete

change in the composition, organization and the size of the armed forces. This did not happen and until today we have not got out of the military rut left behind by the British, not only in the way of organization, staff tables, weapons and equipment, but also with regard to the concept of training, tactics, strategy and deployment of forces.

Military power is a combination of manpower and fire-power, aimed at attainment of optimum 'fire-effect' at a given time and place. After all, in the end it is the fire-effect (as different from fire-power) that wins a battle. Here, a distinction has to be made between 'fire-power' and 'fire-effect'. A machine-gun can fire so many rounds per

minute in a fixed direction and achieve a certain fire-effect on a particular target. But if the same number of rounds, or even less, are fired by many riflemen from different directions on to the same target, the fire-effect would be many times more than that of the sophisticated machine gun. This means that the sophistication of a machine gun can be offset in its fire-effect by several men firing at the same target at the same time from different directions, albeit with a less sophisticated, single-action, rifle. The latter has the added advantage of allowing each shooter to use his own peculiar characteristic of accuracy, adaptability and initiative, while presenting, at the same time, a dispersed and ubiquitous target for counter action by the adversary. This corollary can be applied to any set of weapons, or armaments, designed for a particular fire-effect. This proves that sophisticated arms can be overcome by less sophisticated arms, provided the latter are in larger numbers.

We should draw a lesson from the current Iraq-Iran war. In spite of many handicaps, both military and political, the only advantage the Iranians have enjoyed in the recent fighting is their larger army — 350,000 Vs 250,000 — with the result that a well prepared Iraq invasion has been thwarted and the war has practically come to a stalemate.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army, which is simply armed and indigenously self-sufficient, should be our model and not the western armies. The Chinese have now to modernize their army to match with the Russians. We have no such compulsion as the Chinese modernized army will be mostly deployed against the Russians in North China and not against us.

There is another aspect of sophistication which is high-lighted by the well known cliché 'It is not the gun that matters, but the man behind it'. Which means that the sophistication, and the resultant technical complexity, of a weapon must be related to the competence and genius of the man who has to handle it in the battlefield. With

the illiterate, or semi-literate, manpower that we possess, the amount of sophistication and technology which can be effectively assimilated by our rank-and-file is naturally limited. It would be no use — perhaps a liability — to put an average Indian soldier behind the sophisticated missile, or the computerized gun. For one thing, not knowing its intricacy, he is unlikely to have faith in the effectiveness of the weapon. For another, it would take him much longer to learn to manipulate the armament, let alone master it.

I can cite two examples from the 1965 war with Pakistan: the Pakistani soldiers totally failed to handle the Patton tank and the 'Cobra' anti-tank missile, because of the latter's mechanical and manipulative sophistication, whereas the much inferior and simpler Centurian tank and the Recoiless anti-tank gun (mounted on a jeep) were very much more effective in the hands of the 'rule-of-thumb' trained Indian troops.

In my opinion, the improved version of the Vijayanta tank and the anti-tank (RCL) gun, both of which we produce in the country, are more than a match for any sophisticated weapon in this line which Pakistan may acquire, provided we have them in larger numbers.

But that does not mean that we should not improve upon our weapons and equipment. This the Research and Development Department must go on doing all the time. But development should be compatible with the users' capabilities and the peculiar terrain over which our army has to operate, viz., the mountainous and high-altitude regions of the Himalayas, the heavily cultivated plains of the Punjab and the sandy wastes of Rajasthan.

For instance, the anti-tank missile when indigenously produced should replace the RCL gun, but only in the desert area and not in the Punjab where its utility is limited. In the cultivated fields of the Punjab, intersected by high-bund irrigation channels and interspersed with tall maize and sugar-cane

crops, the RCL gun would be more manoeuvrable and effective until such time that we are capable of mounting the anti-tank missile on a helicopter on our own. Similarly, I should prefer a 'top-less' armoured personnel carrier rather than the modern imported version, for it is lighter, less costly and quicker to manufacture within the country.

The anti-tank (RCL) gun, in my opinion, is more effective in the hands of our rank-and-file than the imported anti-tank missile. It is inexpensive, fires a massive shell and provides a certain amount of protection to the crew from small-arms fire, and what is more, it is manufactured by us in its entirety. The imported anti-tank missile, on the other hand, costs a hundred times more (in foreign exchange) than the anti-tank shell of our own make. Further, it has little to show to our simple soldiers, being no larger than a 3-inch mortar bomb, and it has a mere 'thimble' for a mechanism to guide it on to its target, compared to the 12-foot, cold steel, barrel and the massive shell of the RCL gun. Besides, the launching-pad of the missile affords little protection against any kind of splinters or small-arms fire.

Pakistan seems to have realised the true worth of this weapon and has incorporated it in, what it calls, the Reconnaissance and Support Battalion, one in each Corps. The Battalion has a complement of 48 RCL guns and an equal number of medium machine guns, both mounted on four-wheel-drive jeeps, providing tremendous fire-power in the hands of only six to seven hundred men of the Battalion. We should have this unit in our army also, but at the increased scale of one per Division.

China, with a population of 1000 millions, has an army of 4 millions, Pakistan, with 80 millions, an army of 0.45 millions and we, a nation of over 850 millions, have an army of under one million. In keeping with the manpower to arms proportion of Pakistan, we could have an army nearly five times its present size. But that is not immediately necessary for our defence needs. An addition of 100,00 personnel to the



present strength of our infantry is recommended to begin with

Another 4,00,000 men could be inducted into the army, in subsequent phases, to raise additional units and formations, including supporting arms and services. The induction thus of 500,000 men into the army, which would be a mere grist to our manpower mill, should meet our requirement for the next 10 years. The situation could then be reviewed.

The increment of 100,000 men suggested above for the infantry in phase I, is only in the sepoy rank, so that the number of units and formations remain, more or less, the same. It would mean only larger sections, larger platoons and larger companies, which with increased manpower would be better able to carry out their defence role, especially in the mountainous terrain which constitutes a major portion of our international border.

I further recommend that the army as a whole revert to the quadrangular pattern of organization for sub-units, units and formations, up to the divisional level, as opposed to the present pattern of a triangular set-up.

It may well be asked how would you arrange for the training of so many Infantry recruits? Well, I have some revolutionary ideas on that subject also. But revolutionary only in our context, for we still follow the British legacy in India of Infantry training centres, each to a Regiment of infantry. This system is peculiar to the Indian Army. No other army in the world has any special training centres for the infantry, except, of course, Pakistan. In other armies, infantry recruits are trained by infantry battalions themselves.

In peace time, each Infantry battalion is under-posted to the extent of a company's worth of sepoys and the staff of this company is detailed to impart training to an equal number of recruits inducted into the battalion. The period of training of these recruits is only three months, after which they are absorbed in the battalion

as trained soldiers. Being a short-service army, within this period as many men as there are newly trained soldiers are discharged from the service, and another lot of recruits are posted to the battalion. And the cycle goes on. In our case the period of the cycle of the recruits' training could be 4 to 6 months.

Most modern armies in the western world, so far as the rank-and-file are concerned, are short-service armies, with only one and a half to two years colour service. However, taking the illiteracy and semi-literacy factor into consideration, there is no reason why, with simpler weapons and equipment, we should not be able to reduce the period of service of our sepoys to 3 to 4 years for the Infantry and 4 to 5 years for the mechanical and technical arms, such as Signals, Engineers and Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. This period is more than enough to teach the personnel the use of the simple and less sophisticated weapons and equipment proposed to be entrusted to them. Any proficient rifleman, mechanic or tradesman, with potential qualities of leadership, can within this period, pick up the rank of a Lance Naik and thereby be eligible to be retained in the army for longer service.

I can say from experience that once a man is passed over for promotion to the Lance Naik's rank, he becomes a liability to the Service rather than an asset, and the sooner he is sent out of the army the better.

I strongly believe that the manpower of the army should be divided into two distinct categories.

#### (a) The Professional Cadre

The professional cadre should consist of commissioned and non-commissioned officers selected to be retained in the army on the basis of a permanent tenure. The personnel of this cadre would be responsible for the command, administration and training of the army, both in peace and war. Accordingly, they would be entitled to emoluments specified for each rank, including family accommodation, children's

education allowance and pensionary benefits on retirement. This cadre would constitute nearly 20 per cent of the strength of the army.

#### (b) The Service Cadre

The service cadre should consist of men enrolled for a short service of 3 to 5 years (call it 'National Service', if you like) in the sepoy's rank. If not promoted to the Lance Naik's rank, they would be discharged from the service and receive only a nominal gratuity, and not a pension. They would constitute the bulk of the army and comprise nearly 75 per cent of its strength.

It will be seen that the service cadre of the army would constitute nearly 75 per cent of its total strength. The turn-over of this large manpower every 3 to 5 years will open a vast avenue for employment for the youth of the nation. If these men are enlisted at the age of 17 to 18 years, and discharged from the Service, (except for those promoted to the rank of Non-Commissioned Officer) at the age of 21 to 22 years and given only gratuity, there would be a great saving in the Defence budget. Besides, for such personnel no married accommodation, children's education allowance, or re-settlement by government after discharge would be necessary, as they would be young enough, well-trained and disciplined enough to rehabilitate themselves in civil life.

Here I am reminded of another anomaly that exists in our army since the British days — that is, the Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO), then known as the Viceroy Commissioned Officer (VCO). The VCO was created by the British to provide a link between the British officer and the Indian other rank because of the different cultures, customs and languages. It is a typically colonial legacy. When they introduced Indianization in the Indian Army in the early thirties, the British themselves abolished this rank and replaced the VCOs with the young Indian Commissioned Officers trained at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun. This measure had to be shelved during the Second World War, as the out

put of officers by the newly established Indian Military Academy could not meet the requirement of the rapidly expanding Indian Army. With the introduction of short-service in the army, as proposed, it is considered necessary that at the platoon level young Indian Commissioned Officers instead of the JCOs should command troops. To meet this demand, we would have to increase our output from the Indian Military Academy.

**T**he responsibility for the security of the international border cannot be separated as between peace and war. To this extent the role of the Border Security Force, a central organization set up after the 1962 war with China, in so far as it is independently responsible for the security of a part of the international border in peacetime, is considered anachronistic. This responsibility should devolve on the army. It is suggested that the headquarters of the Director General Border Security forces, along with its separate training and administrative establishment should be abolished. The personnel of the Border Security Force should be enlisted and maintained on a regional basis and put under the operational and administrative control of local army formations. To break away from the past, the Force should be renamed Border Scouts. Surplus elements of the Border Security Force could be absorbed in the provincial armed police and Central Reserve Police force, the role of both being essentially internal security.

This would result in considerable saving to the national exchequer.

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police is another anachronism, passed down from the old days. Under the present conditions, its role on the Indo-Tibetan border is redundant and the organisation should be done away with.

On the face of it, it may seem that the larger army would be more expensive than the present one. But we have to keep in view the economies that will ensue after implementing the proposals suggested above. These are the following:

- (a) The army manpower would be divided into two distinct categories, viz., the professional cadre and the service cadre. The financial commitment towards accommodation, education allowance to children and pensionary benefits would be limited to the professional cadre only, which would be one fourth of the total strength of the army. This would considerably reduce the expenditure incurred on the maintenance of army personnel, largely offsetting the cost commitment of the enlarged army.
- (b) The Infantry Training Centres, which are very expensive to run, would be done away with, resulting in a great saving to the defence budget.
- (c) The ever-increasing outlay of foreign exchange set aside for the induction of sophisticated armaments would be reduced almost to nil. This saving could be utilized in research and development and for the increased production of defence armaments within the country.
- (d) With a large 'service cadre' in the army, there would be no need to have the Territorial Army, or the National Cadet Corps, resulting in saving on this account.
- (e) The Headquarters of the Director General of the Border Security Force and attendant establishments would be abolished and the Force re-organized as Border Scouts, to be enlisted and maintained on a regional basis and placed under the operational command of local army formations, a much cheaper arrangement.
- (f) The Indo-Tibetan Border Police would be done away with — another substantial saving.

It is roughly estimated that with the recommendations made above

the financial commitment for the enlarged army would not exceed the current defence budget, except for the addition of the annual inflation index. *This is the crux of the proposal.*

Manpower is the one commodity in which Pakistan cannot compete with us. Once we attain this 'unassailable' position in the size of the army vis-a-vis Pakistan, the latter would be in no position to pose a military threat to India. Besides, it would act as a deterrent to Pakistan from ever attempting a military adventure in Jammu and Kashmir.

**W**e have to find a balance of military power with our likely adversary not through the 'arms race' but in some other way. And this other way is right at hand — that is our prolific manpower. This is something which cannot be matched by Pakistan.

Manpower is militarily our greatest asset. We should, therefore, capitalize on it and counter Pakistan's sophisticated armament with more numerous, although less sophisticated, weapons and equipment, the production of which is within our own capability, thereby giving us self-sufficiency and self-reliance in defence matters and independence of decision at the political level.

If the highly expensive, and mostly imported, sophisticated armaments are cut out and the larger army, as suggested above, is equipped with the hardware produced within the country, its cost should remain within limits of the present day defence budget.

Our defence production is sufficiently advanced to manufacture everything that our army needs in its defence role. What would be needed is to increase production so as to meet the requirement of an enlarged army. This is not to say that modernization of armaments should not go on, but it must be compatible with the peculiar requirements of our army and consonant with the capability of our manpower.

The Chinese army should be our model and not the western armies.

# US arms for Pakistan

P C LAL

PRESIDENT Reagan has decided that Pakistan should have American arms, and supply them he will, no matter what doubts and fears India or anyone else may have on the subject. Some voices are being raised in the US against this decision but it is unlikely that this will cause the US Government to deviate in any important particular from the path that it has set for itself, nor will Pakistan allow it to do so.

The truth of the matter is that the US needs Pakistan as a military partner, or proxy, in West Asia and Pakistan needs new weapons. The American compulsion arises out of the dependence of the US and its western allies on oil from the Middle East. Deprived of that, much of their industrial power would wither away, possibly to the extent of fifty per cent or more, and

that would inevitably diminish the economic and military strength of the U.S.A. and its NATO partners. Middle East oil is not essential to Russia's survival, for it is self-sufficient in that vital commodity, but control of it could in time make it the dominant power in the world.

In the American view, recent Russian moves threaten oil supplies from the Middle East. The Russian Navy is known to be in the Indian Ocean, with bases in Ethiopia and southern Yemen. The Russian presence on the ground has also been visible in the area since its forces marched into Afghanistan in December 1979. With Iran in turmoil (due largely to the US's own intrigues in that country), the Americans now fear that Russia could turn the tables on them by creating upsets in the medieval emirates and sheikh-

doms that produce the crude oil on which the western powers are so dependent. 'Stability in West Asia' is therefore the slogan of the U S, meaning thereby that the present regimes must be protected from any attempt to upset them, whether militarily or internally

Until recently, it was assumed that the Moslem States of the Gulf were well insulated from disruptive forces by their religious and die-hard, conservative rulers. This comforting belief was severely shaken in 1979, when anti-government forces seized the holy mosque at Mecca, in defiance of the iron-fisted discipline of Saudi Arabia. Given the primitive political conditions prevailing in the region, internal dissensions would seem to be the quickest and surest means of destabilizing the present rulers, and of reducing, if not completely blocking, the flow of oil out of their States

**F**ollowing this line of reasoning, which is not without its logic, the U S sees its primary task in the Middle East to be that of preserving the status quo and ensuring stability. Secretary of State Alexander Haig<sup>1</sup> and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger<sup>2</sup> have spoken about this at length. They seek to maintain a balance of forces in the critical area of the Indian Ocean, and build up a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) that can be moved quickly by air to any part of the world where U S interests are threatened. The essentials of such a force existed earlier in the form of USAF's Strike Command, transport aircraft from which were despatched to India in 1962

1 See report of press conference addressed by U S Secretary of State Alexander Haig at Rome on 6th May 1981, following meeting of NATO foreign ministers regarding 'Client-State relationship' between the USSR and Third World countries, and the Soviet leaderships' 'proclivity to indulge in risk-taking' *US News World Report* of 18th May 1981, also contains Haig's views on 'Soviet proxies in the Third World'

2 Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's concern over the Soviet build-up in East Asia, and the need to establish a 'balance of forces to preserve peace with freedom' is contained in a report of his speech to the World Affairs Council and Commonwealth Club at San Francisco on 28th April 1981

when we sought military assistance against the Chinese

With the ignominious end of the Vietnam war, and the rethinking which that induced in the American military establishment, Strike Command was wound up in the early '70s. Its new incarnation, the RDF, promises to be bigger, more powerful and more versatile. Its effective employment is also bound to require extensive preparations

Testifying before the U S Senate Sub-Committee on 'Seapower and Force Projection' on 16th March 1981, General David C Jones, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that stability in S W Asia was the 'key to denying the Soviets a dominant role in the area' and to ensuring the flow of oil to the West. He also said that the U S was interested 'in improving certain facilities in a number of places in S W Asia that (could be used) as transit and/or staging and support areas rather quickly if conflict were to erupt'. For this he expected 'increased participation by S W Asian friends in regional security planning and exercises'

**T**his is where Pakistan enters the U S scheme of things. Till three years ago, Iran under the Shah was the friend on whom the U S depended in the region. The Shah asked for, and promptly received, the latest and most powerful weapons in the U S and western armouries. He set up large bases and maintenance facilities, manned by western technicians, mostly from the U S, that were in effect support areas of the kind envisaged by General Jones

With the fall of the Shah, and an anti-American regime in Iran, the U S must obviously seek friends elsewhere. That is how they have rediscovered Pakistan, described as 'a staunchly pro-Western country' by the American Journal, *Newsweek*, in its issue of 4 May, 1981. The reporter ignores the fact that from 1962 Pakistan has also been a staunch friend of China, whose incursions into Asia it had undertaken to combat when it signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with the U S A in 1954, and became a member of the Central Europe and South East

Asia Treaty organisations. It then received free military aid in return, which it used against India in 1965

International alignments have changed since then, of course, with Communist China's hostility to the U S S R qualifying it for the friendship of the U S A. Likewise, Pakistan has been restored to the status of a 'staunch ally', despite the anti-American demonstrations that followed the Mecca upheaval in 1979 and resulted in the burning of several U.S. libraries and its Embassy in Islamabad, in which two Embassy employees died and the rest just about escaped with their lives

Also being set at nought is the decision of an earlier U S Government to stop military supplies to Pakistan because of the latter's refusal to accept international control of its nuclear development programme which, according to available evidence, was designed to produce nuclear weapons. No physical injury or insult, or offence against the U S law that forbids the supply of arms to countries which develop nuclear weapons, is now allowed to stand in the way of the U S rediscovering a lost friend. The Pakistanis know this and are taking full advantage of it

**I**n the hey-day of Dulles and the anti-communist drive in the mid-50s, it was the U S that dictated the terms of (free) military aid. Most of the arms supplied to Asian allies were those which were being given up by U S forces, and they came on the condition that they were to be used to counter communist aggression. The recipient was kept on a short leash, with spares and ammunition sufficient only for a limited combat effort

The U S could not prevent the Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1965, but the duration of the war that Pakistan could fight was severely restricted. As Air Marshal (Retired) Asghar Khan recounts in his book, *The First Round*, on the outbreak of hostilities it was his task to find more war supplies for the Pakistani forces. Though Asghar Khan is indignant at Pakistan's acceptance of a cease fire after three weeks, for he

believes that India was at the losing end, from the evidence available it is doubtful if the Pakistani forces could have continued the war much longer, whereas India could have maintained an effective presence in the field for at least another six months. Asghar Khan and his ilk notwithstanding, Field Marshal Ayub Khan had to call off his warriors and seek peace, largely because of lack of support from the U S

**T**oday, the situation is different. With the Shah's Iran a thing of the past, and India out of the running, Pakistan is the only State that can serve as a base for U S forces in South West Asia, the new geographical entity that groups Pakistan with the Gulf States, but leaves out other countries of the sub-continent that it inhabits. Paradoxically, Russia's presence across the border, in Afghanistan, strengthens Pakistan's bargaining position. accept my terms, says General Zia-ul Haq to President Reagan, or else there are others, physically much closer to us, who will help. The language of diplomats and of governments is possibly less direct and more full of circumlocutions but the message is simple enough to get through quickly and clearly. Because of it, Pakistan's renewed American connection will be different, as was explained in a seminar held at Lahore in June last year.<sup>3</sup>

Agha Shahi, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, spoke at length in what was, apparently, a carefully orchestrated performance to win public support for General Zia's foreign and military policies. Amongst other things, he said that 'the past relationship depended on free military aid from the U S and it involved the grant of bases. The new relationship is different. It is not based on military aid. We have made an agreement for the purchase of military equipment that did require

political clearance and good-will of the U S Government, and they have agreed to sell us the kind of equipment that we think would be useful in enhancing our defence capability. Why has the United States agreed to these terms? Simply not because of a stroke of genius (on our part) or that we cast a spell over the U S. It is because of the movement of history. The Soviets marched into Afghanistan. Profound geopolitical transformations have taken place as a result and enhanced the strategic importance of Pakistan.' He claimed that Pakistan's well-being 'is in the interest of stability of the region and world peace, for Pakistan's policy is to stand up against expansion from any direction'. The operative word is 'stability'.

Agha Shahi took care to explain that while seeking arms from the U S A, Pakistan would remain outside its military orbit, that is, it would remain non-aligned. 'The Soviet Union has troops on our borders' he said, 'and American naval forces are deployed in the Arabian Sea. The two superpowers are extending, projecting their power, towards each other. It is in this very difficult situation that we have to summon all the resources of our will and courage to remain outside the arena of superpower rivalry. That is another reason why we did not want to obligate ourselves to the United States by accepting, concessionary credit at 3 per cent.'

**W**hat Pakistan has accepted, and the United States undertaken to provide, is a sum of \$ 3.2 billion for military and economic aid. Until the U S Congress formally approves this, arms will be paid for in cash. This is expected to speed up deliveries and allow the U S Government to bypass the law that prohibits military aid to countries that develop nuclear weapons while permitting cash sales of arms to them. We may also be sure that this time Pakistan will get all the equipment, spares and ammunition that it wants. And, though strongly denied by Agha Shahi, it is beyond reason to expect that the U S A will give all this without itself receiving substantial benefits, such

as 'certain facilities' and 'staging and support areas' for U S forces, if they have to be deployed in the region.

The new relationship also implies that hereafter Pakistan will be the U S' principal 'friend' in S W Asia. It will, in fact, be the U S' proxy, in much the same way as the Russians are said to have theirs in South East Asia, with the task of ensuring the stability of the oil-producing States, which will give it greater freedom of action than did the Mutual Defence Treaty of 1954.

**T**he role of protector of effete regimes should come to Pakistan quite naturally. Its political development has steadily regressed from the democratic parliamentary type of system that seemed to be its objective in the years immediately following independence, to the well-entrenched military dictatorship that brought Zia-ul-Haq to power in 1977, and looks like continuing even more strongly with the imposition of strict Islamic laws and practices.

Whether this reversion to fundamentalist Islam comes out of a genuine faith in the tenets of that religion or as a matter of convenience it is not possible to say. What it does try to bring about is a feeling of greater brotherhood, or homogeneity, with the peoples of the Middle East, and makes Pakistan and its people more acceptable to oil-rich Arabs. While most Pakistanis have the advantage of being Sunnis, as are most Arabs — unlike Iranians, a majority of whom are Shias — the Pakistanis still have to overcome barriers of race and language in order to gain acceptance in the Arab world.

Zia's emphasis on fundamental Islam is possibly directed at overcoming these hurdles. He seems to have succeeded to a significant extent, for Saudi Arabia is reported to have contracted for the services of Pakistani mercenaries to the extent of three divisions, for each of which Pakistan is to receive \$ 1 billion annually. It is this money, along with possibly additional assistance from Saudi Arabia, that enables Pakistan to buy U S arms for cash.

<sup>3</sup> A fairly full report of the proceedings of the seminar at Lahore on the renewal of Pakistan's American connection, appears in the August 1981 issue of *Strategic Digest* published by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi. The quotations from Agha Shahi's statements at the seminar are taken from this report.

Which brings us back to the subject of America's re-arming of Pakistan

Undoubtedly, Pakistan needs new arms. Take its air force, for instance. According to John Fricker<sup>4</sup> a self-appointed authority on the PAF and its most vocal and laudatory publicity agent, Pakistan has today 'only eight or nine squadrons of F6 (Chinese-built MiG 19 SF) short-range air superiority fighters and four (squadrons of) Mirage IIIs and Vs for all-weather interception, tactical reconnaissance and ground attack, the PAF now has no effective long-range day-light strike element. Furthermore, its single squadron of ageing Martin B-57 light bombers has severe operational limitations at night or in bad weather conditions'

Apart from the Mirages, and F 104s which are not mentioned by Fricker, the bulk of the PAF's fighter force is indeed 20 years old or more, if not in actual age then certainly in design and combat capability. By military aviation standards they are as obsolescent as the Hunters and Canberras that the Indian Air Force is now replacing with newer aircraft. If the PAF is to have an effective air force, its Chinese-built aircraft have to be replaced with something more modern. In April this year, Fricker thought that the PAF was a likely customer for the General Dynamics F 16 or the Northrop F 5, both of US manufacture. He was, it would appear, stating the case for the demands made upon the US Government by Pakistan.

No authoritative list has yet been published of the arms that Pakistan is to get from the US. However, one item that features in it for certain is the F 16 fighter-ground attack aircraft. The Government of India has protested against its supply on the ground that it will bring into the sub-continent an extremely advanced and deadly weapon that will upset the balance of forces in the region. This view is based on the aircraft's capabilities as demonstrated by the Israeli raid on Iraq's

nuclear reactor from which, the Israelis feared, would come nuclear weapons for use against them. Flying a round trip of nearly 2,000 kilometres (about 1,250 miles) at low altitudes, eight aircraft were able to seriously damage the heavily protected building in which the reactor was housed, thereby setting back Iraq's nuclear development programme by several years.

The F16 is indeed a most versatile aircraft. Its dramatic and effective use against the Iraqi nuclear reactor was undoubtedly due in large measure to the Israeli pilots who flew them, for they have few equals in the thoroughness of their training and the boldness and courage with which they execute their operational plans. In the case of the Iraqi raid, they were able to navigate accurately at low-level over largely featureless desert and strike their target with the utmost precision, so much so that after the leader having holed the cupola of the reactor building, the seven who followed delivered their weapons through that opening with devastating effect. This was made possible by the use of highly sophisticated navigational aids and aiming devices, and by the use of 'smart' bombs, so called because they can virtually home in on a given target and hit it where it hurts most.

While a variety of fairly accurate navigational systems are available in the market, the ones that can aim and deliver bombs and rockets with precision are as yet on the restricted list, some even being well-guarded secrets. The technical equipment and the bombs used by the Israelis are likely to be in the latter category. It remains to be seen whether the Pakistanis have sufficient bargaining power to extract such devices and the weapons that go with them from the Americans. Without them, the F 16 will be a fine flying machine, able to outperform India's existing fighters, but without the very special clout that the Israelis used to such effect against Iraq's nuclear reactor.

There is, however, another most fearsome possibility: the use of the F 16 as a nuclear weapons carrier. Pakistan is known to be working

towards the production of its own nuclear bomb, though its public statements deny any such intent, it being claimed that nuclear power is being developed for peaceful purposes. Agha Shahi testified to his country's nuclear ambitions in the Lahore seminar. He did not say in so many words that the end product was to be the nuclear bomb, but he did report that the US official negotiating the arms deal had been told quite categorically that Pakistan reserved the right to explode a nuclear device in the course of its development programme.

If any further confirmation were needed of what Pakistan is up to, it is available from the US where the Reagan Administration proposes to modify, in Pakistan's favour, the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits the grant of military aid to countries believed to be developing nuclear weapons. We must assume, therefore, that Pakistan's nuclear bomb, also known as the Islamic bomb, is well on the way to becoming a reality. Married to the F 16, it could produce a most lethal combination.

By itself, as I have remarked earlier, the F16 is a superior aircraft, but to play a decisive role in war it needs electronic devices and lethal weapons that the US may not be ready to give. If that is indeed so, then the aircraft must be reduced to carrying conventional high explosive (TNT) bombs and rockets. With its reported bomb-load of five to six tonnes, the aircraft could deliver a sizeable punch, but with a degree of uncertainty and lack of precision. In any case, the destructive effects of TNT are fairly limited, even a direct hit on a well-built concrete structure, such as a power-house, would only damage a portion of it, and unless that part housed vital equipment, the power-house could be expected to be back in operation within a matter of hours or, at most, a day or two. There are aircraft other than the F16 which could do the job just as well, at much less cost.

Aircraft costs play an important part in calculating the destructive power of a weapons system. The

<sup>4</sup> John Fricker's observation about the Pakistan Air Force and its need for new aircraft may be seen in *AIR International* of April 1981.

system-cost of the F16 — meaning the cost of the basic aircraft with associated spares, ground equipment and maintenance facilities — is said to be around \$ 20 million per aircraft, give or take a million or two. With an outlay of something like \$ 200 million for only ten such aircraft, the air force that uses it must aim to make it as destructive as possible, get the biggest bang for its buck, as the Americans would say. Conventional TNT weapons are best used when large numbers of aircraft can carry them. If those were the only weapons to be used, then a more appropriate aircraft would be the F5, mentioned by Fricker as a possibility. The F5 can carry half of the F16s bomb-load at a third or less of the cost per aircraft.

Thus, an investment of \$ 200 million would produce a fleet of at least 30 F5s which, in the aggregate, could deliver one-and-a-half times the load of bombs that ten F16s could carry. Moreover, aircraft losses, of which there are bound to be some in war, would impose a lower financial penalty if an F5 were lost and at the same time, statistically at any rate, a higher strike potential could be maintained. For these reasons, if for no other, there appears to be every likelihood of the Pakistanis either obtaining from the U.S. the special equipment and weapons that makes the F16 an unusually effective weapon, or they plan to use it as a carrier for their own nuclear bomb.

In either case, the Pakistanis will acquire an edge over any other air force in the region. And should they manage to get both, that is acquire the technical equipment and conventional weapons such as those used by the Israelis and successfully develop their own nuclear bomb, then they would present a truly formidable problem of defence to their likely adversaries.

Who are these adversaries likely to be? Agha Shahi answers that question as well. 'The Soviet Union has assured (us) that "we pose no danger to you" — the Soviets have categorically assured us, and this has been stated by President Brezhnev a number of times, that we

should not take into account this possibility (of an attack by the U.S.S.R. in the Gulf)'. Then he goes on to say 'Any other attack? Well, this is precisely the reason why we want to get the arms quickly. We should be able to defend ourselves against an attack from any quarter'.

Finally, in the course of winding up his presentation, he says 'I have told you that we should put aside the possibility of a massive Soviet military attack. For other attacks we should strengthen our defence capability, and when our adversaries know that it will not be a walk-over, that will constitute an effective deterrent'. With such reassurances from Russia, with China as a close friend, and the U.S.A. a staunch ally patrolling the Indian Ocean, there seems to be only one party left against whom Pakistan need arm itself: India.

Considering the record of the past 34 years since Pakistan came into existence and India gained independence, and the three major conflicts provoked by Pakistan during this period, the prospects of peace on the sub-continent are uncertain. The F16 illustrates the kind of offensive capability that Pakistan is trying to develop, in keeping with this, the weapons selected for its land and naval forces may also be expected to be the most potent ones available.

Ignoring what Agha Shahi says about the U.S.S.R.'s intentions, the Reagan Administration justifies its rearming of Pakistan on the ground that it must defend itself against Russian aggression. That was the line taken by Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., during her recent visit to India. She also played down the threat to India which, according to her, had the 'fourth largest military establishment in the world'.

In Mrs. Kirkpatrick's one public appearance in Delhi during her three days in India, she was most eloquent about the common ideals and hopes and aspirations of the U.S.A. and India, the world's largest democracy. She spoke at length about the Reagan Administration's concern for human rights

and financial aid for developing countries, but not a word did she have to say, on her own, about the tensions in South West Asia and the rearming of Pakistan. She referred briefly to those matters only in response to questions, and then left no one in any doubt that India's views would make no difference to U.S. policy.

Such, then, is the situation that confronts us in this country. Super-power rivalries in what is now called South West Asia have made it possible for Pakistan to demand and for the U.S. to concede the supply of weapons that could pose a major threat to India. Pakistan has played its cards well on the one hand, it confirms to the U.S.S.R. that it accepts its assurances that no military intervention will take place from that quarter, meaning from Afghanistan. In return, it assures Russia and the world that it subscribes to no military pacts, and is not within the military orbit of any nation.

At the same time, by a feat of legerdemain, it convinces the U.S.A. that it is capable of ensuring the stability of South West Asia, of which Pakistan is now an integral part. Geographically, racially and linguistically it is distinct from the Arabs, but a firm link is established through a reversion to fundamentalist Islamic doctrine and practice. The Reagan Administration is only too willing to be persuaded that Pakistan can be built into a bastion against Russian expansionism and a guardian of 'stability' in S.W. Asia, where it can help to re-establish the U.S. presence by proxy.

So, Pakistan is to be armed with the latest, most powerful weapons, regardless of the increased danger of a conflict on the sub-continent. Continuing supplies of oil from the Gulf to the U.S.A. and its allies are infinitely more important than any squabble between Pakistan and India. As in the past, it would be a local affair, even if nuclear weapons were involved, and India should be able to take care of itself.

And that is what we should be able to do, if ever the need arises.



# A broad survey

M L THAPAN

THE snap answer to a casual enquiry as to what national security means to you, is likely to elicit different responses from different people. To the worker or the man in the street, it probably means freedom to go about his business with the minimum of interference. To one engaged in industry, it perhaps signifies an environment of ready availability of raw material, power, good relations with labour and the minimum of controls. The businessman would probably view it as stable market conditions and a smooth turnover of his commodities. Our present day politician, perhaps, would regard national security as being synonymous with personal security and express the belief that it should enable him to remain in circulation at all cost.

The more serious enquiry, naturally, would evoke a more studied response. It is the purpose of this survey to provide some material for thought on this important subject.

It would be fair to say that, even till a decade after the end of World War I, the security of a nation was regarded only in physical terms, as that involving the use of armed force to repel aggression. Other considerations either were ignored, or deemed to be minor. The rise of Hitler and Mussolini, and their fascist forms of government, provided the first signs of new dangers to international peace. The power of propaganda as a weapon to subvert

a people's will was soon in evidence. The Spanish Civil War demonstrated the effectiveness of 'The Fifth Column' — sabotage from within —, and the totality of the Second World War left no one in doubt that national security could no longer be viewed purely as the physical defence of the nation against attack from the elements of land, sea and air, but that its compass also included internal, economic and ideological scarcity.

Let us look at these components in India's context. First, physical security. The land borders of India are vast. On the north we have the Indo-Tibet border, the massive Himalayan tract of 2000 miles or more. To the East we have the Indo-Burma border and, since 1971, a long border with the newly created State of Bangladesh. Our western border is with Pakistan. The sum total length of these international boundaries is in the region of 7000 kilometres.

The terrain and climate through which these borders run are hugely disparate. In parts of Kashmir and along the whole length of the Indo-Tibet border, troops have to operate at heights of 11,000 feet or more, some posts being maintained at 18,000 feet. In the East, the terrain is wooded and mountainous, around Bangladesh, flat and riverine and in the West, irrigated plains and semi-desert. The annual average rainfall



varies from 5 inches to 250 inches, whilst the temperature ranges, between seasons, from minus 40 degrees centigrade to plus 50 degrees centigrade

**T**he effects of these factors on the size, shape and composition of our land forces can well be imagined. They have to be large in manpower, commensurate with their wide dispersion, they must train for warfare in different climes, and they must be provided with a wide variety of war equipment to fulfil their roles in different regions. The cost of India's defence is high, the lion's share being apportioned to the land forces. It has to be so if we are to be adequately protected, though some consolation may be obtained that defence still costs less than our total oil imports each year.

The coastline of India is long, its protection, that is the protection of our ports, coastal installations, offshore islands, the Andamans and Nicobar group, and our Exclusive Economic Zone are challenging tasks to our navy and infant Coast Guard. Offshore oil installations such as Bombay High, (there are many more in the process of development), are attractive targets for saboteurs and would be invaders, they are relatively easy to damage and the effort involved would be quite disproportionate to the disruption caused to our economy. They require special, whole time protection. Our navy has other tasks, too, during hostilities, the protection of Indian and foreign shipping in our territorial waters, and to carry the war to the enemy's coastline. No war has yet been won by passively sitting on the defence, and those responsible for ordering the nation's affairs must constantly review the size and shape of our navy to ensure that these compelling tasks are capable of being performed.

Commensurate with its size, India has a huge air space. The threats from the air will arise in conjunction with land or sea borne attack, or in isolation against vulnerable targets, military or civilian. Our air force, therefore, has a complexity of tasks, of air defence, close air support and interdiction on behalf of the army, air transport sup-

port to the army and other agencies who require it, and strategic bombing, deep in the enemy's heartland. Here, again, penny pinching will not do, money must be provided to this service to equip itself for its tasks. The insurance must be comprehensive and not merely cover third party risks.

Consideration of physical security necessitates assessment of the attitude of our neighbours. A prime requisite for this purpose is a well organised intelligence apparatus. Its four main components are collection, collation, interpretation (or evaluation) and dissemination. All four components must work in concert and the organisation must be staffed by the best brains available. The scope of intelligence is so extensive and specialised that it needs personnel from different walks of life, with differing experience, to seek and evaluate information pertaining to their special field. To be forewarned is to be forearmed and, in this electronic age, the acceptable margins of error in the obtaining of advanced information of hostile intentions are becoming very narrow indeed.

**T**he two main powers who are our neighbours and inimical to us are Pakistan and China. Pakistan presents a military threat to us in all three dimensions — land, sea and air — from the West and through Kashmir. She is also developing a nuclear threat which may be active in a few years. The threat from China is mainly two dimensional — land and air — from the North and North East. The threat from the sea in her case is subsidiary but, nevertheless, significant. She poses an active nuclear threat.

There is a distinct possibility of collusion between these two powers in the formulation of threats against us. Pakistan has cultivated China as an ally, solely to embarrass India, and the converse is probably equally true. This collusion may not extend to active joint military operations, (as withheld in 1965 and 1971), but would certainly extend to tying down our forces for the defence of our Northern and North Eastern borders. Therefore, our defence posture must take into consideration

the possibility of fighting on more than one front.

Our other immediate neighbours, with the possible exception of Bangladesh, do not pose any military threat to us. Their territorial integrity, however, may not be sacrosanct, and we must expect military movements through Nepal, Bhutan and North Burma, should the Chinese decide to embark on a major offensive from Tibet. The threat from Bangladesh arises from its political instability, the weakness of its economy and demographic pressures. This will have to be guarded against, militarily, if all other protective measures fail.

**N**ational development is an inexorable process, but in this age of air power and missiles, some thought needs to be given to defence considerations at the planning stage. Must industry be concentrated at selected centres? Can it not be dispersed? The list of vulnerable points and areas is ever increasing. Already it includes irrigation and power dams, oil storage installations, factories producing defence equipment and critical items, power stations, especially atomic power stations, roads and railway bridges, electronic communication centres, radio and television stations, airfields, railway marshalling yards and workshops, seats of government and so on.

Arrangements need to be made in peace time for the proper protection of these vulnerable points against air and ground attack. These will, no doubt, add to the costs of defence, but there are no escape routes available. It is futile to attempt to improvise when the actual threat is posed. Our uncontrolled urban growth, too, poses defence problems, in addition to social hazards which are only too well known. Vast built up, inhabited areas are tempting targets from the air. Accuracy is of no consequence, indiscriminate bombing will soon empty them, leading to unmanageable problems of dealing with refugees choking main arteries and holding up possibly vital troop movements. The political will must be forthcoming to call a halt to galloping urbanisation. Perhaps, a

system of issuing work permits in towns may provide the only answer

**I**n taking care of the physical security of a nation, it must be remembered that the instruments of protection, namely, the armed forces and para military agencies, need to be kept in a high state of operational readiness. The key ingredients of this are quality leadership, high morale, full scales of equipment and purposeful training. These are best achieved by professionalism which, in turn, is sustained by governmental support, insulation from subversive influences, and total freedom from political interference. Without professionalism, the armed forces are only a rabble, and without intelligent understanding and a nationally motivated political leadership, professionalism can never flower.

Two small examples may help to illustrate this. Existing legislation provides for the temporary notification of areas of land for use by the army for manoeuvres and field firing. Such notification is usually done either for barren tracts of land or where a harvest has already been gathered, for short periods of time. Authority for issue of notification is vested in the Deputy Commissioner. One Chief Minister of a State, situated close to the border, was so enamoured of his power that he reserved such authority for his personal exercise, quite unconcerned at disrupting army training schedules and setting at naught normal civil-military liaison. Pandering to the egos of such functionaries is hardly conducive to the national good.

In the second instance, a case necessitated by the introduction of new equipment, for the permanent acquisition of additional land almost wholly barren and unpopulated, bordering an existing field firing range already owned by the Defence Ministry, was rejected by a Union Defence Minister who belonged to that State, on the prevaricating grounds that there was no pressing national need. He suggested, instead, that the army establishment concerned, which had been located there for over a hundred years, be moved elsewhere! Fortunately, this was nipped in the bud by the fortuitous arrival of his successor from

a different State, whose personal stakes were elsewhere.

However, the national need was thrown to the winds when it came to *his* approval being sought for a similar case in *his* State, where he dug his toes in, emulating his worthy predecessor. If education is a life long process, perhaps there is a requirement for educating our politicians to differentiate national necessity from personal involvement. [In parenthesis, both these gentlemen held the record for endorsing the longest note on ministerial files — 'Secretary, please speak']

If Cicero's comment 'O tempora! O mores!' is apposite for our present day national ethos, there is need for insulating our armed forces from the numerous corroding influences at work, so that professionalism is sustained. Most important of all, there must be no political taint imparted to them, for their commitment to the preservation of national security is far more important than the propping up of transient worthies, whose commitment is to self-interest.

**T**his paper has dwelt on physical security at some length for two reasons, its intrinsic importance and the prevalent indifference to defence matters. In the North, we have had recurrent experience of physical aggression, the most recent acts being those of 1962, 1965 and 1971. The South, however, has not seen military operations since Arthur Wellesley's days. In consequence, public attitudes to national security differ.

The height of political naivete, perhaps, was reached soon after Independence when it was seriously suggested in Parliament that, since India had no aggressive designs against anyone, peace pacts should be signed with the international community and the armed forces disbanded! Even our subsequent bitter experience has not prevented worthy legislators from reading too much in Chairman Mao's smiles or General Zia-ul-Haq's polite utterances. Other interested parties deliberately play down the real threat posed by new developments, such as our being placed in a situation of

nuclear weapon asymmetry, or in the acquisition of highly sophisticated aircraft by a none too well disposed neighbour. We must be continually on our guard against self proclaimed soothsayers.

**L**et us now turn to the role of internal, economic and ideological forces in the preservation of national security. The subject is vast and the examination, perforce, has to be brief. Nationhood signifies unity, a sense of identification and purpose, and the determination to defend a chosen way of life. As in physical aggression, a potential enemy will attempt to undermine the will of his opponent, using all means, fair and foul, to do so, the only difference being that this onslaught goes on *all the time*, without formal declaration of hostilities.

The means used are subtle, spreading discontent against economic hardship by sympathetic agents, fostering religious animosity, propagating divisive agitations, (such as the current demand for Khalistan), setting labour against management, instigating and supporting student unrest, alienating the people from the government — the scope for mischief is endless. Unless there is realisation that subversion can be engineered by external agencies — which include radio and television broadcasts and, in our open society, foreign publications and propaganda material — ideological assault cannot be resisted or countered effectively.

The best defence against ideological attack is the creation of a contented society, a society which is happy in its own environment and which has no desire to experiment with alternative utopias which may be dangled before it. The establishment of such a society is the professed aim of every representative government, but there is always a gap between precept and practice. Are we ensuring that this gap is kept as narrow as possible and not widening dangerously? Can we afford to continue playing up to religious, linguistic, class and caste divisions? We profess secularism but we continue to have laws governing different religious denominations, thus limiting their applic-

ability. Employment, in some States, is conditional on the applicant being a son of the soil, a pernicious qualification, defeating all attempts at national integration. Indeed, the need for national togetherness is recognised by only a few at the helm of affairs

The basis of our political framework — the party system — has been so fractured by self seeking demagogues that party ideology has ceased to count. There are innumerable splinter groups, time serving coalitions, defections galore and individualism to the fore. The compelling necessity for team work is barely understood. The fall out from our political goings-on has had the most deleterious effect on the civil administration. In the party system, it is a recognised principle that the civil servant's loyalty is to the State and not to the party in power. He is there to advise in the formulation and implementation of government policy, irrespective of his personal predilections.

The general decline in public standards has led to more and more civil servants being identified with political parties and even individual politicians, to the detriment of the whole administrative apparatus. The worst affected are the Police, who are regarded as agents of the party in power, and who are censured by their masters and the public alike for either using their initiative or failing to use it, or both.

So long as there is no change of heart in the politician, and a meaningful reform instituted to restore civil administration to its rightful place in the government, the psychological war being fought against us by our foreign detractors is being carried on without their active assistance.

**E**conomic security, which is intimately connected with internal security, has been under intense attack ever since the repeated increases in the prices of imported crude oil which commenced in the winter of 1973. The spectre of never ending inflation has been haunting us throughout the intervening years, and the efforts of government at controlling it have not met with

full success. The biggest problem is the rise in population which has not been faced squarely. Unless there are attractive incentives offered in the promotion of the campaign for family planning and, as a demonstration of its earnestness, positive disincentives imposed against the growth of families beyond a prescribed optimum of those in the employment of the State, the hopes of a fall in the rate of population growth, through natural causes, will remain illusory.

Indeed, good management of the economy is the primary task of the Central and State governments. The basic needs of the people—food, housing, clothing, education, job opportunities, transport, medical facilities, hygiene and sanitation, must be tackled with determination if the people are to have any faith in their administration. Lack of credibility leads first to a state of apathy which, if prolonged, results in social tensions being manifested in violent ways.

The cumulative effects of poor government, continued over the years, are far more serious. A sense of defiance pervades the people, there are increasing tendencies to take the law into their own hands, parallel economies flourish and the resultant instability assumes an air of permanence. No one in his right mind would wish this to be our legacy to our successors.

**T**he challenges posed to the country's leadership in all spheres of human activity are vast. Leadership imposes certain obligations on individuals; dedication and devotion to duty, renunciation of self interest; impartiality in decision making and the setting of an example. It is for leaders to rise up to their responsibilities. There is no more asinine belief than that a democracy needs no leaders. One may as well postulate that children need no parental guidance, or students need no teachers.

A qualitative change is needed in our approach to leadership if we can hope to deal with the multifarious problems confronting us. An area of weakness, perhaps, in the past, has been the failure to formulate foreign and defence policy con-

jointly, for they are so closely inter-linked. The impending possession of a nuclear weapon by Pakistan is one such issue which requires close study. What are its military implications? Are our civil defence measures adequate to deal with this new threat? How do conventional forces operate against a nuclear equipped adversary? Will either of the nuclear-equipped superpowers stand by us to ward off nuclear blackmail?

**T**hese are some real questions posed by the imminence of this development. Our unilateral renunciation of the development of nuclear weapons needs to be placed on firmer foundations than the pious hope that all nuclear blackmail is bluff.

We have committees to go into various facets of our national life, including one on National Integration which, one would have thought, is more a subject for practice in our daily life than for reference to an obscure body of well meaning individuals who have no means of implementing their recommendations. Surely, it is high time for us to set up a National Security Council, headed by the Prime Minister with membership to include not only the important ministers of the Union, e.g., those for Defence, External Affairs, Home and Finance, but also professionals such as the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services, the Secretaries of the Ministries concerned, the Directors General of the Intelligence agencies, and the Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence, to meet periodically on a regular basis to review the nation's security. No doubt some such examination is being done presently, in the colonial legacy of the Whitehall system, by means of circulation of files, and voluminous noting; but this is hardly a substitute for regular, full scale discussion by the top functionaries concerned. May be, security would get better treatment then.

And, may be, we would then have a fuller understanding of the age-old warning—eternal vigilance is the price of liberty — and discover that there is no way of retaining liberty on the cheap.

# Need for greater coordination

AMAR VIKRANT

THE scenario of India's national security is like a Chinese curse come true we are indeed living through 'interesting times' It has also generated a very lively discussion which is well-informed and has helped in focusing the attention of our intellectuals on problems of defence. Such a high cerebral exposure, however, calls for a word of caution — that there is no room for one's ideological beliefs to infringe on problems of national security These should be resolved purely on pragmatic considerations

The geo-political situation had been undergoing a slow but inexorable change over the last ten years Whether we like it or not, we are now a part of the world-wide power game Asia, and particularly the Indian Ocean, is no longer an isolated or neglected geo-political area As a big nation in South Asia, we have to take note of this 'changing situation' The first requirement for a balanced defence policy is an understanding of the geo-political situation and a clear-eyed view of how India's self-interest fits into this scenario.

Since the early 60s, Russia has been making determined efforts to reduce the gap between its military posture and that of the U S A , both in the field of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and conventional forces The U S A . has now woken up to this Russian bid for strategic equality The Reagan administration has announced their determination to close not only the 'window of vulnerability', which in simpler words means strengthening the land, air and sea-based legs of their nuclear force triad, but also a world-wide enhancement of their conventional force levels It is a determined effort on their part to re-establish the balance of power in

their own favour

The scale of this effort can be gauged from the fact that according to published figures, the U S A . defence budget is scheduled to increase from 78 billion dollars in 1980 to 335 billion dollars in 1986 The percentage of American defence expenditure of the GNP will rise from 5.3 per cent in 1980 to 8.1 per cent in 1986 This has clearly sounded alarm bells among the Russian strategists and their leaders have said explicitly that under no circumstances would they allow the Americans to re-establish their erstwhile military superiority The implications of this armament race are truly global; those affected are not only the main protagonists but the smaller countries as well and, particularly, the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean which is now becoming the focus of superpower attention

The superpowers have come to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that developments in the Indian Ocean region affect their vital interests Some of their concern is due to the obvious economic fact that 60 per cent of the oil supplies of the western allies and Japan pass through this region There have also been rapid political changes in some countries of this region and some instability The Iranian revolution was a big surprise for both the superpowers due to a self-imposed hypnosis resulting partly from inept intelligence reporting (a universal problem?) and also from the great faith reposed in the Shah's regime, completely shutting out the turmoil underneath, because it was an unpleasant fact As a result of this Iranian shock, the major powers are now taking hasty steps to bolt the door against further surprise revolutions in this region. In their haste

'to do something', the full implications of foreign military intervention against an internal revolt have obviously not been studied in depth. It is an amateur's response to a difficult situation, combined with a bit of wishful thinking that to every foreign policy problem there is a military solution — a modern-day version of an old colonial practise that the gun boats have only got to put in an appearance and the problem will melt away.

One of the protagonists, the U.S.A., wants to establish a 'strategic consensus' of countries situated on an arc stretching from Somalia to Pakistan—a euphemism for establishing forward base facilities for American forces. This 'consensus' will be strengthened by the presence of a large American military force called the Rapid Deployment Force. This will be primarily sea-borne with its main base in Diego Garcia but with advanced elements scattered all over the arc of strategic consensus.

The other protagonist, Russia, is obviously not going to take it lying down. At present Russia has comparatively few naval bases or forward base facilities in this area and, in spite of the rapid growth of its navy in recent years, is not yet in a position to face this challenge at sea. It will probably flex its muscles elsewhere in the countries co-adjacent with the above arc. Hence its recent efforts to strengthen its position in the few countries which are friendly to it, like South Yemen and Ethiopia, and to mend its fences with Iran. This also gives a partial explanation for its adventure in Afghanistan for, being a neighbour, Russia could not countenance its coming under any foreign influence.

The planned strength of the Rapid Deployment Force demonstrates the earnestness of the superpowers' military designs for this region. The plans for the RDF were drawn up nearly three years ago and their implementation is now being hastened. These plans include the deployment of an American fleet in the Indian Ocean consisting of at least two Aircraft Carrier battle groups. In addition, there

will be merchant ships loaded with military equipment, fuel etc., to give instant support to a marine amphibious force of 12,000 men to sustain 12 airforce fighter squadrons. The negotiations for 'facilities' for the American Fleet and other forces have already been completed, they will use Mombassa (Kenya), Ras Banas (Egypt), Barbera and Mogadishu (Somalia), and Seeb and Muscat (Oman). The air strips at Thamarit, Salalah, Masirah and Qus, all in Oman, as also the air fields at Nairobi and Nanyuki in Kenya and Cairo West in Egypt will be available to the American Air Force in the event of an emergency. The Americans are building 12 specially designed maritime preposition ships capable of deploying another marine division of 13,000 men with all its equipment. The ultimate object of RDF planning is to get soldiers — up to 300,000 — to this region as fast as possible by air and by sea. Speed is of the essence of this planning. At this moment, they can send 800 paratroopers from America within 48 hours and a full brigade within two days. A force of 13,000 men from the pre-position ships can be sent to the area within a week. Two marine brigades (10,000 men) from the Mediterranean and Diego Garcia can arrive within a couple of weeks. As regards the air effort, within 36 hours scores of fighters can arrive from Europe and dozens of B-52 bombers from Diego Garcia and Ras Banas can fly almost as quickly. Further, when their fast transport ships are ready, a mechanised division of 15,000 men can get there within a fortnight and an armoured division within a month.

This is clearly not a mere brush-fire force. This is a veritable armada which could overwhelm all but the bigger countries in this area, and even for those big countries, such a force, with its ability to deploy quickly anywhere, would pose a very difficult problem.

The advertised reason for deploying such a large force in the Indian Ocean region, i.e., to counter Russian influence, is not very convincing. Russia hasn't got the capacity to deploy a sea-borne force of

anywhere near this strength and is not likely to acquire it in the next few years. We can draw a conclusion that whatever the rivalries of the superpowers in the Indian Ocean region, their deployment plans are directed not against each other but against the littoral countries. They are in competition to establish paramount influence among as many littoral countries as possible and they want to be able to influence the course of events before they get out of hand. The American strategic thinkers have been talking about a vacuum in the Indian Ocean since the late 50s and early 60s — before Russia had even acquired a sea-going fleet. Similarly, the Russians had started deploying their surface ships here in the late 60s or early 70s.

There was a school of thought at one time which maintained that the development of a base at Diego Garcia posed no threat to us. The former American Ambassador, Mr. Moyinhan, had stated that the American base at Diego Garcia was no threat to India because it was situated 600 miles from our coast. Such a proposition will not bear close scrutiny. Unlike land battles which are fought across well defined frontiers or a well defined contact line, naval fleets operate in wide open seas and there are no established battle lines. The fleets operate against enemy forces or merchant ships wherever encountered in the vast ocean spaces and have the ability to land forces anywhere along vast oceanic coast lines. Recently the Americans had created a well orchestrated protest over the military threat posed to them by the presence of a Russian brigade of 3000 men in Cuba. If that was a real military threat, then what is one to make of the likely rapid deployment of a force of 300,000 men.

The changes in the geo-political situation much closer to our borders should also be taken into account: There is the open confrontation between China and Viet Nam, the entente between China and Pakistan and now the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan which brings the cold war much closer to us. Our eastern sector remains unsettled and

the Chinese have never given a categorical assurance that they will not exploit this region as and when it suits them

The detente between China and the U S A. started slowly enough ten years ago and is now reaching the status of a neo-military alliance; for the time being, their strategic interests coincide and there is co-ordination of political actions, defence policies and even an effort on the part of the U S A to modernise the armed forces of China. It is obvious that the U S A are playing their China card assiduously. They may be mistaken if they believe that they can contain or channelise the enhanced Chinese military potential. It is of little consolation to us that a superpower may be following a mistaken policy. Ultimately, we will also have to bear the brunt of such mistakes.

**T**he most serious development from our point of view is the decision of the U S A to sell, at concessional prices, sophisticated military hardware to Pakistan. This is a part of their integrated military policy for the Middle East, and Pakistan occupies a key position in it. It also reflects their desire to bring India down a peg or two militarily because it does not fit into their scheme of things. This military aid to Pakistan is to the tune of 3.2 billion dollars over the next three years, plus a cash sale of over 40 F-16s for an additional 1.1 billion dollars. It will amount to the introduction of new weapon systems, some of which are a decade ahead of anything we have.

These weapon systems, viz, F-16 fighter bombers, M-60 tanks, anti-tank TOW missiles, air defence ground environment radar systems, air defence missiles, heavy artillery, are clearly not meant for deployment in the hilly terrain of Afghanistan, nor is Pakistan likely to take on the Russian armed forces in spite of American inducements. Pakistan is ruled by objective-oriented army men. The trend of their re-equipment policy points to our direction only. Pakistan's conflict of interest with us is an old story, the new element that has been introduced is the active American involvement with Pakistan. An armed

Indo-Pakistan conflict in the near future will no longer remain an isolated affair. Such a conflict or even a civil upheaval in Pakistan will inevitably draw the superpowers into its orbit with far reaching consequences for all of us.

It is therefore a useful starting point in our strategic thinking to accept that unwittingly we have now become a part of the world-wide power drama and that we have to play our allotted part. This situation is not of our making and the worst thing we can do is to ignore it or imagine it does not exist.

**A**fter the war of Bangladesh Independence in 1971, the Pakistan Army has expanded by over 70 per cent. The bulk of Pakistan land and air forces are deployed against their eastern borders with India and their peace-time locations are situated close to this border. The strength of Pakistan and Indian ground forces deployed against their common border is roughly equal. If the easily deployable Pakistan forces in their permanent peacetime situations is also taken into account, it follows that Pakistan will be in a position to deploy a greatly superior force at a time and place of its choosing. Its defence budget consumes 9 per cent to 10 per cent of the G.N.P. and in 1980-81 it was 48 per cent of the federal budget.

The Pakistan Army today consists of two armoured divisions, sixteen infantry divisions, four independent armoured brigades, four independent infantry brigades, 6 artillery brigades, two AA artillery brigades, six armoured reconnaissance regiments, six SAM squadrons armed with French Crotale missiles, one special group and five army aviation squadrons. It has its own integrated force of armed helicopters. Its tank force consists of nearly 1100 tanks. The recent shopping list presented to the Americans as a part of their 3.2 billion dollars military aid programme, includes 600 M-60 tanks, 500 M-113 armoured personnel carriers and a large number of anti-tank missiles. It is also in the market for buying Hawk anti-aircraft missiles in addition to the French Crotales.

The Pakistan Navy has six modern diesel electric submarines, five midget submarines, one old cruiser, six modern destroyers fitted with Harpoon missiles (ex-American), twenty patrol boats, seven mine-sweepers, three Atlantic anti-submarine aircraft, six Seaking helicopters armed with AM 39 anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine weapons. It has also ordered forty Asrock missiles as anti-submarine weapons.

Pakistan's air force has 250 combat aircraft and 50 more mirages are on order. This will give it an air capability of nearly 100 French Mirage aircraft and 140 MIG 19/F 6 Chinese built fighters. Its most significant gain is the proposed purchase of over 40 F-16 fighter bombers which will give it a strike capability deep into the Indian territory. A fully armed F-16 aircraft can operate over a radius of action of 800 miles. What makes it extremely versatile and a formidable adversary is its computerised and automated navigation/attack system which incorporates the latest electronic gadgetry. It is in the category of the so-called 'fly-by-wire' aircraft which can penetrate enemy territory at very low levels, navigate up to the target area by the most evasive route and make a first-pass highly accurate bombing run at the target, as amply demonstrated by the recent devastating Israeli strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Because of its low flying, it will be practically impossible to detect with the normal radar systems deployed in the sub continent. It is only on its return journey that interception may become possible. In close combat it is the most versatile aircraft in service today and can out-turn and out-maneuvre any other fighter. It is equipped to carry both conventional and nuclear weapons. With a smaller weapon load of only one or two nuclear bombs, it will be in a position to attack almost any worthwhile military target or vital position in India.

**T**here is no gainsaying the fact that Pakistan is going all out to acquire a nuclear weapon capability. It has set up a weapon-grade uranium enrichment facility which is far ahead of anything we have in



India, working with a battery of something like 10,000 centrifuge tubes. In addition, it has a plutonium processing plant set up partly with French assistance. Pakistan has no comparable nuclear power generation programme to justify these production facilities. They are producing weapon grade material, which is neither sufficient in quantity nor the right kind for a nuclear power plant.

Independent observers in the American Congress, after their visits to Pakistan and verifying the data available with the U.S. Administration, have estimated that Pakistan will be able to go into series production of nuclear weapons by the end of 1982. That by itself will not make Pakistan a full-fledged nuclear power. But it will give it the capability to get together a small nuclear arsenal at the rate of 5 to 10 bombs a year, which is more than sufficient to produce either a decisive military impact or the required deterrent effect in the context of the politico-military situation in the sub-continent.

From a merely occupying power in Tibet, China has lately improved its military capability in this region. There are today approximately 8 combat divisions in Tibet. They are in the process of completing an elaborate logistic back-up system, complete with a petroleum product pipe line and a railway line. From the logistic and force-level point of view, China will soon have the capability to sustain a major military operation at a point of its own choosing along the long Indo-Tibetan border. China is also a full-fledged nuclear power today with its own intercontinental and medium range missiles and, what is of great relevance to us, its own tactical nuclear weapons complete with their delivery systems.

As discussed earlier, the American strategic thinking is that the whole of the Middle East is in a state of flux, that this instability has increased with the revolution in Iran and that there is no early solution in sight to the Arab-Israel problem in the Middle East. They believe that the present unstable position in the Middle East poses a direct threat

to their interests and those of their western allies, hence their decision to establish a Rapid Deployment Force in the Indian Ocean. At its peak, the RDF will consist of 300,000 soldiers with all their weapons and air support. This permanent and high level naval and military presence, within striking distances of Indian vital points, presents new problems for our foreign policy and security decision makers and poses some dilemmas which have not been faced earlier. From now on we have to take cognisance of not only the threat from our immediate neighbours, but also of the very real possibility that a conflict between India and Pakistan will inevitably attract big-power attention, if not active intervention.

At the moment the Russian military presence in the Indian Ocean is small. They have approximately 20 ships operating in these waters at any one time out of which roughly 12 to 14 are either surveillance ships or supply ships. In combat ships they deploy 6 to 8 destroyers/frigates and 1 or 2 submarines. They have no permanent bases in this region but they have fuelling facilities in South Yemen and Ethiopia, both in the Red Sea. Most of their logistic support is provided by supply ships in open anchorage. They have no naval tactical air support or air reconnaissance in this region. Thus their over-all naval presence is meagre as compared with the U.S. fleet.

This raises the question of how, in due course, the Russians will respond to the American military and naval presence in this region. The Russian statesmen have said, time and again, that they will not allow the Americans to establish an overwhelming American superiority either in the strategic or tactical fields. It stands to reason that in response to the RDF, the Russians will try to increase their military stake in this region, both afloat and most probably ashore in countries friendly to them. The introduction of 85,000 Russian troops into Afghanistan has created a complex situation, has exacerbated the cold war and started a series of reactions much to the detriment of the countries of this region.

It does not make military sense that the superpowers will want to start confrontation with each other in the Indian Ocean which is geographically furthest removed from their own territories. It is also on the cards that, unable to bear the escalating burden of rearmament, the superpowers will sooner or later come to an understanding with a view to safeguarding their main spheres of influence. Yet, their military presence which is being built up in the Indian Ocean so vigorously will remain for a long time to come, to the detriment of the littoral powers.

We receive a great deal of advice from abroad that due to limitations of its size and taking into account its policy pronouncements of peace and amity, Pakistan is unlikely to start a war with India. On matters of national security it is not wise to base policy decisions on the declared intentions of potential antagonists. These can and do change overnight with or without change of governments. It is their military capacity and the planned build-up that is the hard reality on which our appraisal should be based. A dispassionate appraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy since its inception will show that it contemplates and provides for no other threat except India and that it has always armed and aligned itself for aggression against us. Any other basis for our defence policy formulation would be tantamount to wishful thinking.

Broadly speaking, Pakistan has a military force which is approximately the equivalent of 21 divisions against approximately 30 divisions of the Indian Army, but the Indian divisions are widely dispersed along our borders with Pakistan, the very long border with Tibet, borders with Bangladesh and Burma and for internal security duties, particularly in the North Eastern region.

The ground forces deployed by both India and Pakistan along their common borders are relatively equal in strength, with Pakistan having the advantage of permanent peacetime military establishments close to the border which gives them the ability for quick concentration at points of their own choosing. In any major conflict, the Indian Army

will not be in a position to divert a significant portion of its ground forces from elsewhere. The Pakistan air force, though smaller in size, has very sophisticated aircraft capable of striking deep in the Indian border without fear of interception. The Pakistan navy with its modern force of destroyers and submarines which are more sophisticated than their Indian counterparts, is well located to carry out trade warfare and even attempt a blockade of major Indian ports on the West Coast.

**P**akistan has always had a fixed military design, viz., the occupation of Jammu and Kashmir and, particularly, the Srinagar Valley. Its broad strategy will be to achieve this limited aim, while endeavouring to ensure that the conflict does not spread to a broader military front. In the event of its spilling over the Jammu and Kashmir borders, it would like to be in a position to call upon outside help. In a short, sharp, sudden thrust, Pakistan, with its greatly enhanced military capability, hopes to achieve this limited aim before the Indian Armed Forces can react in a major way, either in Kashmir or against Pakistan territory in the Punjab and Sind.

It is not beyond the realms of possibility for Pakistan military planners to come to the conclusion that a well-planned, surprise attack is capable of achieving these results. Since their army is deployed very close to the international borders, the problem of obtaining tactical surprise is not a very difficult one for them. The thrust of their operations would be towards cutting off communications between the Punjab and Kashmir, mounting a military offensive in the Jammu and Kashmir area, whilst carrying holding out operations in the rest of Pakistan for which they are suitably dug in and well prepared.

Even for this limited operation they will need support from the USA. Assistance will most probably take the form of strategic and tactical reconnaissance by satellites and aircraft and supply of arms and ammunition which tend to get used up at a very fast rate. The forms of political support are also well-known, i.e., to give international

acceptance and respectability to Pakistan's military adventure, to stall the United Nations' actions for such length of time as will suit Pakistan's plan of operations and, then, to call for a cease-fire immediately. India appears to be going on the offensive.

It is more than likely that the part played by China in an Indo-Pak conflict will be more active than in the past. The Chinese are in a position to ensure that none of our army formations facing the Tibetan border can be diverted to reinforce our front against Pakistan. They will also be tempted to take advantage of our military preoccupation with Pakistan to enforce some of their not-so-latent territorial claims against India.

Nuclear weapons, if acquired by Pakistan, will also fit into this scenario. These can be used or threatened to be used as tactical weapons against communication centres or armed forces concentration in the Jammu and Kashmir theatre. Thereby, they would hope to lessen the impact of the use of nuclear weapons on world opinion and, at the same time, hold out a threat that, if India takes the offensive against Pakistan, then nuclear weapons can be used against our population and industrial centres. Thus the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, though a limited one, can be used both as a tactical weapon and as a deterrent against the conflict assuming larger proportions.

**T**he role of the Pakistani navy will be the classical one for interrupting our sea communications with particular emphasis on the interruption of the oil traffic. At the same time, it will be their endeavour to maintain uninterrupted flow of sea traffic to Karachi and for this they will not hesitate to employ the American naval umbrella to their best advantage. The Pakistan navy is well equipped and well situated to carry out this role. There is also the possibility of the inter-position of the American fleet between the Indian and the Pakistani fleets, a factor which we did not have to take into account in our earlier conflicts. It is a fallacy to think that in a short war between

India and Pakistan, war at sea will have little effect. Imaginatively used, naval forces can influence war situations out of proportion to the forces employed and at long distances from the actual theatre of operations. For instance, in the 1971 conflict, one of the factors which prompted the Pakistan's army to surrender in Bangladesh, when it was practically intact as a fighting force, was that its lines of communications with West Pakistan had been completely and irrevocably cut by the Indian navy.

Pakistan's air force will be deployed to carry out pre-emptive strikes against India's military targets and troop concentrations on the Northern and Western sectors and in supporting their army operations. It will, at the same time, hold out a threat of attacking our military or industrial centres anywhere in the country, thereby imposing a much greater defence effort on our part than hitherto. In their F-16 aircraft they will have a very effective vehicle for delivering nuclear weapons, if they are so disposed.

**T**o be credible, India's defence posture has to be established on the bedrock of political stability and a strong economic and industrial base. In a large country like ours, with a kaleidoscopic history, there are bound to be certain fissiparous tendencies, based on political, religious, caste and even 'ethnic' grounds. There is also the great divide between the very poor who live below the subsistence level and the very rich who are conspicuous by their lavish spending. This country has to be governed by a firm and responsive government, with political and economic programmes which are pragmatic, result-oriented and time-bound. We have an immense capacity for muddling through various crises without reaching the brink, but we cannot count on this for ever. Every divisive movement weakens the nation internally and spoils our reputation abroad.

Our biggest challenge at the moment is the removal of stark poverty. With modern technological and scientific advancements applied to our agriculture and industry and



a sensible population control policy, it should be possible to solve this problem within a reasonable time-frame provided there is a reorganisation of the administrative machinery and the political will to take certain decisions which may be unpalatable to start with. This will form the basis for India becoming a strong industrial nation. There is a great deal of expertise and entrepreneurship available in the country, both in the private and public sectors, which need channeling along the right lines. We also need to create a vast consumer base within the country, both to encourage industrial production and to improve standards of living. In the final analysis, it is the economic and industrial basis of a country which gives its armed forces the wherewithal to fight.

**T**here will always be a debate on what proportion of our GNP should be spent on defence. Ideally speaking, the answer should be zero, but such ideal conditions never prevail. It cannot be said that our defence expenditure so far — about 3½ per cent to 4 per cent of our GNP — has been excessive. We will probably have to spend a little more in view of the adverse geopolitical situation. All of it is not unproductive either. A good proportion of the soldier's pay-packet goes with rural reconstruction and some of our industrial progress, especially in aircraft, shipbuilding, electronics, heavy vehicles, can be attributed to the defence effort. In any case, some tightening of the belt will be inescapable.

The main brunt of our defence effort, under whatever scenario we may consider it, will be borne by the army. There is a great deal of satisfaction to be had from the fact that our army is a well honed tool which has proved its effectiveness in many a trial of strength, but there is always room for greater efficiency and better cost effectiveness. Without appearing to be critical, it can be pointed out that as compared with modern armies, there is considerable scope for improving in the amount of firepower available to our army formations, in improving their mobility and their communication network at all

levels. In our plans for re-equipment and reorganisation and research and development programmes, first attention should be paid to these aspects.

Some traditionally accepted concepts also need a fresh look. For instance, the conventional method of countering a tank force by another equally powerful tank formation is not the cheapest or the most cost-effective method. The NATO countries, for instance, are thinking of countering the tremendous Russian superiority in tanks by deploying a large number of anti-tank missiles and finally by deploying tactical nuclear artillery equipped with neutron bombs. The latter choice is not available to us, but we have the choice of deploying anti-tank missiles in a number of ways, like man-packs, jeep-mounted or carried in helicopter gun ships and tactical support aircraft. Like any other form of warfare, the aim should be to saturate the area around the enemy tank force with missile and gun fire, deployed by all possible means. This is the modern trend and we should try to assimilate the lessons already learnt abroad.

Helicopter gun ships are today an integral part of any modern army. We must develop our own version of a modern helicopter gun ship and decide quickly the best way of manning, maintaining and controlling it in actual combat. To protect our forces from enemy helicopters and support aircraft, we should acquire multi-barrel, fast firing close range guns and short range anti-aircraft missile batteries which should become an integral part of army formation.

**I**n other words, the requirement is for streamlining the fighting units, improving their fire power, both on ground and in the air, giving them greater mobility and, at the same time, making sure that the widely dispersed formations are under effective command and control at all times.

India has, at the moment, a slight edge over the Pakistan air force and it should be our endeavour not only to maintain this edge but to improve on it. Our air force will be

deployed on more than one front. The enemy will always have the advantage of a surprise attack which our air force should be able to contain and then go on to the offensive. The most effective employment of the air force is in the support of land operations, in its widest sense. This support can be given in many forms, viz., attacking enemy lines of communications, railway marshalling yards, supply trains, armed forces' concentrations and troop movements, forward operating air bases and main air bases, radar installations and, finally, tactical support of military operations.

**M**anned fighters are an important arm of the air force to intercept and engage enemy aircraft within certain selected zones. At the same time, it must be clearly understood that this is not the only or the most cost-effective method of air defence. Concentric rings of missile defences are more effective in many cases, at only a fraction of the cost of defence by fighter aircraft. They have other advantages like all-weather capability and greater reliability. This issue has assumed greater importance in view of the enhanced threat from high-performance aircraft like F-16 and whether fighters can offer a credible defence against them. Our aim should be to ensure that the amount of attrition inflicted on enemy aircraft should be such as to become unacceptable to them. This is one area in which we have not invested enough resources or even attention.

We must have modern air-borne warning and control systems. This should be in addition to a modern air defence ground environment system and should supplement the latter as well as plug holes where such an environment does not exist. This AWAC System will give us early warning of approach of enemy aircraft and will be most effective in controlling and co-ordinating various means of air defence available to us, i.e., aircraft, missiles and guns. It will provide surveillance of not only our own air space but also deep into the enemy air space which is necessary if we are to have timely warning of the approach of such sophisticated aircraft as F16s and

Mirages which are low-flying and are practically undetectable by conventional radars.

A deep strike capability against enemy main bases and force concentrations is always an asset and it imposes an additional burden of air defence on the enemy, hence the need for deep penetrating strike aircraft. But this also has its limitations and has to be kept within strictly cost-effective limits. Our aim should be to achieve a favourable rate of exchange — in other words, we should be able to inflict more damage and impose a greater effort on the enemy by the use of deep air attacks than the enemy can extract from us by way of attrition, and in drawing this fine balance we should be guided by the experience of the major powers in earlier conflicts.

**T**he navy's task will be to exercise sea-control over areas of our choosing with a view to ensuring complete freedom of movement and action to our own forces and shipping while denying the same to the enemy. This can best be accomplished by ocean-going task forces built around small aircraft carriers capable of operating reconnaissance and strike aircraft in the purely tactical role, just as is done world-wide in support of land operations. There have been public discussions for and against the concept of operating aircraft carriers.

Some of the arguments are out of context of our requirements. India cannot afford to and must never think of employing aircraft carriers in the strategic role. That is the prerogative of the superpowers who have a requirement for projecting their power all over the globe. If we need aircraft carriers at all, their usefulness has to be evaluated entirely in the context of providing the most effective and the cheapest method of exercising sea control over a given area. A purely shipborne surveillance and strike capability is very expensive and not as effective as air capability based on mobile carriers. A naval force must carry its own tactical and air surveillance with it if it has to do its job most economically and also for survival in an hostile environment against enemy ships, submarines and aircraft.

An argument is sometimes heard in favour of India developing a coastal navy because we have no aggressive designs against other nations. A purely coastal navy would be an expensive folly. If the enemy forces have freedom to operate unhindered up to our coastal waters, then the maritime battle has already been lost. A navy does not merely follow a coastline; it operates where vital maritime interests lie — the trade routes, the oil traffic, the economic zone — and where the enemy forces are most likely to be encountered.

**A** modern submarine fleet poses a powerful threat to shipping and naval ships thereby imposing a tremendous burden of anti-submarine defence on the enemy. It also restricts their mobility. A modern submarine is one of the most cost-effective methods of projecting naval power and we should develop this arm to the maximum, both by way of modern, silent, diesel electric submarines and the more versatile nuclear propelled attack submarines.

Naval ships, like other weapons systems, are becoming extremely expensive to build and maintain. There is a lesson in this for all modern navies to build less sophisticated and cheaper ships, but in larger numbers.

Similarly, in order to be able to deploy our limited naval force to the best advantage, it is essential that areas of vital interest to us in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal should be kept under constant maritime surveillance. An effective maritime reconnaissance force will not only give us early warning of the approach of enemy forces but is also the most effective way of deploying our own small fleet where it is most urgently required.

It is not possible to visualise the Indian Navy facing the fleets of the superpowers deployed in the Indian Ocean, but that should not deter us from deploying our own small but well-balanced ocean-going fleets. The real danger from superpower presence in the Indian Ocean arises when they believe they can achieve their political and strategic aims

against the littoral countries at practically no cost to them. A case in point is the American over-reaction to the sinking of their merchant ship, *Mayaguez*, by the Cambodians in the Gulf of Siam. The Americans decided to mount a powerful counter-attack against the practically non-existent Cambodian Navy because they thought the cost to them would be negligible. That they miscalculated, and in the process lost more marines than the number of merchant seamen they set out to save, is a different story.

But, the moral of this incident is that we must never run down our maritime defence to a stage when big powers can stage another operation against us. We must raise the threshold of foreign naval *Mayaguez* operations against India's vital interests. We may not be in a position to defeat foreign armadas if they choose to strike against our vital interests, but we must be in a position to raise the cost to them to such an extent that it becomes unacceptable. The big powers have also got to weigh the overall loss they can afford to suffer and its effect on their public opinion before they undertake any operation with impunity, and it should be our constant endeavour to make this cost as high as possible and, therefore, unacceptable.

**T**here is a lively debate taking place in the country regarding our nuclear policy. The facts before us are practically incontrovertible, i.e., China already has a full-fledged nuclear arsenal and Pakistan is on the threshold of acquiring a limited nuclear capability which it can use effectively both tactically and by way of deterring our national will to defend our vital interests. It is therefore necessary to evolve a policy which will make the chances of a nuclear exchange of weapons minimal. This can be achieved either by 'fool-proof' guarantees by the three countries against use of nuclear weapons against each other, or by us acquiring a credible deterrent in the form of proven ability to inflict unacceptable damage by a retaliatory nuclear strike.

In the case of China, it is difficult to conceive what type of guarantee

**Are obsolete plant, machinery or  
technology affecting  
your production  
or profits?**

# **WEST BENGAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION**

**OFFERS LOANS  
FOR MODERNISATION TO SMALL AND  
MEDIUM UNITS ON VERY ATTRACTIVE  
TERMS**

Replacing outdated plant, machinery or technology is no longer a problem; West Bengal Financial Corporation has a special scheme to help small and medium units modernise their plant and equipment for diversification, reducing costs and raising productivity. Loans offered are on soft terms spread over 12 years. Why lag behind? West Bengal Financial Corporation is at your door step.

For full details on the modernisation loan scheme, contact:

**WEST BENGAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION**

**H.O. 12A, NETAJI SUBHAS ROAD  
(3rd & 4th FLOOR)  
CALCUTTA-700 001.**

**An Atlas of the Mughal Empire  
Political and Economic Maps with Detailed Notes,  
Bibliography and Index**

**IRFAN HABIB**

A major contribution to the history of the Mughal period, this Atlas provides a unique series of detailed maps of South Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The sub-continent is divided into sixteen regions (from Northern Afghanistan to South India), each of which is furnished with separate political and economic sheets. A special feature of the Atlas, compiled from a very wide range of sources, is the complete referencing provided through notes assigned to each sheet, political and economic. The notes contain so much other information that they practically constitute independent monographs on the historical geography of the different regions.

c Rs 400

**Subaltern Studies 1: Writings on South Asian  
History and Society**

**EDITED BY RANAJIT GUHA**

The aim of the present collection of essays, the first of a series, is to promote a systematic and informed discussion of subaltern themes in the field of South Asian studies, and thus to help to rectify the elitist bias characteristic of much research and academic work in this particular area. The contributors to this and subsequent volumes of *Subaltern Studies* focus attention on what Gramsci called the subaltern classes and their condition. The contributions encompass history, politics, economics and sociology, attitudes, ideologies and belief systems.

Rs 90

**Multilingualism and Mother-Tongue Education**  
**D P PATTANAYAK**

This book deals with the problem of language and education. It is a problem of considerable proportions in India, as census figures reveal that 1652 dialects are claimed as mother tongues though the Constitution recognizes only 15 major languages. Within the broad spectrum of the problem of language and education, the author has attempted to tackle a wide range of specific problems such as the 'elitist' structure of education in India, which is reflected in the choice of the language used as a medium of instruction, the problem of tribal education, adult education and formal and non-formal education.

Rs 80

**Energy in the Developing World: The Real Energy  
Crisis**

**EDITED BY VACLAR SMIL & WILLIAM K  
KNOWLAND**

This is a book about the energy crisis facing the developing world, the three-quarters of mankind where the average consumption of energy per capita is at the level achieved in most of the European nations and in Northern America a century ago. This book tries to bring together a variety of perspectives needed to appreciate the nature and magnitude of this formidable problem and the options available for its alleviation. The energetics of the world's two most populous countries — China and India — and of Brazil, Latin America's largest nation, is dealt with exhaustively.

Rs 100



**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj,  
New Delhi 110002

**Bombay Calcutta Madras**



**seminar**

Seminar brings you a  
discussion each month  
on the problems which  
agitate all serious peo-  
ple. Subscribe to it  
today and participate  
actively in the thinking  
life of India . . . .

**Rates**

Rs. 40 for 1 year, Rs. 100 for 3 years  
US\$ 16 for 1 year, US\$ 40 for 3 years

can be regarded as 'fool-proof' by a non-nuclear State. Since China already possesses nuclear capability, there can be no indefinite guarantees against change of intention. Any acceptable guarantee will have to have the backing of a credible threat of nuclear retaliation. Third-State guarantees are never fully credible as no nation can be expected to invite a retaliatory nuclear attack, even on a small scale, for the sake of a third country. It also puts the client State under the obligation and tutelage of a big power, which is unacceptable and would normally be considered unthinkable for a country the size of India.

Mutual fool-proof guarantees with Pakistan will certainly be used by it to hamper, at every step, our nuclear power programme and research for peaceful uses. It will also put us in a permanent position of disadvantage *viz-a-viz* other nuclear powers in the neighbourhood, particularly China.

Historically, the only policy that has succeeded in preventing a nuclear war has been based on the adversaries establishing a mutual deterrent, such as the USA and USSR. France and Britain are partners in the NATO alliance which operates under the nuclear umbrella of the USA. Yet these two countries do not feel sufficiently secure with the USA guarantee of retaliatory action on their behalf and have thought it prudent to develop their own nuclear force.

**T**hus, faced with a situation when two of our neighbours are potential users of nuclear weapons, there is no option but to develop our own credible nuclear deterrent. That is the only way to remove the unacceptable handicap in which we find ourselves today, of being denied a suitable response to threat of nuclear blackmail, or worse, a nuclear strike.

Possessing a nuclear option will give us the diplomatic room for manoeuvre for evolving a regional policy of minimising the chances of a nuclear conflict. Diplomatic finesse today consists of playing one's nuclear option in such a way

that it will never have to be used. But this diplomatic game can only be played if one has the nuclear option in the first place. Without it, one is at the mercy of the big powers or at the mercy of even a small neighbour which happens to have acquired this capability.

**T**here are of course arguments against our developing a nuclear deterrent, both on economic and moral grounds. Development of nuclear weapon capability involves a great deal of expenditure on research and development and on actual hardware of different types of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. It also imposes an additional effort of training our armed forces in the use of nuclear weapons and in providing defence of our vital areas and vital targets against enemy nuclear attacks. This additional expense has to be weighed against the danger to our national security in the event of the enemy threatening us with these weapons.

There is also an absolutist argument that nuclear weapons are evil in themselves and whether we should succumb to the temptation of using this deplorable means of defence. Furthermore, it has always been our concern that nuclear arsenals should be banished from all the armouries of the world and our moral posture will be greatly weakened if we were to go in for nuclear weapons ourselves.

The choice is not a simple one. However, the imperatives are such that we cannot afford to lose any time in preparing for a nuclear capability while this national debate goes on. We should start a serious research and development effort towards building up an adequate nuclear capability against the limited threat from China and Pakistan. The final step regarding the actual manufacture and stock-piling of weapons and delivery systems can be deferred for the time being and taken up later when the situation clarifies further. The greatest danger to our security will be the intervening period when Pakistan has actually stock-piled nuclear weapons and we are still a few months or even a year from acquiring that capability. That will be the time of the greatest

danger against which we have to provide

**T**here is a lacuna in the way we make policy on matters concerning national security, because there is no organisation coordinating the activities of the various ministries and agencies intimately connected with different aspects of national security.

Defence is no longer merely a matter of the strength of the armed forces or their effective deployment in battle. It is a combined effort of governmental agencies dealing with the national economy, foreign affairs and armed forces. There is an urgent need for greater coordination in policy making on matters concerning national security. Recent instances of this lack of coordination are the superpower build up in the Indian Ocean, introduction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Chinese involvement in Viet Nam and their military build-up in Tibet, the growing political and military axis between the USA, China, Pakistan and some of the Middle Eastern countries, the unstable conditions in Iran, the imminence of Pakistan nuclear capability, the recent crisis in foreign exchange and slow-down of industrial output a couple of years ago.

Some of these problems have been in an embryo state for quite some time and it is only recently that they have assumed some urgency. No doubt all these problems have been studied in individual ministries and government agencies but it also cannot be gainsaid that there has been little by way of a joint appreciation and long-term national planning regarding their effect on national security. This lack of communication or artificial barriers between various governmental agencies dealing with different aspects of national security should disappear. There is a need for an institution like a National Security Council which will be continuously seized of all aspects of security and strategic planning and will be entrusted with the task of evaluating political, military, economic, scientific and industrial development which have a bearing on our national security. There can be no sound national security policy unless it is based on a sound political, economic and industrial base.

# Books

## **INDIA'S WARS SINCE INDEPENDENCE:**

**Volume one, The Liberation of Bangladesh:**

**Volume two, Defence of the Western Border by**  
**Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh Sahibabad, Vikas, 1980**  
**and 1981 respectively**

IN his introduction to this three-volume series, Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh elucidates that the project was 'inspired by the imperative need to present to posterity a true mirror of India's military performance since independence'. The two volumes under review are indeed a valiant effort to achieve this laudable though ambitious task. Although the central theme of these volumes is the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, earlier campaigns including the 1947-48 Kashmir imbroglio, the Chinese invasion of 1962, and the Indo-Pakistan hostilities of 1965 are also brought into the study either in order to make comparisons or to indicate the lessons which had been learnt or neglected by the time war broke out in 1971.

Written in a simple, no-nonsense style the books provide a comprehensive and candid account of the

1971 India-Pakistan war which ended in a decisive Indian victory in the east with the emergence of the new State of Bangladesh and a stalemate, similar to that of 1965, on the western front. But judging from the current atmosphere of tension between the two countries, the events of 1971 have not settled all outstanding issues, notwithstanding the Simla Agreement that was concluded in September 1972.

Uniquely placed as he has at the time, Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh, then Deputy Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters, has utilised his intimate knowledge to give us a detailed exposition of the planning, strategy formulation and behind-the-scenes crisis management before actual hostilities started. Undoubtedly, the Indian handling of the entire situation, starting from the political developments in East Bengal, was far more mature than that of Pakistan. This exhibited the extent of effectiveness an open democracy can generate in times of crisis. Interestingly enough, particularly for a professional soldier in a somewhat insulated army, the author ascribes this primarily to the close coordination that was achieved between different wings of the government including the political and defence branches. With his undisguised admiration for the

then Army Chief, the author emphasises that the colourful Sam Maneckshaw 'pressed for the political involvement of government in evolving a broad strategy and laying down clearcut directives to achieve our aims' because 'the serious business of war cannot be left to soldiers alone.'

While fully endorsing the role of the military planners at the highest echelons of army command, the author is less than effusive about the second and third levels, whether it be in respect of their conception of plans or their execution at the battle front. In a brutal assessment of individual military commanders, some of which is indeed substantiated by other war accounts, the failure on the western borders and even the slow advance in some of the eastern sectors is squarely attributed to the outdated, second world war tactics followed by most of the generals. The latter are indicted for being too 'infantry-oriented' 'inflexible' and even 'timid' during the cause of battle. Fortunately, Pakistan generalship, moulded in the same traditions, acted in a similar fashion, otherwise the course of the war may have been considerably different.

Even while admiring the author's frankness, one is left with the impression that some of his criticism of his peers has been influenced by personal relationships. It is not totally convincing that all the credit for the spectacular blitzkrieg on Dacca is given to Sam Maneckshaw's bold planning while he is absolved of responsibility for the defensive posture in the western sector. On the contrary, it was perhaps the clear objective of a total victory in the east coupled with Pakistan's inferior military capability that produced success. In contrast, the lack of clarity in the aims of our western armies, because of their essentially defensive role, resulted in more conservative tactics. And, even more important, Pakistani presence in Bangladesh had lost all moral authority as reflected in the hostility of the local population. The impact of this on the final result can hardly be underestimated.

That in 1971 the Indian military machine came out with deserved credit is without doubt but, apart from the factors discussed earlier, there was also the fortuitous conjunction of international positions. This the author has not neglected. An assessment of Chinese intentions was critical of decisions regarding timing of military action and the dilution of troop strength on our northern borders for operations in Bangladesh. As the author points out, 'militarily, nothing was more pertinent than the correct answer to this question (the probability of Chinese intervention in support of Pakistan) at the time.'

The fear of a Chinese initiative in the north was effectively neutralised only after the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty in August 1971. Similarly, had the obviously provocative movement into the Indian Ocean of the American task force led by the nuclear aircraft carrier, Enterprise, come some days earlier, it may have had an impact on the course of the war.

The interplay of superpower pressures and counterpressures has special significance in the context of the present day situation in South and West Asia.

In another important respect, Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh's work brings a breath of needed fresh air through his outspoken criticism of the prevailing 'army system'. Unfortunately, the defence services have become something of a sacred cow in our thinking. With other established institutions wilting under new social and political tensions, there is reluctance to subject the armed forces to a hard critical examination. It augurs well for scholars of public affairs that a senior army officer has not fought shy of calling a spade a spade. Even the dedication in the first volume is pointedly made 'to those professionals who fell by the wayside because of our systems.'

The failure to achieve any substantial success in the war in Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan, is attributed to conservative strategy, poor leadership and in the final analysis to 'the failure of the Indian army system'. As for the claims of territorial gains made, the author dismisses these as 'of negligible economic, strategic and political value'. He talks deprecatingly of the colonial heritage of the Indian army because of which 'the overzealous brown sahibs in power made the army more British in outlook than even the British themselves'. Finally comes a plea for greater public interest in 'vital matters of defence' by shedding 'self-interest-induced secrecy' and calling for more open debate.

The fact that the argument for a new approach to matters of defence comes from a dedicated professional soldier makes it all the more powerful. However, the two volumes themselves do not go far enough in their analysis of the existing 'system'. Perhaps this is to come in the final volume which the author promises will be even more controversial as he 'looks into the future'. Be that as it may, hopefully Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh's unconventional approach will encourage others to similar efforts, thereby generating a more constructive debate on issues of vital national security than we have had so far.

Ashok Jaitly

**NON-ALIGNMENT IN CONTEMPORARY  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS** by K P Misra  
and K R Narayanan (eds) New Delhi, Vikas  
Publishing House, 1981

**PERSPECTIVES ON NON-ALIGNMENT** by  
Rasheeduddin Khan (ed). New Delhi, Kalamkar  
Prakashan, 1981

THE first volume on non-alignment is a product of academic collectivism, not a collegiate effort, a collection of symposium papers by Indian (mostly ex-

foreign service officials) and Yugoslav scholars, justifying their respective official foreign policy stances and perceptions of contemporary reality. But foreign policy stances of two nations, even when they swear by common faith, are rarely single minded. To understand them is to trace the main strands of ideas and influences which have been woven into them. For this, it is necessary to draw attention to the time scale in which the total picture has emerged, for that has a bearing on the present and future possibilities. To that limited extent, the volume under review, though not exciting, lives up to the task.

However, reviewing such a collection (17 essays plus inaugural and introductory addresses) is not easy because at one level it merely compiles an inventory of positions taken in the past and of issues which they have to cope with now and in the near future. Yet, it is an interesting volume, for it exposes the ideological and philosophical ambivalence of the non-alignment movement.

At the same time, notwithstanding the snips and snaps of themes and approaches, what emerges from a close reading of this volume is that Indian and Yugoslav scholarship dwells lovingly on the contributions of non-alignment to world peace in the past but is also alarmed by the diversities of the shades and the contradictory nature of various interpretations of non-alignment floating in and outside the movement. The two take much the same view about their ability to sustain, what they believe to be, the fundamentals of non-alignment, thinking themselves to be purer than everyone else in the movement, and assuming that their role is to lead the rest along the right track.

That may well be wholly or partially true, but by romanticising non-alignment they obscure rather than illuminate the problems faced by the two countries. Take the case of detente which, for most authors assembled here, 'has crumbled' and 'a new cold war has arisen'. The sudden loss of credibility in detente has many similarities with the false obituary notices of the cold war in the past. The cold war was (and is) essentially a static battle of attrition, detente was (and is) dynamic diplomacy to achieve cold war aims based on movement. At no time was the cold war dead or had detente disappeared.

Detente, *ex-hypothesis*, is not entente. It began in a limited understanding between the two super powers that there are areas of convergences (decided zones) and divergences (undecided zones). They accepted the reality of two established orders and their respective rights to enforce those orders. Also, they reached a tacit understanding on the inevitability of mutual competition, within permissible ground rules, in the undecided zones.

Now that the two established orders are showing signs of strain and the Soviet Union has stepped

up activities in undecided zones beyond permissible limits, the US wants to contain it to redefine detente and the ground rules of competition. They are playing a 'chicken game' by enforcing order in their respective camps, working for a strategic edge over each other through new armament programmes, shifting credible targets to the European theatre, and exercising other kinds of pressure tactics. Whether a game or not, it is a dangerous scenario. All this is not to say that the non-aligned should not take notice of this deterioration in international politics, or take steps to protect their individual and collective interests, but they should do so not on the basis of flabby logic as the Indo-Yugoslav scholarship exhibits here.

The view that detente is nearly dead and a new cold war has begun is not only extremely contentious but is also based on a rigid theory of superpower deviancy within and outside the blocs as a threat to world peace. It treats as axiomatic the fact that if the superpowers were to behave and 'democratize' detente, all would be well with the world (including the non-aligned world). Detente, the demise of which is lamented by the assembled scholars, was not so long ago characterised by the same people in such pejorative terms as 'superpower condominium' or 'duopoly'. Instead of lamenting, therefore, they would do well to heed to what A K Damodaran (whose piece is most refreshing) has referred to as 'unhealthy' 'to see the progress towards detente as having been successful in the earlier years and being disturbed during the last few years', for detente is by no means destroyed. He also sees in detente, superpower 'collusion against the rest of the world' and the need to build 'on more enduring elements of detente' by being 'objective' about its negative and positive features.

It is such a refreshing contrast to the impractical suggestion of the senior editor (Misra) for a standing or an ad hoc regional or international security arrangement (possibly of the non-aligned and perhaps parallel to the UN Collective Security System) 'to prevent possible intervention'. He adds 'The time has come when the concept of non-alignment has to have this component in addition to the political and economic'.

The other major theme of the book is development. Despite two to three decades of planned development, the third world societies have been unable to realize their cherished utopia of catching up with the developed North — based either on a modern welfare capitalist paradigm or on an egalitarian socialist model. This has led to a shift in development thinking from promotion of development to containment of poverty. In their eagerness to reach this utopia, the more developed among the developing find in it a neo-colonial penetration, while the basket cases suffer.

Thus, when the top crust of the third world, like India and Yugoslavia, talk of the New International



Economic Order (NIEO), they do not reject the dominant paradigms of development, but only censure the attempts to stall their entry. That is why they feel that all that is needed is the freer transfer of technology and capital on easy terms, greater equity participation in and control over multinationals, lifting of restrictions on exports of finished materials (human and non-human), and to integrate them in the economic management of the world. The North has resisted their pressure not because it does not realize that they would give a new legitimacy to the old economic order but because it does not relish the idea of half a dozen Japans in the next two to three decades, nor do they wish to set a destabilizing precedent. So what the non-aligned can do is to organise and cooperate to exert unified pressure that will offset the natural laws of the market economy and the Keynesian laws of intervention.

That is easier said (e.g., see, the contribution by K B Lall and S D Muni) than done. In any bilateral negotiations, third world countries show preference for a trade-aid-development strategy to the collective self-reliance principle. There seems to be little realization that such a strategy is particularly self-defeating in inflationary times when most debts are contracted to finance current trade deficits. They justify it as a short term policy, and collective self-reliance as a long term one.

The incompatibility of the two policies notwithstanding, the short term strategy yields to a lowering of productivity and sharpening of social antagonisms, which are sought to be kept in bounds by creating a sense of national and international conspiracies, reinforced by appropriate administrative controls. In short, there is no common non-aligned front and neither is there likely to be one in the near future. After the initial euphoria of 1974-75, they have continuously back-pedalled — from the IMF meeting in Jamaica in 1976 to the Cancun summit in 1981. The facts and harangues are well known.

It is time that we realized that non-alignment is plagued by the twin problems of aggressive nationhood, frequently leading to trouble and allowing the superpowers to involve the non-aligned in spurious issues, and of fragile statehood, often engendering civil violence and threatening their very existence. Further, the unsympathetic world in which the non-aligned live is subject to an ongoing process of readjustments where issues such as NIEO get side-tracked by the truculence of the superpowers and the obfuscated thinking in the third world.

Finally, it is not the collapse of detente, if that is what it is, nor the cold war stances, nor the North-South rigidity, nor the growing discord among the eastern and western alliances that provide the flash points; the deepening crisis is in our midst — pressures which have built up from the grass roots for a larger slice of the cake. What is required to diffuse the situation is an alternative development paradigm

and faith in and the will to build up collective self-reliance.

THE volume entitled *Perspectives on Non-Alignment* might be about two different things. It might deal with major perspectives of the practitioners of non-alignment as these have emerged, with side-long glances at various stages of their progression, or it might deal with major trends within the non-alignment movement as it faces contemporary realities, and the lessons to be drawn from these experiences. The one edited by Rasheeduddin Khan is about both, without doing justice to either. For those who are familiar with other writings of at least five of the writers gathered in these pages, the volume raises high expectations, but these are belied because their essays are sandwiched between eleven other mediocre and pompous pieces plus the introduction that touts only one line — the desirability of a pro-Soviet tilt in non-alignment.

The introductory essay, 'Non-alignment: The Context, Dimensions, and Challenges' sets the tone and the breathless pace of the volume. It projects non-alignment as a policy 'essentially directed against Western domination' which shares harmonious vibes with 'the Socialist States' — a characteristic which needs to be strengthened to overcome three crises of contemporary non-alignment, namely, of 'identity', 'unity' and 'action' to the extent that it be given the name, 'new-alignment'.

The key arch of this new-alignment is to be 'cooperation and alliance.. with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries for internal development and for international goals and concerns'. The editorial stance is shared, fully or partly, by a majority of the contributors. Transcending this picket vaudeville of pro-Soviet non-alignment are articles by Sukhamoy Chakravarty and A.K. Damodaran who view non-alignment as part of a larger development problematique, and, to some extent, contributions by Sisir Gupta, V.P. Dutt, P.D. Muni and K. Subrahmanyam who are informed by real politik rather than ideological predilections.

But let this pass for the moment. In the fifties, when the bonafides of the non-aligned States were suspect and they were no more than a score in number, they were effective in management of inter-bloc conflicts and promotion of their own interests. Today, when the formal and informal associates of the non-aligned include 120 States and their collective power is felt and acknowledged at most of the international fora, these States seem to have fallen in a trough of inefficacy and marginality and unable to promote their interests, collectively or individually. Why?

Most contributors are unwilling to raise or face this problem, they tie themselves in knots over peripheral issues (e.g., 'trojan horses' in the movement) or analyses within old cold-war parameters. True, detente is a continuation of the cold war by

other means and at other levels, but all the same it has reduced the leverage of the non-aligned — a fact recognised by Gupta, Damodaran and Muni. Indeed, detente has redefined the ground rules of superpower relations which eliminate third party mediations. Further, it has reasserted the right of the superpowers to manage world affairs and insured the commonality of their interests (including their surrogates) in protecting the bourgeois way of life to which they are committed, irrespective of the camp which they head or belong to

Also, with detente has come the superpowers' acceptance of non-alignment as part of the contemporary international scene, and the need to influence such parts of it, the interests and postures of which coincide with their respective global or regional designs. Conversely, this has led to selective proximity of individual non-aligned countries to one or the other superpower without forsaking non-alignment (e.g., Egypt) or by forsaking old alignment (e.g., Pakistan)

Apart from this ambivalence and consequent weakening of the movement and unfavourable changes in the international context, the non-aligned leaders are no less to blame for the shrinking efficacy of the movement. In their quest for control over internal and external environment, their desire to play a significant and independent role in the international system dominated by the superpowers, and their pursuit of a strategy of nation building through a coalition of political-bureaucratic-military elites, these leaders have committed their States to collaboration with either/or both superpowers. Such a liaison has forged linkages between the ruling and trading elites of both the suppliers and the recipients, and brought in diverse packages of alien life-styles and ideas for resolving domestic economic, political and social cleavages

The non-aligned States have become victims of dependencia, a fate which the leaders originally wanted to escape. Yet, it is precisely this kind of liaison that is so enthusiastically endorsed by the academic Left or the Right, as the case may be, exposing themselves to charges of partisanship or simple naivete, if not overt disregard of national interests. However, it is easy to condone and even accept some limited understanding as a Machiavellian necessity — to negotiate and compromise with existing realities with as much benefits as possible and/or at as little cost as possible — and plan for alternatives if such understandings fail to deliver the goods. Then, what is to be done?

What is required is cognitive delinking with various kinds of non-essential alignments with the rich North (both north-east and north-west) and promotion of dialogues and interaction among the non-aligned themselves. This is what Chakravarty pleads for. Damodaran, too, asks for the same thing at a more manageable level to begin with, e.g., cooperation among South Asian and Indian Ocean countries. It is difficult but possible, provided the initiative is

not imposed and does not bring in the vested interests. The earlier alternative has not brought the non-aligned the desired advancement and cohesion but facilitated superpower incursions in areas where the majorities wish to avoid their embrace. Sisir Gupta's metaphor of the non-aligned as 'legitimate trade unionists in a capitalist democracy' is very apt. It has to be remembered that trade unions have poor leverage in negotiating for wage increases at recessionary times when two or more managers of the system present a united front. This has been shown time and again in interminable discussions and wranglings in UNCTAD, IMF, Havana, Cancun and what have you.

So far, the leadership and academic establishments of non-aligned States seem to be digging deeper into the old grooves of thinking instead of getting out of them. The modifications suggested in the volume under review, but for the exceptions cited above, are of a dubious kind and benefit. It is time to recognize that detente has increased, not reduced the choices of the non-aligned due to inter and intra-bloc rivalries than they had when the blocs were monolithic. The non-aligned have to change and adjust policies in face of new realities. Professor Khan's answer to reach new levels of understanding with the Socialist bloc (a temptation against which Damodaran forcefully warns), if not coalesce, is a highly unsatisfactory policy solution. In other words, it means playing the Soviet game. Then, what remains of non-alignment?

R K Srivastava

**STRATEGIES OF BRITISH INDIA, BRITAIN,  
IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN 1798-1850 by M.E  
Yapp Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980**

A STUDY of the first act of the Great Game of the 19th century — in strategic terms conceived as the whole of the Anglo-Russian quarrel about the fate of Asia — acquires a sharp contemporary relevance in view of Central Asia being once again the battlefield in a latter day confrontation of two 'imperial powers'. Yapp in an impressively well documented work challenges the validity of the strategic formulae, traditionally accepted as underpinning British policy in the North West, from the Iranian buffer to the Afghan and the Sikh (Hindu) buffers, to finally the annexation of Kalat, Sind and the Punjab.

This monumental work makes a weighty contribution to the ascendant school of contemporary historians who question the thesis that British policies in Iran, Afghanistan and the Indus were concerned with the defence of India from, first, the French and, then, the Russians. The emphasis on the external threat in documents elucidating policy in Central Asia was a deliberate distortion that arose from the exigencies of the tripartite decision-making structure which determined policy in the grey area between Britain and British India. This comprised the British Government, the British Indian Government and the

'politicals' or the political agents on the Frontier. The formal strategies were often little more than facades designed to disguise the very different interests of the three parties.

In London, be it a Canning or an expansionist Palmerston as Foreign Secretary, it was the imperatives of the European Balance of Power that governed Asian policy. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Iran where the primary consideration was not the defence of India but the desire to avoid a clash with Russia over Iran. London conceived Central Asian policy as directed at checking an expanding Russia from taking advantage of the political decay of Islamic Asia to upset the European balance. Britain was concerned to preempt Russia from strengthening its European bargaining position by acquiring a capacity to threaten British India in the North West, while at the same time taking advantage of political debility in the southern flanks of the Russian empire to pressurise Russia in Europe.

Indeed, the thesis of British policy in the North West as being 'defensive' can be stood on its head by juxtaposing the perception of the steady expansion of the British frontier in search of secure borders and the Tsarist nightmare of British encroachments along Russia's southern borders. Yapp might have done well to recall the comment of Lord Melbourne in 1830 when he was shown a map of Russian expansionism and urged to take alarm. He said that a map of England with her acquisitions during the same period would cut a very respectable figure and colour not an inconsiderable portion of the globe.

The 'external threat' bogey had such currency because it was the one sure means of moving London to be sympathetic to the British Indian Government's search for security against the 'internal enemy' within British India. The underlying premise behind much of Yapp's analysis is the argument that the value of British India as a possession was not sufficiently recognised in London until after 1830. Yapp does not, however, elucidate the reason for the shift in perception, although he does date it from the 1830 Ellenborough's (then President of the Board of Control) initiation of the policy of commercial penetration. But the commercial drive was but the means to achieve political influence in an area where Russian political influence was seen as rooted in their commercial domination of Central Asia.

Curiously, while Yapp maintains that commercial interests were a powerful incentive behind the Russian moves into Central Asia, he categorically dismisses the commercial motive in understanding British expansionism in the North West. It is regrettable that Yapp does not address himself to such considerations as the British interest to counter the Russian tea monopoly in Central Asia. His condescending dismissal of the 'forlorn economic bias' of the Marxists, suggests a flaw in his analysis.

Where Yapp is on surer ground is in his exposure of the hollowness of the external threat. Crippled in their ability to secure support for a forward policy to combat the 'internal enemy' that encompassed unruly Indian States, restive border tribes and disaffection within the British Indian army, Governor Generals were tempted to manipulate the 'external threat'. Yapp argues that Wellesley deliberately distorted the Afghan and French threats to achieve his objectives in Oudh.

An overland thrust into British India by a hostile European power was never considered credible. Instead, the strategic formula devised by the 'political' Malcolm became the formal rationale for British policy. It wove together British sensitivity to the external threat with the threat from the 'internal enemy' by stressing the danger of the establishment of foreign influence along the Indian borders as a spur to disaffection within India.

In the concrete formulation of specific strategic scenarios within this overall framework, the predominant influence was that of the ambitious political agent in the frontier Residencies. One of the main themes of Yapp's study is the relationship between individual ambition on the frontier and the grand strategy. By the virtual monopoly of information the agents could crucially determine the appreciation of the situation. For most, the temptation to present border problems and tribal management as linked with the grand strategy was irresistible as it would catapult them into the nerve centre of British strategy in the North West. Lord's attempts to advance the British dominions towards the Oxus is a particularly revealing example. It was designed to place him at the head of an unnecessary empire in Turkestan. The memorable vignettes of the 'politicals' exercise the best of Yapp's considerable artistic skill in presentation.

It is disappointing though that while Yapp draws many parallels between Russian and British behaviour in the Great Game, he does not carry further the comparison to include the Russian officers on the Frontier. It is believed that Russian military conquests in Central Asia were undertaken by overly ambitious Russian officers on the spot, often in violation of orders from the Tsar and his ministers.

In Yapp's attempts to explicate the forces behind British expansionism in the North West, the emphasis on Eurocentric interests sheds an interesting light on the replay of the Great Game in our time. It is no secret that the US has used the alleged threat posed by the Afghanistan crisis to western interests in the oil rich Persian Gulf to substantially inflate its defence budget and legitimise the extension of its presence in the area. Besides, the Afghanistan imbroglio is an expensive drain on Russian resources as well as seriously restraining Soviet activities elsewhere in the world.

Rita Manchanda

# Further reading

## BOOKS

- Bhatia, H S** (ed) Military dictionary and encyclopedia (of Army, Navy, Air Force, Para-Military and allied terminology) New Delhi, Deep & Deep Publications, 1980
- Bhatia, Shyam** India's nuclear bomb Vikas, Delhi, 1979
- Chaudhary, J N** India's problems of national security in the seventies (lecture) New Delhi, United Service Institution of India, n d
- Chawla, Sudershan and Sardesai, D R** (eds) Changing patterns of security and stability in Asia New York, Praeger Publishers, 1980
- Chibber, M L** Para military forces New Delhi, United Service Institution of India
- India International Centre.** Seminar on Indian Ocean as a zone of peace New Delhi, The Centre, 1981.
- Jain, J.P** Nuclear India New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1974
- Kapur, Ashok.** India's nuclear option atomic diplomacy and decision-making Praeger, New York, 1976.
- Kar, H C.** Military history of India Calcutta, Firma KLM Pvt Ltd, 1980
- Kaushik, B.M. and Mehrotra, O N** Pakistan's nuclear bomb Sapan, New Delhi, 1980
- Khan, M. Asghar** The first round Indo-Pakistan war 1965 Sahibabad, Vikas, 1979
- Kohli, S.N.** Sea power and the Indian Ocean with special reference to India Tata-McGraw Hill, New Delhi, 1978
- Lal, P.C** Some problems of India's defence New Delhi, United Service Institution of India
- Maikap, S C.** Cadet corps in India its evaluation and impact Calcutta, Naya Prakash, 1979
- Mirchandani, G G. and Namboodiri, P.K S** Nuclear India a technological assessment New Delhi, Vision Books, 1981
- Pathak, K.K** Nuclear policy of India a third world perspective New Delhi, Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980
- Patra, Saral** (Comp & Ed) Indian ocean and great powers New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1979
- Poulose, T T.** (ed) Perspectives of India's nuclear policy Young Asia, New Delhi, 1978
- Sarin, H C** Defence and development New Delhi, United Service Institution of India, n d
- Sharma, R P** Manual of B S F laws New Delhi, Joshi Publications, 1979

- Singh, K.R.** Indian Ocean big power presence and local response Manohar, New Delhi, 1977
- Singh, Sukhwant** Defence of the western border vol 2 New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1981
- India's wars since independence New Delhi, Vikas, 1980
- Sinha, P.B and Subramanian, R R** Nuclear Pakistan atomic threat in South Asia Vision Books, New Delhi, 1980
- Sodhi, R.S.** (Brig Retd) Views and suggestions on military affairs Chandigarh, the author, n d
- Som Dutt, D.** Report on reorganisation of the Infantry Division New Delhi, United Service Institution of India — a seminar
- Subrahmanyam, K** (ed) Nuclear myths and realities India's dilemma ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981

## ARTICLES

- Adhikary, Amiya** Arms race in space scenarios for future wars 'Statesman' 10 October, 1981.
- Alexeyev, A and Fialkovsky, A** Peace and security for the Indian Ocean 'International Affairs', No 9. September 1979 51-56
- Anand, V K** Are nuclear weapons obsolescent? 'Hindustan Times' 22 September, 1981
- Antia, S N** National defence viewpoint 'Indian Express' 27 June, 1980 and 28 June, 1980
- National security the public's right to know 'Mainstream' 17(37) 12 May, 1979 26-29
- Wrong approach to defence production 'Mainstream' 19(13) 29 November, 1980 15-17
- Apte, A S** Does your army need its own air arm? 'Caravan', 41(666) 2 February, 1980: 67-69.
- Attar Chand** Super power rivalry in ocean 'M P Chronicle' 11 August, 1981
- Bajpai, U S.** Indian view a dangerous situation 'World Focus', No 13 January 1981 17-20
- Bajwa, K S** Para-military forces need for clear division of duties and command 'Indian Express' 28 August, 1980
- Banerjee, Utpal K** Analytical approach to Indian defence 'Indian International Centre Quarterly' 7(4) December 1980 207-17
- Bery, A L** Air defence of western border. 'Tribune' 8 July, 1981
- Defence budget the task of controlling and trimming it 'Economic Times' 3 October, 1981
- . Role of defence R & D. 'Patriot' 23 September, 1980

- Bhai Mahavir.** Focus on defence research 'Deccan Chronicle' 2 August, 1980
- Bhatia, B.M.** Pakistan; U.S. aid implication 'Indian Express' 6 November, 1981
- Bhattacharjee, Ajit** India's security phobia fears fed by 'nightmare merchants' 'Statesman' 27 July, 1981
- Bhattacharya, H P** Neutron Bomb 'Hindustan Times' 20 August, 1981
- Cariappa, A C.** Basic weapons, the prime need 'Hindu' 19 November, 1980
- Pakistan's latest arms acquisitions 'Hindu' 21 September, 1981
- Tank is still supreme in the field 'Hindu' 22 April, 1980
- Chandrasekhara Rao, R V R** Defence policy and secrecy 'Financial Express' 16 September, 1980
- Chari, P R** India's national security global perspectives 'Mainstream' 17 (22 & 23) Republic Day Number 1979 19-21.
- India's security horizons changing patterns of the West 'Strategic Analysis' 2(12) March 1979 433-37
- National security internal dimensions 'Mainstream', (Annual Number) 18(1-6) 1979 75-76
- Neutron bomb 'Deccan Herald' 28 October, 1981.
- Chawla, Prabhu** Arms business secrecy pays 'India Today' 6(16) 16 August, 1981 49-52.
- Chopra, Maharaj K** Is Pakistan for no-war or ever-war? 'Organiser' 33(34) 10 January, 1982 7
- Why can't we plan better for defence? 'Organiser' 31(4) 17 June, 1979 7.
- Chopra, V.D** Changing picture of security 'Patriot' 10 November, 1980
- Dabhi, Ajitsinh** National security scene 1980 'Free Press Journal' 6 September, 1980
- Damodaran, A K** Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. 'Illustrated Weekly of India' 102(17) 17 May, 1981 12-14
- Deshingkar, G D** Prospects of US arms supplies to China 'Economic and Political Weekly' 16(30) 25 July, 1981 1232-33.
- Eswaran, V.V** India's defence production 'Hindustan Times' 29 June, 1981
- Geelani, Sultan.** India and the emerging power configurations in Asia 'Defence Journal' 7(7) July 1981 33-8
- Ghosh, S K** China's nuclear weapons 'Assam Tribune' 22 November, 1980
- Myth of arms race and disarmament. 'Democratic World' 10(3) 18 January, 1981 10-11 & 22
- Grant, N B.** Integration of R&D with the services 'Defence Management' 7(1) June 1980 1
- Habibullah, E.** Approach to defence 'Mainstream' (Annual Number) 20(1-5) September 1981 147-150
- Inder Jit.** Way out of the arms race. 'Tribune' 21 April, 1981.
- Jacob, Palayoor S.** What ails our navy? 'Caravan' 41(677) 1 August, 1980 14-17.
- Jain, B.S** Civil defence in nuclear war. 'National Herald' 6 November, 1981.
- Jain, Girilal** Gravest security threat. Pakistani bomb and U.S. arms 'Times of India' 11 April, 1981
- Soviet Union on defensive: Poland's possible implications for Asia 'Times of India' 25 December, 1981
- The West Asian cauldron America's painful dilemma 'Times of India' 22 October, 1981
- Kamath, V.A** The emergence of the Indian coast guard. 'U S I Journal' 109(457) July-September 1979 231-40
- Karnad, Bharat.** Indian defence muddled military thinking 'Hindustan Times' 16 March, 1981.
- Indian defence the weapons cost factor. 'Hindustan Times' 25 March, 1981
- No war pact Pakistan's "no lose" option 'Hindustan Times' 9 January, 1982
- Katoch, G.C** The armed forces 'Statesman' 29 December, 1981
- Beyond the Jaguar 'Indian Express' 30 October, 1980
- Border forces: a blue print for reorganization 'Statesman' 20 April, 1981
- Border guard of India. 'U S I Journal' 111(463) January-March 1981 53-59
- Integrating defence a supreme commander for cohesion, unfounded fears of a military coup 'Statesman' 3 August, 1981 and 4 August, 1981
- Kaul, B.N.** Indian army of the eighties 'Sunday Standard' 28 January, 1979
- Krishan Kant** Must we be taught another lesson? 'World Focus' No 18 June 1981. 18-21.
- Krishan Kumar** India's nuclear policy in security perspective 'Vikrant' 11(8) May 1981 13-7.
- Kumar, S.R.** Nuclear to be or not to be? 'Searchlight' 20 April, 1981
- Sinews of Indian defence 'Searchlight' 16 February, 1981
- Kwatra, R.D** Indian Ocean is now a dangerous centre of new tensions. 'Mail' 19 July, 1980.
- Lal, P C** We probably have the bomb. 'World Focus', No 18 June 1981 14-17.
- Longer V.** Mirage-2000 Vs F-16 'National Herald' 5 November, 1981
- Security needs defended. 'National Herald' 21 April, 1981
- Machat, S.N.** What hope for Indian Ocean peace zone? 'National Herald' 23 February, 1981
- Mahadevan, T.K** Bomb, the nation's shame 'World Focus' No 18: June 1981 42-44
- Malhotra, Inder.** Air defence in the 90s some crucial considerations. 'Times of India' 28 May, 1981
- U.S. arms for Pakistan back to bad old ways 'Times of India' 19 March, 1981.
- Mathur, Girish** U.S. stakes in Pakistan. 'Mainstream' 19 (28) 14 March, 1981 6-8
- Why the United States is militarising Indian Ocean 'Peace & Solidarity' 12 (8) August 1981 11-13
- Mattai, Thomas.** The making of defence policy. 'Indian Express' 5 April, 1981.

**Mehrotra, O N** India's defence strategy 'Strategic Analysis' 4 (9) December 1980 399-403  
 ——— Weapons that India needs 'National Herald' 6 January, 1981  
**Misra, K.P.** Peace-zone concept far from the goal. 'World Focus' No. 13. January 1981 7-9  
 ——— Paramilitary forces in India 'Strategic Digest' 11 (9) September 1981 772-784  
**Mohan Ram.** Combat aircraft options for India challenge posed by Pak F-16 'Mail' 26 July, 1981  
**Naik, M B** New imperatives of air defence 'Times of India' 13 August, 1981  
**Namboodiri, P K S** India's nuclear options the bomb is not the answer 'Mainstream' 19(41) 13 June, 1981 7-9  
 ——— India's security environment 'Searchlight' 29 July, 1980  
 ——— U S strategy in West Asia 'M.P Chronicle' 31 October, 1981.  
**Palit, D.K.** India's quest for security 1947-77 'Mainstream' 17 (48) 28 July, 1979 7-9, 31-2  
 ——— Mirage deal needs careful thought. 'Times of India' 30 October, 1981  
 ——— National security 'World Focus' 1 (11-12) November-December, 1980 21-23.  
**Pandalal, K M.** Role of para-military forces 'Economic Times' 23 November, 1980.  
**Pandit, C S.** War and peace with Pakistan commentary. 'Amrita Bazar Patrika' 7 January, 1982.  
**Prakash Chandra** Arms race escalating on Indian sub-continent 'Mail'. 2 June, 1981  
 ——— India's defence spending 'Mail' 10 March, 1981.  
 ——— India needs both bread and arms 'Searchlight' 6 March, 1981  
**Pulla Reddy, O** Time for toning up defence forces 'Deccan Chronicle' 2 October, 1981.  
**Rajagopal, Y K** Navy and Indian Ocean. 'Assam Tribune' 13 January, 1981  
**Rajkhwa, Naresh.** Indian Air Force — its new responsibilities 'Assam Tribune'. 3 October, 1981.  
**Rama Rao, R.** Defence effort an appraisal. 'Patriot'. 26 July, 1980  
 ——— India's security concern in the eighties. 'Link' 24 (1). 15 August, 1981 71-3.  
 ——— Let us start building an arsenal. 'World Focus' No 18, June 1981 23-27.  
**Rikhye, Ravi.** India's security environment. 'Tribune' 1 August, 1980  
 ——— New Pak threat to India's security. 'Times of India' 7 January, 1982  
 ——— Who's afraid of Mirage 2000? 'Indian Express' 26 October, 1981  
**Sabherwal, O P.** Nuclear strategy: Indian and Pakistani roads 'Mainstream' 19(48) 1 August, 1981 4-5, 32  
**Sahay, S** A close look. our oceanic responsibilities 'Statesman' 9 July, 1981.  
**Saigal, K.** Indian security system — a systems approach 'I.D S A Journal' 11(2) October-December 1978. 104-124.

**Sapru, S.** Para-military forces 'Deccan Herald' 11 September, 1980  
**Sardeshpande, S.C.** People and guerilla warfare in India 'U S I Journal' 110(462) October-December 1980 326-335,  
**Sarkar, B.N.** Gravest threat to India's security 'Amrita Bazar Patrika' 19 June, 1981  
 ——— Indian army' performance and potential 'Amrita Bazar Patrika' 5 and 6 October, 1981.  
 ———. Loopholes in India's defence structure 'Amrita Bazar Patrika' 21 November, 1980.  
**Seth, S P.** Security through strength America pursuing a mirage 'Times of India', 14 September 1981  
**Sinha, P B** Defence planning unwarranted arms race 'World Focus', 2(3) March 1981 18-24  
**Singh, Pushpinder.** India's ambitious space and missile development plans 'Asian Defence Journal' 4(4) April 1981 4-6.  
**Subrahmanyam, K** Dearth of defence expertise in India 'Amrita Bazar Patrika' 8 April, 1981  
 ——— Defence India's security problems 'Link' 24(1) 15 August, 1981 68-70.  
 ——— Role of defence industry 'Free Press Journal' 23 May, 1981  
 ——— Superpower interests. the state is raw materials 'World Focus' No 13: January 1981 10-15  
**Thapan, M L.** The armed forces sufferers in the rat race 'Statesman' 21 December, 1981  
**Thapar, Romesh.** State of the military, time to sit up and take notice 'Statesman' 9 September, 1981  
**Thomas, Raju, G.C.** India's defence posture for 80s 'Hindustan Times' 10 January, 1981  
 ——— India's new strategic framework 'Hindustan Times' 25 December, 1980  
**Tomar, Ravindra.** Mirage in the sky should India buy the French Plan? 'Statesman' 7 November, 1981  
**Victor, Cecil** Changes in defence planning 'Patriot' 18 September, 1980  
**Visvanathan, A.** Gearing up defence R&D 'Indian Express' 17 February, 1981  
**Visvanathan, S** Case for National Security Council 'Hindu' 24 March, 1981.  
**Viswam.** New threat from Diego Garcia. 'Deccan Herald' 18 July, 1980  
**Viswam, S.** Defence perspectives 'Deccan Herald' 17 July, 1981.  
**Vohra, A.M.** The military threat. 'U S I Journal' 111(463) January-March 1981 14-22.  
 ——— National security perspectives 'Tribune' 27 July, 1981  
 ———. New military threat to India and foreign policy imperatives. 'Tribune' 28 February, 1980 and 29 February, 1980

#### SEMINAR ISSUES

35	India's Defence	August	1962
48	India & Pakistan	September	1963
65	The Bomb	January	1965
96	Asian Security	August	1977
110	Our Security	November	1968
117	Pakistan	May	1969
145	China Today	September	1971
146	Nuclear India	October	1971
225	Defence and Detente	May	1978

# **the art of good management...**



**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**

Shriram seminars and courses are part of this moulding process .. which involves executives in a ceaseless interchange of ideas, discussion of modern techniques, evaluation and reconsideration of policies. So that the Shriram organisation is constantly infused with fresh dynamism . and our resources are utilised to the optimum.




**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**



My

# ROUTES

to over 40 cities in 5 continents



A thrilling voyage of discovery.  
On board my gleaming jets.  
It's a network to remember.

**AIR-INDIA**

MTB-AIR-62 67-4



# seminar

271

March 1982

Ad  
Abroad  
from Abroad

# INDIA

Seen from Abroad Seen f  
Seen from Abroad S  
Seen from Abroad  
Seen from A  
Seen from  
Seen s  
S

# Benefit from our widest range of compressors, backed by the world's foremost air power technology.

## New additions to CP's expanding range

TB-20½ x 13

Lubricated/Oil-less Horizontal, Reciprocating Compressors

500-RO-2

Rotary, Portable, Diesel Compressors.

'TU' & 'TUO'

Lubricated/Oil-less Vertical, Reciprocating Compressors

## Plus 25 other proven and trusted models

Compressors of every description. Portable and Stationary. Electric motor/Diesel engine-driven. Rotary and Reciprocating. Single-stage/Two-stage. Air-cooled/Water-cooled. Lubricated/Oil-less. Horizontal/Vertical. Single-acting/Double-acting. Balanced-opposed & tandem. In capacities from 3 m<sup>3</sup>/min (108 c f m) to 114 m<sup>3</sup>/min. (4000 c f m)

Together our widest range for every need.

## Why CP Compressors?



CP Compressors are crafted to the highest standards of quality and workmanship and incorporate international designs and know-how. And they're backed by prompt and efficient service both before and after sales. No wonder CP-India are today the largest exporters of compressed air equipment to over 15 countries.

Now, what can we offer you?


### CAUTION

Insist on genuine CP spares to keep your CP compressed air equipment working efficiently

Class TU



Class TB



Class FE

Please contact our nearest branch for literature.

## CONSOLIDATED PNEUMATIC

CONSOLIDATED PNEUMATIC TOOL CO. (INDIA) LTD.

301 L.B. Shastri Marg, Mulund, Bombay 400 080. Branches at: 30 J. Nehru Road, Calcutta 700 016. Eros Apartments, 56 Nehru Place, New Delhi 110 024. Finance House, Pattullos Road, Madras 600 002. Jamshedpur - Secunderabad - Goa - Bangalore.



The power of air harnessed for higher productivity.

# Mahindra


## now brings you the Peugeot XDP 4.90- a diesel engine of advanced design

**Mahindra** meets the challenge of the oil crisis, with a superb new, lightweight high performance diesel engine-the **PEUGEOT XDP 4.90** with greater fuel efficiency

This world-famous engine is now being assembled at the Mahindra plant.


The **PEUGEOT XDP 4.90** will be fitted initially on the **Mahindra NC 665 DP Mini Truck**, Pick-up Van and Ambulance.

By far the most vital factor is the greater fuel efficiency of this lightweight high performance engine.



#### Engine Specifications .

No. of Cylinders	4
Bore-mm	90
Stroke-mm	83
Bore/Stroke ratio	1.08
Displacement-cc	2112
Compression Ratio	22.4:1
R.P.M. (max)	4500
Max B.H.P.	75
Max Torque Kg m	13.3
	@ 2000 r.p.m.
Weight Kg	184



The Mahindra NC 665 DP  
Mini Truck fitted with  
Peugeot XDP 4.90 diesel engine



**Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.**

Economic prosperity is the harbour light that beckons us. We try to reach it by developing technological expertise and manufacturing skill in every field of engineering.

We launched on this activity way back in 1938 and emerged as pioneers in manufacturing dairy equipment in India. Today, we design, manufacture and install plant and equipment for every major national project covering vital human needs like food, chemicals, petrochemicals, fertiliser, cement, steel, paper, nuclear, power ..


We have even extended the limits of our capabilities to cover space technology in order to support the nation's plans to establish effective satellite communication systems. Right now, we are embarking on a totally different activity—cement manufacture.

Our efforts keep us moving towards a definite harbour—economic prosperity through technological development. All 10,000 of us in the L&T Group are prompted by the same sense of direction. And our capabilities are enriched by the experience and know-how of our collaborators—world renowned manufacturers in every field of engineering.



**LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED**  
where technology moves with time  
P.O. Box 278, Bombay 400 038

*When a man does not know what harbour  
he is making for, no wind is right —Seneca*




UN5010



# ESCORTS COMMITMENT TO SAFETY ON THE TRACKS



**Innovating and developing sophisticated railway ancillaries to meet the challenge of railway modernisation.**



HYD-ESC-6972-E

**Adapting advanced technology relevant to India's core needs.**

**ESCORTS LIMITED**

11 Scindia House, Connaught Circus, New Delhi 110 001

Railway Ancillaries • Tractors and Farm Equipment • Motorcycles • Automotive Ancillaries • Industrial and Construction Equipment • Heating Elements


Today, Indian Railways are poised to undertake an ambitious modernisation programme. And being the world's 2nd largest network, this task is gigantic.

This involves increasing the speed and the number of coaches and goods wagons on each train, so that the Indian Railways can substantially increase the passenger and goods traffic they carry.

In technical collaboration with M/s KNORR BREMSE of West Germany, Escorts is working closely with the Indian Railways for the introduction of the most advanced graduated release air-brake system particularly for the new Jumbo Rakes that will carry double the load of the existing goods trains.

***This braking system will also enable passenger trains to get better acceleration, shorter braking distance, better overall train control and safety.***

Escorts has done more than simply accept the world's leading technology. It has adapted it to India's special operating requirements through its extensive research and development efforts which will also enable this sophisticated system to be available with over 80% indigenisation from the very beginning. The result: Increased capacity on railways, better safety and foreign exchange savings.



Escorts range of railway ancillaries includes Centre Buffer Couplers, Shock Absorbers, Electro pneumatic Vacuum Braking Systems.



**FOUR  
SWAN  
FABRICS**

**FOR ENCHANTING SHADES  
IN COTTON AND BLENDED TEXTURES**

**Pamper your every whim and fancy with Four Swan Fabrics  
in cotton and Polyester/cotton blends. Crease-resistant  
Four Swan fabrics come in a wide range of colours and prints.**

*Manufactured by:*

**THE VICTORIA MILLS LTD., BOMBAY.**



**MANGALDAS  
GROUP MILLS**

**Jyoti has designed and developed  
circulating and condensate pumps  
and high tension switchgear  
exclusively for  
thermal power stations**

This is just one of Jyoti's several exclusives, rendered possible by Jyoti's research-oriented philosophy. Others include India's largest 360,000 l p m vertical propeller pumps for dry docks, 33 kV outdoor minimum oil circuit breakers, arno converters for electric locomotives, sophisticated pumps for nuclear power stations, micro-hydel generating sets, centrifuge motors and steam turbine driven generators and process pumps for sugar industry, high tension motors, epoxy resin insulated instrument transformers up to 33 kV, solid state power converters and inverters, as well as research projects on solar energy, laser technology and fluidics.

**This then is Jyoti's bigness — measured by its creative, innovative, inventive and futuristic dimensions — not size and turnover alone**

**WHERE RESEARCH BRINGS RESULTS**



**Jyoti Ltd.** BARODA

**HYDRAULICS ELECTRICALS POWER ELECTRONICS**

everest/432/JY

# Cancer is curable

## if detected early

If you're over 30, check up for cancer. Now.  
Every year, hundreds die of cancer. This dreadful disease is curable, if detected early. Unfortunately, patients come for treatment only when symptoms

are observed. Or, discomforts are felt. By then, it may become too late and reach the point of no cure.

If you are over 30 years old, you could be a likely victim. The best thing is to make sure. So why don't you go in for a check up? It wouldn't cost you anything because it's absolutely FREE.

Take an appointment with the Indian Cancer Society. Today.

### 3-pronged drive to control cancer

#### Cancer control

From Page 8

to some extent the known and complex metabolic pathways of the cancer cells.

An offshoot of this vigorous programme of trials, Dr. W. J. Jussawalla, was the welcome development of collaborative control on a global basis to evolve these compounds. In addition to the screening of cancer drugs, an active screen indigenous to have effects on

Dr. J. Jussawalla, the Indian Cancer Society, in a speech that cancer was in the country should be in the country to attack and destroy them. The court image

#### Cancer curable in early stages

BANGALORE, Nov. 2. The four-day international cancer congress concluded here today, emphasising that cancer was more a dreadful disease if it was detected in early stages. President of the Indian Council for Medical Research, Dr. P. C. Wahi, told newsmen after the concluding session that the deleterious effects on prevention and control of cancer have far-reaching effects on different countries, which were discussed at the conference. He said that cancer of oral cavity in the service of oral cavity were breast and oesophagus were preventable.

The congress called for an integrated approach of various scientific organisations to check cancer. It also stressed the need for setting up regional centres for research and treatment. An idea of forming a federation of Asian anti-cancer organisations was also mooted at the conference. An idea of forming a federation of Asian anti-cancer organisations was also mooted at the conference. An idea of forming a federation of Asian anti-cancer organisations was also mooted at the conference. An idea of forming a federation of Asian anti-cancer organisations was also mooted at the conference.

#### Majority Of Cancers Are Preventable

PROFESSOR BANGALORE

Dr. J. Jussawalla, Sir Richard Doll believes that a high proportion of all human cancers is due to agents in the environment and therefore capable of prevention, in principle. These carcinogenic agents range from sunlight to tobacco in heavy industry.

#### Anti-cancer vaccine in offing

BANGALORE, Nov. 7. An anti-cancer vaccine to immunise people from the dreaded disease is on the cards of research workers all over the world, including India.


This came up for detailed examination at the National Cancer Conference which concluded here yesterday.

Speaking before here today, doctors M. Gurudax and M. S. Rishi of the Mysore Medical Association said immunotherapy was still in an experimental stage. It was successfully tried on animals at Tata Memorial Hospital, Bombay. Further studies were continuing.

TATA ENTERPRISES



When seven of our hotels  
are among the  
300 best hotels in the world,  
should you settle for  
anything less?



Book into  
Oberoi Hotels  
instantly.


Oberoi Hotels Set amidst golden beaches,  
on sunny islands, in bustling cities  
Hotels so good that Rene Lecler, Travel  
Editor of Harpers & Queen, included seven  
of them in his world-famous travel guide  
'The 300 best hotels in the world'  
For reservations, contact Oberoi Instant  
Reservation Offices at

	Telephone	Telex
New Delhi	699571	2372, 3829
Bombay	234343	4153, 4154
Calcutta	230181	7248, 7854
Madras	88156	699
Ahmedabad	448648	
Bangalore	577681	725
	576355	
	577051	
Colombo	20001	CMB 21201
	21171	
Kathmandu	1 1	NP 203


**Oberoi Hotels**  
We look after you better

Oberoi Hotels in Bombay, Calcutta, Darjeeling, Delhi, Goa, Gopalpur-on-sea, Khajuraho, Ladakh,  
New Delhi, Simla, Srinagar, Udaipur, Adelaide, Aswan, Baghdad, Bali, Cairo, Colombo, Dammam,  
Kandy, Kathmandu, Melbourne, Singapore and Zanzibar


# Elegant looks



## Versatile features




Attractive Sleek Two-toned USHA Streamlined—the sewing machine that outclasses any other in its price range With features that others can't match And a 5-year guarantee too




Patch Darning for easy darning and quick adjustment of pressure on cloth



3-position drop feed for easy adjustment of feed-dog position




Dial-type stitch regulator with lever for forward and reverse stitch control and locking arrangement



Thread tension adjuster for regulating poor thread tension.

**USHA Streamlined** feature for feature a better machine



## Dennis Lillee's aluminium bat upsets test match at Melbourne.

The English captain protested. "It's not cricket", the purists said. But the fact is that aluminium is being used, more and more, for things we had never imagined. And in India, Indian Aluminium has been the catalyst of this change.

The first to embark on aluminium production in India, Indal has introduced almost the entire range of alloys in which

rolled and extruded aluminium products are made in this country. In its constant drive towards diversification, Indal has pioneered the use of aluminium in aircraft, currency, power transmission, irrigation tubing, transportation, packaging, housing, and a host of other applications.

Indal pioneering. It's not cricket. But it's progress.



**Indian Aluminium Company, Limited**  
**Anything's possible**

HTC IAL-4073

# seminar

THE MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI

a journal which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every shade of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single problem is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions. Opinions expressed have ranged from janata to congress, from sarvodaya to communist to independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it has been possible to answer a real need of today, to give the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture

**publisher/ROMESH THAPAR**

**managing editor/RAJ THAPAR**

**production/TEJBIR SINGH**

**circulation/C B. KUL**

Published from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1. Telephone: 46534 Cable Address: Seminar New Delhi Single copy: Rs 85 pence; \$1.50. Yearly Rs. 40; £ 7; \$ 16; Three yearly. Rs 100 £ 20; \$ 40 Reproduction of material prohibited unless permitted

## NEXT MONTH: TROUBLE ON THE CAMPUS

# 271

## SEEN FROM ABROAD

a symposium of

Indians looking at

India from the outside

symposium participants

### THE PROBLEM

A short statement of  
the issues involved

### PATHS IN INDIA'S FUTURE

Romesh Diwan, Professor of Economics at the  
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy,  
New York

### GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY

Madan Handa, Associate Professor at the  
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education,  
Toronto

### MODERNIZATION

Baidya Nath Varma, Professor of Sociology  
at the City College of the City  
University of New York

### NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Arjun Makhijani, engineer and free lance  
activist/intellectual based  
in Washington

### BOOKS

Reviewed by Chandra P. Agrawal, Renu Kallianpur,  
Ashok Bhargava, Vaman Rao, Romesh Diwan and  
Suresh A. Desai

### COMMUNICATIONS

Received from Shiv Charan Singh, Delhi and  
Ashok Kumar Yadav, Chandigarh

### FURTHER READING

A select bibliography of books written,  
Associations formed and journals  
published by Indians settled in  
the north Americas.

### COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury Associates

# The problem

WE are back to the over-all Indian problem, but this time a group of Indian academics working abroad, in Canada and the USA, give their view of what is happening and what needs to be done. Many of their ideas and concepts have been widely debated in this country — and presumably these debates have had an impact on Indian thinking abroad — but there is a texture in the thinking which is different. We need to study it with care because it carries

a quiet warning against societies which neglect their base, and the conditions of grinding poverty at that base. A solidly analytical assessment of our achievements and failures is needed at this critical juncture in our affairs. Unfortunately, it is precisely this sort of assessment which is lacking today. This issue of SEMINAR is a small beginning in gathering the thoughts of thinking Indians working abroad.

# Paths in India's future

ROMESH DIWAN

TO understand the India of today, one must recognize the nature of Indian society and the psyche of the Indian people. Both are rather complex, having been influenced by a large number of historical and cultural factors over the past thousands of years. The Hindu period of history left the large Indian society divided into two separate subsocieties on the basis of caste. (i) the upper caste Hindu and (ii) the Harijan. Both subsocieties have common origins, beliefs and visions that unite them. Conflicts between the two arise from the modes of production and associated practices which exploited and pauperized the Harijans. The Muslim period added yet another dimension by introducing a subsociety of Muslims.

The resulting three subsocieties have a sense of unity in view of the sameness of the people and the shared visions. On the other hand, the differences in beliefs and modes of production created potentialities of conflict. Still, the larger society managed to progress and develop such unique integrating cultures as the *bhakti* movement which produced Kabir, Mira and Nanak.

The most serious attack on the Indian psyche and society came in the seventeenth century from British rule and western imperialism. Even though the British are gone, this attack is still on. Its impact is the largest not only because it is nearest in time, and still continuing, but particularly because it has impoverished the country. The process of impoverishment rigidified the caste system and further divided Indian society by producing *en masse* a new class of 'brown Englishmen' or the 'elite'. This is the elite-mass division, super-imposed upon the division along caste and religious lines.

The mass-elite division is based on four characteristics: (i) urban, (ii) political power, (iii) economic status and (iv) elitist education and

attitudes. Thus, the elite society is mostly urbanized, controls instruments of political power, is made up of rich members and involves English-medium education. In contrast, mass society is, by and large, rural and poor, has potential political power but is politically powerless and employs vernacular education. The elite contains a very small fraction of the population; the rest is mass society.

The creation of the class of 'brown Englishmen' or the 'elite' is based on the assimilation — as opposed to rejection — response of some Indian people to the ruling British and later western ideology. This ideology is made up of two propositions: (i) everything associated with the British and the West is good, from skin to technology to methods of torture, and (ii) everything associated with India is bad, from Buddha to Kabir to food and dress. The members of this class have accepted this ideology wholesale and uncritically. They still seek the approval of the western imperialists. Such acceptance has a cost, of rejecting history, culture, traditions and even parents. On the other hand, there are rewards; the privilege of western life style, economic gain and control of the levers of political power. In the process, this colonization of minds has been percolating to even the members of the mass society.

A large number of Indians today, thus, have conflicting and contradictory feelings about virtually everything. These are feelings of love-hate at the same time. An Indian today has both a pride in and shame of India; its present and past. S/he enjoys being Indian, its food, its sense of leisure and relaxation expressed in dress such as the kurta, the pyjama, the saree, its familiarity, its wisdom, its ways that give meaning to life. At the same time, and in the same breath, an Indian wants to give it all up, reject



it in favour of the so-called western life, in spite of feelings of alienation and being lost. These love-hate feelings are more pronounced among the elite. However, these have now reached even the poor and poorest sections of the society.

**P**olitical independence from British rule in 1947, is one of the major achievements of the struggle of the Indian people. Even though external influences played a part, this independence was gained by a sophisticated interpretation by Gandhi, and the use of Indian history and culture through the medium of 'satyagrah'. There were many other struggles, peasant revolts, strikes, Ambedkar's movement. All these overlapped and helped the major independence movement. This was and, perhaps, is the first stage of decolonization in the world as a whole. Indians can, and do, take just pride in being among the first to start this process of decolonization as well as in introducing non-violent means for struggle.

After independence, the elite, made up of colonized minds, took over the power of the government and set itself the task of 'developing' India through five year plans as well as formalising a democratic looking parliamentary system of government. Having accepted the idea that everything relating to the colonizer, in this case the West, is good, the colonized mind sets to imitate the colonizer's life style. The imitation, then, is a means to assimilate with the West. The basic object of a colonized mind is to seek the approval of and eventually the acceptance by the colonizers. Accordingly, the elite hoped that after such development and democratic forms, India would look like the so-called advanced countries of the West. The progress, then, was defined by the level of similarity to the West.

The country followed the practice of elections every five years to form a government even though no real change in government has taken place in the past 30 years or so; the 1977 election at best was an aberration. Through five year plans and other forms of economic policy a large amount of resources were devoted to the production of indus-

trial goods. Furthermore, the government, through various rules and regulations, made the country safe for private and public investment in infrastructure, mass production techniques — in short, industrialization, westernization and modernization, to use the phrases from the literature of development. Judged from the indices of production, savings, investment, capital, technology, etc., these policies have been successful. India has created pockets that bear similarity to western countries. By this criteria, there has been progress.

This progress has come about by the extension of the market. Industrialization has involved production of industrial goods in all parts of the country. These are substitute goods, i.e., these goods substitute for goods produced locally in village craft shops such as textiles. In a few cases there has been extension in terms of new goods such as the bicycle, the sewing machine. Mostly, however, industrial goods are replacing goods from village crafts. The replacement involves both money relations in various parts as well as the destruction of a self-help community oriented production system, thereby generating monopolistic conditions for industrial goods. The industrial modes of production and the market has spread also to such basic goods as food, energy and water. In view of the replacement nature of most of industrial production, industrial production seems doubly progressive, particularly when compared with the community oriented production.

Another area of progress is defined by some — no doubt chauvinistically — by the growth of the military. Military hardware has increased and in a few areas of military goods, India is now able to produce its own hardware instead of importing from other advanced countries. The 1971 war in Bangladesh provided evidence of Indian military progress and further boosted the morale and prestige of the military-industrial complex.

**T**he progress has not been smooth. It has its own contradictions. Furthermore, given the Indian psyche it has produced a number of serious problems. Industrialization,

in the capitalist framework, by its very nature, is a process that generates inequalities because it depends fundamentally on the extension of the market. The process of industrialization first destabilizes the community production and social relations. Eventually, it destroys these. In the destruction phase it makes a very large number of people destitute. As a result, the number of people who join the ranks of the poor increases continuously.

The various studies on the poor and poverty in India attest to this fact. India, thus, has the largest number of the poor in the world; more than one third of the world's poor live in India. By uprooting community based production systems the problem of unemployment is exasperated. It is now widely recognized that the industrial sector in India is not capable of providing employment to more than 10 per cent of the persons joining the workforce every year. The remaining 90 per cent must seek employment in the informal or agricultural sectors. Yet, the industrial sector by its need to produce replacement goods destabilizes both the agricultural and informal sectors.

**T**he final effect of the uprooting of community based production is to create dual societies, one composed of the elites which has both political and economic power and, two, the poor and powerless. The dynamics of the dual society is that the elitist society gets smaller and smaller while the poor and powerless gets larger and larger. The elitist society, by itself, cannot maintain the industrial sector even though it cannot exist without it. At this stage, the industrial sector becomes a burden that has to be maintained by the continuous infusion of resources. The elitist society is powerful enough not to allow its resources for subsidising the industrial sector. On the contrary, the elitist society itself needs infusion of new resources to maintain and develop its elitism. These resources, then, have to be acquired from the larger poor and powerless society. As the poor and powerless society becomes less and less capable of providing these additional re-

sources, the institutions of control and torture have to be accentuated, which is possible only through dictatorial and police State methods

The Indian polity is already going through such phases. The compulsions of politics is that the political parties must articulate the needs of the poor and powerless society, such as 'garibi hatao'. Once elected, the political government is forced to follow policies that go contrary to its electioneering slogans since the government now must transfer resources from the poor and powerless to the elitist society. After a few such elections, elections and political parties lose legitimacy and the political system becomes a farce. Some observers think that the political process has already died in India and we are just following rituals after death. The political parties have been thoroughly discredited and have become irrelevant. Parliament is no more a body where decisions are made democratically. In other words, the political process needs an overhaul.

The dynamics of the dual society also deals a blow to the economy. There is general agreement among a large number of economists that the economy is winding down and in decay. The rate of growth of GNP, industrial production, etc., has been declining every decade since the 1950s. The rationale is quite obvious. The demand generated by elites is comparatively small and for a far larger and diverse quality of goods. No industrial sector can satisfy such a diverse demand. As a result, the level of unused capacity increases continuously and so do the costs of production. The larger poor and powerless society cannot afford to buy the goods from the industrial sector. It is no accident that the industrialists and their proponents are promoting the idea of exports, even of food when such a large part of the population is underfed and malnourished.

In addition to these contradictions of the industrial path, more conflicts arise because of the confrontation of industrialization with the Indian psyche. First and foremost, there are the conflicts inher-

ent in the market system and the traditional values. The traditional values emphasize sharing, giving, concept of enough, compassion, etc. The market system depends fundamentally on greed, selfishness, cheating, ruthlessness, and individualism. The effect of the market, where it becomes successful, is to destroy communities and social relations, which in turn degenerates the social services provided by these communities and the social relations.

Some of these social services satisfy basic needs such as help for the aged, the disabled, the diseased, the sick and weak. Without an alternative source of these services, the suffering of the population is increased. Added to it is the other class of weak people who cannot participate in the market for lack of financial or other resources and thus are denied some basic goods such as food which prior to the market could have been obtained through the process of sharing.

The other conflict follows from the collusion of industrialism with the assimilative properties of the colonized mind. Industrialism and the market, by their very nature, are processes easily prone to corruption. On the other hand, colonized minds seeking assimilation cannot distinguish between ends and means. For them ends justify the means. After all, assimilation is an alienating act for it means not only an acceptance of the West and its values but also, and simultaneously, the rejection of the colonized, India and themselves. The brown English, therefore, cannot afford to question the decency or truthfulness of means. Corruption is a means. What is more, it is a means that helps achieve the objective of a brown Englishman quicker. As a result, the assimilation properties accentuate the corruption propensities of industrialism and the market system.

It is thus no accident that corruption in India has grown in the early years after independence. Since corruption, like many other phenomena, feeds on itself, it reaches momentous proportions in

a matter of decades. By now corruption, and its concomitant black money, has reached beyond a threshold level where it has become a vested interest strong enough to survive and grow by its own force. This phenomenon is very disruptive of the already besieged economy and the political process. Corruption and assimilation are also a source for the degeneration of many of the institutions for the healthy growth of a society. Thus, bureaucracy, the judiciary, etc., are influenced very negatively.

In the past 60-70 years, India has followed two diverse paths which define two alternative futures. The first promotes the interests and satisfies the needs of the mass society. It reduces elite-mass conflicts and is integrative. Path II pushes the privileges of the elite at the cost of the mass society, thereby further accentuating the conflicts and divisions.

Path one was developed in the struggle by the Indian people to gain independence from British rule to control their own destiny. In this, Indians from all walks of life joined together. In the initial stages it provided an united front. The quality of this struggle was basically participatory. It was also a struggle for liberation. It is no accident that Gandhi sought the removal of untouchability as a goal equal to political independence. It was a national struggle, it unleashed historical and cultural forces and provided a pride in India, in being Indian and in the culture of India. Indian dress, in the form of the Gandhi cap and others, gained respectability. The impact was so strong that all the national leaders wore Indian dress even after Independence.

Some scholars argue that it is the widespread participation in this struggle that has kept India democratic so far when everywhere in the erstwhile colonized, and not so colonized, world dictatorial forms have been established. On the shorter time span, India followed this path once again in 1975-77 through J P's *sangharsh samitis*. The 1975-77 struggle unleashed, once again, liberative forces among the people.

Once again Hindu-Muslim joined together. Once again one heard of the need to remove untouchability and other forms of oppression

**T**he second path has been paved by the policies of industrialization followed by the government after independence. This path is still being followed. In everyday language one gets the impression that this is, perhaps, the only path to travel. But it is a very different path, particularly compared to the one described in the para above. This industrialization path has brought India back to neo-colonialism, its people to bondage and colonization. Like colonialism, this path has sown seeds of division among castes and religions. On statute books laws have been passed to remove untouchability. In fact, repression of untouchables is on the increase. Similarly, instead of removing it, the caste system has been strengthened. Hindu-Muslim differences have been regularly encouraged leading to regular Hindu-Muslim riots and tension among the two religions. In fact, the promotion of caste and religious differences have been institutionalized in the political process.

Just as British rule purposely destroyed handicrafts, creating much unemployment, industrialism has destabilized community after community so that now we have major problems of poverty and unemployment. However, industrialism has made India a military-industrial power, one of the top 10 nations in the world. In militaristic terms, India is an accepted regional power.

There are thus two visions, two futures. One is the continuation of the struggle that got interrupted with independence and the election of 1977. It is a vision of a decolonized India where people will be able to satisfy their basic material and non-material needs without being manipulated or colonized by a system. This is a future in which not only will India be able to liberate itself but will also play an important role in the second and, hopefully, the final stage of decolonization in the world itself so that foreign armies will not colonize

other people. It is a struggle in which repression through caste and religion, through hunger and poverty, will be eliminated. Many people have called this vision *Ram Rajya* or *satyayuga*, i.e., the rule of truth and brotherliness rather than that of guns and goons.

The second future is the continuation of the industrialization path. Industrialization will spread so much that through the trickle effect, it will reach a large majority, if not all India will become not only a regional power but one of the major powers of the world so that it can afford to obtain resources from other parts of the world to maintain and promote the growth of Indian industries. It will be like the affluent countries in the West or like Japan. The divisions in society will be reduced through affluence rather than morality. It will be the rule of might not of truth; perhaps might will also be truth.

My own feeling is that the vision of the first kind suits India's culture and history. The second future of a mighty India is more utopian than real and far less likely because already a number of countries are ahead in this path.

**T**he question is: can any of these two visions be realized in the foreseeable future of twenty to thirty years? At the moment, the situation looks bleak. However, twenty years is a long time and if a process starts and gains momentum, major strides can be made within that time. To appreciate this one must consider that it was only in 1929 that Indian leaders even thought of gaining political independence. A few years prior to that, the very idea would have seemed impossible. Yet, India did gain independence in 1947, 18 years after the Congress passed a resolution to do so.

Similarly, who could have thought in the 1930s that Britain, then the most important power in the world, would become one of the ordinary countries of the world. Yet, by the early 1960s, Britain had lost all its colonies and twenty years hence is fast racing into unimportance. Thus,

much depends upon the processes and their momentum. At present the initial conditions exist for both of these processes but it is difficult to say when any one of these will gather momentum.

**T**he greatest asset of the second path is that it is currently being traversed and the country has made important strides in this direction. India today has one of the largest body of scientists and engineers in the world, it ranks after the USSR and the USA. The expertise exists. The government has been organized to promote this vision so that the public is continuously being prepared to follow this path. Furthermore, the State has acquired a large amount of repressive power so that in case people do not cooperate, the State is capable of forcing them into this direction. The basic material resources exist. The government is moving steadfastly to promote the most modern technology. India now possesses an atom bomb capability. The satellite technology is being developed vigorously. *A priori*, many scholars and politicians think that the movement on this path should be easy and the process gather momentum. They are even convinced that this is not only the desirable path but the only feasible one.

Unfortunately, there are a number of difficulties along the path. First, both the US and the USSR are already there, in fact, far ahead of us. To catch up with them may take generations or be virtually impossible. As these countries move ahead, they are forcing destabilizing influences on other countries. Thus, the Russian involvement in Afghanistan is creating a process that is bringing the major powers into the South Asian region. China and the US are arming Pakistan. Diego Garcia is being militarized so that the Indian Ocean is no more a peaceful area.

All this has the effect of forcing India to concentrate on near military goals, thus slowing the process towards industrial development. Moreover, even the US and the USSR are recognizing that the costs of maintaining such large

growth in the military-industrial sectors is becoming prohibitive for their own economies which are better organized to obtain, and transfer, resources from all over the world

India, thus, has little chance even to obtain resources within India itself. For example, India is now paying virtually all its discretionary export-earning—after deducting for debt services—to obtain current levels of oil from the world market. The likelihood of its doubling the oil imports in two decades is quite low. In addition to the material base, the economic costs are getting quite high. Indian economy, at best, is stagnant, more realistically, it is decaying. This decay in the economy is the result of following this path. Further acceleration will simply kill the economy.

Then, there is the additional problem of political capacity. The existing political framework of elections, parliament, cabinet, etc., is poorly suited to the task of moving ahead along this path. The political system would have to change its form to a Brazilian type dictatorship but it is not obvious that such a dictatorship can be sustained. The experience of constitutional dictatorship between 1975-77 does not support the case for, and eventual success of, the Brazilian type dictatorship in India but that does not mean that dictatorship will not come to India. It does, however, suggest that dictatorship will be able, at best, to maintain the status quo as in Pakistan or Chile, and not be able to *accelerate* the movement towards a military-industrial path. Another reason is that the magnitude of poverty in India is too large. The industrial system involves virtually writing this population off and even adding to this write off by making more sections of the population poorer.

**E**ven though the first path is dismissed out of hand, a closer examination suggests that it may not only be feasible but also more likely. The conventional wisdom, based on colonial and capitalist ideology, promotes the impotence of the poor and powerless society, even though this is the larger society. In fact, this

larger society, even if powerless at the moment, can be, and is, a major asset. Its potential is very large indeed. It is the only force of, and for, humanization. Industrialism, capitalism and colonialism are all various forms of dehumanization.

Humanization is the historical imperative unless, of course, human civilization goes out with a bang or a whimper. The elite are incapable of liberating the oppressed and themselves. It is only the so-called poor and powerless who are potent enough to be able to liberate both themselves and the elite. The real strength springs from the weakness of the poor and powerless. After all, it is they who suffer the effects of oppression and understand the need and meaning of liberation. No doubt, many a times the poor and the powerless do not seek liberation but only want to change places with their oppressors. This is what has happened in the first stage of decolonization. The second stage has to go beyond.

The base for a movement along the path to the vision of the first kind lies in the existence of the large poor and powerless society, the need of that large society to wake up and remove its shackles and end the suffering and to know that this is possible. What is lacking at the moment is a mechanism that binds all this mass together and starts it rolling along the path. In view of the size of the mass, once it sets rolling, it can gather momentum very fast.

**W**hen we compare the two visions, we notice that the industrial vision is set on its path and is rolling, however, there are serious limitations to its gaining momentum. The 'swaraj' vision has all the initial conditions in place but is not on the track.

The socio-economic framework has quite a few distinguishing features that sets it apart from many other societies. In terms of the political set up, though there are a number of political parties and elections take place every five or so years, the political process is dominated by one party and herein too by one particular person. Up to

1963, it was Jawaharlal Nehru. After 1968 it has been his daughter, Indira Gandhi. The ruling political party has been so amorphous that it contains virtually every interest and shade of opinion. The political parties, thus, do not define any particular interests, much less the interests of the people. The CPM and Bhartiya Janata Party come closest to being parties with an ideology or a point of view, even if not fully thought out. The political process, therefore, has centered more on personalities than on issues or policies. The defections of a member from one party to another is quite common, further emphasizing the role of personalities rather than of principles. Over a period of time, political parties are becoming virtually irrelevant to the problems of the country or the people. In spite of this, the process of elections seems to have taken root in the populace, judging from the percentage voting in the elections.

**T**he bureaucracy in India is not only as colonial as it was during the British Raj, but has grown enormously and is particularly repressive to the poor sections of the society, both because of the excessive layers in the bureaucracy and the general feelings of frustration that get translated into repression. The most recent incidents of police brutality of poor lower caste people and rape of women is the symptom of this repression. It is particularly a hindrance to production and initiative in the poor society.

The economy is heavily saddled with a parallel black economy, the size of which is impossible to estimate. Some place it at 50 per cent of the white economy. In view of the extraordinary concentration of resources among a comparatively small number of people, the distorting influence of the black economy should be obvious. It distorts all decisions, to save, to invest, to produce, to allocate somewhat rationally, etc., and makes it impossible to achieve meaningful economic goals of production. It also makes white economy less desirable and dries out the investible resources from within the white economy in view of the high rate of profitability.

in the black economy. It influences production structures towards luxury and unproductive commodities and makes the transference of resources abroad easier.

Industry is getting more and more sick. The Reserve Bank of India is continually increasing the list of industries deemed sick. These are where costs and capacity are so high that they cannot produce goods at the market price, even when the market is protected and the price relatively high. The result is that more and more subsidies have to be obtained to keep these industries alive.

Because of the existence of black money and sick industries, the investment in new technology is being negatively affected and technological obsolescence is also increasing, further adding to the costliness of the Indian industrial sector.

The elite society is highly corrupt and rather submissive. Its corruption is both the cause and effect of the black economy, both interacting positively with each other. One witnessed the submissiveness of this class in 1975. How easily it caved in. The professors, journalists, university vice chancellors, government secretaries, members of cabinet and parliament, lawyers, businessmen, etc., all acquiesced within a rather short time without protest.

In addition, as pointed out earlier, its mental make-up is that of colonized minds. It has, thus, little capacity to evaluate, examine critically, judge, sift the influences and objects from the West. Its capacity lies in imitation however inapplicable, inappropriate, inconsistent, inconvenient, ineffective, inefficient, or irrelevant. Assimilation, involving uncritical acceptance, leads to complete obedience of those in power. It explains why so many members of the elite followed Sanjay Gandhi and now bow to Rajiv Gandhi.

The mass society of the poor and the powerless suffers from two sources of division within it, caste and religion. The lower caste of the untouchables has been at the lowest

rung of the society; denied opportunities, oppressed and colonized. As the winds of change have blown, some members of these castes have started seeking their humanity. The upper caste poor have seen this as a threat to themselves. This impression of a threat has been promoted and magnified by the colonizing forces. As a result the caste feelings have become more rigid and the caste system has become still more oppressive. There are stories of a whole group of lower castes being burned to death.

The second source of genuine weakness in this potentially powerful society comes from the animosities between the Hindu-Muslim communities. British colonialism encouraged these differences and animosities and when the British left, they institutionalized the hate relationship through the division of the then India into the now India and then Pakistan — now Pakistan and Bangladesh. The colonizing forces in India after independence have maintained and encouraged these divisions through the manipulation of the political process. Because of these two sources of division, the elite society is able to manipulate the larger society regularly. In the process, this larger society has experienced a growing tendency towards pauperization.

The existing socio-economic framework or the arrangement is incapable of generating a momentum in society towards either vision. At best, it can maintain the status quo; even this is becoming increasingly more difficult. The political framework is losing fast the content of politics so that only forms are left. As a result, the political arrangement is not capable of achieving its objectives of articulating and mediating different interests of different groups on the one hand, and fusing these differences to move towards a visionary path on the other. Instead, the prevailing political arrangement results in extremely capricious decision-making depending upon the mood of the political leader, the manipulations of the hangers-on, the pressures of the immediate situation and the balancing of one faction against the other.

There is no coherence, no planning, no vision. Without some major disturbance, this arrangement can continue for a long time — say 5-10 years. However, it is not capable of withstanding a major shock because this would result in its complete disintegration and its replacement by another arrangement, at this stage it is difficult to recognize even the elements of the arrangement that will replace it.

The economic framework also is not able to both produce the goods needed by the society and allocate whatever little is being produced. Thus, there are growing scarcities of most basic goods. Lentils, sugar, etc., are common examples. The fast growing prices of basic necessities is an index of these scarcities. The allocation problem is particularly serious. Even when there is food in government stocks the populace goes hungry. The agricultural sector produces marketable surplus rather than the goods for the people.

As a result of the deficiencies of this political-economic arrangement, the stress in the society is increasing, leading to increasing social violence and the slow but sure destruction of the social order. This socio-economic framework is no more able to solve the problems in the society. It is not a part of the solution. It is, itself, the problem.

As we have argued, the pursuit of the vision of industrial might is an empty dream. It is most unlikely. The more realistic, and equally desirable, goal is to seek the vision towards 'swaraj'. As we have seen, and argued, this path depends upon the larger poor and powerless society in India. The strategies and actions are, therefore, defined by the objectives of strengthening the larger society and promoting its consciousness about its own potential for its own liberation as well as the liberation of the elite society.

To maintain its power and privilege, the elite society has mastered the colonial methods of divide and rule. Accordingly, it controls the mass society by impoverishing it and pitting its members against

each other and then playing upon the cast and communal divisions. It is thus necessary to combat these colonial tactics.

The sources of strength lie in the unity of the larger society. As pointed out earlier, there are two main divisive forces that weaken it and strategy involves combating these. The most potent divisive force is the issue of untouchability. As the industrial modes of production have spread, the hold of religion in the form of the acceptance by the lower castes of their untouchability has weakened. The idea and, therefore, practice of untouchability, is no more tolerable since it no more performs any meaningful function. It is only a destructive force and the colonizing policies of the present social framework are trying to use it for purposes of control.

To neutralize these policies and to eradicate untouchability requires some fresh thinking. The present system has been able to rigidify caste conflicts through such policies as special quotas in bureaucracy, professions and political leadership for the lower castes while at the same time denying them access to social services and economic resources provided by the old arrangements. In other words, by providing lower castes some visible but limited opportunities, the social framework is able to promote and legitimize the threat to the upper castes who are also being pauperized by the various policies. There is, thus, a clear need to improve on the system in favour of the lower castes and institute a minimum lunch or provision of other basic necessities on the basis of lower incomes even in exchange for some sort of work schemes.

The second divisive force is the exaggerated differences between Hindus and Muslims. British colonialism institutionalized these hate relationships through the partition. The strategy here is to minimize these differences. There are more common issues among Hindus and Muslims in India than there are differences. The present social arrangement has promoted these differences by two policies. (i) the

quota system in political leadership and through it in bureaucracy, and (ii) continual belligerent policies with neighbours.

Here, again, there is a serious need for fresh thinking in promoting harmony among Hindus and Muslims. It may be necessary, and desirable, to develop projects that are carried on by Hindus and Muslims jointly. Secondly, there is a serious urgency to develop good neighbourly relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh both at government and non-government levels. It is interesting to note that all governments in India over the past have maintained friendly and cordial relations with Middle Eastern Muslim countries. Yet, these friendly relations have never been used to promote communal harmony within India.

The other source of weakness in the larger society follows from a continuous process of pauperization. This process has to be combated through such policies as food for work, access to land for cultivation, etc.

The actions for these strategies cannot be determined at national levels. By their very nature, the actions have to be at local levels. People of goodwill, who agree with these strategies, must concentrate their efforts at local issues that arise regularly in various parts of India. For example, poor peasants drawn from 42 villages in four blocks of Gaya district and organised by the Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini in mazdoor-kisan samitis have been struggling to assert rights over 9,000 acres of ceiling surplus land under the control of the Bodh Gaya Matt. The struggle is trying to unite the mazdoors (harijans) and kisans (yadavs). The case, thus, involves not only the reduction in pauperization but also uniting the lower and not-so-lower castes. Such struggles need to be supported. If such struggles can obtain local victories, then the momentum towards the vision of 'swaraj' will gather. Every victory promotes another. The call for action, then, is to join together to ensure the success of such local struggles.

# Global technology

MADAN HANDA

WHEN one thinks about India, there are competing images which come to mind. Social reality everywhere is complex and full of contradictory opposites, but it is particularly so in India. Much of Indian complexity has to do with its oceanic vastness and historical heritage which contains within it the remnants of many social formations. Sitting abroad, where one is not immediately immersed in the reality called India, one is predisposed to think of it as a piece in a global order of nation-States. 'Power' is the word associated with the image of a nation-State, one measure of which is how the particular State can maintain the integrity of its totality, both internally and externally.

In the 'Third World' countries, the newly formed nation-States are neither stable internally nor defensible externally against the pulls and pressures of superpowers. India has shown a remarkable achievement in this respect, only a generation ago many thinkers seriously argued, some do even now, that the concept of one India is a myth. India, it has been argued, is many autonomous nationalities. Today India is one, and is even recognized as a regional power. Much of the heated and malicious argument of the Right or the Left, that India is a 'client' or a 'dependent' State either of social imperialism or imperialism, I am convinced, is an historically misplaced perspective. The political reality of the nation-State of India and its autonomy is a remarkable fact of the twentieth century.

There is another positive element connected with this political reality

India is a democracy and a glaring exception in the Third World (keeping in view, of course, such other examples as Sri Lanka). It is no mean achievement that some 350 million voters (greater than the entire population of the USA or USSR) have gone through repeated peaceful elections at various levels of government.

On the economic front India is being described as the tenth industrial giant in the world. In addition, India has the third largest scientific manpower in the world, which is a staggering fact.

Above all, India is a vibrant country where the old and the new compete, where many languages, major religions, and various sub-cultures thrive in a world in which advanced nation-States like Canada find it hard to cope with one Quebec, or the USA and the UK to give justice to their coloured minorities.

In spite of these positive elements in the image or images, is this the India of my dreams? My blunt answer is 'no' and this, I am sure, is not the whimsical feeling of one Indian but a shared opinion of many, probably millions. Why this feeling?

Taking in the same order as the positive elements, first, the integrity of national unity though once achieved is continuously under stress from within (as a result of many factors, e.g., regionalism, communalism, State oppression, increasing class conflict as a result of prevailing injustice, etc.).

Second, authoritarian tendencies have grown in the Indian polity



which seriously threaten the future of Indian democracy. We have not seen the last of the 'Emergency' of 1975-77 which may be the first of a series which would eventually break the democratic fabric of society.

Third, the uneven development in the country is appalling. The 'new' injustice is heaped over the age-old oppressive social structure of a traditional and caste-ridden Hindu society. Dreadful poverty, famished conditions, unclean water, mass illiteracy, and millions of neglected, ill-fed children exist in a country where a few feast so well.

Fourth, millions are uneducated and the educated millions are unemployed. India is a human wasteland.

Fifth, there is a feeling of betrayal of promises made by the leadership. Much of the vibration of the system is also a cacophony of frustration, the noise that the system produces when it is cracking.

Finally, India can claim to have made its own unique contribution to corruption in everyday life. The immorality in public life and in the everyday practice of people, in a country which upheld the ideals of morality, is so pervading that one senses its general stench in the air.

How can such an India be of anyone's dreams except of those who benefit from it: the profiteers, the racketeers, the smugglers and the tax evaders?

**W**hy has this come about? It is a consequence of the model of development which was adopted after independence. In 1947, India stood at an historical juncture which provided India three options of development: communist, Gandhian or western modernization. The analysis of the communist and Gandhian 'non-revolutions' is a perennial issue which recurs in contemporary Indian debates. The reality is that we are living neither in a communist nor in a Gandhian India but an India of Nehru's conception of 'western modernization'.

Three essential elements of this conception are important to grasp

for a correct understanding of this conception:

- (a) it was considered possible to transform the inherited colonial structure into a socialist structure,
- (b) the main lever of this transformation was State planning for industrialization within a democratic polity and without directly affecting much of private property (i.e., a capitalist framework) and
- (c) when the country developed economically the social structure would also transform. No provision was made for social planning.

Here, then, was a vision that came to be known as the vision of democracy, secularism and socialism, a vision of transformation from the top. There was no concept of cadres for social change. The State's bureaucratic machinery was to be relied upon. There was no conception of an effective redistribution of wealth. Tremendous wealth in the country has been produced. In the ensuing struggle for distribution of this wealth the stronger sections of society have gained enormously even at the cost of weaker sections. They have also tamed the State from its initial national-aspirational character, to serve the interests of privileged sectors and classes. Casteism, communalism and other divisive forces collude with these class forces.

One also observes a correspondence between the political economy and the newly emerging culture: the new *welt-geist*, the best example of which is Indian movies. The sensate vulgar culture is in the making and an 'avaricious Indian' is emerging: the idealist, the socialist, egalitarian man is too irrelevant to the harsh, ruthless, competitive milieu of new India.

**W**here is this India heading? A short answer is that there is likely to be more of the same with some further distortions and perversions in the system as a result of the pressure of global forces and increas-

ing social struggle in India for reform or revolution and the tendency on the part of the State to suppress these forces.

In view of the population increase compounded by the slow pace of economic growth, it may be asked whether 'more of the same' is at all feasible, even though the conventional wisdom, elites in power and vested interests do argue in favour of 'more of the same'. There are those who point to the industrial base India has already built as well as to the intermediate and advanced technology India has obtained and absorbed from industrialized countries.

**T**his prognosis of future India is based on an understanding of the existing reality and its likely trends. The existing reality does not mean only some objective facts but also includes the existing subjective and ideological forces (of imperialism and social imperialism, externally, and reactionary nationalism, casteism, regionalism and communalism, internally). There are powerful ideologies and interests at work which rationalize the existing national and international reality and suggest that there are only two options: capitalist and the State capitalist structures of highly centralized States. That is, after all, the best available sum total of history with us today.

In spite of the existing reality being bleak and the future trends suggesting the likelihood of deterioration, globally and nationally, in the sense that there would be more of the same that exists now, to accept this future as inevitable, even when it is undesirable, is to accept the worst kind of determinism.

To form an idea of India, say, by the turn of this century, it is very important to understand the global forces because it is my conviction that certain forces at work outside of India are going to influence India's destiny as much if not more than the forces within India. This is true not only for India but also for other countries, especially Third World countries. This is a unique feature of our time; it was never true in any other time in the history.



of mankind. History has become world history for the first time. The implications of this perspective are methodological. The methodological issue is, do we focus primarily on the national forces or do we focus on the world system and situate a particular State in it? In this paper we adopt the latter approach. Here we do not spell out fully the dynamics of the world system but only consider the impact of two major global forces in predicting 'whither India in the year 2000 A.D. or so'

**T**he focus on global changes is in the industrialized countries, simplistically, the two superpowers, one called the imperialist having a capitalist system (the USA) and the other the social imperialist with State capitalism (the USSR), both being highly centralized States as generic types. One set of changes arise from the technology. Let us consider the technological advancement in space only, viz, reaching out to space by the two industrial superpowers. The implications of this breakthrough into space are far reaching. Earlier discoveries in the 16th century of the 'New World' and of the sea routes to the 'old world' changed the face of this globe beyond recognition when measured by the norms and standards of previous centuries. The 'space voyage' will make the speed or technological change, even of the twentieth century, appear small. Two implications of this technological race in space are serious

First, India and most of the third world will be *relatively* more backward when compared with the advanced countries than at the present because of the leverage which new technology will provide for the discovery (some from outer space) of the new resources and their use. This increasing economic and technological distance between India and the superpowers, in a world system of nation-States, is what defines India's status as a nation. An individual may opt for contentment and not bother to 'catch up with the Jones'. The iron law of nations is to 'catch up' or at least keep the pace. And this pace is decided exogenously to India. The pressure to adjust to this pace would

be the biggest pressure on India to fall into the orbit of one or the other superpower by either seeking a 'transfer of technology' (the Chinese syndrome) or fighting external imperialism (the present Indian syndrome). The net result is loss of autonomy for a weaker nation State.

**S**econd, the technological race between the two superpowers is a military race, involving destructive and annihilative technology. Neutron bombs and sophisticated missiles are the most recent examples of this race. This in turn has two major consequences

(a) There is militarization of the economies, in fact of the entire social fabric, of the two superpowers. This militarization of the two superpower societies is not going on in isolation. It is leading to the militarization of the rest of the world and of the Third World economies which can hardly bear the burden of armament. The insanity of 'Reaganism' in its policy of confrontation and military build-up has already brought the superpower tension to the doors of India. It is just the beginning and not the end of the drama of war, the script of which is being written outside of India.

This growing threat of war in south-west Asia is going to affect the shape of India's future for many years to come. Economic planning in the future is likely to be increasingly a derivative of military planning. This may come about by (a) linking industrial production to military hardware, and (b) increasing the influence of the military elite on economic and industrial planning decisions. There is an emergence of an Indian equivalent of the military-industrial complex.

Not only will the arms race contribute to the militarization of India's economy but its social and psychological implications are equally serious. Already the government feels that the investment of large sums of resources in Mirages and satellites is socially justifiable. Thus, it fans reactionary nationalism which thrives on military glory. It

pushes India into the role of a regional power — a role that China has already taken upon itself. India's national leadership has, quite rightly, avoided this objective so far. These developments may, initially, provide a fillip to industrialization. However, these will definitely distort, still further, the existing pattern of production which neglects human needs.

(b) The arms race has for the first time in world history made the annihilation of mankind a real possibility. The outcry of the peace movements across the world today is 'survival'. This makes the destiny of each part of the world an integral part of the global destiny. Either we all survive or no part will survive. The implication of this is that the issue is not only survival for us as a nation but survival in which a country of India's size must begin to shape the future rather than accept the inevitable as fate on which one has no control but to be its victim. India cannot afford to leave the issue of survival to be worked out by the external forces but must take an active role in shaping the destiny of the world of which it is a sizeable part.

Two issues arise

- (a) what is an alternative conception of a preferred future, and
- (b) what is the strategy to realize this preferred future? What is to be done?

Hitherto the answer to the first question is within the two received moulds of thought viz, communist and capitalist. It is my conviction that the concepts and practices of these two alternatives lie at the root cause of today's violent world order of nation-States. At the national level too we have exploitation and oppressive regimes which exclude millions from any control over their every day conditions of life. We live both nationally and internationally in a managed world.

**T**here are two starting points in this new vision and conventional thinking would suggest that these two are separate from each other.

In my view these are organically linked. These two points are the global and national

A preferred future for the India of my dreams cannot be the capitalist or the State capitalist variety. It has to be a vision of a non-violent social order, a kind of 'Gandhian India' or a 'socialist India' based on the principle of 'association of equal producers', a system which would give autonomy to the workers and communities in their economic, cultural and political life. Such a national dream, even if it were possible to realize, would probably be short-lived so long as the global order stays as it is today, just as a local, peaceful experiment in India cannot eventually survive if the overall character of the society remains oppressive and exploitative. The macro system will suck the micro system, mutilate and disintegrate it. The starting point has to be at a global level.

At this level the new vision of a preferred future must transcend the present two systems, viz., the capitalist and the State capitalist. Such a vision must start by taking stock not only of 'non-revolutions' in the capitalist world but of 'revolutions' in the State-capitalist world. Such a stock-taking would provide us two building blocks

- (a) to stop further heightening of the violent global order of today, there must be a halt to further armament. There should be a positive process of disarmament,
- (b) there must be development with social justice in the world, particularly in the 'Third World'.

The two together, (a) and (b), provide us the connection of disarmament and development (with social justice). This does not provide a full scale vision of a preferred world order but does provide a rudimentary basis for such a vision. If the arms race continues to militarize the world societies and uneven economic development continues to proceed at a tardy speed without social justice, then, India (as the rest of the Third

World) would continue to be sucked into the world superpower system.

Restructuring the global order of today is, therefore, fundamental to any conception of a desirable national dream. A question that becomes relevant here is: should the global activities be pursued first or should preference be given to national activities and policies? National issues such as poverty, corruption, social injustice, are so overwhelming that these are inevitably going to engage the mind and energy of the people. Therefore, the risk is not that energy would be devoted to the global struggle more than the national struggle. Instead, the risk is of the opposite kind. The global struggle is likely to be ignored due to the exigencies of the every day struggle in India.

For example, there is little by way of 'anti-war and disarmament' movement in India, as is the case in most of the rest of the Third World—caught up in the every day struggle for existence. The nuclear threat and the armament issue seems distant and far removed. Yet, there is a greater danger of the use of nuclear weapons in the Third World than in the West. The connection between the global peace struggle and struggle for social justice in India needs to be articulated.

Thinking at the national level about India's future, the basic issue can be put bluntly. 'Does one stand for Indian revolution or not?' This has been the most anguishing question which my generation, standing at the threshold of youth in 1947, has now to answer. It is an anguishing question because my generation was taken in by the glory and promises of the national leadership. This generation put faith in the model of 'gradual revolution' as an alternative to the rudeness and roughness of revolution which would have, of course, in its fire burnt down the old worn-out system.

The answer to the question 'Are you for the Indian Revolution or not?' has to be 'yes'. It is clear now that the accumulated muck of centuries cannot be cleared gradually. In fact, on the basis of the experi-

ence of the post independence years, it can be said that the muck has accumulated. All the archaic faces of casteism, communalism, feudalism, have found alliance with the corrupt modern capitalist institutions. All this can be cleared only by revolution and not by reform. Radical reform is not possible within the matrix of the present system. Marginal reform will not do.

While 'revolution' is the answer—though the irony is that the revolution is not in sight—we cannot accept a State-capitalist vision of revolution. We cannot accept a vision of revolution in which one centralist State structure would be replaced by another centralized State of the State-capitalist variety. This is the teaching of history to us based on what has happened to revolutions elsewhere. The vision of an Indian revolution has to be a decentralist one. The struggle for revolution cannot be of the vanguard variety in which secrecy and bureaucracy of a party leads the masses. This is where, in any future conception of Indian revolution, Gandhi comes back into the scene.

Gandhi is also the key connection between a preferred global vision and the preferred vision for India. Thinking in received Marxist terms, we end up with a centralized socialist State at best, and a correspondingly centralized socialist State in India. A conception of an Indian revolution must be one in which Gandhian elements of 'autonomy' (*swaraj* for workers), decentralist conception of power, an ecologically sound strategy of development, non-violence, etc., have a prominent place. Does such a conception exist? The 'Agenda' which *Seminar* has been debating would seem to be groping in that direction but it falls short because essentially it accepts the existing capitalist framework. I am convinced that Gandhism is inconsistent with any form of capitalism, either of the strong or weak variety. It is a communitarian conception at the grassroot level. Private property cannot be accepted in a Gandhian conception. The agenda is at its best a well-intentioned programme.

for reform. It is no answer as a programme to clear the basic muck; it would, of course, make the present system more functional.

Given a rudimentary conception of a preferred future for India consistent with the conception of a preferred non-violent global order, the next question is: what are the immediate practical things to do?

- (a) First is the task of forging a united front of all those forces who agree on a radical reform or a revolutionary change in the system. In that enterprise, to borrow a phrase from the Polish 'Solidarity', unity cannot be debatable. Who would struggle for such a united front? Not those who benefit from the system. Certainly not those who are locked up in received historical moulds and who have to sort out *ad nauseum* the mistakes and loyalties of the past. Those who are prepared to come out of these moulds can bring the freshness which is needed at the level of leadership in this respect.
- (b) The notion of a concrete programme around which a front can be organized, and issues debated, is very important. The notion of an 'agenda' is an useful device in this respect.
- (c) The struggle of such a united front must keep world peace as very central to it. It involves raising mass consciousness about this in India. The immediate implications of an agenda of peace is 'peace in the sub-continent'. Peace between India and Pakistan would unlock developmental resources. A common defence against outside threats to the sub-continent is the issue. Armaments against each other is the deadly trap of the superpower war game. Indians and Pakistanis abroad can play a significant role in this struggle for world peace in which the existentialist challenge of peace in the sub-continent fits.

(d) There are two further keys to social struggle. One is the poor, the other is women. Organizing the poor, the Harijans, the Dalits and landless, is one major key. The work should not be agitational (only) but also a constructive programme which not only helps the poor but instils a sense of unity and organization. Some brilliant work, it seems, has already started in India at the grass roots level, such as the Chipko movement. The women's struggle touches directly the very foundations of the social system without challenging State power frontally and thereby legitimising the use of the apparatus of force.

(e) As regards the Indians abroad; for those of us who are involved in the social struggle against racism and imperialism of the super-powers, the vibrations of which we feel strongly, sitting in somewhat global perspective here, there is a deep connection between the social struggle abroad and the social struggle in India. It is a struggle against the two faces of the violent social order. There is need for greater inter-change and communication between Indians engaged in social struggles both abroad and at home. Such interchange can be helpful to both groups. For example, Indians abroad can play a useful role in the struggle in India against rape of women, police brutality and denial of civil liberties. They can do so by disseminating information among Indian communities abroad, raising resources and influencing policy makers in India. At the present, connections are made on an individual basis. A more organized structure is needed. The emigre Indians have a long history of involvement in the struggle for freedom and justice in India. The glorious tradition needs to be maintained and strengthened.

# Modernization

BAIDYA NATH VARMA

INDIA has many faces and modernization is construed from many points of view. I will try to explore first the civilizational tradition of India and then I will put forth a multi-dimensional view of modernization.

First, about the civilization that is India. The one problem that impinges on India's modernization is its multifaceted culture. India is a subcontinent in the true sense, it has the multiplicity of Europe and yet the unity of the United States. Tribes, castes, linguistic groups, religious denominations dot its regions and yet a unity prevails in its villages and cities, which is unmatched elsewhere except perhaps in the United States. Modernization, in the sense of westernization or the 'socialist pattern of society' as it was called by Jawaharlal Nehru, shows a new thrust in the traditional body politic of India.

What is the framework of this traditional polity? I would put it in terms of the concept of 'unity in diversity' (*vyakti men samasti*). An individual encapsulates the cosmos of the whole, just as the whole or the community represents the diversity of individual natures and propensities of action. The *Vedas* (with primacy given to the *Rigveda*) posited unity of thought, which then went into diverse directions in the *Brahmanas*, *Puranas*, *Vedantas* and other scriptures codifying forms of worship, ritual, philosophy and cosmology.

If the *Ramayana* represents the units and strengths of the ideal

polity, the *Mahabharata* depicts the diversity and creativity of political life. The *Gita* enjoins Karma Yoga (life of action), but the *Vedas* preach four elements of such life (the *purusharthas*, as they are called), viz., *dharma* (laws), *artha* (possessions), *kama* (desires), and *moksha* (renunciation and release). Thus the active life of a householder, the key to modernization, is not to be shunned or discredited in any way.

If the key to modernization is the unity of a people, then it exists in the civilizational life of India as indicated above. However, if one is looking for nationhood or national integration, that sense is still weak although gaining in strength since the early years of this century. The traditional polity has been reinterpreted in India throughout history. In recent times, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Deendayal Upadhyaya, among others, have emphasized civilizational values.

However, men like M. N. Roy and Subhas Chandra Bose tried to impose a different set of principles, the former guided by Karl Marx's thesis and the latter by the heroic traditions of the East and the West. These two contemporary idealists have a strong following in the ideological core of the Indian body politic today. Any consideration of India's modernization must contend with the pool of wisdom and ideology bequeathed to it by these thinkers as well as many others like them.

What is modernization? Common-sensically it implies two questions

Who wants what good things of life? And, who can get how much of these things? Social scientists spend all their life answering these vexing questions

Economic growth and nation-building have been two activities discussed most in the literature of modernization. Also, two viable models of modernization for any country — the capitalistic and the socialistic

Under capitalism, private ownership of the means of production will continue forever, labour will sell its services in a market situation, the State will guarantee the accumulation of profit, and all private gains by individuals can be bequeathed to their heirs. Under socialism, private ownership of the means of production is abolished, labour, as a class, determines the level of production, non-familial labour is not available for personal profit, and any private property which can be converted into independent means of production, cannot be inherited

There are six different aspects of contemporary social life in India, viz., national integration, urbanization, economic change, political direction, education, and development of science and technology

First, the question of national integration. There is a consciousness among most Indians of all regions of a sense of nationhood, what with seven general elections for the Indian Parliament and several patriotic wars which India has fought after its independence from British rule in 1947

National unity asserts itself in times of natural disasters, e.g., flood or famine, or under conditions of social conflict, like the Hindu-Muslim riots or linguistic and tribal uprisings. It is reaffirmed also in national calamities, such as the India-China war. There are no doubt costs of nation building which every multiglot nation must pay. However, the civilizational imperatives of India, e.g., the reigning principle of unity in diversity help in times of distress. It is, however, not suggested that unity is easily

gained, if only because the formula for such unity varies from one ideological group to another, modernization, after all, is *par excellence* an ideological issue in all countries

The planners of India continuously guided the nation in the direction of pragmatism, what with adopting the pursuit of the 'mixed economy' and nationalization of some key sectors and the infusion of massive aids from both the capitalist and the Soviet countries. The emphasis on early industrialization was beneficial on two counts, one, the movement in the direction of mass education, and two, creating the infrastructure for economic growth leading eventually to the export of goods and technology both to industrial as well as industrializing nations, and especially to Africa and the Middle East

We come next to the question of urbanization. The growth of urbanization is not so marked in its scope as in its ideology in India. Despite thirty years of developmental planning, only 22% of India's population is urban, some of India's cities have inflated beyond their capacities in providing employment for their residents. However, the urban way of life is seeping into the villages, what with transistor radios, moving cinema houses in rural fairs, and community development programmes of one kind or another. Also, every prosperous family wants to send at least one son to the city for education and employment.

The middle-sized cities act as buffers between urban and rural life. The big cities are generally ridden with poverty and insecurity, except for the rich and the employed. On the other hand, the villages continue their centuries-old style of 'plain living and high thinking'. The peasants dispossessed by the landlords are the bane of the villages and of the cities, where they eventually migrate to. It is in this context that plans for decentralization of the economy and the growth of agro-industries seem very urgent as Jayaprakash Narayan, among others, has pointed out. The Janata government, in its short-lived regime, had started with some pious

intentions and small beginnings; the present government hopefully may also give impetus to several beneficent programmes of rural employment

The area of economic change deserves a paper by itself. The problems of population growth everywhere impinge on the pace of economic growth. It should be noted, however, that if the population explosion was not so massive in India, for instance, adding the numerical weight of the whole population of the United States in the last thirty years to India's already overburdened population, the economic usufruct would have been quite satisfying for its teeming millions. The patrimonial attitude of the government toward both management and labour in the factories has served the country well so far. What India needs from its economists is to provide guidelines for establishing a viable agro-industrial society, which so far does not exist anywhere

Political life is thriving but, perhaps, ready for big change. One does not know if a Soviet type revolution will ever come to India. There has been, recently, a growth in the study of peasant movements by social scientists, partly dictated by the endemic conflicts between the have's and the have-not's of rural India. The political parties of today are viable but lack leadership, except for those which are counted as Left or Right parties. The organizational wing of mass parties is inefficient, to say the least. The judicial, the executive and the military branches of government are sophisticated and competent, but the lack of national political leadership in the recent past may eventually lead to a need for change in India's Constitution. One would not be surprised if a Presidential form of government like that in the United States or even France may come soon

The educational system of India has shown some resourcefulness considering the fact that it was introduced by the British to keep the nation in bondage. The growth of the liberal arts, however, has not been liberal enough to incorporate

the ideas inherited from India's own civilizational past. The sciences and engineering fields have done much better and so has medicine in terms of fulfilling some of India's needs. However, their graduates must be deployed in rural areas, so that their own know-how for solving the country's problems and catering to the rural population may increase. The brain drain to the West is mostly for self-serving purposes of the graduates, but that to the African and other developing nations can be considered as serving altruism as well as opportunism. The scientific laboratories and the medical research institutes in India are a definite boon to the country as well as to other developing countries.

India's modernization is at the crossroads today. India does not know if it should continue with its capitalistic mode of development, perhaps tinkering with elements of public enterprise here and there, or if it should go in the Soviet direction. If there is going to be a Soviet-type revolution, it would, most probably, be preceded by a military dictatorship. However, the framework of Indian civilization is such that the society cannot remain closed forever. The independence of thought in its traditional mode of existence will militate against making a shambles of the open society, which India is and has been through the millennia.

The recent tradition of India, at least from the time of its independence, has been one of seeking stability in the midst of massive change. If the population gets stabilized through birth control and its growth rate decreases, if the educational system is revamped by the introduction of the indigenous intellectual and artistic traditions of India in the curriculum, and by moving in the direction of self-help, if the economists and the national leaders put their energies together in accelerating the growth of agro-industries, if the political situation gets optimistic either through realignment of parties in the direction of a two party system or through changes in the Indian Constitution, if science and engineering as well as medicine are made to serve all the people

and not merely the elites, and if the diverse leadership of the country from the village to the national levels realizes the promise of a united India, one can see a ray of hope on the horizon. These are big ifs, whose answers must come from those who might dare to deal with them. India's modernization will remain partial until the physical and mental poverty of its submerged half, those considered 'below the poverty line' by the economists and 'the lowliest and the lost' by Rabindranath Tagore, is erased in the coming years.

I should now make a few prognoses for revolution in India with a somewhat bold brush. It is not clear who will create the revolution but there are reasons to suspect that someone will. In a successful revolution, there is a congruence of thesis and praxis, somewhat along the lines proposed by Karl Marx, V I Lenin and Mao Zedong. The thesis in India is that elitism and equalitarianism are in dialectical relationship. The praxis consists of the fact that the class structure of western capitalism bequeathed to India by British rule is in conflict with the forces unleashed by the Indian Constitution as well as also with some of the equity-seeking values in a segment of the traditional body politic of India. A part of the praxis also consists of the conflict between the caste system and the equalitarian ethos adopted by the emerging political system as well as by the mass media, especially the movies as they make public opinion. The details of the thesis and the praxis in India will require a larger study.

There is need for an evaluation of the revolutionary situation in India today which may lead to a successful socialist revolution. The one party rule at the center gave in to a multi-party confusion during the Janata regime and then the country went back to the one party, or one might say, one person rule. There is a diversity of opinion among Indian intellectuals about the political destiny of India in the coming decades. In the turmoil of recent years, the Communist parties of India have consolidated their hold,

although still on a minority of the masses. The programmes of changing the condition of the poor in Kerala and West Bengal, both States ruled by Communist parties, have succeeded markedly. The success of the equalitarian programmes of these two States will give a fillip to revolutionary forces in other States as well in the future.

On the national level, if the political parties fail to rule the country, which is the way it seems now, the military may move in, but the military will never be able to consolidate its regime. The chaotic condition of rudderless capitalist regimes as most of India's latest regimes have been at the center or in the States, or the vulnerabilities of military rule, if it ever comes at the hands of the multi-regional multi-credal peoples of India will give an additional push to the revolutionary forces in the country.

What are these revolutionary forces? One is the peasant movements flourishing now in all parts of the country.

When the peasant movements cannot be stopped, and as they gain momentum in contemporary Indian life, someone or a selected few of one or the other organized movement will silently, but surely, gain national leadership and come to the helm of political affairs. When such a person or persons appear on the scene, India's masses will be ready to follow him, her, or them. After all, for more than two decades of contemporary Indian history, Mahatma Gandhi, a simple man, had a following which kings and dictators envied around the world.

Now about the direction of that struggle which, when it is ready to shape the destiny of the nation, has to be called a revolution. The blueprints of a socialist type of revolution have already been laid down by Lenin and Mao. Additional blueprints are available in the varied writings of Jayaprakash Narayan. The details may vary, the strategy may be somewhat different, but the goal is the same. In ideological terms, it is scientific socialism. If a socialist revolution comes to India, the country may decide to isolate

itself, as China did for over a quarter century, or it may remain open to all influences, like Yugoslavia has done, provided the socialist *weltanschauung* is not destroyed in that process.

**T**he socialist route to the modernization of India implies that there will be a countrywide revolution, perhaps brought about by regional revolts gaining strength and accelerating in tempo in a very short time. The national struggle will adopt an ideology of socialist struggle against classes and reactionaries and will constantly move in the direction of establishing economic equality for all citizens. In this struggle, the equities based on the capitalist system, e.g., rights to private property, will be de-emphasized or perhaps even abolished.

In any revolution, ideology comes first. However, after revolution, there must be a comprehensive plan for national reconstruction. The grounds for such a plan have been sketched. At the minimum, it will need goal maintenance, which in institutional terms means abolition of classes and the avoidance of any policy which may end up in the re-emergence of new classes. The leaders of socialist society (in the Marxist sense) must guard their ramparts as much against class interests as the leaders of capitalist society guard against encroachment by the masses or any defiant government or intelligentsia. A socialist revolution for India is not a dream. It is within the purview of reality, if history rolls on with accelerated pace in the same direction as it has done in the seventies.

It is difficult to give an exact blueprint now unless the forces mentioned earlier gain momentum. Peasant revolts, Left trade union movements, student rebellions (e.g., Chhatra Sangharsha Samitis), peoples' revolts (Jan Morchas) may all coalesce together and form the network of a unified national movement moving in the direction of transforming the Indian Union into a Union of Indian Soviet Republics.

It is hard to predict when it will come to be. But it is reasonable to assume that some other organiza-

tions, such as the successful cooperatives of India, which can avoid manipulation by the agents of the government, the panchayats of the West Bengal type, the network of rural leadership which keeps pressure on the government to make the rural bodies serve efficiently the rural people in Kerala, will provide added impetus to the revolutionary movement. In the ensuing struggle, caste and religious institutions as well as the governmental and political framework will be first made powerless and then ignored or bypassed by the revolutionary leaders. Since more than half the Indian population lives below the poverty line, they may not show much resistance to revolutionary change.

**T**he urban population, especially the white collar class, is peculiarly powerless in the face of an ideological movement. The middle class always likes to join hands with whoever may be in power. It is only the rich capitalists and landholders who, with the help of a section of the bureaucracy and the military, may stand in the way of revolutionary transformation. However, if the lean structure of the present Indian political institutions and the guiding light of India's massive Constitution start to fade away in the face of current inflation, unemployment, abominable poverty at the side of massive luxury of the few, and social chaos, no one is to gain but the incipient forces which will carry the revolution onward. The bourgeois newspapers and other mass media may give some opposition to the forces for radical change, but they will have their counterparts in the camp of revolution. A further projection of the future of India's revolution will be merely an intellectual exercise beyond this point.

One final word now. If India sticks to its present capitalist path of modernization and the political leadership crisis remains as it is now, it will go through many more crises of emergency rules, secessionist movements and even military regimes. In the process, it may perhaps become a new periphery of a western capitalist core country, from which situation it had tried to extricate itself to attain independence.

# Nuclear disarmament

ARJUN MAKHIJANI

THE Persian-Arabian Gulf is, the capitalists tell us, their 'jugular vein'. Their 'lifelines' and 'vital interests' are spread like so many capillaries all over the world — in the gold mines of South Africa, in the coal mines of Cheyenne country in Montana, in the cotton plantations of Mississippi and the Sudan, in the factories in Taiwan where women lose their sight making modern computer chips.

The 'lifelines' which feed the imperialists' lust for profit are

knives that bleed the bodies of the oppressed nationalities. Imperialist power — that is, power used for the purpose of economic exploitation — seeks to keep the wounds open with gunboat and neutron bomb diplomacy and with divide and rule policies. It does this today in collaboration with the tyrannical client regimes it installs, supports and maintains.

Such policies are producing the most serious crisis that we have known in the Indian subcontinent,



as throughout the world. The violence against workers and peasants, and particularly those of the oppressed castes, has never been greater. Regionally, the simmering conflict between India and Pakistan threatens to explode in disastrous atomic confrontation.

We have been slow to recognize imperialist design though we should not have been. The British imperialists practised divide and rule in India for two centuries. They did so in other places — Ireland (now going on nine hundred years), Palestine, Southern Africa and Western Africa. When they were forced to end their political-military rule, they manipulated their power so as to force the divisions among the people into crises. When the people were divided and began to kill each other, they appeared to stand above it all, the departing imperialists, 'objective' mediators in other people's conflict.

**W**e will condemn ourselves to repeating these tragedies in intensified form if we fail to understand the experience of capitalism, of working people, most particularly the workers and peasants of the colonies and to act on that understanding. The capitalist's account book shows only what he pays — so much for land at 75 cents an acre, so much for beads and baubles and bribes, so much for wages. But the costs and risks the working people experience are quite different. Workers breathe coal dust; the land on which cotton is cultivated is seized from peasants and tribal peoples, now starving, water is poisoned, a tribe is exterminated, there is a world war, there is the threat of total annihilation. Indeed, these items often appear in his account books as profits — guns and missiles being among the most profitable of businesses.

Based on the struggles of the oppressed for liberation, on the experience of socialist revolutions which, in spite of their limitation and conflicts, have accomplished much, we must develop a coherent world view. We have many other guideposts. Frantz Fanon, for instance, who explained the reality of being colonized and black. Rammanohar

Lohia tried to draw out the progressive tenets of Gandhian ideology and wrote what is, in spite of many defects, the best essay on economics since Marx's *Capital* (Economics after Marx).

**W**e must dispel the myths about capitalism which are the product of the world view of Europe, especially that of the European ruling class. (By the term 'European,' I mean those Europeans and their descendants who live in the capitalist countries — that is, the 'whites'. After World War II, the Japanese became 'honorary whites' in capitalist society — a designation with legal effect in South Africa.) Let us examine capitalist mythology and compare it to the reality of the capitalist economy. Let us remember as we begin, that an economy is the social unit within which all or nearly all the resources, including labour-time and fuels, which are consumed are also produced and vice versa. Thus, the term 'capitalist economy' includes both the capitalist and the 'under-capitalist' countries. I use the term 'under-capitalist countries' to refer to those countries that are diversely called 'developing,' 'under-developed,' etc., partly because I reject the notion that the capitalist countries can be regarded as 'developed'.

1 One myth is that the proportion of people in non-agricultural work has increased in the capitalist economy. It has not. It is today what it was centuries ago — about one-third. (In contrast, this proportion has increased in the socialist economies — i.e., in the Soviet East European economy and the Chinese economy.)

2 While the proportion of non-agricultural workers has stayed the same, the proportion of agricultural workers (including peasants) has declined from 60-65% to about 50%. The rest have become unemployed. Thus, the overall change has been to shift people from agricultural work to unemployment.

3 There has been, in effect, a shift of people dependent on agriculture (in the case of the unemployed, on their relatives) from the capitalist to the under-capitalist countries. As is well established,

there was a causal connection between capitalist industrialization and the destruction of manufactures and of tribal artisanship in the colonies. For instance, the proportion of agricultural plus unemployed people was probably around 60% in pre-British India. Today, it has gone up to 90% in Bangladesh, once one of the great centers of world manufactures — Dacca was the model for Lancashire — to 80% in India and 70 to 75% in Pakistan. During this period it has declined from 70% to 20% in the capitalist countries. We must remember that a 20% change on the Indian sub-continent is equal to a 100% change in England, France and West Germany combined. Comparable changes have occurred in other parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

4 The proportion of landless agricultural workers in the agricultural population has increased drastically from near zero to between 25 and 50% in the under-capitalist countries. Tribal peoples who controlled their lands have also been forced into agricultural wage labour. For most of the remaining peasants who have legal title to some land, their control over its product, and hence over their own labour-time, has been much reduced.

5. Famine has been shifted from the European to the non-European peoples. The consolidation of nationalism in capitalist Europe came with the export of famine from it to regions and peoples outside it in the last half of the nineteenth century. The food that fed most of northern and western Europe came increasingly from two types of colonies. The first type consisted of colonies and semi-colonies such as India, Turkey, China and Russia. In these places, the peasants and other workers were expropriated through taxes, seizure of land and crops, the introduction of private property in land, and plain hooliganism. Lord Salisbury expressed the reality concisely when he proclaimed in 1875 the imperative of British imperialism 'India must be bled'. The peasants of Russia were so heavily taxed that they had to abandon their metal ploughs for wooden ones. At the same time the decimation of tribal peoples and the expropriation of other con-

tinents for settlement by Europeans was completed.

Europe has an area of five million square kilometres (excluding Russia). By the end of the nineteenth century, Europeans occupied 30 million more square kilometres in North America, Australia and Southern Africa. In these settler colonies, the European farmer was paid for the food he sold for export to Europe. He was able to improve his implements and even began to use mechanical power. The resources which enabled European capitalists to have high profits and pay for the food imports came in large part from imperialist exploitation — such as that from the opium trade to China. Thus, while British capitalists banned the use of opium for English workers, they promoted it at the point of the gun in China.

To be sure, famines occurred in pre-capitalist times. But the evidence is that they were less frequent and for the most part much more localized. Generalized famines had usually to do with circumstances arising from war and the demands that (imperial) rulers of feudal times imposed upon local structures as a result. One aspect of today's imperial reality is that for hundreds of millions famine is chronic. The myth of capitalism is that of a consumer's paradise — the reality is of misery more widespread than before.

- 6 Internal colonialism in the capitalist countries was begun by the slave trade and institutionalized by racism. The capitalist-imperialist class uses racism to divide working people and to keep wages low for vast sections of workers in the capitalist countries. For example, the conditions of insecurity, oppression and fear in which millions of blacks live in the rural southern United States are essentially similar in many respects to those of poor peasants and agricultural workers in India.

7 The control of agriculture has become centralized. This is so in the capitalist countries and in the under-capitalist countries. Control of agricultural inputs, of land holdings for cash crop production, of the markets for cash crops, has increasingly

become concentrated in the hands of multi-country corporations (I refer to these as 'multi-country' rather than 'multinational' or 'trans-national' because these corporations do have nationalities. For a variety of economic, political, military and cultural reasons, Unilever is British and Exxon is American, though each of them may operate in a hundred countries.) And the crops that are produced are not determined by the needs of the peasants but the requirements of the capitalists.

The amount of land devoted to export crops in the under-capitalist countries is roughly 50 million hectares — or about 5 times 10 million hectares required for the agricultural exports, mainly cereals, of the capitalist to the under-capitalist countries. Even these cereal exports are primarily to client States like South Korea and Egypt, or to some oil exporting countries (since 1974), or to countries in distress as a lever to force divisions that are detrimental to their long term interests, as in the case of India in 1966 or Bangladesh in 1974.

8 Industrial employment and production in the capitalist countries have become increasingly militarized.

9 Control of industry and finance has become centralized in the hands of the multi-country corporations whose explicit strategy is to keep the under-capitalist countries dependent. These corporations along with other institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the CIA have, in the post World War II era, transformed the colonial structure in order to perpetuate its functions in the capitalist economy. For instance, at a recent seminar for executives of multi-country corporations, Professor Franklin Root of the Wharton School of Business advised them how to make countries more dependent while cultivating the facade of subscribing to the national goals of independence.

10 There have also been shifts within countries and regions. In the under-capitalist countries, the mineral rich and the forested regions have been impoverished more than

others — as in much of Africa, in central and eastern India, in north-eastern Brazil. It is this history that Eduardo Galeano has brilliantly summed up in the phrase 'Mankind's poverty as a consequence of the wealth of the land.'

11 Women have borne the greater burden. In India one can even see this in the ratio of the number of women to that of men. It has been declining throughout this century and there are now seven per cent fewer women in India than there are men. This expresses the way in which imperialism has reached into the very structure of family life through the destruction of cottage industries, the monetization of work, the further degeneration of the dowry system, the scarcity of jobs, and so on.

12. For capitalists only that which is monetized has 'value,' because only by monetizing human activity can they systematically extract profits (including rent and interest — and profit is, of course, the be-all and end-all of their existence 'Gross National Product' (and other similar measures) and 'economic growth' are not indicators of human activity, or work, or even production, but of the amount of monetized-labour-time, the (average) wage at which it is monetized and the profit which is extracted from it. Thus, home gardening, home cooking and wife-beating are not part of GNP or economic growth, but plantation agriculture, restaurant cooking and M-X missile construction are.

Needless to say, GNP and economic growth as such tell us nothing about the living conditions of people. Indeed, 'economic growth' in the under-capitalist countries controlled by multi-country corporations, the World Bank, etc., is designed to enrich the rich and transfer resources to the capitalist countries. It essentially involves monetization of work at low wages and hence the more 'economic growth', the more widespread and militarist the repression of workers and peasants. This low wage monetization of work is characteristic of under-capitalist countries. It is the basic reason for the many continu-

ities in pre-and post-independence economic conditions.

Indeed, in the last decade, economic growth in the under-capitalist countries has accompanied decline in real wages — as for example in India and the Philippines. Brazil has today about twenty times the per capita GNP of Bangladesh, but throughout the period since the generals' coup of 1964, the living standards of 80% of the people have not improved and the poverty and misery of the poorest half of the populations of the two countries is comparable. For such blessings, the waters of Brazil have been poisoned and vast areas deforested, the country is deeply in debt and ruled by the military jackboot, courtesy of Chase Manhattan Bank and Citibank.

**T**his is a dismal economic reality. It is expressed in every aspect of capitalist society from social relations to language to military and political structures. On discarding the mythology of capitalism, which mystifies some experience of some Europeans (and all mythology has this sort of basis, as D D. Kosambi has shown), we find that it is South Africa — not England — which represents in one country most of capitalism's essential features. We have the relentless expropriation of African land and resources, the reclassification of jobs as 'unskilled' when blacks do them; the forcible maintenance of vast differences in wages, racism; 'bantustans' and 'pass-laws'. South Africa is quintessentially the 'Free-World' of capitalist tradition — a tradition that rides roughshod over the rights of peoples and calls it 'freedom,' a tradition that creates and maintains empires and calls it 'free trade'. U S Vice-President Bush showed us the reality of this tradition when he recently toasted President Marcos, the Pentagon's puppet in the Philippines, thus 'We love your adherence to democratic principles and practices'.

When it comes to the oppressed, capitalist tradition does not admit of the freedom to struggle to change one's situation. For instance, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, now U S Ambassador to the United Nations, has this to say about the oppressed. 'Because

the miseries of traditional life are familiar, they are bearable to ordinary people who, growing up in society, learn to cope, as children born to untouchables in India acquire skills and attitudes necessary for survival in the miserable roles they are destined to fill'.

Or take U S Senator Stennis, a staunch supporter of the military-industrial complex, who opines that civil rights workers in the southern U S (during the 1960s) 'flouted all the customs and traditions of a social order to which people had become accustomed and had lived under for almost two centuries.' By so doing they were disrupting 'the spiritual life of both races the peace and harmony of the people'. Such champions of the 'Free World' are well-matched to their white friends in South Africa, where the Boers have a tradition of defending the 'liberty to flog slaves'.

Imperialism is, and has been, integral to capitalism (Lohia put it thus 'imperialism and capitalism are twins.') Mercantilism went with the slave trade, the seizure of much of Asia and the Americas and the extermination of entire peoples. The so-called 'competitive' phase of industrial capitalism during the nineteenth century was established on the British monopoly of imperial power, along with more genocide and the occupation of the rest of North America and Australia, and with the completion of the subjugation of Asia and Africa. The rise of monopolies in industry and finance went with competition between the imperialist powers, intensified exploitation of land, resources and people, particularly in the colonies, and two world wars.

**T**he hand that guides the capitalist economy, which was so 'invisible' to Adam Smith and has remained so to his successors, is the military hand of the capitalist State. This hand guarantees that the capitalists can hold on to wealth and profit even as people starve. It is the hand that protects mansions as it razes workers' huts. It slays blacks in Soweto, Namibia and Angola, commits ten assassinations a day in Guatemala so that four score multi-country corporations can continue

to profit by starving workers. And when imperialist expansion brings capitalist powers into conflict, it is that same hand that they use to wage wars on the world.

For the last half millennium, the principal causes of major wars have been imperialist expansion and the maintenance of imperialist power. These include wars amongst capitalist powers over imperialist expansion and those they wage on the peoples of the under-capitalist countries to enslave them and to repress their liberation struggles. Imperialism is at the heart of war, violence and war are at the heart of imperialism.

**C**apitalism has not a single major accomplishment to its credit so far as the vast majority of the people in the capitalist economy are concerned. The few advances of the peoples of the under-capitalist countries have been the result of their struggles for freedom and equality. And even these are continually under attack from the multi-country corporations, the IMF, the World Bank, the Pentagon, and their economic and military collaborators in the under-capitalist countries. Real wages in India are lower today than they were in Akbar's time.

In the capitalist countries the struggles of people for democratic rights and a living wage have been partly successful for many only because the capitalist class has been able to retain its profits by shifting the principal burdens of exploitation to the oppressed nationalities within and outside the capitalist countries. And, for this, the people of the capitalist countries have had to pay regularly with their lives in Hitler's and Exxon's wars.

We can get some understanding of the Pentagon's current mad rush to war by looking at the clearest case so far of a shock to a capitalist power from a sudden loss of colonial profits—Germany after World War I. German capitalists lost their sources of colonial profits to the other imperialist powers and to the Bolshevik revolution. The condition of German workers deteriorated rapidly as internal exploitation was

intensified. In the severe crisis, German workers were confused and divided not knowing whether capitalism would provide enough to fight off hunger and cold. They largely stood aside as Hitler rose to power on promises of the re-establishment of the German empire in Eastern Europe, in Soviet Russia and in West Asia.

By contrast, much of the cost of the war for the victors was borne by the colonies. Some of the burdens on India alone: 100,000 casualties, of which 36,000 were fatal, to the 1 million troops the Indian people were forced to pay for; a 'gift' of £100 million raised by taxes on the Indian people which paid for much of the 5 million tons of wheat, £80 million of munition and £137 million of jute that Britain imported.

**T**he struggles of workers and peasants and the independence movements rose as the people's response to such sufferings. By the same token, the imperialists were more determined to have the booty. Thus, while claiming to fight fascism in 1942, Churchill was adamant that he would not 'preside at the liquidation of the British Empire' — a statement which inspired Reagan's inaugural address in 1981. Hitler and Churchill were kindred souls: committed imperialists. The neurosis of the one came from the frustration and desperation for colonies of the German capitalist class; the calm of the other came from the pockets of his class bulging with colonies.

The crisis today is somewhat different. The military challenge has come from the defeat of U.S. power by the Vietnamese people and by the refusal of the people of the U.S. to fight in Exxon's wars. And so one group of under-capitalist countries has been able to gain some control of the price of one of their resources — oil. At the same time there is increasing competition among the capitalist countries, saturation of domestic markets for a large number of commodities from infant formula to automobiles, and resurgent democratic-socialist movements in many under-capitalist countries in response to the intensified imperialist exploitation.

The response of the most powerful capitalist class—that in the U.S., has been to slash social programmes, bust unions, give tax write-offs to the rich and prepare feverishly for wars of reconquest. The neutron bomb is not only to keep the European people in line. Weinberger, the U.S. Defense Secretary, would find it 'particularly useful' in several theaters, including Europe. Since it maximizes killing while limiting property damage, it is just the weapon that desperate imperialists would find 'particularly useful' to seize control of West Asian or North African oil, to destroy rebelling black townships in South Africa, to annihilate villages in the Philippines or El Salvador.

The rattling of nuclear weapons by the Reagan Administration is blatant. For instance, Secretary Haig has proclaimed that the United States government will, in the event of 'any change in the status quo in the Persian Gulf' use 'the full range of power assets available to us' — clearly a threat of the first use of nuclear weapons. And the purpose of U.S. policy in initiating the larger nuclear arms race has been to keep the Soviet Union and (until recently) China from assisting liberation struggles. A fundamental premise of this policy is that the peoples of under-capitalist countries are fools and puppets who can have no designs for their own future independent of the big powers.

**B**esides the general and overwhelming threat of nuclear annihilation, the prospect is that the imperialists and their little brothers and minions in the under-capitalist countries will intensify their tyranny. They will leave no room in a time of crisis, when social programmes are being cut back in the U.S., to introduce reforms or yield to those groups that organize to demand better living conditions. Economic growth in the under-capitalist countries must meet the imperialists' requirements first. It must, therefore, be dedicated to increasing the flow of resources to the capitalist countries, increase military and bureaucratic expenditure to build up the repressive

apparatus, enrich the tyrants in power and pay for oil imports.

The situation is similar in many respects to that in tsarist Russia in the early part of this century. That regime too was in hock to European banks, sold agricultural and raw material commodities extracted from the labour of starving workers, had enormous military and bureaucratic expenditures. When the workers of Petrograd, led by Father Gapon, went to the tsar's palace on 22 January, 1905 to ask him for bread, he gave them bullets — bullets that he had purchased with food he had already sold abroad.

**I**n order to further the prospects for freedom and equality internally, peoples' movements in the under-capitalist countries must make international demands and alliances besides the internal ones that are and have been their preoccupation. At a minimum, we must, along with internal demands, work for the following sorts of international demands:

1. A restructuring of the international monetary system in such a way that the parities of the currencies are set according to the local purchasing power of their currencies with respect to wage goods. This would mean massive revaluations of the currencies of almost all under-capitalist countries with larger revaluations for the countries with lower wages. As a result there would be a reduction in the debt burdens in the price of oil, and in the large wage difference between the capitalist and under-capitalist countries. Such a monetary system would be based on a fixed purchasing power of oil, provided of course some supporters of the concept can be found among the major oil exporting countries.

2. A complete stopping of the trade in weapons of mass destruction. We must remember that the Vietnamese people successfully defended themselves against the strongest imperial power without any such weapons.

3. Each movement in each country must demand that the government of that country 'unilaterally

renounce first use of weapons of mass destruction. These are not weapons of defence.

4 An immediate halt to the further production, deployment, testing, and development of and research on nuclear and other such weapons and their 'delivery systems' by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

5 The liberation of South Africa and Namibia from racist rule and the achievement of national self-determination by the Palestinian people.

Such demands mean that people's struggles in the under-capitalist countries must become ever more united in support of each other. It also means that we must align ourselves with the movements for peace and nuclear disarmament and against racism all over the world.

Of course, people's movements cannot be created or sustained only on demands that relate to the position of people in the capitalist economy — though we must remember that such demands have been fundamental in every liberation struggle. We must also make demands for regional peace, equality and friendship and struggle against internal tyranny and inequality in India.

**I**n my opinion, the most pressing regional problem — that is, of the Indian subcontinent — is to prevent a nuclear arms race and nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. The Indian government has exploded what it claims is a 'peaceful' explosive — a claim no prudent person can accept for subsequent explosives, since the purpose only becomes evident after the explosion!

Using the fears of some sections of the Pakistani people, the U.S. government is rapidly militarizing Pakistan and at least acquiescing in its nuclear programme — no doubt directed at making explosives similar to those of India. The purpose of the U.S. government should be clear: as always it is divide and rule. But this time it is desperate. Prior to 1979, the Shah's regime in

Iran provided the U.S. with military manpower to control the Gulf and to control Iranian oil. But now there is not another country in the region with both oil and the domestic population base for a vast military machine to hold the oil secure for the purpose of U.S. imperialism — in particular, to sustain the hegemony of the dollar in the international monetary system. Hence, the strategy is to militarize Pakistan and use Pakistani manpower in Saudi Arabia.

**T**he 1974 Pokharan atomic test has raised the fears of the Pakistan people. These are being used by U.S. power to entrench itself in the region and to intensify the militarization in all countries — and we can ill afford it. A primary aim of a people's movement in India must be to press on the government a unilateral renunciation of all nuclear explosives.

We need not, and should not, have anything to do with the big power designed 'non-proliferation treaty'. Rather, we should seek to show our neighbours and the world the road to nuclear disarmament. We should open all nuclear facilities for inspection to a committee elected by and from among the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We should then invite the Pakistani government to renounce nuclear weapons also and similarly open its facilities. If it refuses, enormous international pressure of various kinds can be brought to bear on it, and the people's resistance to the tyranny in Pakistan will be increased by the removal of one big source of fear.

Such a bold act can go far beyond promoting peace in the region. In a world rushing headlong into nuclear confrontation and annihilation we can reach deep into our greatest traditions to lead the way to nuclear disarmament. The people who suffered the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the true representatives of humanity on this question. Let us open our country to them as a beginning to the international struggle for nuclear disarmament which we must wage — and win in the near future.

# Books

**HINDU INTELLECTUAL TRADITION** by  
Pratima Bowes Allied Publications Private Ltd.,  
1977. 218 pp Preface, Index. N p (Distributed in  
U S by South Asia Books, Columbia, Missouri)

THE purpose of *Hindu Intellectual Tradition* is to show that (a) 'Hindu tradition ... involves a particular intellectual stance to the world', (b) its 'religious, philosophical, social, moral, political and aesthetic values ... were shaped by the distinctive Hindu perception of the world' and (c) 'these values can be reconsidered and used in the task of India's development.' The book achieves the three aims in varying degrees. In summary, it is a commendable effort, the first to explain the intellectual tradition of Hinduism to 'an intelligent layman' and the first to clarify the myth of Indian mysticism versus Greek rationalism.

The central thesis of the book is that the Hindu world view is organic, pluralistic-relativistic and intellectual. It is organic as opposed to atomistic. The atomistic world view perceives all things to have 'a unique and distinct nature of their own' and capable of existing 'in isolation' without being 'dependent on anything else'. The organic world view, on the other hand, perceives all things to be 'finite and limited', existing 'only through their dependence on other things and ultimately on the infinite and absolute ground of all existence — something that as self-dependent just is without having to come into or go out of existence'. Thus, according to the organic view, reality, both phenomenal and transcendental, is non-dual, non-polar, non mutually exclusive. It is One. And multiplicity, or plurality-

relativity, is only 'a correlate of unity'.

The second part of the thesis is that the idea of the oneness of the pluralistic-relativistic existence is intellectual, i.e., 'accessible to human understanding' as opposed to mystical, i.e., 'acceptable only on the basis of faith and authority'. Since, according to the organic world view, man's own being is both physical and spiritual in nature, and 'is directly graspable in experience', the Hindu view recognizes two types of intellectual comprehension — the rational and the intuitive. The rational comprehends a totality self-consciously through concepts 'the function of which is to embody distinctions ultimately backed up by contrast between opposites.' Man's physical nature is explained by rational concepts. The intuitive, on the contrary, comprehends a totality immediately 'without the mediation of concepts'. Man's spiritual experience is grasped by the intuitive. Both means of knowing reality are intellectual, as is assiduously explained by several schools of Hindu philosophy. Samkhya and Vedanta, for example, explain it 'on the plane of reflection', and Yoga, 'on the plane of practical realization'. In fact, the Sanskrit language contains no word 'that can be translated as mysticism'.

The four chapters that form the body of the book argue that the above organic, pluralistic-relativistic, and intellectual world view inheres the many-faceted, and even contradictory, expressions of all phases of Hindu life. For example, in religion, the polytheism of the *Vedas*, the monism of the *Upanishads*, the monotheism of the *Bhagavadgita* and of the *bhakti* movements, and the self-perfectionism of Yoga all aim to lead man to the realization of reality as higher than and yet within himself and his phenome-

nal world. On the intellectual plane, it means that while the Hindu religion encourages man to play 'the game of life' 'at the phenomenal level with phenomenal means, reason, intelligence, feeling, will, as well as intuition', it also provides him the rich understanding of the cosmic plane and the 'capacity to participate in this richness.'

Similarly, in philosophy, the organic and intellectual world view is imbibed (a) in the 'multiplicity of viewpoints from which different conclusions about reality could be drawn' and (b) in the pluralistic methodology of different schools — 'empirical ... used by Nyaya, discriminative . used by Samkhya .. , and intuitive . used by Vedanta.'

The thesis, however, becomes muddy when 'social, moral and political values' of the Hindu tradition are examined. In Vedic times, the practice of the notions of *varna*, *ashram* and *dharma* and of a purer form of the until recently prevalent *jajmani* system safeguarded the well-being of all sections of the society. But with the lapse of time these organic concepts changed into 'atomistic assumptions' — *varna* into 'inalienable differences' of castes; *ashram* into the dominance of power and politics; *dharma* into the trivia of ritualism and the 'pollution-purity complex'; and the purer form of *jajmani* into an individualistic philosophy of life. Why? Bowes answers 'it was not so much the lack of intellectual resources in society but the failure of its leadership'

The answer does not convince. Which intellectual resources could have saved the leadership? Is it not the very organic and intellectual bias of the tradition — the acceptance of both the moral and the immoral as indivisible parts of a totality — that permits, with justification, the self-serving interests of many leaders? If so, the socio-political system is bound to degenerate, bound to 'regress', as is conceived in the Hindu view of the cycle of ages.

Logically, it is an uncomfortable position to accept, and Bowes skirts it by suggesting that 'for specific purposes' we should accept the atomistic methodology though not the atomistic world view. Implied is the contention that our acceptance of the atomistic methodology will propel us to focus on 'specific features of things' and thus will enable us to develop a sadly lacking 'critical tradition in social thinking'. Again, the suggestion is plausible. But is it really possible to remain embedded in an organic world view and at the same time to develop a piecemeal 'tradition' of critical thinking that will periodically check and prune that world view?

With the addition of critical social thinking to the Hindu, essentially Vedic, values Bowes suggests that they be employed to build a new, and better, socio-economic order for the country. The suggestion is worth the consideration of anyone interested in the present or future of India, especially because the information provided in the book forces the reader to think of what went amiss in the first place and why.

The style of the book makes it heavy reading for a layman, even an intelligent one. However, if read in totality, it informs widely about the essence of Hinduism and raises still wider questions about an intellectual moral stance (a focus on the responsibilities rather than the rights of the individual, groups, politics, and so on) which is either dead or is getting ready to be born again.

Chandra P Agrawal

Associate Professor, Weekend College, Detroit

**THE INDIAN ECONOMY: Poverty and Development** by Pramit Chaudhuri New Delhi Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd., 1978

THIS book is an explanation of the economic events in India over the period 1950-1975. It does not claim to take a look at the future. It lays very little emphasis on external factors, since the author feels that the basic explanation of the economic events that have taken place in recent years should be formulated taking the internal factors into consideration. The author presents a 'structuralist' view of Indian economic development.

The planners in India have repeatedly talked of the benefits of planning to a particular group, namely, the poor. The basic argument in the book is that these planners have failed to reduce the severity of poverty because they have sought the solutions in conventional macro-economic terms such as growth rate of GNP, employment, production and still larger all-embracing categories like development and socialism. If the planners are interested in reducing the problem of poverty, it is necessary to form a clear idea about the magnitude and structure of poverty; i.e., identify who the poor are? Furthermore, the plan has to define clearly the objective of raising their standards of living by a certain level, analyze the resource cost of such a programme and identify the location of such resources and mechanisms to transfer these to the poor.

The book is divided into three parts. Part one is composed of the first six chapters and the bulk of the book. Part two is made up of the next two chapters. These deal with issues of the structure of poverty and the state of the poor. Chapters 9 and 10 form part three which discusses the role of the State. The last chapter, 11, is entitled 'conclusions' which is a misnomer, in fact, it summarizes the arguments in the book.

The first chapter 'Assessment of Economic Performance', categorises the various objectives of planned development of the Indian economy as a) those that are desirable from the point of view of the economy as a whole, such as the increasing of the level of national income, self-sustained growth and resource mobilization, (b) those which are of special benefit to the particular sections of the eco-



nomy only, such as the distributional objective of channelling increasingly to the low income groups, the incremental benefits of growth, and (c) those which are designed to alter in some way the structure of the economy, such as the redistribution of land ownership and the non-concentration of economic power.

The second chapter bears the heading 'Resource Base of the Economy, Since 1950'. It gives statistical information and physical characteristics of the Indian economy specifically regarding capital, land and labour for a particular year

The third chapter is titled 'The Growth of the Economy from 1950 to the Early 70s'. It discusses the growth of the economy over a twenty year period and provides statistical data on time series. It talks about the population and the employment change, agricultural production, industrial production and imports and exports

The fourth chapter is about 'resources mobilization, stability and self-reliance'. According to the author, the total value of the public and private investment at constant prices must equal, in realized terms, the total of domestic savings, public and private, plus the net inflow of foreign resources or aid. The rate of investment is discussed, so is the savings rate and the relationship between aid and economic development. Two studies of price behaviour are discussed — one by K N Raj for the period 1946-66 and the other by Chakrabarti and Maiti for 1952-70.

The fifth chapter deals with the performance and the prospects of Indian agriculture and the policy implications of such phenomenon. For a long time the government held the view that the main constraints on the growth of agricultural output lay neither in the lack of a more productive technology nor in a scarcity of traditional inputs, but rather in a lack of diffusion of knowledge of existing technology and practices. The apparently productive new technology had limited and disappointing effects on output. Among others, the author suggests the following reasons: (a) the main revolution was in wheat and not in other major food crops of India; (b) the new practices have not been used extensively by the farmers; (c) restrictive government policy; and (d) the non-availability of water for cultivation.

The sixth chapter talks about the problems in industrial growth. The most serious shortcoming of industrial production according to the author has been the inability to maintain a sustained rate of growth beyond the mid sixties. He goes on to talk about the public sector industries—about how their objective was social profitability, and how the government compounded the inefficiencies caused by poor management. Regarding the matter of foreign capital and technology, he feels that it had a harmful effect on Indian development, since the costs of foreign capital and technology have been relatively large in relation to the benefits,

The seventh chapter is about the 'structure of poverty in India'. The author feels that poverty cannot be removed unless the real wages are increased and, secondly, the supply of food products increased. He feels that the major group of rural poor consists of landless agricultural labourers and those who own or have access to so little land that they are forced into wage labour to earn a subsistence. In addition, there is the burden due to the prevalence of rural indebtedness.

The next chapter is an analysis about the various studies that have been made in the quantitative analysis of the level of poverty in India. All of the studies come to the conclusion that we are moving in the direction of increasing poverty and that economic planning and development have largely bypassed the people who were supposed to be the main beneficiaries.

Chapter nine discusses the major planning strategies followed by the government during 1950-1974. The government represents the rural rich and the urban bourgeoisie. The three major objectives put forward by the government are self-sustained growth, a reduction in inequality and a socialist pattern of society.

The final chapter gives a short description of the nature of policy instruments used by the government and their main areas of operation. The policy of the government in maintaining an overall balance between supply and demand for foodgrains has been based on the import of foodgrains. It also uses a system of taxes, especially import tariffs and export subsidies.

As a conclusion, it can be said that the author is trying to address the questions of whether the government has been successful in promoting economic progress, to what extent it has failed in its objectives and what are the major constraints on the development of the Indian economy. He ends by setting up questions which he feels should be answered by the policy maker. These relate to income distribution, allocation of resources, patterns of demand and adequate production and distribution of the necessary inputs. He feels that unless the priorities are fixed, the problems besetting the Indian economy cannot be alleviated.

The book is more or less a story of the economic development of India in an historical perspective. The historical basis of the first part provides a basis for policy analysis in the next two. It proves useful to a beginner in the study of the economic development of India over the past two decades. The bibliography provides a good source for readings in greater depth. It is a readable book with a simple style. The methodology used is qualitative except for a few parts here and there.

The title is misleading, giving one the impression that the author goes deeper into the problems of



Statement about ownership and other particulars about newspaper  
(SEMINAR) to be published in the first issue every year after last day of  
February

FORM IV  
(See Rule 8)

- |                                                                                                                                                         |                                                  |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| 1 Place of publication                                                                                                                                  | New Delhi                                        |
| 2 Periodicity of its publication                                                                                                                        | Monthly                                          |
| 3 Publisher's Name                                                                                                                                      | Romesh Thapar                                    |
| Nationality                                                                                                                                             | Indian                                           |
| Address                                                                                                                                                 | 19, Kautilya Marg, New Delhi                     |
| 4 Printer's Name                                                                                                                                        | Romesh Thapar                                    |
| Nationality                                                                                                                                             | Indian                                           |
| Address                                                                                                                                                 | 19, Kautilya Marg, New Delhi                     |
| 5 Editor's Name                                                                                                                                         | Romesh Thapar                                    |
| Nationality                                                                                                                                             | Indian                                           |
| Address                                                                                                                                                 | 19, Kautilya Marg, New Delhi                     |
| 6 Name and address of<br>individuals who own the<br>newspaper and partners or<br>shareholders holding more<br>than one per cent of the<br>total capital | Romesh Thapar<br>19, Kautilya Marg,<br>New Delhi |


I, Romesh Thapar, hereby declare that the particulars given above  
are true to the best of my knowledge and belief

Dated 25-2-1982

R THAPAR  
Signature of Publisher

TEXTILES, SUGAR,  
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS,  
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,  
MANASPATI, PVC, RAYON TYRE CORD,  
FERTILIZERS,  
ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS,  
IRON CASTINGS.

IN THE  
SERVICE OF  
THE NATION



**DCM** THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD., DELHI

**Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat:**

**Kheda District 1917-1934**

**DAVID HARDIMAN**

This book examines the present base to the nationalist movement in India, by concentrating on events in Kheda District of Gujarat, which was a major centre of rural nationalism in the early twentieth century. To understand the extent and nature of peasant involvement in the Gandhian movement, the author examines the complex local politics of Kheda at that time, analysing relations between the Congress, Gandhi, Vallabhbhai Patel and the peasants, as also between sections of the peasantry themselves. Besides contributing to the debate on the exact nature of the Gandhian movement in rural India, the book will also find a place in the rapidly expanding field of peasant studies

*Rs 110*

**The Tools of Empire**

**Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century**

**DANIEL R HEADRICK**

Emphasizing the technological aspect of imperialism as the key to European, especially British, expansion, this stimulating book explores the penetration, conquest, development, and exploitation of Asia and Africa in the nineteenth century. The author offers a fresh point of view, based on archival research and recent scholarship, to link the products of the industrial revolution — i.e., steamers, railroads, advanced drugs, sophisticated weapons — with the new imperialism and explains the impact of this modernization on world relations

*Rs 45*

**Marxism and Politics**

**RALPH MILIBAND**

Neither Marx nor any of his successors sought to define an over-all theory of the nature of their political views. Now Professor Miliband has reconstructed from a wide range of material the main elements of the political theory and actual politics which are specific to Marxism. In so doing he highlights some of the problems left unresolved by earlier Marxists and discusses some pertinent questions of central importance to the politics of the twentieth century

*Paper Rs 25*

**Monetary Planning for India**

**SURAJ B GUPTA**

In this book, the author provides the background for the making of a sound monetary policy by a lucid and systematic discussion of the factors involved in such planning. After a consideration of what monetary planning should aim at and why, he goes on to discuss how changes in the supply of money come about. An important section of the book deals with the sources of change in high-powered money, the key factor responsible for change in money supply. The book should be of interest to teachers, students, research workers and policy makers in the area of monetary economics

*Paperback Rs 110*



**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj,  
New Delhi 110002

Bombay Calcutta Madras

**ATTENTION STEEL MILLS**

**&**

**FOUNDRIES**

**EXPORTERS OF WORLD FAMOUS SANDUR**

**MANGANESE ORE**

**OFFER**

**EX-STOCK**

**VERY LOW PHOS. PIG IRON**

**AND**

**LOW ALUMINIUM FERROSILICON**

**PRODUCED IN THEIR PLANT AT**

**VYASANKERE**

*Please Contact*

**THE SANDUR  
MANGANESE & IRON  
ORES LIMITED**

**"LOHADRI BHAVAN"**

**Yeshwant Nagar-583124:**

**Via Sandur, Bellary Dt.**

**Karnataka INDIA**

**Cable: SMIORE, SANDUR (INDIA)**

**Telephone: SANDUR 33, 61, 91:**

**Telex: BANGALORE 427**

**Bangalore: 32175 28262**

poverty and development. Actually, he skims the surface of these issues, in fact, barely begins to talk of poverty till the last section, and even then is more concerned about the causes and the measurement criteria rather than what can be done to alleviate the problem. The structure of the book as a whole could have been tightened by removing some of the oft repeated arguments about poverty and the structure of the agricultural and the industrial sectors, and by developing further some of the policy discussions.

**Renu Kallianpur**  
Graduate Student, Rensselaer Polytechnic  
Institute, New York

**INDIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS: An Analytical Approach (Second Edition)** Edited by J S Uppal  
New York: St Martin's Press, 1979

IN this anthology 'Indian economists abroad' attempt to pay back a part of their debt to their motherland by presenting a collection of essays on India's economic problems to the 'students of India'.

This effort is commendable. It is easily understandable if one notes that the authors had their initial training in India (some taught in India) and then went to major universities in the United Kingdom and the United States of America for advanced training. One of the objectives of this advanced training was to understand and analyze India's economic problems and to provide solutions at a micro and macro level. This is not to say that they have achieved this objective. Many a times, advanced training has been at best irrelevant and at worst a misunderstanding of India's socio-economic problems.

The group has a number of advantages in this undertaking. They have more resources in terms of time and money than most economists in India. They have no pressure to work on specific problems — hence, they can take the long reflective view of events. They have no need to present particular points of view because they are not living with these economic problems on a day-to-day basis. These advantages can provide a perfect environment to do long term, fundamental, scholarly research.

On the other hand, there are a number of disadvantages also. There is usually a lack of resources (books, journals, periodicals, newspapers) specific to the Indian economy, except at a few centers. The majority of the authors do not come from big centers. The detachment from the day-to-day economic problems in India and the constantly changing economic and political situation in India can lead to understandings that are not realistic or

workable. There is the danger that one could look at Indian economic problems in a very superficial manner and assert that a set of policies has worked in another country (Brazil, South Korea, Japan) and therefore should work in India also. Many an economist does suffer from the fallacy of unfair comparisons. It is possible to assume that India should follow the developed countries. Training in these countries encourages such an idea. This is dangerous.

On balance, the 'Indian economists abroad' should view their own work very critically and always be on guard against providing easy solutions to what is a very complex economic situation. They should also incorporate in their work the sophisticated and diverse work on these problems that is being done by Indian economists in India. Unfortunately, many essays in this book suffer from all these shortcomings. They have not drawn upon the work in India. The concepts and practices in developed countries have been imitated uncritically.

The purpose of the anthology is to approach Indian economic problems in an analytical manner linking 'the apparatus of theoretical economic analysis with the facts of Indian conditions' (Preface). The papers included are meant to be comprehensive including not only theory and facts, but also attempted solutions and a comparative analysis with other countries. This is a tall order. The authors have accomplished this to a limited extent, in the sense that many essays lack both facts and analysis. The first edition was primarily for undergraduate students in India. The second edition is aimed at a wider audience. The chapters have been rewritten, updated and two new ones added — one on Gandhian economics and the other on black money. If the reader is looking for answers to the problems of India's economic development, this book does not provide them.

The division of the book into eight sections and topics within sections seems to be based on the material and personnel available. The coverage is not comprehensive and it is not unified by a single theme. Important topics such as inequality and poverty are not dealt with separately or in detail in the existing chapters. The first chapter (in Part One: The National Economy) by Professor Uppal is a comprehensive one on the economy and the plans which provide an historical perspective, the models underlying planning and an evaluation of India's development performance in the last 30 years. A small section at the end brings the reader almost up-to-date with an evaluation of policies and performance during the Emergency and under the Janata Party government. It is a useful, descriptive, non-analytical chapter for a beginner only. The perspective is traditional and the bibliography limited. Important contributions in the literature are omitted.

This is followed by a short chapter on 'Structural Changes in the Indian Economy', which has a

simple exposition of input-output analysis. The discussion highlights the shift in the structure of the Indian economy from the primary to the secondary sector. This is taken, somewhat simplistically, as an indication of the industrialization of the country.

The second section is on the human factor. In the first chapter, Professor Chugh deals with facts and figures on population together with a cost-benefit analysis on having children. The methodology and assumptions of the cost-benefit approach are questionable since they are based on some absolute middle class standards prevalent in developed countries. The argument that costs are low in poor countries and high in rich countries does not take account of the fact that the cost/income ratio may not differ significantly. Inder P. Nijhawan's evaluation of non economic factors in the second chapter on 'Social-Political Institutions, Cultural Values and Attitudes' is well grounded in theory and his analysis provides a good presentation of the differing points of view. This is an important contribution for economists who are not always presented these views in the narrow confines of courses defined by economists. It is especially valuable in the Indian context where students may not have to take a sociology or political science course at the undergraduate or graduate level.

Agriculture and industry are covered in two chapters each under 'The Economic Sector'. The chapters on agriculture by Professor Diwan (Problems and Prospects) and Professor Uppal (Structure and Land Reforms) are very well tied into the analysis of the overall problems of the economy. Diwan's chapter is the best essay in the collection. It is comprehensive, analytical, well grounded in facts and it brings out the implications of alternative policies. He discusses the macro aspect of agriculture (production, productivity, technology, and institutional framework) and analyzes each of these in terms of its linkages to sectors of the economy. For example, a section on the sufficiency of agricultural production raises the fundamental question of whether India is producing 'enough' wage goods. The answer is tied to production in agriculture and industry, poverty and income distribution. The essay should serve as a model for the other essays if another edition of the book is in the works. His discussion leads directly to his later chapter on policy. 'Elements of Gandhian Economics' Ramsinh Asher's discussion of small-scale and cottage industries also ties in well with Diwan's essay on Gandhian economics.

The essay on basic and large-scale industries by Balwir Singh Cheema is mainly descriptive and traditional, differing greatly from the analytical coverage of agriculture. The chapter discusses eight basic and large-scale industry groups (iron and steel, aluminium and non-ferrous metals, etc.). A large array of numbers is presented but there is no analysis how each of these industry groups interacts with or impacts the rest of the economy. One of

Cheema's conclusions is that 'All this successfully and unequivocally demonstrates India's ability to use modern technology' (p 141). This is a strange conclusion and strictly of no relevance since it does not address any real issues of factor proportions, employment, poverty and long-term growth in a meaningful sense.

The division of labour in studying the industrial sector in the book has meant that none of the authors has captured the essence of what happened in the industrial sector in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This is the structural retrogression in industrial production first described by K. N. Raj and then analyzed in detail by Shetty and captured in its essence by a number of other authors. This shortcoming arises because there is no comprehensive analysis of the sector (as in agriculture) as a whole, nor is the sector analyzed by capital, intermediate and consumer goods categories. Cheema explains the slow-down in industrial production by citing shortages of raw material, steel and capacity constraints imposed by the government. The relation of industrial structure to demand, employment, satisfaction of basic needs and long-term growth are important aspects of development that need to be fully analyzed in an analysis of this sector.

The fourth section on economic policy follows from the third section. Sankar discusses industrial policy with an emphasis on the nature and growth of the public sector. Industrial policy, control and regulations of various kinds, and the performance of public enterprises is analyzed. A comparative analysis of the role of government in industrialization indirectly (through regulation, licensing, controls and resources) or directly (through public ownership) would have been useful here. India is not the first country where the government has intervened in industrialization but it seems so in reading large parts of the literature.

In another essay, Professor Diwan raises fundamental questions about the thrust of current Indian economic policy in his discussion of the elements of Gandhian economics. A number of the other essays raise questions about the current development strategy because of the unsatisfactory performance (unemployment, increased inequality, etc.) after 1950. Professor Diwan lays out the rudimentary strands of a new strategy with an emphasis on employment, rural development and decentralization.

Sections five and six deal with labour and capital. The section on labour describes the surplus of labour in the rural and urban areas and the concomitant unemployment problem. The authors should have noted the shrinkage in female participation in the labour force, especially in the agricultural sector. This is an extremely important phenomenon with wide ranging policy ramifications. The capital section points out the difficulties in mobilizing savings. This section also has chapters on banking and inflation. Both provide historical and current information and an analysis in the Indian context. The

final chapter is on black money with a discussion of its definition, sources, estimates, effects and measures for its reduction. A short discussion of black money in other developing countries and in developed countries would put the issue in better perspective.

The last two sections deal with public finance and international economic relations. The two chapters on public finance are on taxation and federal finance. The final section on international economic relations has three chapters: Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments, Foreign Private Investment and Economic Integration. All chapters in these two sections bring out the facts, the theoretical issues involved and an evaluation of the policies followed.

The essays are meant to present the students with the 'economic problems in a more analytical manner'. Some of the essays meet this criteria, others do not. The quality is variable. From reading through them all it is reasonably clear that some of the authors have kept up with the development literature (which now readily accepts many arguments which were radical only a decade back) and others are still using the development thinking of the 1950s. The changes that have taken place in the economy, society and polity are not always recognized or acknowledged in the essays.

The anthology is meant mainly for an audience of students in India. There is a glaring problem in much of the material in that a large part of it is not well tied into the considerable literature on economic development in India. A very simple indicator of this is that most of the essays do not have any reference from the *Economic and Political Weekly*, there are few topics in the Indian economy that have not been analytically and exhaustively dealt with in this weekly.

Ashok Bhargava

Chairman, Economics Department,  
University of Wisconsin

**INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM IN  
INDIA: A Study of Vital Issues** by Sahab Dayal  
New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1980

DISCUSSIONS of industrial labour systems generally focus on the mechanics and quantum of remuneration received by the organized sector of the labour force. While this sector has a certain edge in terms of its contribution to the productive process and superior bargaining power, its problems cannot be meaningfully considered in isolation from the problems of remuneration and general standards of living of the relatively large non-organized sector of the labour force. This is particularly important in economies where inequalities are intense and a small number of powerful pressure groups exert immense influence to grab ever-increasing shares of

the total output. This practice, so common in many developing countries, generally leads to the emergence of new elite groups that may receive whatever they deserve, but they may do so at the expense of the non-organized or poorly organized sections of the working population.

This eventuality naturally exacerbates the already unequal income distribution. The purport of this point, however, is not to deny the important role of trade union activity, nor to belittle the role played by various tools aimed at resolving labour-management conflicts or laying down criteria for wage determination, but to emphasize that these problems must be considered against the backdrop of overall incomes policies and the growth objectives of an economy.

Sahab Dayal's study claims to be an off-beat book in the sense that it avoids the traditional approach of discussing the dynamics of labour history and wage setting mechanisms. The book attempts to deal with an 'analysis of wage-price movements' in the context of the working of five-year plans, along with 'the process of wage formation and wage-setting', 'components of pay structure' and 'labour unrest and strikes'. The book ends up with a few suggestions including 'some proposals for a change in policy'.

In the 260 pages of the book the author introduces different concepts of wages — the minimum wage, the living wage, the fair wage and the need-based minimum wage — that are used in several plan and labour documents but feels that they are inadequate both from the point of view of relevance and implementation. Through a reading of all plan documents, he comes to the conclusion that the Indian government never had a systematic wage policy save a few wishy-washy statements about linking wages to productivity and providing a decent standard of living to the workers.

Except the Minimum Wages Act of 1948, which was quite clear on guaranteeing a minimum wage to workers, all the other documents merely expressed some nice sentiments, without any punch and rigor, in the matter of either determining the wage rates or enforcing them in the industries. Sahab Dayal feels that the abandoned fourth five-year plan alone made some bold attempt to link a wage policy with the price policy but because of the political and economic climate in the country, nothing much was subsequently done. As he points out, the workers' real wages have declined over the years and that any increase in labour productivity has not been compensated for.

Concerning conflict resolution, the author traces the history to show that adjudication, arbitration and negotiations had their days of glory depending upon which particular mechanism suited the government the most at a given time. Whether it is the recommendations of the National Labour Conference (1967), the Pay Commissions, or the Wage

Boards, the government has treated them with benign indifference, resulting in unsatisfactory industrial relations. Sporadic strikes and the worker days lost have become a regular feature without any stable and dependable machinery to resolve the conflicts and to ensure a satisfactory wage rate.

Sahab Dayal is a superb chronicler of events. His choice of relevant facts is scholarly. His description of the industrial relations system is accurate. One would have wished to say the same things about his analysis. The justification or otherwise of a policy is based upon a set of superficial symptoms.

As posited earlier, it is impossible to discuss the problems confronted by the industrial relations system as micro-problems. They have to be dealt with in the context of the stage of development of an economy embracing not only the questions of investment, the surpluses for investment and the choice of techniques, but also the class character of the decision-makers and their class interests, within a politico-judicial framework. In a given framework one has to decide what is the role of organized labour. Should they hold their wages constant and allow the surpluses to be used for growth purposes, so that employment opportunities are expanded and the unemployed and the unorganized labour force also gets a fair share, or should they strive for their own betterment on the lines of American 'Business Unionism'?

Not only the trade unions but also the rest of the nation should decide this crucial issue. To analyze this aspect in the context of the Indian industrial relations system, it is important to study the dynamics of the T.U. movement. Dominated as they are by major political parties, almost all the major trade unions in India have acted more as political parties, always working at cross-purposes, rather than helping to advance either the national or the sectoral economic objectives.

Secondly, in the question of linking the wage rate with labour productivity, one has to be clear about the concept of productivity itself. Assuming that the total productivity is simply an increase of total output over the inputs, what are the criteria to decompose the total productivity in terms of labour productivity and capital productivity? Marginal productivity of labour is an absolutely useless and patently deceptive concept, both in theoretical and empirical respects. The free-market determined wage rate, on the other hand, attempts to cover up the imperfections in the labour market which are so obvious to everybody. How, then, can one justify the linking of wage rate with labour productivity as a practical solution without resolving the problem of productivity measurement?

Thirdly, the question of inflation. It is assumed that deficit financing is the main cause of inflation. That may be so according to one school of analysis. When deficit financing is resorted to, to pump-prime the economy or to make new investment in a

balanced allocation and judicious selection of investment projects, there is no reason to expect an inflationary impact. It is these problems that the government has failed to resolve and, therefore, one observes a policy of drift or ambiguity in the industrial relations system. Sahab Dayal should have discussed these problems and pinpointed the basic causes of the indifferent attitude of the government. It is clear that government lacks a clear-cut economic policy in spite of voluminous plan documents. Flowing from that lack of economic policy is the lack of labour policy.

The above remarks should not detract from the important work Sahab Dayal has contributed in the shape of a well-documented chronicle of events, facts and relevant assertions which will help any reader to come to his own judgment. So far as wage determination is concerned, collective bargaining in an unplanned economy and a national minimum wage in a planned economy seem to hold the best possible answer.

Vaman Rao

Associate Professor, Western Illinois University

**ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE** by R K. Sampath. New Delhi, Macmillan Co of India, 1979.

OUR laws are just. They treat the rich and poor equally and forbid both not to steal food or sleep under the bridge. In the same spirit, neo-classical economics treats all consumers and producers equally. Separated from social relations which are often oppressive, economic activity is considered independently.

The book under review is in the neo-classical tradition. As the title indicates, it attempts to quantify 'economic efficiency'. Neo-classical economics has developed some unquantifiable variables such as 'economic efficiency' or 'pareto optimality'. These are basically ideological variables and perform the function of justifying the neo-classical world views. Not surprisingly, the author concludes that 'Schultz's contention that traditional farmers are "poor and efficient" is invalid in the case of Deoria farmers'. In other words, the poor farmers are inefficient. Again 'the overall redistribution of income, even though marginal, is against the interests of the small farmers'. That is, when land is redistributed in favour of the small farmers, it is against their interest. As one will expect, these conclusions justify the prejudices in neo-classical economics.

There is no way to measure or quantify 'efficiency' in a real world. What is normally done is to set up an hypothetical world and compare the real world with this hypothetical world. If the quantities from the real world compare favourably with those of the hypothetical world, the activity is efficient. Other-

wise it is inefficient. The converts and quantitative buffs go a step further and develop percentages or other measures of deviation of the real from the perfect world.

The author in this book follows this standard procedure. He sets up an hypothetical farming activity, his model I, with the following assumptions: (1) technology for all farms, small or large, is the same, (2) inputs are in limited supply, (3) all farmers, small or large, pay the same price for the same input, (4) there is perfect mobility and divisibility of factors of production, (5) all farmers maximize the total farm net income, and (6) no socio-political-institutional-cultural constraints are operative. He considers this model as the 'perfect economic efficiency'. This is the ideal/hypothetical, desired or optimum farming activity. As a result, the level of output associated with this model is the 'efficient' output. To obtain this 'efficient' level of output, he sets up a linear programming model with linear objective function that has to be maximized with linear constraints. It is a standard linear programming model.

The reader will immediately recognize two basic difficulties. One, the assumptions are too stringent. Like perfect competition, these look elegant on classroom blackboards but are hardly realistic as even the students in the introductory courses point out. Obviously, the technology is not the same for all farmers. Much depends upon the availability of inputs, their price and timing, particularly so in the case of small and poor farmers. As anyone will confirm, some of the modern inputs and irrigation facilities depend upon bribes and/or social relations.

Again, small farmers are not economic units in the sense of maximizing profits, they have other problems on their mind not least of which is free labour for the rich or larger farmers. Factors of production are neither divisible nor mobile, not even the factor of capital. Social-political, institutional and cultural constraints are not only operative, these are particularly oppressive to the small farmers and beneficial to the larger ones.

Two, all these assumptions have, eventually, to be translated into quantities for the linear programming model. It is not clear how the author does it. There are two sets of quantities, (i) the price or costs, and (ii) input-output coefficients. Given the assumptions, one will have to develop these quantities also hypothetically. Here, methodological questions become rather serious. Different researchers can and do develop these quantities differently so that there is no single hypothetical or 'optimum' level. It depends upon the researcher so that the 'optimum' is no more an objective — i.e., scientific — quantity. It is subjective. On the other hand, real world quantities contradict most of these assumptions. These, unfortunately, are the difficulties of the neo-classical approach.

The author modifies this basic model I in model II where assumption regarding mobility is relaxed,

other assumptions are retained. Similarly, he modifies model I to obtain model III by relaxing the assumption about 'same technology'. There are, thus, three models and three levels of 'optimum' output. Comparing the real output with these three 'optimum' levels, the author defines various forms of efficiencies; system inefficiency — due to lack of factor mobility —, technological inefficiency and individual inefficiencies. Having obtained the total level of inefficiency, the author is able to apportion it between system and technological inefficiency, hoping that such apportionment may provide an explanation for the inefficiency in agriculture.

The linear programming exercises have been done on data collected from the Farm Management Survey for the Deoria District of Uttar Pradesh for the year 1967-68. These are extensive exercises and involve a lot of work. The data used are rather extensive. These data are organized under four different farm sizes: 0—1.04 hectares, 1.05—1.79 hectares, 1.80—3.07 hectares, and 3.08 hectares and above.

On the basis of four different farm sizes used in the analysis, the author has made an attempt to address the debate to the inverse relationship between land productivity and farm sizes. His contribution to this issue suffers from one serious shortcoming. He has defined the same linear programme for all farm sizes. This is not legitimate. To make proper comparisons, one has to define different linear programmes for the small and large farms since they have not only different input-output relations but also different constraints.

This is a small book organized in six chapters. The third chapter provides extensive data on the Deoria District. This should be useful to many other researchers. There is an interesting discussion on the theory and measurement of neo-classical economic efficiency in Chapter 4. The last two chapters provide the results of the linear programming exercises for the farmers in Deoria District and for subsistence farmers. Technically, it is a competent study. If one is interested in neo-classical questions or approach, it is a useful book.

**Romesh Diwan**

Professor of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, New York

### **PROUT AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN INDIA**

by Raveendra N. Batra. New Delhi, Khosla Publishing House, 1979.

THE developmental strategy adopted by India in the last thirty years has created a wide divergence between the authoritative ideology — establishment of a just, equal and open society — and the emerging political, economic and social reality. As a result, India is passing through a period of ideological bankruptcy. Witness the protest movements in



various parts of the country. Bereft of any ideological alternative or coherent strategy, these movements are simply weakening social ties and disintegrating existing institutions. They are symptomatic of the phase of ideological breakdown and disaffiliation. This phase of ideological erosion and institutional breakdown has its value and function. It opens up the field for pragmatic groping and search for a different framework of thought. It sets the stage for the start of a new social discourse. Batra's small book offers the economic, social and political philosophy of Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar as an ideological alternative and proposes several concrete and specific policy options for critical intellectual examination.

Batra's agenda for economic reform envisages a radical restructuring of the economic institutions of India. Let me note several of his recommendations.

(1) He advocates a need-based minimum wage to assure minimum standard of living to all and a maximum that is ten times the minimum. He hypothesizes that such a mini-maxi wage structure will not only reduce income disparities but also increase savings. Using 1977-78 data, he calculates that such a policy will generate savings of about Rs 29,948 million a year.

(2) He proposes a wealth ceiling of Rs 60,000 (in 1977-78 prices) or one house in rural areas. In urban areas, the wealth ceiling is linked to the minimum wage — a ceiling that will enable the owner to earn an income equal to the annual minimum wage.

(3) He supports the nationalization of all private firms producing capital as well as intermediate goods such as raw materials and energy, to be operated by autonomous bodies responsible to State governments. He seems to suggest that the salaries of managers in public enterprises above the minimum wage should be paid as a bonus linked to the economic performance of their firms. In other words, no profits, no bonus.

(4) He argues for the transformation of firms producing consumer goods into worker-managed firms. He simply proposes to expropriate stocks and bonds of existing owners without compensation and distribute them to workers.

(5) He is in favour of private firms in small scale industrial as well as agricultural sectors, though his preference is for encouraging them to form cooperatives.

(6) In his schema, public sector industries producing capital and intermediate goods will supply them to the worker-managed and small scale sector in a modified putting-out system.

(7) He contemplates provision of free education and health care at all levels.

(8) He places R & D in the public domain and maintains that its thrust should be towards neutral or labour-using technical change in order to avoid side effects such as pollution. In sum, he proposes to deal directly with the underlying income and wealth inequality. Given income and wealth equality, he feels that the free market will allocate resources efficiently to meet human needs through the media of market demand and supply.

Batra is extremely critical of the existing planned economy, dominated by wheeler-dealer businessmen and corrupt politicians-bureaucrats. Yet, in his schema of things, he assigns the State and bureaucracy a greater role in dealing with even more complex tasks and responsibilities. One can raise the critical question: are we not putting too much burden on the State and its instrumentalities? Will it not lead to more corruption? Batra's answer is the restructuring of the political institutions. Instead of adult franchise, he advocates the formation of an electoral college whose members must pass examinations conducted by the election commission. These examinations will test their intellectual capabilities, sense of social responsibility and their moral values. These members of the electoral college, 'sadvipras', he calls them, will have voting rights and will elect members of legislatures at all levels. They will also elect a collective body for the whole nation that will act as the supreme arbiter in all matters. Batra blames incompetent, immoral political leadership for the present crisis in Indian society. His prescription is to identify and develop a new leadership that is both competent and committed to the basic social and moral values.

Whether Batra realizes it or not, he is advocating a politically and economically centralized society. Such a centralized society perforce needs something other than self-interest as a motivational force — a religion, an ideology, a shared faith. The 'sadvipras' — the consecrated elite interprets the revealed doctrine and enforces it. What is the guarantee that the 'sadvipras' — or an oligarchy of 'sadvipras' near the centre of power may not become myopic and may not persecute those who do not wholeheartedly subscribe to the 'ruling' revealed doctrine? Remember, Nazi Germany was also a strongly centralized society.

Yet, Batra's views or other unorthodox views should command careful evaluation if we want to develop a new ideological consensus and a set of policies more in tune with the moral proclivities, values and aspirations of the Indian people. This is the great challenge and opportunity for Indian intellectuals. Batra's ideas can be treated as provocations leading to a more serious discourse on the development of new policy options for the Indian society.

Suresh A. Desai

Dean, School of Business Administration,  
Montclair State College, New Jersey



# Communications

APROPOS the symposium on Reservations in the December 1981 issue of SEMINAR, we would like to make a few observations in which the other readers might also be interested

The question raised in the problem, that 'it is necessary to underline the implications of the distinction between reservation in positions that are filled by election and reservation in positions that are filled by appointment' needs to be discussed in greater detail and depth. Apart from the reservations in appointments being neither time-bound nor specific, these are further perpetuated by extending their benefit to the same individuals who have once benefited at the time of initial recruitment, in every subsequent activity in the hierarchy of the services, at every level, thus defying the very principle of equity. Special examinations by the UPSC to fill

a certain number of posts in Under Secretary grade only for the reserved category officers in Section Officer/Private Secretary grades is an example of such perpetuation.

'One would expect in a growing economy a declining trend in the proportion of seats and jobs reserved for backward classes and other disadvantaged groups over time, so that the principle of equality in opportunity becomes less and less qualified', does not need only an empirical research, but a serious rethinking in the policy planning and implementation in this regard. Once a facility has been given to a member in a family at a particular stage, and it naturally results in reasonable socio-economic justice, the justification for continuing to extend it to each and every member in the same family would only deprive the

other deserving families of even a single benefit

The 'other disadvantaged groups' might also come to mean, in course of time, such groups or sections of the services in which reasonable opportunity of growth has not been provided, especially in comparison with their counterparts in other groups or sections of the services. For example, an Assistant (CSS) and Personal Assistant (CSSS) are recruited by Government through a competitive examination of the UPSC of comparable standards, and both the posts are comparable in status and emoluments etc. Subsequently, the Personal Assistant has to wait for 20-25 years to get his first promotion to the scale of Rs 650-1040, whereas the Assistant gets promoted to the scale of Rs 650-1200 in about 5-7 years' time, and to the scale of Rs 1200-1600 in another 8-10 years' time. Once the principle of Reservations is enlarged and extended beyond specifics and time spans, the Personal Assistants could be justified in asking for a reservation in posts in Section Officer/Under Secretary grades to compensate them and bring them on par with their counterparts. Not that we intend raising the point, now or ever, because we feel that reservations should be a rare phenomenon and cease at the earliest.

We do not know how far it may be correct, but there was some talk in the early fifties that the total compensation paid @ 45% of the admitted assessment of the property left behind in Pakistan, far exceeded the total value of the property in all Pakistan. No wonder, there might be some apprehension in the minds of people about the reservations also going beyond proportion and creating a different kind of imbalance in society.

**Shiv Charan Singh**  
Hony General Secretary,  
The Central Secretariat Stenographers  
Service Association, Delhi

S L SHARMA has, in the article 'Conversions' (published in SEMINAR, 268, December, 1981) very intelligently and elaborately dealt with the subjectual theme and driven home lucidly the effects prior and subsequent to the conversion in the societal context. He has quoted a spate of sociological researches and authorities to support his view-point. He has also attempted to weave the legal warp with the sociological woof in the fabric of this essentially lego-sociological topic. But in the legal shade, I would like to submit the following in supplementation of the writer's views.

The Indian Constitution is basically a secular document and it nowhere discriminates on the basis of religion. This 'secular' feature was highlighted even by the Supreme Court in the historic case of Kesavanand Bharati Vs State of Kerala (AIR 1973 SC 1461) in which the 'basic structure' theory was conceived and secularism was declared to be a basic structure of the Constitution. Later, the word 'secular' was

included even in the Preamble to the Constitution vide 42nd Amendment Act. The highest court of the land in the above-quoted case also laid down that even Parliament (what to speak of the President) is not armed with the power to destroy/damage the basic structure of the Constitution. But even prior to the formal inclusion of the word 'secular' in the Preamble and declaration of secularism as the basic structure of the Constitution by the Supreme Court, secularism had been the underlying theme of our constitutional jurisprudence. Secular philosophy permeates numerous provisions of the Constitution including Article 341.

Article 341 (1), which empowers the President to carve out a distinct 'scheduled caste' class out of various castes, races and tribes, enunciates that 'The President may with respect to any State or Union territory, and where it is a State after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be'.

It means that the President is empowered to include any 'castes, races or tribes' in the list of scheduled castes. The word 'races' in Article 341 is the carrier of secular jurisprudence of the Constitution and it undoubtedly implies that races may be from within Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Jainism or Buddhism etc. It leads to the only logical conclusion that the Constitution-framers did not want to restrict the scheduled castes' concessions to any particular religion and that is why they incorporated the word 'races' in the said Article. Besides, it is amply clear from the Article itself that the 'castes' or 'tribes' may be from any religion wherever they exist.

In exercise of the powers vested vide Article 341, the President passed, among others, the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and the Parliament subsequently passed two enactments in 1956 and 1976. Clause (3) of the said Order of 1950 stipulates that the scheduled castes' benefits would not flow if the beneficiary ceases to be either a Hindu or a Sikh. Thus, the Order discriminates on the ground of religion which is clearly forbidden by Article 15 (1). It also consequently limits the scope of Article 341 and supersedes the intention of the Constitution-framers who wanted to make India a secular State. It therefore makes a severe dent on secularism, a basic structure.

Hence, I feel that this is a fit case to be taken to the court to be quashed.

**Ashok Kumar Yadav**  
Chandigarh

# Further reading

## BOOKS

on India by Indians abroad

**Agrawal, Chandra P.** (ed) Jaya Shankar Prasad. Journal of South Asian Literature, Vol XIV, Michigan State University, East Lansing 1979

**Batra, Raveendra.** Prout and economic reform in India. Delhi, Khosla Publishing, House, 1979.

**Bowes, Pratima.** Hindu intellectual tradition. Calcutta, Allied Publications Private Ltd., 1977.

**Chaudhuri, Pramit** The Indian economy poverty and development New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House Private Ltd, 1978.

**Dayal, Sahab** Industrial relations systems in India — a study of vital issues. New Delhi, Sterling Publications Ltd, 1980.

**Diwan, Romesh K and Suresh Desai** (eds) Indian economy in 1970s Troy, NY, Association of Indian Economic Studies, 1978.

**Diwan, Romesh K.** (ed) Issues in the Indian economy Troy, NY, Association of Indian Economic Studies, 1976

**Gupta, Giri Raj** (ed) Main currents in Indian sociology New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House

(1976) Vol. I, Contemporary India: some sociological perspectives,

(1976) Vol II, Family and social change in modern India,

(1978) Vol. III, Cohesion and conflict in modern India;

**Hiro, Dalip** India today. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1980

**Kalia, Narendra Nath** The lies we tell our children: sexism in Indian education New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1979

**Kapur, Ashok.** India's nuclear options: atomic diplomacy and decision-making New York, Praeger, 1976

**Lall, Arthur.** The emergence of modern India New York, Columbia University Press, 1981

**Mamdani, Mahmood** The myth of population control: family, caste and class in Indian villages. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972.

**Mehta, Mahesh J.** (ed) Upadhyaya's integral humanism: the concept and application Edison, NJ, Deendayal Upadhyaya Committee of America, 1910.

**Sampath, Rajan Kasturi.** Economic efficiency in Indian agriculture: theory and measurement New Delhi, MacMillan India Ltd, 1979.

**Seshagiri Rao, K L** Mahatma Gandhi and comparative religion Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas, 1978

**Srikantan, K.S** The family planning programme in the socio-economic context New York, Population Council, 1977

**Tirtha, Ranjit** Society and development in contemporary India: geographical perspectives Detroit, Marlo Press, 1980

**Uppal, J.S.** (ed) India's economic problems: an analytical approach. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979

#### WEEKLY NEWSPAPERS

**India Abroad** 331 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10010.

It is the oldest Indian ethnic newspaper. The emphasis is on news from various dispatches. There is rarely any in-depth analysis of news or events. It carries a special column on immigration. Currently it carries a column from Kuldeep Nayar which is the only thoughtful material in the whole 20 pages or so.

**News India:** 11 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017.

It is the second Indian ethnic newspaper produced in New York City. Its set up is similar to *India Abroad*. Emphasis on news dispatches without any in-depth analysis. Has a regular column on immigration and Bombay film stars.

**India West:** 5082 Appian Way, El Sobrante, CA 94803.

This is the Indian ethnic newspaper published from the West Coast, i.e., Los Angeles. Emphasis is on news from various dispatches without much in-depth analysis. It publishes editorials which are generally conservative.

**India Tribune:** 3955 West Lawrence Avenue, Chicago, IL 60625

This is an Indian newspaper published from the mid West. The publishers have shown a great desire to add a lot of written materials. Unfortunately, the writers have not done much thinking on the issues.

**India United:** P O. Box 1222, Boston, MA 02205

It is a fortnightly newspaper from Boston. It is a comparatively small newspaper but has a lot of potential. Much of its simple writing is thoughtful.

**India Now:** P.O. Box 665, New York, NY 10025

It is a monthly newspaper published by the Indian People's Association of North America (IPANA). IPANA has a well-defined Marxist-Leninist point of view. Its coverage of news, however, is particularly good and thoughtful.

#### ASSOCIATIONS

**Association of Indian Economics Studies (AISE)**  
6 Bolivar Avenue, Troy, NY 12180.

It has brought together economists of Indian origin and American economists specializing on India. It holds a conference every two years. This year it held its fourth conference in Villanova, PA. It has published proceedings of the first two conferences. It organizes sessions at the Allied Social Science Association's meetings annually.

**Deendayal Upadhyaya Committee of America:**  
Edison, NJ

It organizes a lecture and symposium on the relevance of Deendayal Upadhyaya's thought and its relevance to current Indian problems every year. The papers collected at the first two years' symposiums have now been published.

**Volunteers for India's Progress (VIP)** Stevens Institute for Technology, Hoboken, NJ.

It organizes one symposium every year dealing with technology and economic issues relevant to India. These papers are then printed in the yearly magazine, *Ec ntech*.

**India Development Service (IDS)** P O Box 980, IL 60690

It organizes seminars on India's rural development. It has sponsored a family who are now working for rural development in Dharwad district. The emphasis is on action.

**Indian People's Association for North America (IPANA)** P O Box 665, New York, NY 10025

Publishes a monthly newspaper, *India Now*.

# **the art of good management...**



**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**

Shriram seminars and courses are part of this moulding process which involves executives in a ceaseless interchange of ideas, discussion of modern techniques, evaluation and reconsideration of policies. So that the Shriram organisation is constantly infused with fresh dynamism and our resources are utilised to the optimum.




**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**

My

# ROUTES

to over 40 cities in 5 continents



A  
thrilling  
voyage of  
discovery.

On board my gleaming jets.  
It's a network to remember.

**AIR-INDIA**

MTB-AIR-62 67-8

# seminar

**272**

April 1982

## The Campus Scene

# With the Compliments of



## **KEC**

**KAMANI ENGINEERING CORPORATION.**

Pioneers in transmission line engineering  
in India;

making a major contribution to build  
a powerful country; and a powerful world too.  
KEC. Largest in Asia, Second in the World  
in power transmission.



**KAMANI ENGINEERING CORPORATION LIMITED**

Kamani Chambers,  
32, Ramjibhai Kamani Marg,  
BOMBAY-400 038.

STUSA



# Mahindra

## now brings you the Peugeot XDP 4.90- a diesel engine of advanced design


Mahindra meets the challenge of  
the oil crisis, with a superb new,  
lightweight high performance

By far the most vital factor is the  
greater fuel efficiency of this lightweight,  
high performance engine.

diesel engine-the PEUGEOT XDP  
4.90 with greater fuel efficiency.


This world-famous engine is now  
being assembled at the  
Mahindra plant.

The PEUGEOT XDP 4 90  
will be fitted initially on the  
**Mahindra NC 665 DP Mini Truck**,  
Pick-up Van and Ambulance.



### Engine Specifications :

No. of Cylinders	4
Bore-mm	90
Stroke-mm	83
Bore/Stroke ratio	1.08
Displacement-cc	2112
Compression Ratio	22.4:1
R P M (max)	4500
Max B H P.	75
Max Torque Kg m	13.3
	@ 2000 r.p.m.
Weight Kg.	184




The Mahindra NC 665 DP  
Mini Truck fitted with  
Peugeot XDP 4.90 diesel engine




Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.


# Elegant looks



## Versatile features




Attractive Sleek Two-toned USHA Streamlined—the sewing machine that outclasses any other in its price range With features that others can't match And a 5-year guarantee too




Patch Darning foot for easy darning and quick adjustment of pressure on cloth



3-position drop feed for easy adjustment of feed-dog position



Dial-type stitch regulator with lever for forward and reverse stitch control and locking arrangement




Thread tension adjuster for regulating proper thread tension.

**USHA Streamlined** feature for feature a better machine

# ESCORTS GROWS WITH ITS PEOPLE




**Blending technology and research with manufacturing and marketing skills, to build up a sustained growth rate averaging 20% a year over the past decade.**



Escorts is one of India's fastest growing corporations. According to The Economic Times' rankings for 1979, Escorts' sales have shown a *phenomenal growth to make it India's 7th largest company in the private sector and the 4th largest engineering company*.

An accelerating growth rate which is a result of Escorts' philosophy of adapting the most advanced technology and combining it with its research and human skills. To manufacture a diverse yet relevant range of quality products in its 14 plants. Ensuring its countless customers in India and abroad, cost effective products that are leaders in their range. These include well-known brand names like Ford, Rajdoot, Mahle, JCB, Knorr Bremse, Goetze and Yamaha.


Behind the ever-expanding enterprise of the Escorts group, are 15,000 employees, 1400 dealers and stockists, nearly 3000 ancillary suppliers and over 35,000 share holders, who share Escorts' growing strength.



**Adapting advanced technology relevant to India's core needs.**

**ESCORTS LIMITED**


11 Scindia House, Connaught Circus, New Delhi 110 001



Escorts Scientific Research Centre where 200 engineers develop and support technological advancement

Tractors and Farm Equipment • Motorcycles • Automotive Ancillaries • Industrial and Construction Equipment • Railway Ancillaries • Heating Elements

When seven of our hotels  
are among the  
300 best hotels in the world,  
should you settle for  
anything less?



Book into  
Oberoi Hotels  
instantly.

Oberoi Hotels Set amidst golden beaches,  
on sunny islands, in bustling cities  
Hotels so good that Rene Lecler, Travel  
Editor of Harpers & Queen, included seven  
of them in his world-famous travel guide  
'The 300 best hotels in the world'  
For reservations, contact Oberoi Instant  
Reservation Offices at

	Telephone	Telex
New Delhi	699571	2372, 3829
Bombay	234343	4153, 4154
Calcutta	230181	7248, 7854
Madras	88156	699
Ahmedabad	448648	
Bangalore	577681	725
	576355	
	577051	
Colombo	20001	CMB 21201
	21171	
Kathmandu	11211	NP 203

**Oberoi Hotels**  
We look after you better

Oberoi Hotels in Bombay, Calcutta, Darjeeling, Delhi, Goa, Gopalpur-on-sea, Khajuraho, Ladakh,  
New Delhi, Simla, Srinagar, Udaipur, Adelaide, Aswan, Baghdad, Bali, Cairo, Colombo, Dammam,  
Kandy, Kathmandu, Melbourne, Singapore and Zanzibar

# FORHAN'S—the toothpaste created by a dentist



## helps strengthen your gums while it cleans your teeth

### Gum troubles could mean loss of healthy teeth




Dentists say that if teeth are not cleaned properly a thin layer of bacteria called plaque, which forms around your teeth and gums, starts accumulating. This leads to tartar which weakens and pushes away gums causing even healthy teeth to fall out. Gum troubles can also harm health in general.

### Forhan's protection for the gums



Dr. Forhan's exclusive formula with its special astringent strengthens gums to help you resist gum troubles. So brush your teeth and massage your gums with Forhan's Toothpaste and Forhan's Double Action Toothbrush.



**Forhan's** For the gums

Regd. T.M. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Ltd.

# A Rs. 3000 crore investment rests on the shoulders of the lowly bullock


## IMAGINE

There are 15 million bullock carts in India

Providing employment to an estimated 20 million people, accounting for two-thirds of rural India's transportation needs And embracing an investment of Rs 3000 crores

## THINK


A little innovative thinking and the bullock cart could more than double its load-carrying capacity, raise the overall animal output to 4 million horsepower, increase



the working life of the bullock And improve the well-being and standard of living of the cart owner —and the rural community at large

## LOOK AHEAD


Dunlop India pioneered the modernisation of the bullock cart and helped develop improved ADV equipment. Besides quality ADV tyres. Much more needs to be done By Dunlop By others If only everybody put their shoulders to the wheels of the bullock cart



 **DUNLOP**  
helping those who help the nation

ADV/CAS-1/81

**Once the setting of  
a royal durbar  
Today, an exclusive  
conference venue.**




Think of it Your next conference in a royal palace in Mysore The city — an oasis of tranquility, at the foot of the Chamundi Hills

The palace — where lifestyle spells magnificence Your conference has a splendid setting A Conference Hall and a Banquet Hall, where the decor is richly royal And with it, full facilities — secretarial services, audio-visual equipment, microphones *et al*

How about a holiday? Bring your seminar or conference to Mysore and discover a fascinating city. With its palaces, serene boulevards and parks

Go sight-seeing to the island fortress of Srirangapatna, the Brindavan Gardens, the temple architecture of Halebid and Belur



The Chamundi Hills with the famous Nandi Bull or the Bandipur Wildlife Sanctuary

The ideal business-holiday tie-up.

**For information and reservations, contact**

The Manager  
Lalitha Mahal Palace Hotel  
Mysore 570010 Karnataka  
Tel 23650 Cables TOURISM  
Telex 0846 217

Or

**Ashok Reservation Service**

	Tel	Cables	Telex
Delhi	350070	CENTRES	031-2468
Bombay	232722	TOURISM	011-4171
	233343		
Calcutta	440901	TOURISM	CA-2307
	440922		
Madras	83865	TOURISM	041-7262
	89672		



**Lalitha Mahal Palace Hotel**

Where conferring has never been more enjoyable.

Hydroquinone  
 ne. Metol  
 rechromone  
 Purechro  
 -3. Purechro  
 -4. Sodi  
 me Sulphite.  
 Sodium Bis  
 Sodium Sodi  
 sulphite. Car  
 um Carbon  
 ate Anhydri  
 ate Sodium Ca  
 ons. Sodium  
 phosphate Mono  
 phosphate Thio  
 Sodium Thio  
 Sodium Ammonium  
 Sodium Anhydrous and Crystals.  
 te Anhydrous and Crystals.  
 sulphate Anhydrous and Crystals.  
 sulphate Formaldehyde. Chloranil. 2:5  
 Sodium Acetate. Benzene. N: N Diethyl Sodi  
 odum Acetate. Benzene. N: N Diethyl Sodi  
 e. 2:5 Diethoxy Aniline. N-Toluidine. Mangan  
 Diethoxy Aniline. N-Toluidine. Mangan  
 ne N N Diethyl Anhydrous. Ace  
 ne Sulphate. Manganese Sulphate. P  
 ese Carbonate. N-Butyl Metha  
 tate. Manganese. N-Butyl Metha  
 crylate. Hydroquin

Paper  
 Electronics  
 Ceramics  
 Polymers  
 Leather  
 Jute  
 Textiles  
 Detergents  
 Fertilizers  
 Paints  
 Dyestuffs

Pharmaceuticals  
 Processing of Photographic  
 and Motion Picture Film  
 (Black & White and Colour)

Manufactured by

**S SATYADEV CHEMICALS LTD.**  
 Pratapnagar Road, Vadodara-390 004.

Suppliers to some of the world's leading manufacturing and trading concerns.

**Wider seating in**




**Club**

**British  
 airways**

We'll take more care of you





Not something you would have heard on the thirteenin hole some years back. But today, golf irons are being made of aluminium. The fact is, aluminium is being used, more and more, for things we had never imagined. And in India, Indian Aluminium has been the catalyst of this change.

The first to embark on aluminium production in this country, Indal has

introduced almost the entire range of alloys in which rolled and extruded aluminium products are made in India. In its constant drive towards diversification, Indal has pioneered the use of aluminium in aircraft, currency, power transmission, irrigation tubing, transportation, packaging, housing and a host of other applications.

Indal pioneering. It's the shape of things to come.



**Indian Aluminium Company, Limited**  
**Anything's possible**

HTC-IAL-4074

# seminar

THE MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI.

Journal which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every  
side of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single  
problem is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions.  
Opinions expressed have ranged from Janata to Congress, from  
Ravodaya to Communist to Independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it has  
been possible to answer a real need of today, to gather  
the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people  
arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity  
facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture

Publisher/ROMESH THAPAR

Managing Editor/RAJ THAPAR

Production/TEJBIR SINGH

Circulation/C.B. KUMAR

Published from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1. Telephone: 46534 Cable Address: Seminar New Delhi. Single copy: Rs 10/-; \$ 1.50 Yearly Rs 40; £ 7; \$ 16, Three yearly: Rs 100 £ 20; \$ 40 Reproduction of material prohibited unless permitted

## NEXT MONTH: NATIONAL CHARACTER

# 272

## THE CAMPUS SCENE

a symposium on  
some aspects of  
university disarray

symposium participants

### THE PROBLEM

Posed by I. Satya Sundaram, Post-graduate  
Department of Economics, Hindu College,  
Machilipatnam, A P

### ROOTS OF ENERVATION

Satish Saberwal, Associate Professor of  
Sociology, Centre for Historical Studies,  
Jawaharlal Nehru University

### THE NEW CULTURAL APPARATUS

P R K Rao, Electrical Engineering  
Department, Indian Institute of  
Technology, Kanpur

### RURAL URBAN DIVIDE

Donna Suri, Journalist

### THE COMMUNAL SLANT

Nina Vyas, Journalist

### AT ELITE LEVEL

Usha Rai, Journalist

### BOOKS

Reviewed by Peggy Mohan and Romila Thapar

### FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography  
compiled by M.P. Nayar

### COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury Associates

# The problem

EDUCATION is an important conduit by which the youth obtain the relevant knowledge, skills and attitudes. Yet, the present educational system is so defective that it has promoted frustration, tensions and unrest among the educated youth. It is true that youth unrest is only a product of the general social unrest. As observed by J.P. Naik: 'the crisis in values which one sees in society is necessarily being reflected in the educational system itself ... in so far as cultivation of values is concerned, the position today has probably worsened.'<sup>1</sup>

However, one should not be indifferent to student unrest simply because it is a product of social unrest. For one thing, reforming the society is a time-consuming process and therefore we cannot afford to be silent spectators of growing student unrest until the society becomes perfect. For another, it is the educational system which has to train the youth on the right lines and provide opportunities for advancement. It is again true that the behaviour of the young is influenced by the home and other institutions. Yet, has our education discharged its primary responsibility of guiding the students on the right lines? As one writer has aptly put it: 'there is hardly anything in the colleges today that can stimulate their interest, challenge their abilities or absorb their attention.'<sup>2</sup>

But, educational reconstruction is not an easy task, for it requires the combined efforts of the government, teachers, students and parents. Lack of cooperation and seriousness among these forces is responsible for the educational crisis. How difficult the task is well explained by Coombs: 'Educating a nation, and keeping that nation's educational system in step with the times, seems to

be many times harder than putting a man on the moon'<sup>3</sup>

One sad feature of the educational system is that it has not shown any dynamism and adaptivity as it moves upwards. The courses are hardly inspiring even at the post graduate level. There are many interesting and socially relevant subjects like journalism and public relations, but they do not find place in our colleges and universities. Consequently, education is being increasingly isolated from society. This is one reason why there is growing frustration among the youth, in spite of opportunities provided by modern society. The students feel that they are neglected by the educational system, parents and teachers. As rightly observed by Saiyidain: 'If, at such a critical period of his life, the student fails to find sympathy, affection and understanding—in his family or amongst his teachers—he becomes frustrated, emotionally unbalanced and unable to face the trials of life with faith and hope.'<sup>4</sup>

The educational system provides little opportunity for the students to advance individually. As one educationist has put it: 'When adequate opportunities are not provided to the students within the education curricula in respect of expression of thought and speech backed by extra-curricular activities, their potential creative urge seeks an outlet in destructive activities. Without the personal attention of the teacher, the student remains uncared for and tends to become eventually an agitated, dis-integrated personality'.<sup>5</sup>

One has to admit that in spite of the high incidence of illiteracy, what India has achieved in quantitative terms in the educational field during the last three decades is really commendable. But, the

1. J.P. Naik (1975) *Equality, Quality and Quantity* (The Elusive Triangle in Indian Education). Allied Publishers, Bombay, pp 55-56

2. M.B. Ghorpade 'The College is Crumbling', *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, January 31 — February 6, 1982, p 16.

3. Philip H. Coombs (1968) *The World Educational Crisis A Systems Analysis*. A.H. Wheeler & Co. Pvt. Ltd., Allahabad, p 7

4. K.G. Saiyidain (1963) *Education, Culture and Social Order*. Asia Publishing House, Bombay, p 193

5. G.S. Gautam (1972) *Crisis in the Temples of Learning*. S. Chand & Co. (Pvt) Ltd., New Delhi, p 44.

expansion appears to lack proper direction. There is an educational explosion particularly at the higher level. There is a misconception that everyone benefits from higher education. This open door policy has increased pressure on physical facilities, increased also the percentage of students not interested in education, and created a non academic atmosphere on the campus. The point is, there is hardly any scope to carry out successfully any educational innovations. It is rightly observed 'To admit misfits and turn them out into bigger misfits with a badge of failure writ large on them is nothing short of cruelty. In fact, a system which is responsible for such a national loss stands self-condemned.'<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, the unplanned expansion in the educational field has resulted in great wastage of precious resources. the school drop outs, high incidence of failures in the examinations and mounting unemployment among the educated. This does not of course mean that a basic thing like education should be denied to the youth. What has to be remembered is that to make education effective only those really interested in education should join colleges and universities. Others may pursue higher education according to their convenience through correspondence courses and non formal channels. A stage has been reached in the process of expansion when the policy of selective admissions will have to be extended to all sectors and institutions of higher education.<sup>7</sup>

One reason why the students are not serious about their studies is that they face a very gloomy future. Mounting unemployment is a nightmare for a majority of the educated youth. More and more students are opting for academic courses because the vocational courses are not popular. They are treated as

inferior and are also expensive. There is unemployment even among those who have completed vocational courses. There is therefore need for making these courses popular and profitable.<sup>8</sup> The demand for skills arises only when the economy makes steady and satisfactory progress. Unfortunately, this is hardly the case at present. The rural economy has to be diversified with stress on non-farm activities like poultry, dairying and horticulture so that the educated youth with technical skills can be profitably employed.

At the undergraduate and post-graduate stages, the stress should be on original thinking and self-study habits. A graduate or a post-graduate has to think independently and find solutions to contemporary problems. To equip the youth for this task, higher education should lay stress not on written tests, but on assignments and group discussions. After all, a student who leaves the college/university must be different from one who enters it, not only in respect of knowledge and skills but attitudes as well. To quote J.P. Naik, 'The emphasis will now have to shift from rote memorisation to stimulation of curiosity, development of self-study habits, study of the community around, and problem-solving so that knowledge is acquired through improved motivation, sharpened powers of observation and original thinking.'<sup>9</sup>

It goes without saying that higher education should be discussion-oriented and library oriented. Then only will educational institutions be able to train the youth to face contemporary problems with confidence. Our students in colleges and universities are little benefitted from their education so long as they do not use the library seriously. However, self-study habits among students can be promoted only when the lectures are made thought-provoking and

6 Mrs S Roy 'Progress of Education Since Independence' in N.B. Sen (Ed 1966) *Development of Education in New India*. New Book Society of India, New Delhi, p. 282.

7. *Report of the Education Commission (1964-66)*, Ministry of Education, Government of India, p. 305.

8 For issues in vocational education, see the author's article, 'Vocationalization of Education: Some Issues', *Journal of Indian Education*, March, 1980 N.C.E.R.T., New Delhi.

9. J.P. Naik (1975) *op cit.* p. 63.

assignments and group discussions form an integral part of the educational system

Our examination system is so defective that a student can successfully get through the examination by concentrating on 25 per cent of the syllabus and by opening books just one or two months prior to the commencement of the examinations. The system has failed to promote originality of thinking and has placed a premium on the cramming of information. It appears that frequent assessment is the only safe and reliable method of objective measurement of students' performance.<sup>10</sup> The new evaluation system should give as much weightage to what the student has learnt as to the interest he has developed in learning.<sup>11</sup>

The task of examinations is to keep the students academically active throughout the year. At present, the students are provided with leisure but they do not know how to use it. The system of examinations should also promote analytical abilities among the students. With certain pre-conditions, the present writer has argued elsewhere that open book examinations may be more fruitful than the traditional examinations.<sup>12</sup> Questions will be set in such a way that the students have to search for answers in the books supplied to them. Only those who have thoroughly studied the books can be successful under an open-book examination system. At present, the very purpose of examinations is defeated because of mass copying.

Another grave defect of the present educational system is that there is little students' participation in educational matters. It is true that students do not have the necessary experience to frame educational policies, but they must be trained in framing the educational policies because they are affected by them. The traditional relationship between the teachers and students should undergo change. Of course, there is need for identifying the legitimate fields for students' participation.<sup>13</sup> Students' participation in educational matters also promotes a sense of responsibility among the student community which is lacking at present. It is rightly said 'Education is all the more democratic when it takes the form of a free search, a conquest, a creative act, instead of being as it so often is, something given or inculcated'.<sup>14</sup>

Unfortunately, the teachers have ceased to be an inspiring force. The young teachers are the products

of a defective educational system. Even the old ones cannot remain uninfluenced by the society which is highly polluted. True, they are more interested in making money through private tuitions than in training the youth on the right lines. A teacher will soon become a back number if he is not constantly in touch with the latest developments in his field of specialisation. Yet, reading habits among teachers are poor and they seldom make use of the library. No wonder, the quest for knowledge is a rare thing among our teaching community. As rightly observed by V V John 'Nothing could be more unwholesome in a university than having to learn from those who have stopped learning'.<sup>15</sup>

It must be admitted that all educational reforms invariably place higher responsibilities on both teachers and students. This is one reason why even teachers oppose educational reforms. But, how long can these reforms be postponed? The educational system cannot, and should not, remain static when the society as a whole is experiencing rapid changes. When a sense of responsibility and dedication is absent even among the teachers, we cannot blame the students for their irresponsible behaviour on the campus. The truth is that the teachers, politicians and elders have set a bad example to our students.

The educational crisis is due to the fact that those who directly influence education are behaving in a non-cooperative fashion. To quote Theodore Brameld 'What actually happens to education in times of crisis is not, then, that all the teachers and other representatives of education join forces. Rather, they tend to fall into opposing camps. They polarize ... So there is within education itself a state of conflict that is symptomatic of the condition of the wider culture'.<sup>16</sup>

The future task has been well summed up by the UNESCO publication which we have already quoted 'Link education to life, associate it with concrete goals, establish a close relationship between society and economy, invent or rediscover an educational system that fits its surroundings, surely this is where the solution must be sought'.<sup>17</sup> The major task of education is rightly described as teaching people how to learn, how to cope with change.<sup>18</sup> Unless we reorient the educational system to meet the requirements of a changing society, not only are we wasting precious financial resources, but also creating a vast army of frustrated educated youth.

I SATYA SUNDARAM

10 Y Masih 'Suggestion for Improving University Education in India', in N B Sen (Ed 1966) *op cit* p 241

11 P D Shukla (1971) *Life-long Education* Orient Longman Ltd, New Delhi, p 50

12 I Satya Sundaram 'Open Book Examinations: Myth and Reality', *Journal of Indian Education*, September 1981 N C E R T New Delhi

13 Saral K. Chatterji (Ed 1970) *Student Participation* The C.L.C., Madras

14 UNESCO (Paris, 1972) *Learning to be* (The World of Education Today and Tomorrow) Indian Edition Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, p. 75.

15 V V John (1976) *Freedom to Learn* (The Challenge of the Autonomous College) Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, p 44

16 Theodore Brameld (1965) *Education as Power* Fawcett Publications Inc, New York, p 24

17 UNESCO (Paris, 1972) *op cit* p 69

18 Albert Tevoedjre (1979) *Poverty Wealth of Mankind*. Pergamon Press Ltd. Oxford, England, p. 108.

# Roots of enervation

SATISH SABERWAL

NUMBER of universities: 20 in 1947, 87 in 1972, with 18 more institutions awarding comparable degrees. Enrolment of university students, less than 0.4 million in 1950-51, over 3.1 million in 1970-71. In my field, sociology, Bombay and Lucknow were the two university departments in 1947. By 1977, over 50 universities and scores of colleges were engaged in awarding degrees of M.A. and beyond in sociology. In 1976-77, 443 students were reportedly set for Ph.D. in sociology!<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On universities, J.N. Kaul, *Higher education in India 1951-71* (1974, Simla, Indian Institute of Advanced Study), on sociology, M.S.A. Rao, Introduction, in each of 3 vols of *A survey of research in sociology and social anthropology* (Sponsor ICSSR), 1974, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, and University Grants Commission, *Report on the status of teaching of sociology and social anthropology, Part II Regional Reports* (M.S.A. Rao Committee report), and U.G.C., *University development in India, Basic facts and figures 1972-73 to 1976-77, Pt. 1, Sec. C Postgraduate and*

For a country of India's size, the numbers are not large in themselves. If we are in difficulties, it is because the university system has expanded by way more of bricks and mortar than of setting and enforcing the norms of scholarly performance at various levels. We know the reasons for this headlong growth. During the colonial period, a new intelligentsia had come to be formed slowly, principally through the university education of students from older urban groups, and it had taken administrative and political reins over from the colonial power. Hence, the belief in higher education as the key to opportunity, turned into a politically effective demand for larger governmentally funded facilities for higher education. The poor, industrious child, studying

*research enrolment*. This essay recasts material from two others, due to appear in the *PUCB Bulletin*, New Delhi, and the Swedish anthropological journal, *Ethnos*.

under the street lamp, and making good in life this image lies behind expectations of mobility through higher education. It would cost the student and his family very little

If the ideal university is an institution that seeks to set its young minds on the road to autonomous enquiry, however, only a few colleges or universities in India have been able to apply themselves to the task seriously. During the colonial period, most of these institutions had been located in metropolitan and other large urban centres. The young mind received some stimulus not only from formal instruction but also from the city's unusual social diversity and from the hubbub of the national movement and the like. The recent mushrooming of 'higher' education brings it closer to the student's home in the village or the smaller town. Student and teacher alike may remain in its parochial grip, and the institution's resources — as well as sights — are set lower. A university degree may here be equated with rote learning from a few dull text books — *provided* the examinations are conducted honestly.

From the rather weak bases established under colonial aegis, admittedly remote from sustained, creative enquiry, we have had this enormous growth. Yet, a university is — or ought to be — a complex institution, working through gradually learned individual routines and supportive, shared norms. Few of us have found the leisure to determine and to learn such habits; the avalanche of institutions has been much too swift for such deliberation. That is to say, the critical judgements in the *public domain* — the press, the legislatures, within the academia — have not been seasoned enough to persuade us to make such deliberation routine. The consequences are plain for all to see.

These may be seen most starkly in the kind of behaviour at least some academics get away with in relation to their colleagues and their students. In a certain northern university, a member of the selection committee for making faculty appointments may find his car tyres deflated; if he misses the selection

committee meeting thus, his known preference for a rival would not help the latter! At another university some years ago, after I had given a seminar, none of the fifty or more students would utter a word. The Professor in the department was chairing the meeting and said that the students would not ask a question in 'The Professor's' presence. I learned subsequently that this awesome image of The Professor was cultivated carefully by his wife, who was also on the faculty.

In yet another university, another Professor was requested by a senior student to arrange seminars by the various faculty members so that the students, as well as the faculty, might know what research the teachers had been doing. This Professor agreed with the request in principle but said that such seminars might present faculty members with ego problems! The student was too polite to ask why the Professor had sponsored these worthies for faculty positions in the first place. A university teacher secured a fellowship for an undeserving cousin by manipulating the marks given; the subsequent agitation by students kept the department closed for more than a month.

A large majority of academics do stay well clear of such misdemeanours, yet situations of this kind are common and well known, and we are often not able to check such gross lapses from propriety. Otherwise responsible academics may even suggest that such postures are immune to external scrutiny on grounds of academic autonomy! Such has been our failure to establish norms in these matters, and to enforce them in relation to ourselves — even in the most eminent of institutions — that when a hitherto quiescent group of students or younger colleagues bestirs itself, its pugnacity is often felt in wanton abandon.

We do invest enormous energies in jockeying for small gains, of material advantage and of *social* domination in academia, or — given the attritions of this process — in settling scores with colleagues and others. Intellectual enervation —

loss of vigour — and this pervasive bickering, these two elements go together. Tentatively I would suggest that these express in academia a very widespread syndrome of difficulties in contemporary Indian society. To this syndrome I now turn.

The issue is large. Put simply, I think we in India today have extraordinary difficulties first in coping with *conflict* in orderly ways and, second, in evolving and maintaining anything like an *impersonal normative order*. These are very general elements which may be seen in millions of acts and situations. An impersonal normative order is at stake, for example, in maintaining the sequence in a queue, in exercising one's judgement for admissions to the university objectively, in making an IAS probationer accept a basic social code, or in enforcing the code for the height of buildings in an area, regardless of the wealth or power of the M.P. who presses for a hotel that would be taller. With such impersonal codes we seem to have enormous difficulties, and I return to this matter below.

One need not illustrate the variety of possible levels of, and contexts for, *conflict* in the daily round. What is not always understood (even among academics!) is that disagreement — and therefore arguments and a measure of conflict — these are an essential part of any reasonably active academic field. Where these debates do not conform to the historically defined and generally accepted ground rules, however, argument does sink into personal bickering, and where, for fear of such personal bickering, academics refrain from publicly evaluating — commenting on, responding to — each other's work, the academic process is reduced to being soliloquies of the deaf. Debate, and associated conflict of ideas, of alternative interpretations often of necessarily sparse and ambiguous evidence — these are the heart of the matter; but we have difficulty in engaging in serious debate on any sustained basis. Why?

Our difficulties in coping with conflict in a restrained and orderly



manier are general, not limited to academics alone, and so its explanation too has to be in terms wider than just the academic situation. I suggest that these are rooted in our inheritance by way of styles for handling disagreements and conflicts. Briefly, I see these styles in

(1) the ideology of hierarchy, which legitimised acts of aggression (explicit or implicit) from top down, and strongly disapproved of counter-aggression upwards, it would act to suppress much potential conflict,

(2) the consigning of the vast bulk of disputes to the relatively private realms of kindred, caste, and village — with their panchayats and *ad hoc* procedures;

(3) the intervention of the big man, the man of power, acting in terms of his personal judgement, not of a generally applicable public code, a variation on this would be the recourse to the *panchayat* of an area's dominant caste, by disputants of other castes, and, when all else failed,

(4) recourse to the force of arms. It will be noticed that none of these styles is appropriate to *academic* contention, and the first three have been disintegrating even in their original realms in recent decades

There is however a rather different tradition of handling conflict to be considered. It grew and took shape in Europe over two millennia, the curious will find some of its facets considered in the uncompleted masterwork of the German sociologist, Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (tr 1968), especially the last chapter in it. The reference is to the possibility of formulating impersonal, 'rational' codes, in the light of individual and wider experience, codes applicable evenly for everyone concerned. This cultural device, relevant wherever there is the possibility of conflict, developed slowly in a particular social and historical context, and if we have serious difficulties in working in its logic, the reasons seem to lie in the very different logic which comes to us from our social heritage, and especially the caste system

If this latter is sometimes thought to be the sociologists' private obsession (delusion?), rather than an institution which has exercised a decisive influence in shaping our past, and in many ways our present, the reason lies in the particular cast of sociological enquiries hitherto in India. These have concerned the framework of groups in local communities and, following Louis Dumont, the structure of the traditional ideology of the caste system, but we have not tried very hard to trace the implications of this ideology and this social frame for the larger historical issues. Establishing these wider connexions will have to await another occasion, here I can go only into the implications of the caste system for academia. In doing this, I take for granted the reader's familiarity with the principles of hierarchy, of segmentation, separating caste groups from each other, and of the segments' autonomy for internal matters in the caste system.

To be sure, in recent generations the caste system has been undergoing some erosion, the more so in the urban, large scale social universe of modern institutions. This is sometimes called the 'caste-free' sector of Indian society. The designation is rather optimistic, for a great many in this sector too continue commonly to be embedded intensely in active, far-reaching ties of kinship — and therefore usually of caste. Furthermore, as the universities have spread away from the metropolitan centres, growing numbers of students with strong embeddedness of this sort have passed through institutions whose own style has seldom been different enough or strong enough to undo effectively the embedding from the long years of one's earlier life. In time, some of the students become teachers

Consequently, one's caste affiliation may come to bear more or less explicitly on one's academic fortunes. The criteria of performance or potential may be surrendered informally to an academic's loyalties to kin, castemates, and the like, this happens in academic relations with both students and colleagues more than occasionally, cleaving into the impersonality of intellectual discourse and judgement. In order to

neutralise the implied tendency towards informal closure in favour of groups which have had a headstart, some States reserve statutorily a large fraction of academic appointments for one or another caste group.

Karnataka reserves 68% of these for six specified caste groups. A professorship in Chemistry may require membership in, say, 'Backward Community' or 'Special Group' as a necessary qualification in addition to the academic degrees. Only 32% of the positions there are open to 'general merit'.<sup>2</sup> Since the matching of subjects with social categories thus is difficult, *ad hoc* adjustments become necessary for a great many appointments, and the politics of caste lobbies dominates the universities. How the gain in distributive justice should be determined, and how it should be set against the loss in the criteria internal to academia—to these questions there is no easy answer

This continuing heritage of the caste system shapes our consciousness in a variety of ways, which I can consider here only illustratively. There are, first, the forms of social relationships characteristic of our traditional society. I count three

(1) the very intensive, multi-stranded kinds of relationships within the extended family, caste and the like, and a comparable order of intimacy is sometimes recreated in factional groups in academia, politics and elsewhere,

(2) the relatively distant, stereotyped relationships with those of other castes within one's own village, with one's in-laws, especially for rural men in North India, or the relationships during a visit to a pilgrimage centre, and

(3) the vertical relationships held together basically by the king's fiat, such as those between say Aurangzeb's *mansabdars*

What we do not learn is the habit of growing into relationships open-endedly, on a basis of mutuality, in

<sup>2</sup> Dr N Jayaram, Bangalore University, very kindly supplied me with the data

terms of a shared normative order. Like it or not, this latter is virtually the only possible basis for creative relationships between academic colleagues, regardless of their formal status. I fully realise the gravity of the position I am taking for building an academic community of equals, there is very little support from the principal kinds of our inherited social relationships — and of associated ideas

**T**he foregoing may be put another way. In the Indian tradition, says the anthropologist, Louis Dumont, when the person is identified with the group consistently, one has been expected to subordinate one's judgement and one's interests to those of the group. The group here would refer to the first type of relationship noted above. At issue, it seems to me, may be not the coercion of the person by the group but happy surrender. Children who are not brought up so as to act independently, to exercise autonomous judgement, may not as adults *wish* to act independently. And if by chance or willfulness they come to act thus, they may not be able to bring to their judgement the discipline, and the habits of learning closely from experience, such as are essential for autonomous action.<sup>3</sup>

In similar vein the psychoanalyst, Sudhir Kakar, comments on the general Indian preference for close social relationships, despite considerable costs in terms of personal autonomy. Neither the traditions of ideas we have inherited, it would seem, nor the way most of us grow up in childhood and youth, encourage us to think and to act independently.

The habits of mind and society arising in the caste system seem to influence the academic process in several less obvious, though not less powerful ways too, but I shall discuss only one of these here. It will

be remembered that the caste system organises social diversity so as to confine a person to very limited segments of that social reality, and this social construction acts too on the human impulses to explore the universe both physically and ideationally. In Basil Bernstein's terms<sup>4</sup>, persons growing up in such a milieu tend to function with a restricted, rather than an elaborated linguistic code, it predisposes individuals to make do with a limited range of ideas

**T**he same restrictedness follows from poverty. Insofar as the universe of new economic opportunity is controlled tightly by a small capitalist class and that of the modern institutions has tended to be concentrated in metropolitan centres and some other exceptionally endowed areas, the older socially constrictive tendency may be reinforced for most by poverty and by the generally scarce access to both economic opportunity and to the modern institutional sectors. One may well clamber through college and university, perhaps becoming a university teacher, yet continue with a serious sense of inadequacy in the open realm of ideas. And feeling inadequate, how does one challenge young minds?

Our difficult — may I say, desperate? — academic situation has numerous other facets but the point has perhaps been made. If in terms of the inescapably western standards of academic conduct — inescapable, for there are no other — our habits seem at times to border on the bizarre, the explanation is to be found not in the oddity of this person or that but in the cultural traditions, the social institutions, and the psychological dispositions which are part of us — all this in a hostile economic setting, which I have not considered here. Exceptionally endowed individuals do manage now and then to defy the enervation which ultimately arises in this heritage, yet this enervation is a serious matter, and we have to take its full measure if the long journey necessary for overcoming it is not to be lost in the wastes of purposelessness.

<sup>3</sup> This is inadequate. Individual autonomy is a specific historical idea. It grew in Europe, reaching a climax in late 18th century Germany, its sweep including philosophy (Kant), literature (Goethe), and much else within and outside the universities, part of a vast cultural movement. See Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, 1975, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1. This large theme cannot be pursued here.

<sup>4</sup> Cited in Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols* (1970, Penguin).

# The new cultural apparatus

P. R. K. RAO

NORMAN DAHL, the first programme leader of the Kanpur-Indo-American Programme that gave four million dollars towards equipment and books, and provided for more than a hundred American professors from a consortium of nine American universities in setting up the Indian Institute of Technology at Kanpur, summarised the achievement when he observed that IIT/Kanpur 'has been an irrelevant factor in the industrial and social progress in India ... a kind of isolated island of academic excellence but not part of the mainstream of India's development.' Pursuit of 'academic excellence' and 'high technology' removed from specific social context and at great expense to the national exchequer, when seriously done, may lead to publications in international journals or may bring honour and recognition in western academic circles and even promotions in academic institutions in the country. But such a pursuit will

contribute little towards the creation of scientific and technical skills appropriate to the needs of the country that are not even perceived.

Oakley, the last programme leader of the Kanpur-Indo-American Programme, during his recent visit, announced to a proud audience that IIT/Kanpur students face no technological background problems of adjustment in MIT, one of the foremost symbols of 'high technology' in the West and the same students show considerable enthusiasm when, possibly for the first time in their education, they are exposed to the ideas of growth of technology and its relation to perceived technological needs specific to a country. That we should learn (do we?) of our failure of perception from our American friends can only underscore our intellectual bankruptcy.

In a decadent society, what is true of one social institution is roughly

true of another comparable institution Hair-splitting arguments and a jumble of statistics can be and indeed are offered to 'show' how IIT/Bombay distinctively differs from IIT/Madras in respect of its hierarchy, or how there is a marked in-breeding in faculty recruitment at IIT/Kharagpur in contrast with IIT/Kanpur, or how much more voluminous is the publishing activity at IIT/Delhi than at other IITs, or how much larger is the quantum of sponsored research/consultancy work at one place than elsewhere. Within their limited frames, the arguments could certainly be legitimate and the statistics may even be true. But it is our contention that much as the benefits of education cannot be quantified in terms of the specific topics that are included in a prescribed programme of study, the ethos of educational institutions of a society elude assessment in terms of hierarchy, number of citation indices, in breeding coefficients, research funds etc., important as they are

Moreover, in a society where the rulers equate authority with power and the ruled mistake anarchy as concerted opposition to oppression, once relevant institutional mechanisms can become the means for self-aggrandisement and subversion. Absence of hierarchy may merely be a symptom of the loss of credibility, a policy of no-inbreeding could be a sure mechanism to recruit culturally-compatible types from North-American universities. A larger publication list may hide co-operative games, unshared laboratory facilities, an effective scheme of extortion from student slave-labour and many other things. Large project funds may reveal mutual back-scratching or connections at the right places or an anxiety as well as a need of the sponsors to distribute funds to boost their own activity indices. The establishments of education, science and technology, thanks to the American innovation of salesman-scientist, are as much commercial as any other. And, after all, if nothing can succeed like success, surely nothing decays like decay either.

Higher educational institutions, which have always been derided as ivory towers and sought after as sanctuaries of modern societies, successfully and readily transform themselves, in a decadent society, into a combine of babel towers of petty minded noises for privileges and subversive centres for the large-scale commercial production of unabashed conformists. The elitist and expert character of the higher educational institutions is a guarantee to their successful metamorphosis. Their hoarse cries for autonomy are as false as the efforts of the State to undermine their autonomy are true and successful. No worthwhile government grants autonomy to businessmen. Governmental contempt for the 'intellectuals' of this country is understandable.

Like several other less developed countries, India with its colonial past, uncritically premised that rapid development of modern science and technology on the lines pursued and prescribed by developing countries is possible and is indispensable for achieving the goals of the economic and social well-being of its teeming millions. The scientific policy resolution of the Government of India, 1958, proclaimed the following as some of its aims;

- to foster, promote and sustain by appropriate means the cultivation of science and scientific research in all its aspects — pure, applied and educational,
- to ensure adequate supply, within the country, of research scientists of the highest quality and to recognize their work as an important component of the strength of the nation,
- to encourage and initiate with all possible speed, programmes for the training of scientific and technical personnel on a scale adequate to fulfil the country's needs in science and education, agriculture and industry and defence,
- in general, to secure for the people of the country all the benefits that can accrue from the acquisition and application of scientific knowledge,

The 'leap-frogging' approach ignored Professor Blackett's warning that 'unless the social and political structure of the country is such as to put economic growth on high priority, neither education, nor management skills, nor capital, nor science and technology, nor all together, will raise the living standards of the mass of population.' In fact, scientists, technologists, academic sociologists, planners and politicians alike, considered that any exploration of the relationship between economic growth through modern science and technology and the prevailing socio political and economic institutions in a given country was an ideologically based defective discourse that somehow tarnished the pristine purity and ahistoric objectivity of scientific truths. To them, doing the 'highest quality' scientific research meant imitating what was being done in the big-money, high-technology laboratories of the developed West

To the framers of the science policy, meagreness of the financial resources available did not imply a basic incoherence between providing for expensive, sophisticated equipment required to maintain, within the country, the world's third largest force of scientific and technical personnel and the objectives of fulfilling the country's needs and of securing for the people of the country all the benefits from the pursuit of science and technology. May be it did, and perhaps they knew their priorities. Are not the careers of a few Fellows of the Royal Society engaged in frontier research more inspiring than the humdrum happiness and elementary education of thousands of gullibles? Is not the budding scientist of today the science policy maker and adviser to the cabinet committee of tomorrow? Who can say that the establishment of science does not seek power?

The establishment of the All-India Council of Education in 1946, of the scientific-manpower committee in 1947, of the 28 CSIR laboratories between 1950-60, of the scientific advisory committee in 1956, of the department of Atomic Energy in 1950, and the Government's taking over the responsibility of running

TIFR in 1955, the creation of many new universities under the auspices of the UGC and the appointment of the Sarkar Committee for setting up higher technological institutions are incipient expressions for rendering State power technocratic. The scientific policy resolution of 1958 is the first draft manifesto of a post-independent India's new elite who sought rapid economic growth through massive industrialisation whose benefits, they thought, would somehow trickle down to the illiterate, unskilled, unproductive, tradition bound millions without their creative involvement in the process of change.

**M**anifestos alone cannot capture power. To acquire and retain power, modern societies must either seize the existing cultural apparatus and consciousness industries or create new ones. The then existing 'conventional' educational institutions and traditional steel, textile, chemical and electrical industries are too resistant to change and too familiar to serve as effective cultural apparatus and consciousness industries. Only the new higher technical, educational institutions, medical schools, advanced centres for mathematics, physics, sociology, etc., can absorb the spirit of the nuclear age, electronic revolution, space era, biological warfare, Weberian bureaucracy, modern management and set cultural trends for the rest of the society. Only modern science and technology-based electronic, aerospace, nuclear and computer industries/laboratories capable of producing wonder toys like video-games, colour television receivers, satellites and atom bombs can usurp the consciousness of the hungry millions who can then be trusted to remain hopeful of a better future tomorrow and can later be blamed for escalating their expectations that are not backed-up by competence. Moreover, the realistic compulsions of balance of payments, defence needs and pressures for increased indulgence by the affluent sections of the society call for the setting up of such industries.

It is in the above context, as a follow-up of the science policy resolution, that Parliament proudly

passed the 'Institute of Technology Act 1961' which declared the five IITs at Bombay, Delhi, Kanpur, Kharagpur and Madras as institutions of national importance. If the intentions of scientific policy were ambiguous with respect to 'highest quality', 'country's needs' and 'all benefits for the people', they were made manifestly clear when the act charged these institutions with the following 'duties'

- to provide for instruction and research in such branches of engineering and technology, science and arts as the *institute may think fit* and for advancement of learning and dissemination of knowledge in such branches,
- to co-operate with educational or other institutions *in any part of the world* having objects wholly or partly similar to those of the institute by exchange of teachers and scholars and generally in such manner as may be conducive to their common objects.

**I**ntended to serve as the cultural apparatus, the five technological institutions take their job seriously, act 'as they think fit' and emerge as efficient centres of subversion. They are subversive because they divorce content, emphasis and balance between different fields of study of higher education from the country's indigenous culture and the nation's economic development. They are subversive because they seek to create a nation of imitation human beings, and in the words of the Islamicist, Mehmet Akif, 'People of a nation, whose religion is imitation, whose world is imitation, whose customs are imitation, whose dress is imitation, whose greetings and language are imitation, in short whose everything is imitation are clearly themselves mere imitation human beings, and can on no account make up a social group and hence cannot survive'. IITs may or may not be islands of academic excellence but they surely qualify to be called islands of imitation. Indeed, one of the IITs, not altogether undeservedly, is sometimes enviously referred to as the latest addition to the States of the U S A.

Subversion starts with the joint entrance examination held at centres spread all over the country. Every year, out of the more than 50,000 candidates who compete for admission into the B Tech. programmes, the top-most 1000 or so successful candidates, henceforth to be called the 'cream of the nation' and pampered, are selected and distributed about equally among the five IITs. The examination is of a good standard and, barring one or two instances of malpractices, selection is based strictly on merit. However, the examination administered in English medium confers an undue advantage on students with urban and public school backgrounds. The upper middle class origins of these bright recruits facilitates their easy conversion into unashamed careerists whose success, in the light of the training they have received, clearly depends on their unflinching advocacy of and support for more and more big-science and high-technology.

**A**round 1973, the rulers of the country, in their periodic unconvincing expression of concern for the disadvantaged scheduled castes and scheduled tribes imposed on unwilling IITs a 20% reservation of seats for SC/ST students whose cultural and inadequate academic backgrounds created more problems than were hoped to be solved by the reservation policy. For one thing, the ill-conceived creation of new ghettos cannot solve old problems and, for another, academic deficiencies cannot be made up overnight even when sincere efforts are made by all concerned which certainly is rarely the case. The reservation policy was thoroughly opposed at the time by all but one of the IITs. Rumour has it that the IITs which were opposed to the policy suggested that the IIT which seemed indifferent to the opposition should handle the four 20% shares of the other IITs and be converted into a 100% SC/ST IIT. Automatic eligibility of SC/ST students to scholarships was resented by regular students until they were restored their lost scholarship amounts. The continuing presence of a sizeable number of SC/ST students struggling

to complete a five year programme in their eighth year of residence constitutes a source of several irritations which the IITs, with all their expert counselling services, slow-paced programmes, have not been able to cope with

**T**he post-graduate students with a strength that fluctuates with the job market from anywhere between 800 to 1000 from year to year, and from one IIT to another, like the SC/ST students, are not IIT's prized possessions. A majority of them come with non-IIT backgrounds and would not qualify for admission on grounds of their academic suitability or enthusiasm for scholarly pursuits. There is a close connection between the practice of admitting substandard students and the somewhat widespread belief among the faculty that their career prospects perilously depend on the numerical strength of students whose thesis work they vigorously compete to supervise.

In spite of the sizeable scholarships ranging from Rs 600 to Rs 900 per month and various other inducements like research assistantships, married-student accommodation, Quality Improvement Programme and Faculty Improvement Programme, the quality of the students who are attracted to graduate studies continues to be low. And among those who join, depending on the disciplines and post-graduation job prospects, anywhere between 20 to 55 per cent drop out of the programmes. Even the relaxation of once tight regulations to restrict external registration of those working in industries/research laboratories, or the introduction of one year post graduate diploma courses have not helped. So much so that last year, a government appointed review committee on post-graduate education and research in engineering and technology headed by Prof. Nayudamma, in its despair, thought it fit to recommend 'It should be mandatory to prescribe post-graduate degree as the minimum qualification for recruitment to many positions in the engineering profession in industry, R & D organisations, Electricity Boards, PWDs, Post & Telegraphs,

Railways etc.' Not satisfied with such a recommendation, the committee went on to demand that 'the government should impose requirements on industry and government departments to sponsor their engineers and technologists for post-graduate education and research in the respective areas of their interest'.

What does all this amount to? Does it mean that the eminent scientists and technologists of the country are in no mood to concede that their 'finding' that 'post-graduate education and research in the country during the past three decades, has done quite a lot of good to national development' is more a matter of compulsive wish fulfilment than reality? Or is it the case that the authoritarian face of modern science and technology is showing up?

**T**he instructional part of the academic programmes in the IITs, at least at the undergraduate level, compares favourably with the best institutions in the world. Only the contents and emphasis are totally divorced from the specific social context of the country in which they are embedded. Teachers, by and large, take their teaching seriously and do a competent job of it. Examinations, assignments and tutorial sessions are conducted with enthusiasm and seriousness.

Consistent with the philosophy that the IITs are to serve as the cultural apparatus for spreading the power base of modern science and technology, undergraduate students in the first half of their programme are given a comprehensive exposure to the basic principles of science and engineering sciences. In a fast changing world of technological fashions, this so-called science-based engineering education approach is envisaged to help increase the obsolescence period of a graduating student. Even in the latter half of a student's programme of study of relevant professional subjects, the emphasis is more on principles and theory than on concrete familiarity with specific technological practices. A debate about relative balance or the lack of it, which forms one basis of a continuing mutual mistrust between educational institu-

tions and industries even in industrially advanced countries, is really an attenuated version of the more fundamental problem of subordinating the pursuit of science and technology to the critically evaluated needs of a society.

When this more basic issue is ignored or dismissed as being ideological in nature by the framers of the science policy and planners of education, is it any wonder that review committees come up with recommendations like the ones referred to above or even with prescriptions such as the following? — 'Government should impose requirements on industry as well as on post-graduate institutions to collaborate with each other. The tendency on the part of the industry to look to the advanced countries for technical know-how should be discouraged. Tax should be levied on any know-how imported from outside. A research cess should be levied (if necessary through legislative action) on each industry. A 133 per cent tax deduction should be allowed on all payments/contributions/investments made by industry to promote post-graduate education and research.'

**T**he post-graduate programmes at both the Ph.D. and M.Tech levels require thesis/project work in addition to course work. The standard of this activity is best summarised by the comments of the Nayudamma review committee: 'post-graduate programmes can survive only on a strong R & D base. Unfortunately, a good amount of research work going on in the country is without review and accountability. Most of the work is done under western perspectives and on borrowed ideas and relates to fashion-oriented problems which are totally out of the Indian context. There is urgent need to take deliberate action to prevent enormous waste of resources on repetitive and irrelevant research projects. Academic research should emphasize work done in the context of socio-economic development.'

Western perspectives and fashion-oriented problems, needless to say, are more the preserve of the IITs than of other 'lesser' institutes. However, lest the above observa-

tions of the national level review committee be interpreted to apply only to institutions other than the IITs, we reproduce below some 'guarded' findings from a recent report of the post-graduate review committee of one of the IITs 'There is a general consensus among the faculty that the standards of admissions to the post-graduate programme have become lax. Due to limitations of time in the QIP programme, it is generally felt that the quality of Ph D programme has suffered. Our review has revealed some weaknesses in the system. The flexibility in the system has in some cases led to a casual attitude about the M Tech thesis. The present system of M Tech thesis examination at a time when a student is virtually packing up to go is not conducive to critical appraisal of the thesis. The freedom to float new post-graduate courses has led to proliferation of courses.'

**T**he cream of the nation, as the IIT undergraduates are called, are indeed a bright lot. Given their urban, upper-middle class background and the mere achievement oriented goals set for them by their parents and educators, given the raw reality of undeserving success that unquestioning compliance can bring, in a very definitive sense, their tragic surrender to the temptations of Mephistopheles in the shape of modern science and technology should evoke more a feeling of horror at the oppressiveness of the system rather than a sense of self-righteousness. The intensity of the identity crisis that some of the more sensitive among them go through is so shattering that they end up as drug addicts or nervous wrecks or worshippers of Ayn Rand, dogmatic Marxists or Maoists or drop-outs. More frequently they get adjusted to reality and turn great optimisers. They get lost in the maze of examinations, quizzes, good grades, movies, fun and the yearly outrages called 'cultural festivals'. Above all, they look forward to going to the U.S.A.

Years before they go, they dress yankee, talk yankee and behave yankee. A close 30 per cent of the top-most of the graduating students

do end up in the land of honey and milk, a sizeable number of them never to return, to pursue the noble cause of extending the frontiers of science and technology. Of those who do not make the mark, an estimated 70 per cent, with all their mastery of science-based modern engineering knowledge, fit into an assortment of managers, sales and marketing engineers, production executives in the profitable outfits of private enterprises that struggle to cater to the needs of the people. Of the last 20 per cent of IIT products, many scramble for secure positions in government owned industries/laboratories. Those who do not even make that join the post-graduate programmes in the IITs to pursue scholarly work.

**E**ducators' responsibility towards shaping the concerns and value structure of the impressionable youth is as great as the responsibility of the society for preserving the freedom of the educator to discharge his/her role effectively. But in a society where the limits of freedom are determined by subservience to power and the validity of values is to be arbitrated by their conformity to the ideological tenets of modern science and technology, freedom and values become empty words and get subverted by the very persons who are entrusted with the responsibility of promoting them. Operationally, when values become empty words, it is easy for an individual to reduce himself/herself to a mere professional available to render service to the highest bidder.

As part of the cultural apparatus, as paid agents of modern science and technology, faculty members have abandoned their role as educators in a developing country. As professionals, they convert and use educational institutions as instruments for promoting their privileged contact with the West by vigorously advocating the adoption of the latest technological structures of the West that are aimed at the creation of more needs rather than satisfaction of the pressing needs of the millions of this country. With their 'high technology' perceptual framework and training, they find it difficult to explore creative socio-tech-

nological alternatives to meet the requirements for sanitation, health, housing, food, energy, transportation and communication of 500 million 'low-technology' inhabitants in 600 thousand islands of darkness. Indeed, rarely ever are they even sensitive to the issue.

Given this stupendous failure of perception that is not even acknowledged, frequent jaunts abroad under the guise of 'intellectual refuelling' and discharge of the duty of 'co-operating with educational or other institutions in any part of the world' as provided for in the 'Institute of Technology Act 1961', can only mean a subversion of that act, participation in national and international committees can only mean perpetuation of privilege, attendance in conferences and symposia is indistinguishable from mutual back-scratching, obtaining project funds for rural something or the other amounts to fraud and sycophancy. Academic activities not prompted by an honest concern for truth and sensitivity to inequity will sooner or later be questioned and it will be a terrible tragedy if, in the deluge that follows, the liberating role of educational institutions gets washed away. When that happens, educational institutions such as the IITs become centres of oppression.

**T**he workers of every elitist institution in the country are like Harijans in many respects. Their presence, no matter how intense is the desire, cannot be wished away. But their existence has become insufferable to faculty, students, administrators and the government, particularly since the slaves have come to recognize that the masters ought to be more grateful to them than they to the masters. If the sight of a 'rotund', no-longer subservient mess-worker and the crude reality of 'dozens of eggs and kilos of butter vanishing into thin air' are sources of sleepless nights for students and faculty, 'official' inaugural lunches and unofficial benefits of large scale construction activities constitute platforms for the erosion of confidence in authority.

At another level, whereas the faculty and students do perceive tangible evidence of benefits that



can accrue to them through their context-free pursuit of science and technology, the same cannot be said of workers. The resulting feelings of marginality are often accentuated by the clumsy manoeuvres of an unimaginative administration, still steeped in the wisdom of Taylolean management principles, by the divisive and exploitative functioning of trade-union leaders and by the well-meaning rhetoric of a few 'progressives' who learn their radical politics along with their modern science and technology from the prescribed textbooks published in the West

One of the IITs, in its proposals for the sixth five year plan and in a tone that sounds almost confessional, notes that 'The third component in an educational institution is the non-teaching staff, whose support can well determine the success of educational research programmes and the quality of life for the community in the case of a residential campus such as the IITs. While it may not be possible to get this component excited or enthused about the great innovations in education or frontier research going on at the IIT, it is all the same necessary to release their psychological energies for the common good. Many of the supporting staff are at the lower end of the wage structure and their needs are genuine. In any case, to aspire is human, particularly in the surroundings in which one lives.. While putting together a first rate faculty and a pace-setting educational programme were the focal points of the institute in its first decade, the problems of the non-teaching staff moved to the centre of the stage in the second decade and demanded near full time attention of the Institute administration'

**A**dministering educational institutions, at the best of times, is a difficult job. The times we live in, even the administrators would concede, are anything but the best.

Like all administrators, the managers of the IITs declare their commitment to the maxim 'that administration which administers least is the best'. The obvious discrepancy between their belief and practice they trace to the unreasonable attitudes of the administered. Just as

the faculty would maintain that examinations are a necessary evil if only because most of the students are not responsible enough, the Board of Governors would argue that promotions for some and stagnation for others are inevitable if everyone is to exert one's best. As progressive administrators aided by the liberal attitudes of faculty and students, they would contend that permanency of jobs to mess workers in halls of residence is not conducive to discipline

**T**he degrading effects of carrot and stick policies are best illustrated by the following not too infrequent incident that occurred a few years ago. A faculty member who was later to become an elected representative on the Board of Governors of an IIT, when approached to attest his signature to an innocuous memorandum to the Board of Governors, while in total agreement with the spirit of the memorandum, pleaded his inability to put his signature because his long-leave application for a jaunt abroad was going to be taken up for consideration the next day by the authorities. Do not the administrators know what they are talking about when they point to the unreasonable attitudes of the governed or when they make bold to declare that elections are not democratic?

Examples could be multiplied but to do so would be to concede that such administrative perspectives and practices are limited to the IITs. What is perhaps more pertinent is to recognize the reality that pursuers of truth and objective scientific knowledge and practitioners of high technology and frontier research are as compliant a lot as any other.

It is no longer tolerable to have scientists and technologists who are unaware of or indifferent to the social implications of their professional activities any more than it is tolerable to have politicians and administrators occupying positions of power in government and industry who know little or nothing about the ideological thrusts of modern science and technology or of the benefits that subordination of science and technology to social needs can bring.



# Rural—urban divide

DONNA SURI

THERE is a common tendency to view peace as something desirable in itself 'Peace on the campus' is generally understood to signify that all is well in the university students are studying, teachers are teaching, administrators are administering and dharma reigns

When campuses are disturbed, departments closed, exams cancelled and VCs gheraoed, then the typical reaction is to decry the situation as wasteful, irresponsible, unwarranted and/or politically manipulated. Because 'peace' is good, then 'unrest' is bad

In fact, peace may mean many different things. Peace may indeed be a sign of a smooth, rational functioning which keeps all parties relatively satisfied. Peace may also indicate a resigned acceptance of the status quo or a numb indifference to futility. One may have peace by playing on natural human selfishness and self-centeredness — one creates a little island where a selected few are kept relatively happy one way or another and cut off from the harsh realities of the outside world. From the point of view of the unjust, the corrupt, the lazy, the inefficient, peace is what obtains when they can continue their business as usual, unhindered and unquestioned. The obvious point of this long paragraph is that

one should not be unduly enamoured of 'peace on the campus'.

As for 'campus unrest', the phenomenon has neither its beginning nor its end on the campus. Taking specific institutions, case by case, one can of course enumerate the particular issues in each instance — this gives us the 'what' of campus unrest, the 'why' of campus unrest however is found in the contradictions existing within the society as a whole. Except in very rare cases, the battlelines on the campus are drawn along the same old divisions which we encounter everywhere else: caste, class, language and community. These conflicts are everywhere all the time, when they explode on the campus we call them 'campus unrest' but basically the only feature distinguishing campus unrest from the unrest everywhere else is simply that it is acted out on the campus.

So, not only should we be very cautious about taking 'peace on the campus' as an invariably worthy goal but, rather, we should view 'peace on the campus' realistically as an odd and unnatural state, at best, a lull between storms.

One quick look at the social and economic conditions prevailing in the country today are enough to tell us why there is so much unrest on

the campuses. Literacy continues to hover around thirty per cent and the number of illiterates rises with the population, in other words, the efforts and resources devoted to primary education have remained minimal. On the other hand, hardly a year passes without some new university being set up — often for the purpose of pacifying the disgruntled elites of various regions and communities.

A university is like a policeman. One of the reasons society has policemen is to focus violence and discontent in the society: striking workers want to punish their management, they are forced to clash with the police instead. The boss sits cool and comfy while the cop gets the rocks and bottles. Likewise, one of the unintended functions of the university is to provide a limited arena where the tensions of sections of the elite can be diverted, confronted and managed.

I lived in Punjab, on a university campus in Punjab to be precise. The disturbances I have seen on my own and neighbouring campuses have basically had their roots in two major problems, one social, one economic. The social problem relates to the rural-urban tension in Punjab, on the economic side, it is the manifestation of the students' ever-present anxiety over employment.

The rural-urban problem is this: as in all other States, the population of Punjab is predominantly rural although it is debatable as to what extent the rural population is politically dominant. One of the educational policies of the State is to encourage higher education among rural youth, in every course at least a few seats are reserved for rural students. But once admitted, the rural student is forced to adapt quickly to an educational environment geared to the white-collar urban elite. In any situation of drastic compulsory change, there is going to be tension and frustration and the situation is given an even sharper edge when one's future livelihood depends on it.

This problem is set up long before the students enter the university.

From the very beginning of their schooling, children of the urban elite have access to better schools, more varied experiences, a literate culture where education is valued and visible. The village child has none of this. Although Punjab has the highest per capita income in the country, its total literacy rate is thirty-three per cent and rural literacy stands at twenty-seven per cent (1971 figures).

The typical village school in Punjab is a poorly-kept one-room affair with a table and perhaps four chairs for the staff, no library, no laboratory, frequently not even a blackboard. Classes are conducted on the bare, dusty open ground as weather permits. The home environment of most children is hardly conducive to either the will or ability to study and economic conditions make even very young non-workers a luxury few village homes can afford — even if there were to be no outlay for books and pencils.

Under these conditions, any rural student who manages to stay in school up to matric level is a rarity and if their SLC marks are high enough to merit college admission it may be justifiably regarded as an act of God.

At the college level, these rural students are suddenly thrown into competition with urban students — kids who have been aimed at college since the age of five, who moreover are acquainted with many other people who have gone through college and therefore know what to expect. The language problem makes this competition even more difficult. Rural students who have had minimal exposure to English are abruptly cast adrift on a sea of English textbooks and even confronted with lectures and examinations in English.

Moreover, the values and life-style of the urban elite set the standards at the college and university level. While rural students may take some time coming to grips with urban values, the life-style is immediately appreciated: motor scooters, expensive clothes, films and coffee houses and, delight of delights, the

possibility of chatting it up with the opposite sex. While all this is irresistible, it is also frequently unattainable for rural students whose financial and social means limit their participation in the urban elite life-style.

The rural student, desperately trying to cope, gets no help from his urban class-fellows either. The traditional rural culture is one in which a man may trade loyalty for assistance, and personal equations are more important than individual merits or demerits. On entering college the rural student soon learns that the urban student is a highly competitive and individualistic fellow who is, not about to loan his books and notes — much less his tereñe shirt — and who is not interested in having the loyal friendship of his rural classmate.

On the other side of this great divide, the urban student views himself as being in every way superior to the rural student and, since his values are based on the concept of individual merit, he resents the concessions made to rural students as unfair advantages.

Incidentally, this business of concessions brings up another point. Concessions are granted on the basis of certificates obtainable from patwaris and S D M s. Even at this level, influence, connections and a little cash are required. Getting these certificates is less a matter of being entitled to them than of having the means to procure them. This is another sore point with the rural students.

Another characteristic of rural-urban tension, another aspect of the problem, is that the faculty mainly belongs to the urban elite and so naturally has a much better relationship with the urban students. The attitudes of both sides soon harden into active contempt and politicization occurs easily in this highly pressurized environment. The more vocal and visible students on both sides are promptly labelled 'trouble-makers' with the rural 'trouble makers' being regarded with comparatively greater alarm because, since they may have more difficulty in finding an outlet for

their frustration in words, they are more likely to express themselves with muscle-power

**T**wo more factors further exacerbate the situation the faculty and the political parties. Invariably, the faculty is no less faction-ridden and contentious than the students. The various faculty 'parties' find it convenient to use the students to fight their battles and so either align with existing student groups or create little bands of proteges. A good deal of the *nara-bazi* on the campus is incited by faculty members to further their own ends. Needless to say, their own ends rarely concern academic issues or principles, usually the object is either pure self-interest or vendetta.

Then, no political party can do without students. Let alone the parties, every political aspirant would like to have a student reserve army all his own. There's nothing like a persistent and vociferous student agitation to embarrass a sitting government. The students are set upon the war path, confrontation is intensified until the harassed government is forced into committing some stupidity like excessive retaliation, etc., etc. — we all know the story. Students, being young, energetic and idealistic make excellent cannon fodder. They are not yet part of the system so a student death is in many ways cheaper than that of, say, a bank clerk or skilled factory worker — no expense in training a replacement, no widow or orphans to compensate.

For their part, the students are attracted to the parties partly for ideological reasons (particularly in the case of the Leftist parties) and even more because, being in every other respect powerless to affect the forces that dictate their futures, they need the sense of power that political participation provides. Furthermore, paid student cadres are said to receive around Rs 400 per month these days — not bad considering the work involved.

The rural-urban split shows up in party preferences also. Most rural students favour one or another Leftist party, well-to-do rural Sikh students come under the wings of

various Akali Dal leaders and the Jan Sangh (by any other name) attracts the urban Hindu students to its A B V P. Interestingly, there is an increasing participation by girl students, at least to the extent of student election canvassing.

Coming to the second major source of tension the anxiety over employment is present from the very first year of college and increases with every passing year until, finally, by the time the student has at last exhausted his financial, emotional and intellectual means to study any further, it has reached the proportions of a genuine psychosis. Frequently, the crisis is reached around the age of twenty-seven at which time the doors of government service snap firmly and irrevocably shut.

**T**he soft option is to go on acquiring M A after M A finally coming to the L L B as a preliminary to enrolling in a commercial institute for typing and shorthand. With each added degree, the student justly feels himself qualified for increasingly better jobs, paradoxically, however, his hope of actually finding employment commensurate with his qualifications decreases. Jobs commanding the desired status and salary are few and the procedure for landing them is often both costly and humiliating. (It is alleged that the posts available through the Punjab Public Service Commission are priced from a minimum of Rs 30,000 for a lecturer's post to Rs 1 lakh for a P C S selection.) This is where contacts count and here, again, the urban student often has an edge over his rural counterpart.

Corruption aside, the search for a job itself is an expensive pastime. For example, the application fee for the bank probationary officers' examination is Rs 40, add another Rs 10 for a photograph and letter registration. The examination and interview will be held in either Delhi or Chandigarh so going, staying and returning will require around Rs 200. This outlay is a bit stiff even for the average urban student and for the rural student it is nearly impossible. How many such interviews can a student

appear for? On top of this he knows that often the interview is a mere formality preceding the already-settled appointment of somebody's nephew.

**T**o make the situation even more poignant, the rural student finds it extremely difficult to go back to his village. There is nothing there to engage him mentally now, and — worse — he will have to bear the taunts of his fellow villagers regarding the fruits, or rather fruitlessness, of his 'higher' education. Furthermore, the parents of these students, who have never gone through an ordeal quite like their sons, find it difficult to understand how, after all those years of work and sacrifice, he has not succeeded in fulfilling their ambitions. Even they accuse and abuse him. So the student is caught in a situation where he can go neither backward nor forward.

In comparison with either their villages or the job-market, most students find their campus a charmingly restful place even when it looks like a police camp. In its sheltering confines a student can maintain at least an illusion of self-respect which he cannot in the outside world.

This then is a picture of the world as seen through the eyes of university students in Punjab — for the rural students especially, it is a portrait in black. Unrest on these campuses is just like rain: the atmosphere is forever overcast with heavy clouds of resentment, frustration and futility, any tiny particle of an issue, whether this particle occurs spontaneously or is 'seeded' by interested parties, is enough to precipitate an agitation. So long as these clouds remain (and they are not blowing over tomorrow by any means) the storms of campus unrest are a hundred times more definite than the monsoon in Bombay.

Unrest is the logical, expected, normal state of affairs on Punjab campuses today and, in spite of the waste of time and money caused by frequent commotions, perhaps an honest unrest is preferable to a false peace.

# The communal slant

NEENA VYAS

LAST year's prolonged agitation at Aligarh Muslim University which led to its complete closure for several months cannot be dismissed as just one more instance of the growing student unrest on our campuses — a phenomenon that is making front-page news almost every day

Inextricably linked to the flare up at AMU are issues and problems related to the basic questions of secularism, the growing frustration and disenchantment among the minorities (especially the Muslims), the right to freedom of expression and the erosion of academic atmosphere on our campuses, the increasing attacks on even liberal bourgeois democratic values and the much wider and more important question of why and where the recent trend of communal and caste based politics is leading us

How did this student agitation to demand the suspension and expulsion of Professor Irfan Habib start? Why did the university allow itself to be bullied by students, the 'millat' and the politicians into suspending a professor for over seven months when all along it must have known that the so-called charges against him were baseless? Was the agitation also used by the 'millat' to get more concessions out of the government on the important amendment to the

AMU Act which came into effect this February?

These questions arise because Professor Habib is not only one of India's most eminent historians but also someone who can legitimately claim the most personal and emotional attachment with the university in which his father taught, where he himself was a student and where he has been teaching for the last 27 years and is now the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences. Therefore, it is pertinent to ask how and why this agitation was begun and to what purpose?

One can only agree with Saiyid Hamid, who became Vice-Chancellor in June 1980 during the agitation, when he said that 'there is more to it than meets the eye.' The agitation forced government to close the university after an unprecedented military like operation and evict nearly 10,000 resident students from the hostels within 24 hours. Carried out with precision, there was perfect coordination between the railways, the police, road transport and even the banking system which enabled the District Administration to complete the procedures without a single scuffle. At the end of it, 213 students had been arrested and at that point it seemed as if government had

made up its mind not to tolerate the extreme demands being made by the students.

However, the situation changed very soon. After hectic lobbying by ministers, parliamentarians and all those claiming to be leaders of the Muslim community, the government virtually did an about-turn, presumably to appease so-called Muslim sentiment. The 213 students who were arrested on January 31 were released unconditionally, and it is reported that this was done through direct political intervention although the District Administration had specific charges against some of the ring leaders. It was decided to reopen the university in phases — this process was completed between March 2 and April 2. And, finally, the Vice-Chancellor issued a charge-sheet to Professor Irfan Habib, which many think is without any legal, let alone moral, sanction. One can safely presume that all these actions had the blessings of government and were taken in consultation with it although ministers have been talking about non-intervention in the 'internal' affairs of an autonomous university. In fact, the decisions were taken at a meeting in Delhi in early February attended by the Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister, some MPs and also some Muslim 'leaders.'

There is hardly a person who looks upon himself as a leader of the Muslim community in India who does not claim Aligarh as his Alma Mater. The status and fate of AMU has thus become a highly emotional issue — it is almost as if Aligarh graduates suffer from a kind of Oedipus complex. It is thus that the hopes and aspirations of the Muslim community have become identified with AMU and its future. The politicians, with an eye on the supposedly rich Muslim vote bank, have also played upon this sentiment and have contributed to projecting the 'Islamization' of the university as being identical to the cause and welfare of the Muslim community in general, and education of Muslims in particular.

Although the recent agitation was, on the face of it, not linked

directly to the question of the minority character of the university (a Bill to amend the AMU Act specifically to bestow on it a minority character was moved in Parliament in December 1980, just before the agitation started, and was passed a year later) a close scrutiny of statements of acknowledged leaders of AMU students and politicians reveals that this issue was very much on their minds, and may have been, in fact, the heart of the matter. Of course, a number of other developments in the university — not the least important was the appointment of Hamid as the new Vice-Chancellor — coincided with this to create a situation which led to the agitation.

Although much has been already said and written about the shocking events that forced Professor Habib to live under the shadow of police protection for almost a whole year and during the course of which the most ridiculous 'charges' were levied against him, it will be necessary to recall the major events that led to the climax of the agitation — the gherao of the Vice-Chancellor's lodge for several days, the blatantly communal and obscene posters and slogans and the complete closure of the university on January 31, 1981, and eviction of students from the hostel followed by the announcement of an inquiry into 'charges' against Irfan Habib by Khalil Ahmed, a retired judge of the Orissa High Court. Still later came the suspension from university service of Professor Habib. Behind each of these events there is a sordid story.

It was in June 1980 that Hamid took up his new assignment. He has himself said that he took the job as a challenge and wanted to do something positive for the university where he had been a student. He has stated that earlier the university had seen 'an erosion of discipline' and that the new administration was 'trying to break with the past' which led to 'alienation of certain vested interests.'

Hamid had to cope with a number of legacies which his predecessor, A.M. Khusro, had left behind. In the previous five years, the system

of the Vice-Chancellor nominating students for admission — a system that is unique at AMU — had led to a situation where student 'dadas' could virtually dictate nominations. These in turn were used by the students to increase their own influence among students. Some students even sold the admissions and made it a lucrative business, which Hamid himself has admitted. Moreover, another system, that of keeping a large number of seats for 'internal' students (students from the three schools run by the university), made this all-India university a preserve of the western Uttar Pradesh Muslim, and it progressively lost its national character. The system of nominated admissions and reserved seats for 'internal' candidates also had disastrous effects on the quality of students who were admitted, and seriously affected its claim to being *the* university for the advancement of education among Muslims.

This systematic appeasement of student 'dadas' and the indiscriminate way in which A.M. Khusro used his power of nominations for admissions over a period of years led to a complete erosion of discipline. According to some teachers at AMU, Khusro also took some decisions to appease the Students Islamic Movement, the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, perhaps with an eye on the Islamic Secretariat. One such example they cite is that of banning the participation of women students in theatrical activity on the campus. Dr. Khusro justified this by saying that dancing was un-Islamic. More recently, at AMU, there have been protests against women playing tennis.

Today, everyone—from the Vice-Chancellor down to the student leaders — agrees that the new administration headed by Hamid tried to put a stop to some of these malpractices. It was about this time that Irfan Habib became the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for a period of two years (the Deanship is given by rotation to professors on the basis of seniority), and as Dean he had a say in all policies relating to the Faculty, besides being responsible for discipline

in the Faculty. He was thus in fact helping Hamid to implement some of the new measures.

Nominations by the Vice-Chancellor for admissions were to be done on the basis of merit, discipline at examinations as to be taken more seriously and efforts were made to cleanse the university hostels of 'some anti-social elements that might have used it as a convenient shelter from the law enforcing district authorities', to use the words of a university spokesman. It was obvious that many vested interests were being hurt by the new Vice-Chancellor, but he enjoyed the support of the government and the confidence of the Muslim 'leaders' (Hamid describes himself as erring on the side of conservatism rather than radicalism), and it was therefore difficult for those hurt by his policies to start an agitation against him directly.

Matters came to a head when at the end of that year he brought in a Pro-Vice-Chancellor all the way from Kerala when many senior members of the Faculty had been hoping for this job themselves. A powerful lobby within the Faculty, a group which had also for long been unhappy with Irfan Habib, set to work to try and undo this. Some excuse had to be found.

It was against this background that the Discipline Committee decided on December 13, 1980, to expel Manzar Safi, who was not only caught cheating at examinations but was also testified by the Aligarh District authorities to be a 'known criminal' who had been 'involved in the Sambhal riots'. Irfan Habib, as Dean, was one of those who pushed through the rustication of Manzar Safi. Later, after the university's closure on January 31, Safi was described by Rajiv Ratan Shah, District Magistrate, as the 'mastermind behind the agitation against Professor Habib', and he declared that Safi was 'wanted under the National Security Act'.

Safi was finally expelled from the University on December 24, 1980, and soon after this four members of the AMU students' union cabinet wrote to the Vice-Chancellor to say that a 'leftist lobby' in the univer-

sity 'led by Professor Habib' had conspired to get Safi rusticated and warned that 'a decisive confrontation' would take place between the supporters of Irfan Habib and the students over the issue of rustication when the university reopened on January 5, 1981. A press release saying this was given by the students to newspaper offices in Delhi. Another group of students, with the expelled Manzar Safi as convenor, in an open letter to Hamid dated December 23, 1980, demanded the 'removal of Professor Habib from Deanship' and charged him with 'grave acts of misbehaviour and misconduct' towards student leaders during an incident on December 17. The incident the students referred to was in fact the one in which Irfan Habib was surrounded by nearly 500 slogan shouting boys demanding relaxation of examination rules in violation of university regulations and statutes.

All this took place long before January 13, 1981, when an interview given by Irfan Habib to an *Indian Express* correspondent was published. The interview has since been cited by the students as the sole cause for their demand for the suspension and expulsion of Professor Habib. It was this interview that became the basis for a charge-sheet issued to Professor Habib by the Vice-Chancellor on February 13-14, 1981 and also became the subject of an inquiry by Khalil Ahmed, former judge of the Patna High Court. It was obvious to everyone that the agitation had nothing to do with the interview and was in fact planned several weeks earlier.

Meanwhile, several incidents of violence took place on the campus and on December 11 Professor Habib asked for police protection. On December 17, a crowd of 500 to 600 boys collected outside Professor Habib's office and, shouting *murda-bad* slogans, demanded concessions in examination rules which he told them he was unable to give. Although the Proctor and the officiating Vice-Chancellor were witness to this, no action was taken against the boys for this incident. Professor Habib had to be rescued by his colleagues and the net result was that, later, under instructions from

the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Habib announced relaxation of rules for examinations while the university administration postponed examinations twice, first from December 20 to 24 and then again to January 5, 1981. On December 18-19, the atmosphere on the campus was so charged that the university officially advised Professor Habib not to come to the campus as it feared an attack on him. It must again be emphasized that this was before the *Indian Express* interview.

By this time it was clear that the campus toughs were combining with the academically weaker students to whip up an agitation against Professor Habib, and indirectly Hamid, to check the university administration's efforts to maintain some discipline. At this juncture, the few concessions made by the Vice-Chancellor only emboldened them as they saw signs of the administration softening under pressure. In fact throughout the agitation it was clear that each time the administration showed signs of giving in the agitation was intensified.

It was at this point that the *Indian Express* interview appeared and the agitators immediately clutched on to it and demanded once again and even more loudly that Professor Habib should be suspended for defaming the 'fair' name of their beloved Alma Mater. It was for the moment forgotten by everyone that in the interview Professor Habib had said nothing more than what many others, including the student leaders, the teachers and even the Vice-Chancellor, had been saying both privately and publicly.

Step by step the students intensified their agitation and kept raising their demands. On January 18 they started a *dharna* outside the Vice-Chancellor's residence, on January 23 they extracted an assurance from him that Professor Habib would not be allowed to attend a special convocation being held in honour of Nobel Laureate, Abdus Salam, and emboldened by this 'victory' they started an indefinite 'gherao' of the Vice-Chancellor on January 25 to demand Professor Habib's suspension from the office of the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences. On

January 30, they intensified their agitation further and announced the start of a relay hunger strike and hundreds of students camped in his lawns. It was only then that Hamid closed the University *si-e die* on January 31, 1981

It was also in this charged atmosphere, with students shouting *murda* slogans against Professor Habib demanding 'nothing less than his expulsion,' that the university authorities decided to hold an emergency meeting of the Executive Council on January 26. Members of the Council were given barely 20 minutes notice to attend it, some were virtually prevented from attending as it was being held at the Vice Chancellor's lodge which was under *gherao* and the atmosphere was described as 'hostile' to some. The notice for the meeting was not accompanied with any agenda papers, contrary to all rules, and was not even signed by the Registrar, the only officer authorized to send such a notice. Many members have seriously questioned the legality of the meeting and its decisions. It was the mob of students outside which decided to allow the meeting to be held to enable the Vice-Chancellor to take a 'decision' against Professor Habib. And the Council obliged the students.

It was at this meeting that the university decided to set up a fact finding inquiry into the *Indian Express* report of January 13. A member of the Council, Dr K P Singh, has described the 'meeting' as totally illegal and has said that 'only a person with no respect for truth can say that its decision on that day was taken free from duress.' He has said that the Council was locked in by a 'howling mob' which was demanding action against Professor Habib and threatening to imprison all the members if they did not do so. The atmosphere was so violent that Hamid had to 'persuade' the members who dissented not to get their dissent recorded on the plea that if the students came to know of it they would make it difficult for them.

Even this illegal action of the Council had no effect on the students who rejected the Council

resolution as it fell short of their demand for the suspension of Professor Habib. The students announced their decision to continue the agitation.

Meanwhile, the AMU Administration decided to reopen the university and, perhaps, to ensure that the university would function smoothly, it had to find some way to satisfy the students. That came by way of an incident during a Deans' meeting on August 1, 1981 just a few days before the university was to reopen. Professor Rahman Ali Khan of the Law Faculty, who was known to be close to the students leading the agitation, tried to stop the Registrar from briefing the Deans about the 'negotiations' that were taking place between the Vice-Chancellor and the students. When Professor Habib protested that there were some at the meeting who wanted to know the facts, there was an altercation between Professor Habib and Professor Khan. According to a statement of the other Deans who were present, Professor Habib asked Professor Khan to 'behave soberly' (*hosh mein rahiye*) and Professor Khan then lost his temper and abused Professor Habib threatening to break all his teeth and have him beaten with shoes. He also got up from his chair and went towards Professor Habib and had to be stopped from physically assaulting Professor Habib by the others present.

Instead of taking action against Professor Rahman Ali Khan, the Vice Chancellor's response to the incident was prompt suspension of both Professor Habib and Professor Khan. He also ordered an inquiry. It was clear that the incident had given him the excuse to suspend Professor Habib and buy peace on the campus. It was obvious that the suspension was the result of the student demand rather than the incident.

All this while a no-holds barred campaign was unleashed against Professor Habib and many vested interests, including some in the Faculty, no doubt believed that the agitation could also force Hamid to quit. Religion began to be used to play upon the sentiments

of the students and the campaign was given a dangerous twist, with the agitators calling upon the students to defend the Muslim faith from the onslaught by Marxists led by Professor Habib. The 'logic' of the argument was that Professor Habib was a Marxist and an atheist and therefore he had no business 'in the land of Sir Syed.'

In the heat of the campaign, the student leaders forgot that they had made similar, and in fact even stronger, statements on the functioning of the university than those made by Professor Habib in the January 13 interview. Irfanullah Khan, president of the students' union, had himself stated in a local journal, *Khair-O-Khabar*, April 1980 issue, that lawlessness and disorder had created a dangerous situation on the campus and that 'some criminal elements want to destroy the peace in our Alma Mater.' He had further quoted a teacher of the university as saying that 'if I were an employer I would not employ AMU graduates as they have not read anything.' One of the main objections to Professor Habib's interview to the *Indian Express* raised by Khan and the student leadership was that he was reported to have said that AMU graduates were being black-listed even by Muslim firms, and that the university must take the hard decision to enforce discipline in examinations if the university's degrees were not to be devalued.

In the June 1980 issue of the *Aligarhian*, edited by student leader M. Furqan, an article written by Sakahuddin Tariq describes the 'agonizing nepotism and adhocism' on the campus and adds that Sir Syed, the founder of AMU 'would have felt suffocated in the AMU atmosphere these days.' He goes on to say 'we see today that knives and pistols are used daily.. the agitational approach has become a way of life in Aligarh.' In another article in the same issue a number of violent incidents on the campus are mentioned.. 'the law and order situation went from bad to worse. A number of criminal cases including a bomb blast in Habib Hall took place. In one stabbing incident



Zaheer Aslam... succumbed to his injuries. In Kennedy Hall Muzaffar was seriously wounded and hospitalized. The article adds that the 'sad and unique' feature of the university is the large number of admissions which are 'done under duress and by force.' In still another article, the writer, Akbar Ehsan, talks about the 'mean looking flick knives' which have become so common on the campus and the presence of 'certain agent provocateurs' about whom the Proctorial office was aware.

The irony of all this is that Irfanullah Khan, president of the Students' Union, who led the agitation against Professor Habib, is described as the 'censor' of the magazine in its print-line. It becomes obvious that the so-called 'derogatory remarks' made by Professor Habib about the functioning of the university in the *Indian Express* interview were just an excuse used by those backing the student agitation. The real reason for their anger was something quite different.

It was at this time, after January 13, that the character of the agitation also began to change with the Students Islamic Movement, student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, circulating a leaflet among the students, calling upon Hamid to 'take advantage of loopholes in the law to throw him (Irfan Habib) out of the university.' It called Habib's views 'inimical to Islam' and warned that if he were not thrown out now 'there would arise not one but hundreds of Irfan Habibs from amongst the staff who would start giving anti-Islamic statements and render the Muslims helpless.'

The same leaflet said that the Islamic community had rejected the AMU Acts of 1951, 1965 and 1972 and had decided to launch a struggle to have these changed and to preserve the 'original milieu of the university.' Encouraging the Vice-Chancellor to 'circumvent the laws, it said that it was only by breaking the laws that the Muslims had been able to preserve certain special features at AMU, like starting functions with recitations from the *Koran*. Otherwise, 'we would have to build temples side by side with

mosques' and that 'would be intolerable to us.' It promised Hamid that if the SIM demand for expulsion of Professor Habib by whatever means possible is conceded, 'we assure you no other demand will be raised.'

The walls of the campus were plastered with slogans like 'Communist Dog Irfan Habib,' 'Death to Communism,' 'AMU is not Poland' (whatever they meant by that) and 'Long Live Islam.' The character of the agitation, which had started with the support of campus toughs and those caught cheating at examinations and who had a vested interest in a corrupt system of admissions and examinations, changed as the Jamaat-e-Islami jumped on to the bandwagon. Perhaps the Jamaat saw in it an opportunity to rid the university of 'traitors' to the Muslim faith and therefore a virtual 'jihad' was declared against Irfan Habib. This has to be seen against the background of earlier incidents in the university when teachers were made to pay for expressing secular opinions. Ali Yavar Jung, Maulana Azad, Rais Ahmed and many others were the targets of attack by AMU students in the past.

It is no secret that the agitation also had the support, and was perhaps even guided by, a well-entrenched group in the Faculty Inter-departmental rivalries, academic disputes in the history department and other issues got involved, and perhaps many feared that they would not be able to have their way in the matter of appointments during Habib's tenure as Dean. In this connection, Professor K A Nizami's name is linked with those guiding the agitation. His known proteges were among those who signed obscene leaflets against Professor Habib.

A senior official in the University Grants Commission points out that Professor Habib's Deanship coincides with the release of a number of Sixth Plan posts in the universities. During his Deanship many of these posts were to be filled and it is because the vested interests knew that Professor Habib would stand no nonsense — he has been described ever by his detractors as a 'stickler for rules' and 'obstinately

self-righteous' — that a hue and cry was made about his Deanship. Mr Safi in a statement to the press (during his dramatic arrest under the NSA in Delhi last year) accused Professor Habib of wanting to manipulate appointments. But as anyone familiar with the method of selection in central universities knows, one man cannot manipulate appointments but he can certainly prevent manipulation of appointments. This would queer the pitch for those interested in particular appointments.

Religion was conveniently used by the agitators to whip up a disgusting communal frenzy — something which can be easily done almost any time anywhere in India. It is not as if the student leaders themselves were communal, but they did allow themselves to be used by communal forces. What was perhaps not fully realized by them was that this kind of communal frenzy could only give dangerous legitimacy to the far more powerful and sinister variety of communalism, the RSS variety. And the Muslims, particularly in Aligarh, should know what communalism means, and how they have, in one riot after another, been the victims of the most vicious form of this disease.

Since the Emergency, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the RSS have been working in close cooperation, 'the communalism of one nicely feeding on that of the other,' as one teacher in AMU said. The RSS has been virtually silent on the recent communal character of the flare up, and not surprisingly. It is waiting for an opportune moment. Recently, the president of the Banaras Hindu University Teachers' Association, Dipak Malik, said that he would not be surprised if the RSS were to raise the question of the 'character' of some other central universities now that the 'minority character' of AMU had been conceded by the government. The Hindu Communalists have for long been demanding another 'Hindu' university in Aligarh too.

The Aligarh Muslim University has become a springboard for those among the Muslims who aspire for 'leadership' of the 'millat'. Those



who make good here can also hope to get lucrative assignments in the oil-rich Middle East. Hamid has had to stop some members of the AMU faculty from going abroad on these lucrative jobs as it would have affected teaching at AMU. This also was resented by those who were denied the chance of a lifetime to make some money.

For these reasons, 'leadership' of major agitations at AMU has also become an asset in the later struggle for a slot in the national political machine. The spectacle of almost all the political parties, barring the Left, actively supporting Muslim communalism at AMU, is just one more aspect of the wider national scene in which caste and communal politics are playing an increasingly important and dangerous role. The consideration seems to be immediate electoral gains. How else could one explain Mrs Gandhi's complete surrender to the 'millat' on the new AMU Act Amendment Bill?

The new Act, by redefining AMU as an 'educational institution of their choice established by the Muslims of India', has cleared the way for litigation and revision of an earlier Supreme Court judgement declaring that AMU was not a minority institution under article 30 of the Constitution. The definition has deliberately used the same language as that used to describe minority institutions under article 30.

The amendment has changed the composition of the University Court and the Executive Council. The Court is expected to be dominated by the most conservative sections among the Muslims and will now be the supreme governing body. Another important change relates to the manner of appointment of the Vice-Chancellor. The Executive Council will prepare a panel of five names for the post and this will be placed before the Court. The Court will then select three out of the panel of five and forward these names to the Visitor who will then select and appoint one of the panel. This has been described as an extraordinary procedure which will give vested interests the opportunity to drag into the mud the reputation

of anyone on the Executive Council panel whom they do not like. Not many serious minded academicians would like to be tried by the AMU Court.

L. S.

The fate of AMU has become a highly emotional issue and liberal opposition to giving minority status, or a communal status to any university for that matter, is misconstrued because of a sort of siege mentality. Muslims in this country have been at the receiving end during violent and sporadic outbursts of communal violence and anyone opposing a 'Muslim' demand — in this case, minority status for AMU — is immediately dubbed as being anti-Muslim. Even those opposing minority status for AMU, including Irfan Habib, do not oppose reservation of seats for Muslim students on an all-India basis. However, it has been pointed out that there are constitutional hurdles in the way of making such reservations.

Linked to this question of minority status for the university is that of service conditions of teachers. During the recent agitation it was unashamedly said that Professor Habib had no right to teach in a Muslim University since he was not a believer. If this was the state of affairs when it was a central university established by an Act of Parliament, one can well imagine what might happen now that it is 'established by the Muslims of India'. At Khalsa College, Delhi University, last year a woman lecturer was forced to take long leave without salary as she had cut her hair. In a notice on the college board the men lecturers were also admonished for showing disrespect to their beards by trimming them. They were warned not to set bad examples to the younger generation.

There are many who feel that the self-styled leaders of the 'millat' have a vested interest in keeping alive the issues of AMU as a minority institution, personal law and Urdu. What will Muslim leaders do if these problems are solved? The AMU issue is one of the problems that has kept the Muslim leadership going, a leadership which is not going to allow anyone to settle the problem easily.

# At elite level

USHA RAI

TO be a student or a teacher at the Jawaharlal Nehru University is indeed a much coveted honour. JNU, as it is popularly known, has a magnificent campus, some of the finest intellectuals on its faculty, subjects that are unique because they are not disciplines in themselves but broad based and multi-dimensional. Above all, there is tremendous academic freedom for the teacher as well as the taught

Despite all this, JNU has not soared to the heights it was expected to by its founders. Some have even termed it a 'non-starter' and others are asking why a campus with just 3,000 students (the strength of two colleges of the neighbouring Delhi University) should receive such special treatment from the University Grants Commission.

A university which in its admission policy seeks to reach out to the economically, socially, regionally and educationally backward and deprived today, ironically enough, occupies a very privileged position in the echelons of higher learning. The financial grants to the JNU are more than to other institutions of learning. In the fifth plan period, JNU's total allocation was Rs 8 crores although a substantial part of

it was, of course, for the development of the university. The average annual maintenance expenditure is Rs. 1.5 crores. On the library alone, Rs. 8 lakhs were spent in the last three years.

For the 3,000 students, some doing part-time courses, JNU has a faculty of 300 teachers. The teacher/student ratio of about 1 to 10 is the envy of other universities. In Delhi University it is 1:15 or 20. Surprisingly, at the school level where individual attention is most vital, a teacher has to handle a classroom of 45 to 50 students.

A big drain on the JNU resources are the office staff and class four employees numbering some 800. The library alone has a staff of 100 and is yet not properly managed.

For a university just 13 years old, the JNU has a vast campus. There is a new campus and the old campus. There are seven hostels, 200 houses for its staff and some quarters for the class three and four employees.

The JNU was modelled on the lines of the famous Sussex University of Britain. The basic concept was that it would not be divided



**FOUR  
SWAN  
FABRICS**

**FOR ENCHANTING SHADES  
IN COTTON AND BLENDED TEXTURES**

Pamper your every whim and fancy with Four Swan Fabrics  
in cotton and Polyester/cotton blends. Crease-resistant  
Four Swan fabrics come in a wide range of colours and prints.

*Manufactured by:*


**THE VICTORIA MILLS LTD., BOMBAY.**



**MANGALDAS  
GROUP MILLS**

**TEXTILES, SUGAR,  
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS,  
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,  
JANASPATI, PVC, RAYON TYRE CORD,  
FERTILIZERS,  
ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS,  
IRON CASTINGS.**

**IN THE  
SERVICE OF  
THE NATION**



**THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD., DELHI**

**Aspects of Indo-British Economic  
Relations 1858-1898**

A K BANERJI

This work deals with India's external financial transactions during 1858-98 in the course of developing balance of payment estimates for these years, and much new data have been presented. Even though the volume concentrates on an earlier period, the estimates presented in it also provide a broad picture of India's balance of payments for the 81 years from 1858 to 1938. A conspectus of this in the last chapter will interest students of political and economic history

Rs 120

**Subaltern Studies 1**

**Writings on South Asian History and Society**  
EDITED BY RANAJIT GUHA

The aim of the present collection of essays, the first of a series, is to promote a systematic and informed discussion of subaltern themes in the field of South Asian studies. The contributors to this and subsequent volumes of *Subaltern Studies* focus attention on what Gramsci called the subaltern classes and their condition and also re-examine well-known events and themes in this new, more rounded perspective. The contributions encompass history, politics, economics and sociology, attitudes, ideologies and belief systems

Rs 90

**A History of Anthropological Thought**  
Professor Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard  
EDITED BY ANDRE SINGER

Professor Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard has been described as the greatest social anthropologist of his generation. This book is the legacy that a great teacher leaves behind him, compiled from the completed chapters, drafts and notes that were found at his desk. As such, it is not only indispensable for all students of social anthropology, it is also the nearest that Evans-Pritchard ever came to a systematic interpretation of the history and development of his subject

Rs 150

**The Oxford-Duden Pictorial English Dictionary**

Certain kinds of information can be conveyed more readily and clearly by pictures than by definitions and explanations alone. In this dictionary, a completely revised edition of *The English Duden* (1960), some 28,000 objects from the whole range of technical activities and everyday situations are both named and illustrated. The subjects covered include typical scenes in domestic and working life, recreation and sport, flora and fauna, industry, the arts, science, and technology. There is also a complete index of words illustrated

£ 7 50



**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj,  
New Delhi 110002

Bombay Calcutta Madras

**ATTENTION STEEL MILLS  
&  
FOUNDRIES  
EXPORTERS OF WORLD FAMOUS SANDUR  
MANGANESE ORE  
OFFER  
EX-STOCK  
VERY LOW PHOS. PIG IRON  
AND  
LOW ALUMINIUM FERROSILICON  
PRODUCED IN THEIR PLANT AT  
VYASANKERE**

*Please Contact*

**THE SANDUR  
MANGANESE & IRON  
ORES LIMITED**

**"LOHADRI BHAVAN"**

Yeshwant Nagar-583124:

Via Sandur, Bellary Dt.

Karnataka INDIA

*Cable:* SMIORE, SANDUR (INDIA)

*Telephone:* SANDUR 33, 61, 91 :

*Telex:* BANGALORE 427

Bangalore : 32175 28262 .

into water-tight compartments but would encourage team work among scholars of different disciplines. Subjects were therefore supposed to be unique.

**S**even schools were originally planned but so far only six have come up. The school for fine arts has yet to materialise. The School of International Studies that functioned in Sapru House from 1958 was amalgamated into the JNU in 1970. Similarly, the school of languages, incorporating the old institute of Russian languages and literature, was started in the early sixties.

JNU's school of languages is indeed special. Under one roof a dozen languages are taught. These include Arabic, Persian, Pushtu, Korean, Uzbek, Spanish, German and French.

The school for social sciences has centres for social system (sociology and anthropology) and a centre for regional development (geography, economics and demography). The school of life sciences has no centre but it covers basic subjects like botany and zoology. The school for environmental sciences too has no centre but its basic disciplines are physics and chemistry.

The school of computer sciences is the smallest and is as good as non-existent. What greater testimony can there be to the school's inefficiency than the fact that the department's only computer, a Bulgarian model, barely functions although it is only five years old. A sizable chunk of the data that has to be processed by the faculty and the students is done by computers in the IIT and Delhi University. For the last couple of months, JNU's computer has only been processing salary bills.

Since JNU was developed as a research centre and not just a teaching centre like other universities, it began at the top with Ph.D. and M.Phil. facilities. It is only later that M.A. classes were started on the campus. There are no graduate classes although at one time there was tremendous political pressure to make JNU the south campus of

Delhi University with graduate courses.

If JNU's achievement is to be measured in the number of Ph.D.s and M.Phils produced annually, the university does not fare too badly. On an average every school produces 30 to 40 M.Phils and 10 Ph.D.s a year. The more enterprising teachers do research, some of it supported by the UGC, the ICSSR and the Planning Commission. Some teachers have written several books. A teacher with 10 years' experience has on an average written two books or important monographs and articles.

**B**ut, the question is, has the basic concept of multi-disciplinary approach for research been achieved? Papers are too deeply rooted in their disciplines, says a critic of the JNU. One reason for this is the faulty guidance of teachers who themselves have never had a multi-disciplinary approach. So though the university boasts of its own ethos and a comprehensive understanding and assessment of a subject, it is really old wine in new bottles.

In spite of the flexibility in the system, the centres are becoming water-tight compartments. Several faculty members discourage students from taking up allied courses. For example, a student doing an M.A. in geography is not encouraged to take courses in the centre for social systems or economic studies. This is not done in a blatant, open manner but quietly and subtly. 'Faculties are like animals trying to protect their own territory,' says a teacher who has served JNU since its inception.

In the School of International Studies a student who has enrolled for international politics is not encouraged by his faculty to join another course in the same centre. This could be because enrolments were so few in some centres that teachers were reluctant to part with the few students they had.

In the school of languages for teaching Persian, there is a faculty of six teachers. And annually not more than four students apply for

Persian studies. So at times a teacher has just one student and he clings to him. Uzbek and Pushtu too have very few students.

But there are others who feel that these are merely problems of a growing university. The language school was started with the concept that all languages of the Asian region should be studied. But interest so far is limited to the more glamorous languages. There are 250 students for French and 15 teachers. It will take time for people to develop an academic interest in languages of the Asian region but this does not mean that JNU can afford to dispense with them, says another teacher.

It may be as the result of having so few students that there is a race among faculty members to build up their own little empires. The centre for science policy, for example, has remained stunted because of the infighting among faculty members. Formal courses for an M.Sc. degree have never been held at the centre. Many of the students who enrolled for M.Phil. and Ph.D. have left in disgust. For five years now the centre has come to a virtual standstill. Three years ago there was even a recommendation to close it down. Not a single doctorate has been awarded by this centre.

**I**n the rapid development of the early years, a lot of teachers seem to have been wrongly placed. A senior teacher in the centre for science policy has done his M.A. and Ph.D. in philosophy. The centre for political studies has a sociologist on its faculty. Neither teacher has been able to give his best to his centre. The School of International Studies has a geographer in its faculty of historians and political scientists. The purpose of these placements was of course to give a broad base to research projects. But, alas, this has not happened. The geographer has four Ph.D. and six M.Phil. scholars under him but in terms of formal course teaching he teaches barely an hour a day. The same holds true for the sociologist.

The history centre too has a sociologist who has a communica-

tion problem with the rest of the faculty. The school of languages has a specialist in philosophy who does not know any foreign language.

**T**he fact that JNU has not been able to live up to the ideals for which it was started and the large amount spent on it have naturally led to criticism of the institute. The dominant leftist ideology on the campus is good enough reason for the politicians to take up cudgels for its dilution.

JNU is probably more left oriented than other universities in the country except perhaps Calcutta university. The leftist seeds were sown right from the time of its inception. The first Vice-Chancellor, G. Parthasarathy, was a man of vision but he had a partiality for the Left and associated elements. Dr. Nurul Hasan, who was a member of the first executive Council of the JNU (1969-1972) and later education minister, and P. C. Joshi of the Communist Party greatly influenced Parthasarathy's administration of the JNU. They collected the faculty which was left oriented, and the faculty in turn collected a coterie of leftist scholars and students.

The left leanings are quite apparent during the election of student and teacher leaders. The Students Federation of India, a CPM body, has dominated student elections for 10 years now. In the teaching staff, also, the leftist group is more prominent.

In the JNUTA elections, too, the leftists have dominated. While 50 to 60 per cent of the teachers are Left inclined — both CPI and CPM together form a united left front — the rest are a loose group that come together on regional and personal issues. Except for a few dedicated party workers, the JNU leftists are largely affluent, arm-chair intellectuals far removed from the committed activists working at the base.

Both the All-India Students Federation (AISF) and the Students Federation of India (SFI) play an important role in ensuring JNU's leftism. During admission time both

groups actively advise and help students to get admission and accommodation in the hostel. These students feel obliged to support these leaders though they lack an ideological base.

The admission policy of JNU has come in for severe criticism. Apart from reservation of 20 per cent of the seats for scheduled castes and tribes and another three per cent for the handicapped, points are given for admission purposes to scheduled castes and tribes (6 points), economically deprived, backward or those whose parents earn between Rs. 400 and Rs. 1000 (7 points), educationally backward (3 points) and those from backward regions (4 points). The purpose of these points was to encourage students from all over the country to join JNU. But so many false certificates have been produced that the authorities are reviewing JNU's admission policy. Are the academic standards of JNU falling because of its admission policy?

**M**uch hope is pinned on the present Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Y. Nayudamma, putting JNU back on its feet. Dr. K. R. Narayanan, the preceding Vice-Chancellor, had the reputation of being a good diplomat but a poor administrator. He avoided taking a decision or facing a crisis. Even when it was brought to his notice that six meritorious students had been denied admission into JNU he merely shrugged and said, 'What can I do? The matter will have to be discussed by the Academic Council.' To quote a teacher, 'Dr. Narayanan whiled away two years on the campus.'

Dr. B. D. Nag Chaudhuri, the Vice-Chancellor from 1974 to 1978, like his predecessor, G. Parthasarathy, wielded a lot of influence with the government and the UGC. But he is accused of doing a great deal of damage to the institution by making appointments that were questionable. He was given specific instructions to develop the science centres of JNU but proved more of a 'science politician.' Though the school of life sciences had been started before his tenure, the two other scientific schools came up

under his supervision. The academic merits of many of the teachers appointed by him are still being questioned. Only two members of the faculty for computer science have a formal degree in computer management.

**S**o much for the many failings of JNU. For a teacher who really wants to do serious academic research, the sky is the limit. Top intellectuals are available on the campus. 'Teaching in JNU has a lot of bite,' says a teacher who does feel fulfilled. There is scope for interaction among teachers, there are endless seminars and discussion groups. Even the study of language becomes a lively dynamic thing because you go into the history, culture, political and social ethos of the country whose language you study. Credit should also be given to the faculty for not allowing too much interference from outside.

As one has said at the very beginning, the framework of JNU is excellent. It is time that the ideals with which the university was started are adhered to. Each unit was supposed to serve as a think tank for government. The multi-disciplinary research should have proved excellent.

Appointment of teachers should be strictly on the academic merit of the candidate whatever his political ideology. Though JNU has a leftist image, during the Janata regime a few rightists did manage to get a foothold on the campus. There are at least half a dozen teachers or those aspiring for a post in JNU who have gone to the Supreme Court because they feel the university has not been fair in its appointments.

Teachers who have the privilege of working for JNU should also take their teaching assignments more seriously. Many teachers do not even teach for an hour a day. There is at least one teacher who comes to JNU just once a month to collect his salary. No one wants to compel or discipline teachers like children in a classroom. But it is time that this discipline came from within.

# Books

## MULTILINGUALISM AND MOTHER-TONGUE EDUCATION by D.P. Pattanayak. Delhi Oxford University Press, 1981

*MULTILINGUALISM and Mother-Tongue Education* began life as a bunch of essays and lectures lying peacefully in Debi Prasad Pattanayak's files in Mysore. When Ivan Illich visited the Central Institute of Indian Languages at Mysore in early 1978, Pattanayak found a kindred spirit eager to listen endlessly to his new and iconoclastic ideas on language, society and education in India. With each day's discussion he gave Illich a paper he had written setting forth his position on the issue at hand.

Illich was overwhelmed by the total experience of Pattanayak and the Central Institute of Indian Languages, and insisted that Pattanayak have his essays published together as a book. Illich wrote the foreword and the first chapter, and Pattanayak wrote a short introduction drawing together the various threads of his argument. The result is an intended challenge to all the bureaucrats and academics who preside over India's outdated, unimaginative and misdirected policy on language and education.

Pattanayak and Illich are both, at essence, old-world romantics fatally drawn to the image of the 'noble savage'. Both speak out strongly against modern bureaucracy that is insensitive to man as an individual, and man in his smaller social contexts. Both look back with nostalgia to an earlier age

when learning did not automatically imply 'teaching', and 'low-energy transport' minimized the distances possible in man's world, both geographically and linguistically before man tampered with the primeval, natural order by experimenting with new concepts like standardization, centralization and, ultimately, the market economy.

The title of the book, then, has an unexpected meaning. 'Multilingualism' here is intended to mean a polyglot fluency spanning only those languages and dialects needed in everyday life in a low-energy culture — including severely context-bound fluencies as might exist in the case of liturgical or literary languages. 'Mother-tongue education', besides its face-value meaning, is also intended to mean the imposition of a standardized, official 'mother-tongue' by means of the educational system. 'Multilingualism', then, is man's primeval and natural state. Monolingualism, and the standardized mother-tongue, or 'capitalized language', is an uncomfortable, 'economical' invention of a new social phenomenon, the 'middle-class elite'. Pattanayak and Illich are concerned here with exploring man's fall from his primeval state of linguistic grace.

Both Pattanayak and Illich develop their arguments in jargon that seeks to counterpose the socio-linguistic processes and concepts with their analogs in the field of economics. For example, the subsistence economy is counterposed against the 'vernacular' culture, and language standardization against the modern nation State, and ultimately the market economy. Standard language is depicted as 'the

earliest of specifically modern commodities, the model of all "basic" needs to come' (Illich 34)

Illich once more rides his old hobby-horse, and he is, as usual, brilliant and erudite in his argumentation. Illich fears the awesome totalizing power of the modern middle-class establishment. He develops the concept of a 'vernacular culture', using the term 'vernacular' in a much extended context to depict all aspects of man's original state of grace, before the modern State and the market arrived to menace it. The 'mother' in 'mother-tongue', argues Illich, is an institutionalized mother, the 'mother' church, the welfare State, the standardized formula dispensed nationwide to human infants in place of their individual mothers' milk. The term 'mother-tongue', too, is only as old as these attempts to institutionalize it, and never bore any relationship to the actual language used by the biological mother.

But Illich's concerns, once again, are off-base for the Indian context. Fortunately or unfortunately, we have not yet evolved to the stage where Illich's nightmare poses a threat, nor do we seem faced with it anywhere in the near future. India's language planning is inept, not diabolically totalizing. The persistence of English (and, indeed, regional prestige languages) in Indian education is almost more a result of official bungling and inertia than of any deliberate policy favourable to vested interests. And it certainly doesn't seem to be 'designed' to extinguish any other local languages far from being 'designed' locally, our English programmes are generally wholesale imports from abroad, more capable of teaching English (inefficiently) in the European classroom than in our confused Indian environment.

Instead, our English classes guarantee that poor students will never learn elite Indian English. English does not seek to *replace* our local languages — it pretends to *add* to our lives by opening up to us the modern West. Admittedly, though, it does in the process stultify our local languages. But Illich does not see these subtle internal differences he is, after all, a product of his western world, a world so conscious of its crimes against the natural order that it feels impelled to warn those behind, who may instead be intent on pursuing other mistakes.

Pattanayak, however, despite his sympathies with the vernacular world, is forced by a sense of responsibility to compromise some of his ideals in the Indian context. He rejects both the options of imposing westernization or of maintaining a zoo-like sanctuary for India's minorities, and instead urges aid aimed at 'creating muscle in them to bear their own burden' (86) — Pattanayak is not against change *per se*. But, for change to be salutary it must be generated from within. Nor is he against 'link languages', 'shuddh' varieties or teaching in a non-native language children understand fully. 'Shuddh' varieties, he maintains, are an acknowledgement that a language can be used in non-trivial contexts too, and not just for basic routine functions.

Standardization, Pattanayak seems to be saying, is a natural process. The reason it has not occurred spontaneously everywhere is mainly the geographical dispersion of the population. Actually, it's a bit more than that. A language, by definition, is a social signal that a given population perceives of itself as a single group. As larger groups form, for example, due to urbanization, dialects iron out their regional differences and 'standardize', and larger languages go through major upheaval to produce a compromise variety. India's problem here is that heterogeneous 'groups' at the regional or national level have tended to form only at the top of the social spectrum. Hence, the elites perceive a need for urban or pan-Indian languages to mark their new group identity, but others do not — and consequently do not learn these standard languages as automatically as they do the other local dialects in their daily lives.

So, Pattanayak's proposal that these minorities be educated and made literate in their own languages first may not only be the path of least resistance, it may also be fundamentally the best possible option. As their needs change, their linguistic competence will adjust without instruction in the classroom. The only question that remains, however, is whether the minorities really want 'relevant' instruction in languages they understand, or have they too been properly brainwashed to opt for the impossible 'capitalized' language.

Pattanayak, in his essay on English in India, seems to give in without a fight. This is disappointing. Pattanayak is too ready to concede a place to English in Indian education simply because academics appear to use it regularly. But in what context? Surely, trivial usage does not qualify English for the status of the supreme academic link language in India. But it is hard for the establishment, to which Pattanayak reluctantly belongs, to admit just how far wrong our English policy in elite education has gone, particularly since our English is superficially so alive. How much of our opting for the routine, our discomfort with sophisticated concepts and original thought, our predilection for rote-learning stems from our inadequate grasp of English — even within the elite? Yet, the alternative is neither clear nor easy. But, considering the vast conceptual and linguistic gap from English to our local languages, and the elitization of academia that this brings, it is sad that Pattanayak felt compelled to make an unequivocal stand here at all.

Pattanayak, in his essays, seems to touch on almost every practical aspect of the language problem, from proposals for reducing and standardizing the multiplicity of local scripts, to the inherent mediocrity of our education system, to the mindlessness of seeking only to 'translate textbooks' (the textbook being sacred, he says, even if hopelessly outdated), to trying to unravel a coherent meaning for the elusive term 'mother-tongue' in India (it is



surprising that he doesn't simply discard the term as useless) But his comments escape being ad hoc Pattanayak is one of those rare linguists who see with an integrated vision Every aside, every 'lob' is inextricably part of a total worldview Hence, despite a minor appearance of overlap between his essays, predictable given their diverse origins as unrelated lectures, the topics and discussions fit together into a credible book And one every person concerned with Indian language and education should be obliged to read to get proper bearings.

His anger and stridency about our failure and insensitivity in this context, too, are rare and refreshing in the meekly 'civilized' third world Anger and impatient iconoclasm may be, after all, our only means of admitting and discarding the rot around us It is a joy to see that there are still some who have not lost the capacity or will to react honestly to the mess we are making of our megasystem, where mega-failure is so starkly before us.

Peggy Mohan

### **EDUCATION AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN**

**INDIA** by Ehsanul Haq Sterling Publishers Private Ltd, New Delhi, 1981

A SUBJECT of considerable complexity is handled rather superficially in this book The author's major finding that there is a co-relation between education and political culture and that there is a dual system of schooling in the country, (that of the public school and that of the government and government-aided schools) and that this duality has a bearing on political culture is of course very well known Political sociology is required to test the argument with hard data but the data used in this study seems inadequate in terms of bringing out the sharpness of the argument It would have benefited from a more detailed analysis with a fuller definition of what makes a political culture

Dr Haq draws his evidence from questionnaires and interviews involving about six hundred persons of which about half were students and the rest teachers and parents His reference points are textbooks, attitudes to various political parties and interest in the mass media The students used as a sample were all male and the reasons given for not including girl students remain unconvincing As such, a significant perspective has been deliberately excluded The choice of schools is crucial in such a study and one would have wanted a fuller discussion of the schools chosen and why.

Perhaps the most debatable theme is that which relates to the use of text-books in inculcating a political culture Dr Haq assumes that this role is essential to the concept of a text-book and that a text-book must emphasise 'national values' He gives a list of items which go into the making of 'national values' and even computes the percentage

presence and absence of these in the text-books used in the schools under discussion We are nowhere told what his method was in calculating these percentages nor is the list of books appended so that the more enquiring reader may be able to follow up Dr Haq's quantification Curiously for a social scientist, he seems to be insensitive to the fact that in subjects such as history and civics there *can* be an implicit political interpretation in text-books which would relate very directly to political culture and which need not be expressed in the obvious form which he is looking for Nor is he concerned with examining the premises of the question of whether the primary function of textbooks should be that of conveying accepted knowledge and research on a subject, leaving the inculcation of national values to other channels such as extra-curricular activities and civic organisations If 'national values' are sought to be deliberately infused through textbooks there is the danger that they may remain formal with no attempt at internalisation

The discussion on the awareness among teachers and parents of the political processes leaves the problem in a state of suspension The nuances of loyalties to political parties are not examined in any depth and one is left with the simple generalisation that because teachers in government and government-aided schools are unionised and have to face a range of socio-economic problems in their daily lives, they participate in the political culture to a greater extent in contrast to those of the public schools who show a higher political awareness but a lower participation That there may be many other facets of their lives which lead them to identify with particular parties is left without further probing. Nor is there any explanation for the seeming paradox of public school parents showing higher political awareness but a lower participation Perhaps if Dr Haq had defined participation as more than voting in the elections and reading particular newspapers then he might have recognised the more subtle forms of political participation open to members of the middle and upper middle classes

The conclusion to the book states categorically that the public schools provide, 'qualitative, standard, English-oriented and Westernised education' and therefore perpetuate inequality and class consciousness and that this education is 'not suited to the indigenous condition and the people at large' Why qualitative and standard education should be unsuitable remains a mystery The author's solution is to abolish dualism in education and introduce a uniform system He believes that revolution and radical changes are a precondition to an unstratified system of schooling This indicates a faith in revolution which has been belied in most areas where revolutions and radical change have resulted not in the abolition of stratified societies but in divergent and new forms of stratification The inevitability of a dual stratification has to be terminated by much more than revolutions and radical changes

Romila Thapar

# Further reading

## BOOKS

- Aikara, Jacob.** Ideological orientation of student activism Poone, Dastane Ramachandra, 1977
- Altbach, Philip G** The university in transition an Indian case study Bombay, Sindhu Publications, 1982
- Azad, Jagdish Lal** Financing of higher education in India New Delhi, Sterling, 1975
- Bhambhri, C P. and Kuldeep Mathur** Students, police and campus unrest a study of images and perceptions Jaipur, H C Mathur State Institute of Public Administration, 1972
- Buch, M B. and P A Patel** Towards work centered education a programme of socially useful productive work in education Ahmedabad, Gujarat Vidyapeeth, 1981
- Chitnis, Suma and Philip G Altbach** The academic profession Delhi, The Macmillan Co of India Ltd, 1979
- Gandhi, Madan G.** Modern political analysis and education New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co, 1981
- Gautam, G S** Crisis in the temples of learning New Delhi, S Chand, 1972
- Gupta, Shanti S' A M U** the national context Aligarh, Viveka, 1980
- Haq, Ehsanul** Education and political culture in India the limits of schooling system and political socialisation New Delhi, Sterling, 1981.
- India Ministry of Education and Culture** Department of Education Expenditure on education as shown in Central and State annual budgets New Delhi, 1981
- Jangam, R T and V T. Patil** The 20 points programme and the students community New Delhi, Sterling, 1981
- John. V V:** The great classroom hoax and other reflections on India's education. New Delhi, Vikas, 1978
- Joshi, K L** Problems of higher education in India an approach to structural analysis and reorganisation Bombay, Popular Prakashan.
- Kim, Y and others** Role of the university in national development Four Asian case studies New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1980
- Kochhar, S.K** Pivotal issues in Indian education New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1981
- Mansukhani, G.S.** (ed) Student power in India New Delhi, Oxford & IBH, 1975
- Misra, D K and others** Youth, university and community New Delhi, S Chand, 1975
- Mohanty, Jagannath** Indian education in the emerging society New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1982.
- Nark, J.P.** Educational reforms in India an historical review Delhi, Orient Longman, 1978
- Equality, quality and quantity the elusive triangle in Indian education New Delhi, Allied, 1975
- Policy and performance in Indian education 1947-74 New Delhi, Dr K G Sayidain Memorial Trust, 1975
- Nanjundappa, D M** Working of university finances New Delhi, Sterling, 1976
- Parmaji, S** Education and jobs New Delhi, Leeladevi Publications, 1979
- Ray, Anil Baran** Students and politics in India the role of caste, language and region in an Indian university New Delhi, Manohar, 1977
- Ruhela, Satya Pal** (ed) Educational challenges in socialist India Delhi, Kalyani Publishers, 1975
- Sarkar, S N** Student unrest, a socio-psychological study Calcutta, Indian Book Exchange, 1974
- Sen, A K** Crisis in Indian education. Hyderabad, Institute of Public Enterprise, 1971
- Shah, Amita** (ed) Youth power in Gujarat diary of events December 1973—March 1974. New Delhi, Vishwa Yuvak Kendra, 1977.
- Sharma, Krishan Dev** Education of a national minority a case of Indian Muslims New Delhi, Kalamkar Prakashan, 1978
- Sharma, S L** Modernising effect of university education New Delhi, Allied Publishers
- Singhal, Sushila** Academic leadership and student unrest New Delhi, Newman, 1977
- Singhi, Narendra K** Education and social change Jaipur, Rawat Publications, 1979
- Srivastava, Anand P** Pathology of higher education some challenges before university faculty Kanpur, Reprint Publications, 1979
- Srivastava, Harish Chandra** The genesis of campus violence in Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi Allahabad, Indian International Publications, 1974

**Srivastava, Ramesh Chandra** College administration (the study of faculty and student participation in college administration) New Delhi, Metropolitan Book Co., 1980.

—— Student participation in administration (the study of teacher training institutions) New Delhi, Sterling, 1975

**Tickoo, Champa** Indian universities an historical comparative perspective New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1980

**Venkatasubramanian, K** Education and economic development in India Tamil Nadu — a case study Delhi, Frank, 1980

**Vidyarthi, L P** Student unrest in Chotanagpur (1969-70) Calcutta, Punthi Pustak, 1976

#### ARTICLES

**Abdul Kareem, S.** Can copying be curbed? 'Deccan Herald' 3 January, 1982

**Adisesiah, Malcolm S** Better education for the future qualitative and quantitative changes necessary 'Mail' 21 June, 1981

—— Issues in the national policy on education 'New Frontiers in Education' 10 (3) July-September 1980 14-24

**Agarwal, Damodar.** What ails Delhi University? 'Hindustan Times' 28 December, 1981

**Altbach, Philip G.** The University as centre and periphery. 'Journal of Higher Education' 4 (2) Autumn 1978 157-169

**Amrik Singh.** The unquiet campus travails of men at the top 'University News' 20 (2) 15 January, 1982 39-40

**Atiya Singh** Evil called capitation fee 'Deccan Chronicle' 17 July, 1981

**Azeem, Anwer.** A M U. Brazen witch-hunt. 'Hindustan Times' 28 March, 1981

**Bahal, Khushhal.** Wrong priorities in education. 'M P. Chronicle' 5 November, 1981.

**Bains, Harcharan.** Campus violence why? 'Tribune' 17 February, 1982.

**Balachandran, P.K.** The roots of student unrest in India 'Social Action' 28(3) July-September 1978 290-303

**Banerji, S.K.** What ails centres of higher learning? 'University News' 20(2) 15 January, 1982 42-43.

**Bashiruddin, S.** Fostering character based education 'Deccan Chronicle' 23 November, 1981.

**Basu, Kaushik.** Discontent in Indian academy lack of promotional avenue 'Times of India' 22 January, 1981

**Beteille, Andre.** The university today autonomy and patronage. 'Times of India' 23 April, 1977

**Bezoruath, D.N.** In the waste land of Indian education 'Assam Tribune' 14 June, 1981

**Bhambri, C.P.** No monolith ideology JNU 2 parts 'Patriot' 29 & 30 December, 1981

**Bhargava, L.P.** Education reforms is the present system worthwhile? 'Pioneer' 7 June, 1981

**Bhat, Vasant D.** Meritocracy in higher education. 'Education Quarterly', 3 (3) July 1981 14-16

**Bhatia, Jagdish C** Re-orientation of medical education needed 'Deccan Herald' 2 April, 1982

**Bhatia, L.D.** Disciplining the teachers 'Hindustan Times' 5 January, 1982.

—— Teachers on warpath 'National Herald'. 1 January, 1981

**Bhatia, S.C.** Curriculum development and the community 'University News' 19 (20) 15 October, 1981 563-64

**Bhiday, M.R.** Integration of higher education for effective vocational training 'Journal of Higher Education' 5 (3) Spring 1980. 371-79

**Bipin Chandra.** A M U and communalists dangerous game of appeasement. 'Mainstream' 19(27) 7 March, 1981 11-18

**Bir Singh.** Education in 1980s. 'Education Quarterly' 33 (1) January 1981 3-7.

**Campus violence why?** 'Tribune' 3 March, 1981.

**Chalam, K.S.** Expenditure on university education a unit cost analysis 'Journal of Higher Education' 4 (2) Autumn 1978 201-24.

**Chauhan, B.S.** Need for residential varsity. 'M P. Chronicle' 10 December, 1981

**Chopra, Suneet.** What ails Aligarh? 'Secular Democracy' 14(4) April 1981 28-30.

**Das, M.M.** Teachers fight for academic values 'Mainstream' 19(29) 21 March, 1981 20-21, 24.

**Datta, Amlan.** Focus on Santiniketan making the most of a national asset 'Statesman' 6 & 7 August, 1981.

**Deshpande, Anjali.** Politics of history syllabus. 'Mainstream' 19(46) 18 July, 1981 14, 32-33

**Diwan, G.S.** Strong case for Indian exams. 'Economic Times' 14 January, 1981.

**Dua, R.** Code of conduct for varsity teachers. 'Patriot' 3 December, 1981

**Duari, P.** Teacher has tremendous responsibilities 'Akashwani' 46(17) 26 April, 1981 12-14

**Dutta, Prabha and Vichitra Sharma.** Medical entrance racket in Delhi 'Hindustan Times' 26 February, 1982

**Engineer, Asghar Ali.** Trouble at Aligarh Muslim University a report 'Economic and Political Weekly' 16(33) 15 August, 1981 1340-42

**Gandhi, Kishore.** Education sans value system 'Assam Tribune' 5 December, 1981

**Gandhi, P.C.** Bihar universities in a mess shameful going on 'Times of India' 30 October, 1978

**Gandhi, R.K.** Cure for ills of medical education 2 parts 'Times of India' 18 & 19 June, 1981

**Gaur, Keshav Dev.** Poverty India case for a new education system 'Social Change' 4(1) March 1981 29-36

**Girijesh Kumar and J.S. Jha.** Youth problems, sex and academic performance a comparative study 'Indian Educational Review' 16(2) April 1981 94-102

**Goel, S C.** Issues and options in higher education in India 'New Frontiers in Education' 11(3) July-September 1981 26-32.

—— Optimising higher education limits to growth. 'Times of India' 11&12 August, 1981.

**Growing student unrest a Statesman survey** 'Statesman' 20 December, 1981.

**Guha, Monoranjan** Saving Tagore's legacy Visva-Bharati's 'different' values 'Statesman' 16 November, 1981.

- Gupta, Subodh Das** Political confrontation over education 'Marxist Review' 14(9) March 1981 363-69
- Guru Dev, S** What is wrong with Hill university? 'Statesman' 2 April, 1981.
- Hadziomerovic, Hasan** University moves fast into a new century 'Socialist Thought and Practice' 21(1) January 1981 80-91
- Halder, Sisir Kumar** Trials for students and teachers 'Statesman' 5 February, 1981
- Hamida Ahmed** Some wrong impression about A M U 'National Herald' 14 March, 1981
- Hariharan, A** Forgotten youth programmes 'Hindustan Times'. 4 December, 1981
- . Scum that floats on top 'Hindustan Times' 18 December, 1981
- Imtiaz Ahmad** Muslim educational backwardness an inferential analysis 'Economic and Political Weekly' 16(36) 5 September, 1981 1457-65
- Jha, Akhileshwar** Campus democracy a big failure 'Times of India'. 3 December, 1981
- . Toning up varsity life. depoliticisation not the crux 'Times of India' 9 February, 1981.
- . Unionism on the campus bane of higher education 'Times of India' 1 September, 1981
- Jha, M.L** Teachers Vs. students modern trends. 'Indian Nation' 20 September, 1981.
- John, V.V.** Aligarh controversy 'Indian Express' 16 April, 1979.
- . Crisis of higher education some problems and solutions 'Indian Express' 2 August, 1981
- . Reflections on a political sport 'Indian Express' 15 December, 1981
- . Role of teachers. 'Economic Times': 5 December, 1981.
- Joshi, Navin Chandra** Delinking degree from jobs 'Education Quarterly', 33(1) January 1981 22-23
- . Higher education new methods to make it less costly and more beneficial 'Mail' 22 May, 1981
- . Higher education needs direction 'Democratic World', 10(9) 1 March, 1981 10
- . Need of the hour is socially relevant education. 'Mail' 24 November, 1981
- Julka, Satyapal** Examination reform a fresh look. 'Mainstream' 19(24) 14 February, 1981 31-33
- . Universities for whom? 'National Herald' 23 May, 1981
- Kalra, R.M.** Should higher education be value oriented? 'University News' 20(2) 15 January, 1982 41-43
- Kamat A.R.** Future perspective and educated elite struggle for new policy 'Mainstream' 19(36) 9 May, 1981 17-24
- Khare, Harish.** How relevant is JNU? 'Hindustan Times' 16 May, 1981.
- Khurshid, Salman.** A M U again 'Hindustan Times' 11 July, 1981
- Krishna Kumar.** Education the bureaucratic imagination 'Economic and Political Weekly', 16(35) 29 August, 1981 1313-15
- Kulkarni, G.B.** Why standards fall 'Economic Times' 5 December, 1981.
- Kurian, K.K.** Rotten groves of academe 'Hindustan Times' 15 January, 1981
- Kusumakar, H.** Capitation fee — a boon or an evil? 'Times of India' 21 April, 1981
- . Pains of ending capitation fee 'Times of India' 21 September, 1981
- Lulla, B P.** Streamlining curriculum administration 'Indian Education' 11(1-2) April-May 1982 76-80
- Malhotra, P.C.** Depoliticise education 'M P. Chronicle' 17 July, 1981
- . Higher education—as if education matters. 'M P Chronicle' 10 January, 1982
- Mathur, Girish.** Aligarh Muslim University and the Irfan Habib case 'Deccan Herald'. 3 March, 1981
- . Congress (I) lets loose AMU goons 'Blitz'. 28 February, 1981 7
- Mathur, V.S.** Raising standards in college education 'University News', 20(3). 1 February, 1982
- Mehra, Manmohan.** Case for a national open university 'Patriot' 29 May, 1981
- Mehra, S.P.** Universities and economic development 'Mainstream' 20(16) 19 December, 1981 28-29.
- Mishra, V.N.** Role of teachers' bodies in education 'National Herald' 8 December, 1981.
- Mitra, S.K** Need of the hour is education trimmed to foster national integration 'Mail' 21 September, 1981
- Mohapelo, J.M.** University and the schools in developing countries. 'Higher Education' 10(3). May 1981 275-95
- Mohindra, P.D.** Teachers' politics in Punjab. 'Tribune' 5 September, 1981
- Moonis Raza and Amitabh Kundu.** Evaluation in higher education 'Journal of Higher Education', 5(3) Spring 1980 359-69
- Nagabhushan Rao, A.** Are educational standards deteriorating? 'Akashvani' 46(29) 19 July, 1981: 13-15
- Nair, K.R. Ramachandran.** Higher studies fall in standard 'Hindu' 14 April, 1981
- Nandwani, S.C.** National development role of the university 'Economic Times' 1 January, 1982
- Nanjundappa, D.M.** Educational outlays cost effectiveness and policy 'Deccan Herald'. 28 April, 1981
- . Linkages between education, employment and development 2 Parts 'Deccan Herald' 1 & 9 February, 1981
- Nigam, R.L.** Oh! Aligarh 'Radical Humanist' 45(3) June 1981: 7-10.
- Nirmal Singh.** A perspective on higher education in India — the case of private control 'Journal of Higher Education' 5(1) Monsoon 1979 21-31
- Noorani, A.G** Politics and the A M U. bills 'Indian Express' 5 May, 1980
- Oad, L.K.** Some misadventures of examination reform in Indian universities 'EPA Bulletin' 3(2) July 1980 9 22-

- Padmanabhan, B.S.** Medical education: what is wrong with system? 'Hindu' 24 September, 1981.
- — — Financial management of universities and colleges in India 'New Frontiers in Education' 10(4): October-December 1980 59-64
- Pathak, S.S.** Gujarat steps for campus peace 'National Herald' 17 December, 1981.
- Patra, Krushnachandra.** Students' movement in Orissa 'Janata' 35(43) 21 December, 1980 9-11.
- Pattanayak, D.P.** Crisis in higher education in India 'Journal of Higher Education' 6(1-3) 1980-81 51-54
- Puri, Balraj.** State stranglehold on universities 'Economic and Political Weekly' 16(14) 4 April, 1981 611-12
- Rai, Anil Baran** Secularism and political protest the case of Banaras Hindu University (BHU) students agitation of 1965 'Indian Journal of Political Science' 39(4) October-December 1978 620-33
- Rais Ahmad** Reorientation in teaching, learning and evaluation 'Journal of Higher Education' 5(3) Spring 1980 331-33
- Raj, K.N.** Irfan Habib and basic issues 'Mainstream' 19(52) 29 August, 1981 11-13
- Raj Krishna** Piece rate education 'Seminar' (291) May 1981 34-36
- Rajan, P.K.** Research in universities 'Hindu'. 16 June, 1981
- Ram Reddy, G.** University administration in India — some critical issues 'Indian Journal of Public Administration', 26(3) July-September 1980 574-87
- Ramesh Chandran.** Depoliticising the campuses 'Economic and Political Weekly' 16(9) 28 March, 1981 318-19
- Rao, V.K.R.V.** Some thoughts on higher education 'Journal of Higher Education', 6(1-3) 1980-81 1-7
- Rathniah, E.V.** Teacher participation in educational administration 'Indian Education' 11(1-2) April-May 1981 67-70
- Roy, Himanshu.** Education as instrument Left Front's policy 'Amrita Bazar Patrika' 3 January, 1981
- Salunkhe, D.K.** Educators need education 'Free Press Journal' 7 May, 1981.
- Santhanam, Raju.** Sagar's troubles are not over 'Statesman' 7 December, 1981
- Sanyal, Sunanda.** Modernizing education now not to cope with numbers 2 parts 'Statesman' 17 & 18 August, 1981
- Shah, A.B.** A M U controversy 'Indian Express' 3 & 4 May, 1979
- Shah, Madhuri R.** Future of university education 'University News' 19(20) 15 October, 1981 561-62
- Shahabuddin, S.** A M U . the other side. 'Hindustan Times' 19 March, 1981
- — — A M U Chasing an illusion? 'Tribune' 16 February, 1982.
- Sharma, Aroon.** Marxist at Aligarh 'Tribune'. 4 March, 1981
- Sharma, Mohindra.** A study of conflict in a university. 'Journal of Higher Education' 4(1) Monsoon 1978 1-10.
- Sharma, R.A.** Goal implementation in university organisation 'Indian Management' 20(5) May 1981. 27-39
- Sharma, Ramesh Chandra** University autonomy — an analysis and proposal 'EPA Bulletin' 2(2) July 1979 49-61
- Sharma, S L** The modernizing effects of university education on the value orientation of students 'ICSSR Research Abstracts Quarterly' 5(3 & 4) July-December 1976 97-103
- Shastri, P D** Abolish university exams 'M P Chronicle' 11 October, 1981.
- — — Education as time filler 'National Herald' 21 March, 1981
- Shervani, Ahmad Rashid** AMU not everything for Muslim students 'National Herald': 12 September, 1981
- Shourie, Arun** A.M U's real character 'Indian Express' 1 December, 1979
- Shubert, Janelle and Joseph Folger.** Handling student grievances in higher education 'New Directions for Higher Education' 8(4) 1980 43-48
- Singh, N.K.** Year of academic emergency in M P 'Indian Express' 16 January, 1982
- Sood, J.K.** Curriculum innovation and implementation bridging the gap 'Education Quarterly' 33(3) July 1981 17-20.
- Singh, A.J.** Menace of capitation fee 'Mail', 7 April, 1981
- Sinha, S.N.** Violence and disruption on campus a critical note 'Political Change' 3(2) July 1980 — February 1981 67-72
- Srivastava, R.C.** Faculty and student status in administration 'Journal of Higher Education' 4(2) Autumn 1978 225-44
- Suri, Surindar.** Communalism in universities 'Tribune' 26 February, 1981
- — — Knowledge is fragments 'Tribune' 25 November, 1981
- — — Protecting varsity autonomy 'Tribune' 1 April, 1981
- — — Trust and responsibility 'Tribune', 14 December, 1981
- Thapar, Romila.** Academic freedom and A M.U crisis 'Radical Humanist' 45(1) April 1981 11-15
- Tharyan, P** Leave Vice-chancellors alone 'Hindustan Times'. 7 December, 1981.
- Tiwari, Satish Chandra.** Teachers must unite to survive 'M P Chronicle' 23 September, 1981.
- Universities under probe**, (editorial) 'Tribune' 1 February, 1982
- Verghese, B.G.** The tragedy of Aligarh 'Indian Express' 17 August, 1981
- Vohra, Gautam S.G.** Playing politics with education 'Times of India' 10 April, 1981

#### SEMINAR ISSUES

7	Our Universities	February	1960
44	Crisis on the Campus	April	1963
88	Students in Turmoil	December	1966
120	Educated Unemployed	August	1969
158	New Education	October	1972
166	Our Paralysed Universities	June	1973
176	The Students Speak	April	1974

We are interested in  
reliable selling agents  
for SEMINAR. Any  
help offered in this  
area would be much  
appreciated. Please  
write in to us ...

# **the art of good management...**



**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**

Shriram seminars and courses are part of this moulding process... which involves executives in a ceaseless interchange of ideas, discussion of modern techniques, evaluation and reconsideration of policies. So that the Shriram organisation is constantly infused with fresh dynamism and our resources are utilised to the optimum.




**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**

My

# ROUTES

to over 40 cities in 5 continents



A thrilling  
voyage of  
discovery.

On board my gleaming jets.  
It's a network to remember.

**AIR-INDIA**

MTB-AIR 6267-B



# seminar

Refocussings

Refocussings  
Refocussings

Refocussings

Refocussings

Refocussings

273

May 1982

# Benefit from our widest range of compressors, backed by the world's foremost air power technology.

## New additions to CP's expanding range

TB-20½ x 13

Lubricated/Oil-less Horizontal, Reciprocating  
Compressors

500-RO-2

Rotary, Portable, Diesel Compressors.

'TU' & 'TUO'

Lubricated/Oil-less Vertical, Reciprocating  
Compressors

## Plus 25 other proven and trusted models

Compressors of every description: Portable  
and Stationary, Electric motor, Diesel engine-  
driven, Rotary and Reciprocating, Single  
stage/Two-stage, Air-cooled/Water cooled,  
Lubricated/Oil-less, Horizontal/Vertical,  
Single-acting/Double acting, Balanced-  
opposed & tandem. In capacities from  
3 m<sup>3</sup>/min (108 c f m) to 114 m<sup>3</sup>/min  
(4000 c f m)

Together, our widest range for every need.

## Why CP Compressors?


CP Compressors are crafted to the highest  
standards of quality and workmanship, and  
incorporate international designs and know-  
how. And they're backed by prompt and  
efficient service, both before and after sales.  
No wonder CP-India are today the largest  
exporters of compressed air equipment to  
over 15 countries.

Now, what can we offer you?


### CAUTION

Insist on genuine CP spares to keep  
your CP compressed air equipment  
working efficiently


Class TU



Class TB



Class FE



Please contact our nearest branch for literature.

**CONSOLIDATED PNEUMATIC**

CONSOLIDATED PNEUMATIC TOOL CO. (INDIA) LTD.

301 L.B. Shastri Marg, Mulund, Bombay 400 080. Branches at: 30  
J. Nehru Road, Calcutta 700 016. Eros Apartments, 56 Nehru Place,  
New Delhi 110 024. Finance House, Pattullos Road, Madras 600 002.  
Jamshedpur - Secunderabad - Goa - Bangalore.



The power of air harnessed for higher productivity.

# Mahindra


## now brings you the Peugeot XDP 4.90- a diesel engine of advanced design

**Mahindra** meets the challenge of the oil crisis, with a superb new, lightweight high performance diesel engine-the **PEUGEOT XDP 4.90** with greater fuel efficiency.

This world-famous engine is now being assembled at the Mahindra plant.


The **PEUGEOT XDP 4.90** will be fitted initially on the **Mahindra NC 665 DP Mini Truck**, Pick-up Van and Ambulance.

By far the most vital factor is the greater fuel efficiency of this lightweight, high performance engine.



#### Engine Specifications :

No of Cylinders	4
Bore-mm	90
Stroke-mm	83
Bore/Stroke ratio	1.08
Displacement-cc	2112
Compression Ratio	22.4:1
R P M (max)	4500
Max B H P.	75
Max Torque Kg m	13.3
	@ 2000 r.p.m.
Weight Kg.	184



The Mahindra NC 665 DP  
Mini Truck fitted with  
Peugeot XDP 4.90 diesel engine



Pick-up Van



Ambulance



**Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.**



## THE JAY ENGINEERING WORKS LTD.

### CHAIRMAN'S SPEECH

Friends,

I am happy to welcome you at our forty-fifth annual general meeting of the shareholders. As you are aware, the closing date of the financial year of the company was changed last year from ending March to ending September. The accounts before you therefore present working results of six months ending September, 1981.

The half year period covered by these accounts *i.e.*, April through September is relatively a difficult period every year in the annual cycle of the company's operations — because sale of fans declines during these months, and prices have to be heavily discounted. Our company's operational results, however, for this year have been considerably better than the same period last year, and the directors have therefore recommended a dividend of 6% on equity shares, equivalent to 12% for a full year, as against 10% for the full year last year.

You may have noticed that the share capital of the company has increased from about Rs 25 crores to Rs 28 crores. This is because the financial institutions exercised their option for conversion of part of long-term loans as per conditions for the same. All the institutions *viz.* IDBI, LIC and LICI have exercised full option of their loans conversion.

Production of fans at all the three factories has been running at higher than last year's levels. There is a noticeable slack in the demand for fans currently, but our marketing effort to ensure that sales keep pace with production has been fairly successful. Overall, taking the current competition into account, USHA has been able, during this period, to maintain its premier position nationally.

The sewing machines unit at Calcutta has achieved higher levels of production. This unit has improved its results considerably. We have been working hard on plans for

#### HIGHLIGHTS

- \* Better operational result than in corresponding period last year.
- \* Usha fans maintaining premier position nationally.
- \* Improved results of the sewing machines unit.
- \* Satisfactory progress at Fuel Injection Equipment unit.
- \* Single-cylinder pumps/Injectors developed by in-company R & D effort receiving widespread acceptance.
- \* Two pillars of management effort:  
    "Inter-group harmony";  
    "Modern Technology—for Zero Waste"
- \* Need for national emphasis on improving "Capital-Output ratio" situation.

upgrading technology and modernising the operations of this unit and this effort is now beginning to yield fruitful results.

At Shriram Diesels plant in Hyderabad, the production, efficiency and cost have been satisfactory. Production of single cylinder pumps and injectors was commenced during the period under consideration. Single cylinder pumps and injectors have been developed by our own R & D department, without any foreign technical collaboration, and I would like to convey our congratulations to our R & D team for this. These "Shriram Diesel" products have received widespread acceptance from original equipment manufacturers. As you are aware, these are difficult products to manufacture and sell, as mentioned in earlier meetings, particularly because the multinational giant dominating the Indian market, naturally uses its international capabilities

and techniques of beating down the national enterprises, through selective price adjustment etc

All the world has been turning to Japan keenly for learning the secret of its foundations of uninterrupted industrial success—so have we at SHRIRAM. For some time now, we have put “Inter-group Harmony” in our operations as our first priority. This concept is vastly different from the traditional concept of so-called Industrial relations based on two parties sitting on opposite sides of the negotiating table. I am happy to say that this new approach and concept of relationship in the enterprise between all those working for the common success of the enterprise, has permeated deep down in our executives, and we have achieved some measure of success in our operations. “Inter-group Harmony” is a much more positive concept than merely the absence of strife. It involves, more constructively, active participation and collaboration between all the various partners in the enterprise. So far as the individual members of the workforce are concerned, this does exist in a great measure. However, unfortunately this does not exist, to the best levels, in the guides of the workforce. We are continuing to take initiatives to establish a positive relationship with the worker guides and hopefully may achieve success in the coming period. Obviously, the workforce, the enterprise, and of course the country would greatly benefit by any measure of success we may achieve.

Our major thrust during the period has been in a new direction of what we call “Modern Technology—for Zero Waste”. As all of us are aware, there is a massive waste in all our national enterprises operations, whether it is in the field of materials, or money, or power, or man hours used etc. Drawing upon the best modern technology from the international pool could help India reduce all these wastes, which it can ill afford. The thrust of our new slogan “Modern Technology—for Zero Waste” has already begun to yield results. Our first thrust was in reducing waste of money through minimising current assets, covering inventories, receivables and book assets. Our effort was also directed towards achieving a system, on the Japanese pattern of “just-in-time” supplies. In spite of inadequacies of suppliers and of transportation, we have achieved a measure of success in this already.

There is considerable scope of reducing waste of materials and tools etc. by using better machines, tools, and methods. There is also nationally a great waste of “man hours” resulting in lower earnings for the individual workers, and loss of production for the nation. The period was marked by transference of this management culture in our executives, and considerable success has been achieved in this direction. We hope to get benefits of this new approach and work ethic during the coming year and years.

Overall, we are working in all our plants on the twin pillars of “Inter-group Harmony” and “Modern Technology—for Zero Waste”. Daily and monthly work is going on in all our factories through cooperative working between the various levels of workforce in this direction. In this lies the future and well being of our enterprise.

Just as fresh investment requires well-informed decision-making, similarly shedding of subsisting operations and pro-

perties, when economically justified, requires perception and courage. We have lately been applying our minds to this aspect to carry out the necessary weeding operation, and have usefully shed many of our operations, to the benefit of the growing small-scale industries sector.

Achievement of corporate goals depends upon an effective organisation. Our company is being restructured on a profit-centre basis. In order to increase operational effectiveness, we are now deepening the concept of profit-centre responsibility and are strengthening the management organisation accordingly. Upon this will depend the achievement of our goals in an increasingly difficult situation.

The “Economic Survey” of the Government of India for the financial year ended March, 1982, reports that there has been a major recovery for the Indian economy, in terms of G N P increase, inflation rate decline, infrastructure being in better shape, power generation and production of coal and steel being increased, oil exploration and energy conservation activities having been intensified, the policy towards production being liberalised etc. This is excellent achievement by any yardstick. However, the assessment of the future needs to be moderated by some factors which need continuous attention. These include, rising imports of potentially indigenous products, declining foreign exchange reserve, deepening balance of payments difficulties, growing debt service burden, falling savings rate in real terms, and most important of all the rising “Capital-output Ratio”.

In my view, the highest priority matter needing national attention from the Government and business alike is of the “Capital-output Ratio” situation. A major component in the matter of “Capital-output Ratio” which has been highlighted often, is of delays in approvals and implementation of various production projects. A certain amount of state regulation of social conduct is desirable and essential, but this should not end up in chaining the dynamic capabilities of the citizens connected with the national production processes. This point is particularly worth noting in the current year, when our Prime Minister has declared it to be an Year of Productivity. She has guided that

“We must get more out of every acre under the plough, out of every spindle and machine, out of every technologist and worker, out of every rupee spent”

This is a managerial approach of the highest order which will do good to the heart of every citizen. I like to think that what we are doing, at our modest enterprise level, is in harmony with what the Prime Minister has prescribed. Given the cooperation and support of everyone involved in our effort, we look forward to steady growth in our operations at our corporate level as well as the national level.

Thank you,

NOTE. This is the speech delivered by Dr. Charat Ram, Chairman, The Jay Engineering Works Ltd at the 45th Annual General Meeting held on 29.3.1982 at New Delhi. This does not purport to be a report of the proceedings of the annual general meeting.

# Jyoti's research team is already on the way to harnessing solar power

This is just one of Jyoti's several exclusives, rendered possible by Jyoti's research-oriented philosophy. Others include India's largest 360,000 l p m vertical propeller pumps for dry docks, 33 kV outdoor minimum oil circuit breakers, arno converters for electric locomotives, sophisticated pumps for nuclear and thermal power stations, micro-hydel generating sets, centrifuge motors and steam turbine driven generators and process pumps for sugar industry, high tension motors, epoxy resin insulated instrument transformers up to 33 kV, solid state power converters and inverters, as well as research projects on laser technology and fluidics.

That's then is Jyoti's bigness—measured by its creative, innovative, inventive and futuristic dimensions—not size and turnover alone.

WHERE RESEARCH BRINGS RESULTS



## Jyoti Ltd.

BARODA

HYDRAULICS ELECTRICALS POWER ELECTRONICS

everest/430/JY



## FOUR SWAN FABRICS

### FOR ENCHANTING SHADES IN COTTON AND BLENDED TEXTURES

Pamper your every whim and fancy with Four Swan Fabrics in cotton and Polyester/cotton blends. Crease-resistant. Four Swan fabrics come in a wide range of colours and prints.

Manufactured by:

**THE VICTORIA MILLS LTD., BOMBAY.**



MANGALDAS  
GROUP MILLS

MAG-MGM-238 A



## **A shining example of a growing commitment to Indian Industry**

Indian Oxygen's intimate association with Indian industry began way back in 1935. Ever since it's been a growing bond, bringing in its wake major developments.

Today, thanks to IOL, Indian industry has ready access to highly advanced and ever developing technology. In the production of gases, ultra pure gases & their mixtures. In their diverse and growing range of applications in the manufacture of welding consumables and

cutting equipment, for the joining and cutting of metals. In the fabrication of complete plants, machinery & cryogenic equipment for the production, storage, handling and distribution of industrial gases.

IOL is also deeply involved in the medical sphere by meeting the needs for vital medical gases, anaesthetic equipment & surgical accessories.

Today, IOL technology has permeated into a wide spectrum of industries and ushered

in a revolution in fields such as Steel, Engineering, Electronics & others. Further, IOL is spearheading specialised services to Mining, Agriculture, Communications, Medicine, Research, Defence, Civil Aviation and off-shore prospecting.


Equipped with a technology that's constantly developing and a cadre of indigenously developed talent, IOL pledges to make greater contributions to India's industrial progress.

In the years to come

IOX CAS-9/79

**IOL Indian Oxygen Limited**  
*Promoting self-reliance*

When seven of our hotels  
are among the  
300 best hotels in the world,  
should you settle for  
anything less?



Book into  
Oberoi Hotels  
instantly.

Oberoi Hotels Set amidst golden beaches,  
on sunny islands, in bustling cities  
Hotels so good that Rene Lecler, Travel  
Editor of Harpers & Queen, included seven  
of them in his world-famous travel guide  
'The 300 best hotels in the world'.



For reservations, contact Oberoi Instant  
Reservation Offices at

	Telephone	Telex
New Delhi	699571	2372, 3829
Bombay	234343	4153, 4154
Calcutta	230181	7248, 7854
Madras	88156	699
Ahmedabad	448648	
Bangalore	577681	725
	576355	
	577051	
Colombo	20001	CMB 21201
	21171	
Kathmandu	1 1	NP 203


**Oberoi Hotels**  
We look after you better

Oberoi Hotels in Bombay, Calcutta, Darjeeling, Delhi, Goa, Gopalpur-on-sea, Khajuraho, Ladakh,  
New Delhi, Simla, Srinagar, Udaipur, Adelaide, Aswan, Baghdad, Bali, Cairo, Colombo, Dammam,  
Kandy, Kathmandu, Melbourne, Singapore and Zanzibar







Attractive Sleek Two-toned USHA Streamlined—the sewing machine that outclasses any other in its price range With features that others can't match And a 5-year guarantee too




Patch Damer for easy darning and quick adjustment of pressure on cloth



3-position drop feed for easy adjustment of feed-dog position



Dial-type stitch regulator with lever for forward and reverse stitch control and locking arrangement




Thread tension adjuster for regulating pull thread tension.

**USHA Streamlined** feature for feature a better machine

---

# PRODUCT QUALITY




•Satyadev Chemicals are widely used in the processing of Colour and Black and white Motion Picture Films, and in the Textile, Jute, Leather and Chemical Manufacturing Industries. Also in the manufacture of Paints, Pharmaceuticals, Dyestuffs, Polymers

Our customers include some of the world's leading manufacturing and trading concerns. The secret of this world-wide acceptance lies in our policy of product quality—the only sacred cow in our fast developing organisation.



**SATYADEV CHEMICALS LIMITED**

Pratapnagar Road, VADODARA, 390 004, India



**"Aluminium oars?  
Over my dead body,"  
said the cox.**

HTC IAL-4078

The cox was foxed. Who ever had heard of aluminium oars? Perhaps no one. But the fact is that aluminium is being used, more and more, for things we had never imagined. And in India, Indian Aluminium has been the catalyst of this change.

The first to produce aluminium in this country, Indal has introduced almost the entire range of rolled and extruded

aluminium products available in India. In its constant drive towards diversification, Indal has pioneered the use of aluminium in aircraft, currency, power transmission, irrigation tubing, transportation, packaging, housing and a host of other applications.

Indal pioneering. Touching your life in more ways than you think.



**Indian Aluminium Company, Limited**  
**Anything's possible**

# SEMINAR

THE MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI

Journal which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every shade of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single problem is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions. Opinions expressed have ranged from Janata to Congress, from Pravodaya to Communist to Independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it has been possible to answer a real need of today, to gather the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture.

Editor/ROMESH THAPAR

Managing Editor/RAJ THAPAR

Production/TEJBIR SINGH

Circulation/C. B. KUMAR

Published from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1 Telephone: 46534 Cable Address: Seminar New Delhi Single copy: Rs. 100 pence; \$ 1.50 Yearly Rs. 40; £ 7, \$ 16, Three yearly Rs. 100 £ 20, \$ 40. Reproduction of material prohibited unless permitted.

## NEXT MONTH: VOICE OF NEPAL

# 273

## REFOCUSSINGS

a symposium on  
changing attitudes  
to development

symposium participants

### THE PROBLEM

A short introductory statement

### OVER THESE YEARS

Romesh Thapar, Editor, 'Seminar'

### TOWARDS A NEW THEORY

Sunil Sahasrabudhey, Editor,  
'Mazdoor Kisan Niti', Kanpur

### TASKS OF THE MISFIT

B.P.R. Vithal, former Principal Secretary,  
Finance and Planning, Andhra Pradesh  
Government, now with the World Bank

### NGOs — CHANGING ROLE

Sanjit Roy, Director, The Social Work  
and Research Centre, Tilonia, Rajasthan

### ROLE OF THE ANTHROPOLOGIST

Harj Mohan Mathur, Joint Secretary,  
Department of Personnel and Administrative  
Reforms, New Delhi

### RESTRUCTURING FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Sri Madhav Ashish, lives in the Kumaon  
Hills in charge of the ashram founded  
by Krishna Prem

### BOOKS

Reviewed by Majid Hayat Siddiqi, D.C.,  
Navin Chandra Joshi and Dilip Cherian

### COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury Associates

## The problem

THE content and nature of many of the problems facing us are changing. In addition, there are new perceptions about some old concepts and ideas. In this issue, we gather a few interventions in the hope that those who govern will not lose sight of them. So much of the failure of today is rooted in the incapacity of the so-called leaders of a society to carry through rigorous implementation

after a careful elaboration of the challenge and the response. At another level, the complexity of social change is not understood. The effort to re-focus has to be continuous, and without blunting the issues which are surfacing. This is particularly so in societies like ours which are in the throes of considerable experimentation and cannot afford to be rigid.

# Over these years

ROMESH THAPAR

AS a young man in the thirties, I remember an India designed for the British rulers and the Indians who were part of their apparatus. Everything was orderly and disciplined — except, of course, for the confrontations organised by those who were challenging foreign rule. A kind of *status quoism* of zero growth prevailed. But, since then, phenomenal change has taken over. Who could have forecast then that the grandchildren of our former rulers would be roaming the streets of India in tatters, described as hippies ...

Change takes many shapes. I shall deal with the change that changes everything. For India, when power was transferred, something very profound occurred. Here were we, a nation of some 350 millions, partitioned, bloodied, with little more than an agricultural system which managed just about to feed us, even though this feeding was punctuated by repeated famines, the last of which had devastated Bengal. But we were free at last, and were possessed of all kinds of dreams about what we were going to do with this



freedom Our notions were woolly because over the centuries of foreign rule we had almost lost the memory of rulership.

**T**hose who came to power were the leaders of the freedom struggle. They were the outstanding men and women of our society, distinguished lawyers, educationists, thinkers and doers — yes, very different from the those who now play at politics. Despite the fantastic disruption of the partition, they set about consolidating our external frontiers, absorbing the extensive domains (five hundred and seven) of the Indian princes, redrawing the boundaries of our linguistic States (into 17 States and six Union Territories,\*) introducing systems of planned economic and social development and, above all, launching the industrialisation of India upon which our self-reliance and future growth would rest. All this was done by inexperienced men, but men committed to the public good. Indeed, even a hostile international climate was sought to be transformed by steering an independent course and mobilising the non-aligned sentiment of nations.

The achievements were so impressive that by the end of the fifties we were intoxicated with success. Perhaps, we had mismanaged our relations with Pakistan and China. Kashmir had not been cleared and remained a running sore. The confusion on Tibet had destroyed a buffer zone and activated a border. But these seemed small matters as India felt her new economic muscle.

In this remarkable self-reliant growth, however, there was a fatal flaw. The whole development had taken a kind of middle class orientation. No social transformation at the base had been ordered. The rural poor remained an unidentified mass, forgotten or ignored by the

leadership for the time being. Land reform was seen only as the ending of feudal relations. The large farms were legislated against, but the implementation of policy was very patchy, and deliberately so. A thorough reorganisation, approximating to the ideal of land to the tiller, was evaded on the plea that it would disrupt the countryside — and even damage the precarious food front.

The implications of this for a genuine participative democracy were either not realised or deliberately ignored. In a sense, this was inevitable in the context of the dominance of certain classes and castes and the inability of the ruling party to forge an alternative coalition. But the intensity of this orientation was gravely to distort our concepts of balanced growth. Development did not bridge the gaps. It increased them.

**W**e know what happened. The towns battered on the villages. While the public sector was publicised as the socialist instrument which would command the industrial economic front, it actually became a very handy prop for the private sector which was moving into massive collaborations with foreign capital (interestingly, to assert import substitution and self reliance). The collaborative aspect, covering both the public and private sectors, was not seen as subservience but part of the drive to national self-sufficiency. However, there was a near total failure to realise the importance of investing in research and development to build creatively on the technologies purchased. Profits boomed and were re-invested in other ventures, but the technological infrastructure was invariably neglected and allowed to run down. The towns continued expanding as never before. The villages remained largely where they were — back of beyond — and the landless farmer, a helot.

So, the India of the forties, which imported even the water container of the flush toilet system from far-off England, was now coping with a remarkably sophisticated economy. Imports were being reduced from year to year. All manner of capaci-

ties had been put into the system giving it a variety of momentums. But, inevitably, this kind of development created an expanding middle class elite living on a productive base which was not properly maintained or rejuvenated. And this elite was naturally able to entrench itself and to exert an enormous influence on the future patterns of planning and growth. In other words, no corrections were sought or permitted, and the base of Indian society (some 30 to 40 per cent of the people) remained very much a part of the poverty pattern.

**T**he danger signals were out early in the sixties. Planning systems were failing. New technologies were needed to salvage the production infrastructure. And the lack of purchasing power at the massive rural base of our society could no longer be treated as a non-problem. At this critical juncture, the slender economic cushion for a revival was removed with the escalation of defence expenditure following the China confrontations. Pakistan could be deterred basically at little cost. China was a military challenge on another level. I do not have to detail for you the terrible cost of defence to a developing economy. Fortunately, by now, we were in a position to attempt self-reliance even in defence needs. But even here the serious failing, to which I have referred earlier, was to manifest itself. Research and development was forgotten or neglected, even though there were no profit-hungry entrepreneurs to satiate. The result is that when it comes to really sophisticated hardware, we remain as dependent as ever.

The sixties were largely years of failure, even though we began to move towards a greener agricultural future. This was important.\* But many problems surfaced. The Indian ethos, with its accent on individualism and its in-built reluctance to move towards any level of collectivity, required curbing in a society which was attempting 'a forced march' to make up 'the leeway of centuries'. The cadres of the free-

\*In 1967, the State of Assam was redrawn to give the hill people more autonomy (Meghalaya). In 1972, the new States of Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur and Tripura were created, while Mizoram and the former NEFA became Union Territories. Nagaland was given statehood.

\*There are 575,718 villages and 2641 towns. Twenty per cent live in the towns, eighty per cent in the villages.

dom movement did not have to be pushed into such commitments. The situation now was changing. Erosion had set in. Egalitarianism was sought to be legislated rather than inculcated. No movements were launched to correct social practices. Our educational system remained essentially what it was under the British — a producer of babus — only the numbers increased. Result: a society enmeshed in a jungle of rules and regulations, licenses and permits. Yes, a jungle to nourish another jungle — the jungle of inspection, of corruption. It all began in earnest in the sixties. The corruption of services. Money in politics. Rascality parading as skill. And, alas, few examples to the contrary were set.

**I**f Gandhi gave us the gospel, which we did not bother even to study as soon as we had the freedom to amass our private fortunes, Nehru in his role as apostle tried to build the institutions which would make possible a continuing and dynamic political/economic consensus as the democratic base of a complex continental polity. It was a project left unfinished, but it could not survive because the gulf between the haves and have-nots was too wide to permit healthy participation. Even democracy has to be based on certain minimas and maximas. It cannot live in a mess of polarisations. Over the years we had nurtured interests and momentums which were antagonistic to the democratic environment. We thought we were inhibiting them. But they would not be inhibited.

By the end of the sixties, India was some 500 million people. There were more than half on the electoral lists. New elements had become active in politics. Economic growth helped to vocalise many problems that had earlier remained below the surface. But illiteracy stood at seventy per cent in 1971, very much larger in absolute numbers than earlier. Some 42 per cent were below 20 years. Conflicts between communities and castes escalated in the desire to get more of the economic cake. Under Lal Bahadur Shastri's government, we had become conscious of our in-

ability to cope effectively with problems. Growing populations and growing military budgets multiplied them; growing militancy over continental language differences also defied any lasting solution.

By the end of the sixties, despite the manipulation of political interests by Indira Gandhi, it was becoming clear that even though the day of reckoning could be postponed, the problems would return sharper and more persistent than ever. The need was for structural change to correct the spreading aberrations and to balance and humanise growth. The political/economic action seemed unconcerned about such change, even in the areas of minor and urgent reform where the citizen felt harassed and beaten.

Nothing of import was done, but the people expressed their appreciation of bank nationalisation and the disciplining of the princes by giving the Congress a resounding victory in the 1971 elections. We carried on without a care in the circles of power — and then were sucked into the Bangladesh eruption. The breaking of the Pakistan army in Bangladesh, and the extraordinary political consolidation which resulted from this at home, was again not utilised to take the hard, unpopular decisions so urgently needed to tackle the new challenges inherent in the Indian situation. I am referring to the quality and balance of development for a population that might stabilise around 1000 million in the year 2000. Unemployment, particularly of the educated kind, which would otherwise spark the worst social aberrations. The continuing poverty of the thirty to forty per cent at the base of Indian society. And the uncontrolled appetite of a massive middle class to consume the fruits of an essentially static economy — a highly inflationary activity. Between 1972 and 1975, all manner of slogans were resorted to, but little else.

**T**he failings of political management were matched by the failings of business management. During this period, the installed capacities were not properly maintained or fully utilised. Indeed, utilisation in criti-

cal areas had dropped to below fifty per cent, and less. While production was static or declining, profits continued to soar on the basis of captive markets and a shortage economy. All these aspects of our economy were sanctified by half-baked notions of socialism and justice. In fact, this crazy situation fired the explosive inflation which now surrounds us.

A refusal to face the inflationary threat, and to take appropriate measures to adopt a modern system of wages and salaries, created the basis of spreading corruption at all levels. Corruption began with 'the over and above' earning to balance the family budget. It then got organically linked with the subversion of the system of rules and regulations. And then moved into the beginnings of extensive black market dealings. An unthinking taxation system intensified the process even as the middle class grew and established what was almost a parallel economy. We were slow in understanding these trends which followed the intoxication of our military triumph in Bangladesh.

**T**he political system, unable to manage problems as effectively as in the past, began in the years following the Bangladesh events to manipulate power with black money. Smuggler financiers, kick-back specialists, property speculators, criminal traders and the like entered politics with their gangster supporters and quite naturally set about to destroy the moral basis of leadership. The special powers which government took under various Acts were an attempt largely by the bureaucracy to salvage a fast deteriorating situation, but actually the political will to deal with these elements had been eroded. These extra constitutional powers were soon to be misused politically.

The declaration of the Emergency was the result of the conjunction of several crises — personal, political, economic. It was a brand of governance without a serious value system. Indeed, the ruling elite had more or less convinced itself that it would be unable to salvage the system except through a resort to authori-

tarian methods. The quiet response to the declaration of an Emergency, despite its very personal overtones in terms of the Prime Minister's reaction to a High Court judgment, was a pointer to this acceptance by the ruling elite. Even the Emergency did not work. Nor did the meaningless reiteration of the Twenty Points programme of Indira Gandhi and her son, Sanjay. It led to the inevitable misuse of power against a faceless people. The inculcation of fear, window-dressing, invocations to discipline, elitist and dynastic posturings are no answer to problems, particularly within the old and rotting frameworks.

So myopic was the vision of the ruling elite that all manner of brutalities were indulged in during the Emergency supposedly to re-assert discipline. No examples were set by the ruling elite. Only naked power was projected. A parallel disciplining operation was conducted on a rather tame press, a demoralised administration, a shattered police force and a judiciary beginning to question its own independence. Public anger was made manifest in 1977, when a confused leadership of the ruling party sought an electoral mandate. The Intelligence agencies had given them the illusion of confidence — deliberately or otherwise. I leave it to historians to decipher. From the massive mandate of 1971, we moved to the Opposition's massive mandate of 1977. The voters certainly wanted credible governance. It was a lesson that needed to be drawn.

**T**he Janata phase under Morarji Desai is always remembered for the bickering — and the bickering was disgraceful and undignified. It was to tear the image of the Opposition to shreds. But the hard fact that went largely unnoticed was the arrival in power of a number of castes and classes that had so far played a back-bencher role. Every now and then they had shown strength in the regions, but not at the Centre. The arrival of these elements marked interesting innovations in policy elaboration, particularly as it affected the rural sector. The tilt to the village had come to stay. No political party would be

able to ignore it in the future. Despite the political chaos, the peasant leader Charan Singh had achieved his objective. But land reform of any description continued to be ignored. Only the needs of capitalist farmers were highlighted.

The so-called Janata coalition jogged along. Unfortunately, it was at the mercy of old, suspicious men with massive egos. Had the influential Gandhian, Jaya Prakash Narayan, insisted on giving power to the second level of leadership in this Opposition coalition, it may have been possible to work out the framework of a new orientation in Indian democratic functioning. But this was not to be. The promise of a major political/economic correction dissolved. There was no group which could rise above the parochial factions. As a matter of fact, these factions seemed totally oblivious of the consequences of their rivalry. Even the enemies of yesterday became potential allies in the battle for political advantage.

**T**he ousted Congress of Indira Gandhi — now rejuvenated through the organised recruitment of lumpen youth linked to criminal or semi-criminal activities — played with skill on the narrow ambitions of the Janata coalitionists. These moves were backed to the hilt by the urban vested interests which had become fearful of the Janata coalition. The coalition broke and splintered into a collapse. The 1980 election brought the massive mandate back to the party which had been ousted in 1977. Nothing could be more unhealthy, for the party which had won consisted largely of half-educated young men interested only in making money and using this money to consolidate power for making more money. In a sense, this change reflected the ethos of a rootless middle class based solidly on all manner of imitative values.

An India modelled on western experience was sought. Gandhi's warnings were forgotten. Nehru's too. A single, simplistic slogan of 'a government that works' was offered. But it has not worked at the

Centre or in the States for the past two years. We now face a spreading collapse of the minimums of governance in the various States of the federation. Witness the administrative collapse in Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh, the ethnic battles in the North-East, the separatist demands in the Punjab and the pockets of 'liberationist' turbulence in Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh. The attempt to create single party rule over the entire sub-continent could further disrupt the federal system. The size of States like Uttar Pradesh (population 100 million) cannot make for effective governance. At this point, there are no real signs of recovery — only increasing disarray in the rather fragile infrastructures of democratic life set up by Jawaharlal Nehru.

The expanding middle class — some 200 million now, if we include all the support systems — continues to push for the opportunity to grow. It has the muscle, the capacities, too, and the skills for this growth, but it has lost its social conscience. When at this juncture it can solve the problems of some 300 to 400 million poor, it refuses to perform because such a restructuring of the base of our society would cut its own dream of the good life. This massive contradiction has to be overcome, or else the middle class will be sitting on a poverty stricken mass, helots organised in support of the urban centres.

**I** do not see any positive signs of any such recognitions. The International Monetary Fund loan of 5.7 billion dollars, extraordinarily large by any standards, and the frenzied search for international finance and multinational support, will perpetuate a soft State with, alas, all the failures I have pointed to repeating themselves. I think it is no longer possible to plan 'forced marches' in India. And we shouldn't romanticise about them. But the poverty at the base of our society is now unacceptable because we have the resources and the skills to change these persistent patterns.

The scenario for attacking poverty in an open society like India is not

mind-boggling so long as priorities are clearly demarcated and the implementation machinery is properly geared. The legislated national minimum wage for farm labour, the land ceiling legislation and the various assistance schemes to small and marginal farms could, if pursued rigorously on the ground, have tremendous impact. Indeed, they have wherever this has been done by dedicated leadership. These are essential preliminaries for reviving and marketing the extraordinary craft skills of the poor in India. It is not as if these matters are not understood. They are part of the political philosophy of the sub-continent, but the ruling elites are unconcerned. To this extent — and on questions of military expenditures which are linked willy nilly to the lack of internal health in the region whatever our exaggerations about the threats from China and Pakistan — major struggles will take place in the eighties.

**W**hat does this mean? We have arrived at a moment in our history when we have to address ourselves rather courageously to the task of texturing a society of some 1000 millions. It demands experimentation in every area. It cannot be done in the western way, and remembering that even the West exported some 100 millions to lands across the Atlantic and elsewhere. Our numbers would defeat us, and so would the resource position. We would in our endeavours have to create a structure of life and living able to co-exist in dignity with other structures. Manageable smaller States. Simple living styles. Decentralised systems. An intelligent use of science and technology. And expanding literacy which fertilises democratic living. This is no small order. And we haven't begun to think about it. These are awesome tasks, but the politician who is to lead the transformation is playing the fool wherever he operates. Democracy cannot work unless we carry the people with us, invoke their participation in decision-making. India cannot run with a minuscule elite astride a vast and simmering population which can blow up the frame at any time.

I am not going to describe for you the spreading collapse of power generation and distribution, the telephone exchanges and the water supply systems. These elements of our crisis are now part of daily life in the sub-continent. Education is also a matter of suction or purchase. Recruitment to jobs, too. Schools and universities are no longer functioning in those dignities which are vital to the growth of national character and intellectual quest. The young cannot find shelter at reasonable rates any more. We are being defeated not only by numbers, but by our inefficiencies and our refusal to understand. We just do not attend to these matters within meaningful parameters. An unthinking bureaucracy has no idea of a civilised society, nor do the politicians.

**I**f educated youth are turning criminal, if peasants board trains and pull chains whenever they want to get down, if rules are for flouting, if anyone with a little power is rearing to harass those without, if successful racketeers are respected, if the more adventurous emigrate to other lands, we must collectively share the blame as a society of non-action. Non-action at the level of family. Non-action at places of work. Non-action where action is called for. We have become an amoral people. Is this a return to old mores? Or is the disease curable? The debate is being joined in earnest.

Action of the kind needed can only begin if an alternative centre of thinking and power is put together. This alternative is struggling to find itself. It has to be young, for India is growing younger. It will demand that the best men enter politics, into nation-building — not the money-infested politics of today, but politics purged of money so that the best men can step forward. This can be done. The correction can be peaceful and democratic. Otherwise, it will be violent. When the alternative begins to crystallise, then a programme will also take shape, a programme to lift us to the next plateau of creative growth. In my opinion, this is the gut problem facing a changing India. It has to be tackled, and can be tackled.

# Towards a new theory

SUNIL SAHASRABUDHEY

THIS paper seeks to provide a theoretical frame-work for a consistent understanding of radical politics in the country. First of all, the attempts to mobilize people on radical questions can be divided into two parts: the political and the non-political. A strict division of this kind may even be questionable but I would like to stick to it with the straightforward and ordinarily understood meanings of 'political' and 'non-political'. The exclusion from consideration of non-political mobilisation is simply to keep the subject matter of the paper within manageable bounds and ought not to be taken to imply any implicit faith or value.

Radical politics, generally speaking, do not yet constitute a dominant trend in the nation's political life, but they can be clearly and distinctly divided into two parts. One consists of the mobilizational attempts of groups and organizations more or less localized at different places. The other consists of peasant agitations. In the former can be included various CP (ML) groups, the Lohia Vichar Manch (LVM) and the Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini (henceforward referred to as 'Vahini'). The latter would include, say, the agitations of the peasantry in Tamilnadu, Karnataka and Maharashtra at present.

Once again, calling the activities of the above mentioned groups radi-

cal or considering the peasant agitations of fundamental value may be disputed. In fact, these very groups and activists may be reluctant unconditionally to call each other's activities radical. I shall prefer, however, not to get bogged down here by a debate on what constitutes radical politics, radical mobilization or radical activity. For, firstly, it would amount to a considerable digression and, secondly, part of my answer to what may constitute radical politics will come through the theoretical considerations which are to follow.

Peasant agitations are the precursor of that impending radical social movement which is likely to transform the Indian society totally and perhaps do more. The radical mobilizational groups do not all have clear sympathies with the peasant agitations for a variety of reasons. The idea therefore is to explore the social bases of such groups which may explain their behaviour, and the state of non-development and non-unity, and thus lay the basis for developing an understanding of a comprehensive and exhaustive politics of radical change.

Before we move on to the theoretical considerations, just a few words about the choice of the groups for consideration. Today, the CP (ML),

LVM and Vahini are precisely those groupings which indulge in radical politics. Their ways of thought constitute trends present in society and yet they do not play any significant role in national politics. The CP (ML) and LVM represent that aspect of communist and socialist traditions respectively which has not yet come to terms with the powers that be, despite recognising their oppressive character.

The CP (ML) groups taken together may be said to represent exhaustively such an aspect of the Indian Communist tradition but the same cannot be said of the LVM. There are other splinter socialist groups who may not identify themselves with LVM and also may not be with any of the leaders who have already clearly taken the compromising line. But the LVM is the largest of such groups. In the summer of 1980, it made an effort at Bangalore to build a new organization, Samta Sangathan, but which has not taken off yet. Vahini does not really represent any clear, historically identifiable political trend. In a sense it may be said to belong to the socialist tradition and yet JP's Sarvodaya mix has introduced important differences. I have chosen it for our consideration because it is the radical successor of the Bihar Movement which could be said to have constituted the real background in which the Janata Party was formed and the Indira Party defeated in the 1977 Lok Sabha elections. Hence, the importance of Vahini.

My understanding of the character of these groupings is based on the knowledge of their activity and extensive discussions with the activists and leaders over a period of five years now. It provided me with opportunities to understand their political character in great detail because almost invariably such discussions were held with the objective of trying to find what was common between us (I represented the group associated with the Mazdoor Kisan Niti) and if possible to work out common activity.

My basic contention is that these radical mobilization groups attempt

to mobilize the most oppressed of the social classes but in fact end up representing only a section of the middle class. The class they attempt to represent cannot yet stand up on its own and the class they actually represent does not have any concept of future society, it is not the class which will be the bulwark of such a reconstruction.

Thus, neither the class they attempt to represent nor the class they actually represent constitutes sufficient social basis for a united political movement. This explains the state of non-unity and non-development of such groups. And, as we shall see further, these groupings can only establish a harmonious relation with the peasant movement provided they give up their claims of leadership because the class they actually represent is not the vanguard class.

Colonial expansion and, later, imperialist development restructured Indian society completely. It ruined and finished the old classes and brought new ones into existence. The capitalists, the bureaucracy, the industrial workers and the urban middle classes all constitute the new classes. The peasantry did naturally exist in traditional India also but, after the British invasion and the organisation of Indian agriculture, the peasantry as a class was transformed completely. For, the nature of a class is in fact determined by its relation with other classes and the State.

Apart from such changes, a deeper phenomenon took place which may be called the imperialism of categories. This made educated Indians look at Indian society through western spectacles. The political and economic categories developed to understand western society and its history were used to understand Indian society also. There was an intrinsic falsehood in such an approach and the indigenous approach, traditional or non-traditional, always turned out to be more powerful and more real. The Nehruvian and the Gandhian approaches illustrate the point abundantly. Today, a self-conscious non-traditional, non-modern ap-

proach has become possible because the class that is to create a non-traditional, non-modern society is coming into its own, slowly becoming conscious of its capacity and destiny. I would like to classify my approach as one such.

British policy divided India fundamentally into two parts. The first part consisted of those who found a place in the new system based on western industry and a westernised value-system. This can be called the *Paschimikrt Samaj*. The other part consisted of people who found no place in the dominant part of the new system. This may be called the *Bahushkrt Samaj*. By and large, urban society is *Paschimikrt* and the rural people are *Bahushkrt*. This is not an emotional identification but is arrived at from the first principles of Marx's thought, which is not difficult because the political and economic categories developed by Marx were expressly meant to be the analytical tools for a socio-historical understanding of western society. And the modern development of Indian society has little in common with capitalist development in the West. I will mention a few very striking dissimilarities.

- 1 The change from traditional to modern India was not a product of struggles within our society, thus the change was alien to start with.

- 2 The series of changes that changed India from traditional to modern were all reactionary. This is substantiated by the fact that such changes unlike in Europe were never popular. The history of 19th century India is the history of peasant revolts and cultural opposition.

- 3 Unlike Europe, the peasantry here did not disintegrate spontaneously under the thrust of capitalist development. Instead, it transformed itself into a 'new' class, peasantry again.

British policy first ruined Indian agriculture and the associated industry, thus rupturing the traditional system. In place of this, a development mode was envisaged which could provide a market for

British goods and, later, for investment of capital in addition to the direct loot of the indigenous product and raw materials. This involved

- (a) keeping the peasantry constantly at its labour and
- (b) developing urban classes which would stand for British ways in general. These urban classes were constituted of those who found a place in the opportunities created by the new industry, the new administration, the new educational system, the system of judiciary etc.

This was the *Paschimikrt Samaj* which gave credence to British rule first and later mustered enough strength to challenge it.

**T**he oppression of the peasantry was of a new type. The peasant belonged neither to the traditional system nor to the modern. Not only that a far greater part (sometimes 9/10) of its produce was taken away by the British rulers, but that his productive activity itself played a subordinate role now. In traditional India agriculture was pervasive, and also the dominant mode of production. It was now the most widespread but not the dominant. Also, it was at the service of the dominant metropolitan mode. Thus, the peasantry belonged to an economic system whose role was to serve the growth of another dominant system. This made the peasantry economically *Bahishkrt*. As a natural corollary, the social values of these people gave way to westernised values which constituted the ideological basis of the new development. Their value system also assumed a secondary position thus making them *Bahishkrt* socially too. Not merely did modern development divide the country into the *Paschimikrt* and *Bahishkrt* Samaj but a specific relation came to subsist between these two parts. *Bahishkrt Samaj* was in the service of the *Paschimikrt Samaj*.

The leading sections of the *Paschimikrt Samaj* were opposed to British rule because they wanted

to have their own control on government policies and therefore on the mode of development. They were not opposed to the nature of development initiated by the British. The *Bahishkrt Samaj*, however, stood in total opposition to the new system and the new mode of development, economics, politics, culture, everything. For, it was this new mode which had stripped it of everything that it possessed and made it *Bahishkrt*. The world views of the two, the *Bahishkrt* and the *Paschimikrt Samaj* find their clearest expression in the thoughts of Gandhi and Nehru.

What is most significant to note is that before independence this *Bahishkrt Samaj* is not conscious of its *Bahishkrt* nature and its relation with the imperial power is mediated by the local authority like the Zamindars. The absence of any direct relation with the central power is in fact one important reason why the rural masses remain unconscious of their *Bahishkrt* state. The changes after independence have made the rural masses conscious of their *Bahishkrt* state and this, from the point of view of social change, is perhaps the most important difference between pre-independence and post-independence India.

**I**ndependence meant the rule of the *Paschimikrt Samaj* or rather the leading sections of the *Paschimikrt Samaj* — the big bourgeoisie. This meant industrialisation at a far greater speed than in the colonial period and alongside the spread of western values at practically break-neck speed. In the colonial period, British rule was generally afraid of the *Paschimikrt Samaj* gathering enough strength to overthrow it. Since greater industrialisation would have added to the strength of the *Paschimikrt Samaj* it was kept at a low key by the British. But independence meant removal of all such extraneous considerations.

Thus, the policy of the government after independence in fact fattened the *Paschimikrt Samaj*. At the same time the abolition of landlordism and the agricultural policy gave rise to the development of a

section of the peasantry. Thus, for almost two decades after independence there was general political stability. The reason simply was that the *Paschimikrt Samaj* was stable as a class due to increase in numerical strength even if there may not have been any significant increase in the real income and the *Bahishkrt Samaj* was not yet conscious of its *Bahishkrt* nature and hence could not initiate new political processes.

**M**id-way through the sixties new contradictions started emerging. A section of the peasantry found itself close to the *Paschimikrt* set-up, though still being outside it. This was the upper stratum of the peasantry whose economic condition improved through the use of modern techniques. It was this section which raised its head from 1967 onwards and the politics of the country thereafter is primarily determined by the contradiction (struggle) between this peasant class and the industrial big bourgeoisie. Even today this peasant class is part of the *Bahishkrt Samaj* — socially definitely so and economically finding itself on the verge of entering the *Paschimikrt* set-up. Nevertheless, this peasant class, in its struggle against the industrial bourgeoisie, attempts to mobilise the entire peasantry on the rural-urban and farm vs industry divide. This makes the entire peasantry conscious of its *Bahishkrt* nature through the peasant agitations, which ought not to be seen as price-movements. Their identification lies in the dynamic of their demands, a dynamic which is still open-ended in so far as the agitating class is not yet fully aware of its destiny. These agitations may be seen as being in continuity with Gandhi's movements. Gandhi represented a *Bahishkrt Samaj* which was not conscious of its *Bahishkrt* nature.

The poorest sections of the rural workers, the Harijans and farm labourers, do not yet identify with these peasant movements. The radical mobilization groups attempt to represent them, but since these sections have not become conscious of their *Bahishkrt* nature because of their role and place in the production process, they do not yet have a



basis of their own on which to stand up and so assume a leadership role in the impending change

The effect of the post-independence development on the *Paschimikrt Samaj* has been almost equally significant. By the mid-sixties the westernized development process came to a point of diminishing returns for the *Paschimikrt Samaj*. This meant that the rate at which the aspirations of the urban middle classes were rising became higher than the rate at which new opportunities were being created. This was when the problem of the educated unemployed came into existence. It may be remembered that the first engineering college strike took place in the mid-sixties.

This fact of a section of the *Paschimikrt Samaj* being thrown out of the dominant system is of great significance because this section came into existence and grew as part and parcel of the new setup. Unemployment of the educated is a measure of its strength and its political reflection is chiefly in student politics. The radical mobilization groups in fact represent this section of our society, which, finding no place in the dominant system, becomes the natural ally of the *Bahishkrt Samaj* in the impending transformation. Therefore, let us consider some important characteristics of this section of the *Paschimikrt Samaj*.

(1) Economically it is being thrown out of the system but socially and culturally it is part of it. This situation is exactly the opposite of the upper stratum of the *Bahishkrt Samaj* which is outside the system socially and culturally but on the verge of entering it economically. It may be noted that economically a section may be thrown out or incorporated into the system in a short time, say a generation, but for the same to happen socially or culturally is bound to take a long time, say, several generations.

(2) As the economic *Bahishkrt*-ness becomes deeper by the day, it is clearly impossible to regain the old position in the system. This

inevitably results in a questioning of the values which constitute the theoretical basis of the system. The emergence of a section of the intelligentsia refusing to accept the 'established' or 'received' truths about the fundamentals or philosophy of development, technology, science, etc., is a clear manifestation of such a situation. The talk of alternatives spreading into newer and newer areas of human knowledge and exercise is precisely this.

(3) There is a certain rootlessness about this class, perhaps, because it has never known any ideas other than those western and thus simply does not have any starting point for the creation of a set of non-western ideas. This results, on the one hand, in a reconstruction of 'tradition' and, on the other, working with ideas like democracy and equality under the illusion that the content of such ideas is totally general.

(4) It struggles on questions of fundamental importance but on its own is unable to take the struggle towards fundamental change. The reason is in (3).

(5) It has the capacity to reject all that is modern-western but has no capacity to work out the positive basis of the new society. Its idea of the clean society is merely a cleaner version of western society.

(6) It does not have clear sympathy with the movements of the *Bahishkrt Samaj* because it is incapable of sufficient radicalism, its thought pattern still being considerably dictated by the leading sections of the *Paschimikrt Samaj*. Therefore, it sees traditional content in traditional forms of oppression. This leads to its imagined closeness with the lowest sections of the rural society and a blown up and distorted construction of the contradictions between the upper and lower strata in rural society.

(7) Two features of student politics in the last decade are most notable one, its widespread occurrence and, two, the anarchy and valuelessness prevailing within it. This first is because the section of the *Paschimikrt Samaj* which is being thrown out of the system is coming into greater and greater con-

tradiction with the system. The reason for the second is simply the inability of this class to find a radical mode of liberation on its own. Student politics can find a long term direction only when it is coupled with the movement of the *Bahishkrt Samaj*, today the peasant agitations.

The activity of all the three groupings, the CP (ML), the LVM and the Vahini, involves organising the rural poor. The CP (ML) has been organising the rural poor against the local rich whom they consider zamindars or feudal landlords. The main activity of the Vahini has been organising the poor against the Mahanth of Bodh Gaya in Bihar. These mobilizations are done basically on the question of land, which they both appear to consider the fundamental question of the Indian revolution. The LVM, however, has been attempting to organise the rural youth on the question of unemployment which, indeed, in my opinion is a far more fundamental question than the land question. In fact, the land question is only a special case of the unemployment question. But the LVM too over-rates the importance of the contradictions within the rural society and very often organises the rural poor against the rural rich.

I do not want, here, to go into the details of the theoretical frameworks that emerge or are expressed in their activity. My concern, here, is to focus attention on the fact that they in reality represent that section of the *Paschimikrt Samaj* which is being thrown out of the system. It is revealing to note the nature of the difficulty they face once the organisation and mobilization proceeds to measurable lengths in some areas.

The C P Reddy group of Andhra Pradesh has been organising the rural poor in one of the talukas of the Karimnagar district which has, for a long time been declared as 'disturbed' under the Disturbed Areas Act. The activists involved in the organization work there and also the leadership openly admit that their struggle has reached a state of stalemate, that they have successfully waged struggle against



the landlords (called 'Dora' there) but are unable to turn this struggle against the State

The Vinod Misra group has been involved in organising the rural poor against the local rich in the Bhojpur area for several years now. They have been facing a similar difficulty. Their eleventh party conference held some time in the last months of 1979 redefined the tasks. In the four tasks mentioned, the last one talks of organising the rural people directly against the State. They set such a development in terms of the necessity of broad overground mobilization. But what cannot be missed is the growing realization among them that 'anti-feudal' activity does not amount to 'anti-State' activity.

The inevitable theoretical consequence is that the ruling class is not feudal. But they cannot draw such a conclusion, because such a conclusion for them would mean that the country has become capitalist and the revolution will be socialist. They are prisoners of the imperialism of categories. They on their own cannot liberate themselves from alien thought patterns, for they, ultimately, represent that section of the middle classes which is being thrown out of the system. Since this class is incapable of independent development, its representatives are incapable of developing a new and real theory of social change and hence cannot give up a well knit theory that they are working with.

The case of Vahini is not very different. In the summer of 1980, the entire leadership resigned expressing its inability to build an organisation which could become the instrument of change. It is not a case of individual or organisational failure. Seen in a wider context, it becomes immediately apparent that the rural poor, whom the Vahini attempts to organise and represent, does not as a class constitute sufficient basis for independent political organisation. The Bihar movement, in fact, is the most outstanding example of the movement of that section which is being thrown out of the system. Vahini represents the radical moorings of the same but is so strictly a prisoner of the imperia-

lism of categories that as an organisation it cannot be expected to change itself into representing the *Bahishkrt Samaj*.

The case of the LVM, as stated earlier, is slightly different. Greater stress on the question of unemployment reflects a broader outlook and some grasp of the fact that modern westernism is the primary evil. Compared to the CP (M.L.) and Vahini, it also has clearer sympathies with the peasant movement. Yet, the basic vacillation is evident. Its leadership (Kishan Pattanaik in *Samayik Varta*) has gone to the extent of calling, at one time, the student movement in Orissa more important than the peasant movement. It identifies the Hindu tradition as an evil on par with the modern-western system. All of this finds expression in its activity. It is not as clearly a prisoner of the imperialism of categories as the CP (M-L) is, but its insistent emphasis on 'equality' and 'democracy' gives the impression that it, as an organisation, would not be able to cast off the imperial network of categories.

This section of the socialists does not present itself as a well knit organisation. Not because, as the socialists think, that they are traditionally weak on 'organisation', but because it represents a wider interest. Although it attempts to represent the poorest section of the rural society and ends up representing that section of the *Paschimkrt Samaj* which is being thrown out of the system, still it has a certain comprehension and feeling of the new and conscious trends developing in the *Bahishkrt Samaj*. This is finding expression in Karnataka.

In conclusion, I only wish to state that a far reaching and consistent politics of radical social change can be developed only on the basis of a judicious combination of the interests of the *Bahishkrt Samaj* and that section of the *Paschimkrt Samaj* which is being thrown out of the dominant system. The radical mobilization groups can have great value in this process provided they see themselves not as leaders but as participants, not as pathfinders but as path clearers.

# Tasks of the misfit

B P R VITHAL

LIKE his clothes, the personality of Vavilala (Andhra's well-known freedom fighter) has never been bleached by the detergence of modern dissimulation or worldly ambition. He is a combination of the influence of Marx and Gandhi that I was always looking for. No doubt, it can be said there were others who had felt both these influences, Nehru himself for instance. But Gandhi's influence on Nehru remained, what I might call, vicarious. By Gandhi's influence I refer to the anchoring in Indian tradition, essentially roots in India's peasantry. In that sense, Nehru was always a sandal tree. His roots tagged on to Gandhi's and in that manner drew sustenance from the Indian peasant tradition, but he himself remained a prince among them, for them, not of them. The peasant tradition need not be romanticised, it can be coarse, but it is nevertheless sustaining. Civilisations have always fallen due to an excess of refinement, not

due to coarseness, in fact it is the coarse and the vulgar who have inherited the earth and then got refined themselves.

Then, there have been those on whom the influence of Gandhi and Marx was successive, the one wiping out the other, like J.P., the *Darkness at Noon* phenomenon. What I mean by the influence of Marx and Gandhi, in a case like Vavilala's, is a syncretic influence, the head influenced by the rational social view of Marx, the heart sensitised and strengthened by the Indian tradition, of which the highest flowering was Gandhi. The head in the twentieth century, the roots in the hoary past. An Indianisation of Marx which unfortunately has never taken place in our political tradition. It was this of which Vavilala is an example.

Mao's service to China was precisely this. He is criticised for having Sinicised Marx, for being more Chinese than Marxist. I don't think this is a contradiction or a betrayal. This was in fact his greatest contribution and our greatest lack. Mao

\*Address delivered at the inauguration of the Vavilala Samstha at Guntur on November 1, 1981, which covers some questions of fundamental importance.

shared with Gandhi that ability to feel the pulse of his people, to be recognisably one of them and yet sufficiently ahead of them to be able to inspire, guide and lead them. But he was also a Marxist and, therefore, had a picture of what kind of society could and ought to be created in the twentieth century, given the leap his country had to make over centuries of deprivation

Gandhi was not so influenced. His influences were Tolstoy and Emerson. They were sufficient to create communes but not communities, and so, perforce, independent modern India had to abandon him at the very moment of its emergence. There was also an immortal component to Gandhi's message which has been picked up even by more advanced societies now in the shadow of nuclear extinction. But that was his moral message, not his economic one, and the moral message required an economic base of contentment that his economic philosophy could not in today's circumstances build. For Mao, Marxism supplied this missing component. His own contribution to its remoulding to suit China's circumstances, like the idea of communes, was tremendous, but basically he had a reliable compass in Marxism.

Of course, now it can be said that his country has betrayed him even more grievously than we have done Gandhi, that depends upon whether one considers lip service better than removing photographs. No doubt, China may be going away from or beyond Mao in a more real sense. But this is after a period when his indelible mark on new China had already been imprinted. It was not Gandhi's martyrdom that prevented this. It would have happened even had he lived, he was himself aware of this when he chose Nehru as his successor and not Vinoba.

**I**n the absence of this Marxist influence in our picture of new India, the western liberal or at best Fabian tradition filled the vacuum through the personality of Nehru. I am aware that, from a Marxist point of view, I am putting the cart before the horse. The state of Indian society and the nature of the leadership dictated the Fabian succession

and it was not Nehru who chose it. But since I am today looking at it from the point of view of personalities, I may be pardoned this mirror image mistake. But coming back to my basic point, Vavilala, to me, represents what could have been, had we succeeded in continuing the Marxist and Indian tradition in a dynamic sense of interaction and not as a geological overlay.

**S**acrifice, rationalism and humanism are the three important facets of Vavilala's personality; the first the result of the Gandhian tradition, the second of the Marxist influence and the third a product of both these influences. It was one of Gandhi's great contributions to make sacrifice an instrument of action and of popular mobilisation. He built on the Indian tradition of veneration more for sacrifice than even for achievement. Whether it is Sri Rama or the Buddha, the image was one of leaving the palace to go to the forest in pursuit of *dharma* or *jnana* or *moksha*.

This was the opposite of the American popular myth of the man who makes it from the log cabin to the White House. Here such a one would not be an authentic hero or role model. Immediately questions would be raised about how exactly he could have made it — merit generally not being accepted as the sole reason — and if all other explanations fail to detract from the achievement, it would be put down to merit stored by sacrifice in a previous life.

It is to such a tradition of sacrifice that Gandhi awoke men like Vavilala. But it is a species in danger of extinction. There are not enough specimens even in captivity, and like all endangered species they do not breed in captivity and, of course, in Sri Vavilala's case, for quite well-known reasons! Even if they had progeny, the characteristic is not inheritable. It is born out of struggle and cannot be bred at will or to order. Even today there are undoubtedly many causes that can inspire men to sacrifice in the course of struggle, but the response is poor in the cynical society we are building and, where there is response,

perhaps future generations will be able to see its shining example, but not we, who have been blinded in our life-time by petty ambitions and treacherous temptations.

The Trust that Vavilala has formed is the culmination of a life-time of sacrifice, it is neither another way of holding one's acquisitions nor an old age recompense for a life-time's aggrandisement. It is necessary to say this, because we seem now to be concerned only with where money goes and not from whence it comes. In morality there are no double negatives. Illegotten money ill-collected does not become good money. But then in capitalism money is always colourless. Money is what money does, not how it comes. Then there is no difference between a Bodhisattva and Robin Hood; between one who gives away his own merit to save others and one who relieves others of their surplus, albeit to help the more deserving. Sacrifice and the sanctity of means are the two most important components of Gandhi's teaching which the life of one like Vavilala exemplifies and that needs repetition and resuscitation now.

**T**o say that rationalism is the result of Marxist influence is neither to assert that it is the origin of it nor to deny that there may be entirely indigenous traditions which could also have encouraged a rationalist approach. Rationalism, even in the West, has had both empirical and non-empirical streams in it. Non-empirical, self-contained rationalism very often led to idealism and while it initially did serve the purpose of liberating man from the incubus of dogma and superstition and appeal to supernatural sources of authority, it later also thwarted genuine scientific enquiry.

Early Indian tradition has been rich in this kind of self-contained rationalism — rationalism which pursued truth without seeking higher authority — and has had its noblest expression in the *Upanishads*, the Buddha and, later, Sankara. In a corresponding phase of western civilisation also, Aristotle in the beginning, and St. Thomas Aquinas later, served a similar purpose. But empirical

rationalism could come only much later, after the Renaissance and the Copernican revolution etc

This phase never occurred in our history till the later part of the British rule, when a kind of renaissance took place here in the second half of the nineteenth century. The inspiration for this was, however, western enlightenment transmitted to us through the British themselves, though in the broader context of national assertion this was sought to be linked with the earlier indigenous traditions by men like Vivekananda

**W**e are, however, concerned with rationalism in the more narrow sense of the rational approach applied to social problems. It is here that the great tradition of Marx comes in, for it was Marx who brought rational enquiry to bear on social problems. Whatever may be the controversy in regard to Marxian economics in general, or to the labour theory of surplus value in particular, the fact remains that he brought about an irreversible revolution in our approach to social issues in two aspects at least, viz, to concede the economic factor in social issues and to identify and analyse the problem of alienation which arises with capitalist industrialisation.

Gandhi identified alienation with industrialisation itself or, more particularly, with its scale. Marx's analysis of alienation in a capitalist society cannot be refuted. All that a critic can raise is the question of whether the alienation does not continue even in non-capitalist forms of industrial development. Marx did not concern himself at that stage with post-capitalist problems. It may be that the problem of alienation even in post-capitalist societies requires further analysis. It may be that Gandhi also was not entirely correct in assuming that alienation is inseparable from industrialisation.

The Cybernetic revolution is said to make it possible now to organise even industry at a much higher technological level in social situations which can avoid alienation

Work and education can be brought back into the home through the computer and television. Whether this can be done within the capitalist system or the abolition of the capitalist system is a pre-requisite for exploiting the full potentialities of this new revolution is another matter. But, these are all issues that are arising only because, for the first time, Marx gave a framework in which such an approach to social problems became possible. Here, again, the manner in which the tool of Marxism can be used to unravel social issues in a society such as ours has not been fully worked out. While pedantic answers have been offered, none has stood the test of real science, namely, the test of either prediction or successful application.

**T**he third aspect which I mentioned was humanism. The briefest definition of humanism can be that in humanism man is the end and man is the means. In humanism the ultimate purpose of all human action is the creation of circumstances in which the human potential can flower to the fullest extent — can flower and not be exploited. With this purpose must go the faith or conviction that such circumstances can be created by human endeavour alone and no appeal to extra human resources is necessary. In this sense Marxism is again essentially the solid basis for genuine humanism. Gandhi's ideals could also be expressed in the same terms when we take concepts like *Daridra-narayana*.

So long as we deal with man as a social being and with the social circumstances necessary for man to reach his highest achievement, there would be no difference of opinion. Differences of opinion occur only when we go further and the question arises whether human happiness — in whatever sense that word may be defined — is only the sum total of economic contentment, social justice and intellectual fulfilment, or whether, while these are undoubtedly necessary pre-requisites, there is a kind of fourth inner dimension which can be neither explained nor pursued in this three-dimensional framework.

In a country like ours where the basic economic and social pre-requisites either for intellectual fulfilment or for human happiness have not yet been provided, it would be undoubtedly diversionary to raise such issues at this stage. We need not deny them, but we can conveniently postpone or shelve them till we have done our duty in respect of the economic and social aspects.

**I** have mentioned the three aspects of sacrifice, rationalism and humanism and delineated in a very broad sense some of the issues related to these three factors, because I feel that in all these aspects the Indian context, like any other context, is unique to itself and we must be able to find our own solutions to some of these issues. However much we may raise ourselves on other traditions, learn from them and draw inspiration from them, ultimately only that solution will survive which can strike roots in this soil.

This was what one was looking forward to when India became free and there was hope so long as men of that first generation, men like Vavilala, were available. But one generation has gone by. We have gone down other alleys, many dead-ends, and a new generation not in touch with its own traditions and deriving inspiration from a West that is itself in acute intellectual crisis, has to face these problems. Who among them will be up to this task and how do we prepare them for such a task? This I think is the great intellectual problem today.

Vavilala has always been greatly interested in problems of development both of the country and of his own State which he loves dearly, viz, Andhra Pradesh. Let me, therefore, raise two general issues about development — one relevant at the national level and the other at the State level. The Club of Rome first raised the controversial issue of the finite availability of resources in the world acting as a constraint on development objectives. This thesis has been countered by several other authorities, not merely on the basis of different economic projections,

but essentially on the basis of a faith in technology being able continuously to solve the problems it throws up

But, whatever may be the validity of this thesis for the world as a whole, there is no doubt that for some societies such as ours and the Chinese, the size of population is such that, in the long range, a resources constraint can be a very real issue. It is unrealistic to expect that resources will be shared on a global basis when even their exchange has not so far been organised on any rational basis. One has, therefore, to take a national view of this matter with only a marginal outlet from an autarchic system in terms of aid or trade.

If that is conceded, it would become immediately evident that the long-range goal of our planning has to be completely different from the goals of planning in other countries, which have either already reached a higher level due to past exploitation of others or which are fortunate in having a better ratio of resources to population. Whether we consciously admit it or not, the long-range objective in our minds has always been that at some day in the future everyone in this country will enjoy the kind of standard of living that a developed nation has today, i.e., in some future century India should be at least what the United States is in 1981. This might appear absurd when put in this crude fashion, but I am afraid subconsciously this, in fact, has been behind our thinking when setting the directions of planned development. My submission is that this has now to be accepted as an impossible goal.

Our whole objective has to be different. Our very basket of goods and services, not only now but in any perspective plan of any span, has also to be conceived of quite differently. To this end the horizons of desires of men and their motivations will have to be reoriented. We have to stop thinking in terms of a car for a family, or if this is not possible for every five families or ten families or a hundred families, and start thinking of a society where easy and comfortable public trans-

port would be available to everybody, because even in the longest possible perspective, that is all we may be able to afford. But the type of consumerism we are encouraging, the sophisticated advertising world that has been built up, the glossy magazines that we are producing, are already generating dreams of a different kind.

It is this basic contradiction and the consequent inability to adjust ourselves to what in fact are our realities, that is generating crisis after crisis in the society even when real progress is taking place. It is here that one of the basic thoughts of Gandhiji is so relevant today, namely, that economic activity must be designed for the satisfaction of needs no doubt, but needs should not be constantly generated or created. In the western type consumer-cum-advertising world we are building, new needs are already being created for a few, while for the vast majority even old needs have not yet been satisfied. Why wonder then if, as a result, we become a crisis-ridden society despite achievement.

Theoretically, two approaches are possible to this problem. One is the straightforward egalitarian approach where the limited resources available are equitably distributed. It used to be a common joke, in our elite circles, against the socialists that if all the wealth of the Big Houses together were distributed among the six hundred million Indians each Indian would after all get a few rupees and that that was not going to make any substantial change to his position. These statements ignore elementary human psychology. In a period of deprivation the next best solution to satisfaction is in fact equal distribution of deprivation. To share deprivation is to make its burden light or at least more tolerable.

The appeal for simplicity and austerity, therefore, is not because of the resources that would be thereby saved, but because of the greater solace that it would give to those who in any case have no alternative to being austere. The egalitarian

approach was the approach that China adopted to begin with. No doubt this generates problems of its own, particularly problems of incentive and motivation after a certain level of uniform satisfaction has been achieved. But I do not think that the only answer, even at that stage, is the restoration of hitherto well known economic incentives.

Socialism in one sense is not merely a question of the forces of production, but also of relations of production and, arising from this, a certain view of human nature itself. Four centuries of capitalism has made us believe that man is basically acquisitive and aggressive, and that, therefore, he cannot be made to work except by appealing to either of these incentives — more pay or an external enemy. We forget that before capitalism, both in the feudal and pastoral societies or even in tribal societies, man was essentially a cooperative being. He lived and survived as a member of a group and was capable of sacrificing himself for the good of the group. There is no such thing, therefore, as basic human nature. Circumstances can be created in which he can evolve either as a cooperative being or as an acquisitive one.

So far all Marxists will agree, but thereafter there is a parting of ways. Some would emphasise that the forces of production should change first to ensure abundance, since only in abundance can cooperative man thrive. The other view would have it that the infrastructure and the superstructure are mutually interactive and changes in either cannot be permanently postponed while the other is being attended to. Just as you cannot have a society based on a mere appeal to altruism with no effort being made to improve the physical circumstances of life, you cannot also have a society where we are so busy in creating and catering to the evergrowing needs of life, that altruism is stifled as not being conducive to production and hoping that, at some later stage, it can be revived or injected.

The other approach would be that an egalitarian socialist solution

is perhaps not possible for a society like ours with a population problem and, therefore, an ultimate constraint of resources. But the sharp differences that capitalist development would normally result in can, it is suggested, be mitigated by creating a dual economy existing at different levels of development — a majority contributing their labour and mostly concentrated in a primary sector using labour intensive technologies, and another sector at a high level of sophistication based on capital and skill intensive industries.

Naturally, there will be exchanges between the two sectors in physical terms and there will always be what one might call human leakages. The highly motivated cannot remain in the primary sector because their motivation cannot be satisfied with the rewards of that sector and if they are allowed to remain there they would be a source of trouble. They are, therefore, allowed to ascend to the second sector where their motivation would be an asset. They perform the role of migrants between these two sectors.

Similarly, the second sector also will be based on such high levels of motivation and sophistication, that some will be dissatisfied even with the level of that sector, though that itself would be very high compared to the first sector. They would then be allowed to leak out of the country itself by way of what is called the brain drain. The brain drain can thus be a safety valve to get rid of highly motivated persons who otherwise would be a source of problems. Incidentally, they could be foreign exchange earners also.

**T**he question however is whether, given our resources and population, a model can be built which strikes the right balance between the two sectors and whether the political institutions will enable a certain degree of separation between the two sectors which the model assumes. If the motivations or standards of living and of aspirations of the second sector invade the first sector through means such as the television, the whole arrangement

would break down. But to start with, it would be interesting to see whether even the mathematics will come out correctly in a model of this type.

Whatever the feasibility, it is difficult to see what third way is possible. One possibility could be what one might call, an alternating phase approach. You have an egalitarian phase, then you have an uneven growth phase. When this creates too many problems you revert to the egalitarian phase. In fact this is a modification of the dual economy approach but spread over time, that is, while the dual economy model divides society into two sectors at one time, the alternating phase approach adopts the approaches of the two sectors for the whole society over successive alternating periods of time.

**A**nd, finally, we come to Andhra — the native soil so dear to Vavilala and to me. A soil so fertile in talent, yet like all fertile soils also prolific in weeds, with the result that Khasa was to say that 'The Andhra is like the rice plant, he thrives only when he is transplanted'. And, unfortunately, neither Vavilala nor I have ever been transplanted with what results I shall not dwell upon.

In several respects Andhra is the country in microcosm. It is near the country's averages in several indicators but, as in the case of the country, these averages conceal a wide regional fluctuation in the levels of development. Just as the nation has some parts whose levels of development and infrastructure may compare with much better developed countries and other parts whose low levels of development bring down the national average, so also Andhra Pradesh has some parts which can perhaps compare with Punjab and Haryana, while there are other parts whose condition would approximate more to the conditions in other backward States in the country. In that sense, it is truly a bridge between the backward Hindi States to its North and the more developed South.

Again, it is, like the country, well endowed with both natural and

human resources and yet has not been able to make a break-through even in terms of the average performance of the country itself. And of course I need not mention that we are very avid practitioners of the national pastime of belittling our own achievements and pulling each other down. The problems of Andhra Pradesh therefore will, in many respects, reflect the national problems and in that sense Andhra Pradesh provides a very fruitful field for research and study of the problems of development in general and of regional imbalances and backward areas in particular. The most important problem is why we are not able to make a breakthrough despite our human and individual endowment, not a spectacular one, but at least one beyond the national average. Is it the incubus of the social structure not having been sufficiently changed? If so how does one go about it given our political institutions and situation? These are issues that could be of national relevance too.

**V**avilala is at the head of a generation of which perhaps my age group represents the humble tail — a generation that saw many a Colossus stride this world. But it is also a generation that saw them either betrayed or dragged down from their pedestals. We are, therefore, the generation of fallen idols. We are told that this is as it should be, that it is what reason demands, the age of the anti-hero. I refuse to believe it. I would rather believe with Carlyle that 'in times of unbelief' we see 'in this indestructibility of hero-worship the everlasting adamant lower than which the confused wreck of revolutionary things cannot fall'. Reason cannot and ought not to light every corner of the human mind. Beauty is a matter of contrast, art of light and shade, not a monochrome.

What have we achieved thereby? A generation where Tolkien is a best seller for adults and Exorcist is a big draw. Had we been allowed our hobgoblins and our friendly witches on broomsticks, these absurd or terrible substitutes would not have been necessary. Maybe, psycho histories are true. Maybe that Lenin's Russia is not worthy of

him, that Gandhi died a disillusioned man, Nehru a saddened one and that Mao after 1956 — or is it 1966? — was wrong. So what? What does it prove retrospectively? Human assessment is like our old examination system, no one gets a hundred per cent as in the objective tests. Mao's assessment of Stalin's contribution was 80 20, 80 good, 20 bad. Mao's successor gave the same score to Mao.

Yes, no man is infallible. Yes; they had feet of clay. To the Hindu that disproves nothing. That an Avatar has a human vehicle with all its failings does not deny his divine descent. We are not monophysites. All idols are of clay. We make Ganesha out of mud, worship it and throw it away in water — though nowadays we seem to be hesitating to do that—does that deny its function? Myths, legends, and heroes who are undoubtedly part myth, are necessary for nations and individuals at one stage of development and one should be careful in removing such crutches. Man is still psychologically handicapped, he is still a mixed being and therefore a mixed up being.

*A being darkly wise, rudely great  
Chaos of thought and passion, all  
confused,  
Still by himself abused or disabused,  
Created half to rise, and half to fall,  
Great Lord of all things, yet a prey  
to all,  
Sole judge of truth, in endless error  
hurled,  
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world!*  
(Pope)

Nevertheless, this is rationalisation. The fact remains that our generation has felt the crushing blow of falling idols. Our subconscious is now full, not of idols but of debris, and we do not know how to reconstruct it or even clear it. That makes misfits of us all. I do not have Vavilala's concurrence to say this, but I would like to believe he would join me in being described as a misfit in today's world which

*Gives too late  
What's not believed in, or if still  
believed,  
In memory only, reconsidered  
passion.*

where

*Unnatural vices  
Are fathered by our heroism.  
Virtues  
Are forced upon us by our impudent crimes*

So

*I have lost my passion why should  
I need to keep it  
Since what is kept must be adulterated?*  
(T S Eliot)

Let me, therefore, conclude by trying to put down what I would call a charter for misfits. We are opt-outs, not drop-outs. We are misfits, not failures.

The test for a misfit is that in today's society if he is successful he is discontented for having succeeded in such a world, and if he is contented he is, in the eyes of others, unsuccessful.

Nevertheless we believe it is not for us to fit, but for us to change things so that those with our ideals can fit.

But we have reached a stage of life when we realise that to fit requires not merely external reconstruction but internal search also. We have to work out the external implications of what the internal search reveals, that

*What you thought you came for  
Is only a shell, a husk of meaning  
From which the purpose breaks only when  
it is fulfilled  
If at all. Either you had no purpose  
Or the purpose is beyond the end you  
figured  
And is altered in fulfilment*  
(T S Eliot)

We have to restore confidence in our original faith that the ultimate purpose which does not so break or cannot be so broken is

*To follow knowledge, like a sinking star  
Beyond the utmost bound of human  
thought.*  
(Tennyson)

To that quest I am sure the Trust, that Sri Vavilala Gopalakrishnayya has constituted, will make a significant contribution.

# NGOs — changing role

SANJIT ROY

THE role of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in India has never really been understood. Nor, regrettably, has an attempt been made to clear the confusion that prevails about them in the corridors of power. The bureaucracy has never admitted in black and white that NGOs do not have a place and a role in the development process but, in practice, the response to the whole idea of the NGOs being mobilised for development purposes has been looked on with much suspicion perhaps with very valid reason.

Not all NGOs have an unblemished track record and neither are the people who are behind the setting up of these NGOs any less controversial. Has-been politicians become 'social workers' when they have nothing better to do. They form NGOs with a view to jumping into the political arena in the future and villages have been chosen so as to nurse a particular constituency. Some NGOs are blatant fronts for political parties though whenever the opportunity arises they deny this vehemently. But in the process all NGOs are much maligned and the genuine ones suffer.

Of course, the next question is what criteria is used to distinguish the genuine from the fake.

this only time will tell. When an NGO is started, the background of the people who have got together, the type of institution supporting them, the area of work they have chosen and its location (city, State, district, block, village) does give some indication to experienced people of whether a particular NGO is likely to be genuine or not. To say that all NGOs are guilty until they prove their innocence is really being quite unfair.

Perhaps the time has come to be a bit more specific. We know that there are NGOs and NGOs. For the sake of convenience people tend to bundle them all under one loose head, with the result that anything and everything which is not within the government system falls in this category — panchayats, cooperative societies, youth clubs, Rotary, Lions, Inner Wheel, Jaycees, Sarvodaya, Ramakrishna mission, Christian missions, bal mandirs, Nehru yuvak kendras and other autonomous institutes, organisations and corporations.

We are such a motley, ostensibly disorganised crowd that one look at us sitting all together is likely to increase rather than lessen the suspicion, mistrust and lack of confidence between the government



and NGO, between the NGO and the community and between the NGOs themselves. One look at all of us rubbing shoulders together should convince even the most gullible that we are not all that humble, dedicated, motivated and simple as we make ourselves out to be. The majority among us who believe this and who at every opportunity harp on these points are actually cashing in on a much flogged image that is dying — if it is not dead already.

**T**his is not to devalue the tremendous work being done by many organisations in many fields but they would be the last one's to talk about it or claim to be supermen and superwomen. In fact, if they are what they claim to be, they would be embarrassed. But in their heart of hearts, they know that the NGO movement is being slowly strangled to death, that the lifeblood of the movement — if it can be called a movement at all — is being sucked dry by leeches and bloodsuckers, leaving a shell in its place. Year by year we are losing the moral authority that we had to influence policy and government year by year we are losing the reputation we enjoyed once, of integrity, of honesty and being just year by year through sheer desperation, in order to justify our existence and tell the world we NGOs are getting bigger, we are welcoming to our fold people and organisations we would never otherwise have touched with the end of a barge pole.

These self appointed leaders of the NGO movement have lost their credibility among their own clan they have been out of touch with the workers in the villages for so long that it is not surprising that their word carries little weight. The mantle of giving the NGO movement some direction, some dignity and some purpose in playing a crucial role in today's development world is on the shoulders of half a dozen people who, beyond delivering the odd speeches and pontificating, have lost the will and the courage to suggest changes in the role of NGOs, to give NGO effort a new dimension and meaning. All they are worried about is themselves and

the contribution they think they are making on the international circuit

Before the new role of NGOs is studied in greater depth, what is obviously long overdue is a need to classify the types of so-called NGOs in India today. Unfortunately, in the minds of the humble public all NGOs are involved in social service as against development work which in government eyes is outside the scope of the NGOs. Since by social service everyone means charitable work, they see little distinction between what the Rotary Club is doing by organising an eye camp or distributing clothes and what a rural development organisation is doing mobilising people to fight for their rights. What the Jaycees do on week-ends distributing scholarships (maybe), the Rama Krishna Mission does opening dispensaries and a youth group based in a tribal area does training village level health workers, is one and the same thing.

By accepted definition, a voluntary organisation is supposed to do charitable work—free service to show the extent of sacrifice and dedication, perhaps. Well, then, the largest charitable organisation is the Government of India today because all their services are free. Education is free, medical service is free, agriculture is heavily subsidised, the setting up of cottage industries is done on a concessional basis, drinking water is free, the construction of roads in the villages is free. It sounds ridiculous especially when the rural community is in a position to pay for all these services — which is what many NGOs are trying to do but not without terrific opposition from the government and political quarters.

**T**he classification is necessary. Not all NGOs would like to be treated alike. Rotary Club members would not like to be seen dead with simply clad, Hindi speaking, Sarvodaya workers nor I dare say would the Sarvodaya workers like to be seen hobnobbing with 'old spice' smelling, prim and pucca type, jet set, social workers—a breed that is fast becoming common these days. It is necessary to classify them under three broad headings: (i) social service NGOs, (ii) NGOs involved

in rehabilitation work, (iii) NGOs committed to rural development.

**A** large number of NGOs fall in the first category, among them the Rotary and Lions Club types. Well endowed, never short of money for the week-end philanthropy they practice, harmless, non controversial and just the sort of service acceptable to government. Now comes the twilight zone where there is much overlapping and confusion. There are traditional agencies with a long past: Christian missionaries, followers of the Ramakrishna Mission and Sarvodaya workers, basically the Gandhians known for the work they have done not only in the field of social service but also in rehabilitation. During natural disasters — recall Morvi and the Andhra Pradesh cyclone—they were the first to reach and mobilise relief.

But, there is another type of rehabilitation which these traditional NGOs have never been good at — the rehabilitation of more than 300 million people living below the poverty line which requires an entirely different approach and strategy altogether. To bring marginal and small farmers, rural artisans, scheduled castes, harijans and agricultural labourers to a socio-economic level where they can contribute constructively and positively to India's development as citizens of this country, is basically a rehabilitation programme but we like to call it development. In a way, of course, we are involved in development the development of the human being from a non-person to a citizen. The sheer magnitude of the task itself is mind-boggling.

Here, again, we enter a twilight zone where there is very little difference between rehabilitation and the third category of NGOs committed to rural development. It is this category which is most misunderstood because perhaps it does not fit into any compartmentalised classification and we know that anything which does not fit properly worries the bureaucrat. I am also convinced that it is this group which will finally be responsible for defining the changing role of NGOs and

essentially how their capabilities can be improved

Already this group has been responsible for an upheaval within the NGO movement. It is not obvious, but younger groups have challenged the older leadership in as quiet and dignified a manner as possible. Not many young people are joining the Sarvodaya and Ramakrishna Missions, what to say of the Christians in fact many are leaving thoroughly disillusioned by the lack of direction and initiative and rigidity which has stifled creative work. This has disturbed the elders but they refuse to admit that the poor example they themselves have set is mainly responsible for this exodus. In many parts of the country smaller break-away groups have been formed with objectives radically different from the charity oriented big-brother image which the elders are fond of propagating. Only time will tell how serious the threat is to their leadership, but there is no question that they have every reason to feel concerned.

**W**hat makes these groups different? They are young and full of zest for one thing. Non-violent but militant, they know they cannot change the world overnight but they also know that the pace has to be forced. If it has to be done through conflict, if that is the way change is possible, then they will be the last one's to withdraw from such a skirmish. They are convinced that such fundamental changes cannot be engineered through the delivery systems of the government because this system has been compromised at all levels. The power that presently lies in the hands of the government and the rural rich must be transferred to the beneficiaries: the 300 million who live below the poverty line.

It is quite unthinkable that the rural rich who constitute only 3% of the rural population would like to hand over on a silver platter their influence and hold on the poor.

Typical Gandhians desperately cling to the weird belief that love and charity can solve all problems

and similar sentiments can penetrate the thick skins of hardened scoundrels. We only have to look at the sad state of affairs of the Gramdan villages and the land gifted to the people really to appreciate the dismal failure of such an approach. Look at the State Khadi Boards stuffed with has-been politicians and burnt out Gandhians: some of them look as if the last constructive thing they did was to participate in the Dandi March. These very people claim to carry the torch for all NGOs in this country.

**H**ow this transfer and distribution of power can take place is the key question. Can it be done without confrontation or conflict? Increasingly the younger groups are convinced that this is not possible simply because the delivery system of the government is not committed to the kind of change likely to benefit the poor—even though all their Plan documents say so. At the village level where it counts, the rural poor are exposed to pressures from quarters that should protect them rather than exploit and abuse them. Strange that there is literally no individual or organisation oriented to guide them, educate them and provide them the necessary tools and skills to stand, hopefully, on their own two feet.

The answers that the new NGO groups have found as a result of their exposure to the realities in the rural areas have not been accepted by most traditional agencies. In fact, the old-timers think that the 'cause' is going down the drain and with this emerging militancy whatever is left of the NGO movement is going to disappear. Not true: they have conveniently forgotten what it was like when they were young. They have lived off the fat of the land for so long that they have forgotten what it was like to believe and have faith.

If we are to talk of improving the capabilities of NGOs, we have to define the changing roles of the NGOs today. No NGO worth its name can, or rather, should be satisfied with cosmetic changes. Because of the failure of officially sponsored

institutions, the role of the NGO has become doubly important in a way few imagined possible a decade ago. The village panchayat and the cooperative society—so called NGOs—have failed to protect and help the poor: they have become the political and development arm of the rich to protect their own interests. Since both these institutions have such weak accountable procedures, sarpanches and members openly misuse funds knowing fully well that no one is going to ask for explanations.

(a) One of the roles of NGOs is to do the work of MLAs without the political sanction of vote banks. It is to act as the eyes and ears of the poor in the area: report irregularities, expose village level government officials caught in the process of misusing money, taking bribes and not doing their job. It is to bring to the notice of their superiors the reasons why plans fail and targets are not met. Of course at the slightest hint of any such move the NGO is likely to be branded as a CIA racket or be accused of conversion or of taking foreign money. There is no answer to these ridiculous suggestions but fortunately there are people in the government who do not take this seriously. However, it can destroy whatever relationship an NGO could have made with the poor and it is also possible that that NGO could fade away. Traditional agencies in such cases buy the peace. They would not like to oppose anything or anyone even though there is something seriously wrong being done in front of them.

(b) The second role of NGOs to my mind follows from the first: it is to test the existing delivery system. The Holy Trinity that is causing incalculable damage to government credibility—the Revenue, the Police and the Lower Judiciary—have yet to be fully tested by any village based institution. It is one of the crucial roles of a genuine NGO to bring this delivery system to breaking point, if need be, just to see how flexible and adaptable it is. How do we do this? You will notice that most of the poor living below the poverty line have land but they do not physically possess it. Such cases need to be reported: cases of trespass and illegal possession con-

veyed to the police: cases disputed where 'stay orders' have been obtained need to be followed up with proper legal advice. More than half the land distributed so far by the government is useless to the rural poor because the transactions are only on paper.

This is not the only way to test the delivery system. There are government schemes for scheduled castes and other socially vulnerable groups which never reach them. The NGO should do its homework and see which scheme fits which target group and then follow it up with the concerned department. But this is not being done by any NGO with the result that lakhs of rupees are being swallowed up in the form of subsidies.

(c) The government has admitted that it cannot tackle this vast problem of development on its own. The objectives may be the same of reaching the poor but strategies differ and methods at the lowest level sometimes have to be even more radical than is imagined if the ultimate goal is to reach vulnerable groups. Inherent in such a confession is government's failure to motivate the right type of people to provide services and opportunities to the poor. All along, the human factor has been taken for granted but it has proved a stumbling block and prevented knowledge and skills from percolating below.

The third role of NGOs is to mobilise the rural poor to choose their own kind for training and equip them with the necessary wherewithal to provide technical and socio-economic services independent of government. The identification and training of non-institutional human resources from the village itself would also be a sort of recognition of rural skills, knowledge and experience which urban professionals have much to learn from — sadly we concerted types think that an illiterate farmer has nothing to teach the scientist.

(d) Financial resources. The younger NGOs believe that if the service is worthwhile, the community should pay to support it. Any-

thing given free is not appreciated. Perhaps the rural rich should be obliged to pay the recurring costs. In any case, what the NGO is publicly encouraging, the government servant is privately abusing for his own selfish end. A primary health centre doctor does private practice before 10 and after 5; a primary school teacher makes money on private tuitions, a patwari and gram sevak makes money on distributing subsidy forms and gets a cut on the astonishing grounds that we are taking government money, not yours! To a marginal farmer this logic is irrefutable. It is not that the resources are not available. The service that is being provided is questionable, otherwise how can a private practitioner flourish where a PHC is based?

The fourth role of NGOs is to generate resources within the area with a view to becoming self-supporting in the future. This charity approach must cease, thus decreasing the dependence of the community on the NGO.

(e) This leads to the fifth role of NGOs—a role which is much frowned upon and treated with even greater suspicion: the need to promote a degree of professionalism. The NGOs today suffer from a lack of clarity of purpose and a direction: the resources are dissipated, the workers all haphazardly selected, the objectives are not clear and the methods are equally vague, the services being provided are not at par and the back up equipment and support to provide techno-economic services non-existent. All these signs and symptoms are indications that the NGO lacks a professional approach without which in this day and age it cannot function. Sure, there are many NGOs without this professional touch but my response to such an NGO is that we can admire it but it cannot be replicated.

The position of the NGOs today is hardly enviable. For three decades we have worked in the villages each doing its own little bit but in the year of the Lord 1981 we still have to find a place in the sun. We still have to prove our credibility. We

have yet to develop the growth pains of a movement. Scattered here and there we have yet to form a common forum. We are constantly talking about it, that we must meet, but each is on its own ego trip. Every agency wants to coordinate and speak on behalf of the others with the result that in the world around us we cut a sorry figure.

The changing roles of NGOs I have envisaged in the future, I dare say, will not be acceptable to traditional older agencies. They would virulently oppose such a move on grounds that we are encouraging militancy. Not so. We are convinced that, contrary to general opinion, the NGOs are more secure and stable than government programmes. We are there to stay. Our policies and strategies do not change with personalities as is the case with government; there is a consistency noticeable in the implementation of NGO programmes which the government will find hard to beat. Perhaps the old system where ICS and IAS officers used to stay for years in districts, in retrospect, was a good thing at least they did what the NGOs are doing now—digging their heels in and staying, regardless of unpleasant consequences, and completing a job. Under these circumstances it is neither unwise nor uncommon to expect hostility and opposition from vested interests. After all, we are committed to fundamental change and our policy is not to join them but beat them at their own game.

The elders are a spent force. My only quarrel with them is that they did not have the vision to look ahead and see the potential in the NGOs. If they had they would not have allowed one NGO to grow in one place for two decades or more, but instead used the agency to train people and start many similar efforts on a smaller scale and covered the country by now. We should have had many more Prembais and Mohan Singh Mehtas and Harivallabh Parikhs scattered all over the country. Incredible people as they are, it is a reflection on them that they could not think on the lines of replicating their ideas in other parts of India.

# Role of the anthropologist

HARI MOHAN MATHUR

AS mankind reaches out for the stars, there remain on the home planet, earth, large numbers of the seriously poor who are unable to live a fully human life. Indeed, the Third World today is characterized by the pervasive degrading poverty of its millions. Development, which all these years should have focussed on the poor, seems simply to have by-passed them.

Nationally as well as inter nationally organized development effort has been undertaken in recent years to alleviate this widespread poverty in the rural areas. The number and variety of development programmes that seek to reach the rural poor have fast multiplied. A high priority has begun to be given to the programmes that seek improvement in the productive capabilities of, and the public services for, the poor, especially those living in the rural areas.

Development of the rural poor is emerging as the main target of all current rural development efforts, and the strategy of launching a

direct attack on mass poverty has now become widely acceptable.<sup>1</sup>

However, experience with rural development has brought to light cases of both successes and failures. Unfortunately the number of successful development cases reported remains small. It is the haltingly moving programmes and projects that dominate the rural development scene. It would appear that poverty has firmly withstood attacks made against it so far. Instead of retreating, rural poverty seems rather to have made further advances.

On the basis of a study utilizing data from 74 Third World countries, Adelman and Morris came to the conclusion that development has only made things worse for the poor. They state that 'hundreds of millions of desperately poor throughout the world have been hurt rather than helped by economic development'.<sup>2</sup>

1 Mahbub ul Haq, *The Poverty Curtain: Choice for the Third World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

2 Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973).

Some studies recently conducted in rural Asia tend to confirm that the standard of living of the absolute poor has declined over time. Expected benefits from the growth process as measured in terms of GNP seem not to be spreading widely to cover all sections of the society. By and large, the poor have tended to stay poor.

It is now becoming increasingly clear that this deadlock in development is attributable to the sole preoccupation of the planners with the issues related to accelerating the pace of economic growth. Simultaneously it is also being recognized that the socio-cultural dimension, which has not received sufficient attention in the earlier planning exercises, is an important factor in the development equation.<sup>3</sup> Development is a complex, multi-layered subject.

**C**urrent rural development literature is replete with stories of how well-meaning development projects frequently fail to reach the target population. Further, as anthropological studies of the development process show, this is not purely accidental. Most such rural projects which end in failure go against deeply ingrained social and cultural patterns and processes.<sup>4</sup>

If pastoral nomads are given agricultural lands to settle in the newly irrigated desert region and expected to change over to a sedentarized way of living which an irrigated farming system demands, development will at best proceed at a slower pace. If efforts are made to increase enrolment in rural primary schools during the busy agricultural season when children are most in need at the farms to lend a helping hand to their parents, the results are bound to be disappointing. If training programmes to improve skills in certain crafts are directed at men in societies where women do the work

there is unlikely to be any considerable improvement in the situation.

Reaching out to the poor has turned out to be a much more complex task than was earlier visualized. Planners and administrators here are on an unfamiliar ground. There is no previous experience to guide them in their operations. Often they are therefore unable both to anticipate socio-cultural hurdles which arise during the plan implementation phase, and to try to overcome them.

Since human factors in the rural development process have not traditionally been accorded due importance, knowledge in these matters has not developed to the required degree. An Asian Development Bank document recently noted that 'very little is known about the socio-economic milieu in which the poor live and operate'.<sup>5</sup> Frequently planners of rural development make assumptions about village life and the rural poor which are not always tenable.

**O**ften differences among villages in different regions are not considered significant enough. Villages across regions are thought of as one entity possessing certain common characteristics. However, the fact is that even neighbouring villages manifest differences in many important respects. Charles A. Murray has recounted as follows the readily visible differences among neighbouring villages in Thailand which he studied:

'Thai villages indeed differ, as any villager will confirm. Some are tranquil, some have a history of feuds. Some are pious and sober, others have a jug of moonshine under every porch and card games every night. Some villages are proud of themselves, and proclaim that they grow the sweetest tamarind or the biggest durian or the most beautiful women in the country. Other villages are a collection of

houses with only a name for a common bond, and no pride at all'.<sup>6</sup>

Rural development plans which are unable to capture the intervention-relevant essence of the differences in villages cannot hope to fully aid in their development.

**T**he community development programme of the 1950s was based on the premise that village communities were closely knit, harmonious entities and that in response to exhortations of the community development officials, all people from the villages would come out to build roads, schools, wells, tanks and other community assets. It was believed that people would work together and equitably share in the benefits of development. Planners visualized a 'Panchayati Raj', and under the scheme of democratic decentralization devolved responsibility for local development on the village leaders. What happened to the Panchayati Raj which was introduced with great fanfare to bring development and people closer together was described some time ago in the following terms:

When Panchayati Raj came great hopes were aroused and it was expected that Panchayats would be in a position to involve all the people in local efforts to build the village community on a pattern in which disparities would quickly vanish. But the people who were elected to the Panchayats and the people who failed to get elected later ranged themselves into strong warring factions, usually along the caste lines. Soon they became so busy in-fighting among themselves — not always on issues relating to improvement of the village life — that the task of development simply got relegated into the background. In fact this situation did not allow

3 Glynn Cochrane, *The Cultural Appraisal of Development Projects* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979).

4 Paul G. Hiebert, "Anthropology and Programmes of Village Development: A South Indian Case Study" in Robert Eric Frykenberg (ed.), *Land Tenure and Peasant in South Asia* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1977), pp. 161-181.

5 Asian Development Bank, *Rural Asia: Challenge and Opportunity* (Singapore: Federal Publications, 1977), p. 220.

6 Charles A. Murray, *Investment and Tithing in Thai Villages: A Behavioural Study of Rural Modernization* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1974). Quoted here from Robert E. Krug et al. "Measuring Village Commitment to Development" in Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and John D. Montgomery (eds), *Values and Development: Appraising Asian Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1976).

much development to occur, and where development did occur it only benefited the powerful and the influential members of the Panchayat or their relatives and friends. The benefits did not trickle down to the lowest in the village.<sup>7</sup>

Failure to see village life as it is with distinct caste groups, forms of cooperative living, factions and their frequent fights has only meant planning divorced from reality on the ground.

**A**mong the planners a widely held belief is that peasants do not like to change and that they offer resistance to whatever plans are made for their development. Some have even gone to the extent of branding them as lazy, stupid, incapable of either attaining or enjoying higher standards of living. According to a common stereotype, 'farmers are ultra-conservative individuals, steeped in tradition, hemmed in by custom, lacking in motivation and incentive, captives of age-old methods, and lacking in ability to make wise decisions'.<sup>8</sup>

To those who blamed the conservative farmers for the slow development of agriculture only a few years ago, the current agitations of the same conservative farmers for more fertilizers, for more water, for more electricity etc., must be a great puzzle. Anthropological studies have by now firmly established that the farmers have all these years been wrongly characterized as lazy, conservative, bound up by traditions and superstitions.<sup>9</sup> Such characterization has been and continues to be helpful only to the planners and the administrators — they are absolved from responsibilities for the project failures.

Evidence on the adoption of innovations among farmers from diffe-

7 Hari Mohan Mathur, "Ending Poverty, Unemployment and Inequality: Experience and Strategy", *Development Policy and Administration Review* (Vol. 1, No. 2, July/December 1975), p. 7.

8 Warren L. Prawl, "It's the Agents of Change Who Don't Like Change", *CERES* (Vol. 2, No. 4, July-August 1969).

9 S.H. Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native* (London: Frank Cass, 1976).

rent parts of the world seems to indicate that farmers are willing to change if advantages of the recommended practices can be conclusively demonstrated. They are in fact vocal in demanding changes. On the other hand, it is the dominant groups and individuals who work hard to see that the poor farmers do not go far ahead on the road to development. They are always looking for occasions to exploit the situation to their own exclusive advantage.

Development affects different groups differently. Its avowed aim is to benefit the poor most of all. Therefore, the rich are not likely to view the process favourably. As they stand to lose once the development gets going, their whole effort is to see that at least the *status quo* is not upset. From his studies, W.F. Wertheim concludes that the true obstacles to development come not from the poor who are willing to change, but from the rich who are opposed to change.<sup>10</sup>

It is the inadequate understanding of village life which primarily accounts for poor planning and slow implementation of most rural development programmes. Unfortunately, planners and administrators do not even have a desire to know more about the rural poor. Often it is stated that while some knowledge of village life may be necessary for the experts from abroad, this would be unnecessary for local experts as they are expected to know all about life in their own countries.

**T**he fallacy of this argument is increasingly becoming apparent. Possibly the local expert may know something about villages from his area, but he cannot be expected to automatically possess complete knowledge of village life relevant to his work as a rural development planner and administrator. In India, a country of continental diversity, the differences in lifestyle in various regions are so marked that even an expert on rural life cannot be ex-

pected to know about the entire country.

Then, most planners and administrators in the Third World come from an urban background. Their world and the world of the rural poor are quite dissimilar. Therefore there is no escape from the fact that unless those responsible for development of the poor know about their condition, the programmes will miss their targets completely. In most Third World countries, as the World Development Report, 1980 points out, 'administration is not properly geared to identifying the people to be served, increasing their access to services, adapting services until they are appropriate, delivering them efficiently and observing (and reacting to) the public's response'. This sequence requires administrators who can gain the confidence of the rural poor and who would be willing to learn from them. Clearly, there is great scope for strengthening administrative capability in this direction.<sup>11</sup>

**O**n the part of the poor there are no compulsions of any kind to stay poor. If they could help it, they certainly would like to shed their poverty. Why then does poverty persist? A simple answer is that the poor cannot lift themselves above the poverty line through their own individual efforts. The odds are heavily against the poor on this battlefield.

The poor live in highly stratified societies, with clearly demarcated classes, castes and other groupings, having their own interests to pursue. The system has been so worked out that the higher groups are prevented by religion, by tradition, and by other social forces to unite and to challenge the established position of the affluent groups. This is true of most Third World countries.

Governments are anxious to see that benefits from public services

11 On making development administration an effective instrument of service to the rural poor, see, Alec McCallum, "Unsnarling the Bureaucracy: Devolution and Rural Development", *CERES*, (Vol. 13, No. 2, March-April 1980).

begin reaching the poor directly, and that the poor actively take part in programmes designed to promote their development. However, the poor are prevented from getting most out of these development programmes. Many factors account for this situation.

For one thing, the rural poor do not enthusiastically come forward to receive the assistance which the development personnel offer them. At the back of their mind are old memories of officials who in the past visited them only to collect taxes. Many in the interior rural areas are still not prepared to believe that the officials can ever have a different role, that of promoting their development.

Finally, there is the question of social distance between the officials and the poor. Often the officials are from higher caste groups, whereas the poor in the village represent the lower caste groups. Thus, social background does not allow mixing of the two groups on a basis and with a frequency necessary for development to get fully started. Officials then have the option to meet and to work only among the high caste villagers. When that happens it helps development programmes to move further along. But this partnership of the officials and the elites makes the rural poor more suspicious of the officials, with unfavourable repercussions on the entire development process.<sup>12</sup>

Participation by the poor in the development process has been talked about endlessly, but this does not seem to have been realized except partially and in some favoured show-piece project villages. It is not easy for the poor to organize and to raise their voice against all the vested interests that so far have exploited them and kept them down in their present low positions. A point to remember is that the poor do not constitute a single category with all the people below a particular income level having a common objective in fighting the

affluent. Individually most poor are so heavily dependent upon the rich (usually the moneylender) that the protest as a way of demanding their share in development may not be considered the most practicable in the circumstances.

The poor have very little access to information. Often they know next to nothing about plans and programmes designed only to promote their development. Information systems of the kind that may be of educational value to the rural poor still have not developed to the required extent.

The way development is designed and administered does not much enthuse the poor people. Everything comes from above. In some places tinned food received as aid from the affluent countries for distribution amongst victims of famine instantly found its way in the food-stores of the bigger cities. The poor just have no use for this food, their food habits are different.

People in the Third World have their own ideas of what constitutes development. These merit careful consideration if the poor are to participate in the development process of their own accord. Development planning of the top-down kind excludes, not invites, participation of the poor in the development process.

For a long time tradition, which still remains a dominant factor in the lives of the rural poor in the Third World, has been seen as something totally opposed to development and change. Therefore planners and administrators have tended to minimize its significance in rural development planning and implementation. Difficulties encountered in specifically assisting development of the poorer groups and in securing their voluntary association in development programmes designed to provide direct benefit to them have now brought to surface the inadequacies of past approaches.

Contrary to the earlier beliefs, anthropological research from a wide range of traditional societies

has shown that tradition and modernity are not in conflict. Rather they may be mutually reinforcing.

Traditional social and cultural patterns can well be utilized to promote the overall goals of development. Farmers may be encouraged to adopt modern agricultural practices in the belief that from there resultant gains in additional incomes, they will be better placed to meet their family and kinship obligations. The authority of the traditionally respected leaders can be invoked in aid of many development programmes at the village level. Summing up experiences in the Arab region, Jurgen von Muralt says:

One of the most important policy questions in the introduction of social change and development at the local level is the problem of how traditional values and institutions can be harnessed to the purpose of development. The problem is to identify more precisely those practices, values and institutions that can be used for constructive social change, together with the strategies appropriate to different kinds of situations, and to incorporate this knowledge in specific programmes of development. Popular participation in development is facilitated where there is a strong tradition of local organization. This is especially true since group action undoubtedly needs more than a perceived coincidence of individual self interests, there must also be a certain sense of solidarity and mutual trust among the members of a group. When rational economic incentives can be successfully implanted in still functioning traditional associations, then there is a chance of transforming them into modern societies.<sup>13</sup>

Awareness is rapidly growing that socio-cultural forces play a significant role, and that their neglect will

12 S C Dube, *India's Changing Villages* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1958).

13. Jurgen von Muralt, "Rural Institutions and Planned Change in the Middle East and North Africa", in Orlando Fals Borda and Inayatullah (eds), *A Review of Rural Cooperation in Developing Areas* (Geneva: UNRISD).



have an adverse effect on the outcome of all developmental activity. Reporting on the Nigerian experience, S K Taime Williams concludes

It is now becoming increasingly clear that possession of technical knowledge alone is not enough in getting agricultural development moving on its path of contributing to overall economic development. This has to be buttressed with knowledge of some of the sociological factors such as land tenure system, family and village organizations, values and norms, systems of sanction and assignment of roles, and the role of strong solidarity among the people.<sup>14</sup>

In working with the rural poor for their development, it is of the greatest importance that the concerned personnel are aware of special characteristics of the traditional village society. They can then work effectively with the people to produce the intended results.

Many anthropologists lament that they are not getting a fair deal from others in the development world, and that the importance of what they have to offer is not fully appreciated.

But if anthropologists think that they are getting excluded from participation in decision-making and action in the field of development, they perhaps cannot blame anybody except themselves. Traditional village societies in the Third World, on which are currently focussed major development efforts, have all along been the subject of exclusive professional interest to anthropologists. The knowledge concerning the poor which anthropology has built up over the years should therefore be critically important to rural development. Unfortunately, anthropologists themselves have not given enough thought to working for rural development.

There is nothing in the field of anthropology which makes any

aspect of it irrelevant to development, kinship studies included. Reporting on Ghana, Janice Jiggins recently noted

West Africa generally and Ghana in particular is the *locus classicus* of British social anthropological kinship studies, a subject many development specialists would regard as an arcane academic matter of little relevance to development policy and practice. I would argue, on the contrary, that understanding patterns of family relationship and inheritance — what has been called the domestic domain — is necessary, and practically relevant to development practitioners.<sup>15</sup>

To be useful as members of the interdisciplinary development teams, anthropologists need to be better prepared. They should be familiar with the issues in development, the methods of administration, the role of other disciplines etc. Anthropologists are frequently not equipped to play their part as development experts. Development agencies do need the services of anthropologists, but not of the kind which universities have traditionally been producing.

Reluctance on the part of anthropologists to come out openly to assist rural development, and to adapt teaching on the campuses to the requirements of development agencies, explains why anthropologists have so little experience of rural development administration. When they get opportunities to work, they are unable to contribute much because of any previous background. On assignments to evaluate the projects (not an easy job in the best of circumstances) anthropologists, usually without sufficient prior experience of governmental agencies to be able to tell what sort of criticism would be acceptable and influential in future plans, have been found to be merely critical.

What is the nature of the distinctive anthropological contribution to development? Mandelbaum in a re-

cent article sets out to indicate the special resources of anthropology as follows<sup>16</sup>.

(i) *Holistic View* An important lesson of anthropology is to view the man in his totality. The insistence on seeing the whole, interconnections among parts, etc., has enabled anthropologists to gain insights into the traditional societies which otherwise is not possible.

(ii) *Field Work*: Anthropology has a long tradition of field work in villages across the Third World. It is mainly through participant observation technique that anthropologists obtain data and other information for their writings. Living among the people in far away villages, they come to know of details which it is not possible to get through any other research method.<sup>17</sup>

(iii) *Relating Microview to Macroview* With their knowledge of local conditions as also the wider national culture, anthropologists are in a unique position to relate the microview to the macroview.

(iv) *Comparative Perspective* Often studies done by anthropologists in a comparative frame cover a wide range of societies. In an increasingly interdependent world, most problems acquire a global dimension. A comparative perspective emerging from anthropological studies can be useful.

In order to view the anthropological contribution in a proper perspective, it would be helpful to be aware of its weaknesses as well. Some of the criticism against anthropological methods particularly must be noted.

Adrian Southhall finds fault with the holistic approach of anthro-

16 David G. Mandelbaum, "Anthropology and Challenges of Development", *Economic and Political Weekly* (Vol. XV, No. 44, November 1, 1980), pp. 1898-1901.

17 Other disciplines also are now getting increasingly involved in village studies. See, Biplap Dasgupta (ed), *Village Studies in the Third World* (Delhi: Hindustan Publishing Corporation (India), 1978), and in particular G. Parthasarthy, "Indian Village Studies and the Village Poor", pp. 149-164.

14 S K. Taime Williams, "Getting Local Traditions on Your Side", *CERES* (Vol. 4, No. 2, March-April 1971).

15 Janice Jiggins, *Report on Ghana* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1978).



# RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS

A few facts you should know.

Garlic has been well-known from earliest times for its medicinal properties. Medical authorities have accepted the value of garlic in correcting various health problems. Garlic can be taken raw or cooked or in capsule form. But to derive the maximum medicinal benefits from garlic, it should be taken in the most effective way.

## Why not raw Garlic?



Raw garlic cloves have to be chewed before the extract acts inside the body. But when chewed they leave an unpleasant smell. When swallowed they are difficult to digest. And the extraction is incomplete.



## Why not cooked Garlic?

On cooking, the effective medicinal properties of garlic are lost.

## Why RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS?

Ranbaxy Laboratories, a trusted name with the medical profession, now gives you all the benefits of raw garlic—without the smell. Ranbaxy's Garlic Pearls contain the pure extract of raw garlic in easy-to-digest, soft gelatin capsules—the most effective way of deriving the medicinal properties of garlic.

### RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS

- Help relieve gas and indigestion, ease heartburn
- Reduce high cholesterol levels
- Help ease disabling joint pains
- Prevent and control recurring coughs and colds

Take Ranbaxy's Garlic Pearls—everyday  
It's a healthy habit




Take  
two pearls  
twice daily  
regularly

The natural way to all-round health.

TEXTILES, SUGAR,  
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS,  
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,  
ANASPATI, PVC, RAYON TYRE CORD,  
FERTILIZERS,  
ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS,  
IRON CASTINGS.

IN THE  
SERVICE OF  
THE NATION



**DCM** THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD., DELHI

# PRESENTING AN ECONOMY'S GROWTH AND OURS



From fertilizers to industrial chemicals, our growth shows on the economy

For, to a growing agricultural-based economy like India's, our role is significant.

Every year we produce more fertilizers for the farmers and bring to them newer, better methods of cultivation.

For the industries, we manufacture vital basic raw materials: Anhydrous ammonia, Argon gas, Ammonium nitrate.. in increasing bulk quantities.

All, to keep the country's production growing, in agricultural and industrial fronts to help create total self-sufficiency .. save valuable foreign exchange

Ever since our inception in 1951, our endeavour has helped achieve:

Our growth  
And that of the nation.



**THE FERTILIZER  
CORPORATION OF  
INDIA LTD.**

55, Madhuban, Nehru Place, New Delhi-110 019

**ATTENTION STEEL MILLS  
&  
FOUNDRIES  
EXPORTERS OF WORLD FAMOUS SANDUR MANGANESE ORE  
OFFER  
EX-STOCK  
VERY LOW PHOS. PIG IRON  
AND  
LOW ALUMINIUM FERROSILICON  
PRODUCED IN THEIR PLANT AT VYASANKERE**

*Please Contact*

**THE SANDUR MANGANESE & IRON ORES LIMITED**

**"LOHADRI BHAVAN"**

Yeshwant Nagar-583124:

Via Sandur, Bellary Dt

Karnataka INDIA

*Cable:* SMIORE SANDUR (INDIA)

*Telephone :* SANDUR 33, 61, 91 ;

*Telex :* BANGALORE 427

Bangalore : 32175 :  
28262 :

pology The argument runs as follows

One reason why anthropology cuts little ice is because it insists on the whole and the general in an age devoted to specialization. It is all right, simply because not very relevant or important, for anthropologists to attempt the study of remote and small-scale socio-cultural systems as wholes, but when large-scale and modern situations are studied, anthropology must surely give way to the more precise, narrow, specialised disciplines, to economics, sociology, political science, and indeed, the new subspecializations to which even they give place. econometrics, public administration, regional science, and the rest<sup>18</sup>

**I**n a generally critical way, Glynn Cochrane suggests that anthropology still has a long way to go before its conclusions can be acceptable to the development agencies

Different economists will be able, independently, to arrive at the conclusion that there will be roughly similar rates of return on an economic investment project. But will several anthropologists give the same advice, if consulted, about a particular investment project? I suspect that most potential users of anthropology think the answer is 'no', intuitively sensing that the cherished individualism of the anthropologist is at variance with the degree of uniformity of judgement and predictability that characterize the objectivity and verifiability of professional statements. Anthropology needs to convince potential users of the discipline that it can be a profession whose members can be relied on to perform with the degree of uniformity and reliability associated with engineers, doctors and lawyers<sup>19</sup>

The value of anthropological studies of village communities for

purposes of national planning is often debated. A question that constantly arises is: How can such studies be used to make nationwide plans of development? On the basis of his study of two Indonesian towns, Clifford Geertz observes

'In the main, the value of systematic studies of particular communities for the understanding of the national economic development lies (1) in their more intensive probing of particular dynamics which are, nevertheless, of broader general significance, and (2) in their more circumstantial depiction of the nature of the social and cultural context within which development inevitably will have to take place'<sup>20</sup>

As a basis of prediction, T. Scarlett Epstein thinks, studies by anthropologists offer a sounder basis than do many of the unreliable macro-economic surveys in the Third World countries. Macro-predictions require statistical data of a sophistication which is often unavailable. But the limitations of macro-predictions are not inconsiderable, she admits

There is, for example, the question of 'representativeness' and the problems of generalizing from a situation in which there can be no guarantee that all the relevant variables are present. There is the further and related issue that the more restricted the form of observation, the greater the likelihood of the local situation under study being affected by intrusive factors<sup>21</sup>

**I**deally, the macro-approach of the economist and the micro-approach of the anthropologist must combine if planning is to be more realistic.

*do For Each other An Interdisciplinary Approach to Development Anthropology* (Amsterdam: B.R. Gruner Publishing Co., 1976)

20 Clifford Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 142

21 T. Scarlett Epstein, "The Role of Social Anthropology in Development Studies", in Hari Mohan Mathur (ed), *Anthropology in the Development Process* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977), p. 100

Anthropologists will also need to modify some of their time-consuming field-work methods to be able to assist the planners at short notice. Consideration needs to be given to so change the method of village studies that their generalizations become valid for the region, if not the whole country. A single village study can be supplemented by visits to a number of villages in the region to gain first-hand knowledge of relevant developments

**A**t the present moment accurate, intimate knowledge of the people and their culture acquired through a field-work method remains the main strength of anthropology. This knowledge is directly relevant to rural development planning and operations. While anthropological theory and methods still are in their own developmental stage, the insights of anthropologists can nevertheless contribute significantly to overall development planning and administration

On the uniquely anthropological contribution to development, Glynn Cochrane emphatically states as follows

The Third World badly needs the kinds of expertise that only anthropologists possess. What special attributes does anthropology have? What would be the utility of an anthropological dimension in development work? My own experience suggests some obvious strengths: first, anthropological methods of data collection are capable of producing unique information of high quality; second, anthropologists have an interest in human motivation which is of inestimable value in making calculations about development policies and their consequences; third, anthropologists have a humanistic orientation which usually causes them to examine the ethical and moral basis for change against the needs of the people whose wants those changes are supposed to serve<sup>22</sup>

22. Glynn Cochrane, "Preface" in Glynn Cochrane (ed), *What We Can Do For Each Other: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Development Anthropology* (Amsterdam: B.R. Gruner Publishing Co., 1976), p. ix

18 Adrian Southall, "Community, Society, and the World in Emergent Africa" in Mangred Stanley (ed), *Social Development: Critical Perspectives* (New York: Basic Books, 1972)

19 Glynn Cochrane, "Introduction", in Glynn Cochrane (ed), *What We can*

# Restructuring for implementation

SRI MADHAV ASHISH

THERE has been very poor implementation of rural planning. When looking for causes, it is insufficient to allocate blame to personnel or administrative institutions. There are indications that a particular class of people aims to benefit in terms of money and power by blocking the implementation of development plans and by diverting development funds.

The history of the Panchayat Raj and Block Development schemes shows a high degree of the people's involvement and enthusiastic co-operation. Block Development Officers, who were often young I A S officers, were trusted by the people and achieved notable results. The collapse of the system into its present lethargy and corruption appears to have followed its deliberate politicisation.

The electoral system which was introduced allowed strong individuals, 'netas', to dominate panchayats. B D O's were made powerless by their personal character reports being made out by the *Sabhapattis*, who are the *netas*.

Thus, the way was opened to controlling the electorate by keeping them uninformed and at a low eco-

nomic level. The way was simultaneously opened to diversion of Block Development and other public funds into the pockets of a relatively few *netas*, their families, and their supporters. This has been compounded by the now entrenched symbiotic corruption between politically backed *netas* and contractors, on the one hand, and departmental officials, on the other. In many instances, work actually done represents barely 50% of the funds allotted.

The huge communications gap between the government and the common people is a necessary component of this situation.

Against this background, it might seem pointless to propose any development programmes designed truly to benefit the people. Only those programmes which benefit the power groups are likely to be implemented. In the U.P. hills, this would mean preferring commercial forest plantations over social forestry. However, there are indications that the situation is ready for change.

Senior members of the political hierarchy are aware that the threat to the national economy posed by massive environmental degradation

in the hills calls for decisive action of a sort that must not be obstructed by the personal interests of a few minor political supporters. At the other end of the scale, the village people are no longer the simple, cowed people of the time when the *netas* seized power. They are more educated, they have more money, and they have more experience of life outside the hills. They are also more frustrated, resentful, ambitious and articulate. In short, they are more ready than before for the responsibilities of self-determination.

At this point it is difficult to assess the effects of the Chipko movement which is inspiring village people to oppose the commercial interests of the *netas* in respect of the forests. Their success confirms the view that the *netas* do not represent the people, and that the *netas'* interests are opposed to the interests of the people. On the other hand, the people's interests coincide with the national need to regenerate the hill environment. There should be no question as to which is to be preferred.

**W**e cannot touch the management of village and forest lands without affecting the lives of the people for the reason that their lives are intimately linked with every inch of the land, both civil land and State owned land. Without their co-operation, there will be no effective implementation of any plans for either the people or the environment. In order to obtain their co-operation, we have to have administrative institutions which, so far as is humanly possible, ensure the democratic participation of the people in a just and equitable distribution of development funds and programmes. Most importantly, the programmes must be acceptable to them as fulfilling their real needs.

It is no criticism of the Block/Panchayat institution that it was corrupted by deliberate political interference. Its framework is sound and is capable of admirably performing the work required of it, provided that it be restored to its original form. No new institution could perform any better than the present one, since it could not be introduced without the help of the

same politicians whose interests distorted the old one.

**T**he limitations of the existing situation can be evaded by creating special conditions in trial project areas, and sometimes in the activities of private institutions. There are also a few shining examples of what the system can achieve in the hands of exceptional men. But we cannot organise the administration of 15,000 villages in eight hill districts on the basis of exceptions. For the administration of programmes which affect a populated area of over 40,000 square kilometers, there has to be a Block/Panchayat system that serves the purposes of the programmes, irrespective of whether areas are treated as blocks or micro-watersheds.

It is to be expected that any move to restore the panchayats to their original state and so to remove their domination by the *netas* would be strongly opposed in the State legislature. If these influences cannot be over-ridden in the interests of the hill people and the environmental emergency, one other way appears to remain open.

If the eight hill districts of U P can be declared Union Territory, then the most damaging effects of State politics can be removed, leaving the way clear to the reorganisation of panchayats, and to implementation of the long-term projects whose urgency only the Central Government presently perceives. This step would also ease the formation of a distinct cadre of hill administrators which is essential for the administration of long-term programmes. The suggestion is not presented as the thin edge of the wedge of a demand for separate statehood, for that would magnify the influence of the very class of persons who would most distort the programmes.

The first point to be noted is that programmes which intimately affect the daily lives of lakhs of village people cannot be properly administered by officers who are tied to their office chairs by paper work, or who are temperamentally disinclined to active touring. These are well known problems for which

solutions should be produced by experienced administrators.

It is not sufficient that the administrative officer be actively interested in his work. He must also have administrative power over the many departments whose cooperation is essential to the programme — forests, P W D, water, electricity, industry, etc — so that he can coordinate and, if necessary, compel their cooperation. Their work must be directed by the demands of the programme and not by the schemings of the *netas*.

B D Os should preferably be hand-picked from I A S, I F.S., I P S, or exceptional P C S officers. They should be young and active men who have just completed their training, ready to live on the spot, and responsive to a new and challenging programme. It should be impressed upon them that their first task is to win the trust of the people, and that this will not be done merely by summoning panchayats and giving them orders. Since the attitude implied by these requirements appears to be contrary to the image of the administrator instilled by current training institutions, an orientation course may be needed.

**S**election of V L Ws must be made with care, because they have more contact with the public than the officers. A hard working and intelligent V L W is an invaluable asset to the community. Introduction of women workers is crucial to the working of a programme whose impact falls predominantly upon the hill women. The aim to establish fodder plantations and to reduce cattle grazing will succeed only with the women's cooperation. If they wish the programme to succeed, and are given institutional backing, it will succeed. If they do not wish it, or, wishing it, are not given institutional backing, it will fail.

The role of women workers is to close the communications gap between the village and the administration. They should be hill women, speaking the local language, who understand the nature of village life and its difficulties. They must be able to identify with the village women, live and work with them, and share their problems. They

must be sufficiently educated to be able to understand the need for the programme, its aims, and the consequences of failure. They must be able to present the plan objectives to the women, and to present the women's views to the administrators, so that programmes can be adapted to local circumstances and needs.

In order to obtain the women with the combination of capacities and outlook we require, it would be preferable to recruit them through and have them trained by a social organisation, such as Laxmi Ashram, Kausani, Almora, which has great experience in this field. We do not want the sort of women who once educated, think it beneath their dignity to labour. The regular work of these women workers could be adult education, hygiene, dietetics, childcare, first aid, knitting and sewing and, if possible, simple medical care such as can be cheaply achieved by homeopathic treatment.

The panchayat may be reorganised on the pattern of the village Sabha on which every family is represented by one person. It should be mandatory that a minimum of 50% representatives should be women, for it is only by bringing the women on to the council that the true interests of the agricultural community will be served. Attendance should be compulsory.

Since this may mean larger numbers of people appearing at every meeting, the existing panchayats may need reorganising into more and smaller groups. Every Sabha decision should require a 75% majority vote of the entire Sabha. The Gramdan ideal of unanimity, though admirable, is seldom practical, especially in villages where there are always apt to be a few pathological obstructors. A high percentage is required to prevent Sabhas being controlled by a few families.

The value of the secret ballot in the election of Sabhapattis is debatable. If it is retained, the Sabha should be given the power to convene a suitable quorum and to dismiss the Sabhapatti by a majority of votes at any time. This is an essential safeguard against abuse of the secret ballot and is required to keep elected Sabhapattis in check.

## LEARNING FROM THE RURAL POOR

(By Volken, Sare, Ajoy)

This book shares the experiences of the Mobile Orientation & Training Team, and characterises the methodology which the Team has developed in initiating processes and training among various cadres of the rural poor and the oppressed.

Price : Rs 15 00

Available from : Indian Social  
Institute  
Lodi Road  
Institutional Area  
New Delhi 110 003

# Books

**SUBALTERN STUDIES (I): Writing on South Asian History and Society** by Ranajit Guha (ed) Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982

THE book, a collection of articles on modern Indian history, opens with a piece by Partha Chatterjee on the links between communal politics and agrarian relations in Bengal, 1926-35. Chatterjee, using little but most illustrative historical data, shows how the two descriptive terms, 'communal politics' and 'agrarian relations', cannot be understood except by examining the links between the two kinds of phenomena these terms purportedly describe. These phenomena, Chatterjee argues, are historically inter-related because the survival of peasant communities in contexts in which the essence of politico-cultural domination has changed to/is changing towards a bourgeois mode produces a huge variety of alternating syntheses and conflict situations which form the stuff of popular politics in modern India.

He emphasizes 'the point which is crucial [i.e.] the inadequacy of the peasant-communal ideology to provide an adequate perceptual guide for the identification of friends and enemies in a situation of rapid agrarian change'. He adds that 'the peasant-communal ideology is [also] incapable of identifying "inside" exploiters or identifying the linkages between "external" bureaucratic State apparatus and its agents within the putative community' (p. 237).

In one stroke then Chatterjee knocks both reductionist Marxist theories that speak of communalism arising from false consciousness and peasant movements from 'class'-struggle, as well as the liberal 'secular' theory that would tend to see all history which does not fall in neatly within its own digits as errant. On a still lower scale of polemics, it makes nonsense of those historians who breathe fire at the mere mention of peasant movements.

Shahid Amin's essay on the economy of sugarcane production, Eastern Uttar Pradesh, 1880-1920, reveals the structural constraints of small peasant production. It explores, with a variety of detail, the interconnections of rural sugar technology and the small peasants' dependence within the process of production. This essay also tells us much about peasant mentality through a sprinkling of folk-rhymes in the text.

David Arnold's article on the Gudam-Rampa risings, 1839-1924, demonstrates his adroit and judicious handling of source materials. He describes with great sympathy the changing nature of the *fituris* (risings) over the years—*fituris* that 'exploded like spraying shrapnel'. Yet, though critical of the Congress attitude to Sita Rama Raju's uprising,

1922-24, Arnold does not cower in fear of being branded 'anti-peasant' or 'anti-rebel' and states his own position with courage 'the *fituris* of the late nineteenth century were a spirited protest against a changing world, but they could do nothing lasting [emph added] to keep out the forces impinging on the hills from outside' (p. 117). He looks ambiguity straight in the eye 'The position of the *muttadar* (estate holder) was ambiguous. At times he was himself exploiter but not infrequently, too, the *muttadar* shared the grievances of other hillmen' (p. 119). He recognizes the 'carefully built up support among the discontented and dispossessed members of the *elite*' (emph reviewer's) for the 1922-24 uprising and for 'the *fituris* of the past' (p. 136).

The article by Gyan (Gyanendra) Pandey on the 1919-22 peasant unrest in Awadh is a faithful summary of a monograph on that subject, except that Pandey points out what he considers to be the 'elitist viewpoint of its author', adding that 'the picture appears very different from the peasants' perspective' (p. 191). He does not offer any fresh evidence beyond what is already contained in the monograph. Pandey does, however, tell us how following a lead from a U P Government list of freedom fighters he set out to 'try and find out more about Madari,' (a peasant leader), only to discover that the village in which he wished to make his enquiries did not exist. He adds, though, that while he did not have the time on that occasion to pursue his interest, he 'feel(s) sure that further effort will yield useful information' (n 106, p. 190). Pandey's article makes interesting reading both as summary and as promise.

The last article in the book is 'The Indian Faction'. This useful review article by David Hardiman criticizes the myth of the 'Great Indian Faction' in contemporary rural-political analysis and argues for the inapplicability of the concept, however defined, to the nationalist movement's politics in Kheda, Gujarat. To this reviewer, section (iv) of the article seemed the most interesting where Hardiman seeks to trace the underpinnings of the prejudice that makes for the persistence of this concept in western (and eastern, too, we might add) social science writings on India. Still, it is difficult to agree with Hardiman when he concludes that 'there is nothing in the idea that cannot be explained better through the concept of class' (p. 230).

The volume also has an introductory essay by the editor, 'On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India', in point form (points 1 to 16). Mainly, it equates 'subaltern' with 'people' ('the people', of course). It deserves to be read along with the rest of the book 'Subaltern Studies' is a catchy title (if ornithologists can have the adjutant stork, why can't historians have subaltern studies?)

and Ranajit Guha is to be congratulated for it. Whether or not it will constitute an alternative idiom of historical expression still remains to be seen.

I am reminded here of a remark by the editors of a felicitation volume for Christopher Hill that one distinguishing feature of Hill's greatness was that he never tried to create a school of historians. Mostly, those who try, try too hard, whether they talk about subaltern studies or about colonialism. But if the fairly high quality of research evident in the first three articles is anything to go by, we look forward if not to an idiom then at least to the volumes to come.

Majid Hayat Siddiqi

**THE BACKWARD CLASSES AND THE NEW SOCIAL ORDER** by Andre Beteille Oxford University Press

ANDRE BETEILLE in his Ambedkar Memorial Lectures starts with an analysis of the Indian nation as it deals with the problem of fashioning a new social order, and states that the ideal of equality can not be easily married with the reality of inequality. At the momentous juncture of achieving independence, there was an enthusiasm for enshrining certain humanitarian principles into the code of conduct that the nation was willingly going to abide by. However, within the confines of any deeply traditional, hierarchically ordered and stratified society, the spirit would have to be more than merely willing to deliver any tangible results within a flesh that was so pathetically fragmented and weak.

Beteille traces the path of the emergence of the social consciousness about equality. Beginning with the Aristotelian espousal of the aristocratic order which championed and accorded recognition to a 'natural' hierarchy, the path leads on, much later, to de Tocqueville who finally notices the distinction and conflict between the governing principles of aristocracy and democracy. Even when they emerged, the two principles of equality—one based on merit and the other on need—were to remain forever conflicting. In Indian society where the operative tenets of any compensatory principle were bound to be mired in the confusion between caste and class, the operation of any equality ensuring principle was bound to be riddled with difficulty. While meritocracy was bound to be socially undesirable as the exclusive basis of distributive justice, the difficulties involved in the egalitarian system were even greater. A pure equality system has the basic advantage that by its very nature it requires less defence than any given non-equal distribution system. The advantage of a meritocracy system is the efficiency it ensures and the quality it guarantees. Need based compensation as the method of distribution is intuitively appealing on humanitarian grounds and holds the promise of setting right historical wrongs.

But where things begin to go wrong is where there is no recognition that equality of opportunity does lead to an inequality of result. Again, it is individual merit that must be recognised and collective needs

that have to be sympathetically considered. In this restatement of standard philosophic frameworks there are few opportunities for original insights and maybe it is unrealistic to expect them either. But the readers are left with a sense of dissatisfaction at the conclusion of the first lecture. 'It is my belief that protective discrimination can and should seek to satisfy present needs, it can do nothing to repair past injuries'.

On the subject of the 'individual' and 'class' in lecture two, the familiar conflict between merit and need reappears. Only this time, it gives way to more familiar sociological terms—pollution and purity—and the old debate of distinguishing between caste and class occupies the centre stage. Here Beteille is the master but, alas, only the glimmer of a new insight is visible in the conclusion that 'attention to individualism may not be socialism'—but a new caste system all over again.

D C.

**SARVODAYA — THE OTHER DEVELOPMENT**

by Detlef Kantowsky Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, 1980

**DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE INDICATORS**

— A Critical Appraisal by Birla Institute of Scientific Research, New Delhi Allied Publishers Private Limited, New Delhi, 1982

WITH refreshing contrast, the first book deals with the conceptual framework and the practical nuances of the Sarvodaya movement as it has unfolded itself at the hands of intellectuals, social workers, political leaders and others. The author has surveyed far and wide, both in India and in Sri Lanka, to find out the involvement of the people and their adaptation, in thinking and in practice, to the ways of Sarvodaya. An important observation of the author is that 'With the passing away of Jayaprakash Narayan, India has lost the charismatic figure around which a new generation's discontent could crystallize'.

It also seems that the author is not sure if the other development strategy, i.e., of Sarvodaya, can really hold its sway in the rural peripheries so long as the urban centres retain their control over the rules which regulate the exchange of goods and ideas. He, therefore, makes a plea for a proper understanding of the 'awakening of all' in the Third World countries and this could be possible only when these countries do not take to the aggressive development style of the industrialised nations.

Divided into three parts, the book makes a thorough investigation of the Sarvodaya concept from Ruskin's *Unto this Last* and Gandhi's village development theory, via Vinoba Bhave's Bhoodan & Gramdan, to Jayaprakash Narayan's Total Revolution and the adaptation of selected elements of the Indian concept to a Buddhist environment by the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka. As for its future, the author believes that the movement may be going in three main directions: (a) the



formation of people's committees in the cities, (b) the organisation of the rural landless and poor for a peaceful and non-violent struggle, and (c) the establishment of Gandhi Peace Centres all over the country.

The practical achievements of Sarvodaya in India and Sri Lanka are reviewed and related to the wider context of rural development in both countries. Though the findings, especially in India, are not very encouraging, the author argues that Sarvodaya's practical performance has not invalidated its concept as the movement has never really been given the chance to be put into practice. The author points out that for explaining the so-called failure of the Sarvodaya concept and its Bhoodan and Gramdan programmes in India, one has to put it into the proper perspective of constitutional Gandhism. 'The lack of routine and formal structures in Sarvodaya has to be taken into account, much more relevant, however, is the damage done to the Gandhian approach by the official policy carried out in his name. Throughout the country, Gandhian labels were used to pursue un-Gandhian aims. The hypocrisy of the ruling elite devalued Gandhian principles much more effectively than all the spontaneity and haphazard work of Bhoodan and Gramdan workers could ever have done.'

The book, however, does not give us a counsel of despair. The author argues that we must not replace one utopia, modernisation, by another. Sarvodaya should not be taken as a dogma, but as an attempt to redefine ends and means according to a given context. More than anything else, the bureaucratic routinisation of the message's charisma would be a self-defeating instrument of the concept. It is only through individual attentiveness that the social reconstruction of a Sarvodaya reality can be achieved.

The second book on *Development and Welfare Indicators* contains the analysis of the multi-dimensional nature of development involving changes in national and per capita incomes, along with other related variables. The analysis belies the hope that the picture of development in our country is perhaps more reassuring than the rate of growth with the per capita GNP would show. Pockets and areas of development in both physical and non-material senses have had little spread effect and have not touched vast areas with significantly sizeable populations in India. The GNP, besides being an aggregative concept, merely measures the production and does not reveal the changes at the grass-roots level occurring in developing economies such as that of India.

After exposing the weakness of the GNP concept in all its ramifications, the publication makes out a strong case for supplementing the national income calculus with the physical indicators of the levels of living. Thus, for a better understanding of the process of development and the factors influencing it, the inclusion of literacy rates in the quality of life index, for example, assumes great significance. In reality, no nation deficient in skill and organisational ability can take rapid strides towards advancement even though it may possess abundant

natural resources together with the necessary machinery and capital equipment.

A plea has been made for a judicious use of the national income statistics and the basic indicators of life so that there may be a more meaningful understanding of the performance of developing countries. The major thrust of the argument is that a rise in GNP does not necessarily mean greater welfare or even greater production. The credibility of GNP and its related measures get further eroded when international comparisons, especially those between the less developed countries and their more developed counterparts are attempted. The conceptual weakness becomes most glaring when the national income rises following progress in narrow segments of the economy but the benefits fail to trickle down to others. Even as India has islands of high technology, advanced education and administration, socio-economic overheads of a high order, etc., the overall impact on the economy seems to be unimpressive for lack of the spread-effects.

Both books contain useful, up-to-date, bibliographies.

Navin Chandra Joshi

**SOCIAL STATISTICS: HEALTH AND EDUCATION** by Ashish Bose, Devendra B Gupta and Mahendra K. Premi. Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1982.

THE planning process in the Indian economy has always been handicapped by the inadequacy of the data base and social statistics have always been a major stumbling block in efforts to plan for the nation's future requirements. In the case of health and education statistics, the situation is even more alarming. While most welfare economies on which India has been trying to model itself, have the advantage of well developed social statistics, the problem of complete statistical coverage which had received some attention during the British era, has not been sufficiently attended to in the post-independence years.

It is, of course, understandable that the problems facing social scientists setting out to get to grips with the health and education programmes for the country have always been compounded by the sheer size of the population under consideration. Besides sheer size, diversity and inaccessibility have been the two other constraining factors in any attempt at social reorganisation based on statistically established requirements.

The book under review is the fourth in a series entitled the *Data Base of the Indian Economy*. The focus has by now shifted to the more intractable areas of the economy — the easier industrial aspects having been considered already. Health statistics as the book amply illustrates 'embraces almost all aspects of life, since the health of a population, in the ultimate analysis, is a consequence of their way of life'. Our perceptions have to be guided by notions of statistical mortality, statistics of cause-of-death, incidence of malaria and the spread of leprosy — to

**Capitalism and Peasant Farming  
Agrarian Structure and Ideology in Northern Tamil Nadu**

**JOHN HARRISS**

This book, based on village field research carried out in the mid-1970s after the introduction of the 'new technology' for paddy cultivation, is concerned with the development of agrarian capitalism and the persistence of small-scale peasant production. It addresses the debate about the relations of production in Indian agriculture, which has been so keenly discussed in the past decade. Since the book also explains the agrarian structure of a region of South India, the relationships between economic, ideological and political levels of the society are necessarily discussed.

Rs 125

**The Indian Response to European Technology and Culture (A.D. 1498-1707)**

**AHSAN JAN QAISAR**

This study examines the technological and cultural impact of Europe on Mughal India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The source material comprises a very wide range of Persian texts, European travellers' accounts and records, drawings, and Mughal miniatures. Demolishing the myth that Indian society was resistant to change, the author discusses the nature and degree of contact that various sections of Indian society had with Europeans, and their exposure to European manufactures and artefacts.

Rs 140

**The Khilafat Movement:  
Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India**

**GAIL MINAULT**

Beginning with a background chapter that discusses the cultural and educational movements which arose among the North Indian Muslim elites in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, the author proceeds in this work to analyse the Khilafat movement in detail in the subsequent chapters. Based not only on sources in English, but perhaps more importantly, on extensive use of material in Urdu, this study reveals the several levels at which the Khilafat movement existed and functioned.

Rs 75

**Prelude to Partition:  
The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920-1932**

**DAVID PAGE**

The emergence of Pakistan is frequently explained in primarily religious or ideological terms, yet these do not reveal how disparate Muslim communities came to see Pakistan as a common goal. This book attempts to give Muslim politics in the crucial period from 1920 to 1932 a structural component to match the ideological interpretation. The author concentrates on the constitutional reforms introduced in 1920, which led to the emergence of the Muslim League as the principal spokesman of Muslim interests in most provinces.

Rs 120



**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj,  
New Delhi 110002

Bombay Calcutta Madras

name just a few factors. The collection of data has to be undertaken at the very grassroot level, very often by persons who are not fully convinced about the need for making tally-marks or even the necessity to state the whole truth.

The problem is no less complicated in the case of education. An awesome array of literacy rates, student drop-out patterns and teacher-pupil ratios become vital inputs into any planning for educational progress. Once again, it is most often a case of the need for doing, coming in the way of doing what is needed. Teachers and health workers have to be mobilised into working with the nation in mind; where numbers matter and planning, if it has to work, must have the right kind of numbers to work with.

The collection of seminar papers brings to the reader an obviously authentic presentation of most aspects of the subject under study. Though seminar papers on the same subject sometimes suffer from the monotony of repetition, careful editing has ensured a smooth flow of information, on information that is available.

The feature which emerges most clearly from the book is that micro-economic variables like expenditure on 'social over-heads' can only be useful at the most initial phases of the planning process. At every subsequent stage, such figures become meaningless and what makes the difference then is the availability of a monitoring mechanism. Handicapped by the need to spend, monitor expenditure, justify decisions and glorify progress, the agencies that have to deliver the fruits of planned expenditure have little time for statistics. And, yet, the State cannot remain eyeless and urgently needs to extend its perspective to more than mere navel-gazing if the stated aim of delivering the goods where the need is greatest is to be met.

**Dilip Cherian**

**AN ATLAS OF THE MOGHUL EMPIRE** by

Irfan Habib Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982.

PROFESSOR Irfan Habib is, alas, usually recognised as the storm centre of controversy in the Aligarh Muslim University. He is one of our most distinguished historians. His *Atlas*, the result of a Jawaharlal Nehru Fellowship, is compiled from a wide range of sources and is remarkable for the interest it creates. It is a work of meticulous scholarship. Over 4000 places are shown in the political sheets, with boundaries of provinces and their divisions, as well as autonomous or independent principalities. The economic sheets show routes, canals, livestock, minerals, crops, manufactures, ports, mines etc., river courses are depicted as they ran in the seventeenth century. There is also a very complete referencing and index. It is fascinating to trace the activities which faded away (like grape cultivation) and those which survived the years of colonial exploitation (craft products). This *Atlas* should be made as widely available as possible if we are to revive an *Atlas*-sense which may spark an interest in caring for the environment in which we live.

# **the art of good management...**



**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**

Shriram seminars and courses are part of this moulding process which involves executives in a ceaseless interchange of ideas, discussion of modern techniques, evaluation and reconsideration of policies. So that the Shriram organisation is constantly infused with fresh dynamism and our resources are utilised to the optimum.




**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**

My

# ROUTES

to over 40 cities in 5 continents



A thrilling voyage of discovery.

On board my gleaming jets.  
It's a network to remember.

**AIR-INDIA**

MTB-AIR-62 67-8

# seminar

**274**

June 1982

# REFLECTIONS

Reflections  
Reflections  
Reflections  
Reflections  
Reflections

# SYMBOLS OF RELIABILITY



## DIGEPLEX

For disturbed digestion

## IMFERON

Rapid, reliable  
replenishment of iron

## RALCRIZYME

The Total digestive

## LOMODEX

The specific flow improver

## MEDICREME

For sprains & strains

## HYALASE

The spreading factor

## TENOPHOS

The health restorative

## BENOGEN

The comprehensive  
multahaematinic

**RALLIS INDIA LIMITED PHARMACEUTICAL DIVISION**

21, D. SUKHADVALA MARG, BOMBAY-400 001.

# Mahindra

## now brings you the Peugeot XDP 4.90- a diesel engine of advanced design


Mahindra meets the challenge of the oil crisis, with a superb new, lightweight high performance

By far the most vital factor is the greater fuel efficiency of this lightweight, high performance engine

diesel engine-the PEUGEOT XDP 4 90 with greater fuel efficiency


This world-famous engine is now being assembled at the Mahindra plant

The PEUGEOT XDP 4 90 will be fitted initially on the Mahindra NC 665 DP Mini Truck, Pick-up Van and Ambulance



### Engine Specifications .

No. of Cylinders	4
Bore-mm	90
Stroke-mm	83
Bore/Stroke ratio	1.08
Displacement-cc	2112
Compression Ratio	22.4:1
R P M (max)	4500
Max B H P	75
Max Torque Kg m	13.3
Weight Kg	184




The Mahindra NC 665 DP  
Mini Truck fitted with  
Peugeot XDP 4.90 diesel engine



Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.

**IN THE  
SERVICE OF  
THE NATION**



**DCM** THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD., DELHI

Hydroquinone  
ne. Metol. Pu  
reochrome  
Purechro  
-3. Sodi  
me-4. Sodi  
n Sulphite.  
Sodium Bis  
ulphite. Sodi  
um Carbon  
ate SodiumCa  
ous. Monohydra  
ous. Metaphosphite (Hy  
rgonate Metaphosphate Thio  
Sodium Thiosulphate Thio  
te. Sodium Ammonium and Crystals. S  
te. Anhydrous. Ammonium and Crystals. S  
po) Anhydrous. Anhydrous. Bisulphite. S  
sulphate Formaldehyde Benzene. Chloranil. 2:5  
Sodium Acetate. 2:5 Dimethoxy Benzene. Sodium  
odium Acetate. N.N. Diethyl Aniline. Sodium  
e. 2:5 Diethoxy Aniline. N-Toluidine. Mangan  
Diethoxy Anhydrous. Mangan  
ne N N Diethyl Anhydrous. Mangan  
ne Sulphate. Manganese Sulphate. P  
m Carbonate. Manganese Sulphate. P  
ese. Manganese. N-Butyl Metha  
tate. Manganese. N-Butyl Metha  
henidone. Hydroquin  
enidone. Hydroquin

Paper  
 Electronics  
 Ceramics  
 Polymers  
 Leather  
 Jute  
 Textiles  
 Detergents  
 Fertilizers  
 Paints  
 Dyestuffs

**Pharmaceuticals**  
**Processing of Photographic**  
**and Motion Picture Film**  
**(Black & White and Colour)**

Manufactured by

**S SATYADEV CHEMICALS LTD.**  
Pratapnagar Road, Vadodara-390 004.

Suppliers to some of the world's leading manufacturing and trading concerns.





**With the Compliments of**

**KEC**

**KAMANI ENGINEERING CORPORATION.**

**Pioneers in transmission line engineering  
in India;**

**making a major contribution to build  
a powerful country; and a powerful world too.  
KEC. Largest in Asia, Second in the World  
in power transmission.**

**K**

**KAMANI ENGINEERING CORPORATION LIMITED**  
Kamani Chambers,  
32, Ramjibhai Kamani Marg,  
BOMBAY-400 038.

STUSA

# The palaces of Maharajas packaged for you this Summer.

## JAIPUR: The Rambagh Palace.

Rs. 975 for 2 persons, 3 nights/  
4 days (inclusive of breakfast,  
one meal)

**Free with stay:** A trip to explore  
your exciting environs. . . Hawa  
Mahal, the Palace of Winds  
Local bazaars full of folklore and  
colour — and treasures. A visit to  
Amber, the old city within a fort  
To Jantar Mantar Observatory  
for a close look at the stars in  
your life

Charges for extra person Rs 400/-

For child below 10 years Rs 325/-

Stays of duration exceeding  
3 nights will be charged on a  
pro rata basis.

## UDAIPUR: The Lake Palace.

Rs. 975 for 2 persons, 3 nights/  
4 days (inclusive of breakfast,  
one meal)

**Free with stay:** A boat ride  
around the lake By Motor  
Launch to Jag Mandir, the sister  
island palace And, a tour to the  
City Palace.

Charges for extra person

Rs 400/-

For child below 10 years

Rs 325/-


Stays of duration exceeding  
3 nights will be charged on a  
pro rata basis.

Make your reservations today  
at:

The Taj Group of Hotels  
Chandralok, ground floor  
Janpath, NEW DELHI 110 001  
Telephone 322333, 322256  
Telex 031 2117 TAJ IN  
Cable TAJGROUP



THE TAJ GROUP OF HOTELS




Offer valid  
till  
September 30,  
1982.

# Elegant looks




## Versatile features




Attractive Sleek Two-toned USHA Streamlined—the sewing machine that outclasses any other in its price range With features that others can't match And a 5-year guarantee too




Patch Darning for easy darning and quick adjustment of pressure on cloth



3-position drop feed for easy adjustment of feed-dog position



Dial-type stitch regulator with lever for forward and reverse stitch control and locking arrangement



Thread tension adjuster for regulating pos. thread tension.

**USHA Streamlined** feature for feature a better machine

**Sue Daley of New York sipped Maaza Mango**





**Her spontaneous  
response:  
"Thums Up"**

**That's right! Maaza  
Mango, Limca  
(and soon Thums Up) are  
brands produced  
and marketed by franchise  
in Kuwait, the U.A.E.,  
Tanzania, Mauritius,  
Singapore and New York**

**If New York said  
'Thums Up' to Maaza  
What will it say  
to Thums Up?**

**Once the setting of  
a royal durbar.  
Today, an exclusive  
conference venue.**




Think of it. Your next conference in a royal palace in Mysore. The city — an oasis of tranquillity, at the foot of the Chamundi Hills.

The palace — where lifestyle spells magnificence. Your conference has a splendid setting. A Conference Hall and a Banquet Hall, where the decor is richly royal. And with it, all facilities — secretarial services, audio-visual equipment, microphones *et al*.

How about a holiday? Bring your seminar or conference to Mysore and discover a fascinating city. With its palaces, serene boulevards and parks.

Go sight-seeing to the island fortress of Srirangapatna, the Brindavan Gardens, the temple architecture of Halebid and Belur.



The Chamundi Hills with the famous Nandi Bull or the Bandipur Wildlife Sanctuary.

The ideal business-holiday tie-up.

**For information and reservations,\* contact**

The Manager  
Lalitha Mahal Palace Hotel  
Mysore 570010 Karnataka  
Tel 23650 Cables TOURISM  
Telex 0846 217

Or

**Ashok Reservation Service.**

	Tel	Cables	Telex
Delhi	350070	CENTRES	031-2468
Bombay	232722	TOURISM	011-4171
	233343		
Calcutta	440901	TOURISM	CA-2307
	440922		
Madras	83865	TOURISM	041-7262
	89672		



**Lalitha Mahal Palace Hotel**

Where conferring has never been more enjoyable

# Power in steps



Steps in the cosmic cycle of creation—the Dance of Nataraja. And now BHEL steps in with power equipment—to effectively harness sources of energy.

Beginning a quarter century ago, we are now among the leaders. With a technological competence that is proven in products, systems and services, in India and the world. Selling to about 40 countries the world over and providing equipment for generation, transmission and utilization of power.

Our successes include a turnkey thermal power station in Libya, an electrification project in Saudi Arabia, boilers for 80% of Malaysia's thermal generating capacity, hydroelectric equipment for New Zealand, Thailand and Nepal. And now, we are providing consultancy services for setting up heavy electrical equipment plants in Turkey.


BHEL is a name that is trusted the world over. With manpower that matches the power we pack—70,000 including 13,500 engineers and trained technicians. And BHEL has supplied over 23,000 MW worth of power equipment already.

BHEL's R&D complex is at work on a wide range of development projects. Introducing latest trends in technology and working jointly with leading companies in USA, West Germany and U.K., BHEL looks forward to an expanding role in the service of energy and power the world over.



**Bharat Heavy  
Electricals Limited**

Registered Office  
18-20, Kasturba Gandhi Marg,  
New Delhi-110001



## Small change? Big change.

Two paise Five paise Ten paise Small change to you. But to Indian Aluminium, it's meant big change. Because Indian Aluminium effected major savings in raw material and production costs of coins by using aluminium.

In its constant drive towards diversification,

Indal has pioneered the use of aluminium in aircraft, currency, power transmission, irrigation tubing, transportation, packaging, housing and a host of other applications.

Indal pioneering. It's bringing change. Both big and small.



**Indian Aluminium Company, Limited**  
**Anything's possible**

# seminar

THE MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI.

Journal which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every  
side of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single  
problem is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions  
opinions expressed have ranged from Janata to Congress, from  
Ravodaya to Communist to Independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it has  
been possible to answer a real need of today, to gather  
the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people  
arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity  
facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture

Editor/ROMESH THAPAR

Managing Editor/RAJ THAPAR

Production/TEJBIR SINGH

Circulation/C. B. KUMAR

Published from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1 Telephone. 46534 Cable Address: Seminar New Delhi. Single copy: Rs.  
pence; \$ 1.50 Yearly Rs. 40; £ 7; \$ 16; Three yearly: Rs 100 ± 20, \$ 40 Reproduction of material prohibited unless permitted

## NEXT MONTH: CHILDHOOD TODAY



# 274

## NEPALI REFLECTIONS

a symposium on

the problems of

our northern neighbour

symposium participants

### THE PROBLEM

A short introductory statement

### POLITICAL SYSTEM

Rishikesh Shaha, former Foreign Minister  
of Nepal

### TRIANGULAR RELATIONS

Lok Raj Baral, Professor and Chairman,  
Department of Political Science, Tribhuvan  
University, Kathmandu

### ECONOMIC REALITY

Devendra Raj Panday, Director,  
Integrated Development Systems,  
Kathmandu

### EXPERIMENT WITH EDUCATION

Poorna K. Adhikary, educationist, former Unesco  
consultant, now working in Kathmandu

### HARD PLAN IN A SOFT STATE

Kamal P. Malla, Professor, Tribhuvan  
University, Kathmandu

### ECOLOGICAL CHANGE

Harka Gurung, former Vice-Chairman of the  
Planning Commission and Minister of State,  
Nepal

### FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography compiled by  
Devendra Kumar

### COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury Associates

# The problem

FOR too long have we in India known too little about our neighbours or, rather, cared too little about them. This cannot do for the major nation in the region. The thought may enrage many of the self-righteous of our countrymen, or those who secretly harbour an imperial sub-conscious, but it would be salutary for us to see our neighbours through their own eyes for a change. The starting point, of course, is to look at the atlas. This would help us to grasp the apprehensions of those nations that lie beyond our borders. For example, little Ceylon has just to glance upwards and see the colossus of India looking down at

the ant-like island at its feet. And Nepal is sandwiched between the two most populous nations in the world. Sandwiched is perhaps the wrong expression because its mountainous terrain gives it some breathing space. The geographic reality must certainly affect the psyche of people and their ways of thinking, giving them complexes of one kind or another. We must take note of these if we wish to disperse the tensions gathering over our region. This issue of SEMINAR will help enlarge our understanding of Nepal. It is written entirely by Nepalis.

# Political system

RISHIKESH SHAHA

FROM 1769 to 1846 and also from 1960 to the present day, the kings of Nepal have ruled in fact as well as in theory. Their exercise of authority may best be characterised as rule by Hukum or peremptory command, which has been patrimonial rather than feudal.

Jang Bahadur Rana, the founder of the system of semi-hereditary Rana Prime Ministers which prevailed in Nepal until 1951, under which the succession of kings were mere figureheads, claimed to have obtained from the king in 1856 the right to rule by peremptory command himself in perpetuity. The Hukumi Shashan or rule by peremptory command of the Ranas continued up to the beginning of 1951.

After that, following the 1950-51 political revolution, the king regained his own right to rule by peremptory command subject to the condition that he would abide by the

constitutional arrangements to be made by a constituent assembly directly elected by the people. However, even after the nation's first general elections were held in February-April 1959 according to the terms of the 1959 Constitution promulgated by the late King Mahendra, the king retained the emergency power to dissolve the elected parliament and rule by peremptory command, and he soon made use of this power by dissolving the first elected parliament in Nepal on December 15, 1960. He thus continued the tradition of rule by peremptory command under the cover of 'the partyless democratic Panchayat system' with all powers vested in himself.

In Nepal, land has always been regarded as the property of the State or the ruler who represents the State in his person. In the early days of Gorkhali rule, it was believed that all land belonged to the king. Feudal retainers such as the

*Birtawals* and *Jagirdars*<sup>1</sup> owed to the ruler their authority which they derived from the temporary possession and use of the land. Jang Bahadur and his successors started the practice of pre-empting both State and private land and other property for the private use of the members of their family and of their favourites.

The concept that land belongs to the ruler or to the government continues to this day in some form or other. It was the prevalence of this concept, only superficially related to the legal theory of eminent domain, that enabled successive Nepali governments to acquire in the post-1951 period private landed estates and forests without compensation. It was this very concept again which enabled the late King Mahendra to confiscate the property of his political opponents and present it to his favourites in the post-1960 era, much in the same way as he had all along given government land and forest revenues to his relatives and retainers.

Extended to the field of private business, this concept, according to which the wealth of the people belongs to the ruler or the State, implies the ownership of profitable businesses by members of the ruling family and elite, and it also embraces their obtaining export and import licences and other profitable contracts and franchises.

**A**lthough Nepal's planning and governmental apparatuses are superficially modern in their external features and seem to be geared to the needs of development and modernisation, their basic political patterns are fundamentally patrimonial in character. Nepal's political-cum-bureaucratic elite is interwoven with the general pattern of the country's social fabric. This system centres around the person of the king who is its model, mentor and innovator. The Nepali type of patrimonial system is characterised

by the highly personal manner in which power is exercised.

The elite is at the heart of the Nepali patrimonial system and may be given some credit for its role in securing the independence and territorial integrity of the country against heavy odds and in the most trying circumstances. The individuals in the higher echelons of the government, who enjoy a fair measure of power and privilege in the system, constitute the governing elite. They may be regarded as the national policy-and-decision makers, and in Nepal those are the people who closely surround the king.

**H**ereditary monarchy, rule by peremptory command, the authority of the monarch as the final court of appeal for justice in both civil and criminal cases, the monarch's sole power of conducting *pajani*, the annual routine renewal or termination of tenures of all those employed in military and civil service, the practice of dispatching royal commissions for tours of inspection (*daudaha*) and of requiring regular attendance at the royal court or camp of everyone who was somebody in the area (*salam* or *darshan*) — these were some of the main features of administration under the unfettered Shah monarchy (1769-1846).

All these practices were continued when the power to rule by peremptory command along with supreme authority in every matter was delegated to the Rana Maharajacum-Prime Minister after the office was made hereditary and kept open only to the 'legitimate' or 'pure' members of the Rana family on the basis of a predetermined roll of succession regulating all ranks in the ruling hierarchy. This arrangement with a few aberrations was continued for a period of 104 years until February 1951 when the Rana family rule was abolished and the king was restored to power.

During the years 1947-51, the Rana government found itself face-to-face with the most serious crisis in its history, following the withdrawal of the British from India and the establishment of Chinese authority in Tibet. At such a criti-

cal time, the Rana family proved to be a house divided against itself. It must, however, be noted that the political change could not be consummated in Nepal until after King Tribhuvan and some other members of the royal family had sought asylum in the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu on November 6, 1950, and were flown to New Delhi in an Indian Air Force plane four days later. The Rana Government initially displayed an unyielding attitude, replaced King Tribhuvan and put his three-year old grandson, Prince Gyanendra, on the throne. However, within three months Maharajacum-Prime Minister Mohan Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana yielded to the insurrectionary tactics of the Nepali Congress and to firm diplomatic pressure applied by India.

On February 18, 1951, King Tribhuvan upon his return to Nepal, made his historic declaration avowing his intention to have the country governed in accordance with a constitution drawn up by a constituent assembly composed of representatives elected by the people. The Interim Government Act of Nepal 1951 or *Nepalko Antaram Vidan, V S 2007*, promulgated by King Tribhuvan has in retrospect proved to be the most progressive constitutional document in Nepalese history, approximating to standards prevailing in other democratic countries in the world. The subsequent amendments of the Interim Government Act of Nepal 1951 had the effect of detracting from its democratic substance rather than adding to it. The net result was a steady decline in the powers of the democratic institutions established after 1951, and a corresponding rise in the trend toward traditional absolutism of the king.

**F**aced with the threat of a countrywide non-violent rebellion, proposed by the United Democratic Front, King Mahendra convened a conference of party leaders on December 6, 1957 but the conference failed to stop the movement from being launched. A week later King Mahendra, under popular pressure, proclaimed February 18, 1959, as the day of General Elec-

<sup>1</sup> The *Birtawals* are the recipients of the *Birta* land in the case of which the historic rent generally accruing to the state was appropriated by the beneficiaries of this kind of land-grant and the *Jagirdars* are the recipients of the *Jagir* land granted to the state employees in lieu of cash payment for their services.

tions. However, on February 1 1958, while continuing negotiations for the formation of a popular interim government, he made a momentous declaration which marked a significant departure from the path originally laid down by King Tribhuvan in 1951

King Mahendra's proclamation blamed political instability for the lack of development in the country for seven years, and as a remedial measure he proposed the early establishment of (1) a constitutional drafting commission to draw up a constitution for a bicameral legislature, (2) a nominated advisory assembly for the interim period and (3) a council of ministers without a prime minister, consisting of independent persons as well as representatives of political parties

Consequently, in February 1959 King Mahendra announced the replacement of the Interim Government Act of 1951 by the 1959 Constitution of Nepal under which the king retained supreme executive power and extensive discretionary and emergency powers. The constitution sought to change the concept of popular sovereignty on which the 1951 Interim Government Act was based. This adversely affected the authority of the first ever-elected government of Nepal

Nepal's first general election was held in the spring of 1959 under the new constitution. Although the Nepali Congress party led by B P Koirala, which stood for the attainment of socialist objectives through democratic and parliamentary means, won the large majority of 73 out of 109 seats in the lower house of parliament, the experiment in parliamentary democracy proved to be short-lived. On 15 December, 1960, King Mahendra exercised his emergency powers on the ground of the preservation of 'unity, national integrity and sovereignty', dissolved both houses of the legislature and imprisoned B P Koirala and other ministers of the 19-months-old elected government

Nepali politicians, under the leadership of General Subarna Shamsher Rana, organized a movement in the name of the Nepali

Congress for the restoration of democracy from their self-imposed base of exile in India. By the end of 1961 armed raids across the border into Nepal had become the order of the day, but were possible only with the connivance of the Indian authorities. They failed, however, to achieve the results of 1950-51. By 1962, China had consolidated its authority in Tibet and was in a position to provide countervailing weight to the Indian support of the rebel cause. King Mahendra also took full advantage of anti-Indian sentiment in Nepal engendered by India's patronizing attitude in the years immediately following King Tribhuvan's restoration to power with India's diplomatic support.

King Mahendra successfully projected his nationalist image by withstanding Indian pressures and expanding Nepal's diplomatic contacts with a number of other important countries. Another factor was the Royal Nepal Army which, thanks to the Indian military mission, was better trained and equipped than the army of the Ranas. King Mahendra was, therefore, in a stronger position to deal with the situation created by rebel activities. In all this, King Mahendra's father's as well as his own association with the popular struggle against Rana rule made his action less suspect in the eyes of the people.

Last but not least, the Chinese military attack on India in the fall of 1962 necessitated a change of attitude on the part of the government of India without any *quid pro quo* from King Mahendra. The King thus had reason to feel grateful to China for relieving him of the pressure of armed raids by India-based rebels.

The Nepali Congress leader, General Subarna Shamsher Rana, presumably on the advice of the government of India, suspended in November 1962 the movement for the restoration of democracy in Nepal and formally stopped it for good by the end of 1962. Although the release of former Prime Minister B P Koirala, in prison since December 1960, and the simultan-

eous pardon of General Subarna and some of his associates in October 1968, came belatedly after pressure from India, King Mahendra's gestures were made to appear as proof of his own generosity and large heartedness.

The helplessness of the Nepali people against the king's action may be explained partly by the failure of the political elite in Nepal to adapt a modern western form of government to a social milieu which lacked the social and cultural infrastructure necessary for a democratic polity. The success of the democratic experiment in Nepal presupposed the cooperation between the king, who derived his position of authority from the time-honoured institution of monarchy, and the newly elected prime minister, who symbolised popular hopes but had yet to create the popular tradition and institutions to sustain his democratic ideas. Unfortunately for Nepal, such a cooperation was not forthcoming. The result was the revival of the traditional panchayat polity under the absolute authority and leadership of the king.

The royal take-over of 1960 initiated a new phase of the kind of direct rule which had been put into effect during the post-Rana period between 1951 and 1959. There was, however, one very important difference—what had been regarded in the past as a stop gap measure at best, became a permanent feature of the new era. The political model adopted in Nepal after the political change in 1950-51 was that of a parliamentary democracy under the aegis of a constitutional monarch. After 1960, the parliamentary system was publicly disavowed by King Mahendra, who described it as an alien system unsuited to Nepal's tradition, history and objective conditions. He expressed his determination to devise a political system which conformed to conditions 'peculiar to Nepal'.

King Mahendra, a master tactician, used considerable skill to avoid emphasizing certain aspects of his political system. To justify his dissolution of parliament and to present his subsequent political actions in a favourable light, he at-

tempted to create a cultural myth about the panchayats to support claims of legitimacy by royal authority. He put forward a vigorous plea that his 'democratic' panchayat system, with its roots in the soil of the country, was better suited to the social-psychological climate of Nepal than parliamentary democracy, which was 'alien to its tradition and genius.' The panchayats, however, had never in the past functioned as regular units of local self-government and had been at best councils of elders drawn from a particular caste to conciliate minor disputes relating to caste matters

In support of his climate-and-soil theory, King Mahendra refurbished the panchayats on a model of traditional polity that basically derived its authority from the spirit of reverence for hierarchy based on seniority and age in a caste-ingrained society<sup>2</sup>. But he took great care to avoid the impression that his panchayat system had, in practice and theory, discarded the basic democratic tenet that power belongs to the people. He professed faith in the concept of popular sovereignty by emphasizing in public the principle of decentralisation. He did not, however, make it clear whether or not decentralisation implied in actual practice any gradual diminution of his royal powers and prerogatives

However, the inherent contradiction in the panchayat system between a theoretical concept of a decentralised political and administrative structure and the existence and maintenance in practice of a highly centralized political-cum-administrative structure was highlighted by the revival in a surreptitious manner of such traditional institutions of the old Shah and Rana despotism as *pajani* (annual renewal of conditions of service), *daudaha* (commission for a tour of inspection) and *salam* or *darshan* (indi-

vidual or group audience with the ruler in his court or camp), parallels for which could be found only in the medieval Mogul administration of India

The frequency of the changes in administrative personnel, euphemistically described as 'administrative reorganisation', was merely a revival in new form of the traditional practice of *pajani* or annual renewal of service.

The *daudaha* or commission for a tour of inspection was a temporarily appointed body which was sent to an outlying area with wide discretionary powers to inspect all government offices, suspend higher-level government officials and dismiss lower-level staff. It had the power to hold summary enquiry and trials and to dispense quick justice on the basis of an on-the-spot investigation. It had judicial authority similar to that of a district court (*zilla adalat*) and openly entertained petitions for justice. It was also authorized to look into problems of economic development with a view to recommending new changes in the on-going projects.

The *salam* or *darshan* was the traditional institution of individual or group audience with the ruler to secure direct justice and a quick redress of grievances. The practice of *salam* or *darshan* in its traditional form and spirit was subtly resuscitated by King Mahendra's much-talked-about tours in the countryside for popular contact (*jana samparka*) and mobilisation.

In addition to the above institutions, special tribunals, reminiscent of the Star Chamber and Courts of Commission in Tudor England, became the order of the day. However much these institutions might have suited the needs of absolute personal rule in the past, they were not only outdated in the modern context, but were also antithetical to the spirit and methods of institutionalisation and modernisation. These practices tended to interfere with the recently established legal and constitutional forms and to obstruct the healthy growth of the due process of law and popular participatory institutions which

were vital to the process of nation-building in the modern democratic sense. The renewal and prevalence of the traditional practices during the post 1960 era led many serious minded observers to believe that what King Mahendra had attempted since 1960 was to institutionalise personal rule within the panchayat framework.

Under King Birendra, the palace secretariat, which also includes the Investigation and Enquiry Centre (Janch-Bujh Kendra), functions not only as a relay station between the king and the government, but also as a policy-and-decision-making body using the central secretariat merely as an instrument for implementing policy decisions. This has led to the kind of situation characterized by Edmund Burke as 'double government', with the central government secretariat directly responsible and accountable to the people for errors in implementation of the government's policy-decisions, and the palace secretariat, screened from the view and criticisms of the people, in a dominant position to dictate the policies of the government.

After the accession of King Birendra in 1972, the Centre for Enquiry and Investigation was the king's top investigative arm for several years, functioning something like the high-powered Imperial Inspectorate Organization for the Shah of Iran. The Centre enjoyed the freedom to investigate anything and anyone including cabinet ministers. It not only investigated charges of corruption in government, but also handled many of the personal pleas for royal justice sent to the king by mail.

The spirit in which King Birendra introduced constitutional amendments in 1975 could best be understood in the light of his own novel concept of constitutional monarchy, which was said to have been derived from a certain aspect of Hindu dharma or religious code of conduct, and which was not the usually accepted one in which both the king and his people derive their rights and responsibilities from a constitution which could be changed at any time by the required majority

2 For a well-informed and perceptive account of the parliamentary experiment in Nepal and its replacement by King Mahendra with his partyless panchayat system, read Joshi, Bhuwan Lal and Leo E Rose, *Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A case study of political acculturation*, Berkeley, University of California, 1966

of the votes of the people or of their representatives in popularly elected national legislatures. His theory of constitutional monarchy seemed to be largely influenced by his concept of a king as God among the people. King Birendra's published statements at the time suggested that he placed himself above the government and the constitution because both of them were his creations.

For hundreds of years, the central government in Nepal was run by a number of interrelated families, with the most influential and powerful of them keeping the chief executive position to themselves. Centrally appointed governors provided the link between Kathmandu and the rest of the country. The principal functions of the government were to maintain law and order and a semblance of justice within the territory, to protect it against encroachment from outside, and to raise revenue from the inhabitants of the territory for the services of order and protection.

Revenues realized from the people were not necessarily like taxes in the modern sense. The system was feudal in nature, land was, as it is now, the primary resource in Nepal, and land grants were made by the central government for services or favours. Land revenues were largely appropriated by a handful of the ruling elite as a consequence of the exercise of political power. To promote one's status, it was necessary to become part of the ruling hierarchy or to undertake some activity with its favour and sanction. For those who could not belong to the ruling hierarchy, the landed aristocracy was the second-best choice so long as opportunities for reclaiming new land in the tarai and the hills existed.

After all the suitable land had been brought under cultivation, the system became static as education, mercantile activity and other avenues for economic, social and political enterprise were ignored. The result was that room at the top became extremely limited, the elite did not have wide scope for economic enterprise and was restricted in number compared to the total population.

Under these circumstances, a political system was evolved which relied for its effectiveness on plots and rumour-mongering, bluster and bullying, and primarily on manoeuvres and counter-manoevres.

The governing elite did not envisage a constituency in the masses but operated on the basis of co-opting individuals as temporary allies in the struggle for position, power and related benefits. Under this system, it was the primary obligation of the common people to support the elite in the government and in the landed aristocracy. The government existed for the elite rather than for the people.

Even after successive changes in the structure of the government and even after the formal adoption of the principles of the welfare State, the common man's well-being and social justice have not been promoted in Nepal. According to a study on problems of employment and income levels, even on the conservatively estimated national annual per capita income of five hundred Nepali rupees, the tarai has 56.1 per cent and the hilly region 72 per cent of its total population below the poverty line, i.e., in 1973 as many as 2.2 million people in the tarai and 5.5 million people in the hills lived below minimum subsistence levels.<sup>3</sup>

The exploitative nature of the old political style seems to remain unchanged to this day. Those in government, practising the same old style of politics, tend to become corrupt with the result that the people are demoralised by submitting to them and ineffective in opposing them. The landed interests, merchants and small traders contribute to corruption and malpractice by resisting reforms that might undermine their exploitative positions. The ministers in power are never tired of repeating that the people have been the beneficiaries of the government's actions, even

when the masses are being actually subjected to the worst kind of exploitation. The end result of all this is that although the masses still remain submissive, they are increasingly discontented.

Even after the 1951 political change the possibility of social mobility for various ethnic groups other than the three socially dominant castes of the Brahmans, Chhetris and Newars has been minimal. According to a study conducted by the Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 80 per cent of the positions of power and profit are still held by Brahmans, Chhetris and Newars, who represent a small minority of the total population of Nepal.<sup>4</sup> A subsequent survey has revealed that more than half the government civil service is drawn from the Kathmandu valley, which contains about three per cent of the population of Nepal.

This chronic state of inequality, which has tended to give the widest possible opportunity for government service and education to only three castes and to one small area of the country, cannot be said to be consistent with the modernization goals of the country. Hence the need for a deliberate and coordinated policy of national integration.

The following practical suggestions, if implemented, may help evolve a coordinated policy of national integration.

(1) The Public Service Commission should be required to follow a policy of keeping to a minimum the number of new entrants to the civil service from Kathmandu or from the three dominant castes. This might be accomplished by giving some kind of handicap in favour of all other groups for recruitment to government service. A tiered system of handicaps would have to be worked out to ensure justice to all backward ethnic groups at different stages of development. Some of the ethnic groups such as the Magars, Gurungs, Rais and Limbus suffer

3 Vijaya Laxman Kelkar and Mahesh K. Banskota, *Problems of Economic Employment and Income Levels in Nepal* (Kirtipur, Kathmandu: Centre for Economic Development and Administration), pp. 29-30.

4 A. Beenhakker, *A Kaleidoscopic Circumspection of Development Planning, with Contextual Reference to Nepal* (Rotterdam: University Press, 1973), p. 25.



less discrimination and disadvantage than those on the lowest rungs of the ladder, such as the Tamangs, Tharus and Satars. Educational scholarships from the lowest to the highest levels of education should also be allocated on a similar basis. The government must find extra funds to finance such an elaborate system of scholarship. The Guthi (public religious trust) funds might fruitfully be used for this purpose.<sup>5</sup>

(2) Recruitment to the army and the police must be widely extended to the Tamangs, the Tharus and the Satars on a favoured basis, and there should be no discrimination against them as in the past on the basis of a kind of 'apartheid' myth of the so-called martial and non-martial races.

(3) The national language must be brought much closer to the language of everyday speech with a view to making it an effective medium of national communication. Words should be borrowed extensively from the dialects in order to enrich Nepali vocabulary, since words borrowed from Sanskrit or coined by the traditional Sanskrit method do not always have the same natural vigour, simplicity and raciness as the expressions from the dialects.

(4) More could be done to provide for a wider dissemination of folk-lore and culture and for the popularization of folk songs and dances.

All this, however, presupposes a change in the attitude of the dominant minority power-elite. Unless the legitimate grievances of the hitherto neglected majority are properly heeded to and a greater opportunity provided for the upward mobility of various ethnic groups, the process of development may create a highly explosive situation in the country.

The spokesmen of the government of Nepal have claimed from time to time that the panchayat system, despite the indifference of the urban

educated elites towards it, has benefited the countryside by promoting the growth of local initiative and leadership in development efforts. But two inquiries of an empirical nature into the impact of the panchayat system on the pattern of changing social life in certain rural areas of the hills and the tarai in eastern Nepal have belied their claims.<sup>6</sup>

These studies by Nepali and foreign scholars have shown that the panchayat system has not only strengthened the traditional hold of the influential castes and families on the economy and politics of the villages but has, in some cases, as for example in the far-eastern hill district of Ilam, alienated indigenous inhabitants such as the Limbus by encouraging the dominance of the Brahmins.<sup>7</sup> Because of the lack of nationally organized platforms and clear-cut election manifestos promising the removal of economic and social injustices on ideological grounds, the panchayat elections at all levels have involved merely an undisguised play of selfish and personal interests, and have tended to accentuate ethnic, tribal and religious differences.

In today's context, what is important from the viewpoint of integration is the evolution of a national consensus and a national political culture capable of mobilizing the nation as a whole. This has to be done by educating those involved in the political and economic processes of nation-building to understand new mental attitudes, new ideas and new forms of social organization. Considered in this light, a multi-party or non-party system appears to be only an instrumental aspect of the more basic problem — namely, the creation of a national unified political culture or consensus.

<sup>6</sup> Pashupati Shamsheer J.B. Rana and Mohammad Moshin, Appendix A, in *A Study Report on the Pattern of Emerging Leadership in Panchayats* (Kathmandu Training and Research Section, Home Panchayat Ministry of His Majesty's Government, 1967).

<sup>7</sup> Lionel Caplan, *Land and Social Change in East Nepal, A Study of Hindu-tribal Relations* (London Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp 169-70.

<sup>5</sup> Rishikesh Shaha, *Nepali Politics Retrospect and Prospect* 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 1978), p 22.

# Triangular relations

LOK RAJ BARAL

NEPAL'S foreign policy has undergone a remarkable change in recent years, but the pattern of its relationship with the two giant neighbours—China and India—is more or less the same. To date, Nepal has established diplomatic relations with more than 80 countries spanning all political systems and ideologies. Its diversified policy can be seen in Kathmandu, the capital, with flags of different sets of nations fluttering. Although the first initiative of diversifying Nepal's external policy was taken by the Ranas themselves in the late 1940s, its actual implementation could be seen only in the 50s.

It is quite obvious that the increasing contacts and active involvement of Nepal in global level interactions either through the United Nations' forums or through bilateral means has not given rise to misgivings to Nepal's two neighbours unless such dealings are in sharp contradistinction to their vital national interests. Misunderstandings arise mainly from their own perception and interpretation. So, Nepal's relations with China and India are, on balance, stable, because they are all agreed to continued stability so long as their strategic interests remain unthreatened.

Yet, India has been trying to assert its security interest from time to time with a view to cautioning

Nepal that it (Nepal) should never try to undermine India's interest while pursuing the policy of diversification beyond India. Given the present international and regional situations which are fast deteriorating, both are however anxious to bring Nepal closer to their respective viewpoints on certain issues. The old international order is undergoing change rapidly but what it is 'yielding to' is far from clear. And how Nepal's two neighbours will fit themselves into it is still unclear.

Compared with China, Nepal's relations with India are complex if not unique. How such a complexity developed over the years and how Nepal's northern neighbour—China—become a prominent factor in putting Nepal into a triangular interaction, is the dominant theme of this paper.

Gone are the days of xenophobic slogans such as 'we will wash blood from our Khukuris in the Ganges'—an extreme nationalistic feeling for the expansion of territories. It was also an assertion of Nepali nationalism in the wake of the rise of the British empire in India. During those years, national identity and international understanding were rivals. But with the awareness of the people and equally with the realization of one's own limitation for the expansion of territory

through conquest, these two terms — nationalism and international understanding — became complementary. In today's world, internationalism appears to be redundant if it is not preceded by a feeling of nationalism. How has national identity become a key element in Nepal's foreign policy ever since the time of King Prithvi Narayan Shah, the founder of modern Nepal, can be examined in the policy objective itself.

Nepal's quest for national identity has also given rise to controversies in the triangular relationship between China, India and Nepal. The identity element which was active in Nepal's foreign policy since the time of the unification of Nepal in 1769 has been further highlighted by the Nepali power elites since the revolution of 1950-51. A close interaction between Nepal and its two neighbours had started taking place when India perceived the threat of the People's Republic of China (communist China) which came into existence in 1949. The new Indian rulers who had replaced the Britishers after India's independence in 1947 realized that Nepal, a country of strategic importance, should be brought into the Indian defence system so that India's northern Himalayan frontiers could be secured.

The emergence of the two big neighbours with their opposite ideological orientations added a new dimension to Nepal's foreign policy, but it was not necessarily a completely new situation. For, Nepal's claustrophobic geographical location had been well described by King Prithvi Narayan Shah when he had compared Nepal with 'a Tarul (yam) between two stones'. For a long time, however, Nepal had to deal with its southern neighbour, British-India, because China could not achieve military parity with the British empire. Moreover, the British had considered Tibet as a buffer between China and India. But Nepal had waged wars against China, despite such a concept of being a buffer zone. Even during the initial period of modern Nepal, national interest which was identified with the psychology of self preservation of Nepal

as a separate, independent political entity had got primacy in statecraft.

When Prithvi Narayan was stating the parameters of Nepal's policy towards its neighbours, he was simply warning the future rulers of Nepal that they should be careful of foreign elements coming from the south. It has been rightly stated by Rose 'Even in his day — the mid-18th century — Nepal's most formidable problem in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy was the preservation of the country's independence in the face of the current but separate threats posed by the newly emerging dominant power in northern India, the British East India Company, and a slowly but steadily expanding Chinese presence in Tibet.'

To their credit and ability, the Nepali political elites ranging from the Shah kings, nobles and priests to the Rana rulers, always made conscious efforts not to jeopardize Nepal's interests, particularly in safeguarding the territorial integrity of the country. The links between domestic politics and external policies were therefore in constant interaction with a view to realizing this objective. Sometimes Nepali power elites appeared to be assertive, but sometimes they did not hesitate to subdue their feeling in order to be amenable to the changing geopolitical context.

Perhaps for the first time Nepal's foreign policy was under active geopolitical interaction with the rise of communist China in 1949 and democratic India in 1947. The Ranas, who were comfortable so long as the British were in India, became anxious with these two major developments in Nepal's neighbourhood. The Rana rulers realized that they could not bear the brunt of both events as China and India had not only emerged as the powerful countries in Nepal's vicinity but also possessed ideologies which could prove detrimental to the archaic Rana rule. Moreover, the motivations and objectives of the new rulers of these countries were not known to the Ranas, despite India's overtures to them. Under the circumstances, the Rana rulers, whose days were numbered,

ostensibly preferred to choose the lesser evil by hobnobbing with the new Indian rulers.

Both India and the Rana government found a common factor in their new working relationship. And that common factor was the communist threat to them from China, which had already come to Tibet. Besides, the Rana rulers seemingly wanted to drive a wedge between the Indian power elites whose democratic credentials were questionable, and a few Nepali politicians then working against the continuation of the Rana regime. The Rana government tried to introduce some reforms within the family oligarchy, but they proved to be illusory in the new political context. Thus, 'the Nepal Darbar made several gestures in the 1947-1950 period which seemed to be designed to facilitate the process of accommodation with the government of India.'

The policy of Independent India towards Nepal had been motivated by a two-pronged strategy — to fit Nepal into the Indian security system as described by the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and to cultivate relations with both the traditional forces led by the Ranas and with new revolutionaries who were inclined towards the liquidation of the Rana rule. This policy led Nehru to pursue what he himself described as a 'middle-way' policy, which was contrived by him to prevent any 'major upheaval that might uproot' the *ancien* regime. The two countries then decided to conclude treaties of Peace and Friendship and Trade and Transit in July 1950. Prior to the signing of the treaties, Nehru had laid down the rules of Nepal-India relations when he stated that 'We cannot tolerate any foreign invasion from any foreign country in any part of the Indian sub-continent. Any possible invasion of Nepal would inevitably involve the safety of India.'

The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship has become quite a lively issue today, for the policy-makers of both India and Nepal seem to be trying strenuously to interpret it in their own respective lights. One of the key clauses of the treaty

enjoins both India and Nepal 'to inform each other of any serious friction of misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments' The letter exchanged with the treaty further elaborates that 'Neither governments shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor To deal with any such threat the two governments shall consult with each other and devise effective counter measures'

**I**t seemed that the Indian government could score a major diplomatic victory by bringing Nepal into its security framework and by putting the entire Himalayan region as a zone under India's protection Although Nepal witnessed major changes in 1951, its relationship with India remained the same despite the criticisms made by some oppositional elements in the post-revolution period Both the victors — King Tribhuvan and the Nepali Congress (NC) and the vanquished (the Ranas) were apparently delighted to find themselves in the new democratic order created by the good offices of Nehru's 'middle-way' policy Nehru's earlier statement that Nepal required a 'continuity with change' policy because of the fledgling democratic leadership elements in the new dispensation, subsequently displayed that this approach was not practicable in the light of the growing alienation of several other political groups and personalities from the Delhi settlement concluded between the Ranas, King Tribhuvan and the NC under the auspices of India

A good many political groupings came to the surface immediately after the 1951 change, thereby putting up stiff challenges to the new democratic order These groups were engaged in relentless anti-Congress and anti-Indian campaigns The strange ensemble of diametrically opposite groups was a new political trend in the post-1951 period and all of them denounced India's 'big brotherly' attitude and paternalistic policy towards Nepal

Although many political parties were baring India while opposing

the NC at home, some sensible Nepalis, without party affiliations, were equally concerned over India's role in Nepal When the middle-way policy was fast disintegrating after the abortive experimentation of the Rana-Congress coalition government in 1951, New Delhi was ruffled by the detractors in Nepal The hard core participants of the Delhi settlement too became inveterate critics of the alleged Indian interference in Nepal's affairs It was a peculiar psyche evidenced then in the 1950s

New Delhi on its part did little to institutionalize democracy in Nepal when its political leverage was high in the period 1951-55 Consequently, political groups and personalities were more inclined to whip up the anti-Indian sentiment rather than engage themselves in brightening the prospect of democracy in the country Thus, one finds that the general concern about promoting democracy in accordance with the 1951 spirit was relegated to the background, paving the way for an uncertain political future

All these trends notwithstanding, Nepal's search for its identity continued without any interruption and foreign policy seemed to help this quest Efforts were afoot to create a policy of 'equidistance' from China and India well before 1955, particularly when India had reconciled with communist China over the Tibetan issue The Nepali authorities did not lag behind in taking advantage of this situation and hence adroitly moved towards establishing diplomatic relations with Peking

**N**epal's foreign policy initiatives gained momentum in 1955 with the formalizing of its relations with China and the diversifying of its policies with other countries irrespective of their alignments with blocs Nepal's China policy was particularly significant in two important respects First, it considerably reduced India's political leverage in Nepal's domestic and foreign policies and, second, 'regiopolitics' was active whereby a small country like Nepal, sandwiched as it was between China and India, had to

enter into constant interactions with them as well as with others with whom diplomatic relations had been established Comprehending the burgeoning situation in Nepal's neighbourhood, King Mahendra, who had ascended the throne in 1955, became quite successful in turning the external situation to consolidating his power through a political order innovated by him after terminating the first ever installed parliamentary process in 1960.

**S**ino-Indian relations were fast deteriorating due to the Tibetan crisis Subsequently, the rivalry between China and India shifted to the border problems When the two giant neighbours turned antagonistic, it was but natural that Nepal started feeling the heat of geopolitical tension in its vicinity Although the NC government had scored diplomatic victory by continuing friendly relations between China and Nepal, despite heavy odds against it, it was nonetheless tightrope walking in view of India's expectation of Nepal's sympathy and support for the former's cause It was, however, clear that Nepal did not side with India during the Sino-Indian border conflict, despite the treaty obligations Yet, the disparate political groups including the vested interests did not keep quiet in stigmatizing the elected government as a stooge of India, thereby precipitating the situation for its downfall King Mahendra dissolved the parliamentary system on the grounds that such an alien system was unsuitable for Nepal.

King Mahendra's action was not favoured by India, though a section of Indian public opinion was becoming hostile to the NC government when it had strenuously tried to maintain the balance between China and India The Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, who had all along been emphasizing the unbreakable 'special relationship' between India and Nepal, criticized the royal takeover as a 'setback to democracy' This statement created a flutter in Kathmandu's Establishment circles, but it did not succeed in extracting the desired objective — the restoration of the parliamentary system On the contrary, King Mahendra

started building the panchayat system which was interpreted by him and the members of the royal entourage as a native political model for Nepal

In sharp contrast to India, China remained conspicuously silent over the royal take-over. Whether King Mahendra had secured Chinese assurance for his move in terminating the liberal democracy or not, as a shrewd and calculating ruler, he must have realised the repercussions on Nepal of the deteriorating Sino-Indian relations. So the Nepali monarch had no other option but to move closer to China whose immediate concern was to denigrate the Indian role in South Asia. 'So Peking in particular geared its diplomacy to exploit the situation to the detriment of India, with whom it had now a direct confrontation in the Himalayas.'

**E**strangement of relations between Peking and New Delhi on the one hand, and Kathmandu and New Delhi on the other created for Nepal much difficulty in maintaining a parity relationship between the two antagonistic neighbours. It was however significant that King Mahendra could assert Nepal's independent attitude towards them, despite the treaty with India. On the contrary, the two treaty partners were pursuing divergent lines and the Indian government for its part did not invoke this treaty obligation during the 1962 Indo-China border war. But China (a third party) could come in as a factor in determining the pattern of relations between India, Nepal and China.

The Chinese also did not fail to give a deliberate twist to the NC movement which was, in the Chinese perception and interpretation, engineered by India against Nepal. Coming close on the heels of the intensified anti-regime movement launched by Congressmen from India, the Chinese foreign minister, Chen Yi, assured the beleaguered Nepali authorities that 'in case any foreign army makes a foolhardy attempt to attack Nepal, China will side with the Nepalese people'. Reading the Chinese assertion as a pretext to penetrate into Nepali territories, the Indian government

allegedly advised the NC leaders to suspend their armed movement against the royal regime. It can be assumed that since the Indian military superiority over the Chinese was questionable, the Indian government wanted to protect the northern Himalayan region by counting on peace in Nepal.

What follows is that Nepal's manoeuvrability during the 1960s proved positive enough for consolidating the new political order despite India's negative attitude towards it. But such a manoeuvrability was highly unlikely in the 70s when India's power position was considerably enhanced after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Yet, China as a significant factor in determining Nepal's foreign as well as domestic policies was evident in the 60s and King Mahendra was successful in maintaining domestic equilibrium by enlisting the support of the pro-Chinese communists to his own rule.

In the early phase of the new order, India appeared to be unenthusiastic about providing economic assistance to Nepal. But this attitude changed when it 'restructured' its policy after 1962. Now both China and India were close competitors for providing aid to Nepal and Indian aid is flowing into Nepal without any interruption since 1963.

**C**hina and India have invariably figured in Nepal's domestic and foreign policies ever since the early 60s. Nepal's two antagonistic neighbours followed opposite policies towards issues and events taking place in the South Asian sub-continent. During the movement for a new republic of Bangladesh in 1971, political groups including government circles interpreted it in their own respective ways. Some communists were toeing Peking's line in denouncing the role of India in the Bangladesh liberation movement. His Majesty's government of Nepal considered it a secessionist movement which deserved to be dealt with by 'heavy laws'.

In contrast to the official line, public opinion was mobilized in support of the 'heroic struggle' of

the people of Bangladesh. Many panchas and opposition leaders advised government to act prudently, bearing in mind its position when Bangladesh became independent. Meanwhile, many political observers were caught unawares, but opposition elements trying to take advantage of the changing power position in the South Asian region after India's exemplary military operations in the Indo-Pakistan war were outmanoeuvred by King Mahendra. Comprehending the new situation and with an eye on the prospective birth of a new republic in Nepal's proximity, the King instructed the Nepali Permanent Representative at the United Nations to abstain from voting on the General Assembly's resolution asking India for an immediate ceasefire, and withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops to the pre-December 3, 1971 position. The Nepali representative, to the astonishment of many, spoke in plain words about the 'limitations of Nepal as a small country surrounded by bigger and more powerful neighbours'. Nepal was 'incapable of either defending itself alone from external attack or of imposing its will on others by means of the use or threat of force', he added.

**T**he volte-face of Nepal was a calculated move to defuse both the threat of domestic political opposition which had been encouraged by the Bangladesh movement, and to readjust Nepal's policy to the changed geopolitical reality. Nepal's manoeuvrability which was at its peak in the 1960s was circumscribed in the 70s. The Chinese damaged India's prestige in 1962, but the military supremacy displayed by India in 1971 and the emergence of Bangladesh with the help of India made Nepal reconsider its policy vis-a-vis China and India. The Nepali authorities, often anxious to whip up anti-Indian feeling to derive certain concessions, reconciled themselves to the new situation, despite China's denunciation of India's role in creating the new republic.

Indian assertive postures were seen in the 70s. And many observers, both Indian and foreign, described India as a 'dominant power' in South Asia, and if there is any

development in the region, India's role with regard to such a development has to be taken into account. In Nepal, India's enhanced superiority is interpreted in various ways. Many believe that the powerful southern neighbour would be in a position to neutralize or counteract Chinese influence in Nepal. If India is weakened or destabilized either by internal conditions or by external situations, a small country, Nepal, would be prone to danger. A parity relationship between China and India would ensure Nepal's security and stability. Despite such a Nepali perception, India enjoys far greater leverage in Nepal than China because of a number of variables, among which economic dependency and geographical proximity are dominant.

India's policy towards its neighbours is not uniform. It might not show any political preference in other South Asian countries including Bhutan with whom India has a treaty relation, but it has done so in the case of Nepal. Even so, its political preference has in most part proved inconsequential for India does not like to push Nepal too far. Its policy towards Nepal is always double-edged, trying to create rapport with the government while maintaining overt contacts with 'democratic' leaders in Nepal. This policy was actively pursued in 1950-51 and continues until today, though the situation has undergone a change. Nepali rulers have withstood India's pressures from time to time without conceding any fundamental political demand to the liberal democrats who are considered India's ideological allies.

In Nepal's relations with China, the policy is stable because of limited interaction between the two countries. China does not feel threatened on the Himalayan borders as India does. And India has legitimate reasons to harbour such fears keeping in view the strategic location of the region. It considers that its security in the northern border is inextricably linked with Nepal which it can hardly ignore.

Why then are Nepal-India relations often characterized by greater distrust and misunderstanding than

Nepal-China relations? There are a number of reasons for this. In actual terms, China is still far away from Nepal and whatever interactions take place are very limited as compared with the 'extensive' relations with India. It is not only geography but also history, economy and social interactions that determine their ties. Some western writers have described Nepal-India economic relations as a relationship between the 'centre and periphery', but this simple comparison cannot be made without realizing the complexity of their relations.

Today, Indian economy is said to have been affected by the illegal trade transactions conducted by unscrupulous traders on the Nepal-India borders. India has been complaining that Nepali authorities have not tried sufficiently to stop such illegal border trade. But the Nepali side alone does not appear to be responsible because the Indians themselves are crazy for consumer goods imported from Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand and Japan. It is thus impossible to check the illegal trade unless the two countries take effective joint steps for curbing it. The illegal border trade has not only become an irritant in Nepal-India relations, but has also produced aberrations in life-styles of the two peoples.

Another important aspect is related to the question of the physical mobility of the people. The Nepal-India border is open and the penetration of the Indian people into Nepal in general and the Tarai in particular is increasing unabated. Nepal, which is already confronting the problem of internal immigrants coming from the hills to the plains, is likely to be overwhelmed by the influx of the Indians who come over to Nepal for better economic opportunities. Many are seasonal labourers but a great many others stay back in Nepal permanently. This is also the case with many Nepalis going to India, but compared to the size and population of India, the Nepalis cannot create the far reaching imbalances there as the Indians can in Nepal. Unless both countries settle this problem, Nepal will have to pay a heavy price in the future.

There has also been a tendency to take Nepal-India relations for granted. But when their interests clash, they distrust each other. The Nepalis, sensitive as they are, react emotionally to Indian policy towards them. By comparison, China does not figure in the day-to-day affairs of Nepal and the Nepalis feel that their northern neighbour always respects and understands their psyche which India does not. How India and China have been perceived by the resentful Nepalis has been described by a Nepali psychologist in these words: 'Historically, the Nepalis had so few occasions to become acquainted with the Chinese mind that they are still in the process of observing Chinese overt behaviour vis-a-vis Nepal. In spite of all that has happened between China and India in recent years, Nepali elites are still disinclined to probe into Chinese intents and motives.'

The domestic politics of Nepal is also responsible for maintaining a rapport with China while at the same time giving grounds for mistrust and animosity in Nepal-India relations. All opposition elements, ranging from the pro-Peking extremist communists to the liberal democrats, have utilized Indian territory as their sanctuary for mounting anti-system activities. On the one hand, the pro-Peking communists found themselves comfortable in the Indian political milieu, on the other they adopted anti-Indian and anti-congress and anti-system postures. Much more important than the role of the communists was the NC movement which was invariably linked with India in influencing Nepal's domestic politics. Sometimes this kind of alleged link was deliberately shown by the Establishment in Nepal and sometimes the Indian leaders themselves generated controversies in Nepal-India relations by voicing their concern over domestic politics in Nepal.

This situation has however been changed since the declaration of the national referendum by King Birendra in May 1979, as many opposition leaders except a few extremists have already returned to Nepal with a view to conducting

politics from within the country. On the democratic front, the NC figured perennially as the largest and active opposition group since the royal take-over in 1960. The dominant position of this group continues even today. Its leaders launched resistance movements which often turned out to be unsuccessful. In 1977, the Janata Party leaders in India took keen interest in Nepali politics with some declaring their own terms for resolving the vexed problems of democratization. Such postures taken by them could neither help the cause of the politicians favoured by them nor brighten the prospect of democracy in Nepal.

How domestic politics found expression in Nepal's relations with its neighbours was evident after King Birendra's decision to hold a national referendum for choosing either the current Panchayat System with reforms or to opt for a multi-party system. King Birendra, obviously with the objective of allaying Chinese fears, visited Beijing and assured them that whichever system came out victorious in the referendum, Nepal's foreign policy would remain unchanged.

It is true that the Janata Party Government in India tried to create the impression that it would respect Nepal's sensitivity with regard to certain bilateral problems such as the separate treaties of trade and transit, and non-interference in Nepal's internal affairs. As a gesture, Janata leaders often declared that India was not going to hurt Nepali sentiment despite the pressures exerted by party leaders. But when the vital Indian interest came up for discussion, New Delhi pursued the same policy towards Nepal as defined and practised by Nehru and his daughter, Mrs Indira Gandhi. Similar was its attitude towards Nepal's proposition that it be declared a zone of peace. The proposal, first announced by King Birendra in 1975, has been accepted by many countries, including China. The Indian government headed either by the Janata's Morarji Desai or by Indira Gandhi has been maintaining that there should be efforts for making the

entire South Asian region a zone of peace.

It is generally interpreted that Indian hesitation in endorsing Nepal's peace zone proposal is related to its security interest in the northern region. As the basic objective of the peace proposal is, in the opinion of King Birendra, to guarantee non interference in Nepal's affairs, India is presumably interested in continuing the 1950 treaty which obligates both countries to forge a common defence system. It has therefore been maintained by Indian circles that since Nepal has peace treaties with India as well as good relations with China, there is no compelling reason to think in terms of a single country being converted into a zone of peace.

Nepal does not see any threat from any quarter and hence the irrelevance of the 1950 treaty. Although the king and other high officials have been assuring India that its recognition of the peace proposal does not mean the abrogation of the treaty, it becomes difficult to comprehend the true spirit behind the peace zone proposal. The Indian government has urged Nepal to spell out the details as well as implications of the peace zone move. So, when one probes into the motivations of the two, opposite considerations are working behind the scenes, with Nepal trying to maintain a more meaningful policy of equidistance from China and India along with the psychology of promoting a national identity, and with India stating its inability to endorse the peace zone proposal because of its security considerations.

Another pin-prick which perennially dominates Nepal India relations is the problem of trade diversification and such other issues vital to Nepal's economic development. In recent years, controversies have been generated over sharing water resources. Nepal maintains that the rivers with huge power potentials should be harnessed by three countries — Nepal, India and Bangladesh. But India is suspect of such a trilateral arrangement, and is persuading Nepal to utilize water resources to the benefit of the two

countries. Although India has been providing assistance to hydroelectric projects in Nepal, the problem of harnessing the big rivers on the trilateral basis remains unresolved. Many Nepalis are emphasizing the alternatives to the existing land-routes for the smooth flow of goods destined for Nepal. And the main rivers flowing on to the Gangetic plains of India can provide such alternatives if India and Nepal agree to the proposed alternative mode of transportation. Whether it remains a dream or turns out to be a reality depends on India's goodwill and understanding.

In the past decades, Indian and Chinese policies did not provide any concrete evidence that they were determined to install a certain type of political system in Nepal. Indian policy has been one of adjustment so as not to jeopardize its primary interests — economic and strategic — by pushing Nepal to the brink. The same middle-way policy enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru has been continuing since the 1950s. In 1960-62, the political preference of India did not mean the overthrow of monarchy in Nepal. This has been substantiated by Subarna Shamsher, the then acting president of the NC, who maintained that the movement launched by the party against the royal regime had a limited objective — to pressurize the king to come to the table for discussion on the future political set-up of the country. Moreover, India wants to keep the anti system democratic forces in good humour so that its people-to-people relations can be maintained and political forces opposed to India countered.

It was also a mistake on the part of the NC leaders staying in self-exile in India to expect any kind of direct help from India for realizing their objectives. What they were lacking was a well calculated long-term strategy with which they could have helped evolve a viable democratic system in the country. When their expectations could not be fulfilled by India's moral support and sympathy, their armed resistance movements collapsed providing them with no other options but to offer 'loyal co-operation' to the King or



to advocate 'national reconciliation' with both the King and other democratic forces. Such a national reconciliation offered by the NC leader and former Prime Minister, B P Koirala, is stated to have possessed two objectives — nationalism and democracy.

As a regional power India would like to create a powerful lobby in Nepal. So would China, a country with a near-superpower status. It is legitimate on the part of India to create a powerful pro-Indian lobby in a country with whom India has so much in common. But to state that India will make all-out efforts to establish the same type of system as prevalent in India is not only far-fetched but also incredible. Similarly, the Chinese do not seem to have established any overt political relations with different communist groups, even though there apparently exists a strong pro-Chinese lobby in Nepal. But it does not mean that China has the same informal advantages as enjoyed by India in the Himalayan Kingdom.

Nepal-India relations are multifaceted, always complex, but not insoluble. India should appreciate Nepal's rising aspirations towards self-reliance and independence. For its part, Nepal must realise that true nationalism cannot be inculcated by creating an artificial lobby against India. Nor can it achieve its national interest by pursuing a policy which aims at creating misunderstanding. Any genuine nationalist Nepali does not require to be anti-Indian in his orientation. Nor should India be over-sensitive and intransigent in fulfilling Nepal's legitimate interests.

Major developments are in the offing in regard to Sino-Indian relations in the 1980s. Nepal, which has been dealing with the two antagonistic neighbours for over two decades, has to embark on a new course of relationship with China and India when they move towards *detente*. How Nepal is going to derive the maximum benefit from them and how its policy of diversification will be providing manoeuvrability in realizing its objectives are some of the queries. Perhaps it is definitely not going to be a policy as usual.

# Economic reality

DEVENDRA RAJ PANDAY

TOWARDS the end of 1979, an international aid agency report pointed out with uncanny bluntness that Nepal might have only five to ten years left to pull itself together before it became completely dependent upon the mercy of aid donors. That this bleak outlook was not contested by the Nepali experts, within and outside the government, underscores the socio-economic reality which the Nepali people have inherited after three decades of 'development'. In the ensuing two years and some months, Nepal witnessed some unusual political events including the national referendum of 1980.

Whatever may be one's impression or judgment on the political achievement or otherwise of these exercises, there are few who deny that it is the economy which got the most severe battering in the meantime. One, therefore, shudders to think how many years the same group of international experts would give Nepal now to prove its economic viability. But it cannot be too far from what the Nepali authorities themselves are admitting these days. The sixth plan (1980-85) blueprint agrees with the above-mentioned report almost word for word when it says, 'it is now apparent that if the nation fails to make concrete improvements in the existing economic condition during the course of next five to ten years, its economic and social consequences will be quite serious'.<sup>1</sup>

While the last three years have no doubt heavily fuelled the crisis situation its source lies, however, in the management of the economy from earlier on.<sup>2</sup> The critical difference now is that the degree of indifference to the elementary norms

<sup>1</sup> *The Sixth Plan: A Summary*, National Planning Commission, Kathmandu, 1981, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> As an ex-bureaucrat in His Majesty's Government of Nepal, the author has to swallow his share.



of decency in political behaviour and the induced erosion of a long-term perspective in economic policies and management had to climax at a time when the problems themselves—economic, environmental and demographic—have assumed a crisis proportion. In this essay we try to explain some of the elements contributing to 'Nepal in crisis' which should concurrently highlight current economic trends and, where possible, future outlook

**S**o far, government spokesmen as well as prominent members of the international donor community have found it legitimate or, at least, convenient to qualify Nepal's performance record with an observation on the 'very short' history of Nepal's efforts and experience. Now, however, opportunities missed or abused through one whole generation are converging on the next as Nepal struggles to check further deterioration in its people's living conditions, preserve the resource base and attain a minimum degree of momentum in socio-economic development. How minimum can this minimum be is a vexing question in itself in the face of a projection that one-half of the country's population would still be living at or below subsistence levels at the turn of the century even if Nepal could attain and sustain a rate of growth of 4 per cent in Gross Domestic Product (compared to a historical trend of around 2 per cent per year)

The country's principal economic problem emanates from an utter lack of progress in what economic development is all about — increase in production. Nepal has been engaged in a planned and wide-ranging development effort with its own resources and abundant help from outside, since 1951. During this period, production per head has barely increased (at least from the early 1960s when relevant data were first made available) whether measured in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or a more down-to-earth indicator like the production of foodgrains. The area where some improvements have taken place is in the socio-economic infrastructure. On an average, 186 km of road has been built per year since

1956 — not an astounding pace but impressive in view of the difficult terrain which had to be negotiated and reached. This, together with improvements in other forms of communication, has facilitated administrative integration to some extent. Literacy rate has increased even though three out of four adults cannot yet read or write. Health facilities have improved to allow an average Nepali to live to be 45 and not 32 as in 1961.

It is not possible here to quantify how much these limited but positive changes have contributed to an improvement in the quality of life of an average Nepali, but they have. It is certain, however, that the lack of an impact on the level and structure of production and employment during three decades of development endeavour in which population grew rapidly, pressure on land increased and accessible forest resources were nearly used up or destroyed, has rendered the task of economic development more urgent and, yet, more arduous.

Without taxing the reader's mind with a lot of statistical jugglery, attention is simply drawn to the brief table below which is self-explanatory.

**T**he record is indeed dismal. Yet, what is distressing about Nepal's economic performance is not that the growth in GDP has barely kept pace with the growth in population for the last two decades, with the per capita product having actually declined during the late 1970s, i.e., the fifth plan. Nor is there need for us to emphasize the unfortunate but

widely known fact that production of foodgrains (by implication, agricultural production as a whole) having marginally increased up to the end of the Fourth Plan (1975) is now back to its level of fifteen years ago (partly due to the drought conditions in the terminal year of the Fifth Plan). What is really aggravating is the consistency with which the production targets have eluded Nepali planners.

**T**he targets, of course, are all there — fixed as consistently as possible with available capital, labour and technology. The planners set a seemingly modest target of an annual rate of growth in GDP of 4.5 per cent and of about four per cent per year in foodgrains for the 1970s. The result, however, has been such as if the planners and the plans are superfluous in the development process in Nepal. The size of savings and investment, the order of priority and all other factors which the economists are so fond of making so much of are apparently of little practical significance in this country.

The growth rate remains around two per cent whether (a) the emphasis is on the development of infrastructure as in the earlier plans or in the directly productive activities including agriculture as in the fifth, (b) whether the investment rate is around five per cent as in the 1960s or about 13 per cent as in the late 1970s (with public outlay alone increasing from 4.7 per cent of GDP to 9.7 per cent), (c) whether the planners emphasize growth, or equity in the form of balanced regional development as suggested in the fourth

**Comparative View of Major Economic Indicators (1962-1980)**

	<i>Second Plan (1962- 65)</i>	<i>Third Plan (1965- 70)</i>	<i>Fourth Plan (1970- 75)</i>	<i>Fifth Plan (1975- 80)</i>
Growth in GDP (% per year)	2	2.6	2	2.2
Foodgrains Production (% increase per year)	1	1	1.8	-2.8
Agricultural yield (ton/ha)	1.92	1.85	1.84	1.78
Share of Agriculture in GDP	65	68	68	60
Public outlay (as % of GDP)	—	4.7	5.8	9.7
Rate of Growth in Population	→1.8←		→2.6←	

*Source: HMG Official documents*

and the fifth plans and one can go on and on<sup>3</sup>

What can be the reason for this apparent incongruity? It may be that fault lies with the statistics especially when anyone familiar with Nepal would not take the data on macro-economic behaviour too seriously. However, for this factor to be the real cause, someone would have to be fouling up the figures with remarkable consistency. Again, while there is no way of independently verifying a variable like the rate of investment or, for that matter, even the level of GDP, the near-consensus on the nature of growing poverty is that an average Nepali is a little worse off now economically than thirty years ago when Nepal embarked upon the road to development.

Even until the mid-1960s there were international economists who felt that 'observation and comparison with neighbouring countries based on personal judgment indicate that the absolute level of income may have been higher than implied. Housing standards in Nepal are generally better than neighbouring countries and abject misery evident in countries with similar income levels is largely absent'.<sup>4</sup> Now the general feeling is that 'Nepal is a poor country and it is getting poorer'. In fact, for all their shortcomings, the planners themselves cannot be accused of not being candid in this regard, as one can see from the National Planning Commission's own critique of the fifth plan. However, this by itself is hardly consoling in a situation when the evaluation result of one plan

<sup>3</sup> Taking (b) and (c) together one can argue that the gains in overall investment might have been offset by its "decentralization" to slow-yielding depressed areas. But in Nepal less than 50 per cent of gross fixed capital formation is contributed by the public sector and there has been no significant movement of private investment to the backward regions. Similarly the distribution of the disbursement of public funds among development regions has not changed significantly. The rate of growth should have been higher at least in the fifth plan which reportedly concentrated on quick-yielding directly productive activities.

<sup>4</sup> *A National Transport System for Nepal*, Report of a Mission Organized by the World Bank, 1965.

does not seem to affect the implementation process and the result of the next.

All plans including the fifth have persistently failed to fulfill their targets — a curious result especially since the estimated plan outlay gets more or less expended. Even then, the fault lies not necessarily with the possible lack of internal consistency in the plans which could have assumed an over-optimistic capital co-efficient or misjudged some other parameter. The problem apparently lies with the process of implementation where policies and programmes are approved which have nothing to do with, or are contrary to, the planned objectives. The economic scene is replete with cases of new policies and major programmes being launched with the introduction of each fiscal year and, indeed, in the mid year depending upon the fancy of individual ministers engaged in a game of musical chairs. In addition, inefficiency, waste, corruption and other malpractices in resource utilization have been rampant.

It is not therefore surprising that one does not see any increase in the quantities produced in the aggregate even with the addition of physical inputs. In agriculture, as one study points out, in the last decade

- the use of chemical fertilisers quadrupled,
- the use of improved seeds increased five times,
- total agricultural loans disbursed through institutional sources increased more than 12 times,
- the number of technicians working in the Department of Agriculture increased from 1,400 to 3,200, and
- more than 1,50,000 thousand hectares of land were brought under irrigation.<sup>5</sup>

The result is that production has gone down in absolute terms, and the yield per hectare has decreased. There is no magic in it, only loopholes in policy and holes in implementation. The price policy

may have driven fertiliser as well as the imported farm equipment (purchased from institutional loans) across the border to the fields in India. The command area of irrigation may have no field channels which an individual farmer can use to water his fields and so on. Besides, the technical synchronization of inputs use which is so critical may be missing. In totality the technicians as well as the farmers might just not be motivated to work for results because of institutional constraints. This condition would in fact hold good for other sectors as well. In particular, the country's civil service has not been allowed to be infused with values and norms that contribute to the making of a development oriented administration.

Under the circumstances, one would therefore have to assume that planning and development is not something that is taken seriously by the government and this may be the principal source of the present economic malaise. Except perhaps for a brief period in the early 1960s, planning has not met with genuine interest and support at the political level. In Nepal, planning has nothing to do with decisions on the allocation of values or resources in the society.

For all the emphasis which has been laid on the need for 'enlisting popular support' from the very first plan to the present era of 'decentralization' and 'popular participation', planning as practised in Nepal is not a political exercise even at the central level. Somehow, it does not matter so long as the bureaucratic rituals of going through the motion of planning including the routine and unimaginative process of periodic evaluations which are conducted with a lot of 'fanfare and little fire' can substitute for political commitment.

There is no other way of explaining, for example, the strange behaviour of the National Planning Commission which could go through the various steps of formulating the sixth plan and get it approved by the National Development Council while the nation itself was going through such monumental political

<sup>5</sup> *Agriculture Sector in Nepal* (Report of Phase I Study), Integrated Development Systems, Kathmandu, 1980.

exercises like the 1980 referendum and the constitutional reforms. That a five year plan could be formulated and approved without let or hindrance at a time when the future shape of the body politic was in question says enough about the degree of seriousness with which such an exercise is approached at the political level. Consequently, the spirit of a plan is as easily ignored in implementation as the document is approved during formulation.

One can postulate that this is all part of the design. One can always argue that development has not been a goal for Nepal's political elite whose vested interest can be threatened by a change from the status quo in the socio-economic structure. If one were to assume, however, that Nepal's political system, standing on a fragile political base as it does, can hope to claim legitimacy ultimately only through an improvement in the socio-economic well being of the people, one would have to conclude that the poor record of planning and development in Nepal may be no more than a result of tradition and inertia sustained by a lack of serious challenge from within the nation, and exploitation of advantageous but transitory external flows such as foreign aid.

**T**he presence or absence of political forces that bring internal pressure for breaking links with tradition and inertia (and, of course, the vested interests) is outside the scope of this essay. What is in reference here is the lack of challenge from the intellectuals, professionals and entrepreneurs to the routine of rituals and rhetorics on planning and development. There may be an interesting relation between this behaviour and what has been called the 'advantages of external flows'. The government is of course the principal beneficiary of such flows. Certain external linkages provide support to the government by assisting it to continue its apparent development effort without having to worry immediately about the gradual weakening of internal economic factors.

As the principal element of such linkages, foreign aid has played an

important role in this context. In 1980-81 alone, more than Rs 4,000 million was committed by Nepal's multitude of donors, this amount was 17 per cent higher than budgeted for development expenditure in the same year. Historically, foreign aid has financed every year at least 60 per cent of the development expenditure, only 60 per cent of which goes to capital formation. Consequently, it is foreign assistance which among other things, has directly or indirectly facilitated the expansion of bureaucracy to which a majority of the educated is recruited and converted into a compliant community. The rest form various other beneficiary groups of real-estate owners, agents, brokers, contractors, researchers and consultants. All in all, foreign aid around which a complete sub-economy has grown up has been a good business for Kathmandu.<sup>6</sup>

**I**ndeed, one can say that a supra-economy has been created on account of foreign aid (and other externally propelled activities including tourism and smuggling). The government's plans, economic policies and even budgets bear little relevance to the nation's economic reality or the needs of the people. They are pursued with an eye on the aid donors on the one hand and the self-seeking attitudes of the ruling class on the other. The potential opposition from the professional and intellectual groups could inject a more constructive or at least a restraining influence. But, there is either complacency or disinclination to rock the boat because the perceived as well as real risk for such groups is also high, being an important beneficiary of the existing system.

However, not everything with foreign aid is counter-productive. Foreign aid has also a potential of being a harbinger of reforms in socio-economic policies which are considered 'progressive'. The multilateral lending institutions which are not usually constrained by the need for following a rigid behaviour pattern or norm of 'non-interference'

<sup>6</sup> L F Stiller, R P Yadav, *Planning for People*, Kathmandu, Sahayogi Prakashan, p 58

as in the case of bilateral countries, do not fail to put gentle or not so gentle pressure on the government to rationalise economic policies and management and, in particular, make efforts for economic resource mobilisation.

The latter recommendation, if implemented would require, among other things, in a country with Nepal's tax structure, a gradual shift to direct taxes which have the additional advantage of promoting equity in the society. In Nepal, again, this has worked backwards to the benefit of the same privileged groups. The government has put up an impressive record in the rate of growth in domestic revenue. But most increases have accrued from indirect taxes which have a special place in Nepal's revenue system and which have thus determined the values and norms governing the conduct of the country's international trade.

This is the second element of external flows or linkages which will be discussed next. For now, it should be noted that it is this linkage which has made it possible for the government to continue with a taxation policy which has restricted, for example, the collection of land revenue (the only tax on agricultural income and property, a sector which contributes more than 60 per cent of the national product and 90 per cent of employment) to the 1970 level even ten years later and that too in nominal terms only! The share of land tax in total tax revenue has decreased from more than 20 per cent of tax revenue in 1969-70 to 4 per cent in 1980-81. Similarly, receipts from income tax have gone down after peaking to a level of about 11 per cent of tax revenue in 1977-78 to about six per cent three years later.<sup>7</sup>

**W**ith such adverse trends in the sphere of direct taxes, a respectable record of performance in the

<sup>7</sup> Similarly, another interesting result of the government's interaction with international lending institutions is that while the government yields to the pressure to curtail or abolish subsidies on rice consumed by the poor, subsidy on chemical fertiliser which mainly benefits relatively large farmers at a tremendous public cost remains sacred and untouched.

revenue front would not have been possible if the receipts from indirect taxes, mainly import duty and sales tax, had not been increasing at an astounding rate. This has been possible mainly due to duties collected on the increasing volume of a variety of consumer imports from countries other than India. Nepal's much-abused liberal imports policy, on the one hand, and India's control-ridden system, on the other, have been a boon for traders, mostly from India, who have found the long and open border between the two countries to their great convenience.

**T**o Nepal, the gains in revenue provide some kind of compensation for the limitations it suffers in either pursuing an independent trade and tariff policy or engaging in industrial production, with the handicap of a high-cost economy of a land-locked nation, on the one hand, and the adverse impact of the 'penetration by Indian industrial capitalism of the Nepalese market' on the other.<sup>8</sup> Nepal's industry and genuine trade continue to suffer from these bottlenecks, with the operations of what is now widely called the 'smuggling sector' actually reinforcing the inhibiting influence.

For government, however, the magic of producing enough resources to maintain a semblance of internal and external financial stability, even while government's wasteful expenditures increased, production stagnated or retrogressed, real tax efforts declined and trade deficits soared, seemed to work so well that it has lulled some into complacency and encouraged others to dishonest pursuits. Apart from a whole gamut of moral and economic considerations, there is danger that this source of revenue can dry up abruptly and without warning,

8 Some 'dependency theorists' have argued that 'The failure of Nepal to develop large-scale commodity production is in large part a result of the domination of the Nepalese economy by India in whose interests it is to maintain relatively stable, but undeveloped "non-capitalist economy" in Nepal.' See D. Sheddin, P. Blaikie and J. Cameron, *Peasants and Workers in Nepal*, Vikas Publishing House 1979, p. 33.

making the domestic resource position really precarious for the first time.

Nepal's real tax base has not increased much simply because the economy has experienced hardly any growth. Furthermore, Nepal's problem of continuing poverty is unlike that of many other developing countries where the poor section of society is getting poorer not because there has not been any growth in GDP but because the benefits of growth are reaped by the few rich.

In Nepal, we have had neither growth nor a more equitable distribution. The latter might have become a bit worse because of the way Kathmandu and a few other privileged pockets have been drawing benefits from 'external flows' while much of the country remains unaffected or in retrogression. As far as the revenue base is concerned, there is some room for taxing this class especially since there is a need to correct the regressive deemphasis of direct taxes as mentioned above. Even then, it is not certain that the erosion in the present tax base that will occur once the luxury consumer imports are phased out for one reason or another, can be compensated fully by the increases in direct tax revenue from essentially a small group of rich tax payers.

**N**epal's problem is multiplied by the fact that while the breakthrough in agriculture never seems to arrive, the country's dependence on this sector for income and employment does not waver. In 20 years, there has been little change in the structure of production or employment except for a marginal increase in the role of the tertiary sector. By the turn of this century, an additional potential work force of 5.5 million people will be added to the presently unemployed and underemployed population, even assuming that total fertility rate will decline from 6.3 at present to 4.3 by 2000. It is evident that such increases cannot be absorbed in agriculture productively.

Without prejudice to the obvious need for taking appropriate meas-

ures to uplift the miserable state of the agricultural sector, one would therefore think that greater attention to the development of the manufacturing sector would be in order. Yet, the prospect for industrialization is inhibited by limitations of resources and market. There are countries which have overcome such limitations, but it requires a cultural and entrepreneurial tradition which puts a premium on man's ingenuity and dignity and does not stifle but rewards individual initiatives. In Nepal, apart from the social, cultural and historical factors, the encouragement given to socially damaging but privately highly profitable 'export import' activities is the principal reason why private enterprise and capital have not been attracted to a more demanding manufacturing sector.

**B**ut, not all of Nepal's problems are of its own making. One of the country's biggest burdens is its geography. The issue of transit right for land-locked Nepal, though occasionally marred by emotional overtones, is an economic one, not a political one. Nepal's imports cost much more and exports become less competitive just on account of transit related costs. The delays have their own economic cost in terms of lost output or goodwill. In industry, as in other sectors, this factor has a tendency to make Nepal's unit cost higher than in India. Yet, the latter has a restrictive import policy in practice so far as entry of Nepal's manufactures into the Indian market is concerned.

The irony is that India's attitude on transit and trade vis-a-vis Nepal does not appear to affect the transit or 'deflection' of goods that may be against India's national interest which it understandably wishes to protect. More often than not, it is Nepal's much-needed imports, for development projects, for example, and exports to India or overseas that have to suffer for one reason or another. One of the greatest hurdles for Nepal's future development will disappear if India and Nepal could arrive at a better understanding of the latter's need for expeditious and assured transit including, where possible, develop-

ment of river transport for mutual benefit

Similarly, development of trade relations between the two countries which takes into account their different stages of development as well as Nepal's imperative need to diversify her economy could pave the way for a more wide-ranging collaboration between the two countries in industrial and other ventures. The long history of suspicion and unproductive debates has unfortunately stood in the way of such positive cooperation.

**S**imilarly, for a generally resource-poor country like Nepal, its water resources are of paramount importance. Water holds the key for effective diversification of Nepal's economy and constitutes an important source of potential export earnings in a country where traditional exports have declined or ceased to grow. Here, again, cooperation with India has an important bearing not only on Nepal's future course of development but also for India's own power-starved economy. It is evident that Nepal which rightly or wrongly feels that it received a raw deal in the past 'water-sharing' agreements, is not likely to have a government with enough political clout or confidence to wrap up more comprehensive agreements with India on projects which are complex and may involve joint ownership and/or operation of the river schemes with far-reaching implications.

The concept of regional cooperation may make sense from this practical point of view. It is unfortunate that an atmosphere of fear and suspicion exists between two close neighbours. But it is the reality of this situation which has deprived both countries of the immense benefits of irrigation, electricity, flood control and many other activities which could have been made available by now. The consequence for Nepal is so aggravating that many bankable projects, especially irrigation schemes, cannot be started for lack of funds while potential donors shy away from a venture that may incur the wrath of a bigger country.

It cannot be ruled out that such a tendency will only harden Nepal's resolve to wait and see if its desire

to see the evolution of a broader framework for the utilization of the region's vast water resources cannot be made to materialize. On the other hand, if India could assume a more magnanimous stance to win Nepal's confidence and trust, there is no insurmountable conflict of interest in this equation. After all, Nepal's cultivable land cannot reportedly use more than 20 per cent of the water that flows down to India from its rivers.

The failure in the production front has meant that Nepal, a regular food exporter, is threatened with the prospect of having to import foodgrains at a time when the import bill for petroleum products is expected to consume 100 per cent of her export earnings by 1985. Even now, if available food were to be distributed equally, an average Nepali would get only 85 per cent of the minimum calorie intake required. Under the existing structure of production and distribution in which the overcrowded and under-penetrated hilly region is particularly disadvantaged, it is estimated that two-thirds of the rural households suffer from a shortage of food. Incidentally, two-thirds of rural working days are also spent in a state of underemployment. In the face of this grim reality, the population appears to be growing at an annual rate of 2.6 per cent, surpassing the most pessimistic projections.

**T**he repercussion of these twin developments is felt in the management of the country's eco-systems which are under serious strain due to large-scale deforestation for fuel and additional land, as well as the heavy soil erosion it has precipitated. It is estimated that between 1975 and 1980 only, land under forests decreased from 34 per cent to 29 per cent of the country's total area while that under agriculture increased from 16.5 per cent to over 22 per cent.<sup>9</sup> This means that an additional 8 lakh hectares of land was brought under the plough in five years. Yet, we saw what has happened to agricultural production and productivity.

<sup>9</sup> Rana, E.J.B. *Rastriya Bana Neeti* (Paper submitted in the Nepal Foresters' Conference), November 1980.

It is the various implications and ramifications of this phenomenon which render the future economic outlook so bleak in Nepal. To top it all, the government's history of adhocism in economic policies and short-sighted improvisations in economic management may now tell upon its ability to maintain the facade of internal and external stability and limit the availability of domestic finance to an extremely inadequate level — even if foreign resources maintain their current rate of growth.

**I**t is unlikely that the situation can be corrected by tinkering with certain elements of the system or by seeking purely technical solutions to complex problems. First and foremost, there is need for regenerating an atmosphere of hope and confidence in the masses as well as the intelligentsia, both of whom are currently seized by growing dissatisfaction bordering on despair. Then there is the issue of political will and commitment which should manifest itself in more concrete terms demonstrating a sense of the nation's destiny and vision of the future. This will allow, among other things, a soul-searching analysis of Nepal's development objectives and the relevance of the basic planning model which has been in use without effect and, yet, without any change except for cosmetic applications of whatever conceptual vocabulary and categories are in vogue at the time of a given exercise.

If these pre-conditions were available, a technical solution to Nepal's economic problems may lie in a strategy which, apart from revamping the policies and programmes in the agricultural sector and correcting various other 'anomalies and irregularities' which as Prime Minister Thapa has recently acknowledged exist in the economy, makes an earnest effort towards gradual diversification of the economy. For the latter, India's cooperation is essential and one can hazard a guess that if Nepal's economic, environmental and, indeed, socio-political stability is of interest to India's enlightened leadership, a more realistic and reasonable posture vis-à-vis its small neighbour may materialize, after all.

# Experiment with education

POORNA K ADHIKARY

NEPAL had a long tradition of indigenous education and culture which was highly developed by the 6th century A D , but which, however, came to an end in 1768 with the fall of the Malla dynasty. Between 1768 and 1951 there was total neglect and often strong official opposition to educating the general mass. However, the Ranas in the beginning of the twentieth century established two forms of education in Kathmandu which were provided free on the one hand but to a limited number of persons on the other. Sanskrit education, up to the Acharya level (master's degree), affiliated with Banaras Sanskrit University was given to Brahmin children from various parts of the country by providing free lodging and boarding facilities at Tin Dhara Paksala. The products of this system who originally came from a lower middle class background, later in 1948 ignited the first sparks of revolution with their campaign 'Jayatu Sanskritam' (let the indigenous culture thrive and develop).

Western type education, up to the Bachelor's level, affiliated formerly with Calcutta University and later with Patna University, was very much restricted to Kathmandu residents, implying that 'modern' education was meant only for the children of the privileged who generally had connections with the ruling circle. As the education was free, a few commoners from outside Kathmandu managed to go through this system. Some people in the countryside sent their children to Banaras where they underwent either Sanskrit or western education which was in practice in India.

The products of Banaras education together with those of Sanskrit education at home played a significant role in ousting the Ranas from power in 1951. The products of Kathmandu's western education became the policy-makers, administrators and technicians pre-and post 1951 Nepal. The Ranas made Char Pass an essential requirement (profi-

ciency in the 3R's and recognition of the legal codes and procedures) for citizens to enter civil and judicial services. Ex-servicemen from the British Gurkha Rifles, who attained a certain degree of literacy, were also to become agents of change and educational development in the far corners of Nepal.

From 1951 to 1970, people were to open schools all over the country. Rural communities showed pride in building schools with or without government help. The Nepalis at this time, intent on modernization and development, took to expanding the western type of education by adopting Indian models which, in fact, were an outdated legacy of British colonial days. Ironically, British colonial education spread massively into Nepal after the British themselves had left South Asia. Students who performed well were awarded scholarships for education abroad. However, those trained abroad could not easily be absorbed by the job market. Many remained under-employed and some emigrated abroad. The educated youth were disappointed when they could not obtain the white collar jobs they wanted nor go back to where they belonged — the rural areas where their parents still worked in small subsistence farms. (As in many countries struggling to develop, Nepali schools which drew revenues and labour from all sectors of the population could guarantee white collar employment only to a few.)

In view of the growing economic, social and political problems, 1970 was just about the time to raise questions about the usefulness of the education given during the fifties and the sixties. A National Education System Plan (1971-76) came into being which can only be understood in the context of the prevailing socio-economic, cultural and political norms of Nepali society.

Before 1951, people had no contact with the State except while dis-



posing of the issues of property rights: paying taxes and settling disputes. They expected no service from the State, only exploitation by its agents. Almost 99 per cent of the population lived in isolated communities on subsistence agricultural activities, with no outside communication. Probably, the significant contribution of the revolution of 1951 was in 'widening the world of the Nepali and as the door opened to all, the values and problems of the outside world, international norms and indicators alike, began to apply to Nepali society.

Nearly 94 per cent of the 14.18 million growing at a rate of 2.1 per cent per year still live in scattered villages with limited communication between the country's multiple ethnic groups and with even less external contact.<sup>1</sup> Although Nepali is the national and official language and also the medium of instruction in schools, as well as the medium of communication between ethnic groups, it is also a second language for nearly half of the nation's population. Government and its related agencies are the main employers of the country's educated. As most of these opportunities exist in Kathmandu valley to which sixty per cent of the country's graduates, comprising 0.96 per cent of the total population, belong, it is not surprising that they, a mere 5 per cent of the total population, are excessively favoured by government.<sup>2</sup>

The majority of civil servants, school and university teachers, doctors, engineers and lawyers fall in the lower-middle or lower income class. Unless they work extra hours or engage in some kind of bribery or corruption or have some other form of extra income, they are hardly able to maintain their white collar life-style. No significant indigenous industry has yet emerged and the industrial labour force is miniscule. The government knowingly or unknowingly supports illicit trade amounting to millions of dollars as well as indiscriminate

import of foreign commodities discouraging industrial development at home.

Of the 94 per cent rural population, 68.5 per cent of the households altogether hold 10.5 per cent of the total cultivable land, while 59.5 per cent of it is held by 9.8 per cent of the households made up of wealthy farmers and the landed gentry.<sup>3</sup> The worsening plight of the rural poor has forced them to carry out deforestation in the hills as well as in the tarai jungles, serious erosion problems have resulted causing the drying up of springs, loss of productivity of the land and, eventually, desertification.

The Nepali experienced only a decade of open political parties and the coup d'état of 1960 brought an end to both the legalized party system as well as the 18 month old parliamentary democracy which emerged out of the 1959 general election held through adult franchise. The sixties and the seventies were marked by both peaceful and armed struggles by the pro-party people to reinstate parliamentary democracy on the one hand, while anti-party people were busy trying to keep the partyless Panchayat rule, on the other.

Then came the 1980 referendum in which the Panchayat system barely managed to survive. This was followed by constitutional reforms and the general election. However, there remain a growing opposition force and intellectuals who have chosen to stand outside the governing apparatus. The frustration and anger of Nepali youth as demonstrated in 1979 has also not been quelled.

The National Education System Plan (NESP), commonly called the new education, was not the first attempt in Nepal at a systematic approach to education development. As early as 1953, the Nepal Education Planning Commission was formed employing a group of

Nepali educators and intellectuals. The Commission submitted a report in March 1955 with a series of recommendations that would serve as a basis for a systematic approach. Some of these recommendations were seriously taken while others were neglected.

In view of the enormous changes taking place in Nepal with respect to new problems and aspirations and in relation to the new available technologies of education, 1970 was just about the ripe time when another attempt for educational planning was needed. A committee of intellectuals and educators, including a few members of the 1953 Education Planning Commission, was formed to study the situation. Possibly due to internal disagreements, the committee was controlled by a core group which excluded the older members. This core body was responsible for planning the NESP document and ordering its implementation. As 'the plan was prepared by command of His Majesty King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev in consonance with the requirements of the partyless democratic Panchayat polity and planned national re-construction',<sup>4</sup> it received top priority in immediate implementation and was first experimented in Kaski and Chitawan districts and covered the entire country by 1976.

The plan defined the objective of national education 'to produce citizens who, with full faith in the country and the Crown, will conduct themselves in accordance with the Panchayat system and to meet the manpower requirements of the development through the spread of scientific and technical education'.<sup>5</sup>

Primary education was reduced from five grades to three grades (6-8-year-olds) and aimed at bringing about literacy and disseminating information about the king and the country, the achievements were to be measured by the district level examination. Lower secondary edu-

1 The *Gorakhpatri*, August 4, 1981, Kathmandu.

2 Blake, P. et al. *Nepal in Crisis*. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1980.

3 Pradhan, B.B. *Strategy of the Development of Small Farmers Through Group Approach*. The case of Nepal Workshop on small farmers development and credit policy, Kathmandu, April 1980.

4 National Education System Plan for 1971-76. Ministry of Education. Kathmandu, 1971.

5 *Ibid*.

cation, extending from grade 4 to 7, assumed that children in this age group were at the stage of character-building, for inculcating a spirit of loyalty to the king and the country and inducing a sense of discipline and responsibility. Pre-vocational training was to be introduced to teach children a respect for habits of labour. Performance would be measured in a zonal examination.

A careful study of the above objectives suggests that the architects of the NESP confused education objectives with those of proselytisation. Chanting in chorus or memorization of verses about the king and the country can make little sense to the minds of children, leave alone inculcate a spirit of loyalty towards them. More importantly, the scheme has neglected the children's stage of cognitive development which should be serving as the basis for education planning. The NESP objectives appear to be suitable in the political education of adult Panchayat workers. In view of the qualification and training of the teachers for primary and lower-secondary education, it is doubtful that the trainers themselves fully understood the role of the Crown in the process of national integration and democratization. It is also doubtful that the district and the zonal levels of standardized examinations would measure children's achievement accurately.

High schools were made to give 20 per cent weightage to vocational education whereas the curriculum of vocational secondary schools gave 30 to 40 per cent. To make education work-oriented the above idea was sound. However, the NESP failed to consider

- a. the purpose of general education at the secondary level,
- b. the strong bias against the productive force that has existed among intellectuals who come mainly from urban and rural privileged groups. Schools in Nepal, whether free or not, have mostly accommodated the children of privileged groups who have little respect for labour,

- c. lack of means and methods necessary to carry out the vocational education on the massive scale. The NESP had envisioned Vocational subjects were allotted to schools on an ad hoc basis. Little thought was given to whether the vocational subject was suitable to the environment and productive means of a given community. Children were often forced to take up a certain vocational subject regardless of his/her interest in it. Materials and methods were typically inadequate, resulting in teaching that was overtly theoretical,

- d. The opportunities for graduates of vocational schools was not clearly defined. As a result, high school graduates were neither fit for employment in the market nor for higher studies at the university level. With continuing bias in the society in favour of higher education, graduates of vocational schools were drawn to it and to the job market, that too if they were qualified for the job or there was employment easily available in their respective areas. In spite of the rhetoric against elitism and the advocacy of implementing the NESP with an iron fist, little was done to remedy this situation,

- e. Innovation can neither occur on the whims of a few people behind desks in the offices in Kathmandu nor can it be achieved so easily on a massive scale. The importance of people's participation at the grass-root level in assessing their own needs and problems was not given due consideration in the design and implementation of the programme.

The result is a total failure in the vocationalization of education. A vast amount of national resource invested in this venture was wasted. This idea itself is now scrapped and the country is again looking to new innovation in secondary education.

Higher educational institutions were all brought under one adminis-

trative umbrella of the Tribhuvan University. Centralized administration has been one side of the coin whereas decentralization in the form of separate institutions for specific areas of studies and locating a few such institutions, as the ones for forestry and agriculture and animal husbandry, outside of Kathmandu valley, has been the other. On the whole, control of the university apparatus lies in Kathmandu, often with its residents, who see the university as an alternative to government bureaucracy in providing white collar jobs for citizens with advanced degrees and diplomas. The purpose of higher education to meet the development needs of the nation as a whole is not again fully defined. The higher institutions of learning are simply reduced to factories producing graduates.

The centralized approach seems to have been justified on the grounds that it would result in the equalization of inputs (teachers, materials, etc.) in various campuses. This, however, could not take into consideration the fact that it would hinder innovation and people's participation at the local level. The consequence has been an acute stage of alienation between educational means and methods and the general population.

There is no attempt whatsoever to make higher institutions of learning relevant to the development needs of the region where they are located. Even if they were, one wonders if they would not further exacerbate tremendous inequalities in the nation as expressed by the existing pattern of opportunities of secondary and higher educational facilities. Over 71 per cent of higher educational facilities enrolmentwise exists in the Central Development Region (CDR) as compared to only 3 per cent in the Far Western Development Region (FWDR).<sup>6</sup> The statistics shows that in 1979, 15.5 and 43.3 per cent of the candidates appearing in the School Leaving Certificate Examination (SLC) originated from Kathmandu district.

<sup>6</sup> Bennett, N. Statistical and Factual Annexes. Unpublished document, Ministry of Education, Kathmandu, 1981.



and CDR respectively, whereas only 9 per cent were from FWDR<sup>7</sup>

**P**rovisions were made for periodic supervision of schools and classroom teaching as well as the delegation of responsibilities to teachers for internal assessment of students' achievement. This, too, remained an excellent idea. The majority of the District Education Officers (DEOs) did not qualify for their job. Former bureaucrats or teachers were appointed as DEOs with only a week's training. In many instances they wrote reports based upon second hand information provided to them by teachers or their associates. Often the data reported were imaginary, for the district officials had no time or motivation to visit schools in the remote parts.

Teachers in many instances were victimized by some corrupt DEOs and had to bribe the officer so as to retain their positions. Many teachers were forced to mark pass or give higher points to some students who would physically intimidate teachers or have telephone calls made from higher authorities. The assessment scheme was also in conflict with the interest of teachers and staff in the university's central bureaucracy in Kathmandu whose earnings from correcting and processing examination papers were jeopardized. It seems as if the architects of the NESP could not take into account the abuse of power that is commonplace in Nepali society which could have immense impact on the internal assessment scheme.

In fact, the abuse of authority was reflected in the original planning of the NESP. The draft document was first distributed to intellectuals and educators, including the teachers of various colleges of the university, for their group opinions. It was quite clear then that it was just an act of formality expressed by the concerned authorities toward the intellectual community for, it was reported, that before their opinion reached the secretariat of the National Education Committee the plan had already been passed by the Rastriya Panchayat. The national assembly and the blue book of the

NESP then was transformed into the *Bible* and the *Koian* of contemporary Nepal.

Some Nepali intellectuals were quick to notice the unusual tendency which appeared in the NESP's planning. Shaha described the whole affair as 'the professed use of the new system of education as a channel for national indoctrination on the "Panchayati" culture, whatever that may mean, may prove to be anti-educational and may restrict the scope for the freedom and growth of the human mind and intellect, with disastrous consequences for the future'<sup>8</sup>

The NESP was made to work on such a fragile base of terror that a crowd of angry students fighting against the government sponsored body of repression called Rastrabadi Vidyarthi Mandal could shake the very foundation of the system. The National Development Service (NDS) for the university students was one of the best schemes the NESP had included in its programme. However, this was cancelled with no explanation in 1979. Probably, the Panchayati government was too timid to have young intellectuals in the rural areas for it feared that their very presence in the countryside would seriously jeopardize its authority, its manipulation and misappropriation of public funds and resources, and any chance of a Panchayat victory in the forthcoming referendum.

**W**hatever the problems associated with the NESP, looking at it positively, it was by and large an attempt to take a systematic approach to educational development. It was not without merit upgrading the status of teachers, systematic evaluation scheme of student learning, attempt at a national curriculum, free distribution of text books for primary school children, opening of schools in remote areas through NDS schemes, etc. Its contribution would have been significant if the architects of the NESP had seriously faced the challenge of making their

project work. Unfortunately, they used it as a springboard for their personal promotion. Their successors either could not grasp the spirit of the founders or were simply interested in changes for their own convenience.

For example, instead of asking why the internal assessment scheme could not work and looking for ways to make it work through some careful changes, they took the easy route out, avoid it by scrapping it completely. Same was true of the semester system as well as other elements of the plan. Changes are being made, one after another, in such a manner that almost everyone in the country, educator and layman alike, is now confused over

Who education is for?

What education is for?

What the nature of education is?  
and how education should be organised?

A glimpse at the nation as a whole suggests that one institution after another is falling apart and that education is no exception. To analyze the underlying causes of this worsening situation, one could draw a series of following hypotheses.

1 There is a deliberate and willful attempt by certain forces to drag the Nepalis to a point of national disintegration,

2 The personalities occupying the higher seats of the national polity are incompetent to manage the nation's affairs,

3 The political and bureaucratic structure of the nation is such that even the competent personalities are also forced to impotency.

**T**he problems faced by the planners of education ten years ago were very much the same. Many crucial studies including mid-term and full-term evaluations of the NESP have been carried out by many organisations, including the National Education Committee and at very high cost. Many of these reports state findings that are as critical as they are useful. How-

<sup>8</sup> Shaha, R. *Nepali Politics: Retrospect & Prospect*. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1975.

7. *Ibid.*

ever, the reports more often than not gather dust on library shelves while the planners find little time or energy to read them. As a result, even after ten years of experience with the NESP, the changes taking place in the education system have been made on the basis of ad hoc decisions, and often they are carried out at the convenience of important personalities. This has created tremendous wastage in education investment to the order of 30 to 50 per cent<sup>9</sup> and a conspicuous lack of proper direction.

**T**he new approach has not yet made any significant reduction in the dominance of Kathmandu over the countryside. There is still tremendous inequality and disequilibria existing between territorial zones in the form of funding (government's grant-in-aid), student-teacher ratio, percentage of trained teachers, opportunity for quality and higher education, formal vs non-formal education, literacy rate, caste/ethnic and male-female ratios in enrolments, etc.

The statistics are staggering in university education, the residents of Bagmati zone absorb 35 per cent of the total opportunities at the certificate (intermediate) level, whereas those of Karnali zone absorb only 0.02 per cent. This is probably why the officials from the central government visiting the Karnali zone are taken as invading Gorkhalis. Of the education budget (of 1980/1981) of Rs 421,626,000.00 (Rs 12.75 = US \$ 1.00), more than 99 per cent of it is spent on formal education and its support means, including administration. Of the school budget in 1979, the entire country spent 35.6 per cent on secondary education while the district of Kathmandu at the same time spent 63.2 per cent.<sup>10</sup> These facts show that Kathmandu residents have much greater opportunities not only in higher education but also in secondary and primary education. The literacy rate in Kathmandu district in 1971 was 38.3 per cent, while in Bajura it was only 4.1

The affairs of some 15,000 schools and about 45,000 teachers go through one or two joint secretaries of the Ministry of Education. On the one hand, there are far too many people in the bureaucracy creating congestion and inefficiency while, on the other, files lie untouched. Administrators avoid opening a file for whosoever opens it is held responsible if anything goes wrong with the matter contained therein. The well known 'Carpet Scandal', involving top bureaucrats and policy makers, started off as a thunderous roar and, after two years of investigation and court trials, has disappeared as if it were a crystal of salt in water. Innocent people were disgraced and those acquitted were not even offered apologies. No convincing explanation was ever provided either for the case's origin or for its end.

The dismayed and terrified bureaucrats cannot act upon anything with courage. The result is that nobody wants to take the slightest risk and bureaucracy is now like a clogged up pipe which cannot allow the flow of water. This author is aware of at least one project document involving international participation of millions of US dollars, taking such a circular path, pending decision for the last two years. Decisions that could be made at the secretary level a few years back can only be made now at the cabinet level.

**T**here is a tendency among senior bureaucrats to look beyond the country and this does not give them time to look into the country. The very nature of the origin of top bureaucrats from the urban and rural elite class makes them give minimum attention to the needs of the poorer section of the population. With regard to the cost of living, their salaries are a bare minimum, and the allure of foreign commodities in the Kathmandu market forces them to find a secondary source of income. For senior staff, official visits abroad pay well and they are constantly scrounging for them. It would not be surprising to find that more than 50 per cent of the overseas visits by the personnel of the Ministry of Education have no relevance to their work in the country.

Elite schools run by foreign missionaries were taken over by the government so as to bring about uniformity. But as soon as the NESP got off the ground, neo-elite schools in Kathmandu started emerging for the privileged children. Even those henchmen of the NESP in the ruling circle sent their children to such schools in Kathmandu or to India, implying that the NESP's education was only for underprivileged children. This phenomenon, which first started at pre-primary education, has now caught up with secondary and, to some extent, higher education as well. As a result, tremendous capital flows to India.

**R**ecognizing this, the authorities began to give licences to private schools. This resulted in a swarm of so-called English medium schools in Kathmandu and other urban areas of the country. The teachers, untrained and unqualified for such schools, have begun to echo the sounds made in the elite schools of India. Basically commercial ventures exploiting the anxiety of the middle class and lower middle class parents, the neo-elite schools use higher level imported texts for lower level grades with no regard to children's cognitive development. Children are taught to utter a few English words which never fails to impress parents. Meanwhile, the elites, having submitted their own children to neo-elite schools, have neither the time nor the motivation to think about the NESP which now has under its fold only the children of the underprivileged and those in rural areas.

Repetition and dropout rates are high particularly in rural schools. Official statistics show that children attending primary school are in the age of less than six years to more than 12 years. Only 55.49 per cent of them in 1978 belonged to the age group of 6 to 8.<sup>11</sup> Irrespective of the age of children, the total enrolment in primary schools is 86.6 per cent of the nation's primary age group of 6 to 8. Such an enrolment also varies widely within the nation as it is only 34.1 per cent for Doti and 184.4 per cent for Kaski.<sup>12</sup> A simple calculation on the above data shows

that only 48 per cent of the 6-8 age group children are in the school system as indicated by the enrolment statistics

The authorities however tend to distort this fact as they often claim that they have achieved near 90 per cent enrolment. Considering the wastage due to repeater and dropouts (40 and 30 per cent respectively at grade one alone) the achievement as expressed above is far below the target set by the NESP of providing primary education to 64 per cent of the children of the age group 6-8 by 1976.<sup>13</sup> Primary education is again being expanded to five grades. The problems of grade I to III were mostly due to difficulties faced by children, who on completing the IIIrd grade had either to terminate their education or walk 2 to 3 hours to attend a school in another village or leave home for elsewhere to attend lower secondary school. The problem was particularly acute in the countryside where villages were scattered and separated by mountains, hills, rivers and jungles. The problem was anticipated in the rural areas in 1970-71 when people there heard of the NESP's grade I to III primary education scheme. Having no chance to express their anxiety, the problem remained undiscussed for a decade until the planners in Kathmandu realized it and decided to switch back and prolong primary education to grade V.

However, this may not be easy as primary schools built during the decade can accommodate only grade I to III. Besides, the practice of leaving the construction of schools to local people seems quite impractical as they are already over-taxed and have no knowledge of constructing educational buildings. The Ministry of Education has not been able to provide even a suitable design for primary school buildings. The shortage of adequate trained teachers (at present only 37 per cent primary, I-III, school teachers and 39 per cent of the lower secondary ones, IV-VII, are trained), and of textbooks and other teaching materials are problems among others which

must be dealt with to allow implementation of the plan. Otherwise there will be a tremendous negative impact on the quality of education.

There has been a serious lack of trained teachers for secondary schools especially in science, mathematics and vocational education. The existing number of science teachers can satisfy the need of 10 per cent of the students and about 90 per cent of the schools cannot provide any science teaching facilities.<sup>14</sup> Besides, the available teachers are either untrained or not adequately trained. In the name of quality, science education lessons from the previous Intermediate of Science course were translated into Nepali and taught at the high school level. Almost every science lesson in the existing curriculum demands experimentation and demonstration but due to lack of qualified and motivated teachers and adequate physical facilities, materials provided to the schools have not been used. As a result, memorization for and cheating in examinations are common practices.

Schools in Kathmandu and other easily accessible areas have science and mathematics teachers while the children in the rural areas are less fortunate but must go through the same national examination and thus suffer unfair treatment. Consequently, SLC graduates from the rural areas have less opportunity to go in for university education in the areas of science and technical subjects. The National Education Committee having scrapped the NESP's programme for secondary education is now proposing new types of schools at this level which will be implemented immediately. These hybrids of the pre and post NESP general high schools are classified in three categories. The first will not be able to provide any science studies and its SLC graduates will not be permitted to join any science or technical studies at the university level. The graduates of the second category schools will have the option to take up biological science studies only, whereas the ones from the

third category would have all the options open to them, including physical and biological science and technical education. This scheme sounds logical in view of the lack of science and mathematics teachers. However, from the view point of equalization of educational opportunities to all regions in the country, as well as from that of providing the basic concepts of science to all children, the scheme seems totally impractical.

A three-year programme in teaching vocational skills with possible one-year internship has been proposed to replace the NESP's vocational high school education. With foreign donations, so far only five such trade schools are being built in the country. It is not clear as yet whether they will provide non-formal education to build skills for the job market or be linked with formal education, allowing brighter students from these schools to go on for technical education at the university level. In either case, it is difficult to say whether graduates of trade schools with the attraction of and access to white collar employment through non-science or non-technical studies would remain in the blue collar job market or be tempted to sit in an office.

Technical and medical education is most sought after and admission is extremely competitive. With the emergence of the NESP, the majority of the competent candidates went into these fields. Later, when they received certificate-level education, only a minority of graduates could go abroad for higher education while others entered the job market. As little upward mobility exists in the technical services for someone starting as an overseer, a mechanic, an electrician or a junior agricultural technician at the non-gazetted level, resulting in life-long service without promotion, these students find themselves at a disadvantage when compared to their counterparts with a non-technical education.

Many such overseers begin to take night classes in public administration or the humanities and social sciences, and to appear privately in university examinations. Many

13 National Education System Plan for 1971-76 Ministry of Education, Kathmandu, 1971

14 Bigyan Shikshako Adhyayan Gana Gathu Karya Toliko Pratibedan National Education Committee, Kathmandu 2036

lower level technicians also, rather than remaining in the rural areas, use whatever influence they can muster to get posted in Kathmandu so as to pursue such studies privately. This situation has threatened the very cause of technical education at the certificate level while at the same time promoting the production of third rate graduates in the humanities and social sciences.

Meanwhile, graduates in technical fields who went abroad for higher studies found themselves ill-prepared in science and mathematics. As a result, the scholarship donor countries began to turn down such candidates in favour of those with Intermediate Science certificates. Moreover, graduates of the certificate level technical education could not compete with those having a Diploma in engineering (3 year course) from India in the job market. The demerits seriously undermined the value of the certificate level technical education as conceived by the NESP. This phenomenon has again caused a reversal in higher education — the highest priority being given to studying science and mathematics. Existing facilities are not adequate to meet this demand.

Since last year, colleges (campuses) have been permitted on private initiative for the humanities and social sciences and that only at certificate (I A) level. There are now some three dozen private campuses in the country very much controlled by the local administrators, since the university was not motivated to encourage them in any way. Neither government nor the university contributed funds or manpower to run these campuses. The few that were more imaginative in defining the role of institutions of higher learning in the context of rural Nepal have been much harassed by local authorities. This has created a climate of distrust between the government and the people. The intention in allowing these campuses to open is not very clear. It may have been to lessen government's economic burden or meet the growing demand of students for university admission or to just let SLC graduates in the countryside remain absorbed in their third rate educa-

tion so as not to burden the better opportunities available in Kathmandu valley.

The Institute of Education (IOE) in Kathmandu along with its various campuses around the country is involved in providing teacher education (both in-service and pre-service training). An overview of the situation shows that the percentages of trained teachers in the primary, lower secondary and secondary schools are 37, 39 and 63 respectively. Short in-service training programmes are rare. Neither have the existing training programmes been able to prepare teachers for the diverse educational conditions existing in the country, nor are the teacher-training curricula consistent with the school curricula. Although 49 per cent of children have a mother tongue other than Nepali, no programme exists to train teachers to teach Nepali as a second language. It is reported that the science teacher education as provided by the IOE is not adequate — it does not provide a strong ground in science and mathematics and it uses out-of-date methods. The IOE desperately needs to develop a good rapport with the Institute of Science (IOS) in training teachers in science and mathematics.

The Curriculum Development Centre (CDC) under the Ministry of Education is engaged in curriculum planning and development while the Janak Educational Material Centre prints textbooks which are then distributed by the Sajha Cooperative. Curriculum experts rarely test the materials before they get printed and distributed to schools. The existing curriculum has very little reference to the needs of rural development. Little attention is paid to making use of inexpensive, locally available teaching materials with respect to both teacher education and curriculum development. On the one hand, there is great difficulty in supplying secondary and lower secondary textbooks to schools in rural areas, on the other, 60-70 per cent of the existing budget is allotted for free primary textbook distribution.

Before 1971, except for a few government-run schools and col-

leges, most educational institutions were started and run by private individuals and communities. Individuals were in the committees because they were interested in working voluntarily and also because they were trusted by the people. After the NESP takeover, all these committees were either dissolved or reduced to local coordination committees which, in effect, made them silent observers. Members in the managing committees were replaced by political nominees of those pseudo-representatives selected by a high power political body called the *Back to Village National Campaign*. Although this campaign was scrapped in 1979, its appointees are still holding their respective positions at all levels of the Panchayat, except the National Panchayat. Now, when the schools are thrown back to the new local committees, undue influence from the local, district and new national representatives as well as ministers is being strongly felt. Considering the marginal popularity of the new representatives, it appears doubtful that these new committees will be able to manage the schools or mobilize people's cooperation.

Even assuming a 100 per cent success of the NESP in meeting the target and achieving its objectives, one can calculate that at least 36 per cent of the 6-8-year-old children would not see a primary classroom; 36 per cent who had the privilege of attending primary school had to terminate their education at the age of 8, and a further 20 per cent at the age of 12<sup>15</sup>. Without considering the wastage that occurred in the process, the NESP has failed to provide any substantial alternative method or means of education to underprivileged children, youth and adults. It has virtually disregarded the value and use of non-formal education by expending almost all efforts and resources on formal education. The implication is obvious that only formal education has the right answers to the problems of illiteracy and underdevelopment.

The budget allocated for adult education in 1973/74 and 1980/81

<sup>15</sup> National Education System Plan for 1971-76. Ministry of Education, Kathmandu, 1971.

has been 1.1 and 0.73 per cent respectively of the total education budget whereas that for higher education has been 29.2 and 35.63 per cent respectively<sup>16</sup>. For primary education (grade I — III) aimed at developing literacy skills at the same time, the allocation has been 20.19 and 27.10 per cent respectively.

**A**dult education and non-formal education are now taken care of by a small cell within the Ministry of Education often headed by a career bureaucrat with little understanding of the problem of illiteracy and its impact on the country's underdevelopment. As this problem can not be tackled by formal education alone, greater attention to non-formal education by the government is warranted. A few pilot schemes on functional adult literacy programmes have been undertaken on the initiative of external donor agencies. Such programmes in the past were continued so long as money flowed in from outside. Little attempt was made by government to take off from earlier achievements.

The NESP had categorised adult literacy in two ways: functional adult literacy and the simple spread of literacy skills. The meagre budget allocated to them especially for the second category for making literate 100,000 adult illiterates annually was divided on the quota basis between the formal education schools and the class organization within the Panchayat. Some token work here and there was undertaken at the beginning but the venture got lost with no significant end result.

There are some cells within the National Social Services Coordination Council which sometimes run adult literacy classes but their impact, too, has been insignificant. Some other ministries, such as health and agriculture, are running short courses for farmers in the villages but their impact, too, has been small so far. Currently, the Ministry of Education in collaboration with World Education, HANDS (a religiously supported organization) and IHDP

(Integrated Hill Development Project, with Swiss assistance) are running their own pilot programmes of functional adult literacy based on consciousness raising through keywords approach.

These programmes, although they need some revision, are interesting, but since they are still being carried along on an experimental basis, their impact is minimal. In view of the many drop outs, left-outs and push-outs from the formal education system, there are countless children needing out-of-school education. Also, because of the enormous unemployment and underemployment problems among the lower economic status Nepalis, and the capture of the available job market by a flood of semi-skilled workers from India, the government's attention should have been focussed on providing short term skill development programmes to its citizens through non-formal education means and methods.

**O**n the basis of the preceding observations, the following broad suggestions could possibly improve the existing system:

1. A shaking up of the bureaucracy should take place. In addition, official foreign visits should be allowed when they benefit the country. Effective mechanisms must be created to stop unnecessary travel as well as undeserved promotions awarded on the basis of nepotism, pleasure of the bosses or just seniority.

2. There should be a systematic approach to decision-making as opposed to the ad hoc practices which prevail. Premises and consequences of a certain intended action should be considered before taking up the action itself. An atmosphere for dialogue with the people should be created which demands humility, confidence, trust in the people, hope and willingness to take risks on the part of decision makers.

3. For quick decision on project planning, monitoring, evaluation and follow-up programmes, both the National Education Committee and the Planning and Programming

Division within the Ministry of Education should be strengthened. In the ministry somebody must be held responsible for the planning of projects and their implementation. The National Education Committee should also forge a systematic plan in the ministry as well as other concerned agencies for further action. The planning should focus on national integration on the one hand and meeting regional needs on the other. This demands taking strong measures to stop exploitation of the rest of the country by the elites in Kathmandu who tend to limit all the opportunities to Kathmandu valley.

4. Block grant system should be related to certain aspects of performance in the schools as attendance of students and teachers, enrolment of the underprivileged children, increase in percentage passing the SLC examination, utilization of teaching and learning materials, innovations in making the school relevant to the development of the community, etc. In view of the great educational disequilibria in the country the rewards provided should not be based upon absolute achievement but on the rate of increase in the achievement.

5. Attempts should be made to enhance the financing of schools at the local level. In cases where local people try to obtain land for schools, the government should try to promote such attempts rather than put hurdles in the way. Certain competitions among local schools could be held yearly within the district. Cash prizes or medals could be provided to teachers or schools in such areas as production aspects, activities towards self-reliance, teaching methodologies, beautifying the school area or community development. The issues could change yearly from one area to another. The DEO along with the district education committee could use their discretion on this score.

6. A satellite school system could be implemented in the rural areas by dividing schools into small clusters, each comprising 10 to 20 schools, while one, preferably located centrally, could act as a basic agent

16. Bennet, N. Statistical and Factual Annexes.

for supervision and short in-service training of teachers<sup>17</sup> The DEO could have a direct contact with the central school. In some places, a high school could act as the central school, while in other areas, a primary school could be put in this position. The central school could also be evaluated by its other participant schools as well as the DEO. Similarly, evaluating the achievement of the DEO should be based upon his performance in providing services to the schools. The ratings given by the central schools of the DEO's work could act as one indicator.

**E**nough harm has been done by ad hoc decisions enforced on people in the name of king and country. The time has come for a committee of concerned educators and citizens to get together and reflect upon the past and attempt a systematic plan on relevant education for the future.

If Nepal sincerely wants to fight illiteracy and underdevelopment, immediate attention should be given to an adequate structure for non-formal education. Since primary schools in Nepal are geared to the development of literacy skills alone and since adult functional literacy is several times cheaper than primary education, allocation of funds for non-formal education should be made in consideration of the high proportion of the nation's illiterate population. The solution to the problem of unemployment of thousands of school and university graduates may lie in the development of the non-formal education sector at field level. For example, those passing the SLC examination in 1981 are wasting almost a year before they can be taken into the university. They could be mobilized in a campaign to eradicate illiteracy as the Cubans did immediately after the revolution.

Furthermore, questions should be raised about whether vocational training is needed and for whom.

There should be decentralization of the higher learning institutions by developing autonomous institu-

tions with various fields of studies and locating them in different areas of the country. These institutions should be responsible in meeting development needs in training, research and services in the region in which they are located. The role of higher learning institutions must be defined in relation to the development of the area, region and the nation as a whole. This demands change in their present role of factories producing graduates. The institutions should be fully autonomous, but their evaluation should be based upon the services they render to the region's pace of development. Undue interference in the activities of the university should be stopped. Cooperation between government agencies and such institutions can be fostered only through a dialogue based upon mutual respect, self-confidence, humility and hope.

**A**s no country can be developed by government alone, the government in Nepal with its inefficient mechanisms should stop thinking that it alone has the capacity to develop the country. If a government can allow tourist industries to flourish in the private sector, why cannot it allow its citizens the initiative in education and development? The main pre-requisite to do so is to have trust in its citizens. No citizen, irrespective of his/her political belief, should be harassed in his/her attempt to participate in national development which should naturally include the sphere of education as well.

Non-government organizations (NGOs) in the field of education and development should be allowed initiatives to make innovations. The NGOs can pick up the politics of the Central government and act as spearheads whose finding and experience could in fact become the basis for the government programmes. NGOs could function as complementary forces to government in a host of activities using schools as centres for collective promotion of the communities, developing and testing special, non-formal and informal educational means and methods for different target groups and areas, running village newspapers and developing relevant post-

literacy reading materials so as to create a literate environment in the rural areas, developing teaching materials with inexpensive local materials to enrich the teaching-learning activities, pilot demonstrations to fill gaps in government programmes, bridging communication between the people and the government and other service agencies.

**F**inally, no study, conclusion or suggestion serves any useful purpose unless there is the political will to make changes with the view to develop a healthy society in Nepal. For instance, a bit of ancient wisdom may be relevant here. This was what Yudhistira taught Bhishma when he was on his death bed: when politics grows lifeless, the triple Veda sinks, all the dharmas (i.e., the bases of civilization) howsoever developed, completely decay when departure is made from traditional state-ethics. Politics embodies the essence of all forms of renunciation, all kinds of religious sacraments, and all aspects of knowledge and around politics all the worlds revolve.<sup>18</sup>

As it has been indicated above, modern educators will also find it hard to disagree with the above teaching as a group of concerned educators from all over the world along with Prof Paulo Freire declared in Persepolis in 1975, 'literacy is not neutral, it is a political act'.<sup>19</sup> The political will of national leaders should not only be manifested in raising clamours of agony in international conferences but should also be backed by appropriate actions at home. This author finds it hard to disagree with Mbanga, an African teacher, who stated, 'I find it shameful and sad that our Third World leaders are so vocal about a New International Economic Order at UNCTAD Meeting when they have not even started correcting the economic mess in their own countries. When do we start?'<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *Mahabharata*, Shanti Praba 63, 28, 29.

<sup>19</sup> *Declaration of Persepolis* — International Symposium for Literacy, Persepolis, 1975.

<sup>20</sup> From the diary of a senior Nepalese administrator. The author apologizes in not being able to cite the original source.

<sup>17</sup> Bennett, N. Some Problems of Education in Nepal.

# Hard plan in a soft state

KAMAL P. MALLA

*This is the way the world ends  
This is the way the world ends  
This is the way the world ends  
Not with a bang but a whimper*

T S. Eliot, *The Hollow Men* (1925)

THIS paper attempts to examine the fate of a hard plan in a soft State. Nepal is one of the few countries in the Third World which attempted to change both the content and the structure of education at one stroke. However, the plan was aborted in the middle of the stream. Why it was done so is of no small interest to educational planners at home and abroad.

The late King Mahendra, the architect of Nepal's partyless Panchayat system, made a surprise visit to a university teachers' meet in winter 1970 and delivered an unexpected paper. The King expressed

his dissatisfaction at the transplanted system of education which produced 'students who seek no other goal but politics of all kinds, of "isms" and ideologies', or 'students who seek no other goal but a job in the establishment.' He admonished the university teachers 'to re-examine our educational strategy with a view to improve the existing system, step by step, to achieve one supreme goal common to all — that is, to create stability, order, peace and above all national solidarity

a by depoliticising the educational system,

b by introducing trade as a compulsory subject in all schools;

c by emphasising quality and excellence,

d by improving the existing curricula and the examination system,



e. by reorienting the entire educational framework to meet the demands of the Kingdom, and

f. by creating an educational environment where ideas of loyalty to the Crown, the country, and the Panchayat system can grow with greatest effect'

**A** little earlier than King Mahendra's surprise visit to the university teachers' meet, a 22-page mimeographed draft in English was made available to the members of Tribhuvan University Planning Committee for the reaction of its members. On September 11, 1969, a meeting was held in Singha Durbar under the chairmanship of the Minister of Education, where the participants expressed their mixed reactions. I for one submitted my reactions in writing and published some of these reactions. Here is a part 'Howsoever glibly we may talk about the urgency of change in the education system we have nearly always acted believing in the efficacy of cure rather than of prevention. We have nearly always compromised and appeased rather than faced the problem. It is by pursuing the policy of appeasement to contingencies that education in Nepal has by now come to be the most institutionalised of illogic'.<sup>1</sup>

The 22-page mimeograph draft was the seminal core of what was later on to become Nepal's ill-fated National Educational System Plan 1971-1976 (NESP for short). A task force was formed in the Royal Palace under the direct supervision of Crown Prince Birendra in the winter of 1970. When the task force had a fuller draft of the plan ready it was circulated for reaction among a cross-section of Nepalis. A great deal of discussion was encouraged. But once the plan was approved not much frontal criticism of the plan was tolerated. Under the full royal patronage of the late King Mahendra and the personal supervision of Crown Prince Birendra the plan was launched in July 1971. After his accession to the throne of Nepal,

King Birendra's address to the 20th Session of the Rastriya Panchayat made it clear that 'My government will implement the plan with application and firmness'. A year later, the plan was implemented in higher education. The royal shield around the plan was both its strength and weakness.

Hardly a month later, the university students went on strike in support of demands for reforms, educational as well as political. Among other things, their demands included the release of the four elected members of the Rastriya Panchayat, including a former Prime Minister, Surya Bahadur Thapa. By a stroke of historical coincidence, Thapa is now the Prime Minister under whose auspices the NESP has been gracefully dismantled. For several years, the 1972 August strike was one of the biggest ones, and the Nepali police used batons and canes to disperse hundreds of university students who tried to march through the streets of Kathmandu on August 16, 1972. Two years later, in April 1974, another student strike paralyzed the university for nearly five months. But this time the government and the university, by working in unison, succeeded in effectively crushing the student unrest. All the administrative-educational authorities they had at their disposal were used to do so. This created a relatively prolonged, though deceptive, lull before the final storm in the university.

**O**n April 6, 1979, the Nepali police clashed with a minor student demonstration marching towards the Pakistan Embassy in Kathmandu to hand in a protest note against the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Although it all began as a mundane student-police confrontation, it was more than that. The clash was a result of a form of student unrest which suddenly spread like simmering fire. The eighty odd campuses of the kingdom's only university were disturbed, one after another. Schools followed the rebellious trail. The unrest soon gained momentum all over the kingdom, crippling many a sector of public life. Strikes, lock-outs, and violent clashes with the

police erupted in all the major towns of Nepal.

A month later, on May 2, 1979, a Royal Commission was announced to investigate the grievances of the striking students and police excesses. Instead of diffusing the situation, the Royal Commission further complicated it. Soon it was painfully clear that the device failed to let the steam out of the explosive situation. Three weeks later, on May 23, 1979, a massive demonstration ended up by setting two public buildings on fire in the heart of Kathmandu. The police could not cope with the angry crowd, the Royal Army was ordered to move in. Early next morning, 34-year old King Birendra took the kingdom by surprise by promising to hold a national referendum to choose the political system the nation wanted.

On May 20, 1979, just four days before the King announced his decision to hold the national referendum, the Royal Commission had ordered both Tribhuvan University and the Ministry of Education to fulfil all the demands of the striking students. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Nepal's National Educational System Plan was finally dismantled and withdrawn after less than 7 years of increasingly compromised implementation. The Royal Commission was only a face-saving device — a hapless body that came to preside over the final liquidation of the plan.

For those who are interested in more serious literature there are three crucial studies on the implementation of the NESP — exhaustive studies which were conducted at the official level: the *Mid-Term Evaluation Report* (1975), the *Full-Term Evaluation Report* (1979), and the *University Organization. A Study Report* (1980). The present paper is only a tailpiece which attempts to investigate why the plan finally collapsed.

**A** university does not operate in a social or political vacuum. Of all the institutions of modernization in traditional societies a university is, perhaps, one of the most critical and subversive one — subversive be-

1 Kamal P. Malla, 'Education: The Road to Nowhere', *Vasudha*, Oct/Nov 1969, pp 11-14. Reprinted in *The Road to Nowhere* (Kathmandu: Sajha, 1979), pp 67-71.



cause it disseminates ideas, ideals, concepts and attitudes which may not always be conducive to the established order of things. The Rana Prime Minister, Chandra Shumshere, was reported to have cried as he laid the foundation of Tri-Chandra College, Nepal's first western-style institution of higher education, in 1918, saying, 'This is our graveyard'. It is, indeed, a cruel irony of the NESP that the plan which intended to depoliticise the education system by creating citizens who were loyal to the Crown, the country, and the Panchayat System — after nearly a decade of heavy financial investment — produced a generation of young men who turned out to be the most vocal critics of the *status quo*.

**T**ribhuvan University was incorporated in 1959. The late King Mahendra took over in December 1960 by dismissing an elected government and parliament formed under the provisions of the 1959 Constitution of Nepal granted by the King himself. The 18-month old elected government of the Nepali Congress led by B P Koirala was deposed by King Mahendra by levelling a dozen or so serious charges against it. Within a year of the royal take-over, the King granted a constitution modelled on a native version of basic democracy. Though political parties were banned immediately after the take-over, the 1962 constitution was not yet a 'partyless' one. It was only in 1967 that the constitution was amended to make the polity a 'partyless panchayat democracy'.

At the same time, the National Legislature, elected indirectly by restricted electoral colleges, claimed that the partyless panchayat democracy was 'without any alternative for Nepal'. In the same year, King Mahendra also announced an outfit called 'Back to the Village National Campaign'. King Mahendra went a little out of the way for a monarch to write a terse exposition of the underlying philosophy of the system and got it printed in his own name under the caption, 'The Kingdom of Heaven and the Soul'.<sup>2</sup> It con-

cluded with the traditional Hindu benediction for the welfare of the cow, the Brahmin, and the common man. Whether the late King's Kingdom of Heaven did arrive for the Brahmin or the cow is unverifiable, but it has failed to arrive for the common man.

Almost every one of the charges which the late King laid against the 18-month old elected Nepali Congress government, has been laid in the past two decades, with no qualms of public conscience, at the doors of any or every one of the governments which stayed in power by royal favour. After all, only four trusted Prime Ministers — Dr Tulsī Giri, Surya Bahadur Thapa, Kirtinidhi Bista, and Nagendra Prasad Risal — have shared the two partyless decades among them, revolving in turn in the musical chair of power. Except for Risal, all the royal favourites had been premiers more than once.

**A**lthough for two decades the polity made an untiring claim to dynamism, vested interests got entrenched in both politics and the bureaucracy, succumbing to all the known syndromes of a soft State. Although from outside things looked agreeably functional, the state of the nation was like that of a room with an active fireplace but no chimney. Public anger, so long suppressed, found a sudden and spontaneous articulation in the 1979 unrest. It erupted from the education sector because it was at once the most vulnerable and organized sector of public life. Why it became vulnerable will be clear from the rest of the paper.

The NESP was formulated and implemented on the hypothesis that there was sufficient political will to implement the plan in the teeth of oppositional politics. Above all, it was assumed that the Panchayat System would deliver to the common man all the goods it promised him. It was assumed that Nepal's economy would grow at the rate of 4% per annum at the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-1976) so that the low level and middle level manpower produced by the educational networks would be

absorbed by a growing and healthy economy. The actual growth rate for the plan period was, however, 0.49%.<sup>1</sup>

The National Planning Commission for one made this fact no secret: 'That there has been no appreciable improvement in the per capita growth rate during the first four years of the Fourth Five-Year Plan will be evident if the population growth rate (2.6%) and the growth rate of GPD (2.65%) for the same period are compared'.<sup>3</sup>

Official and unofficial analyses show that the economic performance of the Panchayat System has been nothing if not dismal.

**T**he successive administrations since the implementation of the NESP had, understandably, opted for soft decisions, particularly in the matter of enrolment in the university. Access to higher education is a live political issue in Nepal because education is one of the few avenues which offers a marginal access to power which had hitherto been the monopoly of the Khas Thakuris, Chetris, and Brahmins. Naturally, the social and regional distribution of higher education enrolment and opportunities have been a much politicized issue. This is clear also from the regular furore made in the press and the national legislature during the time of university admission and entrance tests.

Apart from this, the pressure on higher education is mainly due to three factors:

a the failure of the economy to absorb the low and middle level manpower who would have terminated their education at the end of some form of formal schooling,

b the recruitment policy of the employing agencies, such as the HMG and the corporations, which insist on certification as an entry requirement, rather than relevant training or acquisition of useful skills, and

<sup>2</sup> Reprinted in *Naya Sandesh*, December 15, 1979 (in Nepali).

<sup>3</sup> *The Fifth Five-Year Plan*. The National Planning Commission, Kathmandu 1975, p. 10 (In Nepali).

c glamour value and false importance attached to university certification in our society

Consequently, Tribhuvan University has nearly always to face gate-crashing situations. Year after year it has been obliged by His Majesty's Government to admit more students than it can ever teach in any one year. During my tenure as University Rector, when a Dean of a technical institute resisted the pressure of the Minister of Education, the Minister's reply to us was classic 'Tribhuvan University is for Nepal, Nepal is not for Tribhuvan University. How you do it is your business.' Since I have said it you just do it.

Such insensitivity to academic problems is by and large responsible for reducing Tribhuvan University to what it is. Since its inception, the university has been uncomfortably trapped between two cruel imperatives

a the *political* imperative is that it should admit every one who seeks admission into the university, irrespective of the number of teachers available, the available accommodation, and the library and laboratory facilities available on campuses

b the *economic* imperative is that the university has to function with whatever budget the Ministry of Finance allocates it, irrespective of the number of students it is compelled to accept

One visible consequence of these two compulsions is that Tribhuvan University has had to give, not higher education, but higher education plus water, i.e., one of the most diluted and cheap forms of higher education in the Third World

In the 1979 summer semester, Tribhuvan University was teaching 32,000 students in its 80 campuses comprising 10 teaching institutes. It had some 2,300 teachers and 3,400 administrative personnel on its pay-roll. The 32,000 university enrolment made 2% of the total population of the university-going age group (i.e., 16-22 year old). In

India the percentage is 4%, in Japan 22%, in the UK and Western Europe it is 15%, and in the U.S.A. it is 50%. A large proportion of the university's enrolment and faculty are sub-standard. Because of the rush of students, raw university graduates are recruited in the faculty to teach the expanding student population. Some 70% of Tribhuvan University's faculty had never seen any other university campus other than Kirtipur.

Out of the 32,000 students enrolled in Tribhuvan University in the summer of 1979, about 75% were SLC third divisions. Nearly 70% of these students had failed in one or more courses during the first semester. The rate of attrition in the form of drop-outs between semesters, repeaters, and failures was unbelievably high. In fact, in the Institute of Science it was as high as 56%. While the NESP visualized higher education as an investment in human resources, the shortsightedness of our politicians has successfully converted it into the most wasteful form of investment in human resources.

With this kind of academic environment, periodic eruptions of student unrest and activism are not an inscrutable development. For some years both teaching and learning in Tribhuvan University have been defeating experiences, stimulating mostly negativism and resentment against all forms of established authority — educational or otherwise. In these surroundings it has been relatively easy to sow the seeds of discontent and restiveness than in more congenial academic surroundings.

It is, thus, not unusual that the NESP has had more hostile critics than objective evaluators. The plan is one of the most laudable efforts made by a soft State to implement a hard plan. Unless one is over-biased against the NESP, no sensible citizen of Nepal, irrespective of his political ideology, will question some of the following premises of the plan.

The main object of higher education will be to produce trained manpower. Higher education will be correlated to the job opportu-

nities of the future. Technical education will receive special emphasis with a view of meeting the needs of technical manpower for successful implementation of the national plan. Qualitative improvement of education will be synchronised with its quantitative growth. Arrangements will be made to reduce the number of those taking arts and humanities and increase the number of those who elect technical subjects. The university will organise a separate admission test to determine eligibility for higher education. The number of students joining higher education institutions will gradually be reduced from the present (1970) 27% to 19% (of the secondary enrolment), etc.<sup>4</sup>

Even if a most enlightened government came to power in Nepal it could not have done anything better. No doubt, the NESP had a pronounced political content, but then every system of education has some or other political content. Education has never been politically value-free, in the first place.

Today the NESP is, for all intents and purposes, dead, all the innovations that it brought about in higher education have been gracefully or disgracefully withdrawn one by one — the entrance test, the semester system, the comprehensive examination, compulsory Masters thesis, the National Development Service, and so on. The plan lies dismantled and the university campuses are now somewhat like the deserted sites of construction which were abandoned midway. We are once again back to square one.

Nepal had seen seven ministers of education between the implementation of the NESP and its final dismantling under the auspices of the Royal Commission. Each of them was, in his own small way, eager that there should be no student unrest during his tenure. Each of them had forced the university to do things which the university, if left on its own, would not have liked to do, including the imple-

<sup>4</sup> The National Education System Plan 1971-1976. Ministry of Education, Kathmandu, 1970, p. vii and ff.

mentation of the NESP in higher education. The three Vice-Chancellors who worked under these ministers would, today, gladly testify to the uncomfortable political and economic imperatives under which they had to implement the plan. Running the university had been for them basically an exercise in tightrope-walking. The final say had almost always been of political considerations rather than of the academic norms, values, and standards. When a minister of education dictates to the university to admit 1,200 students in a campus which can take only 300 students under normal circumstances, it is difficult to understand what motive he could have had other than, of course, clinging to power to make yet more of such decisions?

Consequently, Tribhuvan University has now become the sacrificial lamb of the Panchayat System — so readily available for placating the opposition, actual or immanent. While the Panchayat politicians have succeeded in reducing it to a refugee camp, opposition politicians have converted it into an unfailing garrison. The real casualty in this game is, of course, neither. The real casualties are the sincere students and members of the faculty committed to teaching and research of some merit, which is what a university is ultimately for.

In the fiscal year 1979/80, Tribhuvan University had an annual budget of Rs 18.55 crores. Much of this amount in the last two years may be said to have gone down the drain because, except for very short spells here and there, most campuses could not do any serious teaching. This is merely the tangible and computable loss. The intangible loss is even more damaging. The university is unlikely to be the same place again. What it has now lost is hardly recoverable—its credibility as an academic institution. It has been pushed so hard against the wall both by the government and opposition politicians that it has lost its credibility in the eyes, not so much of the public, as in its own eyes — in the eyes of the faculty, students and, above all, of the university administrators.

An erstwhile Minister of Education has recently published a paper in a local English-language daily, analysing what he thought were the main reasons for the collapse of the NESP. Part of his explanation was that the elites revolted against the plan because it sought to give non-elitist or mass education. This is a fascinating, but somewhat ingenious, interpretation of facts which should have been familiar to those who are so directly involved in the decision-making process in education, particularly those decisions which ultimately led to the collapse of the plan. The revolt was not of the elites against a non-elitist system of education. It certainly was deeper than that. The revolt was of the masses against the elites who were monopolising power under the Partyless Panchayat System, of which the NESP was mistakenly considered a sub-system.

The most tangible evidence of public discontent with the Panchayat System is the result of the national referendum held in May 1980. Forty-five per cent of the voters rejected the system outright; they opted for a complete change in the political system. The remaining fifty-five per cent voted for substantial political reforms. One clear message of the referendum result is that few political institutions in Nepal are intrinsically sacrosanct in public eyes, particularly if they fail to deliver the promised goods to the common man. If they fail to stem the ever-rising tide of nepotism and corruption, their charismatic and rhetorical appeal alone will no more compensate for the eroding credibility of these institutions.

Tribhuvan University was founded as the nation's monument to the late King Tribhuvan who was not only the founder of democracy in Nepal but also one of the noblest of her monarchs. To sacrifice its sanctity in order to 'restore' democracy in Nepal is not only an act of desecration; it is an act of vandalism. It is now fruitless to ask who is ultimately responsible for reducing the university to what it is — a raped institution. The question now is: will it ever be able to rise again like the phoenix out of its own ashes?

# Ecological change

HARKA GURUNG

NEPAL, occupying a third of the Himalayan mountain system and with half of its total area over 1,500 meters, deserves a closer examination in terms of environmental economics. The country lies or rather hangs, across one of the stupendous relief features on the earth and thus presents a highly broken topography. It has also one of the highest densities of population among mountain countries and the rate of population growth is very high.

The environmental stress in the Nepal Himalaya — nature ordained and man-made — is a reality which has attracted increasing attention from scientists and policy-makers in recent years. One of the earliest re-

ports on the ecological situation of the country with an obvious forestry bias noted: 'Tremendous quantities of material are removed each year from the soil and carried in the monsoon floods onto the plain, hill-side crops are swept away and farmland in the plains is buried, year by year the tillable land area shrinks, torrents expand, and remnants of forests are often carried away by landslides, in short, erosion is slowly but surely robbing the Mahabharat (Hills) of its habitable land.'<sup>1</sup>

Another forester similarly referred to the increasing phenomenon

---

<sup>1</sup> Ernest Robbe, *Report to the Government of Nepal on Forestry*, ETAP Report No 209, Rome, March 1954, p. 15



**FOUR  
SWAN  
FABRICS**

**FOR ENCHANTING SHADES  
IN COTTON AND BLENDED TEXTURES**

**Pamper your every whim and fancy with Four Swan Fabrics  
in cotton and Polyester/cotton blends. Crease-resistant  
Four Swan fabrics come in a wide range of colours and prints.**

*Manufactured by:*

**THE VICTORIA MILLS LTD., BOMBAY.**



**MANGALDAS  
GROUP MILLS**

## **RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS**

**A few facts you should know.**

Garlic has been well-known from earliest times for its medicinal properties. Medical authorities have accepted the value of garlic in correcting various health problems. Garlic can be taken raw or cooked or in capsule form. But to derive the maximum medicinal benefits from garlic, it should be taken in the most effective way.

**The natural way to all-round health.**

### **Why not raw Garlic?**



Raw garlic cloves have to be chewed before the extract acts inside the body. But when chewed they leave an unpleasant smell. When swallowed, they are difficult to digest. And the extraction is incomplete.



**Why not  
cooked  
Garlic?**

On cooking, the effective medicinal properties of garlic are lost.


### **Why RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS?**

Ranbaxy Laboratories, a trusted name with the medical profession, now gives you all the benefits of raw garlic—without the smell. Ranbaxy's Garlic Pearls contain the pure extract of raw garlic in easy-to-digest, soft gelatin capsules—the most effective way of deriving the medicinal properties of garlic.

#### **RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS**

- Help relieve gas and indigestion, ease heartburn
- Reduce high cholesterol levels
- Help ease disabling joint pains
- Prevent and control recurring coughs and colds

*Take Ranbaxy's Garlic Pearls—everyday  
It's a healthy habit*



**Take  
two pearls  
twice daily  
regularly**

**ATTENTION STEEL MILLS  
&  
FOUNDRIES  
EXPORTERS OF WORLD FAMOUS SANDUR  
MANGANESE ORE  
OFFER  
EX-STOCK  
VERY LOW PHOS. PIG IRON  
AND  
LOW ALUMINIUM FERROSILICON  
PRODUCED IN THEIR PLANT AT  
VYASANKERE**

*Please Contact*

**THE SANDUR  
MANGANESE & IRON  
ORES LIMITED**

**"LOHADRI BHAVAN"**

Yeshwant Nagar-583124;

Via Sandur, Bellary Dt

Karnataka INDIA

*Cable*: SMIORE, SANDUR (INDIA)

*Telephone*: SANDUR 33, 61, 91.

*Telex*: BANGALORE 427

Bangalore : 32175 . 28262 .

**Structure and Cognition  
Aspects of Hindu Caste and Ritual  
VEENA DAS**

Sociological analysis of Hindu caste and ritual has hitherto been confined to the empirical study of local communities. In this work the author adds a new dimension to such analysis by basing her data on an examination of selected myths in Puranic and Sutra literature. First published in 1977, this work was soon widely hailed as one of the most important contributions to the sociology of India published in recent years. The second edition contains a new Epilogue that places the earlier conclusions in the wider setting of discussions on Hinduism.

*Second Edition Rs 70*

**Towards a Political Economy of Urbanization in  
Third World Countries**

**EDITED BY HELEN I SAFA**

Urbanization has emerged as one of the major issues confronting contemporary developing countries. In this book an attempt has been made to bring a new perspective to bear on the urbanization problem in the Third World. The essays examine the impact of colonialism on the economics of Third World countries, their present participation in the global capitalist system, i.e., their dependence on advanced industrial societies for capital, technology, export markets, etc., their urban class structures, and the role of their governments in shaping the urban process.

*Rs 45*

**Towards a Theory of Import Substitution,  
Exchange Rates and Economic Development  
VINAY BHARAT-RAM**

In this book the author analyses the conditions for technological development in third world countries by drawing upon the Indian experience. Based on the idea that foreign exchange shortages provide the key impetus to import substitution, he brings out the fundamental relationship between technological progress and the scarcity of foreign exchange. He relates technological advancement to the progressive substitution of imported elements in the production process by domestically manufactured ones, a process that requires skills as well as capital.

*Rs 120*

**Prelude to Partition  
The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of  
Control 1920-1932**

**DAVID PAGE**

The emergence of Pakistan is frequently explained in primarily religious or ideological terms, yet these do not reveal how disparate Muslim communities came to see Pakistan as a common goal. This book attempts to give Muslim politics in the crucial period from 1920 to 1932 a structural component to match the ideological interpretation. The author concentrates on the constitutional reforms introduced in 1920, which led to the emergence of the Muslim League as the principal spokesman of Muslim interests in most provinces.

*Rs 120*



**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj,  
New Delhi 110002

Bombay Calcutta Madras

of landslides<sup>2</sup> due to deforestation of the Nepali hills. The National Planning Commission task force on land use policy lamented that soil erosion in the country had reached almost the point of no return and stated, 'It is apparent that the continuation of present trends may lead to the development of a semi-desert type of ecology in the hilly regions'.<sup>3</sup> The large extent of erosion and much of this silt is washed down the Ganges, so much so that an immense new island surfaced in the Bay of Bengal in 1974, all on account of 100,000 square metres of silt.<sup>4</sup>

**T**he most eloquent exposition on ecological deterioration in Nepal is to be found in Eckholm's broad survey of environmental stress.<sup>5</sup> He states 'There is no better place to begin an examination of deteriorating mountain environments than Nepal. In probably no other mountain country are the forces of ecological degradation building so rapidly and visibly. In this land of unexcelled beauty live some of the world's most desperately poor. Population growth in the context of traditional agrarian technology is forcing farmers onto ever steeper slopes, slopes unfit for sustained farming even with astonishingly elaborate terracing practised there.'

He dramatises soil erosion as follows 'Topsoil washing down into India and Bangladesh is now Nepal's most precious export, but one for which it receives no compensation'. He further refers to the precarious situation of the Hill economy and the role of the Tarai as the only outlet 'If Nepal's borders ended at the base of the Himalayan foothills the

country would now be in the throes of a total economic and ecological collapse'.

Another more recent observation on Nepali ecology echoes a similar theme 'Nepal provides the most dramatic example of the speed of desertification. In a flash within the decade ending 1971, Nepal has lost 50 per cent of its forest cover. Two-thirds of its people live in the hills, and they cannot feed themselves on spreading aridity. Its people have, therefore, had to flow down with the silt and water, and spread themselves over the entire tarai belt, extending into the hills of Garhwal, Kumaon, Darjeeling, Sikkim and Bhutan, and into the plains of India'.<sup>6</sup>

**T**he above scenarios, whether products of situation analysis or dramatisation for arousing policy concern, are based on hard realities obtaining in the Nepal Himalaya. However, they deal not only with a part of the story but also reveal the myth about ecological balance. The later aspect is best expressed in the following statement 'And it is the Himalaya, that greatest, noblest, most varied and rich of the world's mountain ranges, whose beauty can only be preserved in the fullest sense by the achievement of a functioning balance between man and mountains'.<sup>7</sup>

In reality, ever since the appearance of *Homo Sapiens* with high cerebral functioning, the earth and its natural resources have not been the same again. Further technological developments have indeed accelerated their use and misuse. Moreover, land forms change even without the intervention of man. Long-term geological processes may not be perceptible in terms of human time scale but geomorphic processes of varying categories can be easily observed and even measured. Thus, the Karnali River is calculated to move some 75 million cubic meters of silt and debris every year, an amount that corresponds to a

1.7 millimeter soil cover of the whole Karnali watershed.<sup>8</sup>

Therefore, when a forester claims, 'the brown soil-laden rivers should go unnoticed during the monsoon, and the fact that they are carrying away forever the basis of the very life of the people should mean nothing at all to the vast majority',<sup>9</sup> it is not ignorance but rather the incapacity to deal effectively with the natural process of erosion. But for the transport of vast quantities of sand and silt by Himalayan rivers over millions of years, there would be no Gangetic plain and no plains civilization to contrast with the hill poverty.

Nepal Himalaya, owing to excessive altitude and steep slopes, represents an area of high energy environment resulting in soil erosion, gully and landslides, not to speak of frequent earth tremors and earthquakes. The geomorphic combination of high elevation, slope, angle and gravity cause the flow of materials downhill. Then, upon this stage of rugged physical geography, is enacted the monsoon drama, thwarted by the Himalayan barrier, with seasonal rhythm. The direct impact of rain-drops and hailstones on the land surface and recharged swollen streams and rivers are like engines and carriers of vast amount of erosion material. Thus, while one study concluded that the Kosi catchment area was 'one of the worst eroded in the world',<sup>10</sup> another expert estimated that Nepal was losing 164,000 cubic inch of top soil each year.<sup>11</sup>

**I**n addition, the country has nearly 3,000 square kilometers area under the realm of perpetual snow and ice with large and small glaciers that scour and excavate mountain slopes and transport moraines to the lower heights, in due course to be carried further down by surface run-off and other natural erosion.

2 R.G.M. Willan, *Forestry in Nepal* UNDP, Kathmandu, 1967.

3 NPC Draft *Proposals of Task Force on Land Use and Erosion Control*, Kathmandu, 1974, Mimeo. See also, *Fifth Plan*, Kathmandu, 1975 chapter VI Land Use Policy, p. 50-54.

4 Claire Stirling, 'Nepal' in *The Atlantis*, October, 1976.

5 Erik P. Eckholm, *Losing Ground: Environmental Stress and World Food Prospects*, New York, 1976.

6 A.D. Moddie, 'Himalayan Environment', in *The Himalaya: Aspects of Change* edited by J.S. Lall, Delhi, 1981, p. 344.

7 J.D. Ives, 'Applied Mountain Geocology' in J.S. Lall, *op cit*, p. 377-402.

8 World Bank (IBRD), *Nepal Agriculture Sector Report*, Washington, 1973.

9 Robbe, *op cit*, 1954.

10 Department of Agriculture (India), *Soil and Water Conservation in Nepal Report of the Joint Indo-Nepal Team* New Delhi, 1967, p. 5.

11 Quoted in D.D. Bhatta, 'Nepal Himalaya and Change' in J.S. Lall, *op cit*, p. 253-277.

processes. The changing physical geography of the Nepal Himalaya has been an inexorable natural process over long geological time. The land mass that is still rising is being eroded by isostatic balance and as an area of still active orogenic movements, it must experience greater magnitude of tectonic processes.

In contrast to the long period of natural erosion shaping the physical landscape of the Nepal Himalaya, the intervention of man has been brief in time, the impact of man-made erosion has been significant and far-reaching in consequence. Migration and natural increase in population has put pressure on the available land. Generations of farmers have carved whole hill sides into elaborate flights of field terraces and the need for ever more has led to reclamation of further marginal lands. Livestock rearing for manure and use of firewood as the sole energy source has contributed to the depletion of forests and exposure of more land to increased natural erosion. The destruction of the natural ecosystem is inevitable with human activities.<sup>12</sup> Thus, to speak of ecological balance in its pristine state is only a futile perpetuation of an ancient myth. Yet, one must enquire into the human compulsions to eke out a living even in marginal mountain lands.

**M**ountains everywhere are marginal areas for human occupation. The extant autochthonous people of Nepal are forest dwellers of the Inner Tarai and hunter-gatherers of lower river valleys. Most of the other ethnic groups that make-up today's Nepalese population were derived from successive waves of migrations from the Tibetan plateau and the Gangetic plain. Increasing aridity in the north and historical conflicts in the south drove hordes of people to the security of the slopes of the Nepal Himalaya. The Nepal Hills were already densely populated by the end of the 18th century as evidenced by the military expeditions from Tista to Sulej and

Population Growth, 1920—1952/54

Region	Population 1920	Population 1952/54	Absolute Growth	% Growth	Growth Rate
I Hills	3,144,840	5,142,689	1,997,843	63.5	1.9
II Inner Tarai	1,860,50	506,461	320,411	17.2	5.2
III Tarai	1,937,986	2,418,567	480,581	24.7	0.7
TOTAL	5,573,788	8,473,478	2,899,690	52.0	1.5

the recognition of Tarai as a source of forest revenue

zone of settlement until the mid-20th century.

**W**hen the political boundary of modern Nepal was finally defined in 1816, the only alternative to the economic poverty of the Hills was export of muscle-power or emigration. While large numbers of men turned to mercenary service in British India, many more became yeoman farmers in the Eastern Himalayas and even beyond to Burma. By the turn of the 19th century, Darjeeling district and Sikkim had been overwhelmed by migrants from the hills of Nepal. The number of men recruited in the Indian Army during 1886 to 1904 was 27,428 and 127,770 in the period 1904-1935, all from the Hills.<sup>13</sup> In addition, the number of migrants to Indian cities and some industries continued to increase. The earnings, remittances and pensions of these recurrent migrants sustained the economy of the Hills to a large extent.

There were numerous attempts to reclaim the Tarai land from forests for resettlement during the Rana regime.<sup>14</sup> All the while, population pressure in the Hills was increasing and more marginal land was being brought under the hoe if not the plough. As shown in the above table on regional population growth, the Tarai still remained a negative

The Hill region had a large absolute increase over the three-decade period, four times that of the increase in the Tarai. In other words, the Hills claimed 68.8 per cent of the increase in national population. Thus, the Hills that carried 61.9 per cent of the total population in 1920 were still overburdened with 60.6 per cent of the total population. The percentage growth of the Hill population exceeded overall percentage growth. The growth rates varied from 5.2 in the intermediate Inner Tarai, 1.9 in the Hills and only 0.7 per cent in the Tarai compared to the national growth rate of 1.5.

**T**he intervention of technology which eradicated malaria and turned the Tarai into a new frontier for human occupation is the story of the last two decades. This caused a major shift in population from the Hills to the Tarai with far reaching consequences in population redistribution and land use change.<sup>15</sup> The Tarai and Inner Tarai population doubled during the last two decades (1961-81) and its share of total population increased from 36.3 per cent in 1961 to 48.8 per cent in 1981. However, the Hill population continued to grow although at a lesser rate, the increase was 25.7 per cent and its share of total population decreased from 63.7 per cent in 1961 to 51.2 per cent in 1981. The dec-

<sup>12</sup> Hans Christoph Rieger, 'Man versus Mountains: The destruction of the Himalayan Ecosystem,' in J S Lall, *op cit*, 1981, p 351-375

<sup>13</sup> C J Morris, *Gurkhas Handbook for the Indian Army* Delhi, 1936, Appendix 6, p 173-179

<sup>14</sup> J V Collier, 'Forestry in Nepal' in *Nepal* by Percival Landon, 1928, Vol II, Appendix XIX p 251-255

<sup>15</sup> New ERA, *Study on Inter-regional Migration in Nepal*, Kathmandu, 1981



reasing capacity of the Hills to support the increasing population is indicated by the differential growth rates among the geographical regions

Region	Growth Rate 1961-1971	Growth Rate 1971-1981
I Mountain	0.88	0.69
II Hills	1.68	0.89
III. Inner Tarai	4.51	3.04
IV Tarai	4.21	4.31
V Kathmandu Valley	10.91	1.63
Nepal	2.28	2.27

The Mountain districts show a declining growth rate and the 3 districts of Rasuwa, Manang and Mustang actually had a negative growth rate of 1.79. The growth rate for the Hills decreased by 0.79 during the last decade. Growth rates for the Inner Tarai declined slightly while the rate of decline in Kathmandu Valley was to the extent of 10.07. The Tarai was the only region to evidence an increasing growth rate during 1971-81 compared to the previous decade.

**T**he pressure of population on the Inner Tarai foothills and Tarai plain due to natural increase, Hill migrants and foreign immigrants had a significant impact on the land use pattern. For example, population increase and forest depletion in the Eastern Tarai districts of Jhapa, Morang, Sunsari and Siraha show a close correlation. During the period 1952-1971, their population nearly doubled while the forest area was halved.

A macro perspective on land use change in the entire Tarai region is provided by a comparison of 1927 maps with 1977 satellite imageries. The extent of deforestation in the Tarai and parts of Inner Tarai during the 50-years span comes to 853,510 hectares or 60 per cent of the forest cover in 1927. The magnitude of population growth during the same period was 163.2

per cent. In other words, there was an average per annum population increase of 63,858 persons at the cost of an average per annum forest depletion of 17,070 hectares during the period 1927-77. Thus the Tarai region had only 28.3 per cent of its total area under forest by 1977.

However, the Tarai cannot be regarded as an unlimited frontier for the ever-increasing population. The shift of Hill out-migration to the Tarai, seen particularly in the last two decades, has its own limitations. First, not all Hill outmigrants end up in the Tarai as a large number cross the national border for their livelihood. Second is the basic question regarding the optimum carrying capacity of the Tarai. The time the Tarai can provide breathing space to the national economy is being foreshortened by the present pattern of extractive use of forest resources and extensive nature of land occupation.

**I**t would help to focus on basic issues of ecology and development by discarding some prevalent notions. For example, the establishment of the so-called ecological balance between man and land is no more feasible and much less in Nepal where natural processes and population pressure are intense. National space has no meaning without human survival or welfare. The very objective of modern development is to free man from natural constraints. Ecological conservation cannot be isolated from human welfare.

Then there is immense difference in time span between what nature processes and man utilises. There would be no alluvial plains without loss of valuable soil at the head waters and no fertile river basins without bank-cutting. Nature has a long sequence of sand or silt deposition, vegetation colonisation and humus formation, while man thinks in terms of immediate use or exploitation.

There is no denying the increasing ecological stress in Nepal and some of it accentuated by population pressure. But what are the alter-

natives? It might be pertinent here to refer to an interesting observation on witnessing a landslide in Lamjung (precipitated by the earthquake of 1933). 'Whether it takes place little by little or in one swift calamity, soil erosion is generally attributed to man's careless greed, his idleness or neglect. It would not, I think, be fair to blame the people of these valleys on the Himalayan fringe for the frequent landslips which occur here. In turning the steep slopes into fruitful fields they have neither been lazy nor neglectful. One might say that on such hillsides the forest should never have been cleared, in which case the country must be left uninhabited, or that belts of trees should have been planted which would imply first the giving up of their goats by villagers'.<sup>16</sup>

Indeed, the Hills of Nepal evidence the maximum utilisation of marginal land under the given technology. In other words, the hill peasants are being forced to struggle for survival in an hostile environment. One need not venture into remote Himalayan valleys to realise the poverty of rural Nepal. The pressure on marginal land is evidenced by hamlets on the Mahabharat Lekh traversed by the country's oldest and latest highway.

The field slopes above Khanikhola on the Tribhuvan Rajpath exceed a 45 degrees angle and with top-soil so poor that the maize crops stand to the height of millet. Meanwhile, heavy traffic has been trundling past them over the last 25 years as if through a tunnel without any visible impact. Another example of human struggle with harsh land is presented by the Narayanghat-Mugling road along the Trisuli gorge where the native Chepangs subsist on wild yam and tubers and Magar and Gurung migrants tend tiny maize and millet fields that overhang the steepest slope.

**T**he precarious ecology of the Nepali hills cannot be improved without first tackling the economic poverty of the people. And the Hill

<sup>16</sup> H.W. Tilman, *Nepal Himalaya*, Cambridge, 1952, p. 126-127.

economy cannot be improved without outside intervention. But technical assistance that purports to teach them how to make terraces or simply prescribes alternative energy use will not do. Laying out field terraces is the hill man's elemental device to deal with adverse slopes and the native technology perfected through generations of trial and error cannot be improved upon with outside advice. The outward facing dry terraces are not products of native ignorance or indolence but represent the equation between labour and output. Neither is shifting cultivation a general practice as it is prevalent only in areas of high rainfall and fast vegetation regeneration.

**M**uch emphasis has been laid on the need for the use of alternative energy to relieve the pressure on forests for fuelwood.<sup>17</sup> The case for alternative energy becomes theoretical if not futile when one faces the reality where the value of a cheap biogas plant far exceeds the entire capital asset of a farmer including his simple hut. Intermediate technology can be applied in an economy of some capital formation or on a community basis but in the case of rural Nepal, where most live below the poverty line, it is a questionable proposition.

That economic exigencies force peasants to misuse the resources they once considered valuable is shown by their present exploitation of forests. 'Many of the old established hill tribes, including the Rais, Limbus, Tamangs, Lepchas, Sherpas, Sunwars, Danuwars, and Majhis, maintained this (kipat) communal land system to regulate the tribes relationship with the environment'.<sup>18</sup> But the intervention of outsiders in tribal areas as well as sheer population growth have destroyed the traditional control mechanisms that once preserved forests or allocated land according to need. Thus

it is apparent that new programmes such as community afforestation and watershed management<sup>19</sup> will have only limited impact so long as the Hill economy languishes at the present state of morbidity.

**T**here seem only two approaches which may reduce ecological stress and resolve the economic problems of Nepal. These relate to the reordering of the space in the Tarai and the emphasis on Hill development.<sup>20</sup> They are presented as complementary measures to be pursued simultaneously since the ecology of the Hills and the Tarai are closely interlinked.<sup>21</sup> Similar to emigration in the past, the Tarai has now become the outlet and cushion for hill poverty. However, neither is the Tarai's absorptive capacity for migrants unlimited nor can its forest revenue be seen always as one of harvesting without planting. The Tarai forests that still exist have a bleak future due to the immense pressure. There is, therefore, the need for complete rethinking on the land use of the Tarai whereby maximum area is converted into farmland and existing infrastructures are channelised for expanding secondary and tertiary economic activities.

Yet, the economic disease which bedevils the country is located in the Hills. It is there that the problem of poverty has to be tackled. This will require massive initial development inputs. Fortunately, it is the poor Hills, as the repository of immense hydro electric power, that hold the key to the future development of the country. The silt will continue to flow down the Himalayan rivers as it did for millions of years. But the real loss is in the silent passage of white energy ever waiting for us to harness for a better life.

<sup>19</sup> UNDP/FAO *Nepal / Integrated Watershed Management, Torrent Control and Land Use Development*, Rome, 1980.

<sup>20</sup> Harka Gurung, 'Rationale for Hill Areas Development', *Industrial Digest*, Vol IV, 1971, p 17-24.

<sup>21</sup> Harka Gurung, 'Landscape Pattern of Nepal', *Himalayan Review*, Vol IV, 1971, p 1-10.

<sup>17</sup> RECAST *Renewable Energy Resources in Nepal*, Proceedings of the Workshop Seminar, Kathmandu, 1-4 April 1981.

<sup>18</sup> Mork Poffenberger, *Patterns of Change in the Nepal Himalaya*, Delhi, 1980, p 53-54.

# Further reading

## BOOKS

- Abullaish** An evaluation of administrative decentralization in Nepal Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1980
- Acharya, Meena.** Statistical profile of Nepalese women a critical review Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1979
- Adhikari, Krishna Kant** A brief survey of Nepali historiography Kathmandu, Buku, 1980
- Agrawal, Govind Ram** Mobilization of resources for a basic needs oriented public sector programme in Nepal Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1979
- Agrawal, Hem Narayan** Nepal a study in constitutional change New Delhi, Oxford and IBH, 1980
- Amatya, Soorya Lal** Cash crop farming in Nepal. Kirtipur, Tribhuvan University, 1975
- Bajracharya, Bhuban Bajra.** A review of the co-operative development in Nepal Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1980
- Banskota, Mahesh** Environment management, rural development and project planning Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1980
- Indicators in the context of Nepal's Sixth Plan 1980-1986 Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1980
- Sectoral allocation of development and its productivity Kathmandu, Centre for Economic and Development Administration, 1980
- Banskota, N.P** Indo-Nepal trade and economic relations Delhi, B R Publishing Corporation, 1981
- Baral, Lok Raj** Institution building in Nepal a study of the working of village Panchayats Kathmandu, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 1980
- Oppositional politics in Nepal New Delhi, Abhinav Publications, 1977
- Bererman, Gerald** Hindu of the Himalayas Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963
- Bhatt, Dibya Deo** Nepal and non-alignment Lalitpur, C K Bhatt, 1980
- Bhatt, Bhim Dev, Babu Ram Shreshtha and Bijaya Kunwar.** Administrative problems of project implementation in Nepal Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1980
- Centre for Economic Development and Administration** Regional developments study, Nepal Kathmandu, CEDA, 1975, 4 Parts
- Strategic elements of rural development in Nepal Kathmandu, CEDA, 1980
- Chand, Diwaker** Critical appraisal of rural economy of Nepal Kathmandu, Adarsh Chhaphana, 1976
- Chatterji, Bhola** Palace, people and politics Nepal in perspective New Delhi, Ankur Publishing House, 1980
- Dahal, Dilli Ram, Navin Kumar Rai and Andrew E. Manzardo** Land and migration in far-western Nepal Kirtipur Institute of Nepal and Asian Studies, 1977
- Devkota, Bharat** Government expenditure on road transport in Nepal Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1980
- Dhungana, Bhawani** An analysis of tax structure of Nepal Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1979.
- Financial resource mobilization in Nepal during the nineteen eighties Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1980
- Indirect taxation in Nepal. Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1980
- Dixit, Mani** Come tomorrow Kathmandu, Sajha Prakashan, 1980
- Gurung, Harka** Vignettes of Nepal. Kathmandu, Sajha Prakashan, 1980
- Gurung, Sant Bahadura** Regional development planning and administration in Nepal Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1978
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.** Nepal development, performance and prospects Washington, IBRD, 1979.
- Jain, Girilal** India meets China in Nepal. New York, Asia Publishing House, 1959
- Jain, S C.** Poverty to prosperity in Nepal Delhi, Development Publishers, 1981
- Kaisher Bahadur, K C** Nepal after the revolution of 1950 Kathmandu, Sharda Prakashan Griha, 1976-1977 2 Vols
- Kansakar, Vidya Bir Singh.** Effectiveness of planned resettlement programme in Nepal Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1979 2 Vols
- Population projection for Nepal, 1970-2000 Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1980

- Karan, Pradyumna P** Nepal a physical and cultural geography Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1960
- Karan, Pradyumna, P and Jenkins, William M, Jr** The Himalayan Kingdom Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1963
- Khanal, Yadu Nath** Nepal, transition from isolationism Kathmandu, Sajha Prakashan, 1977
- Reflections on Nepal-India relations (Collection of statements by the author while ambassador to India) Delhi, Rakesh Press, 1964
- Stray thoughts (Collection of speeches and articles by the author) Delhi, Rakesh Press, 1966
- Kiriellia, T.B A.** Selected markets for medicinal herbs from Nepal Kathmandu, Trade Promotion Centre, 1981
- Koirala, Bharat Dutta** Nepal's panchayat democracy Kathmandu Development of Information, Ministry of Communications, 1976
- Kumar, D P** Nepal year of decision Delhi, Vikas, 1980
- Lohani, Prakash, C** Economic plans and economic planning in Nepal Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1979
- People's participation in Development Kathmandu Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1980,
- Mahat, R S.** Capital market, financial flows and industrial finance in Nepal Kathmandu, Sajha Prakashan, 1981
- Majupuria, Trilok Chandra.** Sacred and symbolic animals of Nepal animals in the art, culture myths and legends of the Hindus and Buddhists Kathmandu, Sahayogi Prakashan, 1977
- Nepal the land of festivals. New Delhi, S Chand, 1981
- Narayan, Shriman** India and Nepal. an exercise in open diplomacy Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1970.
- Okada, Ferdinand, E.** Preliminary report on regional development areas in Nepal Kathmandu, National Planning Commission, 1970
- Pant, Hari Dhoj.** Incidence and effects of excise taxation in Nepal Kathmandu, Pant, 1978
- Pant, Y P.** Problems in fiscal and monetary policy Kathmandu, Sahayogi Prakashan, 1970
- Pradhan, Bina, Shreshtha, Indira and Shrestha, Ananda** Child development study in Nepal implications for policy and training Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1980
- Pradhan, Prachanda, P.** Local institutions and people's participation in rural public works in Nepal New York, Rural Development Committee, Cornell University, 1980
- Ram Bhadur, K C.** Land reform in Nepal. Kathmandu, His Majesty's Govt Land Reforms Department, 1968
- Rana, Greta** Distant hills Kathmandu, Sharda Prakashan Griha, 1977
- Nothing greener Kathmandu, Sharda Prakashan Griha, 1977
- Rana, Kamal.** Status and role of women in the organised sector on the situation in Nepal Kathmandu, Social Services National Coordinating Council, 1977
- Rana, Pramode, S** Rana Nepal an insider's view Kathmandu, R Rana, 1978
- Regmi, Dilli Raman** A century of family autocracy in Nepal. Banaras, Nepali National Congress, 1950
- Regmi, Jagdish Chandra.** A concise dictionary of Himalayan people Kathmandu, Office of Nepal-Antiquary, 1979
- Dictionary of Nepalese cultural geography Kathmandu, Office of Nepal-Antiquary, 1980
- Regmi, Jagdish Chandra** People of Nepal Kathmandu, Office of the Nepal-Antiquary, 1980
- Rose, Leo E and Scholz, John T** Nepal profile of a Himalayan Kingdom New Delhi, Select Service Syndicate, 1980.
- Sarma, Nagendra.** Nepal A to Z. Kathmandu, Nepal Association of Travel Agents, 1978
- Satyai, Yagya Raj** Nepalese cultural heritage in a nutshell Kathmandu, H M G Hotel Management and Tourism Training Centre, 1979
- Shaha, Rishikesh** Nepali politics retrospect and prospect Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1978.
- An introduction to Nepal Kathmandu, Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1976
- Essays in the practice of government New Delhi, Manohar Book Service, 1982.
- Sharma, Chandra, K** Nepal and the Nepalese. Kathmandu, Sangeeta Sharma, 1979
- Shrestha, B P and Jain, S P.** Regional development in Nepal. Patna, Development Publishers, 1975.
- Shrestha, Badri Prasad** The economy of Nepal or a study in problems and processes of industrialization Bombay Vora, 1967.
- Monetary policy in an emerging economy: a case study of Nepal Kathmandu, Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1965
- Shrestha, Kedar, N** Educational management in Nepal Bhaktpur, Institute of Education, 1980.
- Shrestha, Mangal K.** A handbook of public administration in Nepal. Kathmandu, Department of Publicity and Broadcasting, 1962
- Shrestha, S H.** Modern geography of Nepal. Kathmandu, Vishwakarma Press, 1968
- Shrestha, Surendra, B.** How Nepal is governed. Kathmandu, Pashupati Press, 1965
- Shrestha, Tulsi Narayan** Nepalese administration: an image Kathmandu, Sanjha Prakashan, 1981
- Singh, Khadga Man.** A retrospect on democracy: party and panchayat Kathmandu, The Author, 1980
- Singh, S.K** The fiscal system of Nepal Kathmandu, Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1977
- Sinha, Upendra Narain.** Panchayat democracy of Nepal in theory and practice Kathmandu, His Majesty's Government, 1972
- Tandukar, Gopal Man.** Kiratas at a glance Kathmandu, International Standard Books and Periodicals Store, 1980

- Thapa, Netra, B.** A short history of Nepal 5th ed Kathmandu, Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1981
- Thapa, Yadab, S** Effects of population growth on government expenditure Kirtipur, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1978
- Tuladhar, Daman Raj** Contemporary Nepal, 1945-1955 Kathmandu, Laxmi Publications, 1980
- Tuladhar, Tirtha, R** Partyless democracy: its basis and background, Kathmandu, Royal Palace Secretariat, 1962
- United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific.** Population of Nepal Bangkok, 1980
- Upadhyaya, Yogeshraj.** Facts about Nepal Kathmandu, His Majesty's Govt, 1980
- Verma, Yogeshwar, P** Nepal progress and problems 1972-80 Dhobauli, Jaleshwar — Mahotary, 1981
- Yadav, Ram Prakash** A glance at the present agricultural research, education, and extension in Nepal Kathmandu, Agricultural Projects Services Centre, 1976

#### ARTICLES

- Agrawal, Govinda, R.** Population management in Nepal 'Prashasan' 12(1) November 1980 51-62
- Ali, Saimat** Preparation for a poll 'Far Eastern Economic Review' 111(8) 13 February 1981 30-31
- Bajaracharya, Pushkar and Agrawal, Jagdish.** Industrialisation during the Rana regime 'Public Administration Journal' 3(2) December 1980 86-98
- Baral, L S** Nepal's apprenticeship in democracy 1951-60 'India Quarterly' 26(3) July-September 1971 185-200
- Bhatta, Bhim Dev** Administrative reform, a comparative study of the Jha and Thapa Commission reports. 'Public Administration Journal' 3(1) May 1980 49-62
- Borgstrom, Bengt-Erik** The best of two worlds rhetoric of autocracy and democracy in Nepal 'Contributions to Indian Sociology' 14(1) January-June 1980, 35-50
- Chatterji, Bhola** King Birendra and democrats must join hands 'Amrit Bazar Patrika' 22 November 1981
- Will king Birendra rise to the occasion? 'Amrit Bazar Patrika' 25 June, 1981
- Datta-Ray, Sunanda, K** Nepal in transition 'Statesman': 7 and 8 March, 1982
- Gautam, Upendra** Institution building in Nepal the case of public administration campus 'Public Administration Journal' 3(2) December 1980 47-56
- The Nepalese field administration 'Prashasan' 12(3) July 1981 6-13
- Ghori, Karmatullah Khan.** Nepal and its neighbours 'Pakistan Horizon' 17(4). 1964 368-384
- Hayes, Louis, D.** Educational reform in Nepal an evaluation 'Asian Survey' 21(6) June 1981 676-688

- Heck, Douglas** Nepal in 1980 the year of the referendum 'Asian Survey' 21(1) February 1981 181-187
- Joshi, Navin Chandra** Revamping Nepal industries. 'Financial Express' 6 April, 1981
- Karki, Chitra Bahadur** Impact of planning on structural development of Nepal 'Prashasan' 13 (1). November 1981 53-64
- Karki, Chitra Bahadur and Sharma, Purushottam** Projections of demand for and supply of wheat in Nepal 'Public Administration Journal' 4(1) May 1981 38 49
- Kurve, Mavin.** 'Nepal's peace zone move: attempt to change 1960 treaty 'Times of India'. 14 January, 1981
- Madeley, John.** Nepal king holds the ace 'National Herald' 7 March, 1981.
- Nepal prepares for elections 'Tribune': 18 February, 1982
- Malhotra, Inder.** Referendum in Nepal 'Times of India' 31 May, 1979
- Malla, Kamal P.** The role of the rector in Tribhuvan University administration 'Public Administration Journal' 4(1) May 1981 13-23.
- Manandhar, Shes N. and Paudel, Byasjee** Morale in Nepalese civil service an empirical study. 'Prashasan' 12(1), November 1980 63-70.
- Mishra, Brahmanand.** Major political shifts in little Nepal 'Commerce' 143(3671) 24 October, 1981 742-743
- Mishra, Indra Deo.** Nepal referendum; an opinion sample among workers 'Mainstream' 18(35): 26 April, 1980 27-30.
- Mishra, Prakash** Nepal and elections 'National Herald' 27 March, 1981
- Mukherjee, Trithankar** Himalayan riddle 'Amrit Bazar Patrika': 31 July, 1981
- Muni, S D.** Legislature and foreign policy in South Asia: the case of Nepal 'South Asian Studies' 6 (1) January 1977 23-39
- Namboodiri, P K S** Gains for democracy in Nepal. 'Assam Tribune' 27 May, 1981
- Nepal's biggest ever budget 'Commerce', 143 (3662): 22 August, 1981 1346-1347
- Pant, Dhruba** Integrated rural development projects in Nepal an appraisal 'Prashasan' 13 (1) November 1981 25-37
- Pant, Dinesh P** Nepalese bureaucracy obsolescences and innovations 'Prashasan' 12(3) July 1981 44-61
- Pradhan, Bharat Bahadur** A search for improvement in project planning in Nepal 'Prashasan' 12 (1) November 1980 1-10
- Pradhan, Prachanda** Institution building and Administrative Management Department a case study of institutionalising the administrative innovations in Nepalese administration 'Public Administration Journal' 3 (1) May 1980 1-15
- Social impact of tourism in Nepal. 'Prashasan' 12 (3): July 1981 25-43.
- Pradhan, Prachanda and Dhungel, Ramesh** Negative bureaucratic behaviour and development: the Nepalese case 'Public Administration Journal' 3 (2) December 1980 20-32

- Rahul, Ram** Making of modern Nepal 'International Studies' 16 (1) January-March 1977 1-15.
- Rajbahak, Ram Prasad.** Institutional hurdles to industrialisation in Nepal 'Public Administration Journal' 4 (1) May 1981 8-12
- Ram Bahadur, K C.** Development and development administration, what criteria? 'Prashasan' 13 (1) November 1981 45-51
- Ram Bahadur, K C** Role of planning cells and strengthening their capacity 'Prashasan' 12 (2) March 1981, 14-19
- Ramunny, Murkot** Nepal another step towards modernity 'Hindu' 25 April, 1981
- Rana, Pashupati, S J.B** The Nepalese economy problems, and prospects 'Asian Survey' 14 (7) July 1974 651-662
- Sapkota, Purusottam, P** Morale how to boost an administration 'Prashasan' 13 (1) November 1981 39-44
- Schloss, Aran** Making planning relevant Nepal's experience 1968-1976 'Asian Survey' 20 (10) October 1980 1008-1022
- Shah, Sukhdev** Developing an economy Nepal's experience 'Asian Survey' 21(10), October 1981 1060-1079
- Shaha, Rishikesh** Democracy in Nepal 'Statesman' 5, 6 and 7 May, 1981
- Democracy's second chance in Nepal King Birendra's offer of political referendum 'Round Table' (277) January 1980 65-73
- The historical roots of non-alignment 'Annual Journal of the Nepal Council of World Affairs' February 1975 57-78
- Negotiations on the Nepal-India Trade and Transit Treaty politics of foreign aid and trade 'Annual Journal of the Council of World Affairs' 12 June, 1971 42-55
- Nepal's peace illusions diplomacy instead of diplomacy 'Statesman' 5 January, 1982
- No sign of genuine reform in Nepal 'Times of India' 16 April, 1981
- Tangled politics of Nepal 'Amrit Bazar Patrika' 2 February, 1982
- Shakya, Dharma Bahadur** Ancient administration in Nepal the Kiratas and the Lichhavis 'Public Administration Journal' 3(2) December 1980 13-19
- The first administrative modernisation attempts in Nepal an evaluation 'Public Administration Journal' 4 (1) May 1981 1-7
- Sharma, B S and Shreshtha, Manohar Krishna** Working of public enterprise in Nepal a study of constraints and financial results 'Prashasan' 13(1) November 1981 1-23
- Sharma, Purushottam** The government and industrial relations in Nepal 'Public Administration Journal' 3(2) December 1980 99-104
- Shrestha, Aditya Man** Big boost to Nepal farming 'Mail' 8 July, 1981
- IFAD (International Fund and Agricultural Development) financed project for Nepal 'Mail' 25 March, 1981
- Nepal constitution ensures new political changes. 'Tribune' 2 March, 1981
- Planning structure in Nepal 'Mail' 31 January, 1981
- Plans fail to help poor 'M P Chronicle' 11 May, 1981
- Statute changes in Nepal 'Mail' 24 February, 1981
- Shrestha, Mangal Krishna** Policy reforms in Nepalese civil service 'Prashasan' 12(3) July 1981 1-5
- Training of administrators at the national level 'Prashasan' 12(2) March 1981 1-13
- Shrestha, Manohar Krishna** Analysis of budgetary system of H M G 'Prashasan' 11(3) July 1980 10-38
- Public enterprises have they dividend paying ability 'Prashasan' 12(2) March 1981 20-9
- Shrestha, Rama Prasad** Amended constitution and constitutional audit in Nepal 'Prashasan' 12(2) March 1981 30-4
- Shrestha, Tulsī Narayan.** Nepal's administrative culture some random observations 'Public Administration Journal' 3(2) December 1980 33-8
- Singh, Karan.** Nepal's cautious transition 'Deccan Chronicle' 29 May, 1981
- Singh, Kedar Man.** Deficits for development Nepal shortfall sets a record as Pant boosts spending on agriculture and irrigation and shifts the tax burden 'Far Eastern Economic Review' 113(30) 17 July, 1981 55
- Singh, M.P and Shrestha, R.P.** Relative potency of the factors affecting job satisfaction of junior technical assistants of Nepal 'Prashasan' 11(1) November 1979 37-46
- Smith, Thomas B.** Nepal's political system in transition 'World Today' 37(2) February 1981 74-80
- Suvedi, Purushottam S.** Public administration problems in Nepal an analytical overview 'Prashasan' 11(1) November 1979 26-35
- Swamy, Narayan** Nepal today the palace and the politics 'Deccan Herald' 22 June, 1981
- Tiwari, Madhu Nidhi** Promotion in Nepalese civil service an appraisal 'Public Administration Journal' 3(1) May 1980 25-30
- Upadhyay, Narottam Prasad** Minimum wage in Nepal an appraisal 'Public Administration Journal' 3(2) December 1980 69-78
- Organisational and personnel function in Nepalese public enterprises 'Public Administration Journal' 4(1) May 1981 50-76
- Upreti, B C** Nepal reforms the constitution 'Janata' 36(4) 8 March, 1981 13-15
- Vaidya, Ratna Kamal** Manpower planning in Nepal a diagnostic study 'Public Administration Journal' 3(2) December 1980 79-85
- Nepalese public administration in historical perspective 'Public Administration Journal' 3(1) May 1980 41-7

#### SEMINAR ISSUE

37 Our Neighbours, September 1962

# **the art of good management...**



**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**

Shriram seminars and courses are part of this moulding process . which involves executives in a ceaseless interchange of ideas, discussion of modern techniques, evaluation and reconsideration of policies. So that the Shriram organisation is constantly infused with fresh dynamism . and our resources are utilised to the optimum.



**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**



## Fly the only airline in the world where you can sit back and read the decor.

Just study the cabin walls. You'll find Indian mythology come alive in Krishna's frolics with gamholling gopis. Gods and goddesses, and lesser mortals centuries old, frozen in arts of love in the frescoes of Ajanta and Ellora. Men and women of India down the ages caught in their daily acts of work and play. They're all part of the interior decor of an Air-India 747.

**AIR-INDIA**

Something good going for you

AI 3104



# SEMINAR

275

280

1982

Should  
not

today

July 1982

# Benefit from our widest range of compressors, backed by the world's foremost air power technology.

## New additions to CP's expanding range

**TB-20½ x 13**

Lubricated/Oil-less Horizontal, Reciprocating  
Compressors

**500-RO-2**

Rotary Portable Diesel Compressors.

**'TU' & 'TUO'**

Lubricated/Oil-less Vertical, Reciprocating  
Compressors

## Plus 25 other proven and trusted models

Compressors of every description. Portable  
and Stationary. Electric motor/Diesel engine-  
driven. Rotary and Reciprocating. Single  
stage/Two-stage. Air cooled/Water cooled.  
Lubricated/Oil-less. Horizontal/Vertical.  
Single-acting/Double acting. Balanced-  
opposed & tandem. In capacities from  
3 m<sup>3</sup>/min (108 c f m) to 114 m<sup>3</sup>/min  
(4000 c f m)

Together, our widest range for every need.

## Why CP Compressors?


CP Compressors are crafted to the highest  
standards of quality and workmanship and  
incorporate international designs and know-  
how. And they're backed by prompt and  
efficient service both before and after sales.  
No wonder CP-India are today the largest  
exporters of compressed air equipment to  
over 15 countries.

Now, what can we offer you?


### CAUTION

Insist on genuine CP spares to keep  
your CP compressed air equipment  
working efficiently.


Class TU



Class TB



Class FE



Please contact our nearest branch for literature.

## CONSOLIDATED PNEUMATIC

CONSOLIDATED PNEUMATIC TOOL CO (INDIA) LTD.

301 L B Shesthi Marg, Mulund, Bombay 400 080. Branches at: 30  
J Nehru Road, Calcutta 700 016. Eros Apartments, 56 Nehru Place,  
New Delhi 110 024. Finance House, Pattullo Road, Madras 600 002.  
Jamshedpur - Secunderabad - Goa - Bangalore.



The power of air harnessed for higher productivity.

# Mahindra


## now brings you the Peugeot XDP 4.90- a diesel engine of advanced design

**Mahindra** meets the challenge of the oil crisis, with a superb new, lightweight high performance diesel engine-the **PEUGEOT XDP 4.90** with greater fuel efficiency.

This world-famous engine is now being assembled at the Mahindra plant.


The **PEUGEOT XDP 4.90** will be fitted initially on the **Mahindra NC 665 DP Mini Truck**, Pick-up Van and Ambulance

By far the most vital factor is the greater fuel efficiency of this lightweight, high performance engine



#### Engine Specifications .

No. of Cylinders	4
Bore-mm	90
Stroke-mm	83
Bore/Stroke ratio	1.08
Displacement-cc	2112
Compression Ratio	22.4:1
R P M (max)	4500
Max B H P.	75
Max Torque Kg m	13.3
	@ 2000 r.p.m.
Weight Kg.	184



The Mahindra NC 665 DP  
Mini Truck fitted with  
Peugeot XDP 4.90 diesel engine



Pick-up Van



Ambulance



**Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.**


**When you need high quality controls,  
remember...**

**Danfoss**

Manufacturers of  
Controls for Domestic/Commercial  
Refrigeration and Air Conditioning.



Automatic Controls



gvc 001/d91/D/26

Helping to save energy Silently.

Registered Office 706-707 Surya Kiran, 19 Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi 110 001

## RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS

**A few facts you should know.**

Garlic has been well-known from earliest times for its medicinal properties. Medical authorities have accepted the value of garlic in correcting various health problems. Garlic can be taken raw or cooked or in capsule form. But to derive the maximum medicinal benefits from garlic, it should be taken in the most effective way.

### Why not raw Garlic?



Raw garlic cloves have to be chewed before the extract acts inside the body. But when chewed, they leave an unpleasant smell. When swallowed, they are difficult to digest. And the extraction is incomplete.



### Why not cooked Garlic?

On cooking, the effective medicinal properties of garlic are lost.


### Why RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS?

Ranbaxy Laboratories, a trusted name with the medical profession, now gives you all the benefits of raw garlic—without the smell. Ranbaxy's Garlic Pearls contain the pure extract of raw garlic in easy-to-digest, soft gelatin capsules—the most effective way of deriving the medicinal properties of garlic.

#### RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS

- ☞ Help relieve gas and indigestion, ease heartburn
- ☞ Reduce high cholesterol levels
- ☞ Help ease disabling joint pains
- ☞ Prevent and control recurring coughs and colds


Take Ranbaxy's Garlic Pearls—everyday  
It's a healthy habit




Take  
two pearls  
twice daily  
regularly

**The natural way to all-round health.**


# Elegant looks




## Versatile features




Attractive Sleek Two-toned USHA Streamlined—the sewing machine that outclasses any other in its price range With features that others can't match And a 5-year guarantee too




Patch Darning for easy darning and quick adjustment of pressure on cloth



3-position drop feed for easy adjustment of feed-dog position



Dial-type stitch regulator with lever for forward and reverse stitch control and locking arrangement



Thread tension adjuster for regulating proper thread tension.

**USHA Streamlined** feature for feature a better machine

# STEEL: design for progress

Steel spells progress and steel plants are vital to India's continued economic progress.

DASTURCO has been closely involved, since its inception in 1955, in the planning, design and engineering of steel and allied projects in India, for the Central and State Governments as well as the private sector.

Pioneer of self-reliance in steel plant engineering in India, DASTURCO is in the forefront of new technologies


- direct reduction □ pelletizing
- electric arc steelmaking □ continuous casting
- OBM steelmaking □ vacuum degassing
- electro-slag remelting □ alloy and special steels
- superalloys etc

DASTURCO is consultant to the Government of India for

- India's first coast-based steel plant at Visakhapatnam
- Special Steels Plant, Salem
- Alloy Steels Plant, Durgapur (expansion)
- CRGO/CRNO plant of Rourkela Steel Plant
- Superalloys Plant, Hyderabad
- Bokaro Steel Plant (expansion) etc

It is also consultant for India's first sponge iron plant, Kothagudem and for TISCO modernisation.

As in India, DASTURCO is actively participating in steel development in the Arab countries, South-east Asia and Latin America. It is the principal consultant to the Misurata Iron and Steel Complex—the first large integrated steel plant in Libya. In Venezuela, it is providing engineering services for the expansion of the SIDOR steel plant at Matanzas, in specified plant areas. In Peru, it is consultant to SIDERPERU at Chimbote for its expansion. In South-east Asia, DASTURCO is assisting ASEAN member countries in planning their steel development strategies and programmes.



**DASTURCO**

*Total Engineering—  
Concept to Completion*

**M. N. DASTUR & CO (P) LTD**

CONSULTING ENGINEERS  
CALCUTTA

# **the art of good management...**



**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**


Shriram seminars and courses are part of this moulding process which involves executives in a ceaseless interchange of ideas, discussion of modern techniques, evaluation and reconsideration of policies. So that the Shriram organisation is constantly infused with fresh dynamism and our resources are utilised to the optimum.



**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**

**"At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India awakes to life and freedom."**

Jawaharlal Nehru



## **And for Tata Steel, a new era begins.**

**The era of modernisation and expansion. 1951: plans fructify to raise capacity to 1.3 million ingot tons. 1955: a contract of Rs 610 million is signed with Kaiser Engineers to raise capacity further. All this time, the Company's skilled manpower, experience and expertise are put at the disposal of the Government of India to launch its own steel mills.**

All round the country, the clarion call of freedom was stirring the people into a new awakening. Projects were taking shape. Dams, bridges, cities and ports were coming up, harbingers of a new India. It was an awakening which Jamsetji Tata had foreseen—long ago. He knew it would happen and he knew what would be needed—steel, the life blood of industry. In the early years of Independence, all these massive projects could get underway speedily,

economically, because of one man's prescience. For he gave the country its first steel mill—nearly four decades before the country attained freedom.

And the tradition continues at Tata Steel where anticipating and pioneering have come naturally, voluntarily. Take, for example, the work done on community development, family welfare, rural development and the facilities provided for technical and other forms of training. In fact, 'everything that affects the community, every aspect of its emancipation' has been of deep interest to Tata Steel.

It is this concern for fellow men, this unflinching belief that forging men of quality must precede the making of steel that have made Tata Steel what Jamsetji Tata had meant it to be—a progressive industrial enterprise generating wealth which benefits the people, enriches the nation.

***What benefits the people, benefits the nation.***



HTC-TIS-4564

**1907-1982**

**TATA STEEL**



Make your gums strong.  
And give your teeth a long life.



**Only Forhan's  
has an exclusive astringent to  
strengthen gums.**

**Forhan's special taste tells you it's working.**

Forhan's astringent actually works to make gums strong. By shrinking gum tissue the astringent keeps gums firm and healthy, checking inflammation and swelling. Only strong gums can give

your teeth a firm foundation and a longer life. Even healthy teeth need the support of strong gums. That is why you need Forhan's the unique toothpaste with astringent




**Trust Forhan's**

**It's the toothpaste created by a dentist.**

288F-203

---

# PRODUCT QUALITY



Satyadev Chemicals are widely used in the processing of Colour and Black and white Motion Picture Films, and in the Textile, Jute, Leather and Chemical Manufacturing Industries. Also in the manufacture of Paints, Pharmaceuticals, Dyestuffs, Polymers

Our customers include some of the world's leading manufacturing and trading concerns. The secret of this world-wide acceptance lies in our policy of product quality—the only sacred cow in our fast developing organisation.



**SATYADEV CHEMICALS LIMITED**

Pratapnagar Road, VADODARA, 390 004, India



**With gems  
on her fingers and jewels  
on her toes, she shall have  
aluminium wherever she goes.**

Because, when time began and all things material were created, aluminium combined with various elements to make up precious stones like the sapphire, the ruby, the Oriental amethyst and emerald, the topaz, the turquoise and the jade. Today aluminium is being used, more and more, for things we had never imagined before. And in India, Indian Aluminium has been the catalyst of this progress.

The first to embark on aluminium

production in India, Indal has introduced almost the entire range of alloys in which rolled and extruded aluminium products are made in this country. In its constant drive towards diversification, Indal has pioneered the use of aluminium in aircraft, currency, power transmission, irrigation tubing, transportation, packaging, housing and a host of other applications.

Indal pioneering making your life richer through aluminium



**Indian Aluminium Company, Limited**  
**Anything's possible**

HTC-IAL-4154

# **seminar**

**THE MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI-1**

nal which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every  
of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single  
em is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions  
ons expressed have ranged from janata to congress, from  
daya to communist to independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it has  
been possible to answer a real need of today, to gather  
the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people  
arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity in  
facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture

**editor/ROMESH THAPAR**

**managing editor/RAJ THAPAR**

**production/TEJBIR SINGH**

**circulation/C.B. KUMAR**

hed from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1. Telephone. 46534 Cable Address. Seminar New Delhi. Single copy. Rs.  
ance; \$ 1 50 Yearly Rs. 40; £ 7, \$ 16. Three yearly Rs. 100, £ 20, \$ 40 Reproduction of material prohibited unless permitted

**NEXT MONTH : OUR NATIONAL CHARACTER**

# 275

## CHILDHOOD TODAY

a symposium on

some aspects affecting

the life of the young

symposium participants

### THE PROBLEM

A short statement of  
the issues involved

### THE RURAL SCHOOL

Krishna Kumar, Fellow, Centre  
for the Study of Developing  
Societies, Delhi

### CHILD LABOUR

Poromesh Acharya, teaching at the  
Indian Institute of Management,  
Calcutta

### GROWING UP IN VARANASI

S. Anandalakshmy, Head, Department of  
Child Development, Lady Irwin  
College, Delhi

### THE SHANTY TOWN

Meera Bapat, architect, now teaching  
at the Centre for Development Studies  
and Activities, Pune

### LISTENING TO THE PAST

Raghuvir Sahay, poet, radio and television  
commentator, former editor of 'Dinaman'

### AN EXPERIMENT IN EDUCATION

Meenakshi Thapan, currently doing research on the  
Krishnamurthi Educational Foundation

### BOOKS

A review article by Frances Kumar,  
specialist in primary education

### COMMUNICATION

Received from Ranjit K. Pachnanda, Panchkula

### FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography  
compiled by M.S. Limaye

### COVER

Designed by Chanda Singh

# The problem

CHILDHOOD in India has changed in many ways over the last half century, and particularly during the last two decades. The economic and social trends which set in with the advent of industrialization have intensified since the sixties, and so has the impact of these trends on children's life. Several of the old patterns of childhood are dying out, in most cases so quietly that their disappearance goes unremarked. Indeed, the entire culture of childhood, as it had developed over a long period of history, is under strain. What does this strain mean in terms of childhood in India today?

A majority of today's parents — including those in the middle class — spend their energies attempting to survive in an increasingly unjust and irrational environment. They are unable to provide the nurturing and stimulation which their children need, particularly in the formative years of early childhood. What little time is left from the struggle for sustenance is expended in coping with the demands of already strained family and community relationships. Amidst the welter of these concerns, the child's needs go unnoticed.

The father's migration in search of a means of livelihood is characteristic of family life in large sections of rural Indian society. The Green Revolution of the late sixties accelerated rural migration by making the life of small peasants economically unviable. In areas where intensive mechanization of agriculture took place, demand for manual work diminished, resulting in greater unemployment

among the landless. Consequently, during the last decade, a greater number of children than ever before had to accept a precarious existence in urban slums.

The pressure on poorly developed urban systems and facilities has seriously affected the day-to-day life of children in metropolitan cities as well as in smaller towns. The greatest pressure is on housing facilities. Children of the lower middle class pass their entire childhood in narrow restrictive spaces. For children of shanty towns, home is a place to sleep, not a space which organizes one's active day-time life. Housing in rural areas is even more underdeveloped than in urban areas. With the increase in rural unemployment and the marginalization of small peasants, housing in villages — particularly in bigger villages — has become a critical problem.

The other system under strain is that of education. Despite the fact that urban areas have a disproportionately large share of educational facilities compared to the rural areas, schooling facilities are under a greater strain in towns than they are in villages. The reason for this is that urban children are able to survive in the school system a little longer than their rural counterparts. But, apart from admission and retention capacities, schools in both rural and urban areas are equally irrelevant to their respective environments.

Through a stereotyped pedagogy and system of testing, the Indian school offers to children an

inflexible routine of silent competition. Its main characteristic is on hierarchical relationship between teacher and pupils, and its main — although unspoken — aim is to find ways to push the majority of entrants out of the system. Thus, out of the ten children who enter primary school at the age of six, less than three remain in the competition for admission to the higher secondary classes. For the remaining seven, the education system serves as a permanent reminder of their presumed inadequacies and failure.

One of the many destructive roles which the stereotyped curriculum of Indian schools has played in children's life has been to phase out their traditional lore and the traditional media which catered to children, such as storytelling and folk drama. Indeed, the school is not the only agency that has contributed to the decline of the traditional media of communication. Modern technological media like radio and television have used the traditional forms of children's culture in an indifferent and often perverse manner. The consequences are very serious. We now have a generation of children who cannot use language with an ability to evoke coherent images and ideas. Although this incapacity can be historically traced to the rapid pace of transformation of community relationships, the school and the media must take the blame for failing to answer historical needs. The vacuum created by education and the media is now being filled by the new toy technology of pin-ball machines which offer for a small price an experience of parti-

cipating in supersonic car-racing, mass bombardment, and holocaust.

Children's literature is a part of the modern media aimed at children. Despite a very large reading audience — literacy rates among children being higher than among adults — publishers of literature in most Indian languages have failed abysmally to create a literary market for children. In fact, if one compares the situation of the thirties and the forties with the one prevailing today in Hindi children's literature, one can easily notice a decline in both the quality of published material and the proportion of readers to the total child population. Since the late sixties, children's books and magazines have carried a clear message of Hindu revivalism, including the revival of feudal and caste-based values. Qualities such as individualization of character and humour evoked by satirising old values which one saw in magazines of the late thirties have disappeared. Today's popular literature for children is characterized by its portrayal of stereotyped human beings who speak in order to please, and act only in ways that legitimize established aims and pursuits.

Children's life is an important component of today's cultural climate. What kind of childhood does our society sanction? This is a matter we must investigate in order to know the human personality we are in the process of creating. We must ask ourselves what do the economic and social changes of the past two decades mean in terms of children's lives?

# The rural school

KRISHNA KUMAR

TAKE a bus that leaves a big village or small town early in the morning and goes along an all-weather road connecting a dozen small villages. On such a ride in any part of the country you will meet children who are going to school in a nearby village. In areas where one is told that parents are backward and do not want to send their girls to school, one will see little girls pushing their way into a crowd of people who do not want to miss the one bus that passes through their village. On such buses I have met children of the so-called backward groups who are characterized in macro-level studies of wastage and stagnation as 'poorly motivated' towards children's education.

A day in a working rural school has often told me more about wastage and stagnation than the elaborate factor analysis dispassionately reported in such studies. But I cannot deny that these studies have had a powerful effect. They have nurtured an anti-rural bias in our education system, and the bias has allowed the system to go on pursuing policies which are aimed at defeating the rural child's desire to learn.

The anti-rural bias of the Indian education system expresses itself in many different ways, some of which are inherited from the past while

others are inventions of the post-independence bureaucracy. One of the salient examples of an anti-rural bias inherited from the colonial past is the annual calendar of the school. Starting from the time of admission, just about every segment of the prescribed annual routine of the rural school is out of tune with the socio-economic routine of village life throughout the country.

The periods when children are busy assisting in the family's work responsibilities are precisely the periods when they are expected to attend the school. On the other hand, when children are free to come to school, the school is closed down for vacations. The disharmony between the cycle of rural life and the school's legal routine is so sharp and has been commented on so many times that it seems pointless to discuss it once more.

The agony one feels on realising that the disharmony is being perpetuated despite the recognition of the harm it causes is succinctly expressed in a statement made by the Kishore Bharati group of education activists five years ago. 'Somehow the school experts seem to be totally oblivious of the pressures of the sowing and harvesting seasons in the life of the village. The annual exa-



minations coincide with the rabi harvest period. While the weekly market day, a major social and economic event, is ignored, the legacy of the Sunday holiday persists from the British Raj. The summer months, when the children are relatively free, find the schools closed for vacations. No one who matters in the education system of the country seems to be prepared to explain the reasons for this major disharmony affecting the lives of the millions of village children, (quoted from *Science Today*, December 1977).

**A**n example of anti-rural bias in post-independence policies is the idea of using the so-called 'interior' village as a prison or reformatory for the incompetent headmaster or teacher. How incompetency is judged is a different matter. What is important to understand is the attitude of the educational bureaucracy towards areas that are on the lowest level of the scale of development. Villages located in such areas are the worst sufferers of an economy focused on the needs of the urban and semi-urban population. Due to the absence or poor condition of roads and means of transport they are cut off from the rest of the country. And it is this insularity that makes them fit places for the 'incompetent' school master. Indeed, the 'better' a teacher is rated by the bureaucracy, the greater is his or her chance of being posted in an urban or semi-urban centre. No wonder, then, that teachers posted in rural schools have a low morale and are envious of their counterparts who are posted in urban centres.

The condition of village school buildings provides yet another example of the anti-rural attitude of the educational administrators in India. No statistical profile can make the reader aware of the nature of the basic physical assets provided by the education system to rural children. Indeed, statistical profiles can be very misleading in this matter since they do not tell us what state of decay a so-called building is in. A recently published survey, for instance, points out that less than ten per cent of primary schools in the country are without a building.

The false satisfaction this information can give to an urban citizen can be put in balance by a visit to a few rural schools.

Despite some variation in different States, one can picture a village primary school with no dependable protection against the elements, particularly rain and dust. Also, the space available is almost invariably too small for the number of children enrolled. The 'space' I am talking about is, of course, the floor, for there seem to be no rural primary schools, run by the government, that have chairs or benches for children to sit on. The village primary school in India is basically a hut, perhaps with a tree in front. Both the hut and the tree are romanticized by Indian politicians and bureaucrats in the name of the unique Indian tradition of the 'ashram' syndrome. In the reality of a hut school, however, there is nothing romantic for village children.

**P**aying no attention to the conditions under which rural children are expected to attend school, researchers typically place a major portion of the blame for the high drop out rate in village schools on children and their parents. On the basis of responses to attitude questionnaires, they argue that rural children have weak motivation for educational attainments. It is argued that rural parents, particularly those who belong to 'backward' castes and tribes, see children primarily as additional labour for the immediate day-to-day requirements. The ability to defer immediate gain for greater gains in the future, the argument goes, is missing among the poorest groups, and that is why they do not take their children's education seriously.

This argument has deep roots in the consciousness of the bureaucracy and educationists. Although the 'culture of poverty' theory on which the argument is based has been debunked in the West where it originated, it continues to have adherents among Indian practitioners of sociology and economics of education. We will have to wait for several more years before survey analysts stop blaming the victim, and begin

to find explanations for the high drop-out rate in rural schools in the material conditions under which these schools operate.

**M**anju teaches in a government school in a village of four hundred people in Madhya Pradesh. The nearest road on which a bus runs is eight miles away. The bus makes one trip a day from a bigger village to another one twenty miles away. From this bigger village the district headquarter, where the District Education Officer lives, is a five-hour bus ride. Manju has taken this ride six times during the last three months in order to get the reimbursement of the expenses she incurred moving to her present school on a transfer order from the other end of the district nearly a year ago.

She is a child widow. An influential woman who was a social welfare activist took an interest in Manju whom she had met by chance. With the help of this woman, Manju appeared in an examination conducted by a recognized private agency for women's education. On the basis of her success in this examination she was allowed to take the higher secondary examination, and ultimately she did a basic training course to become a primary school teacher. After teaching in village schools for fifteen years she now gets close to three hundred rupees. For ten out of these fifteen years she taught in a single-teacher school which had a hundred children on the register. Now she is the senior of the two teachers in her present school which has one hundred and eighty names on the admission list. The junior teacher sits among children enrolled in grades one to three, and Manju sits among the senior children.

Both teachers sit in the same room — a twenty foot long structure of small bricks covered with lime and coated with cowdung, and a ceiling made of Manhua logs covered with dry twigs and hand-made tiles. If all the children enrolled in the school ever showed up, Manju would not know what to do except let them spill through the back door. The school has no desk and just one chair. When both

teachers want to sit down, one of them uses a rickety wooden box. It is a memento from the early days of community development when a visiting Block Development Officer had brought a few abacuses and cans of powdered milk to distribute among children.

**T**he Block Development Officer still pays an occasional visit to the village, but now he brings nothing to distribute free among the children. Nor is he the only officer visiting the village. Officers of many new departments that have sprung up in the district headquarters stop by during a tour. Whenever an officer comes to the village, Manju has to attend to the officer's demands. It may be the attendance sheet of the Food for Work programme. Or it may be the forms of cattle census. It could be any one of the routine programmes started by the government in the name of village upliftment, ranging from distribution of anti-malaria pills to organizing a women's group for non formal education.

Manju and her colleague are the government's tame instruments for collecting information and fulfilling routine duties. The routine duty they have in the school is of the least importance and interest from the point of view of visiting officers. The school is on the periphery of developmental planning. It lacks the novelty and the profitability of the so-called innovative, imaginatively named, and often internationally supported programmes.

The conditions under which Manju lives are no better than the conditions under which she works in the school. When she was transferred to this village she had great difficulty in finding a place to live. A small village has few houses large enough to permit renting, and the people who own these houses are wary of a female tenant. Manju's colleague is an unmarried girl who had managed to find a room with a family of her caste. She offered to share it with Manju, and this arrangement is still going on as Manju has not found a place of her own. If she were sent to a bigger village she might have more luck, but the conditions would not be

much different. In a bigger village, other functionaries of the government who are all known as 'officers' — a veterinary, a police sub-inspector, a family planning worker, and so on — have a chance of being allotted a small government bungalow-type accommodation. A teacher, even a headmaster, cannot be considered for a such a facility.

Like Manju, every village teacher lives under the perpetual fear of being transferred or of being harassed by the bureaucracy or local politicians in some other way. The reimbursement for which Manju is paying visits to the district education office could be of pending bills for attending a week-long refresher course in new mathematics or a three-day camp of non-formal education training. All such potentially useful occasions turn into routine gatherings of frustrated teachers and instructors who know that nothing of what they are teaching is going to be or can be used in the classroom. Each such programme entails a long procedure of leave approval, submission of bills, and payment. Corrupt officials use every such opportunity to make money from the teacher, and one who fails to oblige is transferred. Cancellation of transfer orders requires more visits to the district, and for higher-level teachers the divisional office and higher bribes.

**A** powerless position vis-a-vis influential village leaders and the bureaucracy turns many rural teachers into politicians of a sort. The frustration caused by an impossible routine makes many teachers cynical about their work and towards children. Some of them stop paying any attention to the school, and others become callous disciplinarians asserting their authority with a stick. Stories of village teachers' indifference, incompetence and laziness are circulated by bureaucrats, journalists and the experts of education. Hardly ever have I visited the magnificent campus of the National Council of Educational Research and Training in New Delhi or a State-level training-cum-research institution without being told how a recent improvement programme failed on account of poor

response from village teachers. Never have I heard an interpretation of the 'poor response that took into account the village teacher's plight and perspective.

**W**hat it meant to complete one's primary education in a village school is often forgotten by those who survive in the system up to the higher levels. How sparse and desolate the school looks from a child's eyes, and how helpless it feels to sit under the eye of a tired and unhappy teacher are experiences with which adults who went to school in a nicely constructed urban building and who had books and magazines with pictures to look at cannot easily identify. Planners who spend long hours each year devising a cheap system of school education for the country, and academics of education who tell trainees that materials and equipment are inessential for good instruction, do not look at education from the child's point of view. Nor do subject specialists who replenish an obsolete curriculum by inserting new ideas picked up from imported journals, and who design textbooks for mass use. The child is a peripheral consideration in our education system.

Irrelevance of the prescribed curriculum for rural conditions has long been recognised, and over the years I have seen a few attempts to develop a relevant curriculum. Most of these attempts, unfortunately, fall within the narrow view of curriculum that we have inherited from the early days of colonial control of the education system. The country that colonized us has moved on to a broader concept of curriculum which takes into account the child's perspective and features of children's own living culture, but we continue to remain so obsessed with a textbook-centred curriculum that all attempts we make to change the curriculum end up in rewriting of textbooks. A basic lack of faith in the teacher's ability prevents our planners and experts of education from cutting down the hegemony of textbooks. Thus, attempts to give a rural bias to the curriculum boil down to the addition of some stories and poems concocted to reflect a rural environment. Such modifica-

tions are introduced under the banner of change, but they fail to make the curriculum any less irrelevant for the village child.

The problem, however, is not simply that the curriculum reflected in the prescribed texts is indifferent to the rural environment. What is worse is that the curriculum is indifferent to the child. It is an adult-centred curriculum, embodying an attitude that the child deserves to be patronized and dominated. In a study of Hindi textbooks published by the Madhya Pradesh Textbooks Corporation and the National Council of Educational Research and Training I found that on an average only one out of every five stories had a child as the central character whereas one out of every two stories showed an adult in this role. Evidently, the literary reading offered to children in these textbooks denies to them the opportunity to identify with characters of their own age. They are expected to learn about adult ways and activities strictly as passive observers. The subservience of children vis-à-vis adults is also conveyed in a number of prayers sung in schools every morning. Some of the most popular prayer songs depict children as helpless and ignorant creatures, begging the deity to be accepted as slaves.

Both the explicit and the implicit curricula practised in Indian schools encourage children to be passive and resigned, to listen to the adult voice and do as he says. The few attempts that have been made under Gandhian inspiration or under the auspices of a 'learning by doing' approach to science have failed to influence the overall tone or spirit of the curriculum. Since the beginning of the last decade, the UNICEF has sponsored five major projects in the country to modernise the curriculum of primary and middle schools. The State departments of education that participated in these projects went through the required rounds of establishing needs, objectives, procedures, and so on, and used the right terminology of action-orientation and participation by teachers and the community. The net result is some more revision of textbooks

and the publication of a few teacher guides which are as drab and non-functional as many of the new textbooks.

The same is true of the curricula designed under the so called non-formal education programmes for children. I have not yet come across even one exception so far as the patronizing and oppressively didactic content of the materials produced under these programmes is concerned. In these characteristics the materials produced for children match the adult education primers of which they often are paediatricized versions, produced as they are under the direction of the same expert or group of experts.

The oppressiveness of a rigid, subject-centred, and bureaucratically determined curriculum that makes no reference to children's own life, language, and ways of relating to each other and to the world around them will have to be countered for any meaningful reform in the primary school pedagogy of our country. This would be a radical reform, and many argue that radical changes in education cannot take place without radical shifts in the political and social order. The merits of this argument cannot be denied, particularly in view of the history of educational change in many countries that have gone through convulsive alternations in the social structure.

At the same time, I must point out the pathology of waiting that this argument almost invariably entails and the meaninglessness it renders to every criticism of the education system and to every idea of reform. I fail to see why a more humane treatment of the village primary school child is totally beyond our capacity. Certainly, it is no easy matter to transform the curriculum, and it is an even bigger challenge to alter the prevailing relations between the teacher and those who wield political and administrative power. Such are the tasks, however, that our society will have to accept, be it after a hypothetical shift in the power structure or in conjunction with the many readjustments which are taking place right now.

# Child labour

POROMESH ACHARYA

INDIA is predominantly an agrarian country and so is West Bengal. In the traditional production process in agriculture and indigenous industry like weaving and sericulture there is enough scope for employing child labour gainfully. In fact, child labour is still a considerable component of the total labour force in rural India and in rural West Bengal.<sup>1</sup> Child labour being comparatively cheap, the employers find it more profitable to employ children for certain types of operations like 'cow boy' or 'reeling' in sericulture where they are found to be suitable as well. The labouring families are also interested in hiring out the children as that adds a little extra income to the family budget which is otherwise extremely hard pressed.

In a predominantly traditional agrarian society as is the case in West Bengal, therefore, employment of the children of school going age as child labour is an inevitable phenomenon. Introduction of universal elementary education under such conditions is, no doubt, a difficult task.

It is no wonder that in spite of all the pious wishes expressed and cherished goals announced by our national leaders, universal elementary education is still an 'unfinished business' even after thirty years of independence.

No doubt, educational facilities in terms of free primary schools have been expanded a great deal during the post independence period. And other external incentives like free textbooks and free school meals or tiffin have been introduced in many

parts of our country. In West Bengal, for example, there was an increase of 24.17% in the number of primary schools in 1975-76 over 1965-66, the total number of such schools being 40,740 in that year.<sup>2</sup> According to the Third All India Educational Survey, there was an increase of 21.6% in 1973 over 1965 in the number of primary schools in the rural areas of West Bengal, the total number of such schools in rural areas being 34,596 in 1973.<sup>3</sup> The total number of habitational villages in West Bengal according to the 1971 census was 38,074. It is generally believed that in West Bengal most of the villages have a free primary school or at best have one within a mile of the village. Besides, textbooks are also supplied free of cost at the primary level and in many areas, free school meals or tiffin have also been introduced.

In a recent survey conducted in 4 villages of two districts of West Bengal it has been found that 55.83% of the total children of the age group 6-16 and 50.49% of the total children of the age group 6-11 are non-enrolled. Of the total non-enrolled children of the age group 6-16, 70.34% belong to the two lowest agrarian classes, namely, poor peasants and agricultural labourers. If we add to this the non-enrolled children belonging to the middle peasant class, it becomes 89.65% of the total non-enrolled children of the age group 6-16. 25.17% of the total non-enrolled children of the age group 6-16 have been found to be gainfully employed as child labour. 37.36% of the total non-enrolled children belonging to poor peasants and agricultural labourers are, however,

1. Percentage of child labour to total workers in rural India is 6.71 and the same for rural West Bengal is 5.06. Percentage of child labour to total workers among the agricultural labourers in India, however, is 9.65.

As quoted in *Child Labour in India*, Ed. by M. K. Pandey, Table 2 and 3.

2. *Economic Review*, 1977-78, Statistical Appendix, Table 14.3. West Bengal Government Press, Calcutta.

3. *Third All India Educational Survey*, some provisional statistics on School Education, NCERT, 1975, Table 4, p.19.

employed as child labour. 87.67 of the total child labour belongs to the two agrarian classes at the bottom of the ladder while only 10.95% of the total child labour belongs to the middle peasant class which is at the middle of the ladder. Obviously, none come from the two top agrarian classes, namely, the jotedar and rich peasant, found to be employed as child labour except one lone boy from a rich peasant family who, in fact, played truant and is employed in a tea shop in the nearby township.<sup>4</sup>

Besides, quite a large number of children of school going age belonging to the labouring families, who are not gainfully employed as child labour, do the baby-care or help in household work while their parents are out to work. If we add to the child labour force those who look after the home and make it possible for their parents to work outside, the proportion of child labour to the total non-enrolled children belonging to the labouring families will become very high indeed.

In fact, in response to a question as to what their non-enrolled children do during school hours, 92.23% of the total respondents belonging to the lower middle peasants, poor peasants and agricultural labourers who have non-enrolled children, maintained that their non-enrolled children were either gainfully employed or were engaged in household work like baby-care, etc.. Only 7.77% of the total respondents belonging to the above three lower agrarian classes stated that their children played away their time during school hours.<sup>5</sup> This question, however, did not apply to the two agrarian classes at the top, namely, the jotedars and rich peasants.

4 *Education and Agrarian Relations* A study of 4 villages in West Bengal, Part one, Report (Draft) by P Acharya. Data used in this article in regard to non-enrolment and child labour are from the above report.

5 *Unequal Participation at the Elementary Level of Education: Its Structural and Attitudinal Roots*, by P Acharya, table-8 (This is a paper prepared on the basis of the findings of a survey conducted in 4 villages of West Bengal and read at the National Seminar on Education and Rural Development organised by Indian Institute of Education, Pune.)

It may reasonably be assumed that the introduction of compulsion by law to ensure universal enrolment under such conditions is not likely to yield any considerable result. It is relevant to mention as well that labour processes are different under different modes of production. Working conditions of child labour also are different in an agrarian system of production and in an industrial system of production. As a result, child labour may pose different problems in regard to popular education under different modes of production.

In the early period of the Industrial Revolution in England, the working conditions of child labour in the factories were such as to render them into mere machines devoid of any human spontaneity. According to Marx, 'the intellectual desolation artificially produced by converting immature human beings into mere machines for the fabrication of surplus-value, a state of mind clearly distinguishable from that natural ignorance which keeps the mind fallow without destroying its capacity for development, its natural fertility, this desolation finally compelled even the English Parliament to make elementary education a compulsory condition to the productive employment of children under 14 years in every industry subject to the Factory Acts'.<sup>6</sup>

The upper and middle classes in different growing townships in the early period of the Industrial Revolution in England found the unemployed and uncared for children of the working class parents who were out to work in the factories from morning till night, 'strange and unnatural and a potential threat to order and stability'.<sup>7</sup> The upper and middle classes therefore started taking interest in the education of the children of the working class. The problem of education of the poor, however, was seen by them in terms of socialization of large numbers at the smallest possible expense and Sunday schools and Monitorial

schools appeared as the new institutions best suited to the purpose.<sup>8</sup>

The conditions of child labour in an agrarian society like ours, however, are quite different. Cow-boys or field labourers, though they work from morning till evening, are not confined to the suffocating prisons of early factories. They enjoy fresh air and work in the natural surroundings of rural life. The agrarian production process does not demand of a labourer complete specialisation in a particular operation of cultivation. A field labourer is generally acquainted with all the operations of cultivation from beginning to end. He can comprehend the entire process. It is no wonder, therefore, that unlike factory workers, the agricultural labourers usually nurse in their bosom a desire for owning a plot of land. In the absence of an acute division of labour, the total separation of brain from hand does not take place in an agrarian society as it does in an industrial society. Besides, labour as a commodity is not so impersonal and free in an agrarian society as to pose any threat to the traditional authority pattern. Non-economic compulsions, like religious customs, can still play a significant role in labour relations.

The upper strata of rural society does not find the children of the working parents a potential threat to order and stability as was the case in the growing cities of nineteenth century England. On the contrary, any sort of education they fear will upset the stability of the traditional society, destroying the age-old relation between them and the labouring people. It is no wonder that a majority of the jotedars and rich peasants we interviewed, during the survey mentioned earlier, were against making elementary education a compulsory condition. Illiteracy among the labouring people, they generally think, will help them maintain the traditional authority pattern of village life.

In response to a question whether the introduction of compulsion by

6 Karl Marx, *Capital*, (vol I) p. 377, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974.

7 Philip McCann, (Ed) *Popular Education and Socialization in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 5, 1977, London

8 *Ibid* pp 8, 9, 12. See also, *A History of English Elementary Education, 1760-1902*, by Frank Smith, University of London Press, 1931, p. 48.

law will be convenient or inconvenient, 90% of the total respondents belonging to rich peasants and 80% of them belonging to jotedars, maintained that it would be inconvenient for them.<sup>9</sup> This is in spite of the fact that 100% of the total children in the age group 6-11 belonging to jotedars and 84.31% of the children of that age group belonging to rich peasants are already enrolled.<sup>10</sup> Compulsion or no compulsion, it makes little difference in regard to the education of their children. Why then did they respond so overwhelmingly against compulsion?

The reasons are very simple. They are against compulsion as they fear that universal and compulsory enrolment would deprive them of the easy supply of child labour. In that case they would need to hire adult people instead of child labour at a higher wage which would lead to an increase in their cost of agricultural production.

Besides, the upper strata fear that labour relations would deteriorate if the labouring classes were educated. In fact, a majority of the respondents belonging to the upper strata opted for employing illiterate field labourers in preference to literate field labourers in answer to a question as to their preference in this regard.<sup>11</sup>

It may be noted that Marx observed that 'Several attempts to apply the principles of Factory Act, but in modified form, to agriculture have been made, but have so far resulted in complete failure.'<sup>12</sup> It is no wonder then that in 1899 the English Parliament raised the compulsory minimum age to twelve 'except for children employed in agriculture.'<sup>13</sup>

The working conditions of child labour and the attitudes of different

<sup>9</sup> Unequal Participation etc. *op. cit.* Table 2.

<sup>10</sup> Education and Agrarian Relations, *op. cit.* Table II/a.

<sup>11</sup> Unequal Participation etc. *op. cit.* Table 3.

<sup>12</sup> Karl Marx, *op. cit.* p. 472.

<sup>13</sup> Philip MacCann, *op. cit.* p. 232.

strata towards popular education are different in an agrarian society to those in an industrial society. No copying from an industrial country is likely to yield any tangible result.<sup>14</sup>

Child labour as such, however, should not be considered an evil phenomenon. The participation of children in a productive activity by itself is an educative process. As Marx observed, 'In a rational state, of society every child whatever, from the age of 9 years, ought to become a productive labourer in the same way that no able-bodied adult person ought to be exempted from the general law of nature, viz, to work in order to be able to eat, and work not only with the brain but with the hands too.'<sup>15</sup> Marx, however, justifies juvenile labour when combined with education. According to him, 'The combination of paid productive labour, mental education, bodily exercise and polytechnic training, will raise the working class far above the level of the higher and middle classes.'<sup>16</sup>

It is interesting to note that in capitalist countries the ruling interest could subvert the educational process of the working class as conceived by Marx. Education, as is in vogue in these countries, has been completely separated from productive labour, rendering it predominantly a mental activity suited more to the leisured classes, namely, the higher and middle classes. The recent addition of work education in the school curriculum as an American innovation in this field, is nothing but a perversion of the scientific concept of education.

Work education as an adjunct to the predominantly literary education becomes infructuous however fashionable it may be. Unfortunately,

<sup>14</sup> J.P. Naik and Syed Nurullah, *A Students' History of Education in India, 1800-1973*, p. 486-487.

They have rightly pointed 'A time has come when we should seriously consider whether it is good to continue our dependence on foreign models, whether in social organisation or in educational development. What we urgently need, therefore, is a Swadeshi movement.'

<sup>15</sup> Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, vol. 2, pp. 79, 80.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, p. 81.

though, we toed the capitalist path while planning our education programme. And it was in spite of the fact that the Gandhian concept of basic education discarded the idea of adding a graft as an adjunct to literary education<sup>17</sup> and emphasised education through 'profit-yielding vocation.'<sup>18</sup> Gandhi was categorical in his emphasis. According to him, 'Manual work will have to be the centre of the whole thing: the development of the mind should come through manual training. The manual training will not consist in producing articles for a school museum, or toys which have no value. It should produce marketable articles.'<sup>19</sup> In the All India National Education conference held at Wardha on 22nd and 23rd October, 1937, it was resolved 'that the process of education throughout this period (seven years primary education) should centre around some form of manual and productive work, and that all the other abilities to be developed or training to be given should, as far as possible, be integrally related to the central handicraft chosen with due regard to the environment of the child.'<sup>20</sup>

Gandhi also held that participation in a productive activity is by itself an educative process. While arguing in favour of self-supporting education, he states, 'Even now the poor people's children automatically lend a helping hand to their parents — the feeling at the back of their minds being, what shall my parents eat and what shall they give me to eat if I do not also work with them? That is an education in itself.'<sup>21</sup>

In fact, the institutional education as in vogue in rural West Bengal has no appeal to the children, particularly of the labouring families. It failed to generate any motivation among them. On the

<sup>17</sup> N.K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 200.

<sup>18</sup> Gandhi, *Basic Education*, p. 22, Navajivan Publishing House.

<sup>19</sup> *Educational Reconstruction*: Mahatma Gandhi's Articles, Wardha Education Conferences proceedings etc., p. 22. Vora and Co. Publishers Ltd. Bombay.

<sup>20</sup> *Basic Education*, *op. cit.* p. 32.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid* p. 47.



contrary, the existing elementary education cripples the children, confining them in the dingy holes called classes and compelling the students to cram irrelevant lessons written in a language they have never been exposed to.<sup>22</sup> If one visits a village school and observes for some period the working of the school, one is likely to agree with Gandhi 'that the present system of primary education was not only wasteful, but harmful'. One will surely have the impression that the schools have been created to provide employment to some people as teachers. In most cases the primary teachers belong to the higher strata of the rural society who generally have vested interests in land.<sup>23</sup> Teaching is the subsidiary occupation for many of them in order to earn cash for investing in land. Hardly will one meet a teacher who finds interest in teaching.

In most cases, the enrolled children very reluctantly attend school while the non-enrolled children nurse a strong dislike for the school.

It appears that a different kind of education altogether is required to motivate them which must be through productive labour and at the same time attuned to the natural surroundings of the village. It may be basic education or whatever but not the education now in vogue. Education through productive labour not only allows the children to stretch their limbs, develop their minds but at the same time protects them from the exploitation of their employers without depriving them of their earnings as child labour.

In industrial countries, although the ruling interests could ultimately subvert working class education as conceived by Marx, they nonetheless found it expedient to educate the working class children on their own terms, i.e., as a socialising process. In fact, the universal and compulsory

elementary education in 19th century England was processed, through the interaction between the aims of the ruling interests and the determination of the working class, to construct a meaningful social existence. In 19th century England 'social reason' was roused into 'social force' 'through general laws enforced by the power of the State'. According to Marx, 'In enforcing such laws, the working class do not fortify governmental power. On the contrary, they transform that power, now used against them, into their own agency'.<sup>24</sup>

The ruling interests in the rural areas of our country, however, do not find any reason for taking interest in the education of the children of their labour force. Besides, the agrarian labouring classes, unorganised as they were, failed to place their educational demands. And as such 'social reason' was never roused to 'social force' as happened in 19th century England.

One very crucial question is how, under the given circumstances, a scheme of universal education can be implemented successfully. The answer to this question, it appears, is implicit in the failure of the only education scheme prepared in keeping with the particular conditions of rural society in our country, i.e., the basic education of Gandhi. One very great lesson which we learn from the failure of basic education is that the people for whom the good is meant must be made aware of demanding the delivery of the good.

Basic education was not a participatory programme in the sense that the role of the labouring people for whose children it was mainly meant, their role in organising the basic education, was not defined particularly. It may also be the reason why K T Shah's suggestion for conscription was even acceptable to Gandhi for filling the posts of teachers.<sup>25</sup> Gandhi considered that

basic education if implemented successfully, would bring revolutionary changes in rural society<sup>26</sup> but did not think of organising a 'Swadeshi movement' for its successful implementation. As a result, 'social reason' was never roused into 'social force'; the initiative from below was not released. It is no wonder that the basic education of Gandhi was never given a fair trial even after independence. N K Bose, the Gandhian scholar, may not be wrong when he says 'a grave blow to the new educational system of Gandhi was delivered from within rather than from without'.<sup>27</sup>

The best way of releasing the initiative of the labouring people is surely through their own class organisations, namely, the peasant organisations. Participation of the children from labouring classes in the educative process through productive labour as discussed earlier is a feasible proposition since the children do not lose economically while taking education, and even better their chances of gainful employment or self-employment afterwards. On the other hand, the withdrawal of child labour from the agrarian production process increases the employment potential of adult labour with the resultant growth in the earnings of the labouring classes in general.<sup>28</sup>

In fact, the peasant movement can take up the education of their children as a viable issue for consolidating their class organisations and at the same time constructing a meaningful existence for them even under the present circumstances.

<sup>22</sup> According to Gandhi 'My plan to impart primary education through the medium of village handicraft like spinning and carding, etc., is thus conceived as the spearhead of a silent social revolution fraught with the most far-reaching consequences'. N K Bose, *op cit* p 203.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, p 204.

Can it be said that the Ashram schools also failed because the initiative of the people for whom they were meant was not released?

<sup>28</sup> This aspect has been dealt with to some extent in my paper 'Unequal Participation etc.' *op cit*. In fact, two agricultural labourers pointed this out to me while I was conducting the village survey, findings of which were used in the above paper.

<sup>22</sup> This aspect of elementary education has been dealt with to some extent in an article, 'Politics of Primary Education, The case of Sahaj Path', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol XVI, No. 24, June 13, 1981.

<sup>23</sup> Education and Agrarian Relations *op cit*, p. 42, Table VIII.

<sup>24</sup> Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol-2, pp 80, 81.

<sup>25</sup> Gandhi argues in this regard 'His (K T. Shah) idea is substantial, quite feasible, and deserves the greatest consideration.' Basic Education, *op cit*, p. 79, see also, Educational Reconstruction, *op cit*, p. 69.

# Growing up in Varanasi

S. ANANDALAKSHMY

THE term 'childhood' is generally used as if its connotation were universal. In actuality, the definition of the span of childhood is culture-specific and one that is further determined by both economic and ecological factors. Families that pursue traditional occupations and those that live at subsistence levels tend to induct their children early into adult roles. It is a consequence of the Industrial Revolution that the span of childhood is extended, as

has been discussed by Philippe Aries in his analysis of the social history of Europe. In India, urbanization and the introduction of machine technology has had a similar effect of postponing adulthood and the pursuit of a productive or paying occupation. However, this applies only to a small minority of the population. For the majority of children in this country, growing up coincides with the learning of specific skills to make a living. By the



time the child reaches maturity, he is also fully equipped to earn for himself

In the socializing of our children, we express our values in discernible form. In this sense, child rearing practices are values made tangible. For many parents, socialization may not be a conscious process and articulation of it not easy. However, for the purpose of this study, it was decided that a combination of observation, informal interviewing of parents and children would be the appropriate method to elicit information on the upbringing of children. Standard psychological testing concerns itself with the assessment of intelligence or personality, generally these tests have been developed for occidental industrial-technological populations, and their application to people with other life styles has not been felicitous, in fact it has led to a great deal of misunderstanding on the nature of people who differ from a western model.

In this study, competence was selected as the core variable. In its widest sense, competence involves ordering means to ends. Coping effectively and realistically with the tasks of living can be another description of competence. Competence was conceptualized here as a combination of self-reliance, responsibility and achievement. Self-reliance was operationalized as the ability to take care of oneself and one's belongings, responsibility as the willing and accountable performance of tasks, achievement as that related to occupation, home and school.

As part of a larger study on the families of craftsmen and farmers, the community of silk weavers from Varanasi was selected for the study of socialization for competence. Fifty families of weavers from two *mohallas* in the heart of the city constituted the sample. There were altogether 203 children in these fifty families, approximately equal numbers of boys and girls, between the ages of 5 and 16.

The community of Ansari Muslim weavers lived in the Madanpura and Rewari Talaab mohallas, adjoining neighbourhoods in a very crowded part of Varanasi. Tall buildings

that appeared precariously vertical, narrow alleys with bicycles parked against lamp posts and goats tied to every doorway, a mosque surrounded by roadside shops selling a variety of materials for dyeing and weaving — these characterized the areas. As one walked down the alley, one would cross women fully covered in black *burkas* or see a designer using the road space for his work of coding the jacquard with his pattern. Along the length of a lane would be stretched 36 yards of silk yarn ready for winding on to giant-sized wooden spools. Young boys would stop to spin tops between errands, while older boys would cycle by carrying a fresh supply of *paan* or tea for the weavers. Through the open doorway, one would see eight or ten looms in operation, with the weavers using all the available daylight. A grilled opening on the roof of the ground floor hall served the function of providing additional light as well as of communication to the living areas upstairs, usually accessible only to women or to the men in the family.

The assumption with which this study was initiated was that parental practices of child rearing would be a major factor in the competence displayed by the children. It was expected that by using an informal ethnographic style of interviewing and observing families *in situ*, one would be able to locate issues of subjective relevance to the families and identify the traits for which their offspring are reinforced. The family was the unit of study, with the levels and types of competence of the children between the ages of 5 and 16 being the dependent variable.

Self reliance as a trait was generally high among all the children who were observed. When a child took care of his own needs, it was not considered a great achievement but something that happened automatically. However, it was not possible to trace the child's self-reliant behaviour to parental practices in particular, because the siblings and cousins seemed to play a larger role in some cases. Much was learnt by imitation, children took care of their own needs and

personal cleanliness in a fairly relaxed way. There were not many things a child owned: there were no toys except those improvised with odds and ends, clothes were few in number and easily interchanged with those of siblings the same size. Books were not part of the culture, and the *takhti*, the writing board made of wood, was easily stowed in a corner.

The second aspect of competence studied here was responsibility. The ability to make decisions, to work without supervision and to have accountability, was the operationalization of this variable. In this community, as in traditional groups, adults and children were not separated in space. It was therefore difficult to assess individual responsibility. The groups acted cohesively and there appeared to be a high degree of social responsibility. In this sense, the system could sustain a certain degree of incompetence from individuals, provided that the general level of responsible performance of tasks was adequate. However, with the specific task of weaving, while a boy worked as an apprentice, the discipline was strict and the supervision was constant. The handling of responsibility was not age related; demonstrated ability was the criterion for adult allocation of jobs. For instance, a boy of 15 years, if he had mastered the ability to deal with all aspects of weaving the sari, could himself take an apprentice.

The regular school system played only a marginal role in the lives of the children of the Ansaris of Varanasi. For one thing, the parochial school, called the *Madrassa*, was the preferred educational system. Of the 200 children in the sample, only three boys attended the municipal school, 24 of the others (which included 16 boys and 8 girls) attended the *Madrassa*, all the rest were out of school. So, performance in school tasks was not a relevant category for the assessment of achievement. When the focus was shifted to craft tasks, a totally different picture emerged. A boy is apprenticed to a weaver at 10 or 11 years of age and within the next four or five years picks up all the requisite skills. Silk

yarn was expensive and mistakes would cost a lot, during apprenticeship, corporal punishment was not uncommon. There were differences in the speed with which a boy would learn the tasks, his precision in handling the loom and his perseverance, but ultimately all the boys became weavers.

For the girl, participation in craft tasks was largely by imitation. She had a chance to observe her mother and older sisters at work from her earliest years. Her apprenticeship to tasks of the household, like washing, cleaning and cooking started soon after the first few indulgent years of babyhood had been crossed. The girl's role in infant care and in occupying the younger siblings in play is too well known to require special mention here. The only formal learning expected of girls was that of passages from the *Koran*, towards this end, an aunt or a grandfather would set up classes for the girls of the family. Minimal proficiency in Urdu and in numeracy were valued inasmuch as this would help the girl to keep household accounts and to write an occasional letter. With this variable, again, it was not easy to assess particular levels of achievement reached by a specific child and it was near impossible to trace this to methods of reinforcement used by the parents. The family worked as an organic unit, with someone to take on tasks left unfinished by others. Within this system, there were no recognized 'non-achievers'.<sup>1</sup> Towards the end of the study, it became apparent that competence could be conceptualized both at the individual and the community levels and that even the treatment of competence as an individual trait could be argued.

To comprehend the process of socialization of the children in the families of the weavers, one needs to consider their context. Silk weaving and the Islamic religion were the warp and the weft of their everyday life. Both were viewed as traditions to be proud of. The Ansari weavers of Varanasi were divided into 52 units, each under a head, called the *Mahato* and together the 52 *Mahatos* constituted the Council of Ministers. All major decisions,

religious and secular, were made by the Council. Even the wages for the several tasks connected with the making of a sari were fixed by the Council. They interpreted the *Koran* for practice in the daily routine and for all relationships to the world outside their island of Islamic brotherhood.

For instance, the parents who were interviewed explained that their daughters were not educated as there was an injunction against it in the *Koran*. They believed that they would cease to be Muslims if their daughters attended school. According to their report, the *Koran* proscribed the growing of a moustache, or long nails, and wishing to have fewer children would incur the wrath of Allah. Very few of the girls and women had ever been outside the neighbourhood they lived in. If a woman recalled a visit outside the city, it was invariably for a pilgrimage along with the men in her natal family, undertaken a couple of years before she had attained puberty. All the girls in the sample had been born in the same *mohalla* in which they expected to be married and ultimately to be buried. Even if there was a radio, it was used for film music rather than for news.

In their highly regulated and circumscribed lives, insularity acquired its most complete connotation. For the weavers, the observance of *Namaz* five times a day was a must. And on Friday afternoon, every male in the *mohalla*, arrayed in his best clothes, would attend the *Jumma* in the mosque. It was a privilege, a male prerogative and a duty, and even the few boys who went to the secular schools in the city were expected to miss the Friday afternoon school session to attend the prayers at the Mosque.

The entire family was involved in the craft, sharing the several processes in the making of a sari. The first task is the procuring of the yarn, usually undertaken by the more experienced weavers, who have the capital to invest. Attempts to set up a cooperative have not been successful, and the wage-earning weavers continue an economically marginal existence. Stretching the yarn and winding it around large wooden

spools is a job done by the men in the open grounds adjoining the living area of the *mohalla* or in the alleys. Dyeing requires expertise and is handled by a few of the men in the community.

Putting the weft yarn on to smaller spools is a task allocated to the women. Simple spindles are used for this task and during the hours when they work, the spindles occupy the major living space in the women's quarters. The setting up of the loom, making the design, coding it into the jacquard, weaving and keeping the looms in good condition are all men's jobs. After the sari is woven, it comes back to the women's section for the finishing. The material is fixed on a frame, wrong side up, and the extra threads are snipped off by the girls and the women. Finally, the tasks of polishing (where metal has been used in the weave), folding and selling are done by the men.

Children who are too young to work as apprentices are constantly active as messengers, running errands from the weaving area to the living quarters and back. One gets a feeling of the organicity of the entire procedure with the orchestrated roles of the members of the family and the community. The children seem to acquire the skills requisite for their vocation as one acquires the first language easily and in the natural environment, by imitation rather than by instruction. This is the way in which most traditional skills are transmitted. In an early article on the educational emphasis of the West in primitive perspective, Margaret Mead discussed how adults taught their children what they knew. In her words, 'Miscarriages in the smooth working of the transmission of the available skills and knowledge did occur, but they were not sufficient to focus the attention of the group upon the desirability of *teaching* as over against the desirability of *learning*'.<sup>1</sup>

The contrast between this system and the regular school system with its implicit value for age-specific

<sup>1</sup> Mead, M. Our educational emphasis in primitive perspective. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1942, 48, 633-639.

'compulsory competition' is obvious. If a traditional family occupation is devoid of the element of choice, it is also a situation which is without conflict about social roles. In such a system, there is no possibility of feeling alienated or anchorless. Since the children learned their tasks from watching older models, and each child proceeded at his own pace, he was rarely made to feel inept or useless. While the parents when interviewed admitted that the formal schooling system had its advantages, they were also realistic. They felt that they could not sustain their children through the many years it would require for a professional degree, any other alternative they felt would merely reduce the autonomy they enjoyed of being their own masters and working at their own pace. Many of these people were high on what has been termed the 'autonomy-compliance axis'<sup>2</sup>

Among the weavers, young and old, there was a discernible sense of pride in the feeling that their craft could be traced back four centuries and a sense of satisfaction in continuing the vocation of their forefathers. In addition, the thrill and excitement of crafting an object contributes tremendously to a sense of effectiveness. The feedback is direct in the lives of craftsmen and this intangibly enhances their quality of life. This could be best expanded by a quotation from Ivan Illich who said, 'Tools are intrinsic to social relationships. An individual relates himself in action to his society through the use of tools that he actively masters or by which he is passively acted upon. To the degree that he masters his tools, he can invest the world with his meaning, to the degree that he is mastered by his tools, the shape of the tool determines his own self image.'<sup>3</sup>

The cohesive, well ordered lives of the weavers provided an environment with its own character. Writing over a decade ago, Stone and

Church<sup>4</sup> refer to intelligent life spaces or 'intelligent environments' and postulate that intelligence is not a property of the nervous systems but of how the world appears to people, its qualities and flavours, and meanings and possibilities for action. Extending this type of thinking, one could postulate that while the daily routine was highly circumscribed, the choices limited and their interactions insulated from the rest of the world, they nevertheless had the subjective experience of being in a 'competent environment', capable of offering a sense of mastery to people at varying levels of ability and differential endowments.

Discussions on people who live in rural hamlets, non-complex communities or in poverty groups have tended to focus on their disabilities due to low economic power rather than on any strengths they may have from their world view and life style. This homogenizing of all non-technological groups into one model has proved to be a disadvantage in the proper understanding of how people live and work. Every man may see the world from his own perspective, but the irony that this is true even of the social analyst cannot be ignored. 'Education' or 'family size' are made the criteria for development without an adequate contexting of the situation within which they must be considered.

Perhaps a humanizing of the social sciences is called for. In addition, we should cultivate the state of mind required for a willing suspension of disbelief in alternatives to the models of industrial-technological development. The Ptolemaic approach to the individual implicit in many of the assessments of specific traits in a person, may need to be replaced inter-personal competence, made up of the ability and the inclination to cooperate with others and to work towards group goals may be the Copernican alternative, and one which has the advantage of subjective relevance to the population under study.

2 Hess, R D. Social class and ethnic influences upon socialization. In Mussen, P H (Ed) *Carmichael's manual of child psychology*. New York: Wiley, 1970, 457-557.

3 Illich, I. *Tools for conviviality*. London: Calder and Boyars, 1973.

4 Stone L J and Church, J. Some representative theoretical orientations in developmental psychology. In Looft, W R (Ed) *Developmental psychology: a book of readings*. Hinsdale, Ill: Dryden, 1972, 35-59.

# The shanty town

MEERA BAPAT

URBAN growth in India is viewed with considerable alarm. There is concern that cities, once a symbol of 'security, the good life and opportunity', are degenerating into a 'chaotic conglomeration of human beings living in a state of uncertainty (and) disintegration (and) without a sense of belonging'.<sup>1</sup> Some worry about the 'artificial life' in cities away from the healthy touch of nature.<sup>2</sup> Others detect, as a vast single effect of urbanization, 'a sense of apathy' resulting in the migrants feeling 'helpless and impotent'.<sup>3</sup> Such allegations are rarely based on empirical research, for several studies have revealed a very different situation.<sup>4</sup>

1 Antia, F P Indian Urban Population — The City Dweller A New Deal *Population Review*, Journal of Asian Demography, 7, (1), 1963

2 Mehta, B H Social Aspects of Urban Development *Journal of the Institute of Town Planners*, India 17, 18, 1959

3 Guha, S Socio-economic Impact of Urbanization, *A I C C Economic Review*, X, (3), 1958,

4 Perlman, J E *Myth of Marginality Urban Poverty and Politics of Rio de Janeiro* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1976

Wiebe, P.D. *Social Life in an Indian Slum* Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1975

Deshpande, V D *Towards Social Integration Problems of Adjustment of the Scheduled Castes Elite*, Shubhada-Saraswat, Poona, 1978

Bapat, M *Shanty Town and City The*

More often than not, this response to the growth of cities is prompted by the 'horrors' of urban life associated with 'uncontrolled' proliferation of squalid and ramshackle shanties, congestion, overcrowding and pollution. Remedies are therefore sought in terms of reducing the rate of growth of cities and decongesting them by decentralization of industries. Insofar as the response against urban growth is induced by the concern for 'the loss of good life', it does not constitute a valid economic argument and should not determine the future of our cities. For the city residents, the arrival of new migrants may mean a deterioration in the quality of life but to the in-migrants the move to the city constitutes the availability of income earning opportunities.<sup>5</sup> Regardless of the important role played by cities in the process of economic transformation, the argument for curtailing their growth continues tenaciously without even a perfunctory attempt to examine it critically.<sup>6</sup>

The deteriorating urban environmental situation is often explained

*Case of Poona Progress in Planning*, 15, (3), Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1981

5 Joshi, H and V *Surplus Labour and the City — A Study of Bombay* Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1976

6 Harris, N *Economic Development, Cities and Planning — The Case of Bombay* Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1978

as resulting from insufficient public funds for urban development in the face of 'unprecedented' growth of urban population. In our context, urban growth is associated with the influx of poor migrants who are viewed as marginal and alien to city life. The existence of urban problems is, therefore, explained as one of numbers and socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the newcomers.<sup>7</sup> It is therefore argued that remedies are to be sought in a reformed and regenerated rural sector and in small and medium towns. While rural development is indeed essential in order to grapple with the problems of poverty and unemployment in the country, it is no substitute for tackling urban planning problems.

The preoccupation with the quality of life and evils of urbanization, however, precludes a crucial discussion regarding a more rational and equitable distribution of the city's resources. What is needed is an examination of the fundamental question of access to services and facilities for different income groups of city dwellers. The argument for curtailing city growth, however, helps perpetuate the existing urban development programmes which, in fact, have increased polarization between the rich and the poor.

In the absence of urban plans and programmes which are economically feasible and responsive to the needs of the low-income population and which lead to social justice, the urban poor not only have to live in appalling conditions but also have to face exploitation, insecurity and prejudice. This is the world in which poor urban children grow up.

Using illustrations from Poona, I will now elucidate these points.

<sup>7</sup> In many cases newcomers find shelter in slums. These are often referred to as 'areas of darkness and despair' and their inhabitants attributed a 'slum mentality' which 'explains' their poverty and preference for living in squalid conditions.

Desai, A R and Pillai, D (eds) *Slums and Urbanization*. Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1970.

Venkatarayappa, K N *Slums — A Study in Urban Problems*. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1972.

The population of Poona (Poona Municipal Corporation area) is well over one and a quarter million persons, of which at least 3,75,000 people are estimated to be living in unauthorized hutments. In 1951, 7.6% of the city population lived in hutments, by 1968, the proportion had increased to 11.6%.<sup>8</sup> The hutment population was estimated to be a quarter of the city population in 1975 and now it is more than 30%.

The growth in the number of hutment dwellers since the mid 60s has been spectacular. The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, the availability of new industrial jobs in and around Poona has increased the pace of migration into the city. Severe droughts in the late 1960s and early 1970s in some parts of Maharashtra have also sent hordes of poverty stricken families to Poona in search of livelihood. On the other hand, the type of housing in the city that was built in accordance with building regulations and affordable to a vast majority of the newcomers (as well as the low-income city born forming new families), did not increase commensurate with its need. The migrants had to crowd the already congested inner city and live in old, low-rent accommodation or, more likely, take shelter in unauthorized shanty settlements built in contravention of the city development plan.

There is little dignity in existing as poor unauthorized shanty dwellers; the city administration looks upon them as a troublesome aberration on the city development plan, the rich regard them as anti-social and uncouth elements and a bad influence on their children to be avoided at any cost. On the other hand, the life that the poor face is characterized by gross deprivation and neglect. The world that the poor children grow up in is harsh and oppressive. In order to cope with it they must develop their own rationale and mechanism for survival.

Their homes, particularly in the worse off settlements, are apologies

<sup>8</sup> Poona Municipal Corporation Report of Survey of Hutments in Poona (Marathi), 1969.

for shelter. Shanties are built close to each other and the narrow pathways in between often act as open drains. The gross underprovision of basic services results in disgustingly unhygienic conditions. The near-absence of provision for garbage disposal leaves refuse scattered about. Drains are often blocked, and rotting sludge remains unclear for days. Children rarely use latrines even if provided. The environmental situation is appalling during the monsoons, with damp floors and leaking roofs inside the huts and stagnant water puddles or slippery mud just outside. The few water taps which serve each settlement provide an insufficient quantity of water. Long queues for collecting water are normal and squabbles are frequent.

In some settlements a small area is left open which is used by children as a play area. If there is no open space in the settlement, children play by the roadside. There are no toys or sports equipment to play with, instead children play marbles or go around on a rented or borrowed bicycle or simply get into fights with each other.

With small huts huddled together, the concept of privacy is non-existent. The noise level is generally high. Very few shanties have electric supply for lighting, most families use kerosene lamps. Soon after sunset, darkness envelops these settlements and not much activity is possible.

The incomes of shanty dwelling families are meagre or at best modest. A study in Poona<sup>9</sup> shows that the income of nearly 70% of the households was below subsistence level.<sup>10</sup> Proportionately more women from households earning lower incomes tend to work to augment the family income. Earners are engaged in a wide range of occupations. A majority, however, cannot compete successfully in the formal

<sup>9</sup> Bapat, M *Op cit*, 1981.

<sup>10</sup> In 1976, minimum per capita subsistence income for urban areas, based on the calculations made by Dandekar and Rath, works out at Rs 67.05 per month. Dandekar, V M and Rath, N *Poverty in India*, Ford Foundation, New Delhi, 1970.

sector or for skilled jobs and have to undertake unskilled casual work

**T**he squalid physical environment in hutments severely affects the health of the residents. A recent study in Poona regarding health and health care,<sup>11</sup> conducted in seven hutment communities, shows that the food and water that the people consume is dangerously contaminated by faecal matter. In this environment both the incidence of child illness and nutritional deficiency in the vulnerable age group 0-5 years is very high. Over 40% of the children are severely malnourished. (The death rate in this small sample is comparable to that estimated for rural areas — 34 versus 36 per thousand in the age group 0-5 years)

It is not the low income alone that results in such an alarming health status of the children. Two equally important contributory factors are the low level of awareness among women about health, hygiene and child-care and the unhygienic environment. A woman with a severely malnourished one year old child complained that her child was very sickly and weak; that she was giving him powder milk (as 'modern' and better) but he could not digest even that. It transpired that neither was the water she used for preparing the milk boiled nor was the feeding bottle sterilized. As a special remedy, she had tied round the child's neck a small cloth bag which contained a particular type of insect. She had been told that when the insect died, her child's ailments too would go away.

There is urgent need for creating enhanced awareness about health and hygiene. And yet our health care merely consists of hospital based, primarily curative medicine. Programmes aimed at supplementing nutrition of poor children achieve little improvement as they disregard the importance of sanitary

environment and the phenomenon of synergism of malnutrition and infection. There is ample room for evolving an appropriate health care system that includes the components of curative and preventive medicine and health education. Above all, it must be part of a larger programme for the well-being of the community.

**E**ducation is supposed to be one of the important influences during childhood. It is believed to inculcate certain values and open up opportunities which make possible individual advance. Failure to complete school education is presumed to be a personal inadequacy. And, yet, in spite of free compulsory primary education there is a high drop-out rate amongst children from poor families. In a large number of cases, they are first generation learners. They have neither the tradition of formal education nor the incentives to attend school. They see around them illiterates and matriculates doing unskilled work and earning the same amount of money. An alien and irrelevant school curriculum and the teachers' prejudices against them together create a disinterest towards education. If, therefore, they leave school, their parents do not press them to go back, for they too do not see what little education their children can get as a vehicle for upward mobility. It is not for economic reasons alone that they drop out of school but as a result of a complex amalgam of socio-economic and cultural factors.

In this environment, children who are out of school have little else to occupy them. What they see around them is an adult world of petty gambling and drinking ('toddy' at least). This is what some of them try to emulate. What toughens them further is the attitude of those who maintain law and order. A young boy of ten who goes rag-picking once found a diary in a rubbish dump. Fascinated by it, he sat down by the roadside to flick through its pages. A policeman passing by saw the boy with the diary and assumed that he must have stolen it. He took him in police custody for a day and gave him a good beating. This kind of occurrence is not infrequent. This

suspicion of children must have its repercussions on their reasoning process.

Children in this environment grow up early. They become aware about sex at a young age. Parents, therefore, prefer to get their daughters married early (in some communities before they are even ten years old) for the fear that they may be led astray into some temptation. Many boys, too, are married around the age of sixteen.

One little girl who was married but still stayed with her parents learnt one day that her husband had left her for another woman. Whether or not she understood the meaning of marriage is difficult to know, but she screamed and howled, broke her 'mangalsutra' and cursed her husband. She had probably seen that this was the usual response of women in such a situation.

Even young girls and boys have to take the responsibility of looking after their younger siblings. Girls are responsible for performing many household chores, such as collecting water, cleaning pots and cooking. At the age of ten many boys start earning whatever they can, some work in tea shops, others go rag-picking and portering or help their parents in their unskilled jobs. Girls of six or seven occasionally go rag-picking to earn small amounts of money to buy bangles or ribbons that they might fancy.

**T**he frustration and economic uncertainties that parents face must affect their young children too. During periods of unemployment there is tension between the parents and tempers are frayed, quarrels or wife beating which may follow must make the children insecure. A five year old boy who attended a non-formal programme of education, one day went home in the middle of a lesson. On returning shortly after that he explained that it was his father's first day at work after a long period of unemployment. He had gone home to make sure that the father did go to work.

Growing up in the world of poverty and discrimination does not

<sup>11</sup> Bapat, M. *Determinants of Health in Low-Income Communities*, Centre for Development Studies and Activities, Poona, 1982, mimeo.

<sup>12</sup> Scrimshaw, N S. Synergism of Malnutrition and Infection, 'Journal of American Medical Association', June, 1970.

mean that there is only hunger, unhappiness and deprivation. There is laughter and there are small pleasures in the lives of these children. Playing with an empty reel found in a rubbish dump or buying an ice-cream can be equally exciting.

Their environment does not kill their creativity either. A child in the non-formal educational programme drew a vivid picture of their settlement situated at the foot of a hill. It showed their settlement engulfed by darkness and smoke against the background of the hill with flood-lit temples at the top. In contrast, some children in this programme who had been through a conditioning regime of school for a couple of years drew a stereotyped view of hills with the setting sun, a river, coconut trees and flying birds. Young boys who participated in the programme and who also worked in tea shops enacted scenes at the work place imaginatively with all the details. In the beginning they all wanted to be the shop owner who swore at the boys and ordered them around. Later when they realised that in this play at least, if not in reality, they could answer the owner back, they enjoyed playing the part of tea boys. Their fellow pupils who were school drop outs, on the contrary, performed plays connected with mythological stories of Rama and Krishna.

These are only snippets of the world of the child in a poor family. It is a world which is totally alien to those who make theory and put it into practice. Unless it is studied carefully, a holistic approach to urban development which encompasses all aspects of life cannot come about. Above all, the poor must not be penalized for being poor, for their poverty is the result of failure to generate economic growth and to include them in the productive sector of the economy. Apart from the long-term issues of income and employment generation, they must have a place in our city development plans. To do this, however, involves steps towards rational and equitable distribution of the city's resources. In this respect it is not a question of relevant urban planning strategy alone but of political will.

## Listening to the past

RAGHUVIR SAHAY

MANY of us remember the saying that knowledge liberates. I heard it when I was very young. But I realise its full meaning now when I see that the adult's grip on the child's mind and personality has gradually become more stringent. Stringent it had always been, but the chances for children to free themselves from its tyranny have greatly diminished. The irony is that during this period of growing callousness towards the child, there was a time when thought-



ful people felt and expressed the need to help children free themselves before it was too late. Encouragement was given by such adults for painting, for example, but soon this encouragement turned into another organized repression in the form of regimentation of children's style. It is easy to conclude from this example that well-meaning efforts towards freedom for children can degenerate into actions against them. But it would be too simplistic to conclude that since such attempts degenerate they should be abandoned.

The fact is that such efforts have a democratic purpose, the purpose of maintaining a continuity of non-conformism to callousness which leads to a system of injustice. Living in this world without renouncing it should mean non-conformity. It also implies tension, although the tension I am talking about is different from the tension caused by the rat race. We must prepare our children for facing the tension that accompanies non-conformism, and this is where I see the role of children's media. The contemporary media are not fulfilling this role.

**T**he most significant media for children are the people closest to them, the people children observe, imitate, accept or decide to reject as they develop within themselves the capacity to undertake the tasks appropriate to various stages of their physical and mental development. It is perhaps at an early stage of development that the child learns to disapprove of some adult actions, while approving of some others — may be, not in the same person. The strength to take such decisions is a vital element in a child's early life. Teachings of elders also fall in the same category as the actions.

A child can develop enough confidence not to treat all teachings as suppressive of his or her personality. Indeed, a child can take pride in having the freedom to follow an ideal. Mass media today aim at destroying the desire and freedom to discriminate between ideals propagated by adults, and the child is hard put to escape the net thrown around him. What is still more

cruel is the hypocrisy of routinely presenting two alternatives before the child when the choice between the two cannot be described as a real choice.

**A** look at the fiction that is being supplied to children in today's glossy magazines would reveal that stories commending retribution against injustice are no longer popular. Stories written for children today describe cases of revenge with the message that there can be no higher ambition than to become another tyrant. The desire to strive for a new order and the courage to face failure, which one found reflected in older magazines for children, are absent in contemporary magazines.

Let me quote a few examples of the older type of communication with children. I have before me the November-December issue of *Vanar* of 1933. Among other items it carries the editor's diary which says: '*Vanar* will continue to oppose hypocritical methods used by parents and teachers to mislead children. In future, poems full of meaningless and stupid sycophancy of God will not be allowed to appear in the magazine.' Earlier in the diary, the editor writes about the futility of prayer\*. His style of writing clearly reflects the spirit of the national movement for freedom. Commenting on a prayer written by a contemporary poet for children, the editor says 'What is the use of sending SOS messages to Ram or Krishna? Neither would come to your rescue.' He concludes by saying that 'slavery was born the day man began to look upon God as his master and looked down on himself as the lowliest of God's servants. Human beings would perhaps have become more contented and civilised if they had learnt to regard God as an elder brother who deserved respect and nothing more.'

\*A survey of prayers sung in schools every day was carried out with the help of students and their teachers during my editorship of *Dinamit* by Krishna Kumar. It revealed the symbolic power that prayers use to prepare children to accept authority by first making them accustomed to the glory of God's authority. The survey is a part of Krishna Kumar's *Raj, Samaj aur Shiksha* (Macmillan, 1978).

An example of the older type of fiction which I want to give is from a magazine of the twenties. Chandra Bali Pathak wrote a story called 'The Test' in the October 1925 issue of *Balsakha* which used to be published by the Indian Press of Allahabad. In this story a boy named Sushil is going to take a test in geography the next day. He is laboriously writing a prayer in the margin of his book 'O Lord of the helpless, pity thy devotee, see him through the test.' He writes it once, twice, thrice, twelve times, twenty times, and then follows it up in his copy-book sixty times, a hundred times, until he dozes off after filling up two copy-books. Next morning finds him facing the question 'How would you describe the climate of Southern India?' The answer he gives is 'The climate of India is known for a special feature that there is not the slightest difference between the climate in the north and in the south. The reason for this is that India lies as much in the north as it does in the south.'

The following day Sushil promises to write his prayer two thousand times and keeps the promise. He now faces the history test, and the question he must answer is to describe the battle Maharani Laxmibai fought. He writes 'Maharani Laxmibai fought and fought and fought very well.' The next question is 'Why is she called the Rani of Jhansi?' Sushil is now a broken person. He suddenly realises that he would not be able to sit in the same class with his friend Manohar if he fails to pass the test. The bicycle his grandfather had promised him on the condition that he be promoted to the next class will not materialise. 'Never shall I waste my time in foibles in future,' he promises to himself, and steers himself to try an answer, 'because she was a Rani.'

**T**he story ends here. It explodes the myth of God, and shows the stirrings of self-confidence in Sushil. It is difficult to find something similar in the mass media of today regarding a child's relationship with God. What is easier to find is an advertisement of oneself in which the 'intelligent' child tries to show



off by putting a classmate to a standard general knowledge test. The classfellow floors the examiner by giving a perfect answer and follows it up with a punch that he is a regular reader of the magazine which carries this story and therefore unbeatable. Excellence in general knowledge is a matter of pride and a matter of nerve-breaking competition in today's society.

**T**he mass media have played the profit maker's role in building up this competition beyond all proportion. They could not have succeeded in this de-education without devaluing what was once portrayed as an ideal type of ambition. Listen to the words of *Vanar's* editor: 'What a great day it would be for you when you would lead your own movement here, there, and everywhere in the country as Gandhi did. Imagine the joy you would experience in finding yourself amidst the downtrodden and in their service.'

That an editorial comment of this sort is not seen today is evidence of an organized attempt to keep such discussions out of the reach of children. It also appears to me that the managers of today's mass media for children are against love. Premchand and Maithili Sharan Gupta were among the contributors to *Kumar*, the only magazine in Hindi for adolescents. The issue of July 1932 contains a short story by Premchand about a little girl who is sick in bed and is being nursed by her two younger brothers. They fan her when it is warm and cheer her up when she is depressed. In moments of despair when she becomes precariously ill they pray to God that their love might save her life.

Another story in the same issue describes a most unusual event in paradise, namely, the beginning of love, under the title 'The Mistake'. Someone has allowed entry in paradise to a young man who did not 'work'. Everybody else did nothing but work. The idler he was, he loitered about spending the best part of his time watching a pretty little maid fetch water from the river. One day he requested her to lend her one of her water pitchers to paint flowers on it. Next he wove

strings of colourful threads for her to tie up her tresses with. The girl, amazed by such beautiful diversions, began to spend more of her time admiring the colours on her pitchers and the ribbons in her pigtails than on 'working'. Such waste of time had never been seen to happen in paradise. The head-in-charge ordered the idler to be expelled. The girl decided to accompany him. No one had ever desired to leave paradise before for reasons of personal attachment!

Love and involvement as opposed to exploitation and slavery were given prominence in children's literature in a period when the desire for freedom was a part of the society's political urge for independence. Children shared it with adults. No material incentives were given to persuade children to consume the media. Quest of knowledge was supposed to be an end in itself. The importance of knowledge as a means of acquiring a dubious social status was not particularly known. Advertisements and contents of most of today's magazines for children speak of this advantage in loud commercial tones. Even the appreciation of beauty is propagated as a fashion which places a person in the 'higher' category of people. I am reminded of an advertisement in which a child complains to her mother that the sanitaryware in their house is cheaper looking than the one in the neighbours'. Furthermore, appreciation of the beauty of nature has gone out of children's media. It is very difficult to find a children's magazine that has any description of the land — a description which is evocative.

**T**he popular film and television are often described as two destructive influences on children's lives. Anybody can see that the initial attraction the screen with moving objects has for children of the lower age group has a validity. It is only when the objects begin to project ideas and values intended to condition the mind that a conflict between the child and the media begins. Unfortunately, there are no means to assess the conflict, to gauge the chances of the child wishing to devise methods of his struggle against the conditioning he is

exposed to. My personal observation is that the willing suspension of disbelief sought to be created by TV or film is neither fully achieved nor utilised aesthetically for the simple reason that art is not considered relevant to the programmes on show.

**T**he child, according to the beliefs of those who produce programmes, deserves no more than a magic show. Magic shows are what are presented in various garbs like storytelling and documentary film. The adults who perform in these magic shows use the TV screen to transform themselves into children. They think that such a transformation makes them more likeable to adults — who are watching the show along with children. It is not the child they have in mind, but the childlike image of themselves which has a higher commercial value in the adult market. This is true of both men and women who produce children's programmes for television.

What is needed is to develop small units for communication with and amongst children, units which would try to alter the conditions of the struggle against children's dehumanization. Small magazines, plays, and storytelling programmes could be organized to this end. The commercial theory that masses welcome the corruption of the mind is a myth which has to be challenged. Someone has to challenge the salesmen of today's media to prove their claim that children's journalism of fifty years ago is irrelevant and pointless today.

The writers and editors of the thirties and the forties made a revolutionary bid to identify the needs of children. The resources available then were no more easily available than they are now, nor was the competition against corruptors less formidable. But there was a 'market' for the better and more progressive outlook. My contention is that the market still exists, only the packaging and warehousing make the commodity scarcer and costlier — sometimes beyond small investments. Cutting down these costs is worth trying.

# An experiment in education

MEENAKSHI THAPAN

AS the utilitarian or 'moulding' models of education have come to be challenged, particularly in the last fifty years or so, others have been substituted these have likened education to a 'natural' process in which the individual develops and grows spontaneously. Gradually, a positive 'child-centred' ideology has emerged which emphasises the needs and interests of the child rather than the demands of teachers, the school or society. Thus, the 'progressive' child-centred educator argues against the coercion or punishment of children and suggests that they should be allowed to learn from experience rather than be told things. Moreover, the role of the teacher is viewed as being merely that of the 'facilitator' responsive to the expressed desires of the learner.

This stress on the spontaneous and free development of the child without the usual attendant pressures of domination, authority, anxiety, and so on, is to ensure a perfectly natural physical, mental and moral growth of the child. The child as an individual, in other words, has gained ascendance in progressive educational thought over the child seen as having utilitarian value and, thereby, contribut-

ing profitably to social institutions and society at large.

Jiddu Krishnamurti, in the realm of progressive educators, goes a step further in that he also views the child as being the harbinger of a 'new mind', a 'new culture' which is necessary for the transformation of man and society. He starts with the premise of the decay of society in terms of the breakdown of the moral, political, economic and social order. He further states that real change cannot come about by changing the 'external' situation, such as by the formation of religious organisations oriented toward the spiritual regeneration of man, political revolutions and the like. The change which will transform man is an 'inner' change and this changed human personality will bring about the complete renewal of mankind. It is important at this point to understand that, for Krishnamurti, human consciousness is collective which is why he sees the possibility of individual change leading to social transformation.

It is in the process of the awakening of the new mind, what he calls the 'awakening of intelligence', that Krishnamurti sees the important and necessary role of 'right' education. If, in the years of childhood

and adolescence, the child can be exposed to, and experience, a different kind of learning which comes not only from the acquisition of academic knowledge and technical skills but from the observation and awareness of the environment, people and himself, his perception and relationship with life would undergo some kind of change. Education is, thus, of 'prime significance in the communication of that which is central to the transformation of the human mind and the creation of a new culture'<sup>1</sup>

**T**he word 'education' has misapplied meanings and generally implies attending classes from childhood through university, taking degrees and accumulating a great deal of knowledge about various subjects. The 'cultivation of memory' has become a necessity in the present socio-economic structure as a degree is considered essential for any job. Furthermore, in order to acquire this degree, one must conform to an established code of knowledge and order of society. This encourages, in the child, a sense of competition, an ambitious drive toward success, and such education is geared to industrialisation and war, its principal aim being to develop efficiency. It is, therefore, important to be aware that education is not merely a matter of training the mind. In fact, to find out what 'right' education really is 'we will have to enquire into the whole significance of living.' In understanding life, and the 'art of living', we begin to understand ourselves, and that is the beginning and the end of education'<sup>2</sup>

Essential to the understanding of life is an environment in which there is 'freedom'. This concept of freedom is central to Krishnamurti's educational thought. That is, freedom which implies 'not just to do what we like but to understand the whole process of living'<sup>3</sup>. However, there can be no motives for bring-

ing about freedom because the very thought of the 'uses' of freedom destroys that freedom. Further, it is important to note that in Krishnamurti's writings, freedom and order go together. Order comes about as a result of consideration, thoughtfulness, watchfulness, both outward and inward, and with that order there comes freedom. The external imposition of discipline makes the mind conform and imitate while order, the 'precursor' of freedom, comes from within. Moreover, order and freedom in oneself can only come about in an environment free from fear and compulsion. Thus, cooperation among teachers and between teachers and students in the school is preferred to the imposition of discipline by teachers and authority by the management.

It is only when the child grows in freedom, and in the love that comes with this freedom, that we can create a new world which is not based on tradition or shaped according to the ideals or idiosyncracies of different people. Further, while externally freedom in education is curtailed by examinations which are there for giving each individual a position, internally there is a demand to want to be something or somebody. The function of education is, therefore, to help the children not to imitate anybody but to be themselves all the time.

**R**elated to the notion of freedom is the whole issue of 'authority'. Basically, authority denies freedom. When there is authority in education the mind is conforming to a pattern of obedience which not only breeds fear but also makes the mind incapable of 'freshness', of 'thinking simply and directly'<sup>4</sup>.

While the authority of factual knowledge *per se*, and the teacher as representative of that knowledge cannot be denied, the 'corrupting' influence of authoritative teaching is pointed out. It is only when the teacher can perceive that both the teacher and the student are learning together in dialogue and mutual co-operation that learning without fear can take place in the child.

Krishnamurti views ambition in education as a 'curse' because it breeds the competitive spirit and ultimately destroys relationships and love in the race to get to the top. The purpose of education is to find out what the child loves to do and excels in rather than encouraging him to be something. Thus, while the student must be given 'abundant knowledge in the fields of human endeavour', at the same time, he should be educated such that his mind is free of all 'tradition' so that he is able to investigate into, and discover, the nature of life (1964: 147). It is, therefore, necessary to recognise the distinction that knowledge is useful and important at one level but becomes a detriment at another level. The right kind of education should strike a balance between training of the technical sort and helping the child to 'flower in his goodness'.

**I**n defining the role of students and teachers, a 'real' student is one who is learning, enquiring, exploring throughout life. There is, therefore, no one in particular to teach a student as he is learning from everything. And the learning that comes about through 'self-knowledge' has no limit 'because to learn through your own self knowledge is to know how to listen, how to observe and, therefore, you learn from everything' (1964: 229). It is most important that the student should be capable of research both into scientific matters as well as into the 'workings of his own mind, his own feelings' (*ibid* p. 216).

Krishnamurti imbues the role of the teacher with a 'sacred responsibility' not to be easily set aside for one's own ambitions, power and status. The educator is held 'totally responsible' for the child, not just in terms of his physical well-being or academic achievements, but also for his psychological growth. It is, in fact, in his role of aiding the psychological perceptions of childhood that the teacher is seen as playing his most important role.

This has serious implications for the educator because, traditionally, the school teacher has been viewed primarily as the giver of knowledge, a noble example for the child to emulate, but rarely as the prime

1 Krishnamurti Foundation, India *Krishnamurti on Education*, p. 7 Bombay, Orient Longmans Ltd., 1974.

2 Krishnamurti, J. *Education and the Significance of Life*, p. 13, 14 New Delhi, B I Publications, 1973.

3 Lutyens, M. (Ed.) *The Penguin Krishnamurti Reader*, p. 147, 1964.

4 *Krishnamurti on Education*, 1974, p. 32.

agent for the transformation of mankind. What is demanded from the teacher in this process of education leading to human change is infinite love which can only come about when the teacher is aware of his total responsibility to the student.

Another major expectation, contrary to traditional norms, is that the teacher cannot function with authority, domination or compulsion in the educative process. There are two reasons for this learning cannot take place in a situation where one person holds himself superior to another. It can only occur when both the teacher and the taught are exploring, investigating, observing, listening together. Secondly, learning is also not possible when there is fear on the part of the student which arises out of the authority of the teacher.

An equal relationship between teachers and students is of supreme importance in the learning process. There must be love between them, a sense of mutual cooperation and, above all, each must perceive his responsibility to the other. Moreover, unless the educator understands himself, sees his own conditioned responses and is beginning to free himself from existing values, he cannot awaken intelligence in the child. In order to bring about freedom in the child, the educator must himself be aware of the implications and full significance of freedom (1973 107). Thus, in helping the child towards freedom, the educator is also changing his own values and this process of 'mutual education' creates a different kind of relationship between the teacher and the student.

The quality in the teacher which is of fundamental significance is the 'religious' quality. This quality can only exist in that teacher who is solely dedicated to the 'freedom' and 'integration' of the individual. Such a teacher will then be concerned with 'helping the student to seek out truth and not merely preparing him to fit into a given pattern of society' (1964 162). The function of the teacher can, therefore, be summed up as the task of educating not only the 'partial' mind but the 'totality' of the mind

so that the student does not get caught up in the 'whirlpool of existence but lives in the whole river of life' (1974 29).

To bring about such a transformation, Krishnamurti stresses the urgency of the need for a community of people working together in mutual cooperation, understanding and love. He would really like the right kind of atmosphere or environment, as envisaged by him, to be provided to the child right from primary school through university, but because of practical limitations at present, his work has been confined to the school. The school, in Krishnamurti's scheme of things, as a community of people working together, is thus the catalyst of human change and eventual social transformation.

While the intention of the Krishnamurti schools is clear from what has been stated above, Krishnamurti has summed up the 'total responsibility' of these schools. 'They must be centres of learning, a way of life which is not based on pleasure, on self-centred activities, but on the understanding of correct action, the depth and beauty of right relationship, and the sacredness of a religious life .. these centres must become places of light and wisdom. It is the responsibility of those who are in charge of those places to bring this about.'<sup>5</sup>

The Krishnamurti Foundation in India has a two-fold purpose: the dissemination and spread of Krishnamurti's teachings and the running of the Krishnamurti schools in India. Taking their cue from him, the Foundation has specified the intention of the schools run by it as being the awakening of intelligence in the child and helping him flower in his goodness. 'The cultivation of a global outlook in an atmosphere of freedom and responsibility, a religious spirit without any sectarian bias and a concern for man and his environment.'<sup>6</sup> With this avowed

aim, the Foundation runs five co-educational schools in India, two of which are residential.

One such school, Rishi Valley, is situated in southern India. Space and natural beauty, the two essential prerequisites for the physical environment, according to Krishnamurti, are met with here in that the school is located in large and beautiful surroundings.

As it will not be possible in this article to cover all aspects of the school's functioning, certain crucial areas have been selected for analysis. As the brochure specifies, the school is 'non-sectarian' for students come from all over India. However, a large percentage of the student population is comprised of children from South India. Again, while it is co-educational with about 325 students in all, two-thirds of the children are boys. The medium of instruction is English while Hindi, Sanskrit and Telugu are taught as second languages. The school follows the 10+2 pattern of examinations and is affiliated to the Council for Indian School Certificate Examinations in New Delhi and is also a member of the Indian Public Schools Conference.

Ordinarily, there are three points of entry to the school at the ages seven, eight, and eleven, but a few children are also admitted into senior classes if there are vacancies. While selecting children for admission to the school, parents are asked to visit the school with their child/children, are interviewed and the children tested for academic competence. Criteria for admission include a good regional representation, various religious backgrounds, relatives of old students, the cultural and educational background of parents, vegetarian children, 'sensitive' children, those recommended by the Foundation as being children of parents interested in Krishnamurti's philosophy, and academic performance.

While the school adheres to this policy to some extent, it has to compromise and admit several students who may not meet any of the school's requirements. This is for

<sup>5</sup> Krishnamurti, J. *Letters to Schools* (no 28), Krishnamurti Foundation Trust, London, 1979.

<sup>6</sup> 'Krishnamurti Foundation India Requires Teachers', *Indian Express*, Feb. 2, 1981.

two reasons: pressure from local bureaucrats, politicians and financial backers of the school. Secondly, the school has to fill in all the vacancies which occur every year in order to maintain financial equilibrium. To meet these demands, essential for the functioning of the school, it can pick and choose students only up to a point, after which it takes in second-best and sometimes children who do not fit in at all with the school's expectations.

**T**he children live in small 'houses' (about twenty five to a house) under the care of a house master or house mother. Girls and boys live separately except in the two junior-most dormitories which are mixed. The school has recently taken a decision, under instructions from Krishnamurti, to start smaller houses so that the children are in closer contact with their house parent. Initially, two such houses were started with only children with 'sensitive' qualities being asked to live in them. As the number of children to be selected was very small it was a difficult decision to take. However, senior teachers drew up a list of 'sensitive', 'gifted' children and the principal used his discretion in selecting the required number.

Students' recent writings on the subject reveal that almost all students, both boys and girls, from the three senior-most classes view these special houses and the children in them with some amount of suspicion and distance. This has created some unhappiness in the community in that a few children are seen as being treated differently from others. There is also the feeling that these houses are really no different from other houses and are, therefore, unable to justify their existence.

However, in one such house to which I was able to gain entry, the housemaster and his students, besides having an unusually close relationship, were constantly examining, through informal discussions, the nature of their relationships, their psychological reactions to each other, the meaning of living together, their life in school, and so on. This made them a closely knit

group sharing the experience of living together harmoniously and amicably. These students also appeared to be particularly interested in the values of the school and were seriously investigating the implications of Krishnamurti's philosophical thought. This house is different from all other houses in the school, in that in no other house was there such a close relationship between the house parent and all his/her students nor among all the students of that particular house together. The plan now is slowly to extend this kind of a house system to all students in the school.

**T**he academic system is similar to that of any other school in terms of the content of the curriculum and the examination system, particularly at the senior level. Senior students are offered a choice of only three streams of subjects for the final examination, two of which are science, catering to the engineering and medical careers primarily, while the third is commerce. Some students may choose subjects like history or special english literature but because of the lack of facilities and the time allotted to these subjects, students rarely do so.

Competition is curtailed to the extent that no tests or examinations are held until the students are in senior school. Till then, a detailed record is maintained of each student so that the teacher is aware of the academic capabilities of the students in his care. On parental insistence, reports are sent home at the end of each term stating the child's competence in the subject and, in the senior school, grades are recorded as well.

Students perceive a lack of competition in the school's academic system which they view as being detrimental to their ability to gain admission into universities and technical institutions after school. Most students also stressed the need for a wider choice of subjects so that learning could take place along a wider dimension instead of being restricted to the three streams as it is now. The school explains its narrow academic orientation in terms of the demands of the universities and other institutions to

which students seek admission after school.

In this area, therefore, the school, instead of formulating its own curriculum based on its value system, is having to come to terms with the structured requirements of institutions of higher learning in society. This discrepancy exists primarily because it is catering to a clientele which is not, perhaps, interested in being or doing anything other than fulfilling parental and thus, social norms and expectations. While students clearly perceive the school's values and objectives, their own expectations of education and life later are at variance with those of the school.

In terms of the learning situation itself, at the lower level there is more experimentation in the classroom, less instruction and more sharing, and an effort to evolve a totally different method of communication from the traditional. However, in the senior school, because of the impending pressure of examinations, learning is oriented toward the textbook and the syllabus and in the very senior classes, totally toward the examination. This is because the school has accepted the usual academic pattern which is geared toward the preparation for examinations instead of learning *per se*.

**T**he school offers a host of co-curricular activities such as music, dance, drama, painting, carpentry, leather work and other crafts. These activities are very popular with the largest majority opting for the arts and crafts section. Another effort to develop aesthetic qualities in the child are the fifteen minutes of '*asthachal*' every evening when students are expected to watch the evening sunset in silence. While this has become a compulsory feature of the daily school routine, senior students writing about it expressed the peace and quiet they experienced which rejuvenated them for the evening hour of study.

There is no moral indoctrination of any sort at Rishi Valley. 'Culture' classes and discussion meetings are held every week with senior

students primarily to bring about an awareness in the child of present day economic, political and social problems. An attempt is also made to discuss psychological problems such as fear, jealousy, envy and so on. Most students discuss social issues with interest and enthusiasm but only a few participate in discussions of a more personal nature. These are, generally, students who evince an interest in Krishnamurti's philosophy. However, their participation in such discussions and at other times, affects their relationships with their peers who are not very appreciative of those who attempt to, in their minds, conform with the school culture.

This places the child who is inclined toward reflection in a quandary for, on the one hand, he would like to be identified with his peer group and, on the other, he would like to internalize the values of the school. This creates a situation where groups of students are alienated from the dominant student culture resulting in no major divisions but in a sense of exclusion and separateness for those who are different.

There is also the whole question of the place of freedom in the school. Outwardly, freedom is curtailed by the imposition of a daily routine which students have to adhere to. While this helps in maintaining external order and ensures the smooth functioning of the school's daily activities, senior students feel restrained and overwhelmed by continuous occupation.

In being conscious of the school's value system which emphasises freedom for the child, the school encounters problems of discipline among students. In trying to curb this indiscipline the school, once again, cannot rely on punishment but on communication with the child as an attempt to bring about order. This does not often solve the problem and the school resorts to punitive measures in extreme cases. This is by virtue of the fact that it is a social institution the disruption of which can have harmful ramifications for both other members of the institution, as well as for its functioning.

In their relationships with teachers, students express informality, affection and care. Fear is experienced only episodically. This generally harmonious relationship between teachers and students exists both inside and outside the confines of the formal learning situation although several teachers put on 'fronts' in their formal dealings with students to ensure the modicum of correct behaviour they see as being essential for effective teaching.

As has been seen in the discussion on the school, Rishi Valley encounters problems in implementation at several levels. Given its structure and organisation, which in itself places restrictions on its performance, the main problem is that of having the right teachers. Most teachers at the school are there not because they are committed to Krishnamurti's vision but for a variety of other reasons.

Social pressures emerging from an established code of conduct impinge on the school in different ways through parental demands and through the child's expectations as a result of his perception of his future roles in society. The school is, thus, obliged to compromise in most spheres of its functioning in order to adapt to and operate within the world of social needs and dominant pressures.

It would, therefore, seem as if instead of bringing about the 'new culture' envisaged by Krishnamurti, the school is under pressure of the existent culture in its performance. One way of looking at the problem would be to suggest that such a school can be seen as becoming increasingly effective in the future when society is willing to accept and cooperate with the agents of change. However, having perceived the urgency of change, Krishnamurti has posed a challenge to the committed educator. The difficult task of implementing Krishnamurti's vision into educational practice lies with the educator, in his awareness and understanding of education as being the effective instrument of social transformation.

# Books

**PERSPECTIVES IN PRE-SCHOOL EDUCATION** by Aruna Thakkar Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1980

**SLUM CHILDREN OF INDIA** edited by Drs S D Singh and K P Pothan New Delhi Deep and Deep, 1982

**THE INNER WORLD** by Sudhir Kakar. Delhi Oxford University Press, 1981

**SOCIALIZATION OF THE INDIAN CHILD** edited by D. Sinha New Delhi Concept Publishing Co., 1981.

ONE wonders how any young student of education and social change as they affect children in India manages to find adequate information, or even rudimentary information, about Indian childhood. There are virtually no books published within the last five years that offer a clear, well-documented description of childhood pertaining to any particular social class. Part of the problem lies in the fact that every adult holds strong opinions about how children should be brought up and usually assumes that every other sane adult shares these views. Reasoning thus, there would be little purpose in investigating the obvious. Another part of the problem is the current magical belief in the efficacy of the statistic. 'If enough statistics are marshalled', this line of thought appears to say, 'then all the questions and problems affecting children will be solved.'

In any event, there is a dearth of descriptive material relating to childhood in India. And yet, without such material, the student really cannot hope to have an imaginative understanding of children, and cannot begin to be objective in assessing children's needs. The assumptions that parents of different groups hold about key issues in child rearing, and the ways in which children are moulded into their prevailing cultural norms must be explored. One might turn to literature to gain an impression of how Indian children are brought up, or to see how life appears through the eyes of the young child. But here, again, there is little to be found. With the exception of a few books, like Mannu Bhandari's *Ap ka Bunt*, hardly any recent literary writing gives

a reader an impression of the experience of being young in this changing society.

Nevertheless, one can discern indicators that an interest in childhood may develop. Aruna Thakkar, in *Perspectives in Pre-school Education*, makes no pretence to describe a particular group of children, but gives suggestions as to how this might be undertaken. Her book offers a concise history of the development of the pre-school movement. She summarizes the major philosophical trends both past and present in Europe and America. She distinguishes two major schools of practice — that epitomised by the MacMillan sisters in east-end London with its strong emphasis on social welfare for the young child, and that seen widely in America today, focusing on the child's intellectual development, particularly of the socially disadvantaged child. Like the proponents of the latter school of thought, Ms. Thakkar pays a lot of attention to the work and influence of the developmentalist psychologist, Jean Piaget. No one can afford to overlook the resounding impact of Piaget but, nonetheless, his work has its critics whose reservations seem particularly important for our Indian pre-schooler.

Briefly, Piaget sees children as immature adults in a way, and he posits as the major task of childhood to become adult. Adults have an objective sense of reality which children demonstrably lack. Adults and children may share a similar vocabulary, but experiment after experiment shows that children's understanding of the vocabulary of measurement, conservation, classification, etc., is immature and based on ego-centred perception. Thus, Piaget measures childhood in adult terms. This view fits all too neatly into the present Indian education system (which, one feels, Ms Thakkar is far from praising). But as it presently exists, the Indian education system too devalues childhood *per se*, with its rigid emphasis on 'learning things that a child must learn in order to qualify for a place in adult society'.

One could wish that Ms Thakkar had referred to the phenomenologist school of thought that opposes the Piagetian theory. Instead of describing childhood as a preparatory period, phenomenologists see childhood as a style of living that is complete within itself. Children, according to this reasoning, have their own use of language, their own style of acting on their environment, their own way of perceiving the world, through sensory means (and not verbal). The interesting thing about this line of argument,



and one that has great importance to the investigator of Indian childhood, is that this faculty of seeing and experiencing the environment through non-abstract, non-conceptual thinking plays a far greater role in the personality of the Indian child first coming to school, than in that of his western counterpart as Sudhir Kakar, in his book referred to below, persuasively points out. So, it would appear that this is a crucial point to be taken into account by people attempting to design pre-school programmes tailored to the Indian scene.

It is sad that the lengthy chapter on the Indian pre-school depends so heavily on a recitation of the various pronouncements, 5-year plans and central government *fiats* with regard to who should take which responsibilities and, better still, who should pay. Aside from one telling remark that there is a 'large number of unrecognized schools' for which statistics are not available, Ms Thakkar spares the reader the reminder of the countless private baby-factories masquerading under the name of kindergartens, pre-schools, nurseries and the like in cities and towns where hapless middle-class 3-year olds sit in groups of fifty or more memorizing incomprehensible nursery rhymes in the name of English medium instruction. Ms Thakkar restricts herself, rightly, to discussing the situation of pre-school and its aims within the common school sector.

One hopes that Ms. Thakkar will write more about her experiences with and understanding of pre-school children. We would all stand to learn a great deal from her. She has engaged in a project investigating children's language and interests for designing reading programmes, and is aware, where thousands are not, that the way children are initially taught reading will affect all their later progress. In other words, Ms Thakkar is taking a close look at the actual children with whom she is concerned. One hopes that a future book will describe those children and their experiences in school with the sensitivity of other great and influential teachers like Ashton-Warner, Sybil Marshall, Jonathon Kozol and Gabrielle Roy who have influenced countless young teachers.

The editors of *Slum Children of India* (Drs S D. Singh and K P. Pothan) have indeed focussed on a particular group of children in a book which is both tantalizing and disappointing. Disappointing, because so long as slum people and their children are reduced to sets of tables and statistics, they will remain dehumanized in the eyes of all too many. If references to Pandit Nehru's thoughts on slums, or references to the Constitution's stirring remarks about Justice, Liberty, Fraternity and Equality such as we find here were able to stir the complacent sectors of society to accept their responsibilities towards the weaker sectors, then surely such references would have had the intended effect by now. Nor is it useful, fair, or accurate to assign blame for their condition to the poor's alleged differences from others 'in the sense that traits of personal, familial and social disorganization are abundant in

them. (p 100). It is not 'poverty, superstition and ignorance' that stand in the way of proper nourishment of slum children, it is oppression of one social class by another.

One way around the dehumanizing of slum dwellers in the minds of the complacent would be to bring life to the potentially rivetting information gathered by the informants about, for example, feeding patterns of infants and children in slums (chap 8). It isn't only slum mothers in the Third World who are suspicious of feeding their newborn baby colostrum, the Newsoms, in the first of their books describing social patterns of child-rearing (*Patterns of Infant Care*, Pelican) found the same habit in Nottingham mothers. By recording the mothers' actual words, the Newsoms remind the reader that these mothers are recognizable humans.

Similarly, the potentially insightful chapters regarding a day in the life of the slum child, and the child within the family, serve to tease the reader rather more than to inform him. One's impression, arising from the scantiness of detail, is that these youngsters were observed from the far side of the *nalah* through a telescope. The physical surroundings of typical slums are apparent even to the most callous observer, but what we would like to know is how the children themselves experience their life in this setting. An exception to this meagreness comes in the chapter about psychological problems among slum children. Here we are given good descriptions of four children whom obviously the doctors knew personally and knew well. This chapter provides good insight for the student and arouses that necessary empathy without which there is little point in trying to work with young children.

An immensely readable book, and a powerful exception to the abysmal lack of creative interest in childhood is to be found in Sudhir Kakar's *The Inner World* which must become required reading for all students of education and childhood in India. Kakar is a Freudian psychoanalyst. In this study, he relates 'the psychological themes which pervade Indian childhood' with the 'traditions and institutions of culture and society in India' (p 1). The kind of awareness that Kakar offers is essential to the teacher, for it assists him to understand his own mental processes, assumptions and actions in an objective way. Without understanding how the processes of human development and one's particular culture interact, one remains blind to anomalies of all sorts. It is easier to understand one's own culture after studying one that appears to be different for, without stepping outside oneself, one cannot 'see' oneself.

Kakar elucidates some of his points by drawing direct comparisons with western childhood and modes of perceiving. For example, many teachers in the West are baffled by the confusion invariably shown by Indian youngsters plunged into the world of the western pre-school and kindergarten. These little children are not prepared by their earlier expe-



**He can.**


Believe in him.  
That's the best thing  
you can do  
for the disabled.

 **Jyoti Ltd.** Vadodara  
Shaping technologies for a better life — your life.

everest/82/JY/226

TEXTILES, SUGAR,  
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS,  
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,  
VINASPATI, PVC, RAYON TYRE CORD,  
FERTILIZERS,  
ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS,  
IRON CASTINGS.

**IN THE  
SERVICE OF  
THE NATION**



**DCM** THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD., DELHI

ATTENTION STEEL MILLS  
&  
FOUNDRIES  
EXPORTERS OF WORLD FAMOUS SANDUR MANGANESE ORE  
OFFER  
EX-STOCK  
VERY LOW PHOS. PIG IRON  
AND  
LOW ALUMINIUM FERROSILICON  
PRODUCED IN THEIR PLANT AT VYASANKERE

*Please Contact*

**THE SANDUR MANGANESE & IRON ORES LIMITED**

**"LOHADRI BHAVAN"**

Yeshwant Nagar-583124:

Via Sandur, Bellary Dt  
Karnataka INDIA

*Cable:* SMIORE. SANDUR (INDIA)

*Telephone:* SANDUR 33, 61, 91;

*Telex:* BANGALORE 427

Bangalore : 32175 :

28262 :



**FOUR  
SWAN  
FABRICS**

**FOR ENCHANTING SHADES  
IN COTTON AND BLENDED TEXTURES**

Pamper your every whim and fancy with Four Swan Fabrics  
in cotton and Polyester/cotton blends. Crease-resistant  
Four Swan fabrics come in a wide range of colours and prints.

*Manufactured by:*

**THE VICTORIA MILLS LTD., BOMBAY.**



**MANGALDAS  
GROUP MILLS**

periences for leading a kindergarten life characterized by decision-making and independent thinking. But, equally, these Indian youngsters show enviable calm and good humour whenever the rigid daily kindergarten routine—so stringently fostered by pre-school authorities right back to Montessori—is disrupted. Experiences of that sort leave the contemporary western pre-schooler in hysterical tears. If we read Kakar we will get some ideas about why these two phenomena might occur. Kakar identifies the underlying factors in the Indian child's perceptions and actions. With knowledge like this, one could capitalize on the strengths of the Indian child when attempting to tailor his educational experience.

Kakar has presented specialized information in a readable and interesting way. Someone who initially has no understanding of the principles of Freudian analysis can readily follow Kakar's line of thought, for he is an entertaining as well as a learned writer. He is interested in communicating his understanding. One hesitates to say the same of some of the contributors to *Socialization of the Indian Child* (Sinha, editor). This book is a collection of papers initially presented at a conference in Allahabad. There is a great deal of worthwhile information in this book, but in too many cases the authors have not made much of an effort to write well. And what is the point of doing good work if it is presented in an awkward way? Social scientists have as much a responsibility as academics in any other branch of knowledge to communicate well. Unhappily, matters on which one most needs clarity of thought and exposition are frequently those characterized by a total acceptance of professional jargon.

An essay on 'Socialization and Psychological Differentiation' presents a comparison of the salient characteristics of the nuclear family, as it is developing in India, with the traditional joint family. Here is a case where we all think we know what these characteristics are, but in fact can benefit from the succinctness of this presentation. An essay on the 'Process of Socialization Among Different Cultural Groups' presents a study of three groups—caste-Hindu, backward Hindu and Muslim—within the same physical environment of urban life. It is an interesting study of, among other things, mothers' attitudes to and practices of child-rearing. This essay, and the study on 'Childhood in a Weavers' Community' have thought-provoking observations on what is and what isn't significant to many Indian mothers.

A study that hasn't gone far enough is entitled 'Social Identity and Political Socialization'. Unfortunately, the researchers confined themselves to 'political' strictly in the regional and national identity sense. Surely of importance in the present Indian scene is an awareness of how children perceive social imbalance or, in other words, their 'political awareness' in its wider sense. Few adults could claim to have a notion of their national identity beyond that necessary for acquiring a passport.

The experience of another large, so-called 'multi-cultural' country gives evidence that knowing what makes one a 'Canadian', for example, is a tricky question indeed. But everyone, young—as the essay here on the 'Development of Religious Identity and Prejudice' points out,—and old alike is very clear about who has money and power and who does not.

The fourth section of this book will be of great value to the enquirer. Here, approaches and techniques for the study of socialization are given. A selection of recent studies is offered indicating how they were pursued, and good notes are provided describing various interviewing techniques, methods of observation, and different experimental approaches. Moreover, a critical assessment of these styles is offered.

With the exception of Kakar's remarkable treatise, the materials available for the study of children and society in India are marked by a lack of liveliness and felicity of expression. It seems that the essential freshness and passion of childhood have been lost on almost all our current investigators. Ploughing through the available material, one misses the passion for the child evident in studies currently under way elsewhere. As an example, the superb Newsom study of a group of 500 Nottingham children from birth to twenty-one years whets the reader's appetite to learn more, to observe on his own, to reflect on his own experiences. One is hardly impelled to this sort of enterprise by most of the current Indian sociological studies. It is a pity, and it is a dangerous trend, a pity because pedestrian writing about children denies the reader the excitement inherent in any discussion of children, and a danger because it leads farther and farther away from empathetic understanding of others. This is no small matter in an hierarchical society such as ours where we are all conditioned to see other groups in terms of ethnic stereotypes.

By now the student has well-nigh exhausted himself in his search for good material to re-acquaint himself with the childhood he left behind. He can do worse than to turn to literature to find realistic studies of children. Although there is precious little, still, in the morass of didactic and moralistic books for children, and fifth-rate copies of Enid Blyton, he will find some gems. Let him open the pages of R. K. Narayan's *Swami and Friends* once more, or seek out stories like Tagore's 'The Homecoming' or Wallikanaan's 'Bus Journey'. And if he reads Hindi, let him somehow find a copy of *Ek Dai Panc Nidai* and follow the adventures of a little group of children, as amidst the totally believable squabbles, loyalties and quick-thinking of childhood, they go off to establish an adult free world in a Moghul ruin. In works such as these, one gains an empathetic awareness of how youngsters think and of how they perceive their world. No investigator or planner for children can afford to be without this faculty.

Frances Kumar

# Communication

WITH Reference to 'The Campus Scene', *Seminar*, April 1982, politics has eroded the once cohesive and sanctimonious fabric of our universities as institutions of learning. Today, our universities are the breeding ground for politics and violence. The academician has no place.

It is the occupation of many students now-a-days, to keep changing disciplines in order to stay longer in the universities and help strengthen them as citadels of politics and hooliganism. How they obtain their marks, attendance and degrees is only too well known. All this is very frustrating for the conscientious and diligent student who, after the year-long toil, finds vagabonds securing more marks than him without studying or attending classes.

University administrators are quite indifferent to the genuine problems and demands of a bright student or a sportsman. But they immediately melt if a student leader or a university ruffian approaches them. Hence, we see that the authorities, by encouraging nefarious characters, are themselves responsible for cultivating tension and throwing academics into the backyard. Many educationists are toadies of politicians, hence, they merely overlook the violence and goondaism which they know is rampant on their campus. As a result, genuine demands are brushed aside. The Panjab University is an apt example. During my LL B, very few lights in the main library functioned. The librarian, lamentingly, said that since the Dean of Students Welfare refused to cooperate with him on this issue, he was helpless. Internal politics, ultimately, harms the students for whom universities were, in the first place, created. The Dean had enough funds to install a stereo system in the Students Centre but not for the library. Students are not permitted to take their personal books into the main library. If a student is unable to study in his hostel due to noise (made by blaring radios or roars of regularly drunk students and outsiders) or no electricity, how is he expected to study at all if he

is not allowed to take his personal books inside the library? This simple reasoning refuses to filter into the crevices of the upper compartments of our learned university administrators. Obviously, the result is frustration and violence.

Other causes of violence are jealousy over girls, popularity and bidding for posts. There are numerous cases of bullying of students by outsiders who stay illegally in the hostels. The recent stabbing in the Panjab University, Hostel-I, is well known. Serious, industrious and outspoken students are not safe.

Degradation in the quality of teaching has led to loss of interest of students in studies. Some teachers have been seen indulging in eve-teasing and hooliganism. What example will they set?

Thus we see that the once academic atmosphere in universities has been disfigured. The student cannot be blamed for it. He only practices what is taught to him. So, it is the duty of the parents to ensure that their children follow the right path. If some students still corrode the peaceful atmosphere, stern action should be taken against them. The authorities, teachers, students and university employees should make sure that universities remain institutions of learning and not stages for political dramatists. Teachers should follow the ethical code and society must respect the teaching profession — only then can talent, once again flow in. The press should expose the lacunae of each university so that steps are taken to rectify them. Lastly, and most importantly, the politician himself should see to it that it is in the interest of the country that universities are no longer hotbeds of political tension. Unless this is done these hotbeds may soon spark off into total violence, commotion and confusion, leading to the total destruction of the country.

**Ranjit K. Pachnanda**  
Advocate  
Panchkula

# Further reading

## BOOKS

- Ali Baig, Tara** Our children New Delhi, Publications Division, 1979.
- Banerjee, Sumanta** Child labour in India a general review with case studies of the brick-making and zari embroidery industries London, Anti-Slavery Society, 1979
- Bedi, M S** Socially handicapped children a study of their institutional services Jodhpur, Jain Brothers, 1978
- Bhatt, S G** (ed) Child and law: justice for all Pondicherry, Government Law College, 1980
- Chhabra, Rami and Willy Petterson** Children in India. Stockholm, Swedish International Development Authority, 1979
- De Souza, Alfred** Children in creches day care for the urban poor New Delhi, Intellectual Publishing House, 1979
- Children in India critical issues in human development New Delhi, Manohar, 1979

- Dutta-Ray, S** Psychological disorders of young children New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1980.
- Gokhale, Sharad D. and Neera K. Sohoni**, (eds) Child in India Bombay, Somaiya Publications, 1979
- Gupta, Satya**. Child health question you may ask (rev ed) Delhi, Frank Brothers, 1978.
- Hadfield, J A** Childhood and adolescence. England, Penguin Books, 1975
- Jain, S N and Usha Loghani** (eds) Child and the law New Delhi, Indian Law Institute, 1979
- Kadushin, Alfred** Child welfare services (3rd ed.) New York, Macmillan Publishing Co, 1980
- Kakar, Sudhir**, (ed) Identity and adulthood Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1979
- Indian childhood cultural ideals and social reality Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1979.
- Inner world a psycho-analytic study of childhood and society in India Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1978
- Kale, S V** Child psychology and child guidance Bombay, Himalaya Publishing House, 1978

- Karant, G K** Rural youth a sociological study of a Karnataka village New Delhi, Concept, 1981
- Khalakdina, Margaret** Early child care in India. London, Gordon and Breach, 1979
- Khan, M A** Sociological aspects of child development a study of rural Karnataka. New Delhi, Concept, 1980
- Krause, Harry, D** Child support in America the legal perspective Virginia, The Michie Company, 1981
- Kulshreshtha, Jinesh Chandra** Child labour in India New Delhi, Ashish Publishing House, 1978
- Miller, Mariam (ed)** The neglected years early childhood New York, U N Children's Fund, 1973
- Murgatroyd, Stephen (ed)** Helping the troubled child interprofessional case studies. London, Harper & Row, 1980
- Naidu, Usha, S** Altruism in children a cross-sectional study of boys in a welfare residential institution Bombay, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 1980
- Naik, J P** Elementary education in India a promise to keep Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1976
- Pandhe, M.K (ed)** Child labour in India Calcutta, India Book Exchange, 1979.
- Paul Chowdhry, D** Child welfare development Delhi, Atma Ram & Sons, 1980
- Child welfare manual Delhi, Atma Ram & Sons, 1963
- Shashi, S S** Our tribal children New Delhi, Publications Division, Government of India, 1978
- Shingi, Prakash M and others** Rural youth education, occupation and social outlook New Delhi. Abhinav Publication, 1980
- Singh, Musafir and Narendra Nath** Children in Delhi slum a survey of their life conditions (mimeo). New Delhi, Central Institute of Research and Training in Public Co-operation, 1974
- Singh, Musafir and others** Working children in Bombay a study (mimeo) New Delhi, National Institute of Public Co-operation and Child Development, 1978
- Singh, S D and K P Pothan.** Slum children of India New Delhi, Deep and Deep Publications, 1982
- Srinivasan, K and others** Child in India — demographic and socio-economic aspect Bombay, Himalaya Publishing House, 1979
- Vagh, Anutai** How to run a balwadi Thane, Gram Bal Shiksha Kendra, 1977
- India. Ministry of Education and Social Welfare** Report of the Working Group on employment of children, (mimeo) New Delhi, 1976
- India. Ministry of Home Affairs** Survey on infant and child mortality, 1979 a preliminary report New Delhi, Govt of India, 1979
- India Report of the Committee** for the preparation of programme for children. 1968 (Chairman Ganga Sharan Sinha)
- Indian Council of Child Welfare** Report of the National seminar on education of the teachers for pre-school child New Delhi, The Council, 1978
- Working children in urban Delhi, (a research report) The Council, 1977
- Indian Institute of Public Administration** Administration for child welfare (ed) by T.N. Chaturvedi New Delhi, The Institute, 1979
- International Conference on Public Education 30th Session** Health education in primary schools research in comparative education study, 1967
- United Nations Children's Fund** Inventory of basic services to children in India. New Delhi, UNICEF, 1978
- United Nations Children's Fund** Statistical profile of children and youth in India New Delhi, UNICEF, 1977
- UNICEF study on the young child. New Delhi, National Institute of Public Cooperation & Child Development, 1976

#### ARTICLES

- Ali Baig, Tara** The making of a policy for children the Indian experience 'Future', No 1, 1981 12-15
- Meaning of child welfare 'Mainstream' (Annual-Number), 1979 155-60
- SOS children's villages — care for the abandoned child 'Social Change' 9(4) December, 1979 29-33
- Urgency of adoption law 'Mainstream' 19(11) 15 November, 1980 9-10
- Alamedu, D** Housewife's role in bringing up a child 'Hindu', 7 August, 1979
- Anandam, Sujata.** Cost of bringing up children. 'Deccan Herald', 8 February, 1981
- Improving the children's lot 'Mail', 14 February, 1981
- Anil Kumar** Abandoned children comprehensive law on adoption needed 'Mail', 25 August, 1980
- Arya, Ajay Kumar** Child neglect and delinquency. 'Lawyer' 13(6) June, 1981 108-112
- Attar Chand.** Poor children in rich year 'Madhya Pradesh Chronicle', 7 August, 1979
- Banerji, Anjan Kumar** Plight of children in India 'Times of India', 9 February, 1980
- Basu, Alaka Malwade** Child labour have we the right to stop it? 'Statesman', 23 February, 1982
- Bhagyalakshmi, J.** Children before magic tube. 'Indian Journal of Communication Arts' 4(7-8) March-April, 1979 10-12
- Bhaskaran, G** Better world for the child tomorrow 'Times of India', 2 September, 1979

#### REPORTS

- India Ministry of Education and Culture.** Commonwealth regional seminar on universal primary education Dacca, Bangladesh, December 3-14, 1979 India Country paper. New Delhi, 1979
- India Bureau of Education** Attitudes of student teachers towards children's behaviour, by Edward A Pires 1952.

- Bhaskaran, V G.** Child labour. 'Hindustan Times', 21 August, 1980
- Bhatia, C M** National policy on primary education is vital 'Pioneer', 3 July, 1979
- Bhatia, Meera.** Need for children's theatre. 'Indian Journal of Communication Arts' 4 (7-8) March-April, 1979 17-18.
- Bhattacharjee, Arun.** Plight of under-privileged children 'Mail', 25 November, 1979
- Bir Singh.** Priority to pre-primary education. 'Education Quarterly' 33 (1). January, 1981 8-9.
- Village primary school. 'M P Chronicle', 13 March, 1981.
- . Where not to admit children 'M.P Chronicle', 15 July, 1981
- Bose, Shikha.** \$ 150 m UNICEF plan to better the lot of children in India 'Economic Times', 27 February, 1981
- Butt, H W** Basic health and educational needs of pre-school rural children, an integrated approach 'Social Action' 29 (3) July-September, 1979 235-248
- Chalapathi Rau, M.** Childhood of man 'Link' 22 (16). 25 November, 1979 8.
- Chaturvedi, J.P.** Child education in India. 'Patriot', 30 December, 1979.
- Chaturvedi, Madhur.** Child labour the shame of a nation 'Illustrated Weekly of India' 101 (29) 20 July, 1980. 12-13
- Das Gupta, Arjun.** Role of children's libraries and librarians in India. 'Indian Library Association Bulletin' 10 (3-4) July-December, 1980 154-61.
- Das Gupta, Sailen.** New approach to primary education 'Mainstream' 18 (20) January, 1980. 9-10
- Das Gupta, Samir.** Child labour — a national problem. 'Yojana' 23 (20) 1 November, 1979. 25-27.
- Desai, Avlokita B.** Reaching the deprived child 'Akashvani' 44 (29). 22 July, 1979 34-35.
- Doctor, Geeta.** Children's literature trick or treat? 'Book Review' 4 (2). September-October, 1979 18-24
- Dogra, Bharat.** Child labour a case study 'Indian Express', 28 April, 1980
- Fida, Hussain Z.** Children when the rod is spared. 'Nagpur Times', 12 August, 1979
- Garg, R B.I** Fair deal for children. 'Patriot', 28 November, 1980.
- Garuda.** Children's books. 'Hindustan Times', 26 November, 1979
- Gopalan, C.** The child in India 'New Frontiers in Education' 9 (4) October-December, 1979 8-19
- Gopalji Ram** Abnormal child challenge, not curse 'M P. Chronicle', 20 October, 1979
- Gore, M G** Mentally retarded children work of Bombay's children's aid society 'Lok Rajya' 37(16-17) 16 December, 1981 28-30 and 1 January, 1982 30
- Gour, P N** Libraries for children 'Indian Library Association Bulletin' 16(3-4) July-December, 1980 46-53
- Guha Ray, S.N.** Children's books production 'Indian Book Industry' 21(2) November, 1979 11-12
- Gupta, Binoy.** Marked increase in adoption of orphans. 'Indian Express', 24 September, 1980
- Gupte, Suraj.** Spare the rod, spare the child 'Imprint' 19 (5) August, 1979 52-57.
- Guthrie, Duncan** Saving the children is not easy 'Amrita Bazar Patrika', 29 December, 1979
- Gyan Ranjan.** Child beggars 'Social Welfare' 26 (4) July, 1979 11-12, 34
- Hansra, B.S and M K. Dhillon** Impact of television viewing on teenagers 'Indian Journal of Communication Arts', 5 (3-4) November-December, 1979 11-13
- Iyer, Radha** Working children disquieting trend. 'Business Standard', 31 December, 1979
- Jacob, Alic.** Neglected children and the law 'Social Action' 29(3) July-September, 1979 317-27.
- Jagannadham, V** National policy for children 'Indian Journal of Public Administration' 25(3) July-September, 1979: 533-561
- Jain, S N** Child labour. 'Journal of the Indian Law Institute' 23(3) July-September, 1981 336-348
- Law and the child in India. 'Indian Journal of Public Administration' 25(3) July-September, 1979 613-624.
- Jayaswal, S R** Books for children. 'Lucknow Librarian' 11 (4) November, 1979 105-107
- Jayseelif, L** Problems of a slum school 'Social Welfare' 26 (4) July, 1979 17-19.
- John, Pushpita** Towards better child care. 'Social Welfare' 27(5-6) August-September, 1980: 75-78
- Joshi, Uma** Integrated education for disabled children 'Educational Quarterly' 33 (4). October, 1981 13-14
- Kakar, Sudhir** Childhood in India traditional ideals and contemporary reality. 'International Social Science Journal' 31(3) 1979 444-46.
- Kalra, Satish Kumar** Development of achievement values during childhood non-family members influence 'Indian Journal of Social Work' 41(3). October, 1980 235-9
- Krishna Iyer, V R** Child and the law 'Social Welfare' 26(8) November, 1979 1-3, 35-36.
- Krishna Kumar** Primary education problem and purpose, a comment 'Economic and Political Weekly' 15(17) 26 April, 1980 794-795.
- Krishna Murthy, K G.** Policy for children the case for investment 'Future', No. 1, 1981 15-18
- Krishnan, Jay R.** Children's books shelved 'Hindustan Times', 19 October, 1979
- Kaushik, Ashwani Kumar** If every family needs a child, every child too needs a family 'National Herald', 8 February, 1981
- Kulshreshtha, D.K and Sharma, S.K.** Child labour in Moradabad metalware industry 'Economic Times', 19 October, 1980
- Kurien, John** Towards universal elementary education promise and performance 'Economic and Political Weekly' 16(40). 3 October, 1981 1608-1618
- Leela, R.** How to tackle a sulking child 'Social Welfare' 29(1) April, 1982 33-34

- Malhan, Inder Vir** Developing reading talent among children 'Indian Librarian' 34(2) September, 1979 55-59.
- Malik, Harji** Today's priority our children 'Assam Tribune', 8 July, 1979
- Mandal, B** Health problems of rural children a study in a remote village in Bihar. 'Social Welfare' 28(8) September, 1981 15-16
- Rural children in Bihar 'Indian Nation', 10 August, 1980
- Mani, G.** School dropouts in slums spotlight on Madras 'Social Welfare' 27(1-2) April-May, 1980 21-22, 50
- Mathur, V S.** Towards a new strategy in child education 'Yojana' 23(20) 1 November, 1979 15-17
- Matthai, Thomas** Mobilising help for children 'Times of India', 14 November, 1980
- Meghani, Mahendra** Books for India's children 'School Librarian' 27(1) March, 1979 17-20
- Mitra, Asok.** Citizens of tomorrow children neglected and exploited 'Statesman', 22 May, 1982
- Mohsin, Nadeem** For slum children schooling is a luxury 'Social Welfare' 27(1-2) April-May, 1980 25-27, 51
- Poverty breeding ground for child labour 'Mainstream' 18(41) 7 June, 1980 27-31.
- Majumdar, Modhumita** The child in India 'Hindustan Times', 9 July, 1981
- Moolgaokar, Leela** Children's programmes in villages some unresolved problems 'Indian Journal of Social Work' 40(3) October, 1979 323
- The rural child 'Social Welfare' 27(1-2) April-May, 1980 1-3
- Morley, David** International year of the child a time to look at child health 'Social Action' 29(3) July-September, 1979 213-220
- Mukherjee, D.P** Child labour in India 'Capital' 187(4678) 2 November, 1981 27-8
- Naidu, D A.** Child labour participation in India a Statewise census analysis 'Journal of Family Welfare' 27(4) June, 1981 48-59
- Naidu, Usha S.** Socialisation of scheduled caste children at school 'Social Change' 9(4) December, 1979 7-12
- Naik, Chitra** In and out of school. 'Future', No 2, 1982 6-9
- Nandy, Ashis.** Modern concept of childhood 'Times of India', 3 February, 1982 and 4 February, 1982
- Naveen, Lalit** Retarded children towards new definitions and priorities 'Assam Tribune', 23 December, 1979.
- Ninan, Sevanti.** Child labour and education 'Voluntary Action' 24(7) February, 1982 286-287
- Padmanabhan, B S.** Only lip sympathy for child welfare 'Hindu', 9 October, 1979
- Pal, Anjali** Child health a national challenge 'Deccan Chronicle', 3 November, 1980.
- Parameswaran E G.** A psychological view of the child and child education 'Indian Education' 9(10-11) January-February, 1980 16-18.
- Pasricha, Kavita.** What the Indian child reads 'Youth Times', 1 November, 1979.
- Patnaik, Nalabika** Child labour in India: size and occupational distribution 'Indian Journal of Public Administration' 25(3) July-September, 1979 668-677
- Paul Chowdhry, D** Look at our concern for the rural child 'Kurukshetra' 29(7) 1 January, 1981, 4+6, 18
- Pauline, (Sr)** Understand the child, 'Deccan Herald', 30 October, 1979
- Pichholiya, K R** Child labour in a metropolitan city (a study of Ahmedabad) 'Indian Journal of Labour Economics' 22(4) January, 1980 99-106
- Punde, Padmaja** Children's theatre 'Economic Times', 7 December, 1980
- Raghavan, D** Books in search of children 'Indian Book Industry' 21(2) November, 1979 13
- Rajendran, M.M** Challenge of child welfare. 'Statesman', 14 November, 1979
- Resources to meet the needs of child in India 'Lok Kalyan' 3(1) January, 1980 4-6
- Satisfying the needs of the child 'Yojana' 23(23) 16 December, 1979 4-7
- Ramakrishnan, K** Children's books for better world 'Link' (Republic Day Number) 21(25) 26 January, 1979 89-91
- Ramchandani, Shalini** Exploitation of child labour. 'Free Press Journal', 24 January, 1982
- Rao, Amiya** Primary education problems and purposes 'Economic and Political Weekly' 15(10) 8 March, 1980 11-13
- Ravindran Nair, G** The child too much at stake 'Economic Times', 3 November, 1980
- Problems of rural child 'M P. Chronicle', 18 February, 1980
- Raychaudhuri, A** Can we neglect our children? 'Assam Tribune' 10 February, 1980
- What care do we take of children? 'Deccan Herald', 8 January, 1980
- Razia Ismail** Reaching the deprived child. 'Statesman', 14 November, 1979
- Robtagi, Sushila** Child development, key to human development 'Social Welfare' 28(4) July, 1981 1-3
- Rustamji, K F.** The problem of neglected children and youthful offenders 'Indian Journal of Public Administration' 25(3) July-September 1979 642-657
- Sachindra Narayan and Manohar Lal** Tribal children of Bihar 'Indian Nation', 24 August, 1980
- Sadhu, A.N. and Amarjit Singh** Child labour in India 'Indian Worker' 19(1) 6 October, 1980: 41-43
- Saini, Surindar.** The state of Delhi's children a recent survey of a sample of children of pre-school age in Delhi's low income, non-slum areas 'Future', No. 2, 1982 44-45.
- Salkever, David S.** Effects of children's health on maternal hours of work a preliminary analysis 'Southern Economic Journal' 47(1), July, 1980. 156-66
- Satyan, T.S.** Indian children. 'Yojana' 23(20) 1 November, 1979 9-12.



**Sethi, J D** Child care and development strategy 'Mainstream' 20(26) 27 February, 1982 11-12

**Shahi, L P** Emphasis on primary education 'National Herald', 17 February, 1980

**Shankar Yamuna** Whither children's books? 'Yojana' 23(21) 1 November, 1979 19-23

**Shantaram, V** 'The children's film movement' 'Illustrated Weekly of India' 101(6) 10 February, 1980 8-13

**Sharma, Sima** Giving children their due 'Illustrated Weekly of India' 101(6) 10 February, 1980 29

**Simmons, George B** Some aspects of infant and child mortality in rural North India 'Social Action' 29(3) July-September, 1979 249-269.

**Singh, A J.** School education needs change 'Deccan Chronicle', 15 March, 1981

**Singh, Dr Hira** Child offenders 'Lok Kalyan' 3(1) January, 1980 11-28

**Singh, Karan** Polluting young minds — ancient values for modern life 'Statesman', 26 July, 1981

**Singh, Mala** Sorry state of children's books 'Times of India', 22 April, 1979

**Singh, R P** Socially disadvantaged child in India 'Social Change', 9(4) December 1979. 3-6

**Singh, Raghubansh** Child education in India 'Indian Nation', 21 December, 1980

—— Child mortality in India 'Indian Nation', 11 November, 1979

**Singh, S.D** Juvenile truancy 'Social Welfare' 26(8) November, 1979 29-30-32.

**Singh, Saran** The child in the world of tomorrow 'Lok Kalyan' 3(1) January, 1980 2 3

**Sreedhara Swamy, S.** Comprehensive access to elementary education 'Hindu', 15 January, 1980

**Srivastava, Sigrun** Children's literature still in its infancy 'Eve's Weekly', December, 1979 40-43

**Subbalakshmi** Are children necessary? 'Tribune', 26 January, 1980

**Swaminathan, M.S** Priorities for the child in the sixth plan 'Hindu', 14 November, 1981.

**Tandon, B.N.** Child and nutrition 'Lok Kalyan' 3(1) January, 1980 7-9

—— and others Integrated child development services in India. 'Indian Journal of Medical Research' 73(3) March, 1981 374-394

**Thrope, E.** What do children dream about? 'Social Welfare' 18(3) June 1981 41-42.

**Tripathi, K P** Village school a profile 'M P Chronicle' 12 March, 1981

**Varma, Meera** Socio-economic factors and development of aggression in children 'Social Change' 9(4) December, 1979 13-17

**Venkatesh S** Child labour 'Lok Kalyan' 3(1) January, 1980 22-23

**Venugopal Rao, S** Laws relating to children 'Indian Journal of Public Administration' 25(3) July-September, 1979. 625-632

**Verma, Subhashini** Dealing with problem behaviour of children 'Social Welfare' 27(3) June, 1980 37-39.

**Wani, Roma** Child labour — a social crime 'Akashvani' 44(28). 15 July, 1979 33-34

## Palanpur

### The Economy of an Indian Village

C J BLISS AND N H STERN

This study is a systematic attempt to put to the test theories of underdevelopment and of the motives and behaviour of poor farmers in the village of Palanpur, situated in Moradabad district in Uttar Pradesh. As well as reporting on the village, its population and institutions, the authors provide a thorough survey of the technical and economic properties of wheat, both new and traditional varieties. Among other things, they discuss tenancy, the explanation of the area of land leased in or leased out by a household, the inefficiency of share-cropping and how and to what extent it is overcome in Palanpur

Rs 160

### Towards a Political Economy of Urbanization in Third World Countries

Edited by HELEN I. SAFA

Urbanization has emerged as one of the major issues confronting contemporary developing countries. In this book an attempt has been made to bring a new perspective to bear on the urbanization problem in the Third World. The essays examine the impact of colonialism on the economies of Third World countries, their present participation in the global capitalist system, i.e., their dependence on advanced industrial societies for capital, technology, export markets, etc., their urban class structures, and the role of their governments in shaping the urban process

Rs 45

### Industrialization in India: Growth and Conflict in Private Corporate Sector, 1914-47

RAJAT K. RAY

The period between the outbreak of the First World War and Independence is crucial to an understanding of the growth of the private corporate sector in India. This study considers the historical, political, economic, and cultural factors that influenced the pattern of growth, and asks why India, which was able to build a substantial industrial infrastructure, remained one of the poorest countries in the world and, as subsequent developments showed, pitifully dependent on the West

Paper back Rs 65

## Sadat

DAVID HIRST AND IRENE BEESON

This is the first biography of Anwar Sadat with an extended prologue written after his death. Unquestionably, Sadat ranked among the most remarkable leaders of our times. When Nasser died, in 1970, it fell to the most faithful, most cringing of his disciples, Sadat, to fill the yawning vacuum the giant had left behind. This is not the 'inside story' of a man who changed the course of history. His recorded words and deeds speak for themselves. And the conclusion is inescapable. Sadat was another Shah, but, mesmerised by Sadat 'the peace-maker' Henry Kissinger called him the greatest statesman since Bismarck

Faber Rs 160



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj,  
New Delhi 110002

Bombay Calcutta Madras




## **seminar**

Seminar brings you a discussion each month on the problems which agitate all serious people. Subscribe to it today and participate actively in the thinking life of India . . . .

### **Rates**

Rs. 40 for 1 year Rs 100 for 3 years  
US\$ 16 for 1 year US\$ 40 for 3 years

# Technology...a continuous effort for development



L&T provides design, engineering and fabrication capabilities in collaboration with Caterpillar, F L Smidth, Gutehoffnungshutte Sterkrade, J M Voith, Niro Atomizer, Poclain, Serck, Struthers Wells, Swenson, Unelec

and supplies plant and equipment for chemical, petroleum, petrochemical, fertilizer, cement, paper, dairy, steel, power, earthmoving and construction industries



**LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED**  
*where technology moves with time*

P O Box 278, Bombay 400 038



## Fly the only airline in the world where you can sit back and read the decor.

Just study the cabin walls. You'll find Indian mythology come alive in Krishna's frolics with gamgolling gopis. Gods and goddesses, and lesser mortals centuries old, frozen in arts of love: in the frescoes of Ajanta and Ellora. Men and women of India down the ages caught in their daily acts of work and play. They're all part of the interior decor, of an Air-India 747.

**AIR-INDIA**  
Something good going for you

# Seminar

276



August 1982

**Our  
National  
Character**

**Our  
National  
Character**

Blending products,  
processes and technology  
with people,  
their needs and the  
environment, at GW,  
these are the priorities that  
define our purpose.

Our range of  
products have evolved out  
of these needs,  
and today constitute vital  
intermediates, integral to  
almost every area  
of industry and life. In  
India, and even overseas.



**Our speciality:  
fusing technology  
with needs**



**GUEST KEEN WILLIAMS LTD**  
**The Engineers' Engineers**

Mendon/GKW/10

# Mahindra


## now brings you the Peugeot XDP 4.90- a diesel engine of advanced design

**Mahindra** meets the challenge of the oil crisis, with a superb new, lightweight high performance diesel engine-the **PEUGEOT XDP 4.90** with greater fuel efficiency

This world-famous engine is now being assembled at the Mahindra plant.


The **PEUGEOT XDP 4.90** will be fitted initially on the **Mahindra NC 665 DP** Mini Truck, Pick-up Van and Ambulance.

By far the most vital factor is the greater fuel efficiency of this lightweight, high performance engine



### Engine Specifications .

No. of Cylinders	4
Bore-mm	90
Stroke-mm	83
Bore/Stroke ratio	1.08
Displacement-cc	2112
Compression Ratio	22.4:1
R P M (max)	4500
Max B H P.	75
Max Torque Kg m	13.3
	@ 2000 r.p.m.
Weight Kg.	184



The Mahindra NC 665 DP  
Mini Truck fitted with  
Peugeot XDP 4.90 diesel engine



Pick-up Van




Ambulance



**Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.**

**"...a museum piece that should charge visitors  
for the privilege of seeing its efficiency in operation."**

*A steel expert from Europe*



## **At 75, Tata Steel grows younger by the day.**

**Innovation and experiment.  
Concerted action Resisting age and  
decay while improving efficiency.  
Producing to over 100% capacity, on  
an average, for the last eight years  
That's how a 75-year-old keeps  
perennially young Making every  
decade a passage of progress**

The modernisation programme now under way at Tata Steel seeks to go far beyond updating steel melting capacity. It takes into account the tremendous technological advancements in steel making. The need to develop human skills and productivity to that pitch. To place even greater reliance on research and development so that the emphasis of production shifts from quantity to quality, from simple steels to special

steels—to meet the needs of modern industry

These are the challenges of the years ahead. Challenges which Tata Steel will meet with determination, ingenuity and initiative.

It is this spirit of enterprise that has epitomised Tata Steel's operations throughout its 75 years. A spirit nurtured by the concerted efforts of a fraternity of uncommon people working towards a common goal—the resurgence of industrial India.

It is as Jamsetji Tata wanted it to be—an industry which would generate wealth to benefit the people and enrich the nation.



HTC-TIS-4571


**Founded August 26, 1907  
1907-1982**

**TATA STEEL**


***What benefits the people, benefits the nation.***




# Elegant looks




## Versatile features




Attractive Sleek Two-toned USHA Streamlined—the sewing machine that outclasses any other in its price range With features that others can't match And a 5-year guarantee too




Patch Darning for easy darning and quick adjustment of pressure on cloth.



3-position drop feed for easy adjustment of feed-dog position





Dial-type stitch regulator with lever for forward and reverse stitch control and locking arrangement.



Thread tension adjuster for regulating poor thread tension.

**USHA Streamlined** feature for feature a better machine





## Come for the business. Stay for the style.

Come and get a taste of  
Ashok Hotel's rare blend of business and pleasure.  
At the Convention Hall, spacious and fully air-  
conditioned With a seating capacity of 2500,  
an adjustable stage with excellent  
lighting arrangements, and simultaneous  
translation in six languages Facilities to convert  
the Hall into three smaller sections  
make it a unique choice for conferences,  
big or small

A boon for businessmen and executives,  
the Convention Hall links you smoothly with  
a string of associated facilities  
With a Banquet Hall, a Committee Room,  
Conference Room and a choice of Party Rooms.  
And of course, the Ashok Group Convention  
Bureau, catering to your every need  
while you confer

Ashok Hotel. A style for business. Anything  
but conventional

For information and booking contact  
Ashok Group Convention Bureau  
Room No 296


Ashok Hotel, 50B Chanakyapuri  
New Delhi 110021

Tel 371349, 370101/296 Telex 031-2567  
Cables ASHOKAHOTEL



**Ashok Hotel**  
New Delhi


India Tourism Development Corporation



**The Ashok Group**  
Official Hoteliers & Caterers  
for IX Asian Games Delhi 1982

ASP/AH DSC/82

Providing efficient road transport  
is one way of expressing  
our responsibility...



the other way is by  
creating more employment.

Over 3,00,000 public carriers on the road today are Tata vehicles. Carrying essential commodities to the remotest parts of the country, extending communication links, doing duty on vital project sites.

Each Tata vehicle provides employment to no less than 10 people. Creating over 4 lakh new job opportunities every year.


These are but two of the most striking facets of our multi-faceted outlook in serving the country. Now and in the future.

**Telco**

*helping build a strong and  
self-reliant nation.*

TATA ENGINEERING & LOCOMOTIVE CO. LTD.  
BOMBAY • JAMSHEDPUR • PUNE

CHAIRMAN-63



## **Tower by tower, we are satisfying a worldwide need for more power**

People in cities, towns and villages, around the world, switch on power transmitted by Kamani Transmission Towers.

Pioneer of power transmission line industry in India, and Asia's largest producer of transmission towers, Kamani Engineering Corporation has put a transmission girdle around more than 20 countries.

Energised by a high-powered professional management, Kamani Engineering Corporation is organised to play a positive and dominant role in international power transmission.

**KAMANI ENGINEERING  
CORPORATION LIMITED**

Kamani Chambers 32, Ramji Bhai Kamani Marg, Ballard Estate, Bombay 400 038

CHAITRA-KEC-74




## **seminar**

Seminar brings you a discussion each month on the problems which agitate all serious people. Subscribe to it today and participate actively in the thinking life of India . . . .

### **Rates**

Rs. 40 for 1 year Rs. 100 for 3 years  
US\$ 16 for 1 year US\$ 40 for 3 years



## Where will aluminium be in the year 2001 AD?

Two centuries ago, no one thought of producing aluminium industrially. Even at the turn of the century, aluminium was no more than a kitchen metal. Suddenly, in a few decades, aluminium has become the world's most valuable industrial metal, second only to steel. It is being used, more and more, for things we had never imagined. Aluminium, today, is the metal of the future. And in India, Indian Aluminium has been the catalyst of this change.

The first to embark on aluminium

production in India, the first to effect major expansion, Indal has introduced almost the entire range of alloys in which rolled and extruded aluminium products are available in the country. In its constant drive towards diversification, Indal has pioneered the use of aluminium in aircraft, currency, power transmission, irrigation tubing, transportation, packaging, housing and a host of other applications.

Indal pioneering. It's bringing the future closer and closer.



**Indian Aluminium Company, Limited**  
**Anything's possible**

HTC-IAL-4077

# seminar

THE MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI

Journal which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every  
level of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single  
problem is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions  
opinions expressed have ranged from Janata to Congress, from  
Modaya to Communist to independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it has  
been possible to answer a real need of today, to gather  
the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people  
arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity  
facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture.

publisher/ROMESH THAPAR

managing editor/RAJ THAPAR

production/TEJBIR SINGH

circulation/C B KUMAR

Published from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1 Telephone 46534 Cable Address Seminar New Delhi, Single copy Rs.  
10 pence, \$ 1.50 Yearly Rs 40, £ 7, \$ 16, Three yearly, Rs 100 £ 20, \$ 40 Réproduction of material prohibited unless permitted

## NEXT MONTH : SEARCHING FOR ANSWERS



# 276

## OUR NATIONAL CHARACTER

a symposium on

what makes us

what we are

symposium participants

### THE PROBLEM

A short statement of  
the issues involved

### THE SPIRIT AND THE FRAME

Jai B.P. Sinha, Professor of Social Psychology,  
A N S Institute of Social Studies,  
Patna

### INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY

Kapila Vatsyayan, Joint Educational Adviser,  
Ministry of Education

### THE CONTRADICTIONS

Raj Thapar, Managing Editor, 'Seminar'

### CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

K.K. Singh, Director, Gandhian Institute  
of Studies, Varanasi

### PROFILE OF AN INDIAN

K.F. Rustamji, Retired Director General,  
Border Security Force

### A REACTIONARY VIEW

O.V. Vijayan, cartoonist and novelist

### DIGRESSIONS

Santi P. Chowdhury, documentary film  
maker who died recently

### FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography  
compiled by A K. Joshi

### COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury Associates

② 2013 年 12 月 31 日

WHICHEVER way we look at it, there is no denying that the character of the average Indian has suffered a massive decline. Some argue that this is an exaggerated notion, that every people in the throes of extraordinary change tend to abandon moral disciplines in an attempt to hoist themselves up the economic ladder. Others, very much attached to the old veneer of Anglo-India (for want of a better word), dismiss the theory of decline by asserting that we have merely returned to our traditional precepts and practises — and particularly because new castes and interests have risen to claim political (and even economic) power. The more thoughtful do not subscribe to these easy and comfortable rationalisations. While change and tradition inevitably push for recognition in a society endowed with a very fragile elite, it must be

admitted that the character of our people at every level is today painfully compromised, distorted and made unreliable. The roots of this massive decline are located very much in the shattered institutions of our democratic life which were originally designed to establish probity and integrity. The hard fact remains that we now elect as 'leaders' men and women who cannot look at themselves with any measure of respect. This is the enormity of our shame, and it is about time that we began to see it as such. This wider recognition of the failing within ourselves would clear the way to correction. This is not impossible. After all, the people of India once put terrifying moral power into the gentle figure of a Gandhi. Corrections are always possible, and at any time. May be, the pages that follow will open doors to a new consciousness.

# The spirit and the frame

JAI B. P. SINHA

INDIA is a vast country having an area of about 1.23 million square miles, 680 million people, 16 recognized languages and over 1600 other languages and dialects, all six main racial types, and all great religions<sup>1</sup> of the world. Above all, it has a history which goes back to at least five thousand years. The manifest diversity and infinite variety are, however, contained by what Jawaharlal Nehru<sup>2</sup> called the 'tremendous impress of oneness which had held all of us together for ages past, whatever political fate or misfortune had fallen us'. I think a country with such a long cultural background and a common outlook develops a spirit that is peculiar to it and that is impressed on all its children, however much they may differ among themselves. ...'

It is this *spirit* which is the essence of our national character. The spirit, however, is contained in a frame which has to be broad

enough to accommodate the diversity and the variety. Hence, the Indian character has developed into an *encompassing* system<sup>3</sup> where logically opposites peacefully co-exist,<sup>4</sup> where diverse religious and ethnic elements are held together but not necessarily merged,<sup>5</sup> and where actions do not necessarily follow thoughts and emotions, nor are they confronted with each other. Instead, they are balanced and accommodated.<sup>6</sup>

Such a composite frame is seemingly irrational and inconsistent. It is often slow in adaptation and generally inefficient from the purely rational point of view. And, yet, it manifests a resilience which has more than counterbalanced its inner contradictions, and it follows a

<sup>3</sup> L. Dumont, *Homo Hierarchies: The Caste System and its Implications* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

<sup>4</sup> A. Koestler, *The Lotus and the Robot* (New York: McMillan, 1961).

<sup>5</sup> H. Kabir, *The Indian Heritage* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1955), p. 131.

<sup>6</sup> K. Marriot, 'Interpreting Indian society: a monistic alternative to Dumont's dualism' *Journal of Asian Studies*, 1976, 36 (1) pp. 189-195.

<sup>1</sup> M. N. Srinivas, 'Social structure', *The Gazetteer of India*, Government of India, 1965, 1, p. 501.

<sup>2</sup> J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Calcutta: The Signet Press, 1946), pp. 38-39.

logic which is rooted in the Indian intra-psycho-affective - cognitive structures which reflect the configuration of the Indian familial-social institutions and relations, the Hindu religio-philosophical thinking, and the present socio-economic realities<sup>7</sup>

**T**he caste system and the politico-administrative history have led to an hierarchical structuring of Indian social institutions and relationships<sup>8</sup> There exist elaborate and rigidly defined rules and conventions which are to be strictly followed<sup>9</sup> In fact, an Indian child is provided with a blueprint of do's and don'ts from his early childhood. The blueprint places him in the hierarchy which then determines his inter-personal exchanges and social transactions Complicated exchanges of gifts, food, influence, efforts, etc, follow an asymmetrical pattern<sup>10</sup> depending on whether the person is occupying a superior's or subordinate's role

Major decisions of life are readily left to the superiors and elders who gladly assume the responsibility to sense the needs and feelings of those who are subordinates and to act

7 J B P Sinha, 'The Hindu Identity' Paper presented at the International Symposium on *Unconscious & Identity*, German Academy For Psycho-analysis, Munich, December 11-16, 1981, H Kabir, 1955, *op cit*, p 79 'Rural culture, in spite of large scale changes in religion, remained dominantly Hindu, for men changed their creed but not their way of life', D Narain, 'Indian national character in the twentieth century.' *The Annals of American Academy of Political & Social Science*, 1967, 370, pp 124-132

8 L Dumont, 1970, *op cit*, S Kakar, *The Inner World A Psychoanalytic Study of Childhood and Society in India* New Delhi Oxford University Press, 1978, R Kothari, *Politics in India* New Delhi Orient Longman, 1970, A Roland, 'Toward a psycho-analytic psychology of hierarchical relationships in Hindu India' Paper presented to the Indian Psycho-analytic Society, Bombay, 1980, J B P Sinha, 'Power structure, perceptual frame, and behavioural strategies in dyadic relationship' Paper presented to the International Association For cross-cultural Psychology, Bhubaneswar, 1980

9 R Kothari, 1970, *op cit*

10 K Marriott, 'Caste ranking and food transactions a matrix analysis' In B S Cohn & M B Singer (eds.) *Structure and Change in Indian Society* Chicago, Aldine, 1968

accordingly There develops a 'vertical solidarity'<sup>11</sup> which is preferred over a relationship of equality to the extent that 'it is found easier to work in superior-subordinate role than as equals'<sup>12</sup>

An Indian child internalizes this hierarchical perspective He tends to develop a sense of relative superiority to some and subordination to others He depends excessively on his superior and seeks out his support and directions By the same token, he protects and takes care of those who are below him He lives with the belief system that the world is a benign place and someone will always turn up, should an exigency arise<sup>13</sup>

**R**oland has identified two supportive components of this hierarchical ordering affective reciprocity in the intimacy relationship and the structuring of narcissism which assumes a self-we stance 'Affective reciprocity is the strong mutual care for and depending on, a tremendously heightened asking and giving in an emotional atmosphere of affection and warmth, where emotional connectedness is always central There is a constant flow of affect between persons, and any feelings disruptive to the relationship are contained and inhibited, or sometimes unconsciously displaced to others lower in hierarchy or turned against the self, specially ambivalent ones Ego boundaries are much more open to others and there is little psychological space around oneself'<sup>14</sup>

As a result, an Indian experiential self is more structured around 'we', 'ours', and 'us' than around 'I', 'mine' or 'me'<sup>15</sup> This orientation of submission to the collectivity often

11 M N Srinivas quoted by K Marriott, 'Changing identities in South Asia' In K A David (ed) *The New Wind Changing Identities in South Asia* The Hague Aldine, 1977

12 R Kothari, 1970, p 267, *op cit*

13 S Kakar, 1978 *op cit*

14 A Roland, 'The self in India and America towards a psycho-analysis of socio-cultural contexts' Paper presented to the Centre for Psycho-social Research, Chicago, March, 1980, p 17

undermines the autonomy and initiative of an individual. He feels frustrated if he attempts to move faster than the system or to push the system strongly It is safer for him to swim with the slow moving system than to try to change the system itself So long as he submits to the hierarchically structured collectivity, he can steer his course smoothly, but the system would not allow him to break away from its engulfing social forces which nurture and, at the same time, contain him

**T**he source of this belongingness which is affectively saturated is the physical care and indulgence of the Indian mother that a child enjoys in the first five years of his life<sup>16</sup> The child is seldom left alone or uncared for There is always the mother or the mother substitute to pick him up when he cries, to feed him when he feels hungry, and to give him company when he seems to be lonely He identifies with the mother and develops a feminine-passive stance to the male authority<sup>17</sup> At the age of five, he is abruptly usurped into the male world and subjected to strict disciplinary socialization by many external watchmen of the extended family or neighbourhood His initial dependency on the mother is further strengthened by the presence of this external authority

The father symbolises this authority There develops an inarticulated bond between a son and his father which persists even when the son grows up Ramanujam<sup>18</sup> reports that 'even in adults there is almost a nostalgic desire for the approval and sanction of father at every step' The Hindu system provides a psychological continuum of autho-

15 B K Ramanujam quoted by A Roland, personal communication, November 23, 1981

16 H S Asthana, 'Some aspects of personality structuring in Indian (Hindu) social organization' *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1956, 44, p 155, S Kakar, 1978, *op cit*

17 S Kakar, 1978, *op cit*

18 B K Ramanujam, 'Toward maturity problems of identity seen in the Indian clinical setting' In S Kakar (ed) *Identity and Adulthood* New Delhi Oxford University Press, 1979, p 51

city where father, teacher, and king are said to represent the God

It is not difficult then to understand why an Indian at times subconsciously draws upon the *bhakti marg* to idealize one's superior and to express his devotion, loyalty, and complete surrender to those who are in authority. In return, he expects that his superiors and those in authority (including the government) should deliver whatever he needs for either his survival or prosperity.

He does not see any direct linkages between his own efforts and the goals he cherishes. In fact, he believes that his success in realising the goals is dependent on the intervention of some superior order, power or supernatural forces to which he tends to be devotionally committed.

There is, however, an outer boundary to this emotionally loaded and vertically structured social relationship. The persons within the boundary are considered to be 'own' and the members of an in-group. Within the in-group, psychological distance is minimised and there flourishes a climate of trust, love, helpfulness, and sharing. Immediate family members often constitute the core of the in-group. Caste linkages, language and regional affiliations are relatively less salient but still a potent basis for demarcating the in-group from the out-groups. The out-group members are suspected and treated as strangers. It is striking to find an Indian who is so loving, affectionate and self-sacrificing for his son, nephew, friends, etc., is so suspicious and exploitative of 'others'.

One can draw a parallel of this double standard even in the behaviour of Indian gods and goddesses. Lord Rama, the model of Hindu character, killed Bali by dubious means because his friend, devotee and supporter, Sugriva, appealed to him to do so. The amount of manipulation and dubious means which Lord Krishna adopted during the *Mahabharat* war seems sufficient to allow an Indian to change his norms and standards depending on what the Hindu system calls, *desh* (place),

*kal* (time), *patra* (person), and his own orientation and temperament.

It is revealing to find how this perceptual categorisation is extended to an Indian's management of objects and space. Whatever is considered to be personal and private are affectionately cared for, but whatever is public and impersonal is nobody's concern. One's own house is well maintained but public places are badly neglected. The inside of a housing complex is nicely groomed but common staircases are full of filth. Not many people feel particularly concerned if public property is damaged or swindled away. In fact, an Indian can easily put others at a great loss in order to help, even in a small way, his friends and relations.

Freud<sup>19</sup> once wrote that 'it is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestation of their aggressiveness'. It is universal that the members of an in-group locate the out-groups against which hostility and violence become legitimate and at times even a basis for maintaining the in-group. The Indian situation is, however, special in the sense that it is characterised by regional disparities, language differences, religious groupings, and ethnic dissimilarities which are readily evoked criteria for defining the in-groups and the out-groups. The strong regional, local, or parochial identities which emerge as a result manifest the Indian's disposition to invest too much of emotionality to the categorization of in-groups consisting of 'own' people and out-groups of strangers.

Although the Hindu system advocates that the whole world should be included in one's in-group, an Indian knows too well that the ideals do not have to match with the realities. The realities demand forming a set of concentric circles of in-groups, the central of which is the nuclear family. One aspect of the Indian reality which most

potently determines the boundaries of the circles is the pervasive poverty. Indian is reported to be one of the ten poorest countries in the world.<sup>20</sup>

We do not need any statistics to realize the lot of the majority. What is, however, less obvious but quite striking is the fear of poverty. 'the constant threat of being engulfed by the surging flood of poverty'.<sup>21</sup> Even affluent ones in India 'live in the fear of poverty themselves, regarding it a personal threat. They teach themselves to see what they want to see, yet the scene must stay in the subconscious, suppressed but not altogether, to emerge in self remembered dreams'.<sup>22</sup>

The fear is projected into the perception that resources are limited and that they must be acquired, hoarded and monopolized. A competition, real or imagined, seems to be on where everybody is struggling to ride on others' shoulders lest he or his children should sink in poverty. The terminal goal of life, *moksha* (salvation), is compromised with the lower order goals of wealth and prosperity which have to be acquired by any means. The Indian's propensity to acquire material things despite his professed spirituality is phenomenal.

The physical proximity<sup>23</sup> in which the Indian tends to live and his low spatial mobility<sup>24</sup> increase the salience of his relative poverty. Taken together, they create a situation where interdependence and prolonged and continuous social interactions are the ground rules for his survival. Whether social interactions will lead to sharing of scarce resources or competition for mono-

20 World Bank Report, 1981

21 J B P Sinha, 'The poverty syndrome, power motive and democratization of work place' *Integrated Management*, 1977, 12, p 7

22 V Mehta, *Portraits of India* New York Penguin Books, 1967, p 565

23 D C McClelland, *Power The Inner Experience* New York Free Press, 1975

24 V Mishra, *Hinduism and Economic Growth* Bombay Oxford University Press, 1962

19 S Freud, *Civilizations and its Discontents* London Hogarth, 1930, p 114

polizing them would depend on whether one is dealing with his 'own' or 'other' persons

Comparing oneself with similar others is an universal phenomenon. But the Indian due to the physical proximity and continuous and prolonged social interactions invests lots of emotions in his social comparison process. He compares even with incomparable persons for all conceivable — material or immaterial — things. Naturally, such a comparison leaves him with a sense of ambiguity regarding where he stands in comparison to others on the scales of affluence, and how he can excel them.

In a relationship oriented system, his striving to excel invariably involves other persons. Hence the striving leads to a strong need for power<sup>25</sup> so that he can feel superior and secure. Any inkling that the power base is likely to be eroded causes a shock wave. Even the powerful Indira, the king of gods and goddesses, feels his throne wobble whenever a mortal starts *tapasya* for his spiritual uplift.

**T**he strong need for power in India leads to some interesting culture-specific coping strategies. A superior with power and status might feel a need to brag and to make his power and influence more visible and legitimate. Overt and exaggerated self-appreciation is accompanied with strong demands for loyalty and compliance from the dependents. To a secular analyst, it seems that a superior's ego slips into Lord Krishna and subconsciously fantasizes 'I am Brahman — omnipotent and omnipresent.. I am the source and resort of the entire world' <sup>26</sup>

Naturally, he would demand in the words of Lord Krishna again, 'abandoning all commendable acts, seek shelter with me *alone* [italics added] I will liberate you from all sins, do not worry at all' <sup>27</sup>. And if his subordinate does surrender to

him and remains unequivocally faithful to him, the superior is obliged to make all possible sacrifices for him and to help him out of his troubles.

**T**hus, the *sneh* (affection and care) of the powerful superior is expected to be reciprocated by *shraddha* (respectful compliance) of the subordinates. Excessive dependency in such a relationship ensures *kripa* (blessing and favours) of the superior which *alone* (he believes) can help a person in his advancement. His efforts outside this *sneh-shraddha* framework would reflect his egoism (*ahankara*) and lack of faith in the superior, an inkling of which is likely to put him into disgrace. Outside this framework, the powerful superior is likely to be cruel, unjust and exploitative. The subordinates might respond to such a superior by being either totally docile and submissive or sporadically violent. Violent reactions are not an intrinsic part of the Indian psychic repertoire, they are at best a short lived burst of childish temper tantrum against a superior who has degraded himself by not following the norms of a nurturant guardian.

In between the two extremes, there exists a twilight zone of bad-faith where the majority of Indians are uncertain about the presence of the *sneh-shraddha* climate. The hierarchy is still there but, without proven warmth and affinity, one has to play the power game more carefully. The pro-social expressions are still liberally employed from both ends of the hierarchy to ingratiate and to manipulate each other. One has to have a very sensitive contextual orientation to sense the other's intentions and to decode multi-level communications and seemingly inconsistent behaviours.

The uncertainty creates a stressful situation which is further aggravated by the events of life which often defy any pattern or prediction. The Indian then resorts to the belief in his destiny (*parabdha*) and turns to *Gita* or other religious texts in order to get somewhat detached from the affairs of life in which he finds himself rather too involved.

25 D C. McClelland, 1975, *op cit*

26 *Gita*, Chapter 9, Verse 17

27 *Gita*, Chapter 18, Verse 66

# Individually and collectively

KAPILA VATSYAYAN

A national character is perhaps best defined as that residual taste of personal and public relationships when all else is obliterated from memory in terms of events and time specifics

Clearly, there are many dimensions of the whole which constitutes national character as 'group' or individual. Broadly, it may be identified as the 'value system' governing a 'code of behaviour and conduct' and that intangible area termed as the life of feeling and emotions which, though unseen, is often the motivating factor of much that determines conduct and colours it, as it is itself permeated by the 'value system'. Further complexities begin to arise when the time dimension of the historical past is added to this.

In India, complexity is the norm rather than the exception, and it would be redundant to try and even state some of the aspects of complexities. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worthwhile to look at some aspects of the historical past or those elements of the 'value system' and even the 'social structuring' which continue to affect the behavioural patterns of Indians, both as groups and as individuals, in contemporary India.

The Hindu world view comprising the four *ashramas* and the four *purashrathas* is too well known and commented upon to need elaboration. However, it is not often realised that the most modern amongst Indians, more tacitly and by implication and not so much as intellectual commitment and ideology, continues to be guided by the paradigm of conducting his life in a manner

by which he would sequentially pass from one *ashrama* (the *brahmacharya*, *grahastha*, *vanaprasta*, to *Sanyasa*) and the call of arriving at a balance amongst the four goals of the life of the senses (*kama*), the pursuit of material life (*artha*), the ideal of right duty (*dharma*) and the remote possibility of getting away from it all, or transcendence (*moksha*).

Added to these broad categories is the sub-model within the sphere of conduct and duty (*dharma*) which calls for fulfilling three other types of obligations, namely *devadharma*, *kuladharma*, and *svadharma*. The obligations and the conduct are further linked by the demand of *devachara* and *kulachara*. Obviously, this is an over simplification of complex systems each inter-linked demanding, singly and together, a balance of both 'pursuits' at the deeper level of the life of feeling and emotion and that of action and conduct. The debate is as old as the *Mahabharata*.

The social organisation and individual life pursuits could be valid, meaningful and coherent in a non-competitive system where each of the elements complemented the other, were organically related and were not set up either in a linear hierarchy or polarities or in constant conflict and confrontation. This is obvious from a reading of Indian philosophy, the texts of law and conduct, the artistic manifestations in Indian architecture, sculpture, painting, music and dance. It is repeatedly articulated in literature, where the ideal heroes and heroines invariably symbolise this delicate balance between all that is understood by the modern terms, 'sacred'.



and 'profane'. The two are overlaid, sides of the same coin, and when differentiated, seldom poised as absolute polarities. Only for the *sanyasi* or the recluse they may be considered as set up polarities but again that is not the norm, rather, it is the exception. The other three, the pursuit of the goals of *kama*, *artha* and *dharma* run parallel

**T**he modern Indian carries the weight of the system, belongs to a class or caste and is continually aware and pulled by these paradigms, which require him to fulfil the obligations, and pursue the goals of individual freedom and release. Overlaid on this tacit system is another which he has assimilated in full measure as a result of the educational system begun by Macaulay, further, he functions in a competitive society which demands aggressive assertion of individual identity and a public administration system which *prima facie* does not recognise class or caste, or a fixed status and position of individual or group. Intellectually, he is committed to either nineteenth century liberal ideology or a Marxian ideology, but emotionally he continues to belong and subscribe to all that can be understood as *kuladharmā*.

Resultantly, instead of an individual belonging to and attuned with a holistic view of life, where the single parts are related to the whole and the network of relationships is flexible within clearly defined channels of communication functions and the obligations, he compartmentalises his 'psyche' as he does his clothes. He wears different sets of clothes to suit different occasions and milieu. He almost follows suit in the sphere of conduct and action. How else would he be able to attain balance between the bewildering, mutually contradictory demands of the larger society (i.e., work situations), the class or social group (*kuladharmā*), and his inner callings or wishing to attain release or beatitude (which he at least consciously recognises as his *svadharma*). He fluctuates and is in a state of constant predicament.

The predicament is not that of the 'modern man' per se as in the

West but the predicament is that of arriving at a balance between those 'values' and the 'ideas' of conduct he subscribes to at the emotive level and those others which he is committed to at the 'intellectual plane'.

Invariably, the first group is consciously rejected and few modern Indians will tell you that they do not subscribe to the paradigm and equally universally the second group symbolising progress, democracy and modernisation is vehemently articulated intellectually. In 'conduct' the 'tension' and the incoherence is patently obvious to an outsider. The Indian justifies this by pegging on the ethics to the three different types of obligations, namely, to his gods or heros or power (*Devadharmā*) to the *Kuladharmā* and the *Svadharmā*. In sum, these elements within the 'value' system and the code of 'conduct' provide excellent 'pegs' to justify a rather defined system of 'schizophrenia' or not so elegantly put, 'hypocrisy'.

**T**he modern Indian will, of course, protest if this is pointed out, but equally assertively he will tell you that these are two dimensions which are compatible and that there is no loss of coherence by his following two divergent norms. If he did not make this 'equation' consciously, then there would be psychological imbalances. The fact that there are comparatively few cases of emotional imbalances and the Indians appear to live in a state of equilibrium and harmony compared to the tearing conflicts so evident in western society, is only because the 'emotive life' of human relationships is still well preserved in the strong, almost infallible, security of the home and the family, despite the occasional breakdowns that one encounters.

This emotional security is provided by human warmth and immediate kinship, language and cultural ties joined to each other through a rhythmic pattern of participation, be it the closed family rituals of the 'bhair-duj' or 'rakhi' or larger festivals like Holi, Diwali, Pongal and Onam, long forgotten for their agricultural function and importance at

the urban level but still valid for their equalising participatory role. They often unconsciously or subconsciously provide the bed-rock on which the contradictions of the superstructure of intellectual life can be and are contained.

**W**hat then is the national character or an aspect of it, as seen at the level of the influential minority of educated Indians? Here is an amalgam, often without 'cohesiveness' but one which can and does integrate into a whole by aggregating a large number of elements of many moments of historical time and those of modern western thought and value. His (the Indian's) positive power lies in his arriving at a new balance called out from multiple traditions and reservoirs, sometimes harmonious and at other times discordant. He is able to do this because the tradition provides him with a complex model where each part had to be singly and together interlinked in a framework of relationships, individual and collective, mundane, physical and metaphysical, 'refinement' in the essence, flexibility in expression.

At the most negative the Indian is both hypocritical and unintegrated and an adherer to not only double but multiple standards in life-conduct. Vulgarity and grossness is the obvious result. A severe dichotomy takes place between the life of feeling and that of intellectual commitments and the lack of taste in every sense is the residue.

We had begun by saying that national character is that 'residual taste' of confrontation and dialogue with an individual or group. Perhaps, one of the reasons for the extreme reactions to Indians, positively and negatively, is exactly this capacity of integrating and refining all dimensions of living simultaneously, from the most mundane to the sacred and consecrated, from the life of sense and colour, brush and paint, human relationships, to the inner life of feeling and spirit with a still centre, and the other where the lack of the integrating ability and capacity leads to hypocrisy, grossness and vulgarity. The taste of the first is honey-dew and of the second a bitter pungency.

# The contradictions

RAJ THAPAR

IT is curious how terms are nourished today and sought to be wrapped up in neat little packages to be untied for ready reference. The word 'national' symbolises one such having grown up in an age where boundaries like everything else have become completely material, physical. And over our sprawling sub-continent, one has to make a considerable effort of the mind to think of the tribals of Madhya Pradesh, the fisherwomen of the Konkan, the Pahadis of the Himalayas, the Tamils, the Nagas, the Sikhs of the Punjab, all being tied up into one single package. One wonders what they have in common. Certainly not a shared experience, environmentally or historically. Yet, when confronted with 'others' outside of the sub-continent, certain features get etched sharply.

The first hit me some years ago in Singapore at a conference of representatives from all over South East Asia. The five Indians, coming from different parts of the country and not acquainted with each other, unfailingly spoke their mind, criticised their government, expressed themselves passionately on every issue. All other delegates, bar none, took the positions of their govern-

ments, not out of fear alone but out of a natural propensity to conform, not to let the side down, a part maybe of the collective ethos which so dramatically demarcates us from the rest of the East. One glimpse at China's Great Wall as it meanders over rock and valley over thousands of miles reveals this enormous capacity for collective conformity.

The Indian, on the other hand, has extreme difficulty of fitting into any definite pattern outside the caste and kinship bonds. Perhaps, that is one reason why no protest movement, no revolutionary movement really grows, why splitting is the inevitable movement through the Indian psyche, even when transferred to management or political party, irrespective of what the outside reality demands. This sense of heightened individuality bubbles up unerringly despite the rigid caste and class frameworks of Indian society or, perhaps, because of them. Visually, you see it in a casual glance down any street. No two men are wearing the same length or cut of trouser, shorts, pyjamas, shirt sleeves, or pattern of tying the dhoti. This physical variation is reflected in the mind, in the spirit of Hinduism itself. You can worship what

you like — the object becomes whatever you endow it with. The Indianness of a group of people travelling together lies not in any collective feeling but in a disparate feeling where each eats his kind of thing, has his own hours for prayer or exercise or what have you.

A friend once described his few months in jail closeted with thirty-five other political prisoners — where the whole night was interrupted by a series of aggressive affirmations of individuality. Someone did his deep breathing noisily at 3 am, another chanted something else at 4, a third wanted his tea at 4.30, a fourth had to cleanse his nose and throat with a kind of regurgitation, so essential a part of any Indian dawn, at 5. So it went on, with no one prepared to fit himself into anyone else's schedule. No wonder those in charge of delegations end up as nervous wrecks.

**T**his inherent anarchy is reflected in a sharp critical facility where you can't bear what the other man does, so you inevitably hate your boss but hide that feeling underneath an excessive cringing, you resent your colleagues and you have contempt for those working below you. It is perhaps the Indian's way of striking a blow at his freedom, extricating himself from the suffocating family and caste restrictions. He wants to be organised no more. That is why normal western management principles when applied to our condition fall flat on their faces. Except for family businesses, expansion invariably leads to listlessness. The moment you realise you are a mere cog you lose interest altogether. A Japanese once explained to me that one Indian could measure up to ten Japanese with his wide ranging mind and philosophic capacity, but ten Indians could not measure up to one Japanese because together they would cancel each other out!

These fierce contradictions between the anarchic mind and the restrictive social patterns leads to the second most visible characteristic, which is the facility of an Indian to live on contradictory planes at the same moment in time. It is not a case of discrepancy in what you say and what you do. That is common the world over. It is a

question of entertaining violently opposing beliefs together, the ultimate in coexistence. You can be a raving revolutionary, steeped in Marxism and ready to fling it about at the slightest provocation, and yet observe the most archaic ritual when your son takes his first morsel of solid food, you can talk about scientific advance and worship your tools by smearing them with the colour of red in remembrance of sacrificial blood, you can agree with both parties to a dispute and, in fact, that may be one reason why people drift from political party to political party because they are never sure where they belong and could easily be in two or three places at once if their physical being could be so divided.

This ease, flexibility some call it, leads to the third most obvious characteristic—the concept of ethic has escaped us altogether because everything can be put into a relative framework. Right and wrong are for the birds. If you talk about paying your taxes or observing the law by refusing to allow your ten year old to drive a car, or telling the truth, or working during office hours, you are usually greeted with hoots of derision. This has happened to me on several occasions and I have found myself being apologetic under the gaze of people who obviously thought me plain stupid.

**A**nd, yet, this is not the complete picture, only the outline, bold as it may appear. When you begin to fill it in, you suddenly see all of this as a method of survival, the highest rate of survival at the lowest point in a way. It's the secret of our 'continuity', it's our way of coming to terms with the subjective and objective reality. Laws are neither observed, nor broken, because you might just break yourself in the process. And nothing in life is worth that. So, you circumvent the law.

In fact, an essential part of our character is the circular motion, the invincible zero. Never be direct, skirt the issue because you never know who you might offend and what the repercussions would be.

Hence the open armed eagerness with which we greeted the committee principle and the heedless way in which we have proliferated it. Ring any government office and the official will be 'not on his seat' but in a meeting where he can shed his responsibility for decision making. Nothing controversial, of course, is said face to face at these meetings. So obsessed is the Indian with his own person, the self, as it were, that the slightest criticism offends, ignoring the objective issue completely. So, you go out of a meeting and release your pent up fury behind unsuspecting backs. You avoid confrontation like the plague.

**A**ll this helps to rub out whatever idea of ethic may have survived the many centuries of feverish philosophising. And, let us not forget that the idea of public ethic was a gift of the British colonisers, Rama notwithstanding. Public office and private profit have been interchangeable concepts in the minds of most people from times immemorial. As a child, how frequently I heard relatives talking to my grandmother with obvious delight at having married their daughters to government servants, or having acquired some sarkari status. 'He won't even need the salary now. The over and above will more than suffice.' It's not that people holding public office in other parts of the world don't stuff their pockets, but when they are exposed, they usually have to go. The number of people in India who were astonished at Nixon's ouster—after all, what did he do!—was legion. That is why exposures of people in public office, facts of corruption, nepotism, straight stealing from government funds don't make any impact other than a secret or not so secret admiration for someone who can get away with such booty.

The muffled echoes of disapproval come only from our immediate past—Gandhi and the wogs in consort to lay down the criteria for a minimum integrity. And the democratic process, in its lazy functioning has somehow freed the Indian from all of that. In fact it has been seized upon for its infinite possibilities for making money, turning

politics into such a fun thing today. You can move from under one label to another with astounding speed, having stuffed your pockets adequately at every hurdle. You can get a leader announcing that he won't waste jeeps in the election campaign and next morning discover from the newspapers that he has been hopping from village to village in a helicopter (not run on batteries)

In fact, elections are the contemporary *tamasha*, complete with trapeze artists, expert tumblers and somersaulters, magicians, men and women who can turn homo sapiens into jelly in one second flat, India's 'leela' of the twentieth century

The word 'leela' describes our predicament most vividly. It contains a concept which cannot be translated, which is elusive and yet all-pervasive. It's a joyous happening in which everything is possible. The world is God's 'leela', and then we have Ram's *leela* and Krishna's *leela* where everything happens all at once, the right and the wrong, pleasure and pain, happiness and sorrow, the lot. Today, it is democracy's 'leela' or the politicians' 'leela'

The voters enjoy it all, make what they can while the going is good, but they will not succumb to regimentation (famous last words!) Their normal living conceals so much violence, is so repressive, that it has to out at some stage. The Indian cannot be fenced in for long and this is what political leadership would do well to keep in mind. A Gandhi could appear from nowhere, show a little determination to do what he said, and without the trappings of formal power, shame a people into action. With what delight did they hurl their ties and hats and suits into bonfires at his command, freeing themselves from their western masters, how fervently they followed him, listened to him, walked with him.

More recently, how they voted out the Emergency in 1977, jumping over their caste and class hurdles in one unexpected, flying leap. That's just for the politicians, to remember so that they don't get

smug over this heightened individuality forever. Perhaps it is the rigidity of the caste and family inhibitions which makes us long to escape — from whatever it be.

The British class attitudes, when superimposed over our caste ones produced a unique amalgam of super differentiation. You will never get an Indian greet his domestic servant with a shake of the hand, with a direct communication on the human level. The hierarchies are too deeply embedded in the conscious and subconscious for anything so equalising. Most of my life I blamed it on colonialism, this touch-me-not attitude, this extraordinary arrogance but, sad to say, it is unique to this sub-continent. East of us they don't suffer from any such disease and I have never encountered it in Africa either, this tangled inferiority and superiority complex. Its most destructive manifestation is, however, in the attitude of non-caring which has been enforced and reinforced by Hinduism. There are so many little holes in the philosophy, from which you can escape retribution, so many ways in which you can translate self salvation, turning your eyes away from the horrors, convincing yourself that each is born with his or her destiny and you are not responsible, blissfully freeing yourself from any touch of guilt.

When this attitude is diverted from the human to the inanimate environment, it produces a unique, unparalleled capacity to disregard everything outside the self — almost as if the earth was created specially to receive Indian dirt. Much as everyone likes to avoid this question, to circumvent it by putting the blame on poverty, on the British who created the poverty, on the lack of this or that, we can't really absolve ourselves. It is our 'Area of Darkness' and no amount of raving against Naipaul can clean it up either. Poverty is not the cause because the boom towns of the Punjab are its most conspicuous manifestation, while the poorer, more 'backward' villages are less contaminated. It is without equal and creates problems for us which are, therefore, without equal, defeat-

ing town planners and municipal corporations alike, because no one is willing to accept this fact and then proceed from it.

As a wall is painted, it is stained with *paan* or urine, usually both happening simultaneously. Every pot hole is eagerly snatched as a possible lavatory, when public lavatories were put up in Delhi, every part was stolen so quickly that it was almost as if people couldn't bear to be deprived of the walls and the pavements. The Calcutta underground has also been seized upon with the same gleeful abandon. Of course our cities are horribly overcrowded, of course there is abysmal poverty, but why don't we do something about it. We just don't care for our environment, for our neighbour, for the things we buy, for anything or anybody except those closely related to ourselves.

As I walk to the office after having negotiated the traffic where this not-caring is so evident, I have to tread warily dodging the pavement's share of snot and spit and peels and refuse of a varied kind, only to be confronted with clouds of dust being swept ostensibly from the interior of shops even at 10.30 am, straight into one's face with a kind of childlike joy. Wherever a stone is missing in the pavement, no one replaces it because it becomes the ideal hole in the ground for dumping anything you want to. Climbing the staircase, I tune my ears to catch any sound of nose or throat cleaning so that I might avoid the spray. It is all too, too distressing. Maybe the concept of *achhut* is behind it all—for, cleaning is a task strictly reserved for the untouchable. You don't mind where you place your dirt because you will never be called upon to clean it.

It is an attitude of mind which you carry with you to work, piling up the files for posterity to clear, ordering every citizen to preserve every bill or receipt or scrap of paper for ever afterwards, avoid getting anything out of the way by delaying a decision so long as humanly possible, letting machine or gadget break completely before

launching on any repair and, if possible, just hurling it into the neighbour's yard. Cracked window-panes, broken knobs, tangled wires and stained floors — its all part of the Indian condition

When you extend this characteristic to our rules and regulations, you realise why every office is choked with outmoded procedures, like the drains, and why every new law is greeted with renewed energy to work out ways of circumventing it. Maintenance is a non-word and a non-concept in our minds. When a Japanese team came to inspect one of our power plants — in Delhi — the members were amazed that any electricity came out of it. 'We certainly couldn't make that happen,' they declared, astonished at the improvisation which, by stretching the imagination a wee bit, you might describe as 'intermediate' technology

**R**ecently, when a high powered (favourite hierarchical term with us) science committee was found to have been utterly useless, it was disbanded and another one created. When one of the members of the old committee found he had been invited to join the new one, hopefully, he rushed off to the first meeting only to be startled to find every single member of the previous committee sitting as usual, feeling like new people now that the label had been changed. This really is to illustrate how we avoid action at every level. The mind is forever in a state of frenzied activity, endless symposia and discussions take place, volumes are covered over with suggestions, and counter suggestions, commissions on education, police reforms, name it and its there in some labyrinth of government, never, but never to be translated into action. It is enough for us that the mind has found a solution, the issue is closed forever and the situation on the ground remains as usual. Some say that all of this is the same means and ends game where the end is forgotten and the means become the end. I don't know. It certainly leads to an unending coil of harassment for the ordinary citizen, even though he is also responsible, and creates a feel-

ing of hopelessness on one side of the coin

On the other, it unfetters the mind, and leaves one with time, time to think, time to do the things most of the world has long forgotten to do under the pressures of industrial society like sitting and indulging in an *adda* just for the love of it, for the love of exchanging ideas without the awesome responsibility of ever having to put them into practice, time to correlate at least within the confines of the mind. This capacity for correlation, the philosophic attitude, exists even among the so-called unlettered, almost more so there. To recognise it as such would mean utilising it at every stage for encouraging greater participation.

**T**he innate contempt for maintenance, for sweeping up the litter of the body and the mind, has enabled our people to give themselves up to their individual creativity, a kind of total involvement, shorn of all distraction. I remember seeing a camel in the distance outside the Jaiselmer rest house one evening. It appeared to be clothed in a richly embroidered cloth of brown. But, as it came closer, I realised that there was no cloth at all — its owner had obviously spent long winter evenings cutting its hair in intricate patterns to give that effect. This dedication is visible in every field of activity outside the sphere of management, so its not a question of laziness or incapacity.

Our planners would do well to keep some of these characteristics in mind. The small unit which requires the minimum of management, even though Schumacher may not have had India in mind, individual responsibility, a recognition of the creative talent crying out for appreciation, might perhaps just help us to cross over to the twenty-first century. Only perhaps, because I continue to believe that if we could just hire people to manage the tedious processes of living today, leaving our people to their exuberant creativity spilling over on to cloth and paper and metal and wood and song and dance, we might be nearer the truth, and grasp the essentials about ourselves.

# Culture and personality

K K SINGH

IN the middle 40's, when I was transiting through early adolescence, the air was charged with the spirit of independence. We did not understand Gandhi's truth or non-violence beyond the popular meanings of the words. But we were possessed by a sense of patriotism and the desire to serve our people. We detested foreign rule because it denied us self-respect, exploited our wealth and kept millions of our citizens in perpetual destitution. We wanted to rid ourselves of the stigma of an enslaved people. We desired a new social order to ensure peace and prosperity to all. We respected Gandhi but admired Subhas Bose, Bhagat and Azad. Above all, we wanted freedom for all our people to live in a spirit of mutual respect, cooperation and goodwill.

Our Constitution enshrines these ideals. But, today, on the wrong side of middle age, there is a burning sense of indignation at having been betrayed. Our own flesh and blood mocks at us in the language of 'a new steel plant dedicated to the nation', colour TV or the 'most modern shopping complex' when half of our people do not have the means to qualify for civilized living.

We scarcely hesitate to invest on jet air transport or on five-star hotel

luxury for tourists when the quality of medical and education facilities available to the bulk of our own people remains deplorably inadequate. The political process has helped corruption become a way of life. Black marketing, gangsterism and cover up jobs to protect criminals are supported by political bigwigs and businessmen. Threat to the life and security of the simple folk is ever on the increase.

Few decent citizens can hope to gain access to political power without the backing of big money. Many public and service institutions have a vested interest in their own perpetuation. They no longer want to serve the people unless one has 'pull' or pays the price. Over-staffing, indiscipline, defiance of authority and the lack of accountability plague many a government and commercial institution. Performance is poor and so is employee morale. Prohibitive taxation and inflation tell heavily on the honest tax payer while a parallel economy thrives on black money. Yet, contentment seems to elude everybody.

A clear socio-economic cleavage exists between the urban and the rural cultures or between India and Bharat, as Sharad Joshi has put it. India lives off Bharat as the rulers of the past lived off their subjects.

In spite of promises and many 'plans' the gap between the two has widened. Yesterday, Bharat did not desire to become India. But not so today. The rat-race for consumerism and comforts, another name for westernisation, has become the aspiration of the middle and working class.

**E**lites of the earlier generation who identified with the plight of the under-privileged and wanted to work for their prosperity have been replaced by another generation that seeks power and money for its own sake. Gandhi symbolized the spirit of sacrifice, high ideals and dedication to the service of humanity. We, his children, have forgotten all but his name.

The educated among the rural society emulate the urban rich just as the latter aspire for the ultimate comforts of the idealised West. Rural elites migrate to cities, purchase property and live like the affluent city dweller sans civic culture, others seek employment or start business enterprises, returning to the village with new status symbols and changed values. Still others join the urban slums. Peasants and wage earners in large numbers remain in a state of perpetual poverty due to the low wages they eke out of an economy which does not afford them a better deal (Nanjundappa, 1981).

The tensions this generates have begun to find expression in peasant movements, violence and, more recently, in caste and community massacres. The earlier values of simplicity and self-containment have yielded ground to preoccupation with material goals: money, property and power. The man who wishes to live by principles may find it doubly difficult because he also runs the risk of being called a simpleton, out of tune with pragmatism and reality. Many middle class families face rebellious youth who find the ways of the parents anachronistic but are equally uncomfortable with the demands of the emergent culture.

We may not lack good people but the virtual absence of social com-

mitment, self-dedication and the desire to work for nation building are glaring realities. Our achievements of the last three decades have been dwarfed by a social malaise which cuts deep into our personal ethic as a tolerant, non-materialistic, self-disciplined and God-fearing people. Most of us feel caught in the situation which humbles and depraves us. When corruption and exploitation become a way of life, nobody is spared. A vicious cycle operates. Even the temples of learning have become centres of politics. Most people feel powerless to remedy the situation. We have moved from one kind of enslavement to another.

One, therefore, wonders how all this has come about. There can be no doubt that this was not deliberately planned. Our national leaders acted with the best of intentions. We are one of the largest countries in the world having free elections. Our press is still reasonably free and the judiciary independent. Our top bureaucrats are, by and large, dedicated to their job. The excellence of our professional manpower ranks second to none in the world. Could it be that the strategies for national development, the foundations of which were laid in the first ten years after independence, were wrong? Or is it that our national character is not in tune with the requirements of modernization? Perhaps both have happened.

## II

**S**cientific interest in the study of the relationship between culture and personality is over fifty years old. Every human society has a culture, described as the way of life of a people, shared and transmitted by its members. Individuals cannot survive the hazards of infancy, or the adults fulfil their needs or the demands placed by the environment, without the protection and cooperation of other individuals. Culture gives its members the necessary tools, techniques, skills, symbols, attitudes and values and also teaches them appropriate behaviour patterns for the various roles they are expected to play in life.

Most individuals belonging to a culture respond to situations in much the same way although individuality is never lost. Each society gives its members a common psychic core which distinguishes them from those belonging to other societies. How this core gets acquired is not well understood. Psychoanalysis, particularly Freud's formulation of psycho-sexual development and character structure, provides a cogent conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between culture and personality.

**K**ardiner, a psychoanalyst, hypothesized that primary social institutions (childhood disciplines, maternal attitudes, for example) created the basic personality structure. The basic personality or national character in the context of the nation State, formed the basis of the projective systems and subsequently of secondary institutions such as religion and folklore and the concept of cause and effect, good and bad (reality system).<sup>1</sup> 'The constellations identified in basic personality structure were not finished character traits but a matrix in which these character traits develop. For example, in Alor we find distrust as a permanent feature of basic personality, but this distrust may show itself in any number of different character traits' (Kardiner 1945:24). Projective systems are established under the influence of the pleasure principle, the awareness of pain or expediency. They are a record of traumatic experiences within the period of growth of the individual.

The fewer the anxieties of the growth pattern, the simpler the projective system. Whiting (1953) found that the greater the socialization anxiety for a system of behaviour, the greater was the explanation of illness in terms of that system. The purpose of the projective systems is adaptive, to relieve the mutilating effect of painful tensions. They function in the personality in conditioned perceptions, meanings, affects, psychosomatic re-

<sup>1</sup> National character is discussed in the context of culture and personality, staying clear of the racial superiority inferiority implications or an oversimplified characterization of a people.



actions and behaviour (Kardiner, 1945) at the unconscious level

The concept of basic personality introduces a genetic point of view into sociology. Psychologically, it is central and a common source of behaviour. Child rearing practices, however, are not the only imprints of character. Training given by parents and other adults, one's experiences, imitation and social institutions also influence character formation.

Complex societies comprise people belonging to different religions and traditions. It is, therefore, more meaningful to accept a pluralistic concept of national character. In this context, the expression 'modal' character may be used to indicate the possibility of several national characters in a nation although one of these may apply to the largest number of people. Basic or national character is, therefore, that common core of a people's personality which is most widely shared. It is not closely identified with personality attributes although they necessarily reflect it. National character is a determinant of behaviour rather than the form of behaviour (Inkles, 1968). It has stability or resistance to change.

Under conditions of rapid social change, say, when a traditional society is moving in the direction of industrialisation, mechanisation and bureaucratisation, the existing national character may not be quite appropriate to the new context. Two questions then arise. What is the role of national character in establishing, maintaining and changing the collective behavioural-ideological institutions of a society and, second, what is the role of the socio-cultural forces in producing a new national character?

With the above background we can venture on an analysis of the Indian national character. Much has been written on the subject, but little can be presented as the conclusive truth. A few generally supported inferences along with some personal observations are presented

The Indian child is reared with much indulgence and affection.

The mother-child relationship is very close. Separation from the mother is at first introduced gradually. The female child is assigned chores within the home while the male child is made to spend more and more time under the influence of protective male figures. The relationship between the female child and the mother remains warm all through life. For the male child there is a traumatic break from indulgent bringing up, coinciding roughly with the latency period, which leaves him vulnerable for life. From this arises strong ambivalence towards the female figure (mother) who is viewed both as protector and also as an undependable object of attachment. Closeness and distance, idealisation and distrust, succour and fear of destruction characterise the psyche of the male child with regard to the female figure.

The secure, indulgent and protective childhood in which almost every desire of the child is sought to be fulfilled encourages a sense of omnipotence and self-love. This also helps in the assimilation of social ideals and the examples set by adults. Social ideals are reinforced by the way adults respond to life problems. The concept of the world as *maya* and the search for eternal truth as the quest of life become part of the unconscious of the child.

The love for the self incorporates the love for ideals internalised in early socialisation and reinforced all through life. This tends to give the individual an idealistic character and a narcissistic personality. The desire for self-improvement does not arise from a feeling of guilt, that is, for having failed to do things right but out of the love for ideals (or self). Thus, the core of morality is built around the achievement of ideals one considers important (*dharma*). If the gap between the ideal state and achievement is large, as can often happen, the conscience does not cause a feeling of uneasiness because the accent is not on efficiency or results but on effort. So long as one knows what is right and aspires for it, there is an inherent feeling of fulfilment consistent with the narcissistic orientation.

Discrepancy between action and achievement does not cause remorse or threaten the self-image.

Towards late childhood, discipline is introduced with severity. Threats, ridicule and punishment are resorted to as a means to teach skills, self-control over one's impulses, patience, tolerance, non-assertiveness, deference and the like. While the earlier training develops a positive attitude towards authority and tends to make the child-parent conflict less than severe, the emphasis on self-restraint, discipline and the avoidance of aggression requires the suppression of emotions. A fairly high level of hostility gets closeted within the individual. As a consequence, when the lid is off, raw feelings come out in the open in a form uncontrolled and destructive. The individual loses control over himself as if he is helpless.

The training in self-control is also linked with the achievement of one's ideals and is, therefore, desirable not only for inter-personal relations but also for oneself. This denies the individual the opportunity to learn how to deal with hostile impulses and, by the same token, how to face the hostility expressed by others. The indirect expression of aggression is compulsive as evidenced in cruelty towards animals, the dog being a familiar target, bullocks at the time of ploughing or against individuals who are not in a position to retaliate, such as farm labour in villages and children employed as helping hands in wayside *dhabas* and tea shops.

Spratt (1966) divides narcissists into two types. The superior narcissist cherishes the altruistic ego ideal, is aware of the danger of vanity and attempts to control it. The projective extroverts of this type lack interest in external reality (self-realisation is the goal) but identify themselves with humanity and have altruistic love for mankind. The lower narcissist, whose ego ideals are more conventional, is apt to give way to temptation as he is neither highly principled or proud, nor inhibited by repentance for having committed misdeeds. Under



conditions of social change, when the achievement of material goals are stressed against achieving self-realization or self-discipline, the lower narcissist will readily free himself from the hold of ideals and pursue new goals with zest made possible by the absence of a punitive super ego

The pleasant experiences with authority figures in early life and the reinforcement of the ego ideal at the hands of parents, Gurus and the like engender closeness and trust. The predominant perception of authority is that it is benign, trustworthy and protective. It is feared and also revered. The basic ambivalence towards the female was noted earlier. Given the cultural reverence for authority and age, on the one hand, and the training in the suppression of aggressive feelings, on the other, assertion of one's own claims or rights against authority is difficult. One is likely to tolerate denial for long.

As a consequence, behind the scene manipulations, back stabbing and character assassination are the preferred modes for the expression of hostility, specially in the impersonal world because direct confrontation and the possibility of reprisals are both warded off. This pre-disposition, however, discourages open exchange of views for resolving differences. A hostile outburst will release tension without necessarily tackling real issues while behind the scene manipulations add to fear and suspicion without achieving positive results. They vitiate interpersonal relations with intrigues. This propensity is rather marked in the Indian personality.

A derivative of the narcissistic personality structure and the attitude towards authority is weak identification with the community and people as against the family, kin and close friends. Accordingly, protest behaviour against something wrong or against public interest will tend not to be expressed because there is little personal involvement.

Similarly, 'public spirit' will be found lacking in spite of commit-

ment to ideals and personal selflessness. So long as one is on the right side of authority, the misdeeds of those in power will be tolerated rather than censured or considered outrageous. While the toleration of injustice is not unusual if one's own interests remain unaffected, our national character greatly limits the capacity to engage in creative opposition for an impersonal cause. No issue is all that serious and the world, after all, is a place of transit. This same personality orientation prevents identification with problems of people who suffer or are wrongly treated. At the level of ideas one may be genuinely disturbed but investment of energy for undoing a wrong is another matter.

The foundation of the Hindu character rests on the view that true reality is within oneself, the purpose of life is to be one with God. The external world and the body are unreal. Self-realization and compassion for others are important concerns. Materialistic pursuits for the acquisition of goods essential for living, property, money and the like are not the means towards the realization of the larger goals of life. Even those who are not well off economically believe this to be true. It is basic to the character structure. No understanding of the Indian personality can be complete without recognition of its importance as a dominant belief.

The national character I have tried to portray is stated in general terms. No great civilization survives unless there are enough people who can work for the public good and are prepared to sacrifice for their beliefs. The superior narcissists of the projective extrovert type, who are imbued with high ideals, compassion, strong sense of justice and altruism will serve selflessly and yet not feel the need to have an enemy or a threat before they can begin to act. They will be compassionate even towards those they consider undesirable or guilty. This personality type is probably the one that can face great odds. There is no gap between ideal and action, no place for hypocrisy or double standards. And there is no dearth of such people in the Indian society.

### III

Our national character as such does not lean towards exploitation of man by man. Nor is there excessive hostility and destructiveness, undoing of authority or an inborn propensity to amass wealth or to escape reality. The ethos of the personality is moral and ideational. In terms of strength of character, the positive outweighs the negative. What then accounts for the contemporary adverse state of affairs?

The answer lies not in what the national character is, but in what it lacks in the context of the strategy for modernization adopted in post-independent India. The single most important source of vulnerability lies in the absence of ready rules of behaviour applicable to social contexts outside the domain of the primary group. The existing social norms, rules of conduct and supporting attitudes largely apply to situations involving family members, kin and close friends.

Today, however, people from diverse backgrounds are linked in relationships as superiors, subordinates or colleagues in new social settings. The two principles of interaction germane to the primary group, namely, *identification* (closeness in feeling) and *obligation* (to behave as prescribed) cannot be applied to outsiders unless they are owned as friend or kin. No control can be imposed on the individual outside the law and order system or through group pressures in the cultural no man's lands. He is, therefore, free to relate to others as he prefers—nurturant or indifferent, hostile or exploitative, supplicant or bully. The widespread use of the word 'uncle' or 'brother' illustrates the attempt to claim outsiders as kin. Similarly, bonds of friendship are sought.

But, none of these artificially given meanings are free from complications. The 'uncle', 'brother' or 'friend' may not turn out all that dependable. Problems of conflict of interest which are resolved by the intervention of parental authority in the family cannot be similarly resolved in non-family situations.

Uncertainty and suspicion about the true intentions of the other person underlie the relationship. Eventually, the partners, whether superiors and subordinates or colleagues, might begin to feel that sincerity or loyalty is not reciprocated. Thereafter, promoting one's own interest at the cost of the other, understanding the interest of the organization, or disregarding an earlier understanding follow as predictable consequences. Pre-emptive moves may be initiated on grounds of 'rational' behaviour.

Since the methods of social control developed to regulate behaviour within the family and the community are not applicable to outsiders, it is not difficult to cheat, to lie, or to exploit. Adulteration of food-stuffs, oils, dairy products and medicines is much more extensive than realised. Bribery, black money and black marketing do not create a sense of anger or self-indignation because they occur in the no man's land where self-imposed discipline need not be applied.

In the same vein, doing a fair day's work for the salary one receives is not a matter of ethical concern. The work ethic is related to the culture of the family and the village. It does not extend to the formal organization. The bane of formal organizations is the inability to claim the individual as a member of the family. Contrast this with the Japanese situation where the organization takes full responsibility for the individual in every respect.

A similar situation initially obtains regarding superiors on whom attributes of parental authority as guardians and protectors are projected. Should the authority figure not be able to meet one's personal expectations, as is likely in a formal organisation, there is considerable resentment, even feelings of rebellion. There is a compulsion to agree with authority, on the one hand, and low commitment to do what one agrees with, on the other. The superiors, on their part, expect subordinates to be dutiful (transfer of family image) and yet there is a suspicion of being usurped by them.

A disagreement may often be perceived as disloyalty.

In government organizations, in particular, subordinates are extremely careful not to express views that may be unpalatable to the boss. While the individual would like to base his relationship with the authority on personal expectations, there is a constant suspicion that others are reaping or will reap undeservedly such benefits for themselves. Constant reference is made to the need for impersonality and objectivity but the individual often does not see himself guilty of disregarding standards. He would like to impose on others Personalism, even if it is rejected from an objective standpoint, comes to the individual naturally, perhaps unconsciously (Kumar, 1978).

The unsuccessful transfer of the ethnics of a family-community culture and its accepted methods of social control and rewards and punishment, which discipline individuals and groups, to that of the formal organization, whether the political party, law enforcement, judicial and legislative institutions or new social economic and educational organizations, is one important contributor to the contemporary national scenario. In the last thirty years we have not only failed to use the basic strength of the Indian character for national reconstruction, but have also, in some measure, succeeded in stifling it.

My argument is that we did not take into account the genius of our people before initiating modernization. As a people, we have lived in small communities having face to face relations. Our traditional systems of conflict and cooperation have enabled the people to manage their affairs in spite of the big changes that took place from time to time at the centres of power. The taking away from the community its judicial functions, done a long time back, and the introduction of the Westminster parliamentary democracy have both undermined the authority of the community. Lengthy and expensive legal proceedings employing lawyers, paid witnesses and fabricated evidence have uprooted the system of quick and

just disposal of cases according to norms and practices of the society.

In the process, the concern of the community to ensure just settlements has been replaced by the idea that truth and justice are separable. The conscience of the community and its authority have both been undermined. The collapse of the communal apparatus for justice, the inability to punish offenders and failure to exercise social control has undermined moral authority and also immobilised the village leadership as the guardian of the people. It has bred bad blood, spoiled interpersonal relations and thereby the capacity of the community to engage in cooperative undertakings.

The electoral process throws up people who are not directly accountable to the voters, except in theory. Even if the interest of national integration demands the creation of political consciousness in larger social aggregates beyond the small communities, some intermediate mechanisms for reviewing performance and exercising social control over the elected representatives could have been provided. Had this been done, the political process which today is synonymous with corruption aided by access of its beneficiaries to big money could have been disciplined to serve the interest of the larger majority of the people, most of whom come from the weaker sections. As is well recognised, Panchayat Raj is a sop in the name of decentralized government.

The system of parliamentary democracy, once considered symbolic of our desire for freedom and prosperity has generated in its wake a class of intermediaries and touts who claim a price for their support in terms of power, privileges and resources. The process of political recruitment and mobilization transfers neither an ideology nor commitment to service. Elections are so expensive that only the wealthy or those who can count on patronage or offer it in return, can participate. At least in one respect we are modern: we have succeeded in linking social status with wealth. Our traditional society recognized

wealth, but status depended on qualities other than wealth alone.

We chose to introduce adult franchise and voting as an essential ingredient of our democratic polity. But we did not take into account the fact that our society prefers consensus over confrontation. Voting has been one important contributor to undermining the moral basis of leadership. The assertion of individuality which it implies is contrary to the ethos of collective thinking and consensus in decision-making. We could have thought of a more intelligent solution for eliciting public opinion than voting by secret ballot or the showing of hands.

**I**n our strategy for social and economic development a similar mistake has been made. Instead of working through groups, where consensus and support could have helped mobilize the resources of the community and people enabled to think and act in collective interest, we have adopted an approach which promises prosperity to individuals independent of the group. This naturally favours those with enterprise and the resources to benefit from various schemes. One international study in comparative political behaviour revealed that Indian leaders tend to be more highly change oriented than those from the West (Singh, 1971).

However, the Indian is much more concerned about the consequences of change for the community and is keen to avoid conflicts unless they become absolutely necessary in the collective interest. Our people are deeply conscious of group approval and have the desire to carry others with them. However, India adopted the western model of extension education which appeals to the rationality of the individual decision-maker. These were often the 'rational' people, having urban linkages, sometimes politically connected and usually with superior risk-taking ability. The many needy but group-oriented poor people did not come forward because the strategy was not appropriate to their world view. Instead of recognizing this fact, we continue

to believe that lack of money is the biggest bottleneck to progress. Much reliance is placed on development through bank credit. We refuse to learn from our mistakes.

Several studies have shown that the qualities most admired in leaders are honesty and selflessness, personal sacrifice and public service, getting along with the people and such others as energy and organization ability. People admire leaders who work for the community, help those in need, mediate in disputes, offer advice and assist them in getting jobs. Nevertheless, we have not been able to utilise the services of such leaders in large numbers either in programmes of development or in local government. The general impression is that the village leadership is primarily self-oriented. The external forces that impinge upon the community seem to discourage the involvement of ethically sound and capable leaders either in local development or in national politics.

**P**erhaps the most significant omission in our development strategy is the separation of social ideals and the concern for the spiritual, so fundamental to our people, from the pursuit of socio-economic development. Even today, many of our people believe that man is an instrument in the larger scheme of things. Our national character is steeped in moral and religious values. There will hardly be a gathering of people, whether in a remote village or a metropolis, where the questions of *dharma*, *karma*, *samskara* and god do not eventually come up for discussion. Unless developments in the field of science and technology, agriculture, industry, national integration, or public consciousness are related to our genius as a society and to our world view, we shall neither be able to mobilize the energy for action nor the mechanisms of supervision and control. Impersonal institutions such as government bureaus, courts of law, banks, universities, and industrial organizations cannot make a contribution to national development if they remain so secular as to separate themselves from the moral and ethical basis of our society.

# Profile of an Indian

K F RUSTAMJI

I MUST say that I dislike the word character. It is associated in my mind with British public schools and empire builders and Samuel Smiles and memsahebs urging Indian probationers to develop character.

Besides, character is supposed to be some sort of hard crust developed on an individual by baking in the fire of sexual deprivation, uptight living, a constant desire to lay down your life for others unnecessarily, and to bear heat without air-conditioning, movement without staff car, and parties without alcohol.

Yet, the strange part of it is that although I dislike the word character because of its origin and implications, I like the words 'lack of

character' because it is so easy to cover up everything with them — sycophancy, disloyalty, telling lies, intriguing, fasting unto death and then not dying, even eve-teasing and attempted rape.

How much of an Indian's behaviour has come down from the past — an ancient nomadic past, in the land of the Aryans, said to lie between the Syr Daria and Amu Daria rivers which today flow into the Aral sea in the Soviet Union. The ancient Aryan was pushed up and down the mountains because of the cold and the need for fresh pastures. Life was a perennial battle with nature — with storm, drought and cold — and the greatest protector was fire. To wait in front of a warm

fire till the storm had passed away was the origin of that faith in 'agni' and 'atish' that has persisted to this day in Hindu and Parsi.

I suppose it was from the ancient battles with nature that one great characteristic of the Indian emerged — to accept disaster with equanimity, with a fatalism that often borders on exasperating inaction. Extend the same surrender to nature in the wider sphere, and you have an acceptance of domination, even devastation by a foreign conqueror; acceptance of misrule by the government and oppression by the local landlord, injustice from the guardians of the law, the terror of another caste, the cruelty of a mother-in-law. There is an unqualified acceptance of all evil. If he is against a powerful force, the Indian sits as if by the fire of his nomadic ancestors, waiting for time to work out a change. 'How can you fight nature? How can you fight a thunderstorm or a powerful tyrant? Accept — be patient — defer — compromise — and in due course make it a part of your way of life. Nothing is perfect. Nothing is immutable. It will change.'

That is the way the Indian has lived over the ages. It has been a hard life. He has paid a terrible price for being in a fertile land. Once in a while a Gandhi arises to show the path of revolt. But even that way is gentle, non-violent, considerate of the enemy, and aimed at the conversion of the opponent — not a battle with him face to face, blow for blow. The Indian has his own special method of fighting. If he is to fight someone, his tactics are designed to wear out his opponent, to ensnare him and tie up his legs, rather than to hit him a blow on the face. He deceives, pretends to be a coward, even condemns bloodshed, and when the enemy thinks that he has won, the patience and sheer humility of the Indian brings the enemy down and makes him the conquered.

Perhaps acceptance arises from a deep faith in reincarnation. Therefore patience and persistence, and an understanding of time and space, are highly rated virtues in the Indian ethos and can achieve any

thing that aggressive impulsiveness cannot.

Foreigners at first sight are surprised to see the timidity of an Indian. Strike a waiter, and he quails. Brush aside a beggar and he humbly accepts the push. Give straight talk to a bureaucrat and he wilts so obviously that the foreigner wishes that he had not made him feel so bad. Our timidity has become endemic in politics because the ruler has traditionally been considered irresistible. But, all the time, under a seeming acceptance of domination, there is intrigue and conspiracy. We love it that way.

All over the world, back biting, slander and lies are accepted as the stock-in-trade of politicians. In India, in addition to these, there is the underground river of rumour that every ruler fears. He is not afraid of the noconfidence motion, the critical editorial, even the foreign insult, or disturbance at his public meeting. All that is easy to contend with in a country where aggressive behaviour is considered rather childish. But let a false rumour appear about eating beef or cow's tongue for breakfast, or about a un-married man being dragged to the vasectomy table, or religious books being thrown into a latrine — and even the well entrenched ruler will be frightened and will think of counter measures. Not outright denial. That too would be childish. But a whole lot of counter rumours are issued to feed the fount of religion and astrology, or a series of laws are passed ostensibly to deal with prejudicial acts, which can be used to frighten rumour-mongers.

The Indian has tasted victory during the Hindu period, and defeat in medieval times from Islam, and from Christianity in the modern period. The fury has now faded. Fear of the conqueror who defeated him in battle and held the population down with gruesome laws and punishments still persists. (Pakistan knows us better than the rest of the world, and hopes that re-creating that fear from time to time will enable Pakistan to look bigger than it is, and so be treated by us and others as an equal.) Why is it that Indians did not combine — did not

revolt — when pyramids of skulls were being erected by their tormentors?

In the first place it is not in his nature to unite, or, to put it more precisely, he unites only in small groups — of family, tribe or community and caste, because protection at that level is indispensable for him. The feeling of insecurity in the village prevents mobilisation to face a common enemy though, in recent times, the outside threat has united us and, in consequence, is sometimes misused to deal with internal opposition.

Caste has been the biggest protector of the ruler. It has fractured opposition, allowed the ruler to play one against the other, even to punish without causing a revolt, because a feeling for others does not extend beyond the tribal group. If a 'chamar' is beaten to death by the 'daroga', how does it concern the government or the Muslim? If a Brahmin is hanged, there may be rejoicing among the other groups.

Except for the Gandhian types now almost extinct, sympathy for the poor and the down-trodden is only for vote gathering, and philanthropy or charity is unknown except if it is to get the good wishes of beggars for personal prosperity or as an insurance for the hereafter.

The virtues which the saints and savants of India have preached over centuries are renunciation, and veneration for and dependence on the gods. The ideal Indian is supposed to be around fifty — big investments and children married — after which the husband and wife retire, undertake pilgrimages, propitiate evil spirits, engage in good works like feeding ants and pigeons, even beggars and brahmins, and pass away in some obscure 'Tirthstan' with none to mourn, and with none to remember.

Qualities such as passion, compassion and social idealism do not find much favour in the Indian ethos. Courage is required, but only in the warrior (even virtues are fragmented). Truth and goodness are great virtues, they will tell you. But what is truth? What is goodness? What is

integrity? What is virtue? All is *maya*. And when you wonder what it adds up to, they will tell you that it requires inner-consciousness even to know what it means. If you have not got it, you are just a common cucumber. Thus we create — the humus for corruption, disloyalty, intrigue. All is *maya*.

**Y**et, a slow transformation is taking place because of the economy and education, and all the outside influences of the world that are playing on the young. Among them the common types are increasing. They do not have the faith of their fathers. That is all finished with — a total failure. Actually at the moment they do not have any faith at all. They are waiting for that charismatic leader, that sparkling attractive saviour who will give them a new hope.

Such a void was filled by Gandhi in the twenties. It was his personal attraction — independence was all that was accepted from the Gandhian package — the rest was only the Mahatma. And so the young are waiting again, looking for a leader — the package does not seem to matter much — it is the man (and it can't be a woman) that is required. Wanted — one Leader. Apply with blood sample.

Religion will reappear again and again on the Indian scene. There will be resurgencies based on God-men, and their ability to work miracles, and incite fear with the help of superstitions, and religion will be utilised by any political party that can get mileage out of it. But for the vast numbers of the young, the gods have become a total disappointment. They have no hope from them. Their fantasies centre round the demonstration, the revolt, the smashing of plate glass and stoning the police. It is the same pattern from San Francisco to Peking, even through peaceful, prosperous Zurich.

The tribal identity persists to this day even among the educated and the powerful. The bureaucrat likes to sit in his small circle — Punjabi, South Indian, Bengali — gabbling away in his own language, even dressing in traditional costume, eat-

ing his provincial food, feeling nicely secure in a small group. One result of this is that a bureaucrat is permanently 'at loggerheads' with his boss who is from another group, and yet he cannot harm him as his boss belongs to the bureaucrat's group.

The Assamese wants no outsider in his State, though he would like to come outside and be accepted as an Indian. The Sindhi traders support the Sindhi. The Marwari helps the Marwari. The Muslims of Aligarh live in a ghetto exclusively their own, and the Hindus live separately in their part of the town, and both employ goondas to protect them against the other, and regularly fall out over minor matters.

— Extend the tribal feeling to politics or business and you can see nepotism of the worst type in many States. There are a large number of business firms, even a government agency, that will not employ a Muslim. There are numerous industrial units that are packed only with relatives. They never have a strike or a lock-out. If one of the members rises to protest, the god father rallies the whole clan and there is a phalanx to hound him and his family out of the unit.

From the same primitive dependence on local strength arises the 'sons of the soil' movement. This absurdity reduces us as a country into small gullies or streets instead of a massive land of 700 millions. Another result of this tribal origin is that adaptability is slow, the outsider is unwelcome, change is considered retrograde. But hospitality still persists, most of it among the poor. If you lose your way in a forest, the tribals treat you like a king.

**C**enturies of tyrannical rule have made the Indian incapable of resisting evil. There will always be someone ready to compromise — someone who will betray or open the postern gate to an impregnable fort — someone who will find justification for every false word and unjust deed of the other side. And this character trait is wedded to the instinctive fear of violence and pain which is embedded deep in the ethos

of the race (strangely there is little fear of death).

This explains why violent movements have never succeeded in India. Serious decay may corrode the rule. The ruler himself may be disheartened or thoroughly incompetent, the courtiers may be corrupt and licentious, the countryside may be starving, the punishments meted out to suppress dissent may be inhuman — yet there is acceptance. This too will pass. We will be reborn.

Naturally there are many individuals, specially the educated and the young, the unemployed, the young mother fighting prices, who are not prepared to accept the pious hope of reincarnation. Their temperament has been transformed by education, and the disappointment at being educated, and the new Indian who is emerging will be a very intolerant Indian, unwilling to be the docile servant his father was, and keen to attack the older generation because he feels it was responsible for his woes, and he will probably be intemperate, irrational and very destructive.

**O**ur system is beeping beeping 'System Overloaded' 'Warning' 'Warning' for the last few years. We do not want to believe that this could be correct. 'Everything is perfectly under control' it is said at press conferences. 'Have a good day.' But deep down every Indian knows in his own subtle way that the system is moving towards a breakdown. It is in our character that we refuse to face facts, prefer to delude others and most of all ourselves, and wait innocently for that doomsday when collapse occurs, and we slip away into the unnoticed dustbin of history.

I wonder if I am right in thinking that the behaviour of people is constantly adjusted to their environment, although faiths, beliefs and morality may be fixed by centuries of human experience. Anyway, it is interesting to see what changes have appeared in the Indian since Independence. That timidity which is inherent has survived, with the result that the dacoit, the dada, the rough political boss, the aggressive trade union leader, the goonda, have

floated up to the surface like the flotsam and jetsam of the Indian Ocean.

Just below the surface, there is another layer of clandestine corruption consisting of politicians, government servants, businessmen, intellectuals and none of them have any qualms of conscience that they are polluting the ocean for years to come. Here and there coming up for air through the layer of corruption you may see a brave newspaperman, a judge, an academic, a bureaucrat—but they sink quickly some to reappear, some to disappear

Lower still you have the changing, discontented, lost generation of youth, and the soldiers, sailors and airmen, the scientists, and the technicians, all clearly waiting for the tidal wave of discontent to sweep them up to the surface. And right at the sea bed, stuck in the ooze of illiteracy and dumb obedience and clouded by the pollution above, is the sub-stratum of the rural poor

**A** characteristic of ours which has made the entire administration flaccid and purposeless is laziness induced by the climate, combined with fear of transfer or criticism. All our institutions are breaking down because we refuse to operate them in the right way. We lack the character to permit anyone to do his duty impartially, and legally. Combined with this is a peculiar ivory-tower mentality of the average Indian. If 90% of the men and women who need spectacles in the rural area don't have them, that is not our business. We must give them TV. If 90% of the men and women who need dentures don't have them, that too is not our concern. They must get electricity. We give special attention only to cars, refrigerators, air-conditioners, TV sets; which the 50% below the poverty line can only hope to get in their reincarnation.

Let us take our judiciary. All the men in it are well-meaning, honourable men but can they stand up to an aggressive lawyer defending a rich client? No. Would they have any hesitation in delaying the trial just to please the accused? None. As a result, we can get no decision

in time. Most of those who are rich get away with anything. Justice has been ruined by well-meaning, easy-going, judicial officers who want to accommodate everyone, and in the process they have made this land an easy pasture for the criminal, the corrupt and the villainous.

The same applies in a different way to the police. You have some fine men in the senior ranks, but we just can't allow them to function without interference.

**O**ur bureaucracy was composed at one time of men who were knowledgeable, pompous, commanding, and correct in the interpretation of their duties. We have reduced them to spineless puppets. See the ingratiating smile of a high-ranking officer when he meets the Minister's private secretary, and I feel like saying like our old Sergeant Major in the NCC 'I'll wipe that grin off yer face'. He often touches the feet of his Minister in a symbolic gesture of servility. In many States, he even stands with folded hands for 'darshan' and says 'Any service for me' in a sycophantic whisper. In his office, he has a towel on the right arm of his chair to wipe his sweat when the Minister calls 'Are Bap re, it is the Minister's telephone. Bugger wants me to'. 'Yes, Sir. Certainly, Sir. Your order is everything to me' he says into the telephone. Double talk and flattery develop easily in us.

Take our penchant for anonymous applications. How many in high office, even Members of Parliament, use them to win a point, or to intimidate someone? Has this become a part of our character? — this blow below the belt. How many allegations of corruption and misbehaviour are made in the legislatures which are a gross exaggeration of the facts, with the result that we will not trust them even when they make true ones. That too is part of our character. How many newspapers cast aspersions on the family lives of prominent men and women, and we accept total untruth as part of our free and liberated society?

Where are the men and women who can think in clear moral terms?

This is right. That is wrong. We must not base our society on lies, equivocation, evasion, uproar over unjust suspicions, and official attempts to deceive, mislead or fantasise. The father of the nation rightly felt that our basic defect was reliance on untruth. While he was alive, we made truth our motto, and soon after he left we began to temporise, to explain away, to get benefit out of lies.

Secondly, during the civil disobedience movement we threw overboard concepts of loyalty, discipline, order, and cooperation. Politics came to be based on the lathi charge and on firing. After Independence, we have continued the same concepts, used the same strategy of political propaganda and are now faced with the fact that this could lead to widespread disorder.

**P**eople tell me that if communism comes to India we will become a different people completely. There will be a classless society, no disparities, full employment, creative incentives, much order and concern for the poor. And I wonder whether that caste consciousness that we have, that faith in colour (you have only to read the matrimonial columns with requests for intermediate virgins of fair complexion), that callous disregard of the poor, that attachment to religion, and that passivity which is induced by the climate — all of which are part of our disposition — will ever be eradicated. For all we know, communism may be transformed if it comes to India, and I can imagine the Commissars and Mandarins getting together in a seminar and bitterly repenting the day they decided to come to India.

An extract from the proceedings of the 40th Party Congress may read

'They made communism an Indian cult and in the process we became clannish savants and astrological mediators, and we began to accept poverty as ineradicable and dowry as necessary. We went in as Commissars and came out as Gurus.'

The one factor which has worked against woman getting a proper



place in society for a thousand years has been the lack of security for them in India. After the halcyon life of the ancient Hindu period, the armies of Islam poured into the land under one sultan or another, again and again, to capture a fertile land, rich in its culture. Even in their own home countries of West Asia, Islam had brought about changes in the traditional pattern of behaviour of the Persian, Roman, Greek or Egyptian women. In the home they were loved, they looked after the children, and exercised a say in all matters. Publicly they had no role to play. At best they could sit in partitioned compartments and watch State functions, or dancing girls performing for the pleasure of the lord of the house.

Islam also permitted plural wives to fill the ranks of the fallen in its conquering armies. The fervour and the religious zeal of the armies enabled quick marches, much endurance, much courage. After the area was captured, like conquering armies of the past, the capture of women was permitted. Even in normal times if a nobleman saw an attractive woman, he could raise her status by adding her to the harem.

In consequence, women were concealed, treated like buried treasure, kept away from public view, and they lived in closed rooms never knowing fresh air, except when they walked to the temple. Illiterate, sensuous, concealed, they were never able to have the slightest say in politics or administration. Even during British rule, till the country was fully stabilised and law and order established on a firm footing, the education and public appearance of women did not commence till the end of the century, except in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras.

Compare the western experience, which was so different. Two world wars, and man's work being done by women when the soldiers were away, gave them economic security and the adjustments of society to death and absence which led to changes in partners and increasing divorce rates. In the USA and Canada another factor which helped them was that the society they came

from had made a fresh start in the new continent in which woman had played a pioneering role — stood with the gun to guard the log cabin, moved across the continent in horse wagon or on foot, and achieved a sense of equality. Yet, the feminist movement in the West is still searching for better terms. Today, out of three couples, married or living together, two are likely to break up. Children, as typified by the flower children, have tended to seek a line of originality and independence, and display new fashions in clothes, music and life-styles.

The difference between the western and the Indian man is not as wide as between the western woman and the Indian woman. There are a thousand years of hiding and concealment to be made up. (Even in the West, woman is still far behind man. In the USA and Canada, one out of ten husbands still uses physical violence on his wife.) Gandhi and the leaders of the national movement, and the makers of the Constitution, gave women an equality of status, but much of it still remains on paper. Except in cities, the role of woman in society continues to be that of an unpaid drudge. Democracy may change that. The vote is a powerful lifter of the downtrodden, if it is freely exercised. Unfortunately, in many rural areas few women exercise the right to vote.

So you have in India today the pill - popping, disco - going, rich, working girl — high heels and tight jeans — dashing and capable yet, trapped in an ancient culture which has not changed fast enough for her to find a suitable partner, or to adjust with one if he has been found. And at the other extreme you have a working woman too — the wife of the landless labourer who has never owned a second saree or a mirror — completely dominated — to be changed or thrown away like an old rag, and she too is trapped in a culture that has changed too fast for her.

The average Indian means well by woman, respects woman, (introduces his wife as his lady wife) — a woman can pick her way through a Calcutta street when a fierce riot is

going on. He will even pet her in the house. Having learnt the art of making love from foreign films he may even kiss her, but in the public she must have a low profile, otherwise it would damage his manhood. In any case if a girl child is born, there are no celebrations.

That is the Indian today.

'I am a part of all that I have met,' someone has said. The Indian has met conqueror and marauder, he has met fortune and misfortune, he has met guru and scientist, politician and priest, and he has survived and multiplied. One can never say what it is that has given him that superlative life force. By nature he is non-violent, apprehensive of authority, subject to panic and momentary fits of frenzy. He has never learned to unite, except in some trade unions and religious or caste groups, and yet he has stood together with his kind, and his country is one of the oldest nations of the world. He has an intellect that is quick and complex, and over the centuries his philosophers have traversed the brain, probed into the depths of the sub-conscious, and showed the way to live. He can accept the unacceptable, seek out good where only evil is apparent, and yet in the end his patience transforms the un-acceptable and the evil into the passable. He will not kill cows, but he can watch thousands of imprisoned human beings wither before his eyes. He will not raise a finger if trees disappear, if beaches and rivers are polluted. He loves to pass laws and does his best to interfere with enforcement. He will not raise his hand on a woman. He can glamourise her in temple sculpture and art, but he can degrade her to the lowest level of human existence.

So there he is — the timid, divided, intelligent, poverty-struck, philosophical little man, haunted by spirits and goblins, who has been spoiled by a thousand years of dictatorship, and stunted in his growth by hundreds of years of grinding poverty. Will freedom and democracy bring out that mettle in him which will enable him to use the powerful force of 700 millions to shape events the way he wants them?





**FOUR  
SWAN  
FABRICS**

**FOR ENCHANTING SHADES  
IN COTTON AND BLENDED TEXTURES**

**Pamper your every whim and fancy with Four Swan Fabrics  
in cotton and Polyester/cotton blends. Crease-resistant  
Four Swan fabrics come in a wide range of colours and prints.**

*Manufactured by:*

**THE VICTORIA MILLS LTD., BOMBAY.**



**MANGALDAS  
GROUP MILLS**

**ATTENTION STEEL MILLS  
&  
FOUNDRIES  
EXPORTERS OF WORLD FAMOUS SANDUR MANGANESE ORE  
OFFER  
EX-STOCK  
VERY LOW PHOS. PIG IRON  
AND  
LOW ALUMINIUM FERROSILICON  
PRODUCED IN THEIR PLANT AT VYASANKERE**

*Please Contact*

**THE SANDUR MANGANESE & IRON ORES LIMITED**

**"LOHADRI BHAVAN"**

**Yeshwant Nagar-583124**

**Via Sandur, Bellary Dt.**

**Karnataka INDIA**

*Cable .* SMIORE, SANDUR (INDIA)

*Telephone* SANDUR 33, 61, 91

*Telex* BANGALORE 427

Bangalore 32175 :

28262 :

Hydroquinone  
 ne. Metol. Pu  
 rechromone  
 Purechro  
 -3. Purechro  
 ne-4. Sodi  
 m Sulphite.  
 m Bisulphite.  
 Sodium Sodi  
 um Carbon  
 ate Anhydrous  
 Sodium Ca  
 onous. Monohydrate  
 rbonate. Metaphosphate (Hy  
 te. Sodium Thiosulphate. Thio  
 te. Sodium Ammonium and Crystals. S  
 te. Anhydrous. Ammonium and Crystals. S  
 sulphate. Anhydrous. Benzene. Chloranil. 2:5  
 sulphate. Formate. 2:5 Dimethoxy. Benzene  
 Sodium Acetate. Benzene. N:N Diethyl. Sodi  
 odium Acetate. Benzene. N:N Diethyl. Sodi  
 e. 2:5 Diethoxy. Aniline. N-Toluidine. Mangan  
 Diethoxy. Aniline. N-Toluidine. Mangan  
 ne. N:N Diethyl. Anhydrous. Mangan  
 Sulphate. Anhydrous. Mangan  
 ne. N:N Diethyl. Anhydrous. Mangan  
 Carbonate. N-Butyl Metha  
 ate. Manganese. N-Butyl Metha  
 emidone. N-Butyl Metha  
 crylate. Hydroquinone

Paper  
 Electronics  
 Ceramics  
 Polymers  
 Leather  
 Jute  
 Textiles  
 Detergents  
 Fertilizers  
 Paints  
 Dyestuffs

Pharmaceuticals  
 Processing of Photographic  
 and Motion Picture Film  
 (Black & White and Colour)


Manufactured by

**S SATYADEV CHEMICALS LTD.**  
 Pratapnagar Road, Vadodra-390 004.

Suppliers to some of the world's leading manufacturing and trading concerns.

TEXTILES, SUGAR,  
 INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS,  
 ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,  
 VINASPAT, PVC, RAYON TYRE CORD,  
 FERTILIZERS,  
 ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS,  
 IRON CASTINGS.

**IN THE  
 SERVICE OF  
 THE NATION**



**DCM** THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD., DELHI

# A reactionary view

O V VIJAYAN

ARCHAEOLOGISTS of culture have quarried endlessly in the Hindu\* dichotomy. They seem to be saying: *'Here is the Hindu involved in fifth generation computers and yet in the privacy of his atavisms he provides for his next birth, he cannot but be evasive and amoral. Look, with what ease he moves back and forth between the elevated and vulgar forms of his religion, his civilisation is irrational.'*

History, it is true, is full of examples of how the religions have conditioned civilisations. Behind the West's conquest and expansion, its analytical and destructive sciences, its wealth and splendour was the Old Testament sanction which gave man primacy over nature. To a lesser extent, this was true of the Confucian code as well.

Speculative Hinduism, on the other hand, stupefied the Hindu with

the staggering relatedness of all things, and with a chronology that took in not merely ages but recurring cycles of age clusters. *The Hindu*, say the fossil-diggers, *is done for*. Another curious voice joins in. *'The Hindu does not need the habeas corpus,'* it says, *'he will live on a tenth of the calory optimum, he is in a bad way and needs us to make a man of him'*

This is the voice of the invader. The Hindu had met with invasions in the gross, but this is an invasion in the realms of the subtle. He has been invaded from within.

I do not have the instruments of sociological analysis to help me untangle the mess before me, perhaps these instruments are not relevant either. The only tools I could bring along are those of intuition and love and of a certain perennial morality which legitimizes utopias and rebellions. It is obvious the Hindu projects a despicable image of himself as he snivels and ingratiates, or desperately invokes a sick

---

\* The word 'Hindu' has been used here in the historical rather than the communal sense

spirituality There are two classes of solutions to this abjectness — the millennial and the immediate. And, maybe, each is as valid as the other.

A little more calories, for instance, a little more proteins, and the Hindu might look at himself in the mirror with reassurance. It might secure for him international sexual parity. Or, again, in the vast urban miasmas of today, he could overcome the misery of his inefficiency if only there were inexpensive community air-conditioning.

I recall the two excellent books of Naipaul, *An Area of Darkness* more than *A Wounded Civilisation*, because the former had fewer of those 'deeper' perceptions but plenty of strident and compelling description instead. We are shown the Hindu hankering after imported cheese or making a kind of pig's peace with excrement. But what this book really achieves is the implicit rejection of any genetic defeatism which the theorists of the dichotomy might choose to invoke. Because, Naipaul, perhaps unwittingly, reduces the millennial problem to one of a mere generation. All we need do to stop that man from abjectly begging for cheese is to make some good cheese ourselves and market it reasonably. To wean him from his own unscavenged excrement, all we need is a sanitary system. And there is no reason why we cannot make either of these because we had craft enough to make the world's finest muslin five hundred years ago and had covered drains three thousand years before Christ.

In the three decades and more since Independence the least our leadership could have done was to manage our excrement. They chose to stop the Korean war instead. Understandably so, because involved in the exercise was a problem parallel to the problem of excrement. Obviously, both could not be solved at the same time. I think the following illustration will help us understand both these problems, the excrement one and its parallel. Jawaharlal Nehru went for his first Commonwealth meet as India's Prime Minister dressed in an impeccable western suit, complete with

hat. Insecurity of a different kind compelled him, the nagging fear that the white masters would snigger at the other outfit he used back home, namely the *achkan* and *churidars*, which were something like a totem of the liberation. In twelve months or so he came back to the masters, this time confidently displaying the totem. The totem had been accepted.

Many things had made the acceptance possible: the largest fleet for any diplomatic house in London, the dark sex symbol of a Krishna Menon who allegedly awed the countesses, and the impressive foreign policy menagerie. All this would later climax in the stopping of the Korean war and, later still, dissolve into international beggary and comedy. The right to wear the *achkan* and *churidars* was bought dearly.

It had to be bought so incredibly dearly because nothing lesser than immense top heavy systems were thought of to manage the excrement, and the country could not afford those systems, and nothing less could go with the new grandiose rhetoric. Gandhi was one who thought differently. He had the advantage that he had no rhetoric but only the pure logic of a child. He went to the Buckingham Palace dressed as he always was, and even remarked merrily that his inadequacy of clothing did not matter because the King wore clothes enough for two.

Gandhi was able to do this because he did not have to wait for cataclysmic happenings to give him the confidence to face the King in his loin cloth and rug, because he was powerful in the knowledge that he could bury his excrement like a cat, because he had a civilizational alternative. He had tried to persuade the abject Hindu to carry a shovel along when he went out to the fields to ease himself. Gandhi was introducing neighbourhood aesthetics and popular science, because the excrement buried meant a surface pollutant recycled into nutrient. But Gandhi was doing something stupendous on another plane: he was administering a potentized dose of the historical correc-

tive. With the excrement buried, its primordial spell over men would be broken, and the Hindu be able to recover part of the dignity he lost in the invasions.

Gandhi was taking on the problem along the personal seams of history.

But he had no instrument with which to extend this persuasion beyond a monastic grid of activists. The failure was not a failure of principle but of managerial facility. The post-revolutionary experience of China is full of similar measures with an aspect of utopian and whimsical sociology, but incredibly far-reaching in their consequences. China today has abandoned many of these, not merely to free itself from Mao but because functioning systems had begun to emerge.

A thousand years or more of stagnation in the life of a people might indicate nothing more than a little trial and error. Also, one race can be less fortunate than another, in the manner of individuals, for no perceivable reason. The Hindu's misfortune is that he has been perennially violated from without and now, at last, from within. As a civilized being he turns away from this irrationality of violation into himself, and into the knowledge that, despite everything, countless generations have refined him. It is when this knowledge wears thin once in a long while that he comes out of his existential burrow to look for that stale chunk of imported cheese.

He is turning inward once again, this time to burrow in for much longer, because he has been invaded as never before. And the hordes that rule over him today would like him to get lost in his dichotomy, speculating pathologically and hopelessly. I have refrained from using the word *classes* and used *hordes* instead, because they do not belong to the legitimate processes of this polity. Nor have they any stakes in this country, which they might get away from if the time comes for giving up, along trails charted already perhaps to where their treasures are buried. Meanwhile, they have devastated the resource inheritances, and the cultural inheri-

tances, and created tiers of ethnic serfdom within the country. 1947 marks this tragic tryst with destiny, when a civilized and positive imperialism ended and the over-running began

Two things of great consequence seem to have occurred in our history. One is the caste system, and the other the two and a half centuries under an imperial power whose sensibilities were destined to cross-fertilize our own. The caste system produced the Brahmin as the custodian of precious arcana.

I speak of the Brahmin here more as a concept, and of caste in the sense the *Gita* owns up. It is difficult today, as the gross incarnation of the Brahmin has been corrupted beyond recognition, to respond meaningfully to the concept, even as it is difficult to dissociate imperialism from the folk images riddling its surface: the revolts, the prisons, the massacres. The pivotal role of imperialism in our liberation, and of the Brahmin in a deeper egalitarianism of refinement will be incomprehensible to us, because our words have decayed into involuntary signals and we are like vermin blindly driven by large clusters of them. We are repeatedly assured by the hordes that this has got to be so, because we are groping in the dichotomy and because we have abdicated the right of choice and rebellion. The hordes, if only we let them, will manage it all for us.

Imperialism proper never resorted to the maiming of our minds, it worked within an ethic of conquest. The ethic has since become obsolete. It is thus that the second occupation, the over-running, has become an imperialism of anomie. Bred by default, a mutation caused by a laboratory error as it were, the hordes have undone in thirty years the nation State bequeathed by the Empire, and demolished the great congruencies of *vak* and *artha*, of the word and sense, so patiently accomplished by the Brahmin.

Once we understand why the Hindu evades, we would stop lamenting his degeneration of character. This is a time to hope, to start afresh from the personal seams of history.

# Digressions

SANTI P CHOWDHURY

IS it not necessary to be a nation before we can talk about national character? Are we a nation or an amalgam of nationalities? Aren't we Punjabis, Tamils, Bengalis first? Is it not more reliable to talk about Malayali character, Marwari character, Assamese character? Any attempt at analysis is further compounded by the fact that you have the Hindu Punjabi and Sikh Punjabi, Parsi Gujarati and the Jain Gujarati, the Mopla Syrian Christian and the Brahmin Keralite. Thus you get a series of contradictions — within the same linguistic community, between one and another community, between the north and south.

Is national character something that we can define? Is it not in a state of constant flux, reacting to and absorbing reality, elusive and ambiguous? Thus we get in a people the best of heroes and the worst of cowards and all the shades in-between. But since we live in an age of generalisation and over-simplification, some speculation about what we are may not be entirely irrelevant. But it should be within a time frame — the British national character at the time of Elizabeth the First and, now, during the reign of Elizabeth II, are hardly comparable.

Preservation of the status quo is probably the strongest kink in our character. Our rituals, superstitions, are more directed towards warding off evil rather than being inspired by dreams of self improvement. One puts a little mark on the baby or bites a finger so that the inevitable evil of envious eyes cannot do it any harm. Thus, fear of the unknown gets intertwined with an obsessive suspicion about your

Santi P. Chowdhury, documentary film maker, had written these notes for an article in this issue when he died tragically of a heart attack. We are publishing the notes as we found them.

fellow men. God has willed you into a status and it is up to you to devise ways to protect it from envious destruction

Failure on the power front is not looked upon as human failure. It has already entered the Bengali ethos as an act of God. Even in sophisticated homes, arrival of power after an arduous interval is sometimes greeted with collective applause — like farmers welcoming rain in drought-land. The Bengali penchant for political action — for processions and gheraos — does not get reflected on the power question, a question which affects health, happiness, progress and economy of the community. If you can pass on a problem to the Indian public as an act of fate, it finds fairly ready acceptance. Like floods. People don't question the lack of proper water management. Look at the predominant role astrology plays in our political affairs.

Total approach. Total solution. Not problem solving.

My friend used to work in one of those glass and aluminium skyscrapers on Chowringhee. Outside his picture window, across the road he could see the green expanse of the Calcutta maidan (this was some years ago, before the Metro diggings turned that part of Calcutta into a landscape of disaster). Being a fairly senior officer, in a fairly big company, my friend had plenty of leisure to contemplate the verdure landscape. He got very familiar with one particular routine. A well-built man, fortyish, a labourer, would arrive every day, cut grass for a couple of hours, put the stack of grass and himself under a sprawling banyan tree and go to sleep. He would get up later in the afternoon and loosen up his limbs in a series of spectacular yawns. His siesta now shaken off, he would place the bundle of grass on his head and disappear in a gentle relaxed trot.

The friend, a firm believer in the ethics of work viewed this demonstration of self-indulgence for a whole week with increasing restlessness until he couldn't bear it any more. 'Why do you work for only a couple of hours? Why don't you work harder?'

The grass-cutter (almost indifferently), 'what's the point?'

'You will earn more, that's what is the point, work harder, earn more.'

G.C. 'To phir kya hoga (then, what?)?'

'Don't you have a family? You will be able to look after them better, educate your sons!'

'To phir kya hoga?' replied the stoic grass cutter.

'Well, your sons will do well in life, they will have good jobs, they will be somebodies,' my friend stuttered with enthusiasm, carried away by his own logical exposition of a dream..

'To phir kya hoga?' said the incorrigible grass cutter.

'Dash it, they will look after you, you won't have to work, you will have an easy time.' My friend was getting angry with this slab of black marble, with this monumental indifference, 'Aram karega.'

'Easy time.' A mild smile flashed under his kaiser moustache. 'To abhi kya kar raha hun' (What do you think I am doing now?)

Crushed by this apocryphal snub, my friend returned to his cool glass cocoon wondering at the ways of India that is Bharat.

It is easy to say Indians lack material drive. Easier to say they are slothful. Reality however is more complex, much more many-splendoured.

Many years ago I was down with a mysterious fever. It left me weak but I was strong enough to read. There was some sort of attenuation of the senses and every bit of reading took on an intensity that was almost hallucinogenic. For example, sometimes, for an infinity of time — I don't know if it was a few seconds or a few hours — I would have the sensation of being a moss covered stone under a shady tree. I must explain, at this time, I was reading Jean-Paul Sartre and was particularly taken with his book on Genet, 'Saint Genet'. Slowly but unexorably I kept thinking about the sayings of Ramakrishna, there seemed to be a great deal of correspondence between Sartre's convoluted analysis and the intuitive wisdom of the illiterate saint.

Every Indian is not a Ramakrishna but examples of intuitive wisdom are not all that rare in India.

# Further reading

## BOOKS

- Adkins, Arthur W.H.** Merit and responsibility a study in Greek values Oxford Clarendon Press, 1960
- Appleby, Paul H.** Morality and administration in democratic government Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952
- Bain, Alexander.** Mental and moral science, a compendium of psychology and ethics, 2nd ed London Longman, 1968.
- Benedict, R.** Patterns of culture Boston Houghton Mifflin, 1934
- The chrysanthemum and the sword, Boston Houghton Mifflin, 1946
- Bhambri, C.P.** Bureaucracy and politics in India Delhi Vikas, 1971
- Bhargava, G.S** India's watergate, a study of political corruption in India New Delhi Arnold Heinemann Publishers, 1974
- Bhatnagar, C P** The crises in Indian society Delhi National, 1971
- Boss, Medard** A psychiatrist discovers India, tr from German into English by Henry Afrey. London Oswald Wolff, 1965.
- Carstairs, Morris, G.** The twice-born London Hogarth, 1961
- Chattopadhyaya, Sudhakar** Traditional values in Indian life New Delhi India International Centre, 1961.
- Chaudhuri, Nirad C** The continent of circe: being an essay on the people of India. London Chatto & Windus, 1966
- Hinduism a religion to live by New Delhi B I Publications, 1979
- Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion.** The ethics of power the interplay of religion, philosophy and politics, ed by Harold D Lasswell and Harlan Cleveland New York: Harper, 1962
- De George, Richard T.** ed Ethics and society: original essays on contemporary moral problems. London Macmillan, 1968.
- Douglas, P H.** Ethics in government Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1953.
- Dube, S C** ed Public services and social responsibility New Delhi. Vikas, 1979
- Duicker, H.C.J. and N.H Frijda** National character and national stereotypes a trend report. Amsterdam: North-Holland publishers, 1960
- Ellis, Havelock** Morals, manners and man London: Watts, 1939.
- Erinton, Crane.** A history of western morals London Weidenfeld, 1959.
- Flugal, J.C** Man, morals and society a psycho-analytical study. London Duckworth, 1955
- Freud, S** Group psychology and the analysis of the ego New York Bantam, 1922
- Civilization and its discontent New York Jonathan Cape, 1930
- Fromm, E** 'Psychoanalytic characterology and its application to the understanding of culture' In Sargent S S and M W. Smith (Eds.) culture and Personality New York Viking 19
- Chains of illusion New York Pocket Books, 1963
- Man for himself 'an inquiry into the psychology of ethics' New York Reinhardt, 1960
- Furer-Haimendorf, Christoph Von** South Asian societies: a study of values and social controls New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1979.
- Gandhi, M K** Character and nation building. Ahmedabad Nav Jivan Publishing House, 1959.
- Gupta, Giri Raj.** (ed) Contemporary India, some sociological perspectives. Delhi Vikas, 1976.

- . Cohesion and conflict in modern India New Delhi Vikas, 1978
- Gorer, G** The American people New York Norton, 1948
- . Exploring English character London. Cresset Press, 1955
- Gupta, R K** Towards purity of morals. Delhi Pragati, 1981.
- Hamshire, Stuart.** (ed) Public and private morality Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978
- Honigmann, J J** Culture and personality. New York. Harper, 1954
- Hsu, F L K.** (ed) Aspects of culture and personality New York. Abelard-Schuman, 1954.
- Husain, S A.** The national culture of India (2nd ed) Bombay Asia, 1961.
- Husain, Zakir.** Ethics and the state Ahmedabad: Harold Laski Institute of Political Science, 1960.
- Indian Institute of Public Administration.** The citizen and administration perceptions of the public and the officials preliminary report on some aspects of a sample survey in Delhi State, New Delhi IIPA, 1964
- Indian Institute of Public Administration** Politics and administration for total human development, by Swami Ranganathananda New Delhi IIPA, 1980
- Inkeles, A. and D J Levinson** 'National Character the Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems' In, Lindzey, G and E Aronson (ed.), The handbook of social psychology, 2nd ed, Vol. 4, London Addison-Wesley, 1968, pp 418-506
- Inglis, Brian.** Private conscience — public morality. London Andre Deutsch, 1964
- Johnson, John M. and Jack D Douglas** Crime at the top deviance in business and the professions Philadelphia J B. Lippincott, 1978
- Joshi, Navin Chandra** (ed) Democracy and human values. New Delhi Sterling, 1979
- Kakar, Sudhir** Inner world New York Oxford University Press, 1978
- Kant, Krishan** The present system, its central point of rot and resurgence Ahmedabad, Harold Laski Institute of Political Science, 1981, Pub No 125
- Kardiner, Abram** The psychological frontiers of society New York Columbia University Press, 1963.
- . The individual and his society New York: Columbia University Press, 1949
- Katz, Marvin Charles** (ed) Sciences of man and social ethics variations of the theme of human dignity Boston Branden Press, 1969
- Kothari, Rajni** State and nation building Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, 1976
- Lecky, W E.H.** History of European morals from Augustus to Charlemagne New York George Braziller, 1955
- Leiser, Burton M** Liberty, justice and morals contemporary value conflicts (2nd, ed) New York Macmillan Publishing Co, 1979
- Linton, Ralph** The cultural background of personality. London Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.
- MacIver, Robert M** (ed) Integrity and compromise problems of public and private conscience. New York Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1957
- Madan, G R** Western sociologists on Indian society Marx, Spencer, Weber, Durkheim and Pareto Bombay Allied Publishers, 1979
- Mansukhani, H L** Corruption and public servants New Delhi Vikas, 1979.
- Mayer, Adria C.** (ed) Culture and morality: essays in honour of Christoph Von Furer Haimendorf Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1981
- Mead, Margaret** Male and female a study of the sexes in a changing world New York: Morrow, 1949
- Minturn, L and W W Lambert** Mothers of six cultures New York: Wiley, 1962
- Mohanty, Jagannath** Indian education in emerging society New Delhi Sterling Publishers, 1982
- Morris, C** Varieties of human values Chicago University Press, 1956
- Murphy, Gardner** In the minds of men the study of human behaviour and social tensions in India New York Basic Books, 1953.
- Nagpaul, Hans** Culture, education and social welfare need for indigenous foundations, New Delhi S Chand & Co, 1980
- Naipaul, V.S.** India a wounded civilization New Delhi Vikas 1977
- Nandy, Ashis and Sudhir Kakar** Culture and personality A survey of research in psychology 1971-76, ICSSR, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1979
- Nanjundappa, D.M.** Rural-urban conundrum in Indian Planning Presidential Address, 64th Annual Conference of Indian Economic Association, Sri Venkateswara University, Andhra Pradesh, 1981
- Panikkar, K M** Hindu society at cross road. (3rd ed) Bombay Asia Publishing House, 1961
- Patwardhan, Achyut.** Basis of social and economic development in India. Deen Dayal Memorial Lectures, Delhi, February 1982
- Raghavan, V.** Ramayana tradition in Asia New Delhi, Sahitya Academy, 1981
- Roy, Ramashray** Development, conflict and integration Unpublished, 1977
- Riesman, David** The lonely crowd a study of the changing American character New Haven Yale University Press, 1960
- Ronaldshay, Lawrence John Lumley Dundas, Earl of** The heart of Aryavarta a study of the psychology of Indian unrest London Constable, 1925.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan.** Corruption: a study in political economy. New York Academic Press, 1978
- Sarkar, Jadunath.** India through the ages a survey of the growth of Indian life and thought (5th ed) Calcutta, M C Sarkar, 1960
- Singh, K K. and P E. Jacob.** Pattern of commitment In Jacob (Ed) Values and the active community New York, Free Press, 1971 pp 67-101
- Spratt, P.** Hindu culture and personality a psycho-analytic study Bombay Manaktalas, 1966.



- Thakur, Upendra** Corruption in ancient India New Delhi Abhinav, 1979
- Tiwari, Ramanand.** Unique India Bharatpur Bharat Pustak Mandir, 1980
- Varma, Vishwanath Prasad** Philosophical humanism and contemporary India Delhi Motilal Banarsidas, 1979
- Venugopal Rao, S** Dynamics of crime spatial and socio-economic aspects of crime in India. New Delhi Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1981
- Whiting, B (ed)** Six cultures studies of child rearing New York Wiley, 1963
- Whiting, J W M. and I.L. Child** Child training and personality New Haven Yale University Press, 1953.
- Wilson, Richard W. (ed)** Moral development and politics Edited by Richard W Wilson and Gordon J Schochet New York, Praeger, 1980

#### ARTICLES

- Are we ashamed of being patriots?** 'Times of India'. 24 January, 1982
- Bakshi, R** The Indian aggrieved service 'Indian Express' 21 March, 1982
- Banerji, B K.** Roots of Corruption. the role of moral movement 'Economic Times' 2 March, 1982
- Buch, Kusum.** The decline of the civil service 'Indian Express'. 22 September, 1980
- Chakraverti, P.R.** Drama of power and ethics 'Assam Tribune' 23 September, 1981
- Chitnis, Suman** Decline in public value. 'Business Standard' 14 January, 1981.
- Cho.** Corruption and favouritism have been nationalized 'Illustrated Weekly of India' 102 (27) 6 September, 1981. 26-27
- Chopra, V D** Antulay, tip of the iceberg 'Patriot' 14 September, 1981.
- Deshmukh, Nanaji.** National malaise: why are, all politicians to blame? 'Illustrated Weekly of India' 103(1) 17 January, 1982 18-19.
- Dewan Berindranath.** Wanted laws to regulate political shops. 'Democratic World' 10(39) 27 September, 1981 5-6
- Dube, S C** Problems of nation building 'Times of India' 30-31 January, 1980
- Gandhi, Jagdish.** Moral education urgent need 'M.P Chronical' 27-28 July, 1981
- Gandhi, Rajmohan** Breakdown of values individuals can save the system 'Statesman' 7 October, 1980
- Quest for decency in public life 'Indian Express' 10 October, 1981
- Roots of Corruption-II 'The Statesman' March 15, 1982
- Gyanoo Singh** Crisis in services 'Indian Nation' 31 May, 1981
- Haksar, P N** Wanted a new political ethics. 'Illustrated Weekly of India' 102(27). 6 September, 1981 33-34
- Harnai, Ashok Kumar** Roots of corruption the all pervading evil 'Economic Times' 3 March, 1982.
- Jain, Girilal** Importance of moral values public men must set high standards 'Times of India' 17 September, 1980.
- Indian state in decay no limb functioning well 'Times of India' 26 January, 1982
- Year of Mr Antulay politics of personal power. 'Times of India' 30 December, 1981.
- Jha, Akhileshwar.** Roots of campus malaise 'Times of India' 6-7 April, 1982
- John, V V.** The public servant as citizen 'Indian Journal of Political Studies' January 1978. 1-9.
- Kalelkar, Kaka.** What is wrong with our public life 'Pioneer' 15 August, 1980
- Karan Singh** Polluting young minds ancient values for modern life 'Statesman' 26 July, 1981.
- Karlekar, Hiranmay** Wages of corruption 'Indian Express' 29 September, 1981
- Khushwant Singh** Religion versus morality 'Hindustan Times' 16 June, 1981
- What we can do about corruption? 'Hindustan Times' 18 February, 1982
- Kripalani, J B** Corrupt and decadent government. 'Janata' 36(12) 10 May, 1981 5-7
- Then and now the difference 'Indian Express' 5 November, 1981.
- Kumar, U. and K K Singh** The interpersonal construct system of an Indian manager a determinant of organizational behaviour 'Management International Review' 1. Vol. 18 1978
- Mahasveta Devi** Society today the chains of untouchability 'Business Standard' 20 May, 1981.
- Malhotra, Inder.** Gift of the grab 'Times of India'. 20 December, 1981.
- Malkani, K R.** Roots of corruption: fruits of 'permit-licence quota raj' 'Statesman' 14 March, 1982
- Mande, Y A** Our national character and its validity 'U S I Journal' 3 (463). January-March 1981 85-92
- Mehta, Vrajendra Raj** On political conduct. 'Political Science Review' 19 (3) July-September, 1980. 235-54
- Mishra, Anirudha** Constraints on Indian political culture: some reflections 'Indian Anthropologist' 9 (2). December 1979 6-11
- Nandy, Raj.** Bureaucracy at work, ancient recipe for new fare 'Statesman' 22 August, 1981
- Nehru, B K** Roots of corruption the all pervading evil. 'Economic Times'. 10 January, 1982
- Nielsen, Kai** On the need to politicize political morality World hunger and moral obligation a test case 'Indian Political Science Review' 15(2) July 1981 189-198
- Nihal Singh, S.** Myths and reality 'Indian Express' 16 September 1981
- Noorani, A G** Ethics in public life. 'Commerce' 134 (3428). 12 February, 1977 140-42
- Opler, Morris** The thermal approach in cultural anthropology and its application to North Indian data. 'South-western Journal of Anthropology' Fall, 1968
- Palkhivala, Nani A.** Too many laws, too little justice 'Illustrated Weekly of India' 102 (27) 6 September, 1981 8

- Pandey, Vivekanand and D Pathak** Morality and culture. 'Darshan International' 19(3) July 1979-45-49
- Panikkar, K.N** Roots of cultural backwardness 'Mainstream' 20 (10) 7 November, 1981 15-19
- Rudra, Dipak** Waiting for tomorrow talking big as we hobble along 'Statesman' 12 October, 1980
- Sahay, S** Ethics in public life 'Statesman' 14 September, 1978
- From Pant to Zail Singh. 'Statesman': 24 December, 1981
- Santhanam, Raju.** Growing demoralization among officials 'Statesman' 1 October, 1981
- Sen, Ashok Mohan.** Bureaucracy and public interest 'Financial Express'. 5 January, 1982
- Sham Lal.** National scene a sick body politic. 'Times of India'. 5 September, 1981.
- . National scene. sneers too are no answer. 'Times of India' 26 September, 1981
- Sheth, D.L** Social basis of political crisis 'Seminar' 269 January, 1982. 28-36
- Sibte Hasan, S** Influence of culture on development of thought 'Secular Democracy' 14 (5) May 1981 28-32
- Siddhinathananda, Swami** Education for character and moral and spiritual values 'Vedanta Kesari' 66 (8) August 1979 280-83
- Singh, B P** Political culture and public administration in the national value system the Indian scenarios 'Indian Journal of Public Administration' 27(4) October-December, 1981 1043-54.
- Sinha, Jai B.P.** Power in superior subordinate relationship the Indian case. 'Journal of Social and Economic Studies' VI (II) 1978.
- Sundar Rajan, K.R** Decline of the civil service 'Tribune' 15 March, 1982
- Suri, Surindar** Corruption of political life lack of public philosophy main cause 'Times of India' 23 February, 1981
- Thapar, Romesh** Victims of harassment People's power must exert itself 'Statesman' 17 May, 1981.
- Tilak, Raghukul** Bureaucrats and their bosses 'Indian Express' 10th March, 1982
- Tyabji, Badr-ud-din.** Bright youngman crippled by politicians. 'Statesman' 1 April, 1968
- Verma, P S** Political perception of municipal bureaucrats in India a case study 'Social Science Research Journal' 3 (1) March 1978 77-90
- Waldo, Dwight.** Reflections on public morality 'Administration and Society' 6 (3) November 1974 267-82

#### SEMINAR ISSUES

- |     |                            |                |
|-----|----------------------------|----------------|
| 8   | Corruption                 | April, 1960    |
| 30  | Our democracy              | February, 1962 |
| 64  | Our changing values        | December, 1964 |
| 107 | Politics and society       | July, 1968     |
| 166 | Our paralysed universities | June, 1973     |
| 187 | Changed India              | March, 1975    |
| 192 | The system                 | August, 1975   |
| 242 | Our fractured politics     | October, 1979  |
| 259 | The politicians            | March, 1981    |
| 262 | Levels of consciousness    | June, 1981     |

#### Handbook of Organizational Design PAUL C NYSTROM AND WILLIAM H STARBUCK

This comprehensive reference work in two volumes summarizes and reinterprets research and suggests applications to the design of organizations. Scholars and professionals, from the United States, Europe, and other countries, present the contributions to organization theory of management science, political science, economics, sociology, systems engineering, psychology, history and anthropology. Volume 1 deals with the effects of environments on organizations, and discusses the adaptive capabilities of organizations such as planning, forecasting and innovation. Volume 2 focuses on processes of change within organizations, including control systems, interdepartmental relations and job design.

Rs 600

#### Contributions to South Asian Studies 2 GOPAL KRISHNA (ed)

This volume in the multidisciplinary series started in 1979 with a view to bringing together essays presenting research in Indology, history and the social sciences on South Asia, includes papers on Sanskrit literature, Ceylonese Buddhism, the Ramcaritmanas of Tulsidas, Anglo-Indian attitudes towards India and Indian civilization, the political integration of Indian Muslims, aspects of Muslim social structure and a study of the recent trends towards authoritarian rule in Bangladesh. The contributors are David Smith, Michael Carrithers, SCR Weightman, Margaret Macmillan, Gopal Krishna, Marc Gaborieau and Rahman Sobhan.

Rs 90

#### Poverty and Famines An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation AMARTYA SEN

The main focus of this study is on the causation of starvation in general and of famines in particular. The traditional analysis of famines, concentrating on food supply, is shown to be fundamentally defective — theoretically unsound, empirically inept and dangerously misleading for policy. The author uses an alternative method of analysis — the 'entitlement approach' — concentrating on ownership and exchange. Besides exploring the underlying theory, the approach is used in a number of case studies of recent famines such as the Great Bengal Famine of 1943, the Ethiopian famines of 1973 and 1974, the Bangladesh famine of 1974, to mention a few.

Rs 50

#### Indian Summer Lutyens, Baker and Imperial Delhi ROBERT GRANT IRVING

At his Coronation Durbar in 1911, amid scenes of Oriental splendor, the new King-emperor George V proclaimed the transfer of the capital of India from Calcutta to Delhi, which resulted in the creation of Imperial Delhi, and this provoked bitter disputes and controversy. The transfer of the capital itself, coupled with the choices of site and style, spiralling costs, and antagonism between Lutyens and Baker, the two main architects, conspired to delay and jeopardize the project. As a result, the city was not inaugurated until 1931, amid pageantry widely viewed as a requiem for British authority in India. Based extensively on unpublished documents, this work explores the symbolic meaning of the Indian capital and the dramatic progress of its design and construction.

Rs 150



**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj,  
New Delhi 110002

Bombay Calcutta Madras

# **the art of good management...**



**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**

Shriram seminars and courses are part of this moulding process... which involves executives in a ceaseless interchange of ideas, discussion of modern techniques, evaluation and reconsideration of policies. So that the Shriram organisation is constantly infused with fresh dynamism and our resources are utilised to the optimum.



**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**

# SYMBOLS OF RELIABILITY



## DIGEPLEX

For disturbed digestion

## IMFERON

Rapid, reliable  
replenishment of iron

## RALCRIZYME

The Total digestive

## LOMODEX

The specific flow improver

## MEDICREME

For sprains & strains

## HYALASE


The spreading factor

## TENOPHOS

The health restorative

## BENOGEN

The comprehensive  
multihaematinic




**RALLIS INDIA LIMITED PHARMACEUTICAL DIVISION**

21, D. SUKHADVALA MARG, BOMBAY-400 001



Two leading automotive manufacturers in the world have come together. Peugeot of France and Mahindra of India. A magnificent association. The famed XDP 4.90 diesel engine is now being manufactured by Mahindra.

This is the first time that this fuel-efficient and noise-free engine will be manufactured outside of France. To power Mahindra vehicles that span the length and breadth of India.



Running reminders of ruggedness and reliability. Nor do they stop there.

In 21 countries round the globe, Mahindra vehicles are proving their worth. Beyond a doubt. Proudly putting India on the world map of efficient, dependable transport.

**Mahindra and Mahindra Limited**  
Gateway Building, Apollo Bunder  
Bombay 400 039, India.



**ATTENTION STEEL MILLS  
&  
FOUNDRIES  
EXPORTERS OF WORLD FAMOUS  
SANDUR MANGANESE ORE  
OFFER  
EX-STOCK  
VERY LOW PHOS. PIG IRON  
AND  
LOW ALUMINIUM FERROSILICON  
PRODUCED IN THEIR PLANT AT  
VYASANKERE**

*Please Contact*

**THE SANDUR  
MANGANESE & IRON  
ORES LIMITED**

**"LOHADRI BHAVAN"**

Yeshwant Nagar-583124  
Via Sandur, Bellary Dt  
Karnataka INDIA

*Cable* SMIORE, SANDUR (INDIA)  
*Telephone* SANDUR 33, 61, 91  
*Telex* BANGALORE 427  
Bangalore 32175 28262

**MUKAND  
IS  
STEEL**

**MUKAND IRON & STEEL WORKS LTD.**

*Registered Office*

Lal Bahadur Shastri Marg  
Kurla, Bombay 400 070.

## The Bombay Dyeing Star Celebrity



Bombay Dyeing Menswear  
A superb range of polyester/  
cotton shirtings 50/50, 67/33,  
80/20 and 100% polyester  
prints, polyester denims and  
textured suitings.

And now, introducing  
a new range of  
**POLYESTER  
WOOL SUITINGS**

**KAPITAN**  
POLYESTER SHIRTINGS


**WADRENE**  
POLYESTER SUITINGS

# BOMBAY DYEING

U-BDM-32

TEXTILES, SUGAR,  
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS,  
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,  
VINASPAT, PVC, RAYON TYRE CORD,  
FERTILIZERS,  
ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS,  
IRON CASTINGS


**IN THE  
SERVICE OF  
THE NATION**



**DCM** THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD. DELHI

**Your blood. This minute,  
someone is dying for want of it.**

Be a Blood Donor.  
Give someone a new  
lease of life.



**Jyoti Ltd.** Vadodara  
Shaping technologies for a better life — your life.

everest/82/JY/227



# **the art of good management...**



**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**

**Shriram seminars and courses are part of  
this moulding process .. which involves  
executives in a ceaseless interchange of  
ideas, discussion of modern techniques,  
evaluation and reconsideration of policies.  
So that the Shriram organisation is const-  
antly infused with fresh dynamism . and  
our resources are utilised to the optimum.**




**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**


# Elegant looks



# Versatile features




Attractive Sleek Two-toned USHA Streamlined—the sewing machine that outclasses any other in its price range With features that others can't match And a 5-year guarantee too




Patch Darning for easy darning and quick adjustment of pressure on cloth



3-position drop feed for easy adjustment of feed-dog position.



Dial-type stitch regulator with lever for forward and reverse stitch control and locking arrangement.



Thread tension adjuster for regulating poor thread tension.

**USHA** Streamlined feature for feature a better machine

# ASP POISED FOR STAGE-II EXPANSION

With the successful commissioning of Stage-I expansion facilities, the Alloy Steels Plant, Durgapur is now going ahead with the Stage-II expansion

DASTURCO has been fully involved in the planning and engineering of ASP since its inception. The firm provided the full range of consultancy services—design and engineering, procurement and inspection, construction supervision and related

services—for the initial plant with a capacity of 100,000 tons/year. DASTURCO was also the engineering consultant for ASP's Stage-I expansion which has just been completed. With the installation of

additional steelmaking and conditioning facilities, ASP is able to utilise to a greater extent the in-built capacity of its existing blooming and billet mills, while raising the plant capacity to 160,000 tons/year. And now, DASTURCO has been entrusted with the work on Stage-II expansion which will further augment the capacity to 260,000 tons/year. Newer technologies will be adopted—vacuum refining facilities for improving product quality and productivity, and continuous casting for slabs and blooms in stainless steel and other alloy steel grades.




*Forge Shop 2000-ton press in operation*



*Steelmelt Shop 1 First tap of steel from the 40-ton Electric Arc Furnace (January 1965)*



*Stage-I Expansion New 50-ton Arc Furnace*



*Billet Mill 650 mm size, commissioned in 1967*



*Alloy Steels Plant Durgapur Plant general view*


**DASTURCO**  
Total Engineering—  
Concept to Completion

**M. N. DASTUR & COMPANY (P) LIMITED**  
CONSULTING ENGINEERS  
CALCUTTA

J MND-40A

---

# PRODUCT QUALITY



Satyadev Chemicals are widely used in the processing of Colour and Black and white Motion Picture Films, and in the Textile, Jute, Leather and Chemical Manufacturing Industries. Also in the manufacture of Paints, Pharmaceuticals, Dyestuffs, Polymers

Our customers include some of the world's leading manufacturing and trading concerns. The secret of this world-wide acceptance lies in our policy of product quality—the only sacred cow in our fast developing organisation.



**SATYADEV CHEMICALS LIMITED**

Pratapnagar Road, VADODARA, 390 004, India



## Dennis Lillee's aluminium bat upsets test match at Melbourne.

The English captain protested. "It's not cricket", the purists said. But the fact is that aluminium is being used, more and more, for things we had never imagined. And in India, Indian Aluminium has been the catalyst of this change.

The first to embark on aluminium production in India, Indal has introduced almost the entire range of alloys in which

rolled and extruded aluminium products are made in this country. In its constant drive towards diversification, Indal has pioneered the use of aluminium in aircraft, currency, power transmission, irrigation tubing, transportation, packaging, housing, and a host of other applications.

Indal pioneering. It's not cricket. But it's progress.



**Indian Aluminium Company, Limited**  
**Anything's possible**

HTC-JAL-4073

# seminar

THE MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI

journal which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every  
side of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single  
problem is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions  
opinions expressed have ranged from Janata to Congress, from  
Urvodaya to Communist to Independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it  
has been possible to answer a real need of today, to give  
the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people  
arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity  
facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture.

publisher/ROMESH THAPAR

managing editor/RAJ THAPAR

production/TEJBIR SINGH

circulation/C.B. KUMAR

Published from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1 Telephone 46534 Cable Address Seminar New Delhi. Single copy, Rs  
pence; \$ 1.50 Yearly Rs 40, £ 7, \$ 16, Three yearly, Rs 100. £ 20, \$ 40 Reproduction of material prohibited unless permitted

## EXT MONTH : FUTURE OF POLITICS

# 277

## SEARCHING FOR ANSWERS

a symposium of  
some approaches to  
priority problems

symposium participants

### THE PROBLEM

A short statement of  
the issues involved

### CRUMBLING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Romesh Thapar, Editor, 'Seminar'

### ACADEMICIANS AND CREDIBILITY

Pratap Chandra, Reader in Philosophy,  
University of Saugar, Saugar

### ASIA'S DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Ramlal Parikh, Director, Peace Research  
Centre, Gujarat Vidyapith, Ahmedabad

### TRADITIONIZING MODERNITY

Attila Agh, a scholar from Hungary

### THE LEARNING CAPACITY

Soedjatmoko, Rector, United  
Nations University, Tokyo

### GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FUND

Masaki Nakajima, Chairman of the Board,  
Mitsubishi Research Institute, Tokyo

### BOOKS

Reviewed by Shahida Lateef, Namita Sinha, M.N. Ashish  
Ganju and Ashish Lall

### COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury Associates

# The problem

**THERE** is a breed of policy-makers which imagines that the problems confronting governments today can be tackled by marginal adjustments of approach. While this may be true at a certain level of activity, it is certainly not valid where the infrastructures have broken down. Such a breakdown has to be recognised. It is not confined to this or that society. It is global, although the areas of breakdown vary. The rigid, or unthinking attitude which refuses to see the need for a restructuring of the system, or a re-alignment of certain basic features, has the effect of multiplying the processes of collapse. The effort to revise our assessments and conclusions has to be continuous, even obsessive, if we are to cope with the escalation in numbers, in needs, in impatience and in



alienation. The failure in this context is marked, despite the stirrings of a new consciousness in politics, in economics, in science and technology, and in a wide variety of social perspectives. Developing societies like ours have to take even more serious note of these new realities, for only then can we hope to bridge the gulfs imposed by the exploitations of colonialism, by the profit orientation of multi-national corporations, and the leap effects of science and technology which have placed the industrialised nations of the North decades ahead of the lands in the South. Indeed, the search for answers calls for the highest priorities. The approaches are many. It is for us to find the creative conjunctions.

# Crumbling political institutions

ROMESH THAPAR

THE most visible crisis of our times is the erosion of the democratic frameworks in which so many societies live and the rise of a desperate acceptance of authoritarian remedies. It is as if our world is returning to the beserk twenties, the decade after World War I when fascism found roots in Europe. The sickness is more profound today. I am not speaking of pockets of authoritarianism, but of a widespread despair, and a collapse of democratic commitments.

The terrible aberrations of the twenties and thirties will probably continue to be seen as a response to the authoritarianism of Communist

practise — at least, until such time as we probe deeper and locate the cause of the aberrations in the crisis of capitalist growth and the rise of challenges for which there were no meaningful responses. The deterioration in the human condition — and the institutions designed to process the corrections — continued into the years following World War II. We were reluctant to go below the glossy surface of consumerism textured with care on oil available at one dollar a barrel. Now, the human and institutional collapse is general.

In our times, politics intrudes at every level. Mounting numbers,

impossible to contain within the existing structures of democratic life, naturally burst their bounds raising demands which cannot be met. Institutions, designed in the days of feudal endeavour, continue to yearn for quality when an unreal equality is the demand. No one has addressed the problems of this equality demand, but certainly quality is an early victim of these problems and its death begins rapidly to damage the framework of democratic leadership and management. Whether it is at school or university, those training grounds for the future, or in radio or television which unthinkingly programme the new masses, or in the overburdened departments of governance which should serve rather than oppress, or in political parties and institutions which become the crowded points of manipulated factions and ambitions, or in the election procedures which are overwhelmed by the play of money, often mafia money, the strain and tension is now quite visible — and so is the spreading breakdown.

One of the critical manifestations of this crisis today is the reluctance among the best educated and the most thoughtful to get involved in the increasingly corrupt manipulations of politics and the growing role of mafia money. This is particularly true of situations in the developing world where there are very fragile infrastructures to insulate the institutions of democratic life from those influences which create extra-constitutional centres of power — including foreign influences which promote such illegitimate exercise of power. The politician, wherever he or she be, is no longer the tribune of the people, the articulator of programmes and commitments, but a 'front' for some shadowy, sleazy and unhealthy lobby or interest, domestic or international. The fact is that the 'expense' of what is described as politics has made him so.

All over our part of the world, the art of politics is being surrendered to the nominees of businessmen who have an ample supply of black money, or of smugglers whose net-

works of influence and patronage are extensive or of those whose links with international sources of exploitation are intimate. The nominees are invariably the local toughs, uneducated hoodlums who are able to organise 'activities', and plain gangsters capable of linking fear to accountability. If dynasties hold the stage, they are merely the necessary decoration of respectability so anxiously sought by the new operators of political life. As we see it, these patterns are more sophisticated in more affluent situations. The cushion of make-belief prosperity and security makes this possible, even though the cushion is wearing thin as oil prices and armament budgets take the deceptive stuffing out of it, and as the science of economics is found increasingly at odds with actual economic phenomena.

Parallel to the decline in the quality of political leadership and expertise is the increasing complexity of the inter-related tasks of governance. Until now, we have assumed that the perspective is one of providing the basis of productivity and its more just distribution. Well, the global *problematique* is quite different now. We have to plan for population explosions never dreamt of before, for unprecedented and massive transfers of people across cultures and politics, for a global decline in growth rates, for profound and permanent inequalities between continents, and the overwhelming desire and demand to humanise development and growth. The populist rhetoric of today, at national and international level, which seeks to confront the challenges that are forming, is a reflection of a bankruptcy in concepts and ideas. It is also an attempt to mislead people into believing that the corrections and remedies are really quite simple and will soon be forthcoming. This is very far from the truth.

Leadership, and the institutions which support it, are called upon today to perform a variety of awesome tasks, many of them unpopular. It is thoroughly short-sighted to suggest that societies are beginning increasingly to run on their own momentums and expectations. Perhaps, the extent to which they do so

determines the level of confusion and anarchy that is released. Increasingly, the guiding role of leadership is to steer individualised questing towards a more collective assertion which has social sanctions. The stress on a decentralised polity, the autonomy of institutions, the warnings against monolithicism and the centralisation of power and patronage, are all designed to strengthen a more just and humane underpinning for governance. The implications of such an approach are wide-ranging.

To begin with, it is of paramount importance that the most intelligent and thinking elements of the population be persuaded to see political activity as a creative act. This will not happen until the political process is insulated from the manoeuvrings of money. So frightening has this aspect of public life become that only the mobsters linked to gangster funds are able to play at leaders. These peculiarities are not confined to our countries in the South, but are rooted inspirationally in the experience of the northern hemisphere. Our institutional weaknesses make us more permanent victims of this particular aberration.

The demand is already arising in our countries for a fund that underwrites the costs of democratic living — elections, referendums, supervisions, investigations and corrections. It is rightly believed that these expenses would be marginal compared to the enormity of the corruption now tolerated. But, as the debate on such a fund gets under way, a wide range of accepted democratic practice comes under question-marks. The distortions inherent in direct elections and expanding constituencies, the disarray of parties based increasingly on sectional and parochial interests, the splintered results and opportunist coalitions, and the mystique of electioneering (a very corrupting activity, if analysed) which fertilises the ambitions of those who manipulate the media and communication networks, are some of the manifestations of the *malaise*. In this connection we should remember that the era of political systems mediated through territorially grounded units — parties, governments — is over and

there is need for an alternative political and socio-economic model.

Systems of indirect elections will have to be carefully studied, even though the idea used to be anathema to democrats not so long ago. In the process of its adoption and elaboration, the belief prevails that it may be possible to nurture talent at the grassroots and separate parties from sectional or communal interest, making for greater social coherence. It is even possible that as a result voting may focus more on issues rather than personalities — and finally on carefully thought out perspectives which alone can salvage us globally. This would depend largely on institutions able to reflect the common aspirations at various levels and to project them into the equations of power and implementation.

A salvage operation on this scale, and with the avowed purpose of hammering into shape an effective alternative to authoritarianism, would require at another level a parallel effort to curb the propensity of governments to expand their dreary and deadening presence into almost every area of life. This can be done by an institutional framework which is purged of its bureaucratic orientations and is responsive to the demands of citizens. It is significant that at the moment much of the controversy on this matter is around simplistic notions of public and private enterprise. We need to go deeper into the complex organisational challenges involved in trimming the activity of the State apparatus.

The breaking of monolithic administrative structures, the introduction of smaller, competing units, the emphasis on autonomous working, and decentralisation seen together with the ramified impact of micro-electronics, should spark a profound change. However, it will not develop the dimensions we seek unless perspectives are cleared well in time. Government must be confined to those tasks which cannot be performed in any other way, but the 'liberated' area, as it were, must pass to systems which are carefully insulated from private mafia manipulation and unscrupulous profiteering. A failure here could reverse the

healthy trends now visible. This is in particular reference to the developing lands of South Asia where governance is breaking down under the pressure of numbers and private enterprise imagines it can stage a triumphant return.

The moment we begin seriously to probe these possibilities and potentialities, we enter an extraordinarily rich field of investigation — self-reliance, individual and collective, reflected in the sensitive organisation of the productive base of society and in the non-governmental institutional infrastructure. Self-reliance has always been linked to national aspirations. Seldom has it been seen as the inner strength of individuals and groups. A commitment of this quality, if properly researched and integrated with other developmental perspectives, could humanise a great many ideas and concepts.

Throughout the lands of Asia, a centuries-old self-reliance has preserved the people from the neglect of governments and their brutalisation. In today's situation, ironically, it is very often the actual thrust and priorities of growth programmes that disrupt this self-reliance, making the people dependent on distant, often unresponsive, authority. There are vital inputs which traditional societies cannot do without, but an unthinking application can be destructive. We need to make possible extensive exercises on humanised self-reliance even as science and technology leaps forward to its own horizons of push-button self-reliance. In this effort will be preserved the creative continuities which we cannot do without, wherever we belong, north or south, east or west.

Unless the crumbling of political institutions is viewed as the climactic crisis of the political, economic and social systems which support our civilisation, we will not be able to organise ourselves ideologically to halt the drift to authoritarian 'remedies' and the totalitarian State. It is not necessary to elaborate on this. There are too many live scenarios available to us — and against the awesome background of armament drives which now consume

about 700 billion dollars a year of resources that humanity needs for its own survival in dignity. To fiddle marginally with reform systems alone is to become irrelevant. This realisation is now very much a part of the thinking apparatus of those concerned with the future in Asia.

In this connection, it is significant that wherever the new consciousness expresses itself, it cuts across rigid ideologies, opposing party lines and competitive institutions. The Keynesian, the Marxist-Leninist, the Trotskyite, the Anarchist and the Nihilist all appear incapable of coping with the enormity of the challenge. Hence, the sad search for miracle-men, Messiahs. What is, in fact, the imperative need of the hour is to humanise humanity's efforts and the systems designed to support these efforts. It is here that the failure is stark in all societies, whatever their pretensions. And it is here that we have to strike.

Naturally, the effort must begin to evolve a leadership, essentially collective, which will have the courage to experiment with new democratic forms. May be, the new systems will be tried out in areas where there are no inhibitions about the trying out of experimental ideas. Indeed, those who continue to parrot their support to the old structures of leadership are becoming the caretakers, if not the undertakers, of an unsatisfactory, non working *status quo*. If we are to move in the direction of this coordinated, collective leadership, composed of persons who have graduated from sustained work among the people, we will have to carry out extensive structural changes in our political systems. Variations in solution finding will be necessary and healthy. Let us not seek the single perfect model.

The crumbling of political institutions can be halted if we seek qualitative changes. Anything less is tantamount to betraying the people and handing them over to the insecurities and uncertainties of charismatic operations which are the opposite of political institutions.

# Academics and credibility

PRATAP CHANDRA

CONVERSION of a concept into a symbol is not always or necessarily a welcome development. True, symbols enthuse and inspire and have an emotive appeal and content. But they also bar discussion and hinder dispassionate and cool analysis. Life, however, needs rationality and emotion in equal measure and sometimes it becomes necessary to subject even the most moving symbol to rational scrutiny.

University autonomy or academic freedom is a case in point. An unexceptionable and valuable concept, it has undergone an unbelievable metamorphosis in India. Yet, those who ought to have known better remained so preoccupied with its symbolic aspect or incarnation that they took no notice. Though we academicians have by and large managed to hoodwink the people, it is undeniable that university autonomy does not connote today what it did some decades ago. It is no longer a device to safeguard higher academic values.

Most Indian academicians today are, perhaps, not even aware of such values, much less do they believe in them. Autonomy is being used purely as a kind of paper curtain to hide what is going on in the colleges and universities, thereby escaping social accountability. Appeal to autonomy in most cases is just another way of telling society that though you foot the bill, you have no right to ask what we do with your money. Universities have, or are trying to, become Lanka like citadels. One cannot speak out the truth without first opting for the role of Vibhishana! However, since much more than the self-interest of a highly vocal and active group is at stake, one should not mind being branded a modern-day Vibhishana.

The barren and sterile exercise of prescribing cures without bothering about the real roots of the malady has gone on for a little too long. It is time that the gravity of the illness be realised and something done before it becomes too late. Cancer cells in an organism can do no good to it, no matter whether there is awareness of their presence or not. Our wilful refusal to face the facts or a pathological inability to see through the game of certain vested interests is not likely to forestall or wish away the very real danger threatening the country's future.

There is no need to expend too many words to establish that higher education in our country is in the throes of a crisis of epic proportions. The vehicle is rolling down a sharp incline and one does not know how, when and where the journey will end. Though honourable exceptions will always be there, the fact remains that there is an all round decline not only in the quality and standard of every activity which can be called academic but also in the character and mettle of both students and academicians.

Education — meaning somehow completing the class-room attendance, appearing at examination and securing a degree — has become a kind of war with no holds barred. Stress is not on acquisition of knowledge or skills but on success in examinations. Using unfair and undesirable means is not bad, only getting caught is! Punishment meted out to the few unlucky delinquents, who are really not even a fraction of the total, does not seem to deter any one. There is in fact a collapse of both authority and values.

Worst of all, the entire system has lost its credibility in the eyes of a very large section of the student community. If one could elicit frank

and honest responses, one would be astonished to see how few students really believe that higher education is anything but a cruel joke and a game of make believe. Not many students feel any pride in belonging to their alma mater. Their alienation from the system is near-complete. It is bad enough that the job requirements and also, perhaps, social norms require them to waste so much time in the precincts of their institutions. Must they also rejoice in this silly bondage?

**W**hat has brought about this horrendous situation? Is it political interference or the bleak future job-prospects? Is the burgeoning amorality responsible for it or the sudden induction of capitalistic values? Given the will and the current mood of the academicians and educational administrators, one could merrily go on looking for as well as finding such facile and readymade 'explanations'. One could even aver that such crises are inevitable whenever a tradition-bound society modernises and that instead of feeling sorry for it we should rejoice at this sure evidence of a movement in the right direction. All one needs to take recourse to in such clever theorising is an utter freedom from a sense of responsibility and, perhaps, an equally astounding inability to read the writing on the wall.

The answer to the question, what *really* ails our higher education? is not at all difficult provided one is not allergic to facts. The root of the malady is, and has been for sometime now, a decline in, some would say a total eclipse of, the moral authority of the academicians. Holding politico-bureaucratic interference or spreading amorality alone responsible for this situation would be to adopt a wholly non-dialectical approach. It is true that politicians and bureaucrats have time and again come to the rescue of rowdy elements or have indulged in appeasement where the cause of education demanded relentlessness. But it is the teachers who did their bidding, co-operated with them and often even exceeded their brief to please them.

Academicians are no less responsible for the lamentable state that higher education is in. If anything,

they are more to blame. Much has been written and spoken about on the share of non-academicians in the decline of education. I wish to confine myself to what we academicians have been contributing to the general lowering of the quality of academic life. We have succeeded in befooling all people for some time and perhaps will be able to befool some people for all the time. But don't let us beguile ourselves into hoping that we will be able to befool everyone for all time. We have been able to hide behind the not so-thick paper curtain of university autonomy so long not because the Indian people have been tolerant or forgiving but only because they have been apathetic. But the realisation of what our doings imply for the future of the country is slowly but surely dawning. The day is not far off when we will be exposed to the glare of very adverse publicity. Would it not be better if we took rectification measures before this happened and acted as genuine academicians and intellectuals ought to?

I wish to concern myself with only two questions. How has the academic community helped in the creation of this unhealthy situation, and what can be done at this late stage to stem the rot or at least to prevent its spread at a faster pace.

## I

**B**oth as a concept and as a symbol, university autonomy is a last century import from the West, part of the package called 'modern higher education'. Ancient and even medieval India knew neither of a degree-oriented educational system nor of intellectual straitjackets, (witness the vast multitude of schools of thought and religions). The concept of university autonomy had definite historical origins in the West which are well-known and need not detain us. The first batch of senior academicians and educational administrators came from England and were naturally brought up in an atmosphere which set great store by this autonomy. Thanks to them, it soon became axiomatic in India also that academicians were entitled to a kind of freedom and autonomy not allowed to any other section of society. The situation has

not changed in the intervening years.

**A**cademic freedom is undoubtedly a pre-requisite for the healthy growth of genuine academic life. Those working under State control cannot help feeling regimented. They will have no option but to kowtow to the powers that be, to say what the rulers want to hear and generally to subserve their interest. Their allegiance will be to the mundane and not to truth and objectivity. However, the granting of such a special status cannot, and indeed should not, be without a certain *quid pro quo*. A particular type of mentality and set of values are expected in those considered rightful claimants to this special status. Society frees them from accountability only because it believes that their lives will always remain irreproachable. As a matter of fact, it reposes its trust in its academics and experts that a healthy disregard for worldly success and creature comforts, a disinclination to compromise on principles and an ability to speak out the truth however bitter, will always characterise their behaviour.

Those who laid the foundations of our academic world might have fulfilled all these conditions. There is no way of finding out for sure. But one could say with full responsibility that with the proliferation of universities and colleges, especially since Independence, a new breed of academicians has taken birth and, most regrettably, a disconcertingly large number of our present-day academicians belong to it. This breed teaches and performs other academic functions, not because it is its vocation but because it failed to get any other equally remunerative job. One should not feel surprised that these academicians are not cast in the mould of those for whom academic freedom was originally intended, though this does not deter them from demanding and also receiving the same kind of public esteem. Any curtailing of university autonomy continues to cause concern to the intelligentsia in general.

We come now to the crux of the matter. What is being done with the special status that society has

bestowed upon its academicians? Are they engaged in bold adventures of ideas, making new discoveries, widening the frontiers of knowledge? Not by a long shot. The bulk of our academicians are too busy feathering their own nests to pay attention to these and similar tasks. They worry far more about securing their positions, about making money somehow or the other and about promotions than about any academic matter. A substantial number of university and college teachers are basically amoral, worldly-success-oriented and a great many are also unconcerned with the consequences of their actions. It is none of their business what happens to an entire generation. Since they believe they are in a position to make or mar careers, they think it is their right to demand obeisance from all the seekers of their 'favours'. Nepotism, favouritism and double standards are rules rather than exceptions these days.

**I**t can be, and has often been, said that academicians cannot outgrow the milieu that produced them. If the whole of society is amoral and worldly-success-oriented, how can the teachers be otherwise? The hollowness of this argument will become plain the moment one realises that every forward-looking society has been worldly-success-oriented, including those which gave birth to the concept of academic freedom and spawned communities of genuine academicians. Academicians are the conscience-keepers of society, the guardians of its norms and all that entitles it to be called civilised. They simply cannot be allowed to think and act like other sections of the society if that society has not already written itself off.

Contrariwise, if they do honestly believe that they have a right to the same kind of acquisitive mentality which characterises other individuals, then they should stop making claims to a special status. At the moment, they are trying, not without considerable success, to have the best of both worlds. Can even the cleverest sophist find high-sounding justifications for this? This new breed of academicians appears to be having a field day in three areas of academic activity and playing

havoc with each one of them as well as higher education in general. These are teaching and examinations, research and appointments and promotions.

Right from the selection of text books and distribution of teaching assignments, one can observe certain special tactics at work. These go on to appointment of examiners, moderators, other experts and even to the actual conduct of examinations. In a fairly large number of cases, favourite writers (mostly compilers, really), publishers and teachers in other institutions appear to be pre-selected. They are obliged year after year in all possible ways, the quality of their work or product being of no consequence.

This would have been bad enough. The real pollution of academic life begins when even students are similarly pre-selected on extra-academic grounds. Relationship with the academic bosses seems to count for much more than is realised outside the charmed circle. Add to this the open secret that very few senior teachers in residential universities are chary of maintaining their personal 'storm-troopers' — gangs of less than desirable boys to be used in times of need. Now you have a rough idea of the proportion of the specially favoured ones among the total number of students. These chosen few are helped in every way. Not only special tuition and other facilities are provided, in some cases papers are leaked out, examiners are influenced, special leniency is shown during invigilation and all other measures are taken to ensure that they land up with a high percentage, whatever their abilities or inclinations.

**A**ll of this goes on while the rest of the students look on. Yet, it is expected that this 'disprivileged' group, numerically much larger than the other, would go on respecting the teachers who indulge in such practices and believing that the examinations are a fair indicator of one's true abilities. As a matter of fact, if somehow this favouritism in teaching and examinations could be done away with, credibility would return to the system to a substantial extent. Examination malpractices

indulged in by both the groups, the favoured and the others, would also end.

Today this is just not possible, whatever measures the administrators may take. Use of force can never make up for the loss of moral authority and credibility. So long as some favoured students are allowed to take recourse to unhealthy practices, others can never be expected to tread the narrow and straight path.

**T**he quality of research in the universities has been steadily deteriorating over the last few decades. The requirement of a doctorate for teaching jobs has given it a further downward push. In the first place, not all those who join research are really academically-oriented, a fair proportion being those who secure a high percentage at the master's level through favours. The number of scholarships and fellowships being offered today lure many to research who would not have otherwise opted for it.

Favouritism is equally rampant at the research level. One scarcely hears of a thesis being rejected for its poor quality these days. In fact, it is not the candidate but his or her research guide who is judged by his friends and compères. Research in all disciplines is largely repetitive and often one gets away without even looking up the primary sources. All this has been made possible only with the active connivance of senior and middle-level academicians. They care more for their extra-academic objectives than for the academic ones.

When the newspapers published some time ago that the 'experts' chose the least qualified candidate for a particular job at Bhopal, many people thought that it was something out of the ordinary. The Chancellor ordered a review and probably something may come out of it. Yet, those who know will testify that this was far from being an isolated case. More often than not, wholly extraneous considerations guide the choice of candidates. Very few senior academics, who serve as experts, feel any compunction in compromising in the matter of

quality. The same favoured boys and girls who start with an initial advantage go on to produce research works and eventually become claimants for academic positions. The same academicians who indulged in favouritism at one stage go on repeating it at every stage. A whole new generation of academically poor and irresponsible teachers is gradually taking over most of the north Indian universities.

This is not all. Every discipline has its own establishment. Only those belonging to it can look forward to a bright future. One needs godfathers in the teaching profession more than in several others. Committees and panels of the UGC and the councils are also manned by people belonging to the same establishment, with predictable results.

There has been no dearth of committees and commissions to enquire into the decline of the country's academic life. How many of them, if any, ever bothered themselves with this burgeoning crisis of credibility? How many of them ever even remotely suggested that the academic community, particularly its senior members, may be responsible for pulling down higher education to where it is today? But, then, how could one expect them to do so when the same senior academicians served on those committees and commissions? The scenario is gloomy. The self-perpetuating system of spoils will go on. Feeble voices like the present one will continue to be ignored. Some day the masses will wake up and perhaps only then will there be any change.

## II

At the outset, one may quietly agree that prescribing remedies for a malady of these proportions will not be easy, if at all possible. Appeals to the inner voice, the conscience, are not likely to bear any fruit since the inner voice has been smothered by most of us. We think, talk and act, in most cases, making a clear distinction between 'we' and 'they'. Double standards are part of our second nature. What we condemn in strong terms when it relates to others we treat as the most natural and correct thing to do in our own cases. There is really

no need to prolong this tale of woe. Most of us are well aware of what is going on, though all of us may not like to play Vibhishana.

Could these malpractices proliferate in the glare of broad daylight? Should one not start seriously rethinking on adapting university autonomy to the peculiarly Indian conditions? The Indian psyche, for reasons into which we cannot go here, has all along fostered a kind of split personality. It has never been necessary to profess and act in the same way. The number of ancient Indian sages and intellectuals whose personal life could not stand any scrutiny is legion. Perhaps we are carrying on the same tradition while history has imposed on us a concept and a symbol which made sense in a wholly alien culture.

One could suggest a small beginning towards rectification here. I am convinced that even the most audacious of our academic godfathers would think twice before practising his dubious art if he knew that he was being watched, not only by his comperes but by people in general, by the news-gathering community and others. Ways should be found to open up the entire system, to subject it to public scrutiny continuously. This in no way curtails or affects autonomy. The courses of study would be formulated by academicians, who would also choose the texts, appoint the examiners, evaluate the answer-books, conduct viva-voce tests and carry on all other functions. The only difference would be this: Proceedings of all the academic bodies would be made available to whosoever wanted to go into them so that one could fix individual responsibility. If there were any doubt about the soundness of any particular decision, no one should be allowed to hide behind the anonymity of a committee-decision.

Secondly, all the answer-books would be returned to the candidates or, better still, placed in the library, so that everyone might know what kind of answer in a particular case fetched what percentage of marks. This would help in two ways. The academicians who manage to 'value' thousands of answer-books every

year and make a pile will be deterred, since no one can do justice to every answer-book in this kind of situation. Those who award marks to their favourites or under influence or under-value those they do not like will also have to be wary if the valued answer-books become public property.

Thirdly, all the viva-voce tests would be conducted in public, before everyone. It is difficult to believe that anyone except a genuine researcher would be able to defend a thesis in these conditions. Showing favours would also become difficult to a candidate who performs miserably in this kind of a viva.

Lastly, all the proceedings of a selection committee too would be made public. Bio-data of all the candidates who apply could be mimeographed and supplied to whosoever wanted to go through them. In case the selection committee and the expert chose to ignore better qualified candidates in favour of one not so well-qualified, they would be obliged to put down their justification in writing.

If there were nothing underhand in what they did and they were wholly above-board, the members of selection committee would have no objection to this. After all, one should not forget for a moment that the teacher to be selected would be paid out of public funds, as so the committee-members. The public has a moral right to know what is being done with the funds provided by it. We academics have already completely forfeited our claims to be treated as the holiest of the holies. It is time that, in the larger interests of the nation and society, we stop posing as such and allow academic life to limp back to normalcy.

I have no doubt at all that my suggestions would raise a storm if pursued seriously by someone who mattered. Too many well-entrenched vested interests are likely to be hurt, and a hue and cry from them will be both understandable and even justifiable. However, public apathy in this vital sphere of nation-building activity should be deplored and the process of re-awakening be hastened.



# Asia's demographic profile

RAMLAL PARIKH

THE unfolding of the ultimate demographic profile of the stabilisation of world population in 2110 provides an unquestionable evidence on areas of the world which will determine the future of mankind. The UNFPA (United Nations Family Planning Association) projection of a world of 10.5 billion in 2110 has brought out an unequivocal revelation that if the world's wealth remains the same as today, then the developing world will eventually have 90% of the world's people and 20% of the world's wealth (The state of world population, 1981)

The population of 'developed nations' (hardly 22 nations) will decline from 24% in 1980 to just 13% of the global population at the point of the projected global stabilisation in 2110 or even earlier, while Asia's population will still constitute nearly 60% of the global population.

The focus of the new world therefore has to centre in Asia which will have the size of the current global population by the end of the next century. As of today, Asia constitutes nearly 58% of the current world population (37% in India and China). One must therefore clearly recognise that the quality of life of

mankind would largely depend on how and at what pace the basic human needs of families are fulfilled (at least food, health, education, employment, housing).

Rarely does a fund disbursing body assume such great dimensions as UNFPA has acquired by its distinct and unique role in removing the isolation of programmes of population control from the development process and preventing it from becoming a mere bio-medical programme or just a demographic movement. As stated in the Tokyo Declaration of March 1978, the interest of peace and humanity requires urgent improvement in the quality of life for families in the developing countries, giving due attention both to rural areas and to the urban disadvantaged poor. Failure to meet these basic human needs would plunge the world into economic, political and social chaos.

Following the Tokyo Declaration which recognises the integral relationship of population with peace as well as development, the first ever world conference of parliamentarians at Colombo (Sri Lanka) in August 1979 elaborated this inherent relationship between both components of manageable size — population and basic human needs. The conference 'reaffirmed that the principal aim of social, economic and cultural development of which population goals and policies are integral parts, is to improve levels of living

\* Paper presented at the First Asian Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development at Beijing, October 1981

and enrich the quality of life of the people.'

The Colombo Declaration did not stop at this generalisation but concretely specified the implications of a population explosion in the context of developing countries, in terms of (i) finding 800 million additional jobs between now and the end of the century, (ii) social unrest caused by the accumulation of human fear and hopelessness, (iii) human needs outstripping the productive capacity, (iv) a delay of just one generation in bringing the world population to a stable level resulting in the addition of approximately 3000 million persons.

It further emphasized (i) development directed to social justice, (ii) discouraging migration from rural to urban areas, (iii) emphasis on individual self-reliance, social awareness and political consciousness, (iv) promotion of status of women, (v) choice of technology that suits local needs, (vi) public education as a principal instrument of development and feed-back, (vii) reduction in child mortality, (viii) easy access to family planning services to meet diverse social, cultural and economic settings (sequence very important), (ix) training of adequate paramedical field staff, (x) higher age of marriage, (xi) greater participation of youth and voluntary agencies, 36% (or 1500 million persons of world population) are estimated to be under 15 years of age (Approximately 42% in Asia, despite 116 per thousand live birth rate against a global average of 103 per thousand. This is only 22 per thousand in western Europe and only 16 per thousand in North America)

**I**t is again a singular contribution of UNFPA in fostering the role of political functionaries in the twin problems of population and development with particular reference to elected legislators — Members of Parliament, State legislatures, local government, village councils (panchayat) etc. This is an unqualified recognition of the proven experience of three decades of the development process in developing countries. It is now widely accepted that the

political will of the governments requires the instrumentality of people's representatives to express it rather than the bureaucratic administrative mechanism which so far, in all democratic societies, dominates and controls the implementation of development programmes

**W**hile there are some very enlightened persons in the bureaucracy as well, the system of bureaucracy as such does not seem to be conducive to the rapid development of basic human needs. Political functionaries can be transformed into a mode of effective communication with people at the grass roots level and provide the real feed-back that is glaringly lacking with the development administrators. This is a new and most significant venture in the history of development programmes. It hardly needs to be established that for making population growth commensurate to a life of human dignity it must be considered a developmental programme of more enduring nature. The real linkage will be possible through this massive agency of political functionaries of all shades and opinions.

A people's movement of restraining population cannot be fostered by a government administration. It should be initiated and forged by the political functionaries as representatives and leaders of people at the bottom of the political systems. Mahatma Gandhi never agreed with a mere parliamentary role or a mere partisan role for politicians. He wanted every politician to be required to do some constructive work outside the government mechanism or outside legislative institutions. A developmental programme of such great magnitude and urgency cannot succeed unless representatives of the people at every level integrate such work of social reconstruction and social change with their parliamentary or legislative life. Population and development will be integrated easily if legislators integrate the programme of long-term and massive public education with their legislative duties.

Most of the Asian countries have a composite society, full with socio-religious as well as economic-politic-

al diversities. This is true of developing countries of other continents and even developed countries. This situation obliges us to transform all our political functionaries into constructive agents in the process of voluntary social reconstruction and social change. Family planning in this context should not be treated as an economic component only but as a social process without which economic development will not sustain.

Family planning is therefore at best a socio-economic movement based on social and cultural and, according to Mahatma Gandhi, even spiritual foundations. Population programmes cannot be separated from the 'development process' and the development process cannot be further separated from a process of societal transformation and social reconstruction. The entire developmental process will have to be made to move upwards from micro level to macro level in order to facilitate the inescapable role of political functionaries in this vital programme.

**M**ahatma Gandhi did express reservations and reluctance to artificial birth control. But this should not be deduced to mean that he favoured unchecked population growth. If his writings on this subject are read in totality, it would be clear that he favoured a smaller family norm. In the circumstances of the thirties and forties he felt that it was possible to contain the population growth without resorting to artificial means which he apprehended might promote a permissive society, leading to moral degradation and weakening of the age old social fabric, particularly in developing countries like India.

According to him, it was the moral and spiritual foundations of oriental culture that sustained these nations under all vicissitudes and gave continuity and inherent strength to their culture and civilisation. Since he was a practical idealist he vehemently pleaded during the freedom movement that the people of India had no right to add to the population of India until India was free, as this would amount to 'multiplying slaves and weaklings.' While he preached the highest

ideal of birth control through self-restraints his practical idealism also led him to recognise human infirmities and he suggested practical methods of restraining new births.

As far back as 1936, Mrs Margaret Sanger, the famous leader of the birth control movement interviewed Mahatma Gandhi to seek his support for birth control through artificial methods. He recommended the method of avoidance of sexual union during the unsafe period, confining it to the 'safe' period of about 10 days during the month. That had at least an element of self-control which could be exercised during the unsafe period. He also advised one of his ashram inmates in 1946 not to indulge in sexual intercourse against the wish of his wife who did not want more children. He went to the extent of suggesting to him that those who could not control themselves should use modern methods but not add to unnecessary births. He was thus clearly concerned about unwanted population growth.

Some of the methods suggested by him were the following.

1. Abolition of early marriages and raising of the minimum age at which boys and girls could marry.
2. Giving children simple food and clothing in order that in early adolescence the stimulation of passions be avoided.
3. Leading an ideal life of non-indulgence by the parents so that the children could follow their example.
4. Practice of self-discipline and abstinence by married couples.

**T**hese are ideals as well as practicable methods. Gandhiji dedicated his life to social service and wanted to serve God through service to humanity. That is why he took a vow of celibacy as he thought that further procreation would be an hindrance in rendering social service. Though he did this in the later

period of his life, he propagated birth-control through self-control.

Acharya Vinoba Bhave pleaded for the ideal of Rama and Sita who had only two children. A couple must keep that ideal before them and should think that if they have the right to leave their heirs to society, they have their duty also not to unduly increase the burden on society by increasing the population. This is bound to appeal more to millions of illiterate persons but possessed of sound common sense in highly populous countries like India where 80% of the population lives in rural areas and on rural vocations like agriculture and animal husbandry.

Because Mahatma Gandhi pleaded for a life of restraint in every sphere of life, he thought this could extend to family planning as well. But it would not be correct to interpret that he would encourage the unabated growth of population. He vehemently opposed new births during the Indian struggle against imperialism and even on attainment of independence categorically stated that mere national independence was not adequate for liberating the last man from hunger and poverty. He would therefore have been the last man to justify population growth where millions of children would have no opportunity to live a life of human dignity.

**M**ahatma Gandhi viewed the problem not from demographic and economic aspects alone but more from social and moral aspects which even the so-called modern society of the West is recognising. Several Gandhians therefore veered round to the view that in terms of population goals, there were several common factors to justify the co-operation of Gandhians and Sarvodaya leaders with the family planning movement in developing countries. In the context of the larger goals, the family planning movement could consider Gandhian ideas of self-restraint as conducive to the creation of a proper environment for restraining population growth and for cautioning people to be conscious of preventing possible moral degradation of the social fabric while using artificial means,

It is clear that Mahatma Gandhi left to himself would not like artificial means and would advocate-married *brahmcharya* (abstinence). But he would not also approve of increasing the social burden by unplanned births. It should also be remembered that he always stood for the woman's right to determine the number of children she should have and always opposed the husbands subjecting their wives to child-bearing against their will.

**T**he Gandhian profile of development would provide a strategy which would concentrate on fulfilling basic human needs. He could force, in 1909, constraints on natural and physical resources of the world and was very much concerned about the inequitable distribution of global resources in an extremely limited number of so-called advanced countries and the exploitation of the poor by the wealthy, of villages by cities. There was perhaps not enough data to prove this in 1909 but now there is abundant data to prove the depletion of natural resources and the dangers of environmental pollution as well as ecological imbalances due to careless industrialisation, making man a slave rather than master of the machine.

The important components of the Gandhian profile of development are as follows. Taking into account the very large size of population of over 4000 millions in Asia at the end of the century, which will have to be looked after, despite a strong family planning movement, the population restraint movement will have to be kept alive to ensure that it does not over-shoot the projection of UNFPA for 2000 AD.

(i) The foremost component will be to recognise the principle of providing for basic needs instead of greed. Rapidly depleting global resources and the urgent need for their equitable distribution leave us with no alternative but to work a priori for the fulfilment of basic human needs. Five-year plans in India describe this as the Minimum Needs Programme (MNP). Instead of an acquisitive and greedy

society for the few, we must strive for a non-acquisitive socialised human order where at least everyone has equal opportunity for satisfying one's minimum needs

(ii) Economic development should centre around 'man' rather than 'goods'. The development process almost in all countries is centred around goods without taking adequate care about its simultaneous and equitable distribution. We must work for 'economics of man', for developing human resources and human capacity to develop oneself.

(iii) Exploitation of any kind will be treated as violence. We should work for a *non-violent society in the sense of a non-exploitative society*. Exploitation in any form of the poor by the rich, of developing nations by developed nations through multinational companies, women by men, etc., will have no place in a society which wants to ensure social justice to its population.

(iv) *Conservation of resources* and its spend-thrift use instead of economy based on 'waste'. The ecological balance of the world cannot be restored without world-wide acceptance of this principle.

(v) Self-reliance coupled with liberty and social obligations not only for the nation but for the individual as well. Every family will generate its own natural resources on the principle of 'bread-labour' without depending on government so far as the basic requirements of food, clothing and energy are concerned. Agriculture including animal husbandry, gainful work at the door-step and equal access to fundamental and basic education are some of the areas in which the self-reliance of each family or group of families should be ensured. In spite of a declining area of arable land, agriculture in the form of agro-industrial activity will have to receive top priority to achieve self-reliance and feed such large numbers of people even at the point of stabilisation.

discovered in 8000 B.C. It then took 10,000 years to the year 1975 for world population to reach 4 billion — 256 fold increase, or 8 doublings — since the dawn of agriculture.

'But, in only the next 40 years, another 4 billion people will swell the world population at the current growth rate

'To feed these *extra* 4 billion people, world food production must be increased in the next 40 years by as much as it increased in the long 10,000 years span since the birth of agriculture

'This is a tremendous and critical contract. Its success is essential and vital to safeguard the future of world civilisation. Failure to achieve this goal will plunge the world into economic, social and political chaos

'Can the goal of doubling food production in the next 40 years be achieved? *Yes*, but with great difficulty and only if world governments give top priority and continuing support to agriculture. It cannot be achieved with the miserly and discontinuous support invested in world agriculture in the last 50 years.'

(vi) Population restraint is now imperative for the peace and tranquility of the world. The wasteful and dreadful arms race and atomic and neutron weapons have no place if peace is to be maintained.

In this type of Gandhian development profile, population restraint programmes are not relief measures but are programmes of societal reconstruction to achieve a just and equitable socio-economic order not only in each country but in the world as a whole.

Gandhian experience of micro-level working for village-self-rule (*gram swaraj*) provides enough evidence of how population growth can be checked and people successfully led to self-determining self-reliance without individual freedom and social obligation being sacrificed in any manner,

# Traditionizing modernity

ATTILA AGH

ARE the non-European national cultures 'a colossus on feet of clay', i.e., without massive foundations in the national economy and state? Are the extremities of non-European cultures to be ridiculed or the traditional attitudes and values to be blamed for the underdevelopment of Third World countries?

These questions have to be raised since in modernization theories as well as in European public opinion traditionality appears as the main obstacle to development in non-European nations. There is a strong European bias against traditionality *the traditional cultures have to be destroyed in order to reach modernity, that is traditionality and modernity are arch-enemies*. We think this is a pseudo-contradiction but we do not dwell on the fact that the representatives of European cultures — namely those of western Europe and the United States — for-

get about their own historical past in which traditionality played a very important and stimulating role in modernization. Based on the East European experience, we try to undermine the 'European paradigm' about traditional culture as the main obstacle to development and/or modernization by showing its stimulating role in East European 'delayed' modernization. This is why we concentrate on the relation of traditionality and modernity in a particular world historical context and in order to characterize this important but contradictory role of traditionality stimulating modernity, we introduce the term and the concept of 'traditionizing modernity'. With the description of the development of East European cultures as the key for understanding the develop-

---

\*Reprinted from 'International Foundation for Development Alternatives' *Dossier* 28 (March-April 1982)

ment of non-European ones we offer a 'European contribution' to the concept of development

**T**o start with, not only is the thesis about the blocking effect of traditional cultures central to the modernization theory but also the intent is clear enough behind the warnings about the danger of the recent waves of cultural nationalism in the Third World: it is to suggest that nowadays there is a change for the worse in cultural development in comparison with the previous era of rapidly spreading world culture. We think, this has been effectively the reverse of the truth nowadays: new, young and vigorous national cultures are emerging in the international arena to challenge both the previous masters' national cultures and Europeanized world culture

In this respect Wallerstein's argument on the cultural domination as a result of economic and political domination deserves to be quoted in extenso;

'What of the cultural sphere? Was there no place for ideas, values, science, art, religion, language, passion and color? Of course, there was, for cultures are the ways in which people clothe their politico-economic interests and drives in order to express them, hide them in space and time, and preserve their memory. Our cultures are our lives, our most inner selves but also our most outer selves, our personal and collective individualities. How could there not be a cultural expression of hegemony? Such expression would not be in all cases cultural dominance. Core powers often dominate peripheral areas, imposing a sense of inferiority on people regarding their own culture, it is, however, unlikely that a hegemonic power would be able to do the same with other core powers. At most, in the latter case, the culture of a hegemonic power can serve as a model, especially a technological model, but cultures are precisely arenas where resistance to hegemony occurs, where appeals are made to the historical values of established 'civilisations' against the temporary superiorities of the market. This is true

today and was no less true in the seventeenth century<sup>1</sup>

Cultural hegemony and cultural dominance are, of course, more important and more dangerous phenomena today than they were in the 17th century because of the mounting interdependence of national cultures as a result of the massive improvements in communications after 1945. On the other hand, 'cultural resistance' and efforts to formulate a national identity of their own is also reinforced by the pressure of Europeanized world culture in the Third World countries. This primary emphasis on cultural nationalism in the Third World countries can only be understood from the fact that national identity is the condition *sine qua non* of national development as such. The recent development crisis has proved the failure of European modernization theories and strategies which all shared the thesis that the Europeanization of culture would promote the development of the national economy and State by suppressing the traditional national cultures, i.e., by getting rid of the 'main internal obstacle' to development.

**N**one the less, there are even nowadays a lot of concepts — sometimes pretending to be Marxist ones — describing the story of colonization as the penetration of modernity to the non-European world and its victorious march against traditionality.

'The industrialization of the West from the late eighteenth century onwards tended to initiate and then accelerate modern development in the rest of the world, which otherwise would have remained comparatively stagnant. Western economic expansion aroused the non-western world to a modernization process for which its own internal development has not yet prepared it. There were three aspects of this impetus: destruction of pre-modern cultures and modes of production, stimulation of aspirations new in both degree and kind, implantation of ele-

ments of modern civilisation, both culturally and economically.'<sup>2</sup>

The author, Bill Warren, goes on to state that the 'cultural transfer' served the 'modernizing aims' of colonizers and was disturbed only by a 'nationalist mythology' of colonized peoples. He cites W.K. Hancock's description of Ghana's modernization as a fight for rapid economic development against traditionality, i.e., for the sake but against the will of the local population. 'We must remember that the opening up of Africa is a very recent occurrence, and we must admit that the traditional way of life in that continent imposes many hindrances to rapid economic transformation. And yet the transformation has in some parts been amazingly rapid.'

Warren emphasizes repeatedly and unequivocally the progressive character of western cultural export — or even aggression — to the Third World and considers cultural resistance itself and the ensuing modern national cultures a result of this cultural modernization. 'The association of modern education with societies that combined enormous economic, technological, and military power with parliamentary democracy and individual rights represented a major liberating force in custom-bound societies and an important cultural export, which in the end was used against the colonial power itself. Imperialism was the means through which the techniques, culture, and institutions had evolved in western Europe over several centuries sowed their revolutionary seeds in the rest of the world. This culture was in many respects unique, and contributed much of value to humanity. We must accept the view that the epochal imperialist sweep was indeed a titanic step towards human unity (on the basis of the greatest cultural and material achievements so far attained by humanity).'

**T**his is what we call the European paradigm of World Culture and non-European national cultures which in its special form in Warren's

1 I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System II, Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750*, (New York: Academic Press, 1980), p. 63.

2 Bill Warren, *Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism*, New Left Review Books, Verso Edition, London, 1980, p. 114.

book claims to be the genuine Marxist concept of culture. The point is whether the peoples most, and directly, affected by Europeanized world culture 'want to hold on to as much as they can of their traditional culture'<sup>3</sup> or, as Warren declares, 'if the rise of modern nationalism has shifted attitudes, ideologies, and rhetoric in a very different direction, it has nevertheless failed to alter the fundamental effort to assimilate western culture, values and technical achievements.'

After having identified the major problems in the current literature concerning non-European national cultures we try to introduce a regional approach in the development of national cultures. This comparison is clearly the most relevant for the theory of non-European cultures since it demonstrates the transition between the different historical ways of development instead of being confined to the extreme contrasts (say, western Europe and Black Africa). *We suggest that there are two models of national development (nation-building), the first is the (Western) European one which is organic — the evolution starts with the emergence of a national economy and the further developments of a national state and culture are based on it —, the second is the non-European one which is inorganic, that is, the evolution usually starts with the result of the European model, with a — sometimes artificially made — national state or with a national culture prepared by cultural resistance and it goes in the opposite way, to build up a national society and economy 'from above' and in many cases without success*

It can be seen from these two models that *the national cultures as well as the national state play a primary role in the process of Third World modernization, a very different one from its role in western Europe*. World historically this primary role was played in eastern Europe for the first time — and somewhat later in Latin America, which underlines the parallel of the two regions in this respect — and

<sup>3</sup> R. Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, p. 14, quoted from Warren, *Op. Cit.* p. 138.

this is why the East European development may serve as a bridge between the poles of the centre and periphery of world capitalism as key to the understanding of non-European cultures and as a contribution to development theories

## II

It is well known that eastern Europe became a *periphery* of European capitalism from the 16th century onwards and responded to the demand of western Europe for primary products. This led not only to a trade dependency on the economically advanced countries in the 16-18th centuries but generated some fundamental social and cultural changes, namely, the preservation of the pre-capitalist mode of production in a new form as a function of the emerging world capitalism ('second serfdom'). Seemingly, the initial penetration was blocked administratively but actually capitalism penetrated only in order to produce this function, and not as genuine capitalist development. The first challenge occurred in the 16th century when the evolution of the international division of labour began to take shape and the major outlines of the pattern of dependency of eastern Europe on western Europe were established.

The second challenge occurred in the wake of the industrial revolution, in the 19-20th centuries, when eastern Europe became a *semiperiphery* of world capitalism and the preponderance of foreign capital and skills reduced radically the spread effects which would otherwise have been produced by a real challenge. Finally, under the impetus of foreign rule (Austrian, Prussian and Russian empires) and capital (German, French, English investments) the classical model of dependent industrialization was materialized in eastern Europe and has determined its historical path so far. Our presumption is that the above described *East European development model does not rest upon the inherent characteristics of these societies inherited from their feudal period but rather upon the specific historical circumstances under which they developed in the framework of*

*world capitalism from the 16th century onwards*. Moreover, failures in the modernization of political structures and cultural self-consciousness were at least partially due to the specific features of capitalist expansion of eastern Europe.

We are aware that the problems we have summarized are discussed by the literature in detail<sup>4</sup> but this is only the background against which we would like to elaborate our concept of traditionizing modernity. Now we may return to this concept at greater length since the East European way of underdevelopment provides clear guidelines to the identification of the East European kind of development of national cultures. What is more, the *description of East European underdevelopment in general* is consistent with, indeed *is the condition for, the classification of non-European national cultures* and specification of the East European regional one.

The overall effect of western European capitalist development cannot be confined to its economic consequence, although the question arises first whether the economic transformation generated by world capitalism in eastern Europe proved to be capable of creating the conditions for a genuine development of the national state and culture, or it was sustaining and recreating underdevelopment in general producing permanently structural imbalances in the relationship of the major social spheres or sub-systems (national economy, state and culture). In our opinion, the latter was the case. This is why we concentrate in our paper on the unevenness of development of the above mentioned social sub-systems.

As a primary products exporting periphery, eastern Europe was, so to say, a contemporary of western Europe only in its consciousness, i.e., at the level of theory and culture. This aspect, however, was extraordinarily important since eastern Europe was faced with the demonstrative effect of western

<sup>4</sup> See Wallerstein's two volumes, or, Dudley Seers, *Underdeveloped Europe. Studies in Core-Periphery Relations*, (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Studies in Development, No. 1, 1979)



modernization which threatened the survival of its nations (Poland).<sup>5</sup> The shock of western progress and modernization brought about a cultural nationalism throughout eastern Europe in the 18-19th centuries with its very characteristic ambiguity. On the one hand, eastern Europe tried to imitate western developments and catch up with it, on the other this cultural nationalism was strongly opposed to it on behalf of the national traditions and, as Wallerstein would say, appeals were made to the values of established, endogenous civilizations

Since, from the emergence of east European cultural nationalism onwards, the same ambiguity has been repeated in the other regions of the periphery and semi-periphery of world capitalism as well, and the same ambivalence could be detected against western modernization in the policies and concepts of progressive, modernizing forces of all countries, this casts a considerable doubt on the widespread commonplace that modernization in itself embodies the highest value and, on the other side, traditionalism in itself is necessarily reactionary. This concept is dualistic, or even manicheistic, distributing good and evil to the opposite poles, because a successful modernization in some countries usually means a more fierce competition for the others in the military-political and economic respect (as it was in the case of European absolutisms which were reactions to British hegemony)<sup>6</sup> or modernization from outside threatens with dependency and lopsided development (as it was in the case of eastern Europe)

What is more, in these centuries there were no independent and national States and economies (integrated national markets) in eastern Europe. With a certain exaggeration we could state that *the recent East European nations existed at that time only in the form of their cultural nationalism or national identity, literature etc*, which offers, once

again, a striking parallel with the non-European nations before their 'flag independence'. The lack of a well-established national economy and a 'strong' national state was a specific feature of East European development before 1914 in comparison with West Europe and this is why a great emphasis was laid on the national cultures being the 'only' form of national existence. The national culture or cultural nationalism became the main organizer, catalyst and programme-builder of nation-building or modernization. *This modernization process, however, was to be carried out in a national framework in eastern Europe, as happened so much earlier to the West European nations.* The 'modernizing elite' had to mobilize the national forces with an appeal to the national values of the historical traditions, to call for national unity in support of the socio-economic reforms.

Thus, the emphasis was laid inevitably on historical continuity and specificity as far as national unity and opposition to the outer forces were concerned and on historical discontinuity as far as the internal revolutionary programme and the suppression of reactionary traditions were concerned.

To be brief, the policies of East European 'modernizing elites' might be characterized in general by what we called *traditionizing modernity*. This attitude was very characteristic, e.g., for the Hungarian 'reform era' in the first half of the last century or for Poland in the same period, the other nations in the southern part of the region followed suit at the end of the last century. The Hungarian reformers evoked the spirit of the past in their fight for an independent Hungarian national state and national economy they wore 'ancient' Hungarian costumes, 'discovered' the old Hungarian mythology — or the poets and writers created it quite anew since it was mostly forgotten — and with the revival of old, sometimes archaic, Hungarian words and names succeeded in renewing the national language and literature.

This was the 'fashion' all over eastern Europe. the drama of

modernization began on an artificially made historical scene with the players fighting against traditions on behalf of traditions. And western Europe looked at this colourful carnival with hatred and irony, ridiculing the 'childish' behaviour of the 'modernizing elite' using traditions for their national purposes as if the English revolution had been conceivable without referring to prophet Habakkuk and the French one without the rhetoric of the Roman republic.

### III

The same hatred, irony and misunderstanding is manifested in the western countries towards the recent expressions of traditionizing modernity in the contemporary world, e.g., against so called revival of Islam etc. It is not that they do not 'understand' these 'exotic' cultures sticking only to their extreme manifestations and overexaggerating their 'medieval' features. Simplistic view or not, in our opinion, the interests of the industrially advanced nations of the West are against the independent national developments in developing countries and they expect developing countries being oriented towards the imitation of the western model of development and modernization, virtually deprived of any specific national features.

Obviously, it is outside the scope of this paper to explore in detail the nature of regional variants of non-European cultures. A few points, however, must be made on the major outlines of their similarities and dissimilarities with the East European model.

First, we think, a historical documentation would conclusively demonstrate that there is no evidence of and *direct* relationship between traditional attitudes and values and the recent developmental crisis in the Third World countries. But for an historical approach, the opposite seems to be proved by the facts. At least some 'traditional' attitudes and values are neo-or pseudo-traditional, that is they are 'artificially' generated and constantly reinforced by the external factors of dependence and under-development. A

5. See W. Kula, *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System*, (London: New Left Review Books, 1976).

6. P. Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, (London: NLB, 1974).



simple comparison between Japan and India shows that Japan was fostered by her traditional culture in many ways and India was forced back into a neo-traditionalism during the centuries of British colonial rule.<sup>7</sup>

*Second*, in such a way, to us, it goes without saying that *only* a healthy cultural nationalism could foster the national identity and culture which, in turn, is able to generate a genuine national development. Traditionizing modernity is an organizing principle and revolutionary pattern which consciously refers to the progressive national traditions in order to mobilize the large masses of population for a deeply going social transformation and nation-building. Our approach suggests a fight between two kinds of tradition and/or modernization and we are against any dogmatic approach to the controversy between modernity and traditionality. Modernity is quite often connected with aggressive external forces and strives to preserve the economic and socio-cultural dependence in a holy alliance with the internal reactionary 'traditional' classes (as the British made it in India with maharajas and zamindars), and, at the very end, the complete assimilation leads to the 'death of a nation'.<sup>8</sup>

*Third*, genuine — i.e., effective and independent — development or modernization presupposes a creative application of the international models to the local and particular conditions and, therefore, it must have a specific national character. Even this national 'face' of development appears as a mobilizing factor and, as it is many times argued in the modernization literature, social progress and modernization are met with much less

resistance if they are strongly connected with the active traditions and a continuity is maintained between the old and the new in the modernization process. The farther a local culture is from the European tradition, the greater emphasis must be laid on its specificity for an efficient modernization.

*Fourth*, there is an internal dynamism and logic of national cultures leading either to extremism or to a normally developed specificity. Once the particular character of a modern national culture has been established, it tends to generate a self-reinforcing momentum since it opposes the Europeanized world culture in its 'universality' as well as the other national cultures based on their own particularity, like Myrdal's model of cumulative causation transferred from the economy to culture. When relative normal circumstances for national development are secured in the international arena, this cumulative causation leads to a building up of the specificity of a national culture. If not, the external factors are threatening the nation, and modernity appears as an outside aggression and offense against the national traditions. As is the case with most of the Third World countries, this challenge is met with extreme manifestations of cultural nationalism. Thus, national consciousness is alerted against the external influence, sometimes confusing its misdeeds and benefits, and produces pseudo-'medieval' forms of national culture.

To conclude: as a Marxist point of view, too often a statement is made about the relative independence of culture from the economy and politics as mere lip-service to a fundamental Marxist tenet without a - profound argumentation. Our short analysis of traditionizing modernity has tried to go beyond this by specifying the relative independence and active role of national culture in Third World countries and regarding the significance of the basic needs strategies for overcoming the recent developmental crisis. We suggest that the role of the specific national cultures in the process of development and modernization have to be tackled more seriously than hitherto.

7. See, concerning the 'open secret' of Japanese traditionalism in the modernization process, R E Ward, 'Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan', in: C E Welch (ed), *Political Modernization*, (Belmont, California, 1967) and, concerning India, J Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, 1965

8. See, for Latin American, Leopoldo Zea, *El pensamiento Latino-Americano* (Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, 1965) and *Latinoamerica en la Encrucijada de la historia* (Mexico, UNAM, 1981).

# The learning capacity

SOEDJATMOKO

THERE seems to be a growing disparity between what we know about our human predicament which so marks our time and our ability to act on that knowledge. We do know that the decisions we have made, are now making and will be making in the present decade will have a decisive influence on the condition in which our societies will move into the 21st century.

We have a pretty good understanding of the forces which have

led to the present 'problematique'. To a very large extent they are, directly or indirectly, the result of the progression of science and technology, including the rapid growth of communications. To speak about the interdependence of the world has become commonplace. We know that the industrial world is rapidly moving into a post-industrial, information-intensive phase. We also know that the resulting dislocations are aggravated by another set of adjustments

that have to be made. These are the consequences of the industrial revolution finally, after two centuries, reaching the southern hemisphere of our globe, and the resulting demands for access to industrial country markets

It is already obvious that we are involved in a rather painful but overdue process of change in the pattern of international division of labour towards a more rational and equitable distribution of industrial capacity and jobs across the globe. At the same time, we have all become aware of the growing deterioration of the global resource base on which modern industrial societies are based, as well as the continuing ecological degradation of land, sea and air.

**D**ifferences in the population growth rate between the North and the South have added to the complexities of these problems. Those in the West have gone down, and this is reflected in the rising median age of the population curve. Those in the South remain high, although several countries are beginning to show a declining rate of increase. Nevertheless, the age pyramid in these countries indicates a continuous lowering of the median age which is expected to continue for some more time. They are already being confronted with a youth cohort larger than ever before. And their societies, as presently structured, are beginning to strain under this pressure.

In the industrial countries of the West, the problem is that a relatively smaller productive labour force will have to be able to support an increasingly large unproductive part of the population, in a culture which has not yet found a meaningful role for the aged. At the same time, population projections also indicate that the presently urgent problem of youth unemployment may be serious but not permanent.

In the Third World, it is beginning to become obvious that massive unemployment will require a development and industrialisation trajectory which will not be a replica of

the western model. It will have to be shaped autonomously, by dealing directly with rural unemployment and the structural nature of widespread and endemic poverty.

We all know that the period of cheap energy is over, but no significant movement towards an energy and resource conserving lifestyle and mode of production is yet discernible. If decisions are taken at all, they are in the direction of the use of nuclear power as the easiest way out despite its present technological flaws, its high ecological cost and the risks of waste disposal. Almost everyone, including those directly involved in the nuclear arms race, is aware of the ultimate irrationality of the dimensions into which it has grown. But no one, including the superpowers themselves, seem to be able to bring the process of continuous escalation under control and to reverse it, let alone to redirect the tremendous scientific, technological and financial resources behind it to more peaceful purposes. Neither do we seem capable of getting an adequate conceptual handle on the post-non-proliferation problems that are now beginning to stare us in the face, not to speak of our capacity to negotiate and manage a reasonable system of control. (And now the beginning fragmentation of detente has made all of us realize how much closer we are getting to the flash point of nuclear conflagration).

The redistribution of global power has also begun with the emergence on the scene of new economic global as well as regional political powers. Simultaneously, there has been a considerable diffusion of power across the globe, with a relative decline in the power of the West, even though United States' power may have increased in absolute terms.

**W**e all know what the doomsday prophets have to say about these trends. We are also familiar with the technological optimists who are putting their hopes on human inventiveness and unlimited technological progress. There are also those, especially within the Third World — and I am one of those — who believe that the present crisis

may signify the beginning of an historical process of long duration, but of a fundamental nature, which will eventually witness the emergence of non-western civilisations, possibly the Sinitic, the Moslem, the Hindu, and quite likely some others as well, taking their rightful place side by side with western civilisation, on a basis of rough parity. Be that as it may, none of these three visions deny that we are presently moving into a very crowded and hungry competitive world, interdependent but still unequal, with great potential for systemic dislocations and breakdowns, as well as violent international, regional and domestic conflicts.

Analysts of this general incapacity of nations to come to grips with these problems, and to bring about the necessary social changes, often blame the absence of political will for the immobilism and drift that seems to be characteristic of our time, and then they move on to other subjects. I suggest that this is too easy a drop out, too facile a dismissal of a crucial problem, and an abrogation of man's responsibility for his future. And certainly in a gathering of communications experts, we should at least try to deal with some elements of it which touch on their field of professional interest.

## II

**I**n many ways, some of which we don't fully understand, the development of modern communications has been instrumental in bringing about the great social changes that have shaped, and are continuously reshaping modern life and society. It has also been partly responsible for the rapidity of the rate of change and for the fact that rapid change has become man's constant and inseparable companion in life. In the industrial countries, modern communications have made possible the growth of large organisations and their bureaucracies. But this has, quite unexpectedly, also led to personal alienation and a growing unwillingness to identify with these larger structures. In fact, many people are turning away from a superficial and undifferentiated mass culture, also made possible by modern communi-

cations towards a new emphasis on the individual as a human being in search of personal authenticity and self fulfilment, often thereby narrowing the horizon of their public commitments to local politics and community affairs, away from the larger depersonalized structures and bureaucracies, including those of State and business

**T**he persistence of language, ethnic origin and religion, as essential elements of one's self definition as a person and as a communal or national group claiming political recognition, and the search for roots in what used to be the modern a-historical society *par excellence* — the United States — are all part of this trend. It is less clear how communications has contributed to this phenomenon, but there seems to be no doubt that it has. Likewise, modern communication has, through the rise of political consciousness of previously marginalised groups, made possible mass participation in politics, but at the same time it has also contributed to the fragmentation of society along communal lines, and to the vast increase in litigation which is now overloading the judicial systems leading to a search for methods of non judicial, community-related resolution of disputes

It has helped to increase the power of government but at the same time it has helped to erode its authority. Modern communications have helped raise to a previously unimaginable level the frequency and intensity of human interaction in the cities which have turned these into magnets pulling in large numbers of people from the countryside. But, by the same token, communications have made possible the subsequent movement out of the cities, leaving them insolvent and unmanageable, with their inner core a desolate waste-land

It is not too difficult to expand this list of the ways in which modern communications have intervened and reshaped our lives at the personal and interpersonal level as well. It would be incorrect and unfair, however, to look at modern communications as a primary cause rather than as a contributing factor

expanding the impact of other, more decisive ones. Likewise, it would be unfair to blame the intractable nature of modern inflation on communications, although undeniably communications have contributed to increasing the levels of expectation of material welfare, which now seem to outstrip the capacity to meet them.

It is equally unclear what role communications have played in the shifts of basic value orientation which has taken place in much of the industrial world. Certainly, on the one hand, communications have contributed to greatly increased productivity in agriculture, in business and in government, but do we really know whether, and if so, how, communications have contributed to the loss of the work ethic in industrial society? This, as well as phenomena like the shift away from rationality to an emphasis on the expressive, intuitive, and transcendental faculties of the human person, the lower tolerance for injustice, the emergence of a sense of human solidarity, transcending communal, ethnic and national boundaries, may well be rooted in dynamics in which communications have played at least some significant role

**P**art of the unemployment problem in affluent societies may have to do with changed expectations towards the kinds of jobs people are willing to accept, because of a more general insistence on having meaningful jobs, jobs that have psychic value to the workers. This opens up one of the fundamental dilemmas that face industrial society. Should it restructure its industries so as to make individual jobs more meaningful? What if this means changes in the criteria of efficiency objectives, which in turn might endanger growth and output? Or should it export those industries which cannot restructure their production process without considerable loss of efficiency to other, developing, countries?

In short, the adjustments to the transition towards post-industrial society with its emphasis on capital — and information — intensive industries, the necessary develop-

ment of energy and resource-conserving lifestyles, as well as the implications of the changing pattern of the international division of labour, resulting from the gradual industrialisation of the South, are all problems which, urgently and fundamentally, raise the question of the capacity of modern industrial nations for necessary and inevitable social structural transformation.

**A**s to the developing countries, especially the large and populous ones, the autonomous development — and industrialisation — trajectories which both poverty and demography impose on them, will require the revitalization of the rural countryside through the restoration of their hope and their self-confidence, the utilisation of traditional and new skills, the active and voluntary self-organised participation of the poor. This also holds for youth, for in most of these countries youth constitutes more than half of the total population. Such a development trajectory also aims at overcoming the other structural imbalances which were inherited from colonial and pre-colonial times: those between center and periphery, between town and countryside, between the modern and the traditional sector, and between the foreign and national, domestic sectors

It is obvious that such a development effort from below has its own communications requirements. The amount and range of information which has to be brought within reach of these groups simply exceeds the capacity of the more traditional forms of communication: the village headman, the extension services, and even the more recent centrally broadcast farmers programmes. This type of development effort will require a vast increase in locally produced, relevant information, and will need decentralized programming with the full participation of those whose interests it purports to serve. It also requires greater ability to package the information in line with existing levels of education, intellectual orientations as well as cultural traditions.

Special attention will have to be given to the location of communica-

ation equipment in the villages and the poorer urban sectors in order to ensure free and equal access to, and use of the equipment. This means as much local control of this vast domestic communication network, including the social reinforcement and feedback mechanisms that will ensure such control and such local participation, as is compatible with the equally legitimate interests of governments to reach their citizens.

The general slowness in implementing such communications policies is, apart from the financial constraints, to a large extent caused by considerations that are political and legitimate, but not necessarily insurmountable. They stem from the difficulty of managing orderly structural change. The implementation of the autonomous development model involves fundamental social and political changes of a magnitude which is bound seriously to strain the fabric of social cohesion and the resilience of the political system of these countries.

In a number of Third World countries which tried to make the transition from a growth to a social justice-model, but who failed in this attempt because the accompanying tensions exceeded the capacity of the political systems to absorb them, total polarisation set in, leading towards the erosion of the center and eventually the collapse of the political system as a whole. And the escalation of senseless violence became almost inevitable.

**W**e know very little of the role communications have played in events of this kind and this magnitude. Whether and how that has contributed to the polarisation processes or not, and whether such collapse could have been prevented, is not a question that should be addressed to the communications media. The relevant question that remains however is, does the communication system have the potential capacity to dampen the extreme swings of the pendulum of opinion and emotion, and if so, how should it then be used.

Development, by whatever trajectory, will have to speed up the

capacity of developing countries to handle science and technology and to integrate these into the culture of their nation. In the final analysis, what makes the difference between a developing country and a developed one is whether it has, or does not have, the capacity for the self-sustained autonomous generation of knowledge in response to the problems it faces. We still know very little about the dynamics of science and technology transfer, the mediating and filtering mechanisms that are required to indigenize them. Nor do we know much about how to stimulate indigenous intellectual and scientific capability and creativity, other than through credible guarantees for the freedom of scientific inquiry. But here again the question arises, is there anything that modern communications can contribute to speed up that process? Can communications research improve a nation's scientific and technological learning capacity?

**P**eople in these large, populous countries will also have to learn to live under conditions of extremely high population density. These countries will have to develop a greater capacity to manage, humanely, justly and efficiently, such high concentrations of people, both in their rapidly growing primate cities, and in rural settings. Can modern communications help in devising administrative systems at the scale required, capable of doing this through the technological and systemic resolution of the conflicting needs of both center and periphery, central rationality and peripheral autonomy?

Modernisation is often equated with greater individualisation, increased competitiveness and innovativeness. The need for liberation from obsolete, unjust social structures which have kept people shackled for so long, certainly requires this. At the same time, learning to live in areas of high density with some degree of harmony, civility, and some sense of community, will require major cultural adjustments, possibly rediscoveries, and innovation. In any case, people will have to learn to cooperate together effectively at higher levels of individuali-

sation, even though it is unlikely — and even unwanted — for their cultures to reach the extreme levels of individualisation which one finds in some countries in the West.

High population density is also bound to reduce personal space. I believe that we all, in the industrial world as well as in the developing countries, will have to learn to develop a corresponding sense of inner space, through a heightened perception of beauty, through artistic creativity and through religion as an inner experience. Shouldn't modern communications address these questions in the setting of transitional societies as well?

**A**t the international level, interdependence is an undeniable fact. It is also a fact that no single country, and no combination of countries is in control of it, capable of imposing their will on others. Adding to the difficulties of managing such a situation are the larger numbers of participants or actors, in the shape of new nations, and a large number of so-called non-territorial actors: the international organisations and the multi-national corporations. Compounding this is the greater permeability of national boundaries, through which essentially uncontrollable short-term money flows and transnational portfolio investments, as well as communications take place. Legitimate national policies within the domestic sphere of one country, including economic development plans, may affect adversely the interests of other countries.

Like in the domestic sphere in industrial as well as developing countries, there is in the international sphere an urgent need for greater managerial capacity, in the first place with a view to keep international conflicts localized and to prevent their escalation from reaching unmanageable levels of violence, or worse, from reaching the nuclear threshold. There is also the need to manage the reduction of the level of trade in conventional arms and to manage post-non-proliferation nuclear problems. In a different area we will have to learn to manage international cooperation at an unprecedented higher level of inter-

national interaction. Problems on a global scale like the global environment, food, energy and other resources are crying out for more effective instrumentalities of international management. So do the ever increasing numbers of political prisoners and refugees, victims of the vagaries of national and international politics but, especially, victims of our incapacity to manage necessary structural transformation humanely.

Like at the national level in developing as well as industrial countries, the need for improved management capacity at the international level is clear, the problems are recognized, but there is a similar failure to act accordingly. At the international level, too, there is a need to learn how to bring about fundamental structural change in an orderly fashion. In the view of a large majority of mankind the present international order is not only non-viable, but also immoral. The struggle of the Third World for a new international economic order as well as their efforts to increase cooperation and exchange of information and experience among Third World countries themselves, are manifestations of a more general desire to overcome the global, structural dualism which lies at the heart of the present international pattern of inequality and injustice. It is, therefore, unlikely that we will see a reduction of international tensions before the attainment of greater equity in the international division of labour and in the global distribution of political power.

### III

**T**he capacity of a nation — not just of its government, but of society as a whole — to adjust to rapidly changing techno-economic, socio-cultural and political changes, on a scale which makes it possible to speak of social transformation, very much depends on its collective capacity to generate, to ingest, to reach out for and to utilize a vast amount of new and relevant information. This capacity for creative and innovative response to changing conditions and new challenges I would like to call the learning capacity of a nation.

This capacity is obviously not limited to the cognitive level, but includes the attitudinal, institutional and organisational levels of society as well. It therefore resides not only in a nation's formal educational system, not only in the government bureaucracy, in parliament and the political parties, but also in the business community, in the media, the professional organisations, the trade-unions, the cooperatives and the various kinds of voluntary associations within the society at large. It also includes the political public, political constituencies, consumers groups, and all other kinds of permanent and ad hoc pressure groups. Changing conditions are bound to make our traditional skills and means of livelihood obsolescent, and we will continuously have to learn new ones. There will then be a need for new instrumentalities for retraining and re-schooling. We will have to learn to organize for 2 or 3 career lives, as life expectancy increases in rapidly changing societies.

**M**uch of the resistance to social change has turned out to be not of an intellectual kind alone, but also social. Bureaucratic rigidities in both governmental and non-governmental organisations, institutional traditions and priorities that are no longer relevant, all very much determine the outer limits of a nation's total responsive and innovative capacity. The tendency to sit on information and to treat it as a bargaining chip in inter-bureaucratic competition is an affliction not only of Third World bureaucracies. They may become a major cause of a nation lagging behind others, or of falling behind the point at which new problems and challenges could be met by small incremental responses, as a result of which painful and dislocating adjustments of a much larger order of magnitude become necessary or inevitable.

Improving the organisational and institutional learning capacity of a nation would require not only a greater capacity to ingest new information, improved two way horizontal and vertical information flows, throughout society as a whole and between as well as inside organisations and institutions. It might well

require the development of a second generation of 'open learning systems'. Opportunities for senior bureaucrats and administrators to expose themselves to new ideas and information through compulsory leave of absence or study leaves, intra-bureaucratic seminars bringing together senior and junior staff on equal footing for unstructured bull sessions, changes in the reward and promotion system, lateral entry to make possible bringing in fresh blood without having to make the slow rise towards seniority, but also regular review of mission and priorities of the institution, are ways which should be considered in this connection.

**T**he capacity to manage orderly social change will also very much depend on the existence of an adequate number of research and policy analysis institutions dealing with the key problems of social change. It is important that such institutions be independent of government, but close enough to it to make possible the use of its products by government institutions and decision makers. At the same time they should be remote enough to ensure autonomous generation of information, independent critical judgement and policy innovations and proposals that are credible not only to the government bureaucracy, but also to the public at large.

Such institutions could be connected with universities — although in many Third World countries universities are often part of the problem rather than of the solution — or they should be free standing, even though some times, of necessity, indirectly funded by government. Such institutions could also contribute micro policy studies for use by non-governmental organisations, volunteer groups, local cooperatives and other voluntary associations. Governments should realize more than they generally do, the importance for improving the learning capacity of the nation as a whole through these non-governmental organisations and ad hoc citizen groups.

Ultimately, they are manifestations of a society's capacity for creative response, self renewal and

innovation, at local as well as national levels, at the level of people as well as governments. Ideally, these free standing institutions of policy studies, together with these non-governmental organisations could become, and should be treated, as a second supplementary capability in a nation's system of governance from which the government could draw new ideas and policies.

**A**t the cognitive level, it is clear that the improvement of the national learning capacity does not end with the ingestion of larger amounts of information. These larger amounts will have to be relevant to the problems the nation faces. There is therefore a need for greater selective capacity, although there is also a point where selectivity becomes too narrow and dysfunctional, leading towards the nation's cognitive impoverishment and retardation. What will have to be enhanced in a short period of time, in both industrial and developing nations, is the capacity for critical judgement. Critical judgement lies at the heart of a nation's capacity for discovery, creativity and innovation.

Even though modern communications may at some point in the future greatly increase the self-learning capacity of individuals within a society, and thereby make classroom instruction largely obsolete, the maintenance and nurturing of a nation's capacity for critical judgement and discovery, in terms of both the rational and the expressive and imaginative dimensions of human life, at the individual and national levels, constitutes an autonomous faculty which is almost independent of the amount of information available, and largely unaffected by the technological advances in the communications field.

These faculties cannot be nurtured and stimulated through training programmes. They can only grow and flourish in communities dedicated to free and scholarly inquiry, through untrampled exposure to cross fertilisation and mutual criticism by other creative minds committed to the pursuit of truth and excellence. This may well be a characterisation of our universities in the near future.

Part of our incapacity fully to comprehend what is happening to us in the changing conditions of the world, despite the plethora of available information, lies in the inadequacies of present conceptual frameworks. We almost need a new language and we certainly need new concepts which will enable us to select, synthesize and conceptualize the full implications and the human significance of the challenges we face, of the changes we are going through, and of the means we will choose to meet these problems.

In short, what we need, and what we should work towards is a comprehensive democratic theory of the management of orderly and humane societal transformation. The new concepts and the new language of such a theory will quite possibly, but not necessarily, be developed in such centres of critical judgement and discovery. If in the past, science greatly drew on the concepts of mechanics for the construction of its models, now electronics and higher mathematics have become such a source of conceptual imagery. But their application to the broader problems of social transformation in ways that would have operational significance, largely still remains to be done.

Interdependence, the need for greater international understanding that goes deeper than the level of superficial contacts through commerce and tourism, or through vicarious experience through exposure to the media, but also the need for much higher levels of cooperation among nations as well as within nations, the need for greater social cohesiveness in the face of stronger tendencies towards social fragmentation, all point to the need for expanded consciousness, sensitivity, empathy and human solidarity, not only on the part of governments and national and international bureaucracies, but also between ethnic and communal groups within the same country and among the transnational communities of the faith.

**H**ow does a nation learn to develop these sensibilities? In the past it used to be the churches and the social institutions of other religions

which inculcated and helped to develop the capacity of primary groups for human compassion, transcending the limits of one's own group, and to relate and to trust others who are, in various ways, different from ourselves. Growing secularisation has left us everywhere almost without institutions performing these humanizing functions. We will have to learn to develop new ways and instrumentalities for these purposes in order to bring about the attitudinal changes which are needed to deal with the vast transformations the future will bring.

In doing so we should however not limit ourselves to the education of school children and to the field of child psychology. We will all have to learn to live with the uncertainties of change, with rapid change as a permanent condition of modern life, in ways which do not lead us, in fear and self protection, constantly to fall back on the primordial security and loyalty of one's own primary group, in hostility with all the rest. We will have to learn to live with the increasing vulnerabilities of extremely complex modern societies and an extremely fragile and complex world. We will have to learn how to manage our fears if we are not to perish.

**A**t a more fundamental level, increasing our capacity for almost continuous attitudinal change brings us inevitably face to face with the cultural and religious substratum of our societies in which the values that shape our behaviour are rooted. The different value configurations of each culture are determined by the responses of that culture to the ultimate questions of human existence: death, tragedy, power, love, loyalty and hope, the meaning and purposes of life, one's expectations of life on this earth, as well as with regard to the place of the transcendental in human existence.

These parameters predetermine for each culture, the area of choice and freedom. They set the limits of a nation's capacity to learn and to adjust. They constitute the structure into which new information, new technology and new skills will have to be integrated before they can be used creatively by, and within, that



culture. They prefigure a nation's cultural identity.

History has shown that these parameters are not fixed for all times. They do change, but over long periods of time. More rapid change of these parameters, often as a result of defeat in war, but also because of the overwhelming impact of a more powerful culture, has often, though not always, led to the disintegration of the nation and the collapse of its cultural identity.

The magnitude of the societal changes that are now taking place, as well as of the challenges to which we will have to respond, now make adjustments of these parameters themselves necessary in both developing and industrial society. This will require a continuous process of reinterpretation and rearticulation of the often hidden, but sometimes explicit, assumptions of the culture and religion in which the nation is embedded, as well as reinterpretations of the myths which reflect the unspoken aspirations and purposes of culture and nation.

No technocratic manipulation of values, through the media or more directly, will bring about the kind of attitudinal change which the magnitude and fundamental character of the social changes in which we are already involved, require of us. The impact of any deliberate programme to bring about new attitudes may well be limited. And may be we should say fortunately so. Each nation will have to learn to develop these new attitudes through a clearer awareness of the problems it faces, through a greater capacity to relate the basic assumptions of its culture and its basic values to these problems, and through a greater capacity for national self-reflection, moral reasoning and moral commitment to action. It is a capacity which in the final analysis hinges on the vitality and creativity of that culture.

#### IV

**W**hat can modern communications contribute to the learning capacity of nations?

The search for a democratic theory of societal transformation, valid for an interdependent world

and of global moral relevance, is essentially an intellectual and conceptual activity outside the realm of communications as such. Nevertheless, the mass impact of modern communications makes it incumbent upon the communicators to bring out, not only the social and political implications of the use of new advances in communications technology, but above all their full societal potential. Each new piece of technology creates its own social structure, it becomes part of larger structures, it is embedded in a social system which affects its use, but which itself is also affected by the way it is used.

It is of course not entirely to be foreseen what the ultimate social impact of a piece of new technology is going to be. But awareness of its possible implications and potential may help nations to decide how to regulate its use without restricting its potential and also to make sure, to the extent possible, that its use will not erode the institutions, processes and procedures of democratic life and decision making, but rather strengthen them. Like the medical doctor, the manufacturer of pharmaceuticals, the researcher in microbiology, genetics, pharmacopsychology, and nuclear physics, the inventor and producer of communications technology can no longer summarily dismiss his responsibility for the broader social consequences of his inventions and their production.

**O**f course, scientific and technological creativity has its own thrust and dynamics, but invention and development in the community-field are generally no longer products of the individual mind but of R and D systems which can, and should be held much more socially accountable. And so they have to help identify the moral and political dilemmas these technological advances raise, and to indicate the ways in which their use might strengthen civility and freedom or, conversely, threaten it.

Seen more broadly, modern man's greatest failure so far has been his incapacity to domesticate and to control science and technology. His failure to make them serve social

and ethical purposes. They now derive their main thrust from the increasingly irrational needs in the areas of the production of arms and of a technology of convenience. The crux of the problem which the future poses to the scientific and technological community is whether they can redirect the expansion of knowledge and technology, including communications, to better serve the goals of human survival and peace in justice, as well as the eradication of hunger, disease, illiteracy and backwardness in the larger parts of the world.

**A**n even greater contribution modern communications could make is in the area of improving national and international capability for the management of orderly social change. It is true that humankind's capacity to manage social transformation may quite likely be inadequate in matching the magnitude of the historical forces which seem to be at work today, and which we barely understand. But the utter destructiveness of the means of violence, in problems in which the stakes no longer only involve the possible death of hundreds or thousands of people, but of millions, leaves man no choice but to try.

Modern communications has already contributed a great deal to the information — and management — sciences. But even there we should be more aware that their unthinking application automatically tends to strengthen the power of the center to the detriment of the periphery, to strengthen the capacity to oppress, and to weaken the social conditions for freedom and emancipation. In improving management capability to deal with the problems and challenges ahead we will have to make it more sensitive to the eternal dilemmas of choosing between efficiency and justice, between effectiveness and freedom, between man's inevitable place in a set of information systems, and the privacy he needs to remain autonomous and creative.

The question then which we have to face is, can modern communications be used — and, if so, how — almost against their inherent social implications in ways that will main-



tain and strengthen the essential pluralism of our societies, in ways which will ensure greater capacity and opportunity for the weak, the poor and the uninformed to participate effectively in decisions affecting their lives and those of their family.

This in turn raises more general and fundamental questions of control, both on the national and international level. The struggle for a new world information order at the international level with its problems of the sharing of control in allocating equitably broadcasting and non-broadcasting frequencies, the allocation of electronic spectrum use and the policy problems affecting freedom and the symmetry and asymmetry of information flows, of privacy, as well as Third World representation on the boards of international news agencies, almost all find their counterpart at the domestic national level, in industrial and developing countries alike.

Another dimension which requires more attention is the training of communications technicians. In light of the previous discussion, the need to sensitize them to the broader social and political implications of the emplacement of the technology they are working with, needs no elaboration.

One other important area in which modern communications could make a contribution is mass education. None of the experiments in the use of TV and other electronic media for the purpose of mass education have been very successful. The reason for this may well be that the technology has been put into the hands of educationists alone, without reference to the larger processes of economic and social change and possibly without fully utilizing the possibilities of bringing the medium closer to the felt needs and economic, social and political interests of their clientele. In addition, mass learning will have to be largely self learning within the context of social reinforcement mechanisms. The technologies, both in terms of hardware and software, seem to be all available, but they still remain to be put together more effectively in new open learning systems.

The final question deals with the importance of communications research. Communications research, however, is still a relatively new field, and it has not yet moved much beyond fragmentary studies about impact on, and interaction with specific audiences. It would be unfair, at this early stage, to expect communication research to deal systematically with the communications impact on whole cultures and on macro-processes of social change. Still, at some point soon it will be necessary to address these problems. To this end it will be necessary to draw the best scholars from various social science disciplines into this endeavour. It may be a useful task for the International Institute of Communications to undertake or stimulate it.

A great many studies are at present under way in various places in the world which deal with the shape of the future. Some centre around economic, others around technological projections. One study underway is entitled 'Financing the Future'. These are all legitimate and important approaches. But none deals with the future as an ethical category in which the ethical and value-choices we make today will shape that future. It is in this area in which communications research, with the support of a variety of disciplines, could at least raise the pertinent questions to which communications technology producers, experts, consumers, planners and political decision makers would have to respond.

For, it is clear that unless those of us who are in the field of modern communications face up to these responsibilities, communications will automatically become the hand maiden in mankind's headlong rush into a totalitarian future. If modern communications and the people in that field have the courage to face up to these responsibilities, communications may on the other hand become an important means for the further emancipation of both western and non-western civilisations in ways which will ensure human growth and freedom. For, if there is going to be a tolerable future for all of us, rich or poor, weak or strong, we will have to liberate it.

# The global infrastructure fund

MASAKI NAKAJIMA

THERE is today an ever-intensifying confrontation between the West and the East and manifest discord between the North and the South. These have unfortunately become fundamental frameworks for current disputes in the world. Besides, new gloomy prospects are coming to the surface that refuse to accept rational solutions, such as religious problems, racial issues and military aggravation. Mankind, today, is indeed at a critical turning point in the history of its development.

Of course, in spite of all these worldwide difficulties, a beam of hope is emerging over the horizon. That is, humanity's ardent desire for 'peace construction instead of big war.' The advent of nuclear weapons, which could technically destroy our earth in a matter of hours, is, contradictory as it may

sound, making major international warfare less frequent and less expansive. We must take it for a fact that the deterrent power of nuclear weaponry has contributed to prolonging the intervals of major world wars. So, a very important factor today is the long duration of peace. Whether one likes the present political systems of the Soviet Union and its allies or not, this reality makes it essential that we must find a way of adjusting to the coexistence of the East and West.

The time is, therefore, fast approaching when mankind must design a 'super conception' to establish a new framework of globalism for the future. That is tripartite participation of the developed countries, OPEC countries, and developing countries for the common interest

of solving global problems by sharing all resources, capitals, technologies and management know-how available around the world. What we wish to propose in this paper in the name of the 'Global Infrastructure Fund' (GIF, for short) will be a positive step toward that goal.

Under the prolonged worldwide recession since the early 1970s, every country around the world is today groping for ways to get out of it. The main purpose of GIF is to generate effective demand within this century amounting to more than \$ 500 billion, a sum equivalent in current prices to the US costs of World War II, under the assumption that all leading advanced industrialized countries and oil producing countries cooperate to do so. GIF may be aptly termed a 'Global New Deal', since it has a nature of public investments for common use by the world which go beyond a given national economy. GIF aims at developing new sources of energy and increasing food production for the world, thereby trying to establish long-range programmes to overcome current worldwide stagflation.

It is expected that the implementation of various 'super projects' proposed in the framework of GIF would lead to the development of peaceful demand in the manufacturing industry as well as of technological incentives in advanced countries in lieu of arms production. It is to be fully recognized that the lapse of 36 years since the end of World War II has seen the resurgence of narrow-minded nationalism in various parts of the world, which in turn has fomented political and economic uncertainties. Now is the time for mankind to assert positively a bold and long-range vision. And that vision should be the one based upon a worldwide perspective which transcends narrow or short-term national interests. As Solomon said, 'where there is no vision, a people perishes'.

**G**IF is theoretically based upon contemporary perceptions of the reassessment of Nikolai Kondratiev's long-term business cycle

theory as well as upon the global application, or 'globalization' of the Keynesian economic development theory. The following is our rationale behind these two theoretical backgrounds.

The post-World War II economic activity and growth which continued during the 1950s and 1960s were a reaction to the ravages of a major war. Coming into the 1970s, protracted sluggishness of economic growth was experienced, and the term 'stagflation' entered our daily vocabulary. Stagflation, meaning the unusual and bizarre combination of two opposite economic evils, i.e., 'stagnation' and 'inflation,' is today deep into our society. As things stand, there is no widely accepted consensus among all countries afflicted with it as to its cure. We submit, however, that in a nutshell, stagflation may be regarded as a metamorphosis of the 18th and 19th centuries' 'financial crisis' followed by deep recessions.

In trying to work out some solution to stagflation, we may first of all pay some renewed attention to the implications of the predictions made by a Russian economist, Nikolai Kondratiev in the 1920s. He postulated the well known theory of long-term business cycles, in which he identified four basic 'conditions' which would affect worldwide economic and business trends over the long run. One war, two technological innovation, three money supply, and four resources.

**O**f the four conditions postulated by him, 'big war' does not apply at present, even though there have been localized wars. As for 'technological innovation,' it is today often pointed out that the world is at the bottom of the Kondratiev cycles, with no major breakthrough technologies in sight until probably after the turn of the next century. Concerning 'money supply,' trends are clearly toward using the restricted monetary and fiscal policies in many industrially advanced countries owing to the huge drainage of petrodollars causing high-level inflation. Finally, speaking of 'resources,' we have come to recognize the growing concern for developing alternative sources of energy and other re-

sources. No doubt, the Venice Summit talks agreed upon the importance of these economic issues for the decade of the 1980s. While proclaiming 'there are no quick or easy solutions,' they declared that 'the reduction of inflation is our immediate top priority and will benefit all nations.' Another major highlight of the agreement reached at Venice is the recognition that 'the industrialized countries of the free world, the oil producing countries, and the nonoil producing developing countries depend upon each other for the realization of their potential for economic development and prosperity.' This attitude underscores the growing importance of resources development from a global perspective. Thus, a contemporary reassessment of the Kondratiev theory assures us of even closer interconnection on a global scale as a key to the future development of our world.

**A**s is generally known, the Keynesian economic theory, born out of the crisis in the 1930s, has provided theoretical support for economic policies adopted by major advanced industrialized countries since World War II. His contribution to economic policy was first, incisive criticism of the classic gold-standard theory and, second, policy for the stimulation of effective demand.

The counter-cyclical ideas since the latter half of the 1950s rested, in part, upon policies for the maintenance of growth through an effective stimulation of demand in the Keynesian fashion or New Economics. This policy operated with good results for nearly two decades after the war. Recently, however, its various inherent problems have become subject to serious reflection. The first of these is that a policy for stimulation of effective demand contains, by its very nature, an inflationary trend.

The second problem is that such a policy has led to increased restraints on the supply of resources by increasing consumption, both in terms of quality and quantity, in all countries. The inflationary trend that was encouraged by growth policies was called a mere 'creeping' inflation so long as these restraints

on the supply of resources did not arise. But, a genuine inflation became evident when human and other resources necessary for growth became restricted.

**I**n today's world, however, the development of nuclear weaponry and their deterrent effect rule out a large-scale war that would involve major industrial nations. The political and economic consequences of the Vietnam war clearly demonstrate that while localized warfare can create temporary economic stimulation, it does not have long-range effects.

In order, therefore, to overcome the present worldwide recession, there is no other alternative but to stimulate private business activity in the major industrialized nations. Enterprises will not invest unless they can accept profits, while the incentive for new investments has already been reduced by the stagnation in technological innovation. This situation is expected to prevail for a long time to come (e.g., until the end of the present century, based on the Kondratiev cycles). It seems too early to predict what future technological innovation will be. Consequently, we believe in order to allow the existing world economic system to follow a peaceful and steady course without excessive dependence upon military expenditures, a type of public investments on a global scale would be strategically effective.

However, all the conventional types of public investments have their limits in terms of needs and capabilities when looked at solely in the light of each national economy. For instance, among the advanced industrialized countries, West Germany does not require much public investment. On the other hand, while there is great need for this among the developing nations (e.g., Africa, Southeast Asia), they lack the means to carry through such investments. Therefore, it will be necessary to implement New Deal policies on a global scale in order to first stimulate private business activity in the advanced industrialized countries and then extend its effects to the economies of the developing countries.

Under the framework of GIF, therefore, we are proposing such type of 'multinational public investments' to be carried out on a global scale. Their planning and implementation for worldwide activity should be most effective as a long-range massive economic development policy with global application of the Keynesian theory. In this respect, GIF may be synonymous with a 'Global New Deal' in approach. What we mean by a 'multinational public investment' is an entirely new kind of project that involves some countries both in terms of its execution and benefits, and in which the period of implementation and the size of investment far exceed the scope of public investments made by a single country within its single national boundary. Moreover, since the major objective of such multinational investment would be to remove restraints on resources, it would also serve to eliminate stagnant economic activities and unemployment. Included, for instance, would be the development of untapped energy resources, the development of oceanic resources, and the improvement of environments. As examples of such projects, there are many expansive concepts that, since the last century, have been described as 'Engineers' Dreams' or 'Super Projects.' Since December, 1977, we have tentatively listed up twelve such 'Super Projects' to stimulate further discussion among macroengineers and development specialists.

**T**he major purposes and prominent development aims of GIF will be treated in this paper as 'basic philosophy.' First and foremost, GIF clearly postulates that humanity must pursue the fundamental idea of 'peace construction instead of big war' as its long-range global aim. As earlier indicated, today's situations are maintained in a delicate balance by the deterrent power of nuclear weaponry, but it is by no means the best and most ideal way of upholding world peace. GIF is dedicated from a strictly non-military perspective to make both the free world and socialist bloc pool their constructive resources for a common effort in the field of third world development.

Second, GIF strongly and pre-eminently postulates that industrialized countries and developing countries both must stand on equal footing or stance for global development, i.e., we advocate the principle of 'equal partnership.'

Third, it is crucial that development programmes should be carried out on a global scale. The problems facing the world today should be viewed in the perspective of 'globalism', which transcends 'nationalism'. Supported by a separate, independent and international organization (as will be elaborated later), GIF aims at simultaneous solving of stagflation (on the part of industrialized countries) and development problems (on the part of the third world) on a global scale. For that goal to be achieved, of course, it would become crucial for both the North and the South to closely collaborate and make joint, common efforts trying to solve long-range problems. And through such kind of collaboration, the true meaning of globalism would emerge.

**F**ourth, as implied in the third point above, GIF is concerned not merely with a strategy for solving long-term economic stagnation of the developed countries, but also has aspects bearing upon the strong development of ideal North-South interrelationship. GIF could produce development effects in the South through its related sub-infrastructure such as transportations, communications, etc., and on the job training opportunities would be created as a way of raising socio-educational levels. In this way, GIF would make it highly effective to transfer technologies from the developed countries to the developing countries, especially, 'standard' technologies that are so abundant. Through this process, unused productive capacity of the advanced countries could also be effectively transferred as basis of standard technologies.

Fifth, GIF specifically takes a long-term outlook, asking how we should envisage the world at the end of the twentieth century and on into the twenty-first. We realized that a proposal of this nature would not have immediate, direct, short-term impact

upon the current debate over international economic policies. GIF is primarily directed toward establishing a long-range strategy for shaping the future of mankind. Because of this specific nature, once a typical GIF project took off, it would ensure the continuity of operation, during which time many opportunities could be created to fulfil basic needs on the part of recipient countries.

In order to make effective transfer of resources from the North to the South, projects for development purposes must be clearly defined and must be made concrete ones in specifications, with the formula of implementation to be studied from an entirely new angle. We, therefore, propose GIF should be 'project-oriented' rather than traditional 'money oriented.'

**W**e have observed that past and current development programmes largely fall into the 'money oriented' category. There have been some reports that development fund is being directed into uses non-essential for the country concerned, or that leakage is occurring. To prevent this, it is extremely important to define our projects and clearly account for the use of funds. As a corollary of this 'project oriented' approach, GIF also advocates that funds should not be dispersed among too many small-scale projects. In order to generate sufficient multiplier effects, there is empirical evidence of the greater need to design projects on a very large scale. In this respect, one may recall that the U.S.'s military expenditures during World War II would amount, at 1975 prices, to some \$ 530 billion; a massive stimulus of, at least, that magnitude would be required.

In order to realize these projects, we propose a 13-billion dollar annual fund, to be established under the name of the 'Global Infrastructure Fund' (GIF) — with annual contributions of five billion dollars collectively from the U.S., West Germany and Japan, another five billion dollars from OPEC; and remaining three billion dollars from other industrialized countries. Such an annual fund of 13 billion dollars would serve to finance projects with multiplier effects on a 25 billion

dollar scale annually. Every year, until the end of this century, these countries would continue to donate funds as allocated above. The total impact of GIF, for 20 years and with multiplier effects, would reach a level of 500 billion dollars. Such an amount would not yet be very large for expenditures on public works of worldwide dimensions, but its purpose is to carry out a pump-priming role that would arouse effective demand comparable to the military expenditures during World War II by the U.S.

**W**e also propose that, in view of the total fund impact of 500 billion dollars until the end of the current century, we could design and implement at least fifty large global infrastructure or super-infrastructure projects, each costing around ten billion dollars. Each super-project would be designed to take 10 to 20 years for completion. Of course, it might not be expected to establish such an extra-large development fund all at once from the start. Some kind of 'rolling plan' should be introduced, and one after another carefully screened projects should take off with clearly earmarked funds and step-by-step schedules. And each project should be subjected to rigorous 'annual review' both by the donor nations and recipient countries through an appropriate, independent international organization (as will be elaborated later).

The five-billion dollar annual contribution by the U.S., West Germany and Japan, as well as another three billion dollars from other advanced countries — sum total of eight billion dollars a year — should be realised by cuts on military spending across the board. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are today spending \$ 600 billion annually for the military. We believe that the arms race must be decelerated, and these two biggest powers should take the initiative in achieving 'disarmament for development'. The idea of 'disarmament for development' is not necessarily a fancy; we remember when, back in 1978, the U.N. General Assembly discussed the 17-nation proposal exactly for that purpose. More recently, in May, 1979, Robert S. McNamara, former President of the World

Bank, urged the industrialized nations to take some of the 400 billion dollars they spend on arms and use it instead to reduce world poverty.

Now, about the OPEC contribution, OPEC, in 1979, had a surplus of some \$ 65 billion on its current account balance, compared with seven billion dollars for 1978. This was an all-time high since 1973. Looking into 1980, OPEC could even garner upwards of \$ 110-120 billion, quite an improvement over the 1979 record surplus. Recycling of petrodollars, then, naturally becomes a very important issue for the world.

Given the assumption that OPEC could continue to accumulate surpluses every year afterwards from now, it would not be too difficult to expect OPEC to consider the annual five billion dollars contribution to GIF. Their investment to GIF would also benefit them, since our super-infrastructure projects would be mainly aimed at developing new energy resources, so that it would help conserve their petroleum, which should be reserved as a valuable material for petrochemical industrial development rather than burn out. At the same time, OPEC would be able to become leader of the third world and secure the right of voice on the new energy strategy for the world. All of which, as we hope, would reduce the need for massive military spending in the problem areas and would bring out lasting peace—an important factor to enable OPEC countries to spare petrodollars for development aid programmes.

**W**e have tentatively proposed twelve 'super projects' that might qualify for funding within the framework of GIF (refer to page 44). These are, however, merely illustrative ideas (some of which have long been known as 'Engineers' Dreams' or 'Macroengineering Projects'). Our preliminary study has led to uncovering more than 100 such ideas and concepts, primarily based on documented sources. These additional 100 plus may be broadly grouped as follows: 12 within Europe, 26 within Africa, 6 within Middle East, 12 within Asia, 15

within Latin America, 6 within North Africa, 1 within Greenland, 2 within Australia, 2 within China, 5 within the Soviet Union, 11 energy projects (no geographical limitations), 4 space projects (same as before) and 8 oceanic projects (same as before) — total 110.

A quick review of these sources indicates that some are still simple ideas, but many are serious engineers' dreams and many could be evaluated as quite feasible macro-engineering and super-development projects.

**W**e propose that GIF should be established as a fund separate from existing international organizations (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) because such organisations have become the scene of international conflicts of interest, and have sometimes created difficulties in obtaining positive consensus owing to 'too many voices'.

On the other hand, GIF must not be regarded as a monetary relief measure aimed at alleviating the accumulated foreign indebtedness of developing countries, a problem that calls for a solution today and within the existing international system. Our concept of GIF has an entirely different and uniquely structured objectives and mission vis-à-vis the ongoing international bodies. We believe in order to fulfill these goals in the most effective manner, a 'new' appropriate international organization would become necessary. As for the specific modus operandi of the proposed new workable structure, we provisionally envision the establishment of a 'central' organization to be composed of main donor-countries (advanced industrialized countries and OPEC countries). The central organization of GIF would function to design and screen appropriate projects and supervise the financing and auditing. The Fund would also have a number of 'regional' organizations to be located in recipient countries and to be managed in close cooperation with the central body; the regional ones would be held responsible directly for implementing the approved projects and maintaining the operations. These regional branches might be estab-

lished according to the geographical locations of the GIF projects.

**T**he international status of the GIF organization could be substantially enhanced if the countries from the socialist bloc would participate through means appropriate to them, thereby providing a greater opportunity for the new sense of the East-West detente. We would welcome socialist countries to join with the West and OPEC, and fund commonly interested projects and carry them out together. Historically, when the Marshall Plan was formulated in 1947 and an invitation extended to the Soviet Union to participate in it, Stalin refused his satellites permission to cooperate. Although the Marshall Plan turned out very successful, it resulted in keeping the Soviet Union from greater interaction with the West for the purpose of development programmes collaboration.

As for the type of financing, GIF should consist of both 'grants' and 'loans' (and some combination thereof, depending on the projects). Primarily, however, GIF should be directed toward a type of multinational public investment project that could not be adequately handled by any existing international organization because of its massive fund need and/or extra-long duration of execution as well as the depth and width of the project. For this type of 'super project', typically, a grant or an extra long-term soft loan would apply—a good example of this being a project for food production, establishment of large-scale irrigation systems, development of alternative energy sources. In contrast, for a microengineering project such as a canal construction which might become profitable upon completion, loans might be preferable. In some cases, loans might be negotiated with existing international organizations.

Once GIF projects were completed we also propose they be protected under some kind of 'international convention' and designated as 'non-bombardment objects' as is the case of Paris. Giving that kind of status to GIF projects would also serve to create the worldwide realization that GIF is truly 'for peace

construction instead of big war' both in name and in substance.

(1) *Promotion of the North-South dialogue* In the planning and execution of GIF projects, it would be necessary to give substantial autonomy and authority to the areas where the projects are to take place, while at the same time maintaining the principle of international harmony. This should contribute to a further promotion of the North-South dialogue.

In the course of project development, designing and implementing of a typical super-infrastructure project would also give rise to the need for some related sub-infrastructure development, especially transportations, communications, educational and training institutions, hospitals, housing or town planning. In these areas, 'standard technologies' readily available in major industrialized countries could be transferred to the third world as part of the super-infrastructure programme, thereby promoting a local economic climate, i.e., economic capabilities.

A typical GIF project would require an extra long-range time span (say, 10 to 20 years) for completion. During that period of development, while related standard technologies are being transferred, recipient nations would have a great deal of opportunity for applying transferred technologies locally by means of on-the-job training at various stages of project development. The result would be the enhanced basis of the third world for further economic and industrial takeoff.

Such an approach would constitute a grass-roots approach as it were, i.e., development of society from its bottom up (or perspective of its basic human needs), in contrast with the traditional macroplanning, i.e., development from top down. The GIF concept for the transfer of standard technologies in this way, therefore, would also stimulate effective demand on the part of industrialized countries simultaneously.

(2) *Development of third world capabilities*: Upon the completion of a typical super-infrastructure pro-

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Dilip Chowdury". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

DILIP CHOWDURY (1935 — 1982)

WHO died on the evening of August 19, was one of those who helped mould and design the 'face' of *Seminar* — the cover. It was a long association of nearly a quarter of a century, beginning with our very first issue in September 1959. Dilip was a pioneer. Design, its compulsions and its thrust, its fundamental role in all activity, was a burning passion with him, permeating everything he did. Despite the struggles he had to wage on many fronts, struggles for survival, his passion kept him principled and uncompromising to the bitter end, a quality given to very few. He was too young to go. Only 47, and we in *Seminar* will always remember him.



A note from

## seminar

Dear Subscriber,

We post SEMINAR on the 1st of every month. If your copy does not reach you by the fifteenth of that month, please inform us immediately so that we can send a replacement. Complaints of non-receipt of copies at a later date makes it impossible for us to do anything in the matter.

Circulation Manager  
SEMINAR, P.B. No. 338  
New Delhi-110001

## A BUSY MAN NEEDS A BANK THAT MEANS BUSINESS.


Grindlays services  
just for you:



Efficient,  
personalised service




Prompt, comprehensive  
replies to  
correspondence/  
queries



Regular payments  
of fixed amounts,  
e.g., insurance premia,  
membership subscrip-  
tions, recurring deposits,  
etc., against your  
standing instructions



Investment counselling  
on savings plans, safe  
custody facilities for  
documents, shares  
and other valuables



Grindlays — Professionals in banking



**Grindlays  
Bank p.l.c.**

Incorporated in the United Kingdom.  
The liability of members is limited.

ASP/HK/387/145 A



ject, it would have major direct effects upon the nonoil producing third world through the development of energy resources to replace oil, increased agricultural production, and comprehensive development of all related sub-infrastructure. Over the long run, such a project would also serve effectively for the solution of population explosion in the South as the result of socio-economic improvements (e.g., higher nutrition and lower birth rate).

(3) *Creation of new effective demand in advanced countries.* GIF would provide an opportunity and a great challenge for the creation of new, massive effective demand in the field of industries and technologies in developed countries. GIF would not only serve to stimulate direct demand for the machinery and other capital goods which would be required for the construction of global infrastructures, but also kindle interest in new industrial innovations, if not radical breakthroughs.

(4) *Avoidance of recessions in the third world.* Another important contribution by GIF is that investments in GIF projects would not, by virtue of their nature, result in 'over production' quite unlike conventional private investments. A typical GIF project would be directed primarily to fulfil basic human needs (food production, irrigation development, etc.) as well as to improve environments (development of alternative energy resources, etc.), so it would be the 1947 Marshall plan-type 'commodity aid' programme. GIF could effectively avoid the danger of creating unnecessary 'recessionary' consequences by overproduction.

(5) *Reflection of greater OPEC voice.* Last but not least, we are today faced with the urgent task of evolving ways and means of absorbing and recycling mounting excessive international liquidities. The accumulated liquidities are not necessarily being effectively utilized at present. As a matter of fact, one of the greatest causes of today's stagflation worldwide is the 'uneven distribution' of accumulated liquidities due to the inadequate reflection of the voices of surplus countries within existing international monetary

systems. For instance, Dr Rimmer de Vries, senior vice president of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York and an international monetary authority, stated on a visit to Tokyo that the IMF had become today increasingly ineffective in absorbing and recycling petrodollars for constructive use. The IMF must be restructured so as to reflect the voice of OPEC and permit OPEC's greater participation in it.

By having OPEC participate in GIF, it would become quite feasible to preserve 'oil' as a valuable industrial material instead of lavishing it as a source of heat. Should we fail in this effort, it is possible that it might lead to another chaos similar to the 1973-74 oil crisis. In such an event, the nations of the world would not be able to join together and establish another 'new international economic order'. Our proposal of GIF could serve to check such an unwanted plight out of providing direct avenues for close dialogue with, and greater participation from, OPEC countries.

#### PRIMARY EXAMPLES OF GIF CONCEPTS

##### 1 *Greening of deserts*

Greening of the deserts in the Sahara, the Sinai and the Arabian peninsula. The related countries are North African Nations, Israel and Arab states.

##### 2 *Collection station for solar heat*

Erection of a large-scale installation for the collection of solar energy in a remote part of the world. Total investment in land, pipelines, and accessory equipment would reach \$20 to \$50 trillion. Its total annual energy output would be equivalent to 200 billion barrels of oil.

##### 3 *Second Panama Canal*

(1) Construction in Panama of The Second Canal according to the plan of Shigeo Nagano, President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. (2) Construction in Nicaragua of a large canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The related countries are U.S., Panama and Nicaragua.

##### 4 *Kra Isthmus Canal*

A 170-kilometer-long canal linking Phang-nga Bay on the west coast to the Gulf of Siam on the east coast.

This would shorten by 2,400 km the sailing distance to and from the Indian Ocean. The related countries are Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.

##### 5 *Electric power generation using oceanic energy*

(1) There are 12 promising areas along undeveloped ocean shores extending from the equator to the temperate zones. Maximum generating potential of one area, 35 million kw. Total for 12 areas about 200 million kw. (2) Oceanic thermal energy conversion (OTEC). (3) Tidal electric power generation.

##### 6 *Himalayan hydro-electric project*

Damming of the Sanpo River on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra in the frontier area between China and the Indian province of Assam to make it flow into India through a tunnel across the Himalayas. Potential generating capacity 50 million kw in maximum, 37 million kw in average. Annual generating capacity 240 billion to 330 billion kWh.

##### 7 *Control of sea currents in the Bering Strait*

Construct a dam across the Bering Strait at its narrowest point (85 km wide, 45 m deep) and control the sea currents flowing from the Arctic Ocean. This would alter atmospheric conditions in the North Pacific and make the climate more temperate. The related countries are the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

##### 8 *African central lake*

Control the flow of the Congo River by building a dam to create a vast lake in the Congo and Chad regions of central Africa to improve natural conditions in the area. The related countries are Central African nations.

##### 9 *Hydraulic power plant in South America*

Construction of 9 dams and 7 artificial lakes across the Amazon and the Orinoco and the Paraguay. The related countries are Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay and Argentina.

##### 10 *Quattara Depression project*

Construction of the canal between El Dabaa and El Sera. Construction of port at El Sera. By the flow of water through the canal, electric power is generated. The related country is Egypt.

##### 11 *New silk road*

Construction of a super highway, modern version of ancient "Silk Road" across the Eurasian continent from the central part of Europe to China. The related regions are Europe, Middle East, central Asia, the U.S.S.R. and China.

##### 12 *Gibraltar Strait bridge/tunnel*

Construction of a bridge/tunnel between Morocco and Spain. European and African continents are connected through the surface transportation. The primary commodity is to be carried easily from Africa to Europe. The products of both the continents are exchanged quite easily through the bridge.

# Books

**INDIAN WOMEN AND PATRIARCHY** by Maria Mies  
Mies Concept Publishing Co, New Delhi, 1980

**HER GOLD AND HER BODY** by Jamila Verghese  
Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980

**WOMEN IN CHINA** by Hasna Jasimuddin  
Moudud Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980.

MARIA Mies book theorizes on the social condition of Indian women which permits changes in public roles, while continuing to restrict private roles. She points out quite rightly that the theoretical formulations applicable to women in industrialized societies are inadequate when providing a framework for the study of women in less industrialized and more traditional societies. While in both industrialized and traditional societies women play dependency roles, in India with its distinct social and cultural background these roles tend to be emphasized and the role of the family is functionally different in the two socio-economic systems.

In the West, according to Maria Mies' assessment, the women's movement has understood the challenge it can pose to the capitalist system based on the separation between the productive male sphere and the reproductive female sphere. This movement further challenges the sexual division of labour and the institution of the family which is perceived as the instrument which continues to subjugate women. In India, this is conceptually different. The family has never been rejected, even during the heyday of the women's movement, and despite the family's certain involvement in the subjugation of women as is evident from Jamila Verghese's book, the family continues to be important today in charting the course women take. Mies thinks that women in India are more readily mobilized around general economic and political issues than on issues specifically related to their problems.

This lack of conflict between the perceived interests of Indian women and the family intrigues the author, who finds that the collusion prolongs this subjugation. The author tries to apply the role conflict theory to Indian women but finds its application limited to middle class women, who feel pressurised by the duality of careers and family obligations imposed on them. This overlooks the majority of Indian women who are routinely subject to extremely adverse economic and social conditions and play a variety of social and economic roles without apparently finding them conflicting. While Maria Mies states that role conflict exists for all class levels, her study, however, is confined to middle

class women who seek employment mainly for economic reasons and sometimes for emancipatory ends. This results in conflicts when women are forced to continue in their subsidiary domestic roles despite their economic self sufficiency and despite the support of their families for their career.

The book does not touch upon the concerns of women in rural areas or those not professionally employed, who nevertheless make a major contribution to household finances without apparent role conflict. The application of the role conflict theory, therefore, appears to be more closely correlated to education and the consequent raising of expectations rather than simply to economic independence. This is not to deny that women with even a modicum of economic independence do not exercise better control in domestic decision making, but that impatience with continuing inflexible domestic constraints, provokes more reaction from women already trained to question irrational behaviour or ideology and possessing a certain degree of economic autonomy.

Maria Mies' contribution to the growing body of literature on Indian women should be of interest to women's groups and to social scientists since it raises questions which need to be further explored. For, even when one disagrees with her conclusions, as for example her discounting the lack of a women's movement due to the divisions of caste, class and regional nationalisms in India, which is not born out by the political and social trends current in Indian society, the validity of her questions remains.

Jamila Verghese has painstakingly documented the new and disturbing form taken by dowry seekers in her book *Her Gold and Her Body*. Parents of bridegrooms propelled by greed kill brides by burning them, in order to usurp their dowry and to marry off the bridegroom again for further financial gain through dowry from another bride. The mental anguish of parents subject to financial and social constraints, unable to support their daughter economically, or socially to enable her to leave a potentially dangerous environment and seek shelter with them, are also unable to get her justice in death and have her murderers convicted.

The author has researched the historical background of the subjugation of women and notes its universality over the East and the West. The periods of subjugation and emancipation are cyclical in both parts of the world, the subjugation has been enforced through a combination of socio-religious fiat. Implicit in this analysis is the inability of legislative changes to effect deeply entrenched social attitudes and the alarming effects that social indifference or neglect can have on social problems particularly as they relate to women.

This book, despite the importance of its subject matter and the fact of its being well researched, is

not easy to read, since the author has attempted a difficult style which brings together history, sociology and dramatized case histories of the victims of assault. However, it should be widely read because the continuation of the custom of dowry degrades all women. It demonstrates a disregard for change and modernization taking place in other spheres of Indian life, it pinpoints the essential weakness of the Indian family and social structure which provides support for men but not for women, to the extent that women threatened or endangered by their in-laws cannot find enough support, either from their families or from government or social welfare organizations, to leave before they are killed.

The continuance of the custom implies that the progress in women's education, the wider acceptance of their public roles, still does not elevate their status with their own families or with society sufficiently to lead to an acceptance based on their intrinsic worth. This book has the potential of stimulating public opinion to the point of implementing laws already on the statute books.

Finally, *Women in China* by Hasna Jasimuddin Moudud is a misnomer for, while there are some references to the author's concerns with women's issues and to Chinese women, the volume is by no means solely devoted to Chinese women. From the limited references to Chinese women, it appears that not unlike women in other parts of the developing world, they too have legislative rights without the necessary enforcement. The author mentions the Federation of Chinese Women, an organization fighting for this enforcement and for the revision of certain legislation and the implementation of equality in the wage structure. One interesting point with regard to the Chinese attitude towards birth control emerges from the fact that they provide no facilities for unwanted children, only for children who are victims of natural disasters. Also, women have to apply to their place of work for permission to conceive a baby, and this is granted to fit in with the schedule of the workers and the office. For the rest we are treated to the reactions of the author to sights seen, places visited and people met, in the course of a short visit to China.

Shahida Lateef

**BONDED LABOUR IN INDIA National Survey  
on the Incidence of Bonded Labour, Final Report,  
January, 1981, by Sarma Marla Biblia Impex  
Private Ltd, New Delhi**

A national survey was conducted in 1978 to determine the incidence and characteristics of bonded labour in the country. The publication under review is the final report of the survey, conducted jointly by the Gandhi Peace Foundation and the National Labour Institute. The project headed by Dr. Sarma Marla assessed that there were at least 26 lakh persons working as bonded slaves in India.

Although the survey was confined to the agricultural sector alone and covered only ten States, its vital importance cannot be undermined. Punjab, Haryana, W Bengal, Kerala and the North Eastern States were excluded on the presumption that bondage was unlikely to exist owing to the nature of production relations and the specific characteristics of agriculture in these States. Given the findings of the survey, however, which indicate that bondage exists in areas in different stages of development, it would be important to study the States excluded. Marla himself admits that there exist 'disguised forms of dependency' for instance in W Bengal, a study of which may influence the identification of bondage elsewhere.

Tomes have been written on the Indian peasantry, and our historians and economists have been occupied with the debate on production relations in agriculture in the pre-British and post-British periods. The problem, however, of bondage, which emerges from a relationship of the complete dependence of the debtor on the creditor, has been virtually ignored.

Under the system of bondage, an individual pledges his person in lieu of an advance (loan). This agreement renders the debtor at the complete mercy of the creditor, who is in fact forced to forfeit his freedom to seek employment elsewhere; to move freely through the territory of India ('in most cases he is not even allowed to leave his village') and to sell his labour/produce. The wages (if paid at all) are below the average minimum wage and are often paid in kind leaving him virtually incapable of clearing his debt. Marla observes that 'the more characteristic feature of bondage is the indefinite period of bondage', with reference to the findings of the survey in U P that 'once in bondage a person can never succeed in freeing himself'.

This characteristic of the bonded labour system where the clearing of a debt passes from one generation to another is also evident from Marla's statistics in 26% of the cases observed the original debtor was unknown and in 17.6% the bonded slave was working towards clearing the debt left by his father.

An important fact noted by the survey, which goes contrary to the theories of many who have written on indebtedness, is that 'among the reasons for taking loans the domestic reason ranks highest of all' rather than other superfluous expenditure. Unable to meet the basic requirements of the home, given the lack of alternate sources of employment rather than starve, individuals are drawn into bondage.

Given this scenario of the mechanism evolved by the rural elite to maximise their benefit from this supply of cheap, surplus labour, it is not surprising to find that 90.2% of these landlords do not own agricultural machinery. Nor is it strange that 86.6% of those bonded belong to the socially and economi-

cally most backward section; the scheduled castes and tribes.

The system of bondage forces the woman of the family to become the main bread earner, while at the same time she and the children can be called in to do odd jobs for the master or work in the absence of the person bonded, with no remuneration. With reference to Tamil Nadu, Marla says that 'according to the reports we have recently received there is woman bondage in a disguised form. Usually they have to work for the master when the husband is sent out of the village by the master for a different work.'

According to Marla, bondage is to be found wherever there is 'a social encounter between the landed upper caste Hindus, propertied peasant castes, ritually categorised as Sudras, and the poverty stricken scheduled castes and tribes'. This generalisation fails to take into account the fact that 28% of the masters belong to the scheduled castes and tribes. Marla, in his attempt to view the caste and the class factor separately, has thus arrived at generalisations which do not always match his own statistics. He has in fact made a serious omission in the questionnaire on which the survey was based. While collecting information on the pattern of land-holdings of the bonded labourers, he has failed to investigate the same in the case of the masters. Land distribution is an important indicator of the agrarian system, particularly when, as in the case of India, there is a concentration of land in a few hands. This would also provide perhaps the explanation to how such a sizeable section of the masters belong to the SC/ST.

Given the fact that it is the only all-India survey on bonded labour and has thus brought out hitherto little known facts, the findings are most valuable. What is unfortunate however is that Marla has been able to provide little analysis to put these facts into perspective. Despite the fact that during the survey the investigators found that '30% of the bonded labourers interviewed by us had become bonded after the Act (1976) was passed,' Marla does not attempt to analyse why the bonded labour system has resisted the laws to abolish it or why it has persisted despite modernisation. On the other hand, he congratulates the Indian State for passing the Act. Nor does he analyse the system of bonded labour in the context of the Indian social system, and the stagnation in Indian agrarian economy. Inadvertently, the survey reveals that legislation is not an effective mechanism for the abolition of the bonded labour system, a system which is protected by State governments themselves'. (One must not forget that the Bihar government fought hard to deny the very existence of the system in the State).

Thus, despite these criticisms one must admit that Marla's work has indeed been of supreme importance given the ignorance on the subject. It is also a valiant effort given the problems of identification of bonded labourers, and for this one must also con-

gratulate the investigators who contributed towards this end.

Namita Sinha

**THE OUTLOOK TOWER: Essays on Urbanization in Memory of Patrick Geddes**, edited by J V. Ferreira and S S. Jha. Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1976.

**AN ALTERNATIVE URBAN STRATEGY** by William S W Lim. DP Architects (pte) Singapore, 1980.

URBAN development in the third world has raised a challenge which is undoubtedly beyond the capacity of concepts developed recently in the industrially advanced countries, and which have been applied indiscriminately to the planning of our cities. The alarming growth of slums and squatter settlements, the inadequacy and inappropriateness of urban infrastructural systems, the glaring inequity in distribution of community facilities in our cities, and the breakdown of the cohesiveness of community life are the symptoms of a malaise which mocks at the attempts of town planners and city administrators in our country today. It is against this background that *The Outlook Tower* comes as a welcome reminder to us that the fundamental values of our civilisation and a painstaking and detailed survey of the present situation are the necessary ingredients for a more relevant urban planning ideology.

It may come as a surprise to many urban planners in India that Patrick Geddes, a pioneer in town planning theory in the first quarter of this century, was the first Professor of Civics and Sociology in the University of Bombay, having served in that capacity from 1919 to 1924. The significance of this fact lies in the complex and rich personality of Geddes. To quote from the first essay of this book, 'The real Geddes, however, was an unusually complete man: one who delighted in escaping from labels, pigeon holes and compartments of learning. Turn by turn he was a botanist, an economist, a sociologist, an art critic, a publisher, a civic reformer, a town planner, a producer of pageants, an academic revolutionary, a teacher or as he might have described himself, "a comprehensive, synthesising generalist".'

Some of the important town planning concepts of Geddes included his idea of civic and regional survey or 'diagnosis before treatment', and of 'conservative surgery' instead of wholesale destruction of slum areas. He expressed his basic human principle in his town planning report on Madura in 1915: 'Town Planning is not mere place planning, nor even work planning. If it is to be successful it must be folk planning: its task is to find the right places for each sort of people, places where they will really flourish. To give people in fact the same care that we give when transplanting flowers.'

In the period of 1919-24 Geddes made diagnosis-and-treatment surveys, both under British and local

auspices, of some 50 Indian urban areas. His report for Indore (1918) was, in the words of one of his biographers, 'the most comprehensive and most far-reaching of his Indian town-planning reports' — the two volumes of this report represent a milestone in the study of civic problems in India, indeed in the western world as well, for they contain much that would still give pause to European and American planners' Excerpts from his report on Tanjore (1915) give an idea of how Geddes diagnosed local needs and criticised typical European-type solutions — 'As usual, it is proposed to drive a new grid iron of forty feet streets through a congested and insanitary area. Again, as usual, this dreary and conventional plan is quite unsparing to the old homes and to the neighbourhood life of the area. It leaves fewer housing sites and these mostly narrower than before, and the large population thus expelled would again, as usual, be driven into creating worse congestion in other quarters, to the advantage only of the rack-renting interests.'

This commemorative volume of essays is distinguished not only by a detailed presentation of Geddes' ideas, starting with a compact account of his life and activities, including Jaqueline Tyrwhitt's assemblage of Geddes' statements, proposals and recommendations relating to university life in general and his University of Central India in particular drawn from his celebrated Indore Report, but also by the inclusion of nineteen papers by different authors which deal with various aspects of urban sociology commencing with some of its general aspects and going on to some of its aspects in America, in Asia, in India, in Australia and in Africa

In some sort of contrast to this is the collection of speeches and articles by William S W Lim entitled *An Alternative Urban Strategy*. A much thinner work, got up with the sophistication of modern advertising techniques, this collection puts forward ideas on planning and environment, transport, housing, and values and creativity, which purport to add up to an alternative frame for urban development in the third world. However, the liberal use of jargon and populist catch-phrases on 'consumerism', 'environment', 'energy', 'decentralisation', 'peoples participation', 'limits of resources', 'the creative society', only serves to obscure the importance of indigenous modes in third world situations which would require a new set of problem-definitions before solutions could be effectively proposed. Perhaps most of Lim's perceptions are based on his doubtlessly keen insight into the urban problems of Singapore, but these can hardly be taken as typical of the entire third world situation

The kind of generalisations attempted in this book could be exemplified by the following passage 'The whole world is changing rapidly. Scientific and technological development appears to recognise no frontier. Everything seems possible. Until a value eruption in the West totally destroys the established equilibrium of confidence and serenity. However,

the elite particularly in the Third World still clings desperately to the traditional images of the West. The new value changes are often regarded with disgust out of fear or ignorance. In the meantime, the traditional values in the Third World are being changed, modified or even destroyed through western contacts and influence. The Third World is utterly confused.'

Such statements only emphasise the alienation between the urban planner and ordinary people. One is then reminded of the force of Geddes' double-action formula of 'Place-Work-Folk-Folk-Work-Place', which helps to affirm the primacy of people and their particular place in cities, as much needed today as it ever was, in the third world or in any other world

M N Ashish Ganju

**BEHAVIOUR OF PRICES AND OUTPUTS IN INDIA** by Isher J Ahluwalia The Macmillan Company of India 1979

**THE BEHAVIOUR OF PRICES IN INDIA 1952-70 AN EMPIRICAL STUDY** by Santi K Chakrabarti The Macmillan Company of India, 1977

BOTH the books are condensed versions of Ph D dissertations at MIT and LSE respectively. The former is a macroeconomic model of the Indian economy with five sectors, viz., agriculture, manufacturing, foreign, fiscal and monetary. It covers the period 1951-73. Chakrabarti concentrates on prices and studies in detail, three important price variables — relative price of cereals, price index of manufactures and average wage earnings. He covers the period 1952-66 and later re-runs the model for the larger sample 1952-70.

Isher Ahluwalia attempts to lay more emphasis on the supply side as she feels that the existing models are explicitly Keynesian in their basic framework, with inadequate specification of the supply constraints in the economy. The outstanding feature of the agricultural sector is the treatment of marketed surplus. It is taken to be the true indicator of supply as up to two-thirds of the output is retained for self consumption by the farmer. The econometric results are however open to debate. In the equation which determines marketed surplus, the coefficient of the relative price of foodgrains (an explanatory variable) is negative indicating that in a price-output space, the plotted curve will be downward sloping to the right. This has implications for farmers' self consumption which is just the other side of the coin. It will consequently be positively related with price, implying that a farmer growing wheat will increase his consumption of wheat as its price rises. It is difficult to believe that the Indian farmer is so irrational. It is quite possible that the lady is encountering the standard problem of identification in econometrics. Therefore in effect the esti-

mated function is neither a demand nor a supply function, but just a locus of various equilibrium points. Santi Chakrabarti is unable to derive any conclusive results on the short run price elasticity of marked surplus but finds the long run price elasticity to be zero as opposed to Isher's figure of 0.417.

In the manufacturing sector, capacity utilization is determined endogenously. The demand side is incorporated by including the share of government investment in gross domestic product. This is expected to capture the indirect multiplier effects on overall demand in the economy. Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine the very existence of such an effect. It is therefore felt that the demand side is inadequately represented in this sector. Santi Chakrabarti uses a much more realistic approach. He assumes that prices in manufacturing are determined by the rule of 'Mark up over unit prime costs'. The data shows a clear rising trend in the mark up ratio over time. Chakrabarti attributes this to changes in the quantity of money which undoubtedly have an effect on aggregate monetary demand in the economy. His variable — index of per capita money supply performs fairly well in this context.

In the fiscal sector, direct taxes are divided into agricultural and non-agricultural, and indirect taxes into customs duties and others. Given the contribution of agricultural income tax to government tax revenue it would perhaps have been better to treat them as exogenous. Union excise duties should have been explicitly incorporated as they are the most important of the indirect taxes.

In one equation in the monetary sectors, time deposits and government bonds are taken to be close substitutes. Mrs. Ahluwalia is probably unaware that in India the public hardly buys government bonds. They are generally bought by commercial banks and LIC. Unlike most macroeconomic models, Isher's model has a very attractive feature; it can be quite easily related to textbook economics. The well known classical dichotomy, and the working of the quantity theory of money can very easily be demonstrated by taking a sub system of nine equations in the monetary sector.

The conclusions by both authors are not anything dramatic. Things like the importance of agricultural output in the determination of prices, is not a new story.

Chakrabarti's book does not make very interesting reading as he indulges in hairsplitting on issues of little importance. He is unable to lead the reader, he presents something like ninety regression equations, out of which he ultimately chooses only five. He also seems to be unduly disturbed by marginal differences in goodness of fit, thereby giving undue importance to statistical as opposed to economic results. Isher Ahluwalia on the other hand fails to give satisfactory interpretation to many of her econometric results.

Ashish Lall

## MAHATMA GANDHI : A Biography

B R NANDA

Few men in their lifetime aroused stronger emotions or touched deeper chords of humanity than Gandhi did. 'Generations to come, it may be,' wrote Einstein of Gandhi in July 1944, 'will scarcely believe that such a one as this ever in flesh and blood walked upon this earth'. While millions venerated Gandhi as the Mahatma, the great soul, his political opponents saw in him only an astute politician. Not until 1946-7 (when the transfer of power enabled them in their minds to disengage Mr Gandhi the man from Mr Gandhi the arch-rebel) were the British able to see him in a gentler light. This biography, widely acclaimed on first publication by Allen and Unwin in 1958, has stood the test of time and come to be regarded by many as the standard and fullest 'life' of Gandhi. Carefully researched, objective not compelling, capturing all the nuances of momentous events, it is not only the biography of a remarkable man but also a record and analysis of a critical period in South-Asian history. (1981) 542 PP. Rs 80

### SOME PRESS OPINIONS

- 'an admirable account of the life of Gandhi, from which there emerges a full picture of this strange and attractive man'  
*Lord Attlee, The Spectator*
- 'well arranged and informed by a sense of proportion and relative value. It rescues Gandhi both from the sentimentalists and from the debunkers'  
*The Times*
- 'nobody who takes the subject seriously can afford to be without his (Mr Nanda's) book'  
*B B C Listener*
- 'a vivid picture of his personality and a comprehensive account of his activities. The style is simple and elegant'  
*The Hindu*
- 'an excellent account of Gandhi's life and of the movement for Indian Independence'  
*Times Literary Supplement*
- 'The reading of this book is an exalted kind of experience'  
*Deccan Herald*
- 'complete and readable. Mr B R Nanda makes the Father of Indian Independence a personality from the opening paragraphs'  
*New York Times*
- 'He wields a smooth pen. It is a pleasure to return to the atmosphere created by Mr Nanda.'  
*Saturday Review*
- 'His well-designed and fascinating chronicle is also an interpretation, and therein lies its great value.'  
*Birmingham Post*



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj,  
New Delhi 110002

Bombay Calcutta Madras



## FOUR SWAN FABRICS

FOR ENCHANTING SHADES  
IN COTTON AND BLENDED TEXTURES

Pamper your every whim and fancy with Four Swan Fabrics  
in cotton and Polyester/cotton blends. Crease-resistant  
Four Swan fabrics come in a wide range of colours and prints.

Manufactured by:

**THE VICTORIA MILLS LTD., BOMBAY.**



**MANGALDAS  
GROUP MILLS**

## RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS

A few facts you should know.

Garlic has been well-known from earliest times for its medicinal properties. Medical authorities have accepted the value of garlic in correcting various health problems. Garlic can be taken raw or cooked or in capsule form. But to derive the maximum medicinal benefits from garlic, it should be taken in the most effective way.

### Why not raw Garlic?



Raw garlic cloves have to be chewed before the extract acts inside the body. But when chewed, they leave an unpleasant smell. When swallowed, they are difficult to digest. And the extraction is incomplete.



### Why not cooked Garlic?

On cooking, the effective medicinal properties of garlic are lost.


### Why RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS?

Ranbaxy Laboratories, a trusted name with the medical profession, now gives you all the benefits of raw garlic—without the smell. Ranbaxy's Garlic Pearls contain the pure extract of raw garlic in easy-to-digest, soft gelatin capsules—the most effective way of deriving the medicinal properties of garlic.

#### RANBAXY'S GARLIC PEARLS

- Help relieve gas and indigestion, ease heartburn
- Reduce high cholesterol levels
- Help ease disabling joint pains
- Prevent and control recurring coughs and colds

Take Ranbaxy's Garlic Pearls—everyday  
It's a healthy habit



Take  
two pearls  
twice daily  
regularly.

**The natural way to all-round health.**



Make your gums strong.  
And give your teeth a long life.



**Only Forhan's  
has an exclusive astringent to  
strengthen gums.**

**Forhan's special taste tells you it's working.**

Forhan's astringent actually works to make gums strong. By shrinking gum tissue the astringent keeps gums firm and healthy, checking inflammation and swelling. Only strong gums can give

your teeth a firm foundation and a longer life. Even healthy teeth need the support of strong gums. That is why you need Forhan's - the unique toothpaste with astringent



**Trust Forhan's**

**It's the toothpaste created by a dentist.**

288F-203



# Benefit from our widest range of compressors, backed by the world's foremost air power technology.

## New additions to CP's expanding range

**TB-20½ x 13**

Lubricated/Oil less Horizontal, Reciprocating Compressors

**500-RO-2**

Rotary, Portable Diesel Compressors.

**'TU' & 'TUO'**

Lubricated/Oil less Vertical, Reciprocating Compressors

## Plus 25 other proven and trusted models

Compressors of every description. Portable and Stationary. Electric motor/Diesel engine-driven. Rotary and Reciprocating. Single stage/Two-stage. Air-cooled/Water cooled. Lubricated/Oil-less. Horizontal/Vertical. Single-acting/Double-acting. Balanced-opposed & tandem. In capacities from 3 m<sup>3</sup>/min (108 c f m) to 114 m<sup>3</sup>/min (4000 c f m)

Together, our widest range for every need.

## Why CP Compressors?



CP Compressors are crafted to the highest standards of quality and workmanship and incorporate international designs and know-how. And they're backed by prompt and efficient service both before and after sales. No wonder CP India are today the largest exporters of compressed air equipment to over 15 countries.

Now, what can we offer you?


### CAUTION

Insist on genuine CP spares to keep your CP compressed air equipment working efficiently.

Class TU



Class TB



Class FE

Please contact our nearest branch for literature.


## CONSOLIDATED PNEUMATIC

CONSOLIDATED PNEUMATIC TOOL CO. (INDIA) LTD.

301 L B Shastri Marg, Mulund, Bombay 400 080. Branches at: 30 J. Nehru Road, Calcutta 700 016. Eros Apartments, 56 Nehru Place, New Delhi 110 024. Finance House, Pattulua Road, Madras 600 002. Jamshedpur - Secunderabad - Goa - Bangalore.



The power of air harnessed for higher productivity.



**Fly the only airline in the world  
where you can sit back  
and read the decor.**

Just study the cabin walls. You'll find Indian mythology come alive in Krishna's frolics with gambolling gopis. Gods and goddesses, and lesser mortals centuries old, frozen in acts of love: in the frescoes of Ajanta and Ellora. Men and women of India, down the ages caught in their daily acts of work and play. They're all part of the interior decor of an Air-India 747


**AIR-INDIA**


**Something good going for you**

# SEMINAR

278

October 1982





## **Tower by tower, we are satisfying a worldwide need for more power**

People in cities, towns and villages, around the world, switch on power transmitted by Kamani Transmission Towers.

Pioneer of power transmission line industry in India, and Asia's largest producer of transmission towers, Kamani Engineering Corporation has put a transmission girdle around more than 20 countries.

Energised by a high-powered professional management, Kamani Engineering Corporation is organised to play a positive and dominant role in international power transmission.

**KAMANI ENGINEERING  
CORPORATION LIMITED**

Kamani Chambers 32, Ranjibhai Kamani Marg, Ballard Estate, Bombay 400 038

CHAITRA.KEC-74




Two leading automotive manufacturers in the world have come together. Peugeot of France and Mahindra of India. A magnificent association. The famed XDP 4 90 diesel engine is now being manufactured by Mahindra.

This is the first time that this fuel-efficient and noise-free engine will be manufactured outside of France. To power Mahindra vehicles that span the length and breadth of India.



Running reminders of ruggedness and reliability. Nor do they stop there.

In 21 countries round the globe, Mahindra vehicles are proving their worth. Beyond a doubt. Proudly putting India on the world map of efficient, dependable transport.



**Mahindra and Mahindra Limited**  
Gateway Building, Apollo Bunder  
Bombay 400 089 India.





## *The Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Limited*

"Registered Office" Lohadri Bhavan,  
Yeshwanthnagar—583 124, Via Sandur (Bellary Dist ) Karnataka State



Speech by  
SHRI Y R GHORPATE  
Chairman,  
The  
Sandur Manganese and  
Iron Ores Limited at  
the Twentyeighth Annual  
General Meeting held  
on 4th September 1982

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have great pleasure in extending to you a warm welcome to the 28th Annual General Meeting of the Company

The turnover of the Company went up to Rs 24 crores from Rs 17 crores last year, though the profit was Rs 146 lakhs after providing depreciation of Rs 119 lakhs, compared to a profit of Rs 225 lakhs, after providing depreciation of Rs 98 lakhs, during the previous year. It is proposed to declare a dividend of 15% on equity shares, as compared to 10% in 1979-80 and 12% in 1980-81. The main reason for the higher turnover was the increase in the sale of pig iron from about 28,000 tonnes during 1980-81 to 35,000 tonnes in 1981-82, the corresponding production of pig iron increasing from 29,000 tonnes to 40,500 tonnes. The sales of ferrosilicon also increased from nearly 8,000 tonnes in 1980-81 to about 13,000 tonnes in 1981-82, the production going up from 12,000 tonnes to 14,000 tonnes. However, our profits did not increase proportionately because of the drastic increase in power rate, in total disregard of our long-term agreement with the Karnataka Electricity Board, and a sharp decline in the average sales realisation on ferrosilicon due to further weakening of demand for this product in the internal market and much lower prices in the export market. We have represented to the Government of India, through the Indian Ferro Alloy Producers' Association, that ferrosilicon also badly requires the support of export subsidies to enable indigenous producers to utilise available power for the production of this product without building up unbearable stocks or incurring heavy losses on the export of ferrosilicon. The Government is yet to take a decision in this matter.

With regard to manganese ore exports also, the situation worsened inspite of our repeated representation to the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India Ltd (MMTC) to appreciate the basic fact that if our Company is to maintain its present labour force of about 3000 employees at our mines, we must be enabled to produce and export at least about 2 lakh tonnes per annum. Manganese ore is canalised through the MMTC, which was able to export only 50,000 tonnes of our ores during 1981-82, as against 86,000 tonnes last year, and an average of 2,70,000 tonnes during the years 1972 to 1974. However, the local sales of manganese ore during 1981-82 were 53,000 tonnes, including 38,500 tonnes to MMTC at Vizag at highly unremunerative prices. The world recessionary trends continued to affect the sales of manganese ore to the steel industry abroad, which is also now using less manganese ore per tonne of steel due to technological factors. During the seventies, the use of manganese went down from about 18 kgs per tonne of steel to about 10 kgs per tonne. Moreover the South African mining interests have been able to make a serious dent into our established markets in Japan, by aggressive sales, utilising much larger ships of 50,000 tonnes and faster rate of loading to bring down the freight charges. Our ports are not yet equipped to handle such big ships for manganese ore. Moreover, the policy of the Government of India to progressively reduce the volume of manganese ore exports, in the name of conserving it on a long-term basis, generated a lackadaisical attitude even with regard to the export of low grade manganese ore like ours, which is sustaining so much employment in this area and earning valuable foreign exchange, and whose reserves in our mining concessions are estimated at 30 to 40 million tonnes.

When the Vijayanagar Steel Plant, near Sandur, becomes a reality, it will no doubt enable our Company to produce and sell more manganese ore locally, thereby improving the overall economics and viability of our mines. The foundation stone of the Vijayanagar Steel Plant was laid by the Prime Minister, Smt Indira Gandhi, as early as 1971, at Torna-gallu, in recognition of its great potential and after expert evaluation. I am sure, the Government will take all possible steps to expedite the work on the Steel Plant and ensure its early completion. However, our Company has to depend mainly on exports and face the South African competition in the Japanese market, and for this, the Company should be allowed greater initiative to conclude sales in Japan and the East European countries, under the overall guidance of the MMTC, especially as our reserves of manganese ore are more than adequate to meet any future demand from our steel industry and, at the same time, to maximise exports. It is significant to note that the Japanese steel industry, inspite of the recessionary limitations, imports annually about 100,000 tonnes of 38-40% Mn ore, which used to be almost wholly supplied by our Company until 1974, but now South Africa supplies the bulk of this demand, and the exports of Sandur A grade (38-40% Mn) ores to Japan during the

year 1981-82 was nil. Under the circumstances the Government of India should seriously consider abolishing the export duty of Rs 12.50 per tonne on manganese ore, which is serving no purpose except to worsen our competitive position in the world market. The Government should also consider giving an export incentive for manganese ore and modernise the port facilities on a priority basis.

In spite of these grave difficulties, the Company has refrained from retrenching labour who have been depending on our mines for several decades for their livelihood. But this vital employment factor and human consideration should also be fully supported by the MMTC. As a result of the Company's employment and production oriented policy, in the hope of the MMTC and the Government liberalising their restrictive export policies and quota system, our manganese ore stocks have built up to 3.36 lakh tonnes. However, during the year 1982-83 there are signs of improvement in exports to Japan and especially East European countries. Every effort will be made to ensure that the stocks of manganese ore do not increase further.

The production of electric pig iron has been the mainstay of our Company for the past few years. It may be recalled that we established a 15,000 KVA electric furnace in 1968 to produce about 40,000 tonnes of foundry grade pig iron per annum. The furnace has served the interests of the foundry industry in the country, especially specialised foundries which require quality pig iron, for nearly a decade and a half and our low phosphorus pig iron made a name for itself in the home market for its quality and reliability. We were producing and selling about 2,500 to 3,000 tonnes of pig iron per month, even after we were forced to increase the price of pig iron in April 1981, in keeping with the increase in rates of power and other inputs. But suddenly in the month of April 1982, our monthly pig iron sales dropped to 500 tonnes from an average of nearly 3,000 tonnes per month in 1981-82 and have not picked up. This was mainly because of the import of cheap pig iron that was permitted under the new liberalised import policy. China and Pakistan dumped pig iron at unrealistically low prices, which should be a matter of concern for India. Both in the short-term and long-term interest of our country, we should not have allowed such imports which does positive harm to indigenous production and to the basic policy of maximising self-reliance and reducing the foreign exchange gap. The result is that our Company built up heavy stocks of pig iron amounting to about 8,000 tonnes, and consequently shut down the pig iron furnace from 1st June '82. Our pig iron production capacity has been built up over the years by making sizeable investments from scarce capital resources. To suddenly render this capacity infructuous by permitting indiscriminate imports, without specifically taking into account indigenous production and capacity, is most unfortunate in a year which is being observed as the 'Year of Productivity'.

We are also unable to understand why the import duty on pig iron was reduced from 55% to 20%, after the imports were canalised through the Steel Authority of India Ltd (SAIL) from September 1981. Before that, private parties were permitted to import pig iron under the OGL, though prior to April 1981 pig iron imports were totally banned. Moreover, from November '81 to March '82 there was no import duty at all. Even today, no distinction is made between low phosphorus (0.2% P max) and high phosphorus (0.4% P max), and therefore a lot of low phosphorus pig iron has come into the country. The IMF loan, which became necessary in the wake of oil price increases, is meant to strengthen the balance of payments position and not to displace indigenous production which is generating national income and employment. We have therefore represented to the Government of India that

- (i) Pig iron imports, especially low phosphorus pig iron, should be totally banned,
- (ii) the concessional import duty of 20% should be withdrawn and the previous import duty of 55% should

be restored, or even increased in the interest of protecting indigenous industry from dumping, and

- (iii) SAIL should purchase our pig iron stocks which are of proven quality.

If production units like ours, which have a long record of service to the nation, are forced to close down for no fault of ours and our production replaced by imports, it will only worsen the recessionary trends and considerably weaken the capacity and will of the nation to stand on its own legs and minimise dependence on foreign aid. We however, welcome the decision of the Government to set up a high-level panel to review the imports of some sensitive commodities under the liberalised import policy. Pig iron production is extremely sensitive to imports, as already stated, and should be included as one of the items to be reviewed by the high-level panel expeditiously. The official thinking regarding the estimated gap between demand and supply of pig iron may also be re-examined, especially as SAIL is holding sizeable stocks of imported pig iron which are not moving. Overall concepts and strategies can prove counter-productive and even deepen recessionary trends if they are applied in a hasty and unimaginative manner, without taking into account the specific requirements of different industries. Shri L. K. Jha, Chairman of the Economic Administration Reforms Commission, has also recently stressed the need for an industry-wise approach, to ensure that well-meaning economic policies are so implemented that they strengthen indigenous industry and not weaken them.

The Company continued to pay attention to the various welfare measures which have, over the years, strengthened the standard and quality of life of our employees and maintained a human relationship of faith and confidence between management and labour. The subsidy scheme, by which the Company supplies to the employees essential commodities such as rice, jowar, turdhal, gramdhal, jaggery, sweet oil and chillies, at prices prevailing in March 1972, has cost the Company Rs 55 lakhs during the year as compared to Rs 31 lakhs in the previous year and Rs 10 lakhs in 1976-7. This is not only a measure of the rate of inflation as it affects labour, but also a practical strategy to protect the real wages of employees from the ravages of inflation, and is capable of wider application on a nation wide basis.

The Company strengthened the nutrition programme by providing nutritious food to children in our balwadies and schools, apart from various other welfare activities in the fields of health education and extension services. Under its programme for providing training for skills and productive employment to supplement the family income of the employees, the Company introduced the Sewing Machine Scheme, by which an employee is enabled to buy a sewing machine, with loans from banks and the Company to the extent of 75% and 25% of the cost respectively, the Company's loan being interest free and the interest on bank loan in excess of 4% p.a. being subsidised by the Company. This scheme has evoked a great deal of interest and enthusiasm especially among womenfolk. The housing programme both at the Mines and Metal and Ferro Alloys Plant is also making satisfactory progress.

The Company enjoys the unique record of not having had a single strike during the 28 years of its existence and, I am sure, the same spirit of harmony and understanding will be maintained in the years to come. I wish to express my deep appreciation of the good work put in by all the employees of the Company. I am grateful to all my colleagues on the Board and the Financial Institutions for their valuable guidance and support.

Thank you,

Yeshwantnagar,  
4th September 1982

Y. R. GHORPADE

Note: This does not purport to be the proceedings of the Annual General Meeting.




**When you need high quality controls,  
remember...**

***Danfoss***

Manufacturers of  
Controls for Domestic/Commercial  
Refrigeration and Air Conditioning.



**Helping to save energy. Silently.**



everest/d81/D/26

Registered Office : 706-707 Surya Kiran, 19 Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi 110 001.

**Ahmed S. Moloobhoy & Sons**

**ESTD: 1910**


**SHIPCHANDLERS**

**Government Approved Manufacturers of  
Safety Appliances**


**Address:** 'Anchor House', 1st Quay Street, Mazagaon, Bombay-400 010.




# Elegant looks



## Versatile features




Attractive Sleek Two-toned USHA Streamlined—the sewing machine that outclasses any other in its price range With features that others can't match And a 5-year guarantee too




Patch Darning for easy darning and quick adjustment of pressure on cloth



3-position drop feed for easy adjustment of feed-dog position




Dial-type stitch regulator with lever for forward and reverse stitch control and locking arrangement



Thread tension adjuster for regulating post thread tension.

**USHA** Streamlined feature for feature a better machine

Providing efficient road transport  
is one way of expressing  
our responsibility...



**the other way is by  
creating more employment.**

Over 3,00,000 public carriers on the road today are Tata vehicles. Carrying essential commodities to the remotest parts of the country, extending communication links, doing duty on vital project sites.

Each Tata vehicle provides employment to no less than 10 people. Creating over 4 lakh new job opportunities every year.

These are but two of the most striking facets of our multi-faceted outlook in serving the country. Now and in the future.


**Telco**

***helping build a strong and  
self-reliant nation.***

TATA ENGINEERING & LOCOMOTIVE CO. LTD.  
BOMBAY • JAMSHEDPUR • PUNE

CHAITRA-T-663

# Technology...a continuous effort for development



L&T provides design, engineering and fabrication capabilities in collaboration with Caterpillar, F L Smidth, Gutehoffnungshutte Sterkrade, J M Voith, Niro Atomizer, Poclain, Serck, Struthers Wells, Swenson, Unelec

and supplies plant and equipment for chemical, petroleum, petrochemical, fertilizer, cement, paper, dairy, steel, power, earthmoving and construction industries




**LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED**  
*where technology moves with time*

P O Box 278, Bombay 400 038

# ESCORTS GROWS WITH ITS PEOPLE




**Blending technology and research with manufacturing and marketing skills, to build up a sustained growth rate averaging 20% a year over the past decade.**



Escorts is one of India's fastest growing corporations. According to The Economic Times' rankings for 1979, Escorts' sales have shown a **phenomenal growth to make it India's 7th largest company in the private sector and the 4th largest engineering company**.

An accelerating growth rate which is a result of Escorts' philosophy of adapting the most advanced technology and combining it with its research and human skills. To manufacture a diverse yet relevant range of quality products in its 14 plants. Ensuring its countless customers in India and abroad, cost-effective products that are leaders in their range. These include well known brand names like Ford, Rajdoot, Mahle, JCB, Knorr Bremse, Goetze and Yamaha.


Behind the ever-expanding enterprise of the Escorts group, are 15,000 employees, 1400 dealers and stockists, nearly 3000 ancillary suppliers and over 35,000 shareholders, who share Escorts' growing strength.



**Adapting advanced technology relevant to India's core needs.**


**ESCORTS LIMITED**

11 Scindia House, Connaught Circus, New Delhi 110 001



Escorts Scientific Research Centre where 200 engineers develop and support technological advancement.

Tractors and Farm Equipment • Motorcycles • Automotive Ancillaries • Industrial and Construction Equipment • Railway Ancillaries • Heating Elements



Not something you would have heard on the thirteenth hole some years back. But today, golf irons are being made of aluminium. The fact is, aluminium is being used, more and more, for things we had never imagined. And in India, Indian Aluminium has been the catalyst of this change.

The first to embark on aluminium production in this country, Indal has

introduced almost the entire range of alloys in which rolled and extruded aluminium products are made in India. In its constant drive towards diversification, Indal has pioneered the use of aluminium in aircraft, currency, power transmission, irrigation tubing, transportation, packaging, housing and a host of other applications.

Indal pioneering. It's the shape of things to come.



**Indian Aluminium Company, Limited**  
**Anything's possible**

HTC-IAL 4974

# semina

THE MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI

Journal which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every  
side of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single  
problem is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions  
opinions expressed have ranged from Janata to Congress, from  
Vaidya to Communist to independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it  
has been possible to answer a real need of today, to gather  
the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people  
arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity  
facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture

Editor/ROMESH THAPAR

Managing Editor/RAJ THAPAR

Production/TEJBIR SINGH

Circulation/C B KUMAR

Published from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1 Telephone 46534 Cable Address Seminar New Delhi Single copy Rs  
100, \$ 1.50 Yearly Rs. 40, £ 7, \$ 16, Three yearly, Rs 100 £ 20, \$ 40. Reproduction of material prohibited unless permitted

## EXT MONTH : PLAYING GAMES

# 278

## FUTURE OF POLITICS

a symposium on  
the changing dimensions  
of governance

symposium participants

### THE PROBLEM

A short statement  
of the issues involved

### CHANGING CONCEPTS OF GOVERNANCE

Romesh Thapar, Editor 'Seminar'

### WHO CAN STOP THE APOCALYPSE?

Rudolf Bahro, political theorist and dissident writer,  
originally from East Germany

### RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL RESURGENCE

Mrs. Nazir Aziz Butt, novelist and journalist  
from Pakistan

### OVER CROWDED POLICY-MAKING

J.J. Richardson, Professor of Politics,  
University of Strathclyde, Scotland

### ECONOMIC ORDER

Mihailo Markovic, former editor  
of 'Praxis', now teaching at  
Belgrade University

### MOVEMENTS

D.L. Sheth, 'Lokayan', Centre for the  
Study of Developing Societies, Delhi

### BOOKS

Reviewed by Dilip Cherian and  
Ashish Lall

### FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography  
compiled by M.P. Nayar

### COMMUNICATION

Received from Satya Deva, Chandigarh

# The problem

ALL over the world, the business of politics is under anxious debate. Power invariably corrupted the persons exercising it. There were exceptions, but too few. Today the corruption is so twisted and extensive that the whole relevance of present-day political systems is being questioned. No satisfying alternatives have evolved because the debate remains tentative and half-hearted. The hope persists that the crisis is merely rooted in the unfortunate rise of unprincipled and incompetent leaders, that these creatures can be replaced. Very few understand that the crisis is systemic, that political activity is getting increasingly unrelated to urgent needs, that the manipulations of money, black money, and the conspiracies of local mafias have created terrible gulfs between the rulers and the ruled. Increasingly, the desperate resort to authoritarian remedies is seen as the only answer — yes, even though it only heightens the political aberrations from which we suffer.

Despite the prevailing gloom, it is possible to focus on a healthy future for politics. The remedies, too, are not so difficult to sketch. But the one essential



element for corrective action is to shake ourselves out of the congealed notions of the past. We have to investigate every aspect of democratic political life in such a way that basic truths emerge. This applies to the selection of political activists, the distribution of power, accountability, and the perspectives before those who govern. Naturally, there will be an incredible variety of views on the future of politics. We have to sift them, attempt to evolve some coherent alternative patterns, and always to keep the expansion of democratic participation as an infallible compass. The world of today cannot be turned back. Extraordinary changes have occurred at so many levels. We have to study them most thoroughly to begin the restructuring of our political life. In other words, it is only the open mind that can face this challenge.

The papers included in this issue of SEMINAR are taken from the proceedings of the World Assembly of the World Future Studies Federation held in Stockholm early in June, 1982. The theme of the World Assembly was 'The Future of Politics'.

# Changing concepts of governance

ROMESH THAPAR

ADMITTEDLY, governance can be of many kinds, particularly in a world traumatised by the most brutal political messiahs, by conspiratorial cabals mouthing liberationist jargon, and military dictators invariably promising a return to what is described as 'normalcy'. These are the pronounced aberrations in our condition, and we tend at times to despair of remedies. But I am concerned with representative governance without any qualifying clauses.

Representative government as the term is understood today was built, brick by brick, as different sections of society clamoured to participate in the organisation and supervision of their lives. It is the same clamouring that is now hacking away at the edifice we built, because it is no longer serving the purpose for which it was erected. Populations are certainly exploding, but I believe that it is the distance between the ruler and the ruled which is at the core of the crisis.

In a very real sense, this distance, this gulf, widens with every leap in technology. The highly centralised systems of government, the craze for standardised procedure, the rise of huge productive monoliths, their inter-dependence and their vulnerability to spark disturbing chain reactions, create deep, unexpressed

fears. When governance surrenders itself to this faceless, impersonal role, it is possible that the people will react violently and smash the infrastructures, and the technologies, which hold them enslaved.

The danger is very much with us. The effort to close the distance between the ruler and the ruled is tame and faltering. The choices before peoples have shrunk to no choices at all. The political processes are so ramified, the costs way beyond the means of the people who possess either integrity or honesty, that it is impossible to reach the seats of governance without being crooked or leaning heavily on the shoulders of a mafia. That is the raw reality — and even despite the affluence in the northern hemisphere, the education and the nutrition and what have you. The average citizen is almost as helpless as he ever was, and can only make his voice heard when he organises outside the elaborate framework of governance.

The consequences of this to the so-called Third World, struggling out of the stupor of colonialism, direct or indirect, is even worse — because the distance between the ruler and the ruled, whatever the reasons, takes on another dimension altogether. The rulers are the rulers in the so-called affluent world, and

so tend to represent their own people less and less. The few countries where there is representative government may find the spending spree of elections more and more difficult to bear. The system is discredited daily. In other words, the rules of the game will have to be changed to enable a truer and more authentic representation. This central fact of active participation is what thinking on governance has to apply itself to before we are overwhelmed.

**C**learly, governance as we have known it is facing varying degrees of paralysis because we have never really applied our minds to changing its structures and powers to serve the challenges of today. This critical fact, covered over by layers of delusion about the affluent society and the comfortable theorisings about what is a very unequal world, and deliberately preserved in confusion, is becoming too obvious to be hidden. Now a growing body of opinion is forming which insists that the political and economic models that have prevailed so far — and these cover the capitalist-liberal and the socialist communist worlds — are no longer valid frameworks for modern governance.

This sentiment is more strongly shared in the world that was horribly exploited by the colonial powers and which is now confronted with the gigantic problems of raising two-thirds of mankind to some level of dignified, humane living. Here, all manner of ideas about governance have been discussed, and even experimented with. The decentralisation of power to encourage wider participation. The pressure of egalitarianism to build simple life styles and to defuse social tensions. The disciplines of planning and management to ensure priority development in the interests of a national self-reliance which blocks the exploitative propensities of the international economy. And the implications of mixing the economic emphasis with the social. Notwithstanding this effort, terrible aberrations have occurred in our societies. The struggle continues. Its outcome, we believe, will be dependent on the concepts which mould governance.

Over the centuries which we are in the habit of recalling, governance has been a familiar centre of power and patronage, for good or for evil, slowly sought to be transformed into a democratic system of checks and balances. In these developments and setbacks, there has been a certain predictable and analysable continuum. However, since World War II, with the considerable disruption of colonial empires upon which these comfortable continuums were based, we are witnessing a widespread systemic failure, whether it be democratic or authoritarian. Remedial action does not yield results. There is a growing feeling of despair, cynicism and alienation about governance, but no coordinated effort has been made to bring the many-sided crisis into focus for political and economic action that will transform the social landscape and provide a real alternative.

We are no longer looking at the world from the capitals of the former colonial powers, even though these powers still command awesome exploitative positions and flourish on life-styles in their own societies which are extremely wasteful of resources and productive capacities. We are compelled to view problems globally, for, despite resistance to this kind of thinking, the imperatives are increasingly global and will tear us away from the moribund concepts of the past. The passionate rhetoric to expose the plight of the poverty-engulfed within a nation has now to be matched by commitments to bridge the gulfs between rich and poor nations — and made so not because of some biological blockages but by historical circumstance. We are in the midst of a great awakening, but are not responding to it.

**W**e have to change the concepts of governance in this era when qualitative changes are crying out for recognition. What are these changes? We must take note of them because only then will we appreciate the need to see governance in a new setting. Let me try to do this in the priority areas of living, so that we can get some idea of the quality of structures that would be needed and the kind of persons who could head them.

*First*, the quality of development. Until now, we have spoken in meaningless statistics about per capita incomes, about gross national product and the like. Today, the concern of governance is more with how development must first tackle the business of social transformations at the base of societies. The polarisations which exist have first to be dissolved, or else development only accentuates them. This is in many ways an enormously difficult undertaking, particularly for societies which are open and subject to pressures. I do not call them 'democratic' but that is what is meant in common parlance. And as this social transformation proceeds, we are now convinced that we must inject into it those inputs which strengthen the natural self-reliance of the people. Present-day governance must see that a people in economic growth cannot be turned into things that are disposable, nor surrendered to the bureaucratic hierarchies which increasingly take over the levers of dominance and harassment. They have to retain and expand their creativity, and build a new dignity for themselves, enriching participation, curbing the bureaucracies. We forgot this obvious lesson of history.

*Second*, the technological processes and human participation. Whether it is muscle-power or brain-power that is being replaced by the new thrusts of science — and the technologies it spawns — the participation, control and direction of human beings over these technologies must, more than ever, be the main concern of governance. This will, of course, take various forms — and there will have to be continued experimentation to evolve practice and precept suited to each culture. The humane base of the values underpinning this variety of participation, urban or rural, would be common. This is important and very much a part of our globalism. The dangerous doctrine that all that is needed in this electronic age is to replace work with leisure is illustrative of the lazy approach to the problems of the century ahead by those who govern.

*Third*, housing cries out for attention in our third world countries.

where large populations have no shelter at all. It has to undergo revolutionary change. This is not merely a statement about the unthinking violation of our landscapes by cost-benefit, box like structures made of cement-concrete and glass, but also an assertion that we are nowhere near evolving new materials, building aesthetics and planning systems to provide adequate shelter for hundreds of millions round the world. May be, we will have to move boldly from a mud culture and easy renewability within modern *casbahs* to spreading habitats which use whatever local building materials are easily available. Governance has totally failed in this area because it is fearful of moving out of the existing frameworks. Result all over our world, housing programmes are shot through with disappointment and disillusionment. A feeling grows that this problem of shelter will never be solved, and it is a feeling on which fantastic fortunes are made through artificial speculation in land and construction. The game has gone on uninterrupted for too many decades.

*Fourth, Transport.* What is the future of the private automobile in an age of mass movement for work and pleasure? It is a question that is evaded because there are too many pressures from the automobile industry. And yet we know to our cost that the conflict between individual and mass movement grows with education and development. It is imperative to work out systems of mass transport and transit which will reduce the obsessive interest in private cars now jamming the roads and parking places. The deep urge to possess a vehicle, if only to enjoy the freedom of movement it creates on still open highways, is not easily met. Hiring systems is about as far as we have gone. As for the waste in materials and fuel, the less said the better. Clearly, the vision of a world where everyone has a car, or two, is stupid. But we live with it, and so do those who govern us. In fact, they live by it.

*Fifth,* the question of education, of learning, of preparing the human

mind to meet a complex of inter-related challenges. Education has to become a very much more intensive process through which an individual moves beyond the computer and is equipped for creative thought whatever he attempts and in any specialisation he seeks. It is an ever-changing scenario closely linked to the technologies through which the mind will move. The present system, originally designed for a less demanding age, was erected to produce a certain level of excellence, but the egalitarian flood has made nonsense of these pretensions. The structures of education will need drastic altering if the educated are to make proper use of the machines which assist them. This is one of the most urgent and serious crisis facing those who govern. Only a tiny fraction of the human brain is being utilised. Its fuller use raises an awesome challenge.

*Sixth,* jobs are going to see the most drastic re-definition in the years ahead. This perspective is beginning to crystallise with the massive use of the micro-chip. The panic, yet unexpressed, of human beings about the robot systems now taking over the industrial processes has to be faced squarely. Human beings have to be convinced that they will remain in command, and that they must continue to aspire to individual and collective excellence. A failure here would have disastrous repercussions. The machine might well become something to be smashed given our uninformed and vague notions about the mixed up role of science and its technologies. The extraordinary fact has to be recorded that globally governance treats this area of challenge within the old frameworks.

*Seventh, Health.* It is a major concern. A totally unbalanced budget exists for coping with the diseases which afflict a tiny percentage of the population. The extraordinary effort to maintain the life systems of those who are decrepid and unable to respond fully to treatment should be contrasted with the inept and inadequate base of medical activity which impacts the overwhelming majority. There is a kind of disarray throughout the system,

supported by powerful lobbies of doctors, drug manufacturers and hospital infrastructures. With the increase in numbers, the pollution and desecration of environments, and the new consciousness about the care of the balance of the body, there is in fact a solid core of professional opinion which is convinced that delays in the restructuring of health policies could threaten the human species. The voice of denial gets softer and softer. We need the will now to compel action.

*Eighth,* the defences of culture and the dimensions of its infrastructure, underpinned by a constant effort to establish an integral identity for a people within the increasingly mechanical and imitative matrix of modernity, will certainly have to be radically redrawn. I say this because societies are based increasingly on egalitarian questing and are neglectful of the mainsprings of their heritage and increasingly unconscious of quality. Quality nurtures an elite. We cannot do without it, but in a different context from the past. How do we mobilise a category of persons to give bold, often unpopular, leadership in these fields of cultural continuity and creativity? The closest present-day governance has come to this sensitive area of human assertion is to discuss the causes of pornography and violence and to accept vaguely the need to study their impact. A sad commentary on the existing state of governance. The nurturing of creativity in all its forms is a paramount need.

*Ninth,* life styles need fundamental re-designing. Over the years, they have developed aberrations which are ostentatious and vulgar, creating sharp contrasts between rich and poor, peoples and nations. This is a mark of a massive aesthetic failure and can prove disastrous for the ecological balance of the planet. What's more, our world cannot live for long at several different levels. It has become too small to tolerate these gulfs. But, as we know, life styles have a way of striking deep roots. Any effort to change them will have to be profoundly persuasive. A combination of factors will have to be coordinated to introduce those simplicities for uncomplicated

living. Any frustration, or feeling of denial, could wreck these efforts. In other words, the alternatives cannot be left to chance, and the free choice of the market will have to be influenced with skills equal to those of the advertisers who push the self-defeating consumer society 'Alternative life-styles' must be made into massive persuasion drives

And, tenth, the efforts to consolidate peace among the nations will need much greater sharpening. I do not have to spell out the terrible consequences of an annual armament expenditure of some 700 billion dollars (U S ) except to say that few realise the extraordinary distortions it causes in the normal life of communities. Indeed, the critical tasks I have detailed are neglected because of the psychosis around these expenditures. Certainly, the various systems of governance will be called upon in this decade to cut this criminal expenditure. Where public opinion is mobilised and strong, it may even be possible to compel unilateral disarmament — that is, when the basic futility of armament is seen in a world that already can kill itself many times over

I have taken time to spell out some of the basic tasks that have to be undertaken today to indicate the qualitative change in the challenges which now confront governance. So profound are these challenges, and so deeply concerned with the texture of life styles, that it is stupid to surround governance with the old value systems. Governance can no longer be a simplistic matter of gathering resources, allocating them and organising accountabilities. It is now an immensely creative act to reorganise and restructure the political, economic and social systems for the tasks of a very much more complicated world. It requires sensitivity to a number of inter-related problems, and the potential for mischief in so many familiar concepts. Indeed, the structures and priorities of governance will undergo profound change — for the tasks I have listed are among the most neglected, usually at the mercy of junior politicians, and the first to feel the axe of budgetary cuts and

short-falls. This is a generalisation which applies to all governments, backward, progressive and advanced

The tasks spelled out emphasise a new quality of political leadership when the politician in so many parts of our world has reduced himself to scum. Actually, a whole new vocabulary exists in the language of formal political science to emphasise how bereft the politician is of those qualities which helped to build the groundwork of civilised governance. All this is very easily said, but it calls for a hard and honest look at the unsatisfactory procedures and dishonest practises which throw up 'leaders'

Where do we begin to find the new leadership for this transformation in governance? In the shifting shadows of the charismatic? Within the uncertain hierarchies of military regimes? From benevolent mafias? In the ranks of the impatient cadres of bigotted or authoritarian parties? Or do we move to the men and women who are working among the people, and those who have the broad trust and goodwill of the people? I have no doubt that it is here that the new leadership has to be mobilised for the momentous tasks we face. We don't want TV performers. We want down-to-earth representatives of the people

But the tasks will remain unfilled if we imagine that the existing systems of democratic choice will throw up such men and women for governance. Alternative systems will have to be evolved — and speedily. We will have to experiment with them continuously in order to find the right mix of principled procedure and practise. These systems will vary from region to region, from society to society. But the central point to remember is that the participation of people at the base of society is essential for decision-making — and this in turn means decentralised structures where power must be shared on the ground. It is to this gut problem we must address ourselves. Other problems follow. Only then will governance take on its new role to re-order the business of living and working, and to make it humane and creative

# Who can stop the apocalypse?

RUDOLF BAHRO

SO as not to cause any misunderstanding, I must confess right away that this cannot be, and is not supposed to be, a piece by an objective observer. It is more of an appeal than an analysis, and in its form it is more of an outline sketch than a scientific lecture. The first reason for this is a practical one — both trivial and welcome. In the last two years, I have not been able to undertake scientific work in the strict sense, as too much has been going on outside the libraries. This already bears on the subject of my talk. A movement is under way in various countries of Protestant central and northern Europe, a movement which I like to call the ecology *and* peace movement, but which by virtue of its inherent dynamic is a movement for conversion in the metropolises,

for a transformation that goes right through to the material and mental foundations of our culture.

This movement is at a formative stage and naturally corresponds to similar tendencies in all other parts of the world. My interest in this subject is not academic, but existential, so I shall deal with it in a quite one-sided and absolutist manner. In this case, too, the universities are not the major source from which the movement proceeds. The present time is one of applied theory or, to be more accurate, applied ideology.

Basically, the question at issue is still more elementary. For many people, the exterminist and self-destructive tendency which seems to

have taken hold of our entire social body presents itself in so fundamental and necessary a way that the evidence for it is as great as was the evidence for the compelling myths of archaic times. Even though the outlines of the goal are quite unclear, nothing needs to be demonstrated or proved, for the plagues of ancient Egypt are upon us, the horse-men of the apocalypse can be heard, the seven deadly sins are visible all around us in the cities of today, where Babel is multiplied a thousand-fold. In 1968 the promised Canaan of general emancipation appeared on the horizon, and this time at last for women as well. But almost all of those who believe in this have tacitly come to realise that first of all will come the years in the wilderness. All that is lacking now is the pillar of fire to show us the route of our exodus.

This is all to say that a mood is spreading which is more to be grasped in the language of these old parables than by scientific analysis of behaviour, and which is gradually making its way across all the differentiations which political economy, sociology, political science and social psychology like to maintain. And this mood has more reason than ever before to be apocalyptic, this time not just for one particular tribe, one or other particular State or even one particular civilisation, but rather for the one civilisation that is finally decisive. This I assume is self-evident. I don't intend to prove anything, to present the evidence for those who don't want to read the writing on the wall, as I believe that facts and arguments are not what such people lack.

This will make clear my basic attitude towards the subject of this congress, and the counterposing of 'governments' and 'movements' — something that I find very appropriate, as by this complementarity both concepts attain a very global and comprehensive character. So it is the experience rather than logically presented arguments that lead me to ask what is meant by the 'future of politics'. Shouldn't futurologists assume that politics has to be put in cold storage? You can of course say that movements are also

political. What I want to stress though is that *professional* politics is not going to save anything, but can only make everything worse. Hopeful initiatives cannot come from this direction, unless they are spurious. It wasn't really the German chancellor who brought the USA and the Soviet Union to the conference table in Geneva. And, besides, what are we to expect of this? On any question of survival, it always comes down to forcing the politicians to react by irresistible pressure. Thus everything depends on convoking 'non-political' or 'extra-political' forces, precisely on an overwhelming movement of conversion, which disrupts the normal activity of the official institutions, for example, the activity of the defence ministries in 'securing peace'.

Let us assume that a peace research team was to observe the present scene in western Europe, Japan and the USA in order to make a prognosis. They would naturally recognise a dialectic, an interaction between the grass-roots movements and the forces that speak for these in the institutions. And if they were optimistic, they would conclude that what ultimately matters is that parliaments and governments should make new decisions, given that a new security policy is a matter for the State, it has the State as its subject. I would not challenge any of this. This is at least one aspect of the process. It is clear theoretically that movements and institutions do somehow or other interact, that if a movement is successful it will transform the institutions, and in some way or other will itself be institutionalised, etc. This is just commonsense.

Yet, for reasons which have nothing to do with any general theory, as is sometimes put forward to relate movements and institutions, I would say that only the peace movement can save our civilisation. And by the peace movement here I am putting the part for the whole. Given this very particular extreme situation in which we find ourselves, I mean that against all the institutions which have been programmed for whole epochs to pursue every-

thing in the accustomed direction, or at least to maintain everything as it is, only the most basic social movements can bring about that break in cultural continuity without which we shall be unable to save our very existence. The more this movement proceeds from the grass roots, the more decisively it raises the question of power. Not in the sense of preparing to storm the Winter Palace. Its main subversive potential is that of destroying the traditional consensus which supports the State and constructing a new consensus, and in that connection the front line generally runs right through the individuals concerned. But, as this movement criticises the old world order in its totality, it naturally negates for a start its whole institutional heaven. Here, it polarises against all those instances which make up this old heaven and, thus, also against the traditional opposition.

We already fall back into the system if we act as if politics could be challenged by politics (of the same type). What can we achieve by immersing ourselves in the study of how the dominant politics functions, even with a view to bringing about improvements? The time always comes when the thinkers of a new era refuse to get drawn into the distinctions of scholasticism. We still run the danger of getting absorbed by the 'compulsion of things' which is administered and reproduced on an expanded scale, just like a certain Green parliamentarian in the Federal Republic. This person used to radically oppose nuclear power stations. Then he got elected to the *Landtag*. He soon realised that a nuclear power station could be built even against his opposition. So he transformed himself into a realist and began discussing whether an underground power station — if such could be built! — wouldn't be better than an above-ground one. As if there weren't already enough reformists to take on that role. So the system easily gobbled him up.

This strikes me as an example of the problem of the relationship between science and the system on the one hand, science and the move-

ment on the other. Should we not say goodbye to this contemplative analysis of the decisive objects? You can either be a servant and adviser of various governments and other system-maintaining institutions, or be militantly for the movement and in the movement. I am not advocating fanaticism, or even a break in communication. Yet, debate will be more honest if it is conducted between intelligent people on either side and not through so-called 'intermediaries' who express themselves in non-partisan translation. The point is to see the praxis that alone can save us as running completely across the traditional business of politics and science, also across the political advisers of the Left, who generally produce only a few initiatives that do not contribute to the prolonging of existing conditions.

We cannot expect any escape from the vicious circle in which our civilisation is terminally trapped from the kind of science, aiming to master its object, that we have had since Euclid, Socrates, Aristotle and Archimedes, simply because this is fundamentally bound up with this civilisation's motive forces. So far as the social process is concerned, its objectivity stands for the subjugation to laws which can only wreck our evolution if we do not manage to overcome them.

Let us assume we were living at the time when one of the many Central American civilisations that produced steadily growing pyramids was in its death-throes. Would it be sensible to expect help from those very priests who represented the law by which that culture was born and grew up, then blossomed, declined and died? The science business is largely the priestly corporation of our present civilisation. Most likely, every means it hits upon, every advice it gives, will only mean adding a further stone to our tower of Babel, for example, in the shape of a new industry for environmental protection. Of course, I am speaking of those scientists who play their role and uphold the rules which have to be overthrown if anything is to be left of our civilisation except — in the best of cases — pyramids of reinforced concrete, which don't

even keep their shape as long as stone ones do.

Even that supposedly progressive economic analysis which uses Marxist categories functions today in conformity with the system. It goes on feeling the pulse of a still continuing accumulation of capital, calculates profit rates and forecasts short-term — and recently also long-term — cyclical crises. But it has nothing more to say on the question of how this pulse is to be stopped, how the accumulation of capital can be not just measured but actually brought to an end. All that is left is the latest economic reformism, which already assumes the next long wave, the breakthrough into eco- and bio-industries, total cable communication, etc., as an inadvertent given which we have to surrender and adapt ourselves to. They don't even ask whether there is a chance of halting accumulation in its present trough.

In practice as well as in theory, the old Left forms part of the institutional order which has to be overcome, and for this reason the movement of conversion is also directed against *its* mental structure. Although Marxist theory did not originally raise the task of stopping accumulation, it suggests that capitalist accumulation will come to a halt for intrinsic reasons, as a consequence of the internal contradictions of the bourgeois mode of production, whereas it is becoming ever more probable that the avalanche of accumulation is catastrophically reaching external limits — and without encountering fundamental resistance from the specific interests of the subordinate classes. Quite the contrary. Yet, for the traditional analysis the new social movements serve only as a preliminary substitute behind whose action the real protagonists will again re-appear.

This is failing to see the wood for the trees. Today the provocation proceeds from the reproduction process as a whole, or rather from its ever less controllable dysfunctions. It is the all pervasive *output*, harmful in the most varied ways, against which resistance is developing. The exterminist consequence which is inherent in the entire mode of production acts against human

nature on the whole scale of values from the highest ideals of self-realisation down to mere self-preservation. It is not abstract causes but concrete sufferings that produce the counter-mobilisation. No matter which way the individual experiences this injury, the psyche reacts as a whole, and the movement provides a synthesis for the impression that no treatment for the symptom is any longer of use.

This leads to a new or, rather, a very old answer to the question of the mode of association. Should the opposition forces base their unity on a compromise between their differing social interests, or should they locate this unity above or below the level of differences of economic interest, i.e., at the level of fundamental and long-term interests? If we believe the latter, however, we depart from what in the traditional view is the most important thing: class interests in the stricter sense. We completely cease to consider the analysis of the social structure as the main key to a transforming practice. We give primary status to *other* differentiations (in particular, social-psychological ones) within the social continuum of interests.

The distinction between fundamental and long-term interests on the one hand, and immediate and short-term interests on the other, becomes more important than the distinction of different class interests. Within the metropolitan countries, which have as a whole an exploiting position, the class contradiction has only a relative importance, and is always based on immediate and short-term interests, as a general rule it fuels the characteristic dynamic of material expansion. In the movement, on the other hand, those forces come together which want to abolish the overall system of regulation by which all phenomena of crisis are mediated. It goes without saying that we expect these forces to develop a plan which takes into account among other things the continuing class differentiation, and prevents redistribution against the interests of the wage-earners from raising still further the threshold for the leap into a different logic. It is



simply a question here of a change in the key position given to the traditional social question.

This has all been preliminary — perhaps in too great detail — so as to make my premises clear. I admit that I am using an extremely global construction. I started in the title by speaking of a number of social movements (and I don't deny their plurality). Then I went on to speak of the ecology and peace movement as a single movement. And this phenomenon does exist, or is beginning to exist, in Holland and Germany for example (even a little in the GDR), with signs appearing also here in Scandinavia. In actual fact, however, even in these countries we find a diversity of movements, and the women's movement or the squatters' movement — just to take two examples — would in many cases politely decline inclusion in this general concept that exists in my head. Which is why I took refuge in a yet wider field, and spoke of a movement for conversion in the metropolises.

This naturally contains right away a whole number of implicit and venturesome assumptions. Let us take two of the metropolitan countries, France and Germany. It would be hard to find two European countries with more different political cultures. But I would maintain that in the German resistance to the nuclear power station at Wyl and the resistance in France to the new military training ground at Larzac, the two peoples are closer in spirit than in their political structures, as close in fact as the French jacquerie was to the German peasant war, even though the two were separated by 200 years. I believe there is a subterranean current at work here.

To give another example, why has this peace movement risen up within one year, first in Europe, then in Japan, then in North America? And the uprising in Poland, which didn't talk especially about peace, but like every popular revolution dealt with *everything*, did even more than our West European demonstrations towards the cause of peace, by forcing one of the two military blocs into a political impasse. Real movements are converging in this way, even

though their origin and their specific goals lie wide apart — so that in the final analysis it is, perhaps not so arbitrary for me to consider them together.

So far as my construction goes, it is global not only in the figurative sense but also literally, just like the challenge. Conversion in the metropolises where are these metropolises? Firstly, of course, the European countries, as well as those from North America to Australia where the Europeans wiped out the indigenous inhabitants. And then, of course Japan, which was so strikingly well disposed to assimilate the aggressive spirit of European industrialism. But where in the Third World today are there not big cities that are bridgeheads of the capital accumulation which proceeds from the centre? Industrialisation in the East also obeys the same imperatives, not only since it's got in debt to finance capital. The global metropolis has no geographical limits, it is this so far unstoppable process of industrial expansion driven and guided by capital, which is driving us over the edge of the abyss at a hundred points simultaneously.

It is this challenge — Edward Thompson has termed it exterminism, referring initially to its military side, but this can easily be generalised — which gives the diversity of movements a tendency to unite in a single movement of conversion. In the final analysis — but I don't mean this in the abstract sense, it will show itself in practice — the marginalised masses in the countries of the Third World who plug into the electric power supply without paying will prove to be convergent with the movement against nuclear power stations, even though in functional terms they seem totally in contradiction. The question is simply that the capitalist industrial system can only be driven back and destroyed by an ungraspable and manifold movement of humanity, without formal coordination, not by an industrial working class which is defined in purely economic terms and centrally organised.

As human beings we are all marginalised. It is just that many of us are not yet aware of it. Many people

still say, in pacifying terms, that the megamachine is ultimately made up of human beings. Sure! But here the reversal of the relation of master and slave has been achieved on the grandest scale. Does anyone still seriously imagine that the old actor, Ronald Reagan, is only the master of the Doomsday machine which he's been transported into? But the marginalised and excluded, those with their backs against the wall, now have an unbeatable ally in this very wall that they have their backs against. This wall is formed by the limits of the earth itself, against which we really shall be crushed to death if we do not manage to brake and bring to a halt the great machine that we have created before this finally bumps against it.

Every action that somehow or other obstructs its progress forms part of the movement, a progress which is above all the progress of its investments and the acquisition of capital for these. In the rich countries in particular, we are all in the situation of the building worker who lives next to the planned new airport runway and is offered work on it. He has to make a new decision!

How can we bring to an end the industrial era, an era that cannot endure in the long run as it is consuming its own foundations, before such time as it dies from its own activity and takes us with it? This is the question that demands an answer. This answer must lie in the concrete actions, not only political ones. Its tendency — at first a symbolic one — will be to tear down the tower of Babel before this collapses upon us. And the resolution for this must be defended against any demand to say first of all what better system we want to replace it with.

At the time of the anti-fascist struggle, Bertold Brecht told the story of the Buddha of the burning house, which is very relevant here. When the roof was already burning, the Buddha was asked: 'What's it like outside, then? Isn't it raining? Isn't it windy? And is there another house to go to?'... And the Buddha answered: 'Really, friends, if someone finds that the ground is not yet

so hot that they would rather exchange it for somewhere else than remain, then I've nothing to say to them'

**W**e are not yet in a position to tear down the tower. Investments now in progress are not only reinforcing the floors already built, they are massively at work building the next storey. And our efforts to halt this growth are only fragmented: we demonstrate against a particular weapons system, we prevent a nuclear power station here, an airport runway there. In most cases we only delay things. We reduce the speed limit on the motorways a little. But we have to persist. We need at least to consider a great moratorium, a kind of general strike against expansion, the blocking of everything embraced by the word 'development', a pull on the emergency brake. This is the task that the conversion movement has to fulfil above all else, in a whole variety of forms. It must actually achieve the stopping of investment that hostile propaganda already attributes to it, by directing itself even more against sales expectations than against the bulldozers and concrete mixers.

Liberation from deadly, injurious and superfluous labour is the other side of this anti-investment strategy. Even though emancipation is not the immediate slogan here, it is exactly at this point that the possible gain in freedom is to be found. The industrial system and its implications oppress freedom, and not only at the centre. Almost all peoples who have submitted themselves to a forced industrialisation in the hope of finding freedom at the end of the tunnel have remained stuck at its darkest point. Contrary to a once current idea, freedom is not obtainable through industrialisation, but in fact only through the rejection of industrialisation.

It is pertinent here, of course, that there is in fact no other industrial system than the capitalist one, and that we certainly deceived ourselves in seeing the ultimate cause of its alienation in the capitalist *form* of industrial progress. Industrialisation has since already shown that it can no longer offer any perspective of emancipation simply because

it is impossible for all people to achieve. And it has to be halted here in Europe above all where the industrial system had its start, and where we are particularly susceptible, as also is Japan, to its unforeseen backlash. Unilateral industrial 'disarmament', or at least the transition to a quite different kind of equipment, is the motto here.

**N**ow it is one thing to recognise something like this as a task, even to welcome it. But is it at all possible for human beings to halt a historical dynamic in which they are themselves so deeply enmeshed? Isn't conversion movement of this kind not simply a mere postulate, corresponding in reality to nothing more than an incommensurable sum of isolated fears and hopes? Won't we all continue to be hurled along on the roundabout? After all, I myself travelled here by plane.

In my view, the problem is more specific. For, there have already been several movements of conversion in history, precisely in times of crisis which were not completely dissimilar to our own. These have always worked with free energies, i.e., energies not tied down in the given institutional context, and in this connection it is not just a matter of counting heads and working out from people's occupations where energies are free and where they are tied. Many people divide their forces. There really are such free energies, the substance is there.

That 'one-dimensionality' which Marcuse warned against is even now incomplete. Alternative movements of this kind, for this is what they always were, have succeeded and failed in different ways and to different degrees, i.e., it is impossible to definitively conclude from studying them whether the present effort will be victorious or not. And yet previous crises were always local in character, and the concrete barriers which such movements sought to overcome were not of so absolute a kind as today. These movements didn't run up against factors which are bound up with the very existence of society.

Considered superficially, what is now rapidly crumbling in the

Federal Republic is simply the post-war consensus. Generalising a bit beyond the edge of the national stage, it is the fourth Kondratiev wave that is particularly reaching its end in our part of the world, where the population enjoyed a rise in welfare as a substitute for their lost identity. But beneath this lies the end of the perspective of industrial progress in general, even if a new wave of industrialisation is possible, it no longer promises anything, but is simply more threatening (for example, it is even more essential to ban genetic technology than nuclear). The industrial revolution, however, presupposed the Renaissance, and the Renaissance even in name presupposed the Graeco-Roman civilisation. The oldest stratum of civilisation involved in the present crisis is that of patriarchy, with ten millennia behind it.

**T**he very complexity and relative indirectness of the answer already shows that all these superimposed formations are forms which overlay a relatively constant substance, the species-nature of the human being, which is not a product of history, but of natural history. Something that has gradually proceeded from this is now reacting upon it, striking through all the superimposed historical strata down to the original basis. All those human energies involved in the evolution of civilisation find themselves more or less implicated in the overall exterminist tendency.

Since this cannot be an accidental result, the correction must also get to the roots. The movement of conversion today must precisely bring about a mutation in the 'genotype' of society. The theologian, Johann Baptist Metz, called this an anthropological revolution. What does this relate to? European civilisation has certainly discovered the *non plus ultra* of efficiency (as its admirers call it) in expanded reproduction. But very probably this realises only in an excessive measure something that is present already in our species endowment.

Doesn't the whole progress that led into civilisation have above all the character of *material* expansion?

(more heads, more consumption per head)? Even in the earliest religions, aren't the intelligible, the mental forces ultimately deployed for the sake of mastering the *external* world? And isn't the centre of gravity of all human culture to be found in these 'exosomatic organs', from the stone flint to the computer? People nowadays speak of the 'exo-centredness' of human nature, quite analogously to the understanding that the ant has its essence not in itself but in the ant colony as a whole. Whatever previous movements of conversion may have changed, they have not affected this basic text. The next prophet in line has had to begin again by preaching against the normal social life of his time

In my opinion, we can make clear what the problem is by reference to the ants. If human nature was so involved with the social edifice right from the start as is the case with the ants, there would be no possibility of escape from the blind alley of evolution. As ants, we could not even raise the question of putting our cultural evolution into reverse or correcting it, after it had led us into the Babylonian captivity of our technostucture. As human beings, we are far too ready to agree that we are only ants and as little capable as other species of escaping from an evolutionary impasse, withdrawing from a specialisation that has prospects only in the short term.

**I**s this really impossible? With our genotype it should be possible. Our cultural specialisation is precisely not biologically inscribed. The ten thousand years of civilisation have not made us incapable, at least not yet, of living without our artificial environment. As opposed to the ant, human individuals are in a position, in certain circumstances which at times are present on a massive scale, of withdrawing the most significant portion of their natural powers from the social edifice and engaging them in new purposes. And there are historic examples for the reconstruction or demolition of enchain-ing structures, for their disintegration, even for an exodus from them.

If the exosomatic evolution is to be corrected, this is only conceivable

with a force not yet disposed of, or at least not yet decisively disposed of, by the civilisation stamped by the last ten thousand years of history. Our genotype is such a force, and it does not doom us to carry round this technostucture like a tortoise and its shell. This is a force, and the only force, that stands outside the given historical universe, and yet is a real social force that can be summoned up within society. Human beings are indeed already social beings when they enter into this history, which presents itself, or is recorded as, a history of class struggles. At this point in time they have all the essential capacities and desires that drive them through to today. And as it appears, they have since this point in time become alienated in many respects from their definition, by following the principle which in the Bible is referred to as Mammon

**B**efore going on, I want to mention one thing, though I only have an intimation here. As I see it, the genotype is that social power present in every human being which the old prophets always evoked under the name of God. God is the alter ego, the 'thou' of our genotype that is always aimed at. The place of God is where the developmental needs of our original nature converge, above all of course an inward place. This is why we can be called from and to this place.

I see in this completely this-sided and inner-worldly connection the reasons why the religious dimension is now making its return, and the fundamental role it has to play. What religions invariably and timelessly say about God and his/her 'actions' and 'attitudes', the way he 'proceeds' seems to me to be directly a pattern containing all those models by which the task, substance and strategy of the conversion movement can be described. Here there are readily translatable categories in order to grasp what I have in mind as the extra- or supra-historical saving power, the substance which bears the concrete and then of course completely historical action.

The decisive thing will be the amount of energy that we bring

together. This is on the one hand the problem of associating the unbound energies, their bundling together, for which the old political forms are inadequate. More precisely, the question is really that these energies should be at work on all sides, or decentrally, and in the same direction, so that the system they are confronting cannot deploy its forces now here, now there, but is simply overburdened. Coordination is above all else communication, knowledge of one another and also feeling the connecting stream. On the other hand, there is the problem of releasing as many as possible of those energies still tied into the system. The genotype is certainly there, but its best forces may be expropriated and alienated. The energy it can supply in its own interest is quite other than constant. Here it is, above all, the association also experienced in actions, the social-psychological support, that gives endurance to the new distribution of mental resources.

**S**o far as *strategy* goes, the strategy that will result from this in the historic context, I will confine myself here to the narrower field of the conversion movement in the metropolises, where the securing of human dignity generally doesn't begin with the struggle for a minimal existence. I am completely aware that we are working here in conditions of luxury, that a social network covers our uprising which would have difficulty in existing without colonialism. What I have to say is also much abbreviated and incomplete.

The basis, as already mentioned, is the progressive disintegration of the social body as expressed in a decay of the system of values and thus of all institutional authorities. More and more people are either excluded, marginalised, dismissed, or directly motivated to drop out, with either all or part of their energies. This gives rise by necessity to a strategy (by which I don't mean anything like a secretly elaborated and planned plot) that combines two elements: a gradually spreading *refusal* and a deliberate *obstruction*. This is not meant as a kind of new discovery. I simply want to draw

attention to what is necessary and deliberate in it.

Refusal, above all, means protecting one's own energies from being absorbed, and on top of this it means active withdrawal of energies from the ruling structures, very often backed by an accusation. Refusal of military service through to total non-cooperation is the most striking example of it. I believe that non-political withdrawal is only a temporary moment in this context. One may say that the productive apparatus itself rejects people's energies — unemployment — and that the hippies, alternative people, job-sharers, etc., only help to relieve its burden. But a far more comprehensive trend is involved, also with those who for the time-being still remain 'inside'. It is already affecting work motivation as such.

**A**t the political level refusal means the withdrawal of legitimation. The *Frankfurter Rundschau* of 12 May, 1982 quoted a study according to which 66 per cent of young people in North-Rhine Westphalia, and 43 per cent of adults in the Federal Republic as a whole, denied that politicians took decisions in the interest of the people. Still more people are convinced that the big enterprises think only of their profits and not of the well-being of society. 74 per cent of young people in North-Rhine Westphalia and 46 per cent of adult citizens in the whole country recognise naturally enough, given their assessment of the cause, the increasing tendency to resolve conflicts by violence. This means that the system is already near to defeat ideologically.

The crisis of legitimation naturally finds expression also in elections as the preferred ritual of legitimation. The counter-movement will either boycott elections and/or gain a political foothold in parliament that is conceived right from the start as being there simply to disrupt the normal execution of the 'compulsion of things', to tear away the curtain of justification and expand the space for extra-parliamentary forces to put pressure on the institutions.

Obstruction means restricting the operation of the system by active

resistance, starting with the most dangerous of its normal directions of development. The motto for this is selective ungovernability. Specific measures such as the installation of new weapons systems, the construction of nuclear power stations, more and more airports, motorways, new industrial plant, etc., should be made impossible. Actions can stretch from blockades and demonstrations via refusal of taxes to legal obstructions, making each new investment a wearying obstacle course. The most important thing, however, is the relativising of the norms of an achievement society, the undermining of the consensus for expansion.

**T**he administrators of the great machine and their advisers stress the fact that our super-complex society cannot tolerate the shock of disorganisation. Chaos and anarchy must be avoided. What purpose these slogans have, and how relative their truth content is, has been shown by the political struggles in Poland. Those who demand that the movement should provide detailed recipes for reconstruction in advance can be answered with the words of Goethe's earth spirit: 'You're like the spirit that you grasp/You're not like me.'

Enough people of talent with a reformist orientation are to be found in the institutions and on their margins, for example, in the scientific establishments, who are ready to accept compelling impulses from outside and then propose to the establishment a feasible programme of energy conservation or measures for the humanising of work etc.. But this is not an affair for the movement itself. This need only supply the impulse, which need not necessarily be refined and adequate to the problem. The main thing is to produce the pressure: then it is always possible to discuss how progress can be made most effectively and avoiding so far as possible counter-productive diversions.

The movement must not be seduced into becoming 'constructive' and obeying pre-existing patterns, so long as it still has no influence on

the basic direction. The example of Solidarity in Poland has given us a good example of this, inasmuch as it refused to take responsibility so long as the hostile apparatus still had its hand on the wheel. The movement in the West must stick still more forcefully to a position of fundamental opposition, as here seduction by the pliability of the institutions is far greater than in the East or South.

What the movement offers that is positive and alternative is not something to be attained within the system, but in opposition to it. Even though the eventual outcome will certainly not be a purist one, the movement must strive completely to cast off the ruling structure. In its actual practice, therefore, its own ideal can be present only as the measure by which actions of obstruction are assessed. It must take shape in forms of behaviour, in methods and means, both inwardly and outwardly. Militancy is not the same as violence. Here, in the metropolitan countries, at any rate, everything indicates a strategy of non-violence in the sense of not injuring life on the other side. If we force them to use tanks, then we ourselves make the ideological break-through impossible.

**F**or those involved, the conversion movement itself becomes an adventure, a field for enjoyment of life and self-realisation and identification. The different society, the new state of the world as a goal, is not the ultimate motive of commitment, even though the utopia is very important for the direction as well as for the choice of means. In view of the provocation that the social structure represents for the genotype, the natural human constitution, the goal is as if newly founded by natural right. The human being has a claim to the satisfaction of the basic social needs that our natural history, our prehistoric biological evolution brought with us into civilisation when this began. In the utopias, whose number is legion, a situation is outlined that precisely promises fulfilment of this.

It is of course impossible, in strictly epistemological terms, really to

abstract from the present historical existence of the civilised human being, but this does not prohibit the completely necessary concern to distinguish between things which we can dispense with by our nature and things which we cannot dispense with. Graspable units that are to a large degree autonomous and even autarchic with respect to everyday needs are the ever recurring ideal — an ideal, moreover, which at least in this generalisation is not exclusively designed for industrialised countries. The opposite image is one of large-scale technology and organisation, which are recognised as hostile to individuality, initiative and communication, and where the source of material waste is also to be found. I believe that the resistance of these constants to any critical scathing bears witness to an irrefutable content

**T**o conclude, and to summarise once again: in East and West and South we are dealing with the different consequences of one and the same challenge, with the formerly unstoppable character of capital accumulation, which however bears with it more than just the dominant social formation of the last two hundred years. In this connection, the economic component that is stressed in the description proves to be only the spearhead of an overall development proceeding from European civilisation, which must unquestionably be corrected if we are to have a future as a species.

The industrialisation-to-death of the world is pursued by an institutional complex of competing camps and States, firms and corporations, which can do nothing else but drive forward the criminal process in *its* direction. There is an international priesthood, including the so-called elites of the Third World, which directly serves the Moloch

The employers' associations and trade unions in the metropolises also pursue one and the same goal externally, for all their antagonistic cooperation. If a shipyard in my own city of Bremen is threatened with the loss of an order to a Danish shipyard, then all the political and

corporate forces unite in demanding State subsidies so that it will be the *German* ship-building industry that increases surplus capacity for sea transport. Let people in other countries go without work! Outside the European borders no consequences of export strategies are foreseen — there things can take their own course. No one *wants* the starving millions who are the natural result of the logic of the world market.

The official structures occupy themselves incessantly with military and industrial competition, with the spread of scientific progress and the stereotyped commercial culture across the whole world, and anyone who is forced to live on this only dies from it a bit more each day.

**T**here are various seemingly irrational responses in vogue: the New Age Movement or the Acquarian Conspiracy. One thing about them is correct: what is required really is a world-embracing counter-movement, and there is *no* Archimedian point within the existing institutions which could be used to bring about even the smallest change of course. Without forces that attack from outside, the atomic holocaust is not to be staved off. It is not a question of the fate of governments on the one hand, movements on the other, not a question of impartial prognoses of their respective chances. What is at stake is the fate of the world, including the fate of these impartial umpires.

I would like to return finally to the point that we must direct ourselves to the real and in no way ethereal function that the prophetic invocation of God always had in apocalyptic situations: as the authoritative and visionary appeal to a radical change of consciousness, to a break with the death-dealing habits that compel us to play along with everything so that tomorrow there will still be power for the electric shaver. The question is to give this appeal a content, character and style that is in keeping with the times. If we have come to view a certain kind of enlightenment and science as contemptible, I still believe that we should act in a manner that in no way rejects the legacy of reason.

# Religious and cultural resurgence

NISAR AZIZ BUTT

IN 1959, as I began work on a long novel in Urdu with the background of the freedom struggle in the sub-continent, a writer friend suggested to me that I read Spengler's *Decline of the West*. This was one of the books on a long list that my friend had suggested but once I began to read the book, I was galvanised. Imagine my excitement when I read in the very first pages of the introduction the following passage:

'Thanks to the subdivision of history into "ancient", "medieval" and "modern" — an incredibly jejune and "meaningless" scheme, which has nevertheless entirely dominated our historical thinking — we have failed to perceive the true position in general history of higher mankind and of the little part-world which has developed on West European soil from the time of the German Roman empire .. The cultures that are to come will find it difficult to believe that the validity of such a scheme [i.e., "ancient" "medieval", "modern" scheme] with its rectilinear progression and its meaningless proportions was never whole-heartedly attacked.

'It is not only that the scheme circumscribes the area of history. What is worse, it rigs the stage. The ground of West Europe is treated as a steady pole — a unique patch chosen on the surface of the sphere for no better reason than because we live on it — and the great histories of millennial duration and mighty far-away cultures are made to revolve round this pole in all modesty. It is a quaintly conceived system of sun and planets. We select a single bit of ground as the natural centre of the historical system and make

it the central sun. From it, all the events in history receive their real light, from it their importance is judged in perspective. But it is in our own West European conceit alone that this phantom "World-history" which a breath of scepticism would dissipate, is acted out.

'We have to thank that conceit for the immense optical illusion (become natural from long habit) whereby distant histories of thousands of years, such as those of China and Egypt are made to shrink to the dimensions of mere episodes while nearer home the decades since Luther and particularly since Napoleon loom large as Brocken-spectres. We know quite well that the slowness with which a high cloud or a distant railway train moves is only apparent and yet we believe that the tempo of Babylonian, early Indian and Egyptian history was slower than our recent past. And we think of them as less substantial, more damped down, more diluted because we do not make allowances for inward and outward distances.

'It is self evident that for the cultures of the West the existence of Florence or Paris is more important than Lo-Yang or Pataliputra. But is it permissible to found a scheme of world history on such biased estimates? If so then the Chinese historian is quite entitled to frame a world history in which the Crusades, the Renaissance, Caesar and Frederick the Great, are passed over in silence as insignificant. How from the morphological point of view, should our eighteenth century be more important than any other of the sixty



centuries that preceded it? Is it not ridiculous to oppose a "modern" history of a few centuries and that history to all intents localised in West Europe, to an "ancient history" which covers as many millennia — incidentally dumping into that "ancient history" the whole mass of the pre-Hellenic cultures, unprobed and unordered, as mere appendix matter? This is no exaggeration. Do we not, for the sake of our heavy scheme, dispose of Egypt and Babylon — each one as individual and self-contained a history as our own "world history" — as a prelude to classical history? Do we not relegate the vast complexes of Indian and Chinese culture to foot-notes, with a gesture of embarrassment?..

I apologise for inflicting on you such a long quotation but its importance to me was phenomenal. Starved as we then were for some kind of dignity and self respect, this world-view came to me like balm to the 'bruised spirit'. I read the two volumes with great fervour. It elated me immensely by speaking of the great cultures of the past but it also completely deflated me when I realised that these cultures were now moribund, and may be beyond recall. Besides, the book created in me an insatiable thirst. I no longer wished to belong to any one culture. I wished to know and experience the deep world-feeling of as many cultures as I possibly could.

Poor Oswald Spengler had not written his *Decline of the West* for me — one of the fellaheen. He had written it for the West European and American peoples — the Faustian men — and presented it with a proud flourish as a German philosophy. With all his keen insight and his deep intuition he did not see that he did not belong to the rectilinear scheme of history and it was he rather than the scheme that would be rejected.

Arnold Toynbee soon appeared on the scene and began speaking of apparented civilizations and 'Challenge and Response' — and before Spengler could even turn in his grave, the ideas he had thrown out in such abundance were somehow

fitted into the rectilinear scheme and the rest rejected out of hand. For a long time afterwards, whenever I spoke to a European friend about Spengler, he always gave me the same answer 'Spengler? Oh Spengler is dead!'

The word 'dead' here is significant. I have not heard any other philosopher's philosophy being labelled as dead. Thus the West — Europeans and Americans — assimilated the threat of Spengler and went blithely their way still following the 'ancient', 'medieval', 'modern' scheme with some slight modifications occasioned by the Spenglerian onslaught, but alas there was nothing to protect me against him and I went down heavily.

The anguish, loneliness and the harm done to me were immense but for the life of me I would not have missed this experience. If I were to live all over again, I would again fall into the Spenglerian trap. Imagine a space-man going on a floating journey from one planet to another and yet another — briefly sojourning everywhere — understanding every planet to the depth of his being but not being accepted anywhere! And this simply because wherever he goes, it is divined that he harbours inside him other world-feelings too and alien and hostile world-feelings at that! This is the fate of a person who gives himself up to Spengler. He experiences all the cultures but himself belongs nowhere. For, you cannot experience other cultures if you are firmly planted in any one of them, in which case the other cultures just don't exist for you and are completely meaningless or pernicious.

Besides, it was not only the West European cultures that were rectilinear. So were all the other cultures. Spengler asked with great cynicism how a western man would feel if a Chinese historian ignored the Crusades, the Renaissance, Caesar and Frederick the great? But the Chinese man does ignore these epochs and these men — if not historically then in his guts. Few are the people willing to become like the spaceman I mentioned above — the one who floats between planets and does not

belong anywhere — and Chinese historians may not be among them. Besides, what if the very time-space frameworks were different from planet to planet, i.e., from culture to culture?

One does not have to go to philosophy books to find out the way the different time-space frameworks operate in different world cultures. The life and beliefs of the common man are eloquent on the subject. For instance, a Muslim would easily believe that a spiritually advanced person can meet physically with saints and prophets from other centuries, that he can be at two places simultaneously, that he can get to another place without any visible means of transport. In other words, for him, time is not irreversible, nor space dense.

A Hindu nullifies time by the doctrine of rebirth — by a soul getting reborn again and again and in many different bodies. And he believes that time-space is 'maya', i.e., illusion. In West Europe, once Christianity was dethroned and the Christian time-space framework demolished, time and space both became infinite on the one hand and on the other they were rigidly measurable, minutely counted and mapped out, and fully accounted for commodities when considered in smaller chunks. Also, the western modern man greatly loved both time and space — a dangerous pursuit judging by the assiduity with which so many other cultures tried to gloss over both time and space somehow or the other.

Now, let us suppose for the sake of argument that industrialisation and development depend largely on adopting the western framework of time-space, i.e., clocks ticking on every street corner, the rigidest control of daily time and how it is spent, punctuality and schedules — while the traditional soul of some desert or jungle man takes refuge in ignoring time! This man refuses to register the day he was born, so he can't know when he is expected to die. He counts time by the moon which is fluid and variable and not by the sun which is inexorable. His watch is the sun's shadow, his

calender the seasons of the year. He sinks deep in the community like the plant in the jungle, so that his roots are deep in the soil.

Ask this man to change his time-space framework so that his community or society or country will become developed. He will unconsciously and inarticulately calculate the cost. More bread, more cars, more television sets, more this or that? But these he can get in any case without manufacturing them himself. He decides to stay put in his own time-space framework and live on the fruits of other people's labour.

This was the only way I could explain the underdevelopment of the underdeveloped world which now has the dubious honour of being called the Third World. How else was one to explain it when so much effort was being made all round to get these countries moving and they would not take off. Lots of people spoke of delay in beginning the process—thirty years from now, fifty years from now, they hopefully calculated, but Japan overtook the western countries in industrial output within decades and China took a short-cut to industrialisation by the Marxist route. Why could not the other countries do the same — by one route or another? I have a strong suspicion that the Chinese (& hence Japanese) time-space framework is somewhat similar to the western framework, but I have no direct access to their ancient culture and hence cannot formulate any hypothesis.

And it is not only the individual to whom his time-space framework is important. I will go a big step forward and say that a whole culture depends on that framework. In fact, this framework is the very basis of a culture and hence of the resultant civilization and any interference — serious interference — would unsettle the entire edifice. That being so, we can understand the relentless struggle of the indigenous cultures of the Third World countries against development efforts and industrialisation.

In 1965 this thing was so little understood in the West that in a

seminar at Harvard, while westernisation was being discussed and I suggested that a high degree of nostalgia for the past existed in Third World countries, nobody was willing to go along with me. Henry Kissinger was present at the discussion and asked me 'what about modernisation?' I said modernisation was seen as westernisation by most Third World countries and hence resisted, but my audience remained sceptical. They were of the view that modernisation was the goal of all these societies, whatever the degree of their success might be. Of course, by now this nostalgia has become recognised the world over and today we discuss 'The Religious and Cultural Resurgence' of this epoch.

Alas, things are not as simple as I have made them sound so far. If the Third World countries had totally rejected the time-space framework of the modern western world-view they would be a homogeneous group and a formidable force to reckon with. Under the immense pressure of contemporary western thought and technology, however, most of these societies got splintered. As an illustration, let us consider the sub-continent.

Towards the end of the 19th century, after the First War of Independence called the Indian Mutiny of 1857, had failed, there was a deliberate effort on the part of the Muslim community in India to accept western education and acquire western knowledge. This movement was spearheaded by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and his colleagues and greeted with enthusiasm by the elite of the time but the important thing in this context was the platform which remained of Muslim connotation. The Muslims as Muslims were exhorted to come out of their ignorance and decline, and embrace ways and means of achieving political and economic advancement as opposed to other communities.

This movement succeeded in activating the Indian Muslims. Besides, at that period the English were easy to emulate, in the sense that they believed in discipline,

hard work, scientific progress, and carried within them a deep faith in the future. Even so, only the elite embarked on the venture with any seriousness. The common man stressed the other part of the movement in which Muslim backwardness was lamented. This translation of a couplet of the poet Haali is an indication of the spirit and direction of the movement. 'It is time that we pray urgently, for O, Special among the prophets, your followers are in dire trouble.'

To begin with, however, the effects of western education were only superficial. Only a minority could get education — economic hardship and paucity of schools being the cause — and of these only a minority allowed its soul to be touched and changed by the process. And that too by the third generation after Sir Syed.

But once western thought had penetrated this crust — which became the upper crust socially since it was most in contact with the British ruling class — two things happened at once. The intellectual elite became hostile to the West (wherever western modes of thought are really assimilated and internalised in Third World countries, sooner or later emulation gives way to hostility and self assertion) and they inherited all the conflicts, the Right-Left schisms and different shades of political thought from the West. Hence the splintering!

One could perhaps discern three major groupings

- (a) Western capitalist (various shades from stark conservatism to liberalism)
- (b) The Socialist - Communist (from very diluted socialism to hard core communism)
- (c) The traditional indigenous (again subject to the sub-divisions of the traditional ethos)

In this picture, the single most important factor still remains the fact that the vast majority remained uneducated and hence rooted in the indigenous ethos. Common belief has it that people are uneducated because they lack either intelligence or money or dynamism or else all



three But education today being western education all the world over, can it be that people are either so rooted in the indigenous ethos or else so afraid of leaving it, that they cannot accept the incoming ideas? For, exile from the ethos can bring extreme anxieties, loneliness, sense of guilt and unhappiness.

If some kind of cushioning could be provided by the adopted ethos, there might have been a mitigation of anguish But non-acceptance by the First World is of phenomenal proportions Whatever the reasons, a Third World person has to be tailor-made in order to find a very junior and very conditional position in the privileged intellectual enclaves of the First World. The very labels First World and Third World are indicative of the respective positions Besides, inside the First World there is such variety and such abundance of detail (more about this aspect later) that some poor soul from a Third World country has great difficulty in catching up

Also, he is on the proverbial horns of a dilemma If he ventures deep into alien territory, he loses touch with his base and becomes completely cut off from and incomprehensible to his compatriots If he remains even partially rooted in his own culture, he looks unfamiliar and ignorant to his First World audience Most intellectuals solve this problem by remaining comfortably mediocre This way they can maintain touch with both camps

I am afraid I am not explaining my point well With the onslaught of the scientific-industrial revolution, western thought trends became so dominant on the world scene that most other cultures and their thought trends froze in their tracks Decay had set in in most of them anyway or else the colonial ventures of European countries would not have succeeded so easily

Hence, frozen indigenously and unwilling to participate fully in the incoming western culture, most intellectual work in the Third World came to a standstill Too much time and energy was being used up in balancing on the indigenously

alien tight rope stretch for any original thinking to be possible, and intellectual debate mostly centred round the point how much or how little of the incoming influences were to be allowed in?

The debate only intensified the fragmentation and splintering of society so that even political cohesion became impossible — since any kind of democratically inclined system presupposes complementary groupings — not mutually exclusive ones This being so, inter-group communication and dialogue also became difficult and fraught with conflicts I have been speaking here mostly of Pakistan but I have a feeling this picture is true of most Asian countries In rare men and during rare epochs the groupings fused dynamically together, the schisms healed and dynamic action became possible

This happened during most colonial wars of liberation since freedom is a concept common to all systems of thought However, these wars were not simple traditional wars — where might is pitched against might. These were wars fought by the elite, with the slogans of the opposite camp as weapons, viz, democracy, equality between men, self-determination, justice etc

The masses did not quite understand these abstractions, for they had their own abstractions which they clung to tenaciously It was up to the leaders to get the people activated and involved on a consistent long term basis Hence the importance of leaders in Third World countries. It was a rare man indeed who could galvanise his own people as well as keep in harmony and negotiate with the global set up

The Gandhi-Nehru team provides an interesting illustration of the process Here two — not one man — did the job Mahatma Gandhi understood his people, spoke their language, believed in a reformist programme rooted in the indigenous ethos Left alone to his programmes of reform and non-violence, he might not have been able to negotiate the freedom of India, so that part of the struggle

he left entirely to Jawaharlal Nehru It is significant that in 1947 when Nehru, steeped in emotion, — was ushering in freedom at midnight at Delhi, Mahatma Gandhi was in Calcutta trying to stop the Hindu Muslim riots Thus India, like many other Third World countries, was ushered into the modern comity of nations half heartedly, with its soul turned away towards poverty and passivity

Most Third World countries would have somehow found a balance between the traditional and attained some kind of equilibrium politically and socially if they had been left to themselves But the end of the colonial period was followed by the 'spheres of influence' policy of the developed nations and before long we had the super powers, their rivalries and their cold and hot wars Perhaps it was this rivalry which intensified and encouraged the splintering within Third World countries and in some cases triggered the splintering Every Third World country was now a possible theatre for civil war and, of them, many actually fell prey to civil war

With deep regret I say that the super powers have been playing the Dr. Jekyll and Mr Hyde game with the world I speak here of the governments and not of the peoples The super powers obviously cherish and respect their citizens and work tirelessly for their welfare In this zeal, the rest of the world becomes unimportant to them. If the interests of one super power or the other are being served, no hardship, no tyranny, no destruction inflicted on a Third World country is considered too high a price for the advancement of that interest.

My own personal view is that stable, strong Third World countries are in the interest of world equilibrium irrespective of their ideological connotations Russia and China are both communist countries but they have not yet formed an alliance against the western countries It is viability and dynamism that counts, not the path by which it is achieved

This does not seem to be the opinion of the super powers, since

whenever a country shows any signs of viability and dynamism a spanner is mysteriously thrown in the works and that country is back to square one in the international game of snakes and ladders. It is little wonder then that in this kind of a global situation, not 'progress' but acceptance and security should become the major need of the moment and refuge should be sought in more traditional enclaves.

**T**his may or may not have adequately explained the religious and cultural resurgence in Third World countries. Inside the developed countries also equilibrium is somewhat threatened. After all, the modern western man is also human and his infinite time-space framework sometimes tends to become too much for him, specially since it is superimposed on the Christian time-space framework.

However ruthlessly religion might have been exiled from the intellectual horizon, it has a way of reappearing through the cracks. Colin Wilson, Shaw, and before them Nietzsche, all hoped and prayed for the appearance of the superman, a demi-god who would just float above the skyscrapers, wave a magic wand and chase all the problems away. But perhaps the superman is already here—has been here for some time—plodding in laboratories and on space fields with his head overlooking other planets even as he sadly contemplates his feet of clay! Can it be that even he sometimes thinks longingly of the friendly torture of hell fires when he looks at the impersonal awesomeness of infinity all round him?

But superman will be superman and our superman is not entirely at the mercy of his time-space infinity. He can escape into another kind of infinity—the infinity of detail. Did Descartes (and later Freud) know they were providing the coming generations with a much needed safety channel by opening up the analytic labyrinths? Analysis can open up such vistas of detail in any one small object or topic that a whole lifetime can be swallowed up by it. How comfortable! History

has never witnessed such wealth of detail before and this is another hallmark of our unique century. This might have cushioned the western modern man and prevented him from a headlong rush back to religion but it has further precipitated religious and cultural resurgence inside Third World countries.

The reason is simple. Emulation of the developed countries is becoming more and more difficult for them. Individuals from these countries can adopt some one field of specialisation and work at it, but to get any kind of holistic picture of the jigsaw puzzle of the developed world is becoming increasingly difficult for them. Besides how do you reproduce this kind of a model in your own societies even if you were to want it desperately? Next to impossible!

The field is thus left clear to the groups which stand for tradition, religion, revival of the old cultures. Their appeal can be strong indeed. They promise to shut out the frightening reality of today's world. They are identity-oriented—a major consideration in the present global atmosphere of rootlessness. They invite you to tread pathways that have been rendered smooth by centuries of use.

Best of all, they do not insist on catapulting you into the technological age with all its pressures, competitiveness, hard work and uncertainties. Fruits of technology? Those you can buy from other markets, so why toil and sweat. Being treated with contempt for being underdeveloped? That you can stonewall or ignore and treat the incoming influences from developed countries as movies on the T V or cinema screens, viz, as mere entertainment.

**H**owever, when all is said and done, do not let us forget that we live in the most fantastic century in history. Even at the risk of offending my favourite philosopher, Spengler, I assert that the 20th century has been unsurpassable in the known history of man. It is as if all the centuries flowed into the one century and turned it into a small sea of

time. What richness, what wealth! Alas, we are too small to face up to the grandeur of our century. We cannot face up to it. We seek refuge in drugs, high living, constant activity or else burrow into a small corner created by some specialisation, some ideology or some detail. Lucky are the people who can take the enormous vitality of the 20th century, can experience the infinite variety, the anguish, the stark honesty and stark truthfulness that this century has exposed us to.

**T**he future? Who cares about the future? We can always hope that one morning when we wake up all the problems would have vanished into thin air. No pitched political battles or civil wars within countries, no conflicts with other countries beyond the frontiers. No East-West or North-South hostility either. Peace on earth and peace in the soul of man. Or else we can live in perpetual fear that the conflicts will intensify and the earth itself be turned into a mushroom cloud.

Whatever happens, the 20th century will remain for me the most fantastic century in history. When I go I would like to go with Tagore's words on my lips. He says 'When I go from hence, let this be my parting word that what I have seen is unsurpassable. In this playhouse of infinite forms I have had my play and here have I caught sight of that which is formless.'

In conclusion and as a recipe for the future, do I dare suggest that you, my friends, are perhaps not fully savouring the 20th century! You are too rooted in the First World or the Second World or the Third World. I invite you to step out of your own particular world and experience all the other world-feelings that are available to you—experience them emotionally and not with the intellect only. I invite you to taste the deep anguish, loneliness and the many dimensional emotional richness created by wandering far away from the base which T. E. Lawrence experienced on return from Arabia and which we the humble people from Third World countries are constrained to experience very often.

# Overcrowded policy-making

J. J. RICHARDSON

ONE very considerable difficulty in discussing political trends, particularly in the context of the theme of this conference, 'The Future of Politics', is that we probably lack systematic and reliable data. I am especially conscious of the fact that the observations contained in this paper are rather subjective and impressionistic. Moreover, my central theme — *that policy-making and implementation in western democracies has become much more difficult over the last decade or so* — is one which even in an ideal world would be difficult to prove or disprove. Nevertheless, I do believe that my remarks will be seen by those practitioners involved in aspects of the policy-making and implementation process (in Britain at least) as reflecting their own perceptions of the real world in which they work. As an academic political scientist, one of course is anxious to produce 'hard' evidence, but equally one should not be afraid to offer com-

ments, as (one hopes) a reasonably experienced observer of the political process, on at least the possibility of developing trends which could have important implications for the way in which we are governed and for the capacity of governments to manage and solve societies' complex problems

In trying to make sense of the massive amount of policy-making and implementing activity of the modern State, Professor Gustafsson of the University of Umea, Sweden, and myself, have taken some tentative steps to develop the concept of policy style. The concept is no doubt much too simple and if taken too far could raise as many problems as it tries to solve! However, we believe that at its minimum, the concept has some heuristic value in pointing us towards central questions relating to the effectiveness of government in problem-solving. In our original formulation we chose

the interrelationship between (a) radical and non-radical policy change, and (b) the relationship between government and other actors in the policy process, as the two essential features of our concept of policy style (Gustafsson and Richardson, 1980).

More recently (Richardson *et al.*, 1982), we have suggested that it may be more useful to distinguish between an anticipatory/active approach to problem-solving and a more reactive approach to problem-solving, rather than becoming involved in a somewhat sterile debate over what is radical and what is incremental. Thus, whilst readily conceding that not all policies are handled in the same way, we nevertheless believe that it is equally true that policies are generally not so distinctive as to prevent them being accommodated in a basic and simple typology of policy styles.

Many descriptions of the policy process appear to be more or less related to two factors. (1) A government's approach to problem solving in terms of adopting either an *anticipatory-active* attitude towards societal problems, or taking an essentially *reactive* approach to problem-solving. (2) The second 'primary' factor appears to be a government's relationship to other actors in the policy-making and implementing process. For example, how do governments 'deal' with the thousands of interest groups in a modern society? Is a government very accommodating and concerned to reach *consensus* with organised interests, or is it more inclined towards *imposing* decisions notwithstanding opposition from groups? Policy style can, in this way, be defined as the interaction between (a) the government's approach to problem-solving and (b) the relationship between government and other actors in the policy process

Such a definition enables us to categorise societies into four very basic 'policy styles'. Thus, some societies seem to be located in a category which we might see as emphasising consensus and a reactive attitude to problem-solving. Others appear to be located in a category also stressing consensus but with a

set of normative values which emphasise an anticipatory or active approach to problem-solving. Others are seemingly less concerned with consensus, but see the role of the State as being rather active and willing (even having a duty) to impose policy changes in the face of opposition from organised interests. A fourth category into which most post-industrial societies may be moving is where governments are increasingly reactive rather than anticipatory in their approach to problem-solving, yet, if any significant policy change is to be achieved, it has to be enforced against the resistance of at least some organised groups.

By concentrating on our two primary factors in the policy process, it is possible to construct a simple basic typology of policy styles as shown below.

My own belief is that, though it is still possible to argue that all policies are not handled in the same way (Lowi, 1964; Wilson, 1973), there may well be common trends in liberal democracies which (a) reduce differences between different policy sectors in any one country and (b) reduce differences between different countries. Thus, there may be factors at work which are leading to a convergence of policy styles (at least in western Europe). Are there forces at work which, like the impact of high fuel prices on motor-car designs, lead to some conformity? Are there forces which encourage all policy sectors to behave similarly in any one country — to adopt common operating procedures? In particular, do the increased mobilisation of interest groups and the development of what may be called 'unconventional participation' bring with them certain practical imperatives in the policy-making and implementing process, irrespective of policy sectors?

Writing in 1975, Heclo referred to the 'crowded policy environment' in the sense that 'partitions which were previously assumed to separate policy areas are more often being called into question'. The interplay of what were once thought to be exogenous factors for a given program is increasingly seen as integral

to its very substance' (Heclo, 1975, p. 404). Elsewhere, we have argued that western democracies are subject to a different form of 'overcrowding' of policy sectors, in addition to the increasing interdependence of policy problems described by Heclo (Gustafsson and Richardson, 1979; 1980). We have suggested that many policy sectors are now subject to participation by increased numbers of interest groups (and sometimes ordinary citizens, too) and that this participation is causing an 'overcrowding', leading to increased difficulty in reaching agreed decisions in each policy sector. We see this as an important phenomenon in what have been called 'post-industrial' societies.

Even before the 'post-industrial period', interest groups in most western democracies exercised influence through informal and formal contacts with decision-makers. Thus, writers on Britain have long seen the role of interest groups as quite central to the policy process (Beer, 1956; Finer, 1958; Eckstein, 1960; Hayward, 1974, 1976; Richardson and Jordan, 1979). In Scandinavia very similar labels have been used. Rokkan's description of numerical democracy and corporate pluralism is well known (Rokkan, 1966, p. 107). His view was echoed in Kvavik (1976) and by Christensen and Ronning (1977).

In Sweden Elvander has concluded that there is possibly the strongest interest group system in the world (Elvander, 1974). Lijphart's study of Holland, where he coined the term 'the politics of accommodation', clearly fits this pattern (Lijphart, 1968), and even in France there is a suggestion that we may all have underestimated the degree of group involvement in the policy process (Suleiman, 1974). There is a possibility that we have been bemused by the more spectacular defeats of groups in France, because these have been the object of so many studies, and have missed the quieter activity of the organised interests in some sectors.

What we have seen with the onset of post-industrialisation is an intensification of these developments — hence the flourishing debate on

corporatism (Ruin, 1974; Schmitter, 1974, 1977, Pahl and Winkler, 1976, Panitch, 1977, 1980, Cawson, 1978, 1979, Heisler, 1979; Cox, 1981). Alongside this development, there may well have been a change in the nature of some of the demands which decision-makers have to process. In particular, the development of non-materialistic values may have rather important consequences for the policy process. Increasingly, conflict is not just about the distribution of material benefits to different sections of society, but is also concerned with what Inglehart has identified as nonmaterialistic values (Inglehart, 1977).

**T**he role of environmentalists in articulating non-material values has been particularly significant. As Cotgrove and Duff argue, disagreement with the central values and beliefs of the dominant social paradigm can often run deep: 'Not only do they (the environmentalists) challenge the importance attached to material and economic goals, they by contrast give much higher priority to the realisation of non-material values — to social relationships and community, to the exercise of human skills and capacities, and to increased participation in decisions that affect our daily lives' (Cotgrove and Duff, 1980, p. 34). A further development is the apparent increase in what can be termed 'unconventional participation'. Put simply, many new groups, and following their example some long-established groups as well, have exhibited behaviour quite outside the 'rules' of the normally well-regulated policy systems.

It seems probable that the number of interest groups seeking an active role in policy-making, at both national and local levels, has increased very considerably. The 'environmentalist' groups again provide a good example. In the United Kingdom, for example, it was estimated that the vast majority (85 per cent) of local amenity societies were formed after 1957 (Barker, 1976). The number of groups nationally active in the environmental field also increased in the 1960s and 1970s. Many of these groups brought a new holistic and ecological perspective to bear on

environmental and pollution problems (Brookes and Richardson, 1975). Even long-established 'preservationist' groups became more active and determined to influence policy. By 1975 it was estimated that membership of the environmental movement in Britain had possibly reached 2 million (Lowe, 1975). In West Germany it had been estimated that the new 'grass-roots' organisations (groups) have more participants than the political parties (Mayer-Tasch, 1976). An official Danish survey demonstrated that the number of local administrations which have contact with grass-roots organisations increased from 36 to 51 per cent over 1973-6 (Gundelach, 1978). Even in France, hardly thought to be the cradle of 'interest group liberalism', it has been estimated that during the period 1967-76 an average of 25,000 voluntary associations (mostly local) were established annually, compared with only 1,000 in the inter war period (Hayward, 1979, p. 29).

It is almost a truism to say that the arrival of these large numbers of groups on the political scene has made the task of the decision-maker much more difficult. For example, the lead time for large development projects such as road building, power stations and airports has been adversely affected by the need to accommodate the demands of such groups and some projects have had to be abandoned. What might have been a routine and rather technical decision about, say, road construction in 1950, is now often a hotly debated issue, involving rather wide participation and quite new values in society. Such issues can take a very long time to 'process'. For example, the debate over a change in the permitted size and weight of lorries in Britain has continued since 1969 and is due to be resolved in 1982!

**B**ritain perhaps represents the extreme case of a policy style which exhibits the increased difficulty in governing in such a way as to have some hope of achieving policy change and the obstacles to governments acting as problem-solving, rather than purely consensus-building, institutions. Britain also illustrates the degree to which power,

in modern societies, is decentralised in the sense of being shared amongst many different actors—some elected and others non-elected. Power, in Britain, can be said to be diffused, with non-electoral and non-parliamentary arenas of decision-making having increased importance. Thus, Britain may be described as a post-parliamentary democracy (Richardson and Jordan, 1979).

This view of the British policy process is neatly captured in the following quotation from Lord Croham, former Head of the Home Civil Service, when addressing young civil servants in 1978 'As regards the way government is conducted, this is always changing without anyone noticing it. The more central government seeks to intervene in the economy, the less powerful it will become, because it will have to rely on an ever-increasing number of bodies and individuals to do what it wants. Those people in this situation will bargain and make terms. If you believe that elections should determine policies, that policy choices should be clear cut alternatives, and that there is or should be a wide range of possible alternatives, you will not enjoy the general situation I have forecast because it is one which creates the need for consensus policies, inter-party deals and bargains with pressure groups. Without such arrangements, it will be difficult to put central government majorities together, or get the various levels of government to function' (Lord Croham, 1978).

The quotation illustrates what I believe to be a primary feature of British politics — namely, the particularly high degree of integration of groups into the policy process.

**I**n discussing the British policy style, I do not claim it is an accurate description of the *detailed* operating procedures for handling issues as diverse as, say, nuclear energy, foreign policy, abortion reform, or regulation of the privately rented housing market. The *dominant* style is a procedural ambition. There is a preferred type of machinery, reflecting normative values — which is to avoid electoral politics and public conflict in order to reach

consensus or 'accommodation' in the labyrinth of the consultative machinery which has developed

These *preferred* operating procedures tend also to be the *standard* operating procedures. The 'normal' policy style is perhaps best labelled as 'bureaucratic accommodation' (Jordan and Richardson, 1982). This is a system in which the prominent actors are groups and government departments and the mode is bargaining rather than imposition. Departments readily recognise the 'relevant' groups in a given policy community and whenever possible seek to mobilise the community around agreed policies. The predominant style is thus one in which a predilection for the avoidance of active or innovative policies is combined with a desire to achieve a consensus relationship between government and groups.

The pattern of group/departamental relations can depart from 'bureaucratic accommodation' in two broad (conflicting) ways. On the one hand, there is a tendency to highly formalised 'tripartism' where the Trades Union Congress and the Confederation of British Industry are accorded near-equality by the government. On the other hand, there is some tendency for policy-making to be less orderly than the bureaucratic accommodationist style and to involve an unpredictably wide number of groups in rather unstructured relations. There are then conflicting trends towards order and regularisation and towards fragmentation (See Jordan, 1981).

This account of the British style becomes on occasion an ideal type of 'how to negotiate'. In other words, certain practices appear to be likely to develop in any society as a means of abating conflict. Societies cannot, by definition, be solely based on conflict, and the 'logic of negotiation' appears inevitable. The need for social appeasement in order to develop social cohesion is likely to impose similarities on the general policy processes of various States. The *British* style turns out to be the negotiative style — that is, necessarily not peculiarly British.

We have elsewhere (Jordan and Richardson, 1982) discussed the British style in terms of five (overlapping) features — sectorisation, clientelism, consultation, institutionalisation of compromise and the development of exchange relationships. Hayward has effectively summarised the essence of the style: 'Firstly, there are no explicit, overriding medium or long term objectives. Secondly, unplanned decision-making is incremental. Thirdly, humdrum or unplanned decisions are arrived at by a continuous process of mutual adjustment between a plurality of autonomous policy-makers operating in the context of a highly fragmented multiple flow of influence. Not only is plenty of scope offered to interest group spokesmen to shape the outcome by participation in the advisory process. The aim is to secure through bargaining at least passive acceptance of the decision by the interests affected.' (Hayward, 1974).

Space does not permit consideration of all five features and, for the purposes of the Conference, I will concentrate on the process of consultation as it best illustrates the phenomenon of overcrowding referred to earlier. There appear to be two principle forces supporting the practice of consultation and negotiation: (a) cultural bias containing normative values which emphasises the need to legitimise decisions through consultation; (b) functional necessity. Underlying the consultative-negotiative practice is a broad cultural norm that the governing should govern by consent. In Britain according to Lord Rothschild (former Head of the Central Policy Review Staff based in the Cabinet Office) there is a 'beatification' accorded to compromise. There is the complementary belief that participation ultimately enhances the legitimacy of a policy.

Consultation appears to have become the bureaucratic norm in Britain, possible more so than in other European countries. For example, Eldersveld *et al* (1975) in their study of bureaucrats' perceptions of interests groups show that (of the five West European countries they discuss) British civil servants were least likely to view the

clash of particularistic groups as a serious problem. Only 4 per cent of British respondents saw the close collaboration between a ministry and the groups or sectors most affected by its activity as improper or unnecessary.

The 'standard operating procedures' for processing policy problems are based in and nourished by normative values of 'legitimate' action. The existence of these enduring values is one of the limitations on change in policy style. Attempts in Britain, such as under the Conservatives in 1970-74, to move to a more anticipatory, deliberative, information-based, policy style undervalued the strong tradition of bargaining and consent.

A series of mutually reinforcing propositions can be advanced to argue that the key role accorded to interest groups comes not only from broad cultural values, but from purely functional requirements. Consultation contributes to system maintenance not only because it imparts a sense of involvement but also because it should produce more acceptable policies. Only the wearer knows where the shoe pinches and, arguably, in giving access to interested groups and individuals the system is more effective in supplying public needs than a dirigiste system. Thus, problem definition might be improved as a result of the wider participation by those most directly affected, even if the effort and time needed to reach a decision are increased.

The legitimacy of civil servants in imposing change is less than that of politicians. Civil servants have little recourse to arguments such as 'the government must govern' or 'the electoral mandate'. As politics has become more specific (matched by a tendency for groups to become more particularistic and greater in number) the tendency has been for civil servants to be obliged to carry a larger and larger part of the policy-making load. Given that the civil servants lack legitimacy derived from the 'democratic process', they are ill-placed to impose solutions and conflict avoidance is likely to result. British civil servants, compared with French ones, generally



lack the confidence to operate an imposition relationship with groups (or, indeed, with other public agencies) They, too, are the prisoners of the same values which often lead their political masters to see consensus as *the* goal of policy-making

**C**onsultation and negotiation are, of course, not exclusive categories. Consultation can be purely cosmetic, but it indicates something of the normative values of the society in that it is even in such circumstances considered worthwhile. Of major interest is the zone where consultation has turned into negotiation. In such areas the government is probably dependent on the groups for assistance in that specific matter (or the groups are so important in some other matter, they cannot be needlessly antagonised). In many areas groups wield some kind of veto, which in the last resort the government might be able to overrule — but it would be politically too expensive to override groups on too many issues.

Wolfe's term 'the franchising of public policy' quite neatly describes (originally in the USA) the way in which sectors enjoy some degree of self-regulation (Wolfe, 1977), but the metaphor perhaps wrongly implies that the centre has always been keen to allow the sectorisation and ultimately the diffusion of policy-making. The position is more that it has been unable to do much about it and is generally unwilling to challenge it once it exists.

The importance of consultation with groups was confirmed by civil servants in a range of departments we contacted as part of a wider study of policy communities in the UK. Indeed, so uniform are the replies that we quote a range not to make the point — adequately made by the first — but to underline the fact that there is rather a more positive flavour to the replies than, say, received by Suleiman in his survey of French equivalents (Suleiman, 1974).

For example, one respondent replied,

'You are quite right to stress its [consultation] importance. Sound-

ing out opinion in advance of potential changes in policy or subjecting possible proposals to informed comment is something which is done in this country whenever possible. Consultation between Departments with a common interest in a particular policy area takes place as a matter of course, both formally and informally, at meetings or on the telephone. The ways in which interested public opinion is tested can range in formality from Royal Commission and Department Committees of Inquiry through Green Papers to individual groups and general invitations to express views' (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food).

'You are correct in assuming that consultation between Government Departments is an essential part of arriving at decisions. Consultation between Government Departments and groups outside government is also an important part of arriving at decisions although the scale and way in which this is done will depend on the type of decision being made' (Scottish Development Department).

'Certainly .. [one must] attach importance to the process of consultation both within the Civil Service and between Whitehall and other organisations. This is clearly an intrinsic part of the democratic government process' (Department of the Environment).

'If you don't consult them [the groups] they will only try and block the proposal in Parliament. Not consulting them is not worth the risk' (Health and Safety Executive).

'I personally agree with you that the whole consultation business is getting more and more difficult to manage, and more time-consuming for Ministers and Departments' (Department of the Environment).

**I**t is, in fact, difficult to establish that this stress on consultation is new. It is not easy to find comparable issues in past years. One civil

servant replied to our inquiries that it was difficult to 'prove' a growth in the scale of consultation, because in the not too distant past there was no governmental interest in his own policy area. He went on to distinguish between matters put only to the 'regular' consultees in his policy area and areas of wider implications when a consultative document would seek to attract all interested opinion. Consultation with non-government groups will naturally depend on the issue involved. What evidence we have suggests that it is reasonable to claim that consultation of various types is more extensive than formerly. It *may* reflect a change in style by the department, but it also reflects the greater number of organisations and interests involved in each policy sector as well as a greater *intensity* of interest from long established groups.

**T**he need to consult and negotiate with a specific set of groups concerned with each policy problem of course has a direct bearing on the nature of policy outcomes. Essentially, it normally leads to incremental policy change, irrespective of the party forming the government at any one time. Thus we may see the groups interested in a particular policy as acting like a magnetic field, holding the policy in place. It is possible, under certain unusual circumstances, to induce policy change (to change the 'magnetic field'), but there is a natural predisposition for the field to hold the policy in place. Moreover, departments have little desire or incentive to disturb a magnetic field once it has been established. The bureaucratic preoccupation tends to be the minimisation of disturbance, the securing of a stable environment or negotiated order, rather than significant policy change. To pursue an anticipatory or active approach to problem solving, is to risk disturbing an equilibrium (expressed in policy outcomes) which has been carefully negotiated over a period of years. Policy maintenance is, thus, a more common phenomenon than policy change.

I believe that an examination of many other western European politi-

cal systems yields a similar picture of increased interest group involvement in both policy-making and policy implementation. (For a discussion of France, UK, West Germany, Holland, Sweden and Norway, see Richardson, ed., 1982.) Again space precludes discussion in this paper, but it is appropriate to draw upon Heisler and Kvavik's illuminating description of what they term the 'European Polity' (Heisler and Kvavik, 1974). Though we may see the UK and other individual European countries as developing their own *particular* institutions and processes of group integration, there seems little doubt that Heisler and Kvavik are correct in identifying 'a decision-making structure characterised by continuous, regularized access for economically, politically, ethnically, and/or subculturally based groups to the highest levels of the political system, i.e., the decision-making subsystem' as one of the central features of European politics. The recent literature on corporatism in western Europe does point to a common integration of groups in the policy process — though the corporatist label with its engrained connotations might not usefully describe the phenomenon.

In the context of our Conference theme, *The Future of Politics*, one might argue that one of the central challenges facing political systems in the future is how to manage the seemingly ever-increasing level of interest group involvement in the policy process. As a result of this involvement there has been a de facto decentralisation of power such that (a) parliaments are often effectively excluded from the policy process, (b) governments themselves find it difficult to follow the dictum, 'governments must govern', and (c) it has seemingly become more difficult to secure necessary policy change or to achieve successful implementation of existing policies.

The outcome of these developments is likely to be a dangerous degree of immobilism in the policy process, unless our governors exhibit a high degree of political skill in managing what I see as the 'overcrowding' of policy-making in many liberal democracies.

# Economic order

MIHAILO MARKOVIC

FOR more than a billion people in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the years following the second world war signified an historical emancipatory breakthrough. Traditional empires crumbled, dozens of new States emerged, brute forms of political domination receded, international organizations emerged which strongly affirmed principles of self-determination, sovereignty of States, and non-interference in internal affairs of other States, equity and aid to underdeveloped regions of the world.

There were still strong remnants of colonialism, there were occasional military interventions of super powers that bore all the marks of traditional imperialist aggressions, there were a number of nations that never got the right of self-determination and some local wars were going on all the time (more than two hundred took place after the second world war). And yet there were reasons to believe with Hegel that history was, after all, 'a march of freedom', an ongoing process of emancipation. More than eighty new governments from earlier colonies gained majority in the United Nations. As a result of *detente* among super powers, international security was considerably strengthened, economic growth took place in Asia, Africa and Latin America and it trebled the output of goods and services from \$ 1 billion in the late 1940s, it rose to more than \$ 3 billions by the early 1970s. The *Green Revolution* in South Asia resulted in a spectacular increase of food production. Exports per capita of manufactured goods in some Asian countries exceeded those of some European countries.

However, even before the shock of the economic crises in the mid-



seventies, it became increasingly clear that something was profoundly wrong in international economic relations and in the whole paradigm of modernization and growth adopted from the West.

**M**odernization of the developing world was nothing but westernization, a brutal subjugation of underdeveloped countries to western forms of social organization

In the West, industrialization meant creation of an indigenous technological and productive capacity. Capital invested was accumulated during centuries of organic growth of autonomous cities and of a vigorous, dignified stratum of free burghers. On the other hand, unparalleled economic expansion was possible because, as a result of colonization, natural and human resources of the whole world were ruthlessly exploited

When, at this late hour, in the second part of the twentieth century, former colonies attempted their own industrial take off, capital, organizational patterns, technology, the whole idea of modernity had to be imported. The substitute for the entrepreneurial class were former landowners or colonial administrators who quickly developed into a parasitic bourgeoisie which played an inferior role in joint ventures with transnational corporations. As a consequence, those industries were built which brought maximum profits and not those which had a maximum impact on the welfare of the nation

In Malaysia, a most prosperous Asian country with \$860 GNP per capita in 1976, only 5% of households had electricity, half of them had incomes below an established poverty line, 51% had no toilets. Between 1957 and 1970 the bottom 60% of households suffered an absolute decline in their real income<sup>1</sup>

In Iran the transfer of technology toward agriculture drove rural areas toward disintegration. Unable to sustain their livelihood in the vil-

lages, the poor and landless made for the urban centres in search for jobs. Being illiterate and unskilled they remained marginal to the urban economy and had to join the enormous reserve army of the unemployed. In spite of a fabulous growth (GNP increased from 9 billion to \$46.2 billion during the period 1967-1977) the Iranian State did not even try to cope with the problem.<sup>2</sup>

In this kind of modernization, the shift of people away from the countryside resulted only in a transfer of poverty. Poverty went together with parasitic affluence of the owners of businesses and the bureaucratic elite. The more the centralized State apparatus grew the more the quality of services deteriorated. State-financed and State-managed basic industries operated with losses. Workers were denied freedom of organization and were kept in control by police-controlled trade unions.

**T**his kind of modernization does not create anywhere a viable infrastructure for the further harmonious development of an entire economy. It does irreparable damage to the existing technology of the country. Irrigation canals, pastures and forests are usually so neglected and damaged that huge supplies of food have to be imported. In some cases, natural environment underwent drastic destruction. For example, Malaysian forests, among the oldest in the world, are so rapidly depleted that by 1990 the country, which at the moment is still one of the world's largest producers of sawn timber, will be a net importer.<sup>3</sup>

After several decades of national independence, struggle for development and 'aid' of developed countries, there are still 40 countries with a population of about 1 billion who live below the minimum necessary to sustain human life. Some of them had GNP per capita below \$100 in 1950 and a quarter of a century later nine of them still have

\$80-130 10 million people die of hunger each year. According to the FAO estimate at the World Food Conference in 1974 some 460 millions were malnourished or hungry for a significant part of the year

2

**T**he economic world order imposed by powerful western metropolises rested on glaring injustices. It either almost entirely blocked the development of former colonies or fostered a model of development which did not really correspond to the national interests of these countries. The basic characteristic of economic relations between developed countries (DCs) and less developed countries (LDCs) was exchange of raw materials and cheap labour for manufactured goods (including increasing amounts of armaments). Owing to their control of international markets, the DCs were able to determine extremely unjust terms of trade. Prices of raw materials were exceedingly depressed, it is sufficient to remember the case of oil. After two unilateral reductions of the price of crude oil in 1959 and 1960 it reached merely 18 cents a barrel — 200 times less than its market value today. Only current cheap labour entered the cost.

On the other hand, accumulated past labour entered as cost into the price of industrial goods and made them relatively high. An unreasonable proportion of the resources of developing countries go for the purchase of armaments (mostly for internal purposes). A vicious circle emerges: poverty produces a sense of weakness, which in turn produces the need for armaments, the purchase of which makes the country even poorer, etc.

Another feature of current international economic relations is export of capital from the DCs to the LDCs either in the form of loans or, more often, through investments of multinational corporations. This leads to drastic forms of exploitation: workers' wages are often kept at bare survival level. Another serious consequence is the emergence of an economy which is capital-intensive and export-oriented when the country needs an economy that is labour-intensive, and oriented to-

1 Lim Teck Ghee, *Alternative ways of life in Malaysia: what prospect for the masses*, United Nations University, Project GPID, 1980

2 M Hossein Haeri, 'Economic development and the village in Iran: prospects for an alternative approach', The United Nations University, Project GPID, 1980

3 Lim Teck Ghee, *Op cit*, p 17.

ward satisfaction of the basic needs of its own people

A model of growth underlies this kind of unequal cooperation which has been merely transferred from the West, which serves the interests of the ruling elite but not of the population as a whole, which increases class differences, perpetuates dependency on foreign capital and technology, seriously weakens domestic agriculture and neglects social services (education, health, housing etc.).

**T**his kind of world economic order was a formidable constraint to real autonomous development. Once development was reduced to industrialization and industrialization required non-existent capital, it was natural for the issue of *aid to developing countries* to get such prominent place both in the demands of the LDCs and in the rhetorics of the DCs. The former insisted that no industrialization was ever possible without external resources and that aid to industrialization of the DCs would merely be the return of a fraction of what was once taken.

The spokesmen of the DCs were for a long time ready to accept declarations, to pass resolutions and make promises of aid. Partly, this was ideological rhetoric all those phrases on human rights, equity, justice, mutuality were very insufficiently translated into practical assistance. Partly, giving aid appeared a noble, philanthropic act, and philanthropy was always part of bourgeois culture. Partly, however, aid was an investment for which a reasonable return could be expected in political and economic terms.

Once many Third World countries proved reluctant to sell their independence for aid, or to interpret aid as mere investments of private corporations, also when even the most advanced industrial countries found themselves in a profound economic crisis in recent years — most promises of aid evaporated.

Some forms of aid still exist. About a dozen billion dollars is the amount of annual flow of assistance. The United Nations have designated a target of 0.7% of the GNP of

each country which was supposed to bring the total annual amount of aid to about \$ 24 billions in 1980. Experts calculated that merely 2% of the annual increment of the DCs would meet the target. They are still able to dream about what would be the marvellous consequences if rich countries would make a major cooperative effort with the poor ones. If the United Nations programme described above would be met, life expectancy among the poorest one billion on earth would rise by more than ten years, infant mortality would drop by more than a half, literacy would more than double and birth rates would drop sharply. By the late 1980s, this programme would lead to 10 million fewer deaths and 10 million less births annually.<sup>4</sup>

**I**t would indeed be not only a matter of justice but also of rational insight to support and bring about this kind of programme. The underprivileged part of the world cannot survive in the old ways. Humankind happens, however, to be in the same boat. Developed countries depend on the external markets, raw materials and energy of the Third World. They can no longer simply send marines and take what they need. Owing to modern mass media the whole world is watching. Rival super powers do not manage to agree on spheres of influence. They themselves lack inner unity, resolve, spirit, they are no longer wolves facing helpless lambs. Any place could turn into a Vietnam or Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the economic collapse of the Third World would be a most serious threat to the survival of the rest of the world. International aid to developing countries to solve problems which are very much of international making would indeed be a far-sighted rational strategy. After all, this is the only strategy that could prolong the life of the present world order, which is very favourable to the rich.

<sup>4</sup> J.P. Grant, 'The changing world order and the world's poorest thousand million', *Proceedings of the 25th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs*, 1976, p-159.

However, there is little ground to hope that we shall ever see substantial, unselfish western assistance to the Third World. If under the conditions of prosperity in the sixties, the United Nations' Decade of Aid to developing countries failed so miserably, it can hardly be expected that bureaucracies of the metropolises finding their own societies in the long dark tunnel, will think of anything but of inflation, stagnation, unemployment at home, and of how to avoid approaching political turmoils.

Since the present world order cannot be saved by humanitarian and rational patronage of the privileged ones, it will have to be changed.

3

**W**hen one comes to think of it, expectation that the world's elite would offer a friendly hand to the world's 'sansculottes' was as naive as the utopian socialist dream a century and a half ago, that the evils of capitalism would be overcome overnight from above in the name of reason and justice.

An alternative to this is a basically social democratic view that a poorly functioning old order may be reformed and slowly adapted, without losing its basic structure, in a number of small steps. The result of such an approach is the strategy of the *New International Economic Order*.

This strategy is the embodiment of a growing crisis of world economy, it was determined by a succession of changes at the international scene that revealed the vulnerability of the DCs. Decisive was the energy crisis and the action of the *Opec* countries. For the first time in history a group of Third World countries used its monopoly position in the international market in order to dictate prices to developed countries and to squeeze out monumental profits from them.

In their own best self-interest, more enlightened spokesmen of advanced industrial countries were ready to reconcile with the new economic realities and to accept a deal which tends to preserve the basic structure of the world econo-

mic order but looks also favourable to the Third World. The declared principles of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) are: universality in scope and nature, respect of political independence, equity and cooperation among countries and nations, economic interdependence, self reliance, reduction of the gap between developed and developing countries. Some slogans which were heard already in the fifties and sixties such as 'massive infusion of technical aid', 'import substitution', 'trade not aid' were now incorporated into a total package called NIEO.

In more concrete terms, the New International Economic Order boils down to an agreement to promote industrialization of the developing countries, to utilize much more effectively than ever in the past a practically inexhaustible world wide reservoir of cheap labour and to solve the energy crisis for developed countries. Technological development in the areas of communication, organization and transport made distant cheap labour available. The energy crisis and the *Opec* oil price policies brought developed countries into a position of relative dependency and imposed on them some hard choices

In order to try and preserve the status quo, three alternatives were open, none too pleasant. One was to grab the oil by force like in old colonial times. After Vietnam and under the conditions of a balance of fear among the super powers, that option had to be dropped. Another possibility was to recycle petrodollars to borrow money from the oil producers in order to buy more oil. This would lead to accumulation of debts that would eventually have to be paid (A familiar situation with unpleasantly reversed roles). The third alternative was to attract oil producers to invest in the economy of developed countries. Such a loss of control over one's own national enterprises would deal a heavy blow to national pride and would certainly produce strong political opposition.<sup>5</sup>

5 M Halty-Carrere, 'Towards a new technological order', *Proceedings of the*

The fourth alternative was the approach of the New International Economic Order: its novelty is the industrialization of developing countries. A large part of capital would come from surplus oil-revenues. The DCs would continue to contribute technology and markets for the Third World's manufactured goods. The latter would continue to contribute 'natural and human resources' — which means cheap raw materials and cheap labour.

#### 4

The New International Economic Order offers a new international division of labour, a new pattern of sharing capital, labour and markets, that in some respects is favourable to the Third World. It has some potential for the transformation of the world economy which is very much worth studying. However, one must be aware of some basic limitations of this project.

First, it maintains the old technological order and, in fact, intensifies technological dependency of less developed countries on advanced ones. Governments and transnational corporations of the DCs have almost total monopoly on industrial technology applied in the LDCs. They own research and development, infrastructure, financial and managerial resources, they fully benefit from the lack of clear rules and patent laws governing technology transfer. The LDCs lack even the knowledge and skill to select, adapt and fully absorb foreign technologies, leave alone develop technologies of their own. While most developed countries spend 9-20 times more for their own research and development than for import of foreign technology, in the LDCs, expenditures for these two are the same, at best.<sup>6</sup>

Ironically enough, great contributions to the present third technological revolution in the fields of microelectronics, automation and genetics have been made by Third

*Twenty-fifth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Development, Resources and World Security, 1976, p 123-124*

6 *Ibid*, p 118.

World scholars coopted by the universities and laboratories of the DCs. The technological gap is growing technological dependence breeds further dependence. During an early phase of industrialization, relatively simple technology is imported. It becomes increasingly sophisticated at the stage of import substitution when imitation of foreign goods exerts strong pressure on choices of technology. At a later stage of industrialization an export-oriented economy reinforces tendencies to buy most advanced foreign technologies which involves multiple dependency on loans, equipments, spare parts, foreign specialists, some indispensable foreign raw materials. Advanced countries usually insist on selling whole packages of technology ('turn-key' factories).

One of the worst consequences of this kind of dependency is neglect of local research and development capacities. A specific vicious circle of underdevelopment is thus generated. With increasing orientation towards foreign technology, local science gets marginalized. Decreased local technological supply increases demand for foreign technology, etc. While this problem remains unsolved, NIEO does not really offer to eliminate strong dependency and exploitation of the periphery of the world's system by its centre, it only proposes to modify their forms. The relative improvement of the lot of poor countries would be very slow. Their contribution to the total world's product, which is now only 7-9% would increase to just about 15% at the end of the century.

Another basic limitation of most interpretations of the New International Economic Order is a continuing, implicit dependency on the modern western paradigm of development and of life-style. This is indeed a fundamental form of dependency, a considerably deeper structure than political or even economic dependency relations. It is especially serious since we are not sufficiently aware of it and accept it uncritically. There are by all means some elements of lasting universal value in that paradigm such as respect for individual liberties and human rights, an openness toward

innovation, a very active attitude toward the world, an instrumental rationality and practical efficiency which are always needed in pursuit of well selected goals

Elements of that paradigm which deserve critical re-evaluation are the following ones:

(1) an exponential growth for the sake of unlimited accumulation of material wealth,

(2) an idea of development in terms of GNP that is no measure of a just distribution of wealth nor of the level of satisfaction of the basic needs of people,

(3) an increasingly more capital-intensive production, increasingly more wasteful with respect to natural and human resources,

(4) a tendency of creating big centralized systems with a growing amount of built-in heteronomy,

(5) fast bureaucratization, the tendency to introduce too many professionals with specialized skills into the decision-making process, even in those phases of that process where common sense and practical wisdom (Aristotelian *phronesis*) would be of much better use. It is very difficult even to survive, let alone to develop when a society must support a constantly growing non-productive super-structure,

(6) consumption as a basic means of individual self-affirmation and indicator of social status, therefore a consumption that tends to grow far beyond the level of satisfaction of real physical and cultural needs,

(7) a style of life characterized by preference for non-manual activities, material comfort, privacy, security, growing mediation in human relations, an 'investment-return' approach to other individuals

Some critics of NIEO express the view that its ultimate purpose is making periphery societies similar to those in the centre of the existing world economic order. According to Frank, NIEO is an 'utterly modest proposal for a better and greater integration of the Third World in capitalist world trade'.<sup>7</sup> In Galtung's

view, NIEO is a 'capitalism for everybody' charter.<sup>8</sup>

Another limitation of NIEO is closely connected with the preceding one. It is not clear how NIEO could prevent further social polarization within developing countries. Development measured in terms of GNP is the index of the growth of welfare of the upper 40% of the population which receive 75% of all income, it does not affect the lives of the poorest 40% who collectively receive only 10-15% of the entire national income.<sup>9</sup> Under such conditions, most of these societies are drastically split: one part suffers in poverty, unemployment, starvation, illiteracy, lack of elementary social services, whereas the other part tries to catch up with the West and establishes enclaves of high sophisticated modernity that sometimes surpass the luxury and waste of western elites. Such societies lack a minimum of inner unity and homogeneity. Often it is only the army that prevents them from falling apart. No wonder the sale of arms increased 70% (in the Third World even 300%) only during the period 1981-1982, and reached the colossal amount of \$ 600-650 billions a year. When they look at NIEO from this angle, some critics reduce it to a deal among the world's elites for the perpetuation of an obviously unjust world order under the guise of something new.<sup>10</sup>

The new concepts of NIEO such as interdependence and national self-reliance acquire ideological meanings in that context. *Interdependence* may mean that while periphery States depend on transnationals, they also assist in decisive

Economic Order', *Development Studies Discussion Paper*, No 35, (1977) p. 16

<sup>8</sup> Johan Galtung, 'Self-reliance and Global Interdependence. Some Reflections on the New International Economic Order', a paper presented at the Society for International Development meeting in Linz, in the seventies

<sup>9</sup> Robert S. McNamara, Address to the World Bank Board of Governors, Nairobi 1973, *Pugwash Newsletter*, October 1975, Vol 13, No 2, p. 58

<sup>10</sup> Herb Addo, 'Approaching the New International Economic Order dialectically and transformationally', The United Nations University, Project GPID, Geneva, 1981

ways in securing a peaceful squeezing out of profit from their own people. *National self-reliance* may degenerate into refusal to let anyone interfere with internal repression. 'Whatever we do inside our countries is none of your business'.<sup>11</sup>

The point here is not that there is nothing really new in the NIEO, and that it has to be understood as just one more ideological device of contemporary imperialism, but that the whole NIEO project is still vague and contradictory and can be interpreted in different and opposite ways. Its lacunae and ambiguities are such that it can play the ideological function of the preservation of the existing world order. However, it also contains potentially emancipatory responses to just demands of the underprivileged nations. Some concessions made by more enlightened spokesmen of advanced countries are not at all popular among conservative forces. They oppose the NIEO, the RIO project (Reshaping of the International Order) which does not offer anything but 'transfer of some Center industries to the periphery under the wing of multinationals'.<sup>12</sup>

Rather than rejecting NIEO one should examine whether it contains any potential for a true transformation of the world economic order.

The most important thing about NIEO is that, like most social-democratic projects,<sup>13</sup> it may be the best feasible possibility under the circumstances. It offers some improvements and if properly interpreted and translated into practice, it may serve as the vehicle for more radical changes of both the world economy and the internal structures of developing countries. So far it has mobilized considerable social forces: governments and intellectuals in the Third World, more enlightened spokesmen of advanced countries, and it has been backed by a power-

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59

<sup>12</sup> Samir Amin, 'Self-reliance and the New International Economic Order', *Monthly Review*, 29, No 3, p. 20

<sup>13</sup> The idea that NIEO is a social-democratic project stems from Fawzy Mansour's 'Global Social Democracy and the New International Economic Order', The United Nations University, Project GPID, Geneva 1979

7. Andre Gunder Frank, 'Rhetoric and Reality of the New International

ru political movement — that of non-alignment

It is essential to keep in mind that NIEO is not a very definite and static thing but a flexible open project which could be imaginatively interpreted and creatively developed by all those who search for a more rational and just world order. The vision of such an order will serve as a philosophical standpoint for critical assessment, reinterpretation and development of the idea of NIEO

When we ask whether there is a potential in NIEO for the creation of a more rational and just world order, we must first establish that its basic element, external aid for industrialization of developing countries, has undoubtedly a possible emancipatory meaning. Whatever industrialization may also turn out to be, it is essentially an immense leap in human productive power. Therefore, it is a potential means for satisfying basic human needs of all members of society and substantially liberating them from excessive toil. History knows of three ways to achieve industrialization: (1) cruel, primitive accumulation of capital as in the West, (2) extraction of huge surpluses from peasants and workers under one excuse or other (Eastern Europe, Japan), (3) massive infusion of external capital and technology as in recently industrialized countries of South Asia

A reasonable amount of foreign aid, reasonably used, may certainly alleviate the sufferings of primitive accumulation. Petro-dollars which are now invested in western banks and businesses or are wasted on expensive modern armaments, tourism and luxury, could be much better used for supporting initial steps towards the take-off of poorer countries. However, there is a hard lesson to learn from all those countries which relied too much on external loans (Poland is one of them). The only rational policy for developing countries is to mobilize their own forces and rely on their own natural and human resources. The amount and quality of desirable external assistance in capital and technology must be very rationally assessed. Self-reliance here means

maintenance of independent decision-making, full control of one's own resources, complete responsibility for one's autonomously chosen project of development

A crucial dimension of the new concept of development was best expressed by the Tanganyika African National Union in 1971: 'For a people who have been slaves or have been oppressed, exploited and humiliated by colonialism or capitalism, "development" means "liberation"'. It means both the elimination of oppression, exploitation, enslavement and humiliation and the promotion of our independence and human dignity'.<sup>14</sup> In contrast to the extremely abstract, reifying concept of growth in terms of increased GNP, the new concept of development is relative to basic human needs, to specific cultural values, and it does not refer to accumulation of material things but to *increase of societal capacities*, including endogenous technological capabilities.

Reduction of technological dependency and achievement of technological self-reliance is a slow complex process which involves a number of elements. There are alternative technologies from among which to choose. For selection one should not rely solely on consultancy agencies from advanced countries but also create national and regional institutions for technical intelligence gathering and evaluation. Imported technologies need to be adapted to a specific social environment; they should use local raw materials and involve training of local personnel. In order to absorb a foreign technology, the social infrastructure for it must be prepared or else it could seriously and unfavourably disrupt the socio-economic environment. Finally, in order to build up indigenous technological capabilities, developing countries must create research and development institutions which would be tied in with actual processes of production in their own countries.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> T A N U Guidelines, Tanganyika African National Union, Dar Es Salaam, 1971

<sup>15</sup> R C Desai, 'The Technological Basis for Independence', a paper presented

The next important problem is the choice of productive branches to be socially supported. High priority must be given to the production of food and to labour-intensive industries in order to eliminate starvation and unemployment. Contrary to western belief in greater efficiency of big systems, decentralization is highly preferable in societies which are plentiful in people and short in land and capital. After agrarian reforms in Taiwan in 1947, economists learnt to their surprise that forty 2.5 acres farms could produce significantly more food and employ far more labour than would a single 100 acres farm. The criteria of utility are obviously quite different: the aim of a developing community is to produce more in absolute terms and not *per capita*

Another big advantage of a decentralized economy is reduction of bureaucratic and technocratic apparatus. Cancerous growth of parasitic elites could almost entirely block development. This is even more true of enormous expenses incurred by the professional army and the purchase of sophisticated weaponry. Great ideas of self-determination and self-reliance could be interpreted in such a way as to involve *self-defence*. The great advantages of self-defence over a professional army are, *first*, incomparably lower costs: self-defence does not require any sophisticated armaments. *Second*, self-defence, as examples of Yugoslavia (during the second world war) and Vietnam, show is a far more successful barrier to any foreign invasion. *Third*, self-defence cannot be used against one's own people, whereas the main functioning of a professional army turns out to be the repression of internal liberation movements

We already have a glimpse of how rich is the potential of NIEO if its own principles of justice, self-reliance and self-determination are taken seriously and applied to both the international and intranational problematic. The crucial issue is, of course, internal restruc-

at the International Conference, on *The Principles of Non-Alignment* held in Baghdad, 4-6 May, 1982.

turing, redistribution of power and wealth. Advocates of NIEO tend to gloss over this—they never pretend to be revolutionaries.

But what does it mean to have *revolutionary* transformation in the Third World countries? Is it what happened under Pol Pot in Kampuchea, under Khomeini in Iran or under Karmal in Afghanistan? Or is it a series of rationally conceived, ongoing structural changes supported by the vast majority of the population, such as agrarian reform, mobilization of idle work for local investment projects, introduction of universal education and health services, progressive taxation of propertied classes, establishment of a reasonable minimum wage, socialization of key enterprises followed by introduction of self government and independent trade unions.

Such initial revolutionary changes are fully compatible with the very principles of NIEO (equity, justice, self-reliance). Without such internal structural changes, NIEO can never become a reality. Industrialization with limited external assistance is possible only if people consciously invest their labour into their future. 'Brain drain' can be stopped only when intellectuals and youth are highly morally motivated by the social projects of their country. The organization of self-defence makes sense and may actually come into being only when the ruling elite is not entirely alienated from the people or when no ruling exile exists any more. Only under such internal conditions is it also possible to generate sufficient mutual trust among neighbouring countries. Without this thrust, the full measure of regional mutual collaboration and of regional self-reliance can hardly be achieved.

The projection of a New International Economic Order was meant to be a mere *modification* of the World Order. But some of its fundamental ideas, formulated in order to make the project more appealing, have a real emancipatory significance. When the full implications from them are drawn, when they are applied to both international and domestic problems, they may point towards a more rational and just world order.

# Movements

D L SHETH

MUCH of the current discussion and thinking on the future of politics is marked by two rather divergent views on 'modern politics'. These views differ on the role and capacity of the contemporary political processes and institutions in solving the various problems facing the world today: hunger, wars, nuclear terror, pollution, social injustice and violence, economic and cultural domination and exploitation of the poor nations and peoples of the world, political instability and the growth of authoritarian regimes in several countries of the Third World and so on.

The problems are varied and complex. They are so interconnected, structurally, that no one can think of solving one without attending to the others, for, they all collectively bear on the existing structures brought about by the functioning of 'modern politics' since the beginning of the century. Put differently, they are born of a pervading crisis of structures and values governing the present international order and the nation-States comprising it. What is at issue is whether the contemporary political processes, institutions and the actors operating internally in the various national societies and externally at the international level are capable of alleviating this crisis.

Of the two divergent views on this issue, one holds that the institutions and structures of the existing national and international order are far from being exhausted in their capacity to deal with the problems facing the world today. Of course, there are problems with their efficacious functioning, they admit, but these they believe could be overcome without disturbing the overall framework of the present order. The other view is that these institutions and structures have run their course and they can no longer contain, let alone solve, the problems that face us today. There is a need for — and now with the erosion of



these institutional structures, a possibility of — moving beyond 'modern politics' towards a new, more participative and humane politics.

Underlying these views are two different perspectives on 'modern politics'. According to the first 'modern politics' has played and is still playing an important role in bringing about major transformations in the world. Wherever it has struck roots, whether through revolutionary socialistic ideologies or through liberal democratic ideologies, modern politics has worked the engine of economic and technological growth by transforming the supply oriented societies into demand-oriented societies. It has, for the first time in human history, placed the needs, urges and the aspirations of the common man at the centre of politics. It is through the working of modern political institutions that the hitherto discriminated, marginalized and disadvantaged groups of the earlier societies have been made part of the new national societies by bringing them in the ever expanding fold of citizenship.

Modern politics has, thus, conferred liberties, entitlements and rights to individuals *qua* individuals disregarding, and often undermining, the 'rights' that the traditional collectivities had over their individual members. Although it is true that the new collectivities (the nation, the State, the party etc) have extended their own rights over their individual members, the nature of these collectivities is quite different and the exercise of their rights is mediated through certain universally accepted norms and procedures and for the 'common good'.

**I**n sum, it is through creating the national States and societies and then through operating, by and large, within the boundaries of these new entities that 'modern politics' has heralded fundamental transformations in the social structure, culture and the economic organization and activities of their member populations. These transformations, it is held, have generated liberating forces within the respective national societies. The problems of social unrest and turmoil which have been

created in the process are acknowledged but they are viewed as problems of tradition. The problems of hunger, violence and social-disprivilege that exist today in many national societies are viewed as 'anachronisms' surviving from the past; they represent the still 'unfinished work' of modern politics. The above perspective, it seems, survives today not so much by the validity of its assessment of the realities of modern politics as by having become an article of faith. It is for this reason that the fast growing expectations and demands by the multitudes of the deprived in the poor countries of the world (themselves the creation of modern politics) and their assertion by way of agitations and movements are greatly feared by the proponents of this view. It is felt that these tendencies, if allowed to grow further, will destroy the institutional fabric of modern politics, even in those countries where it has struck roots and has brought the 'boons' it had promised. So their new programme is of containment, restriction and, if necessary, repression, but all in the name of the 'common good'.

**I**n this perspective, therefore, only those intellectual initiatives and activist movements which aim at actions which are corrective and restorative of the political order (national and international) qualify for support, promotion and patronage. Those movements which seemingly confront this order and go on to challenge the basic principle of its organization are seen as a threat not merely to the institutions of modern politics but to the entire modern civilization.

The other perspective has emerged only recently through various intellectual critiques of modern politics, the experience of the recent movements of the activist groups all over the world and a rather different experience of modern politics which the countries of the Third World have had.

Modern politics, it is now realized even by the proponents of the first perspective, is a double-edged instrument while it generates massive demands and aspirations within the new nations and introduces new

criteria of politics within them thereby destabilizing their traditional structures — anti-domination and anti-hierarchical sentiments, ideas of equity and social justice — the same criteria after a time begin to 'intrude' in the international order threatening its stability. When this happens the pretence of values is abandoned and the practice of 'realpolitik' becomes manifest. The concern of the international order ceases to be the expansion of modern politics to new nations, instead, the quest becomes one of establishing control by a few old, established, and economically and militarily powerful nation-States over the numerous new nations so that their 'internal problems are not externalized'. If normal mechanisms of control fail, recourse is taken to all forms of arm twisting, discriminatory trade practices, gun-boat diplomacy and the use of naked force. All these methods have been a part of recent history and they have greatly eroded the legitimacy of modern politics at the international level.

Similar processes of delegitimization of modern politics are at work within the nation-States, especially of the Third World. The elites of these societies and, consequently, the institutions of modern politics which they control, are being militantly confronted although in different forms and on different issues in different countries by common people. The forms such confrontations take vary from movements for ethnic self-determination and regional autonomy to terrorism by marginalized groups; but they, together, unquestionably threaten the institutional order of national politics everywhere.

**W**hile the existing national and international order is seen crumbling before their eyes, albeit under its own weight and without fulfilling the promises it once held out, small but significant sections of intellectuals and activists in Third World societies have begun to think anew about modern politics and its future.

Firstly, such new thinking rejects the view that 'modern politics' represents the *universalizing* principle by which fundamental structural

transformations are brought about in all national societies. Such a view was held until recently by the social scientists and political elites of many Third World countries under the influence of the western — more specifically, the American — theories of political modernization and comparative politics (It is now giving way to more differentiated and empirically sensitive theories of social transformation.)

In the fifties and the sixties, western theories presented modern politics to the elites of these societies as a value-free and culture-free package of institutions, in short a turn-key project of politics. It was believed that by adopting this package the nations of the Third World would put themselves on the linear course of political and economic development.

Although this simple minded proposition was academically refuted and is by now discredited even in western social science, it still remains an article of faith with the ruling elites of many Third World countries. Being intellectual and political heirs of colonialism, their policies and practices are informed even today by some version of this theory both at the national and the international level.

However, many intellectuals and activists have experienced first-hand the dissonance between received theories and the reality and, therefore, have consciously fought the colonial thought structures which they have inherited. They are associating themselves with the several action-groups and micro-movements that have recently grown and filled wide political spaces outside the mainstream politics of parties and elections. As a result of all this, they are groping for a different perspective on the whole issue of social transformation. They are growing increasingly aware of the tremendous social, cultural and even economic costs their societies have had to pay without any significant gains in trying to make the currently reigning dispensation work.

Thus, more than an intellectual understanding, it is the experience of the growing partnership in social

transformation on the part of many intellectuals and activists in these societies that has led them to the rejection of modern politics not only in theory but in practice at the grassroots. In the process they are moving towards a redefinition of what is 'political' and what is relevant social knowledge. The search, therefore, is for a politics that is in tune with the historical and cultural continuities of their own societies, a conception of politics based on the self-definition of a people. It is in this respect that this emerging perspective is different from the earlier academic refutations of the universal theory of political modernization.

Secondly, the new thinking has made the intellectuals and activists of these societies aware of the vertical linkages that exist between the global economic power structure and the ruling elite who have set up corrupt and repressive regimes in their own societies in the name of modern politics. Especially among the grassroots workers the awareness is growing, albeit slowly, that the local power-structures which they are fighting in their respective areas derive their power vertically from the macro-structures of the prevalent national and international order.

Hence, the politics of the action-groups and movements is getting progressively dissociated from the national politics of these societies and is gradually acquiring an orientation to global level problems, an orientation quite different from that of the ruling elite of these societies. Such problems as the threat of nuclear warfare and ecological destruction which until recently appeared to them as quite remote concerns, are now fast becoming a part of their political consciousness and activity.

Thirdly, the evolution of the new perspective is based, to a large extent, on the day-to-day experience of ordinary people with the working of modern politics. It is the experience of hunger, destitution and terror on the one hand and of sheer inability of the established institutional order to protect them from the rapacious exploitation and crushing domina-

tion of the local power structures they are subject to, on the other. All this, far from keeping the original promise alive, has eroded the legitimacy of conventional politics and of politicians in the eyes of ordinary people.

Such disillusionment with politics at the popular level is fraught with different possibilities. It may give rise to retrogressive movements that may push these societies back into the dark periods of their history. In fact, such movements *are* emerging in many of these societies. But, on the other hand, it may spawn micro-movements led usually by semi-political action-groups. Such fairly large scale and spontaneous and popular movements are also seen to be growing. These do not allow any political group or political party to acquire control over them. In terms of the social forces these movements seem to represent and the recent political promise they have been revealing, they show the sprouts of the conception of a new politics, however vaguely defined.

Fourth, this emerging perspective on the future of politics is greatly strengthened by the experience of even those few societies of the Third World where the institutions of political democracy, based on the ideas of modern western politics, have been functioning almost continuously for about thirty years. Even these 'model' democracies are facing severe economic and political crises for quite some time now. They have little to show to the other countries of the Third World, either by way of economic or cultural gains from having operated the liberal democratic or socialistic institutions for so long. A great confidence and hope was generated about the future when, in the fifties and the early sixties, modern political institutions were still functioning in these societies. But, by the late sixties, the promise began to fade away, and by the end of the seventies there was all-round disillusionment.

Initially, for a decade and a half the working of modern politics seemed to have given a grievous jolt to the traditional structures of dominance and exploitation. Modern politics expanded citizenship



rights, stimulated the economy by increasing growth rates, extended securities and entitlements to the poor by phenomenally raising public expenditures on welfare and set-up infrastructures for technological, scientific and industrial development.

Although there were no greatly visible gains as compared to any developed country, it appeared that at least an institutional foundation was being laid for 'progress'. Calculations were made first in terms of decades and then, optimistically, in terms of years about how long it would take for these 'politically modern but economically backward' societies to catch up with any one of the developed societies of the West. It was during this time that the political elites and the social scientists in the Third World thirstily lapped up the reigning western theories of political development and economic growth

All this make-believe came to a halt, almost rudely, by the late sixties. The social structures far from being transformed were distorted by modern politics and the distortions created solid bottlenecks in the way of further economic growth and distribution. After a point, the benefits of economic growth stopped percolating down. At the same time, the expansion of citizenship rights to the economically exploited and socially disprivileged groups began to hurt the interests of the elites as unemployment among the educated increased steadily.

What once looked like a bridgable distance between the developed and 'developing' countries now began to appear to grow every day — something which could never be spanned. But the more important phenomenon was that similar distances had been growing within those societies between the elites that had benefited in the first phase of development and the vast numbers of the masses who were sinking rapidly below the poverty line into the depths of destitution.

The poorest of these societies have, thus, lost both the worlds they were uprooted and displaced

from their traditional habitat and the social milieu which provided them with a modicum of physical, social and economic security (even if under the old structure of domination and exploitation), but no place was found for them in the modern political and economic structures except as voters (where some kind of democracy survived) performing a five-yearly ritual and as faceless masses swamping the cheap and surfeit labour markets of the cities or, worse still, as targets of new forms of social oppression and violence in the villages they could not leave. The 'transformation' achieved for the vast majorities of the poor in these countries has been from a state of exploitation and poverty to unmitigated hunger, destitution and social terror.

Such is the genesis of the new assessment of modern politics which has been growing at least among some in the Third World countries and this informs their perspective on the future of politics.

## II

The divergence of perspectives on 'modern politics' gives us the background against which to view the role of action-groups and micromovements. A closer look at these is required in order to develop some understanding of the role they are likely to play in shaping the future of politics both at the national and international level. Much interest has been evinced in the developed world about such transformative movements as are focussing on peace, human rights and ecology. Such movements have thrown up several non-State actors in the arena of international politics. Little attention has however been paid to similar happenings at the micro-structural and grass-roots level in the Third World countries. This is for the simple reason that in the national and international media, stirrings at the grass-roots are routinely overshadowed by the news and events pertaining to the mainstream politics.

In what follows, I shall briefly indicate to the nature of stirrings at the grass-roots and the kind of poli-

tics they project for the future in the context of India. In doing this I shall largely depend on my experience of about two years of work in an action-cum-research project of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, called Lokayan.

Lokayan operates at the interface of social knowledge and social action, of academic institutions and activist groups. It aims at changing the existing paradigm of social knowledge in India, the generation of new social-knowledge and its use with a view to making it more relevant to the issues of social-intervention and transformation. Rather than depending on the conventional methods of social research (we did that in the past long enough) the Lokayan project identifies action-groups and micro-movements and the key participant of these processes and brings them together in dialogues with academics, intellectuals, journalists and even concerned public officials

It is through such dialogues that issues of local, national and international nature are identified jointly by the individuals and groups involved in the dialogues. These are then investigated and analysed through participative research which, again, is carried out jointly by small teams of dialogue participants. The results are then shared with the people and with the public officials, on a common platform together with the activists and intellectuals. In the process, a frame-of-action to deal with these problems emerges.

This method has many consequences among which one is evolving a partnership in social transformation between intellectuals and activists, and in the process enlarging the networks of concerned intellectuals and activists in search of new forms of political action. It is through this process that a conventional researcher like me has been exposed to different realities and stirrings at the grass-roots and to the activity oriented intellectuals and intellectually oriented activists.

Let me explicate the political, economic and social context in which the contemporary groups and movements have come about and

are functioning. Politically, with the breakdown of the old Congress Party, signs of which had begun to show by the late sixties, the Indian polity entered a state of crisis. rapid decline of the legitimacy of the political authority, growing instability and volatility of the political parties and legislatures creating impasse in the functioning of the parliamentary system. The State, once seen as the liberator of the poor, a fair and justifiable political authority, began to be progressively perceived as a power-structure in the hands of a small elite. The fragmentation of national politics produced a situation in which the national parties of yester-years began to acquire a regional character, not only geographically, but also politically in terms of the issues to which they addressed themselves and the preoccupations that guided their political choices.

**A**t the same time, several ethnic and religion-based parties and movements (the parties and movements of the Harijans, the tribals, the Muslims and the Sikhs) began to grow. Added to these were the 'nationality' movements, (e.g., of the Dravids in Tamil Nadu), self-determination movements (in Kashmir and the North-East), the 'sons of the soil' movement (in Assam) and so on which were not in control of any national political party, they evolved an autonomous politics of their own. Alongside these rose several spontaneous movements of the people (the farmers' movements) acquiring durable organization and leadership, and the micro-movements of the action-groups, carried out at the grass-roots of Indian politics in specific local areas.

Seen in this context, the politics of movements and groups, on the whole, was getting detached from the national politics of parties, legislatures and elections. The conventional political theory that viewed such groups and processes as 'infra-structures' of the national polity or 'mediating forces' between the polity and society no longer held true. It is, however, an open question which among them were oriented to creating the new politics, although almost all of them, in their activities, programmes and thinking,

seemed to strike at the existing political order.

**E**conomically, also, India entered a period of crisis by the late sixties, with the rate of unemployment, especially of the educated, growing high, acute food shortages, rising prices introducing acute anxieties among the middle classes and pushing large sections of the lower-middle classes closer to the poverty line severely affecting their nutritional standards and blocking the means of the social mobility, i.e., higher and professional education and income for accumulating some wealth.

Under this condition of anxiety and distress, several politically inclined middle and lower middle class youth began to feel alienated from their own acquired culture of the western educated middle classes. The traditional route to normal political careers — working in party organizations, cooperatives, educational institutions etc., — being blocked, they were now exposed to new thinking and ideologies. Their characteristic idealism led them to move away from conventional politics to the politics of movements and action-groups. In the seventies hundreds of youths abandoned the universities, left the prestigious professions to 'work with the people' and founded a variety of action-groups.

Public expenditure, especially on welfare, had begun to shrink in real terms. A large part of whatever was made available for the welfare of the poor, began to be transferred back to the middle and upper classes through serious seepages created by corruption and mismanagement. The benefits of development and welfare stopped percolating down to the poor thus exposing them to hunger, destitution and social terror. This increased further their vulnerability to economic, political and now even cultural exploitation.

While their awareness of the situation in which they now found themselves had grown a great deal, they could not find adequate means of articulating and asserting the demands through conventional politics. This found expression through spontaneous movements of the peo-

ple or through the micro-movements of the action-groups in which the political parties had no role. All the above trends have accelerated over time.

Related to the above developments is the demographic situation as it has gradually emerged. Above 65 per cent of the Indian population is below 30 years of age. This youthfulness of the society is thwarted by the existing social and political order. For instance, all political parties, especially the Left parties, are run by gerontocracies. In the other organizations and institutions — the trade unions, the universities, the factories — the youth have either little role to play in decision-making or are on the defensive. The emerging divergence on the structures of these organizations and institutions in terms of age-cohorts (keeping for the moment the issue of divergence of class aside) has created fundamental differences of perspectives, sensibilities and work-ways between the old in the command of these structures and the young confronting them.

It is this situation which has alienated a large number of the young from the system. Seen in this context the rise of Sanjay Gandhi was not an accident of Indian politics, nor is the fact that the leadership of almost all action-groups and movements operating outside conventional politics is constituted of people below the age of thirty.

**S**ocially, a gap is widening between the established middle classes and the vast majorities of the poor. They are no longer divided only economically and socially but also culturally and politically, the two are no longer bound by a common meaning system or norms in public life nor by a common code of political behaviour. There are no programmes, agendas and claims of 'common good' coming out of politics which hold good simultaneously both for the elite and the masses.

Superimposed on this situation is the growing divide between the rural and the industrial-urban India. The farmers' movements for adequate prices for their products, the movement for adequate minimum wage by



**FOUR  
SWAN  
FABRICS**

**FOR ENCHANTING SHADES  
IN COTTON AND BLENDED TEXTURES**

Pamper your every whim and fancy with Four Swan Fabrics  
in cotton and Polyester/cotton blends. Crease-resistant  
Four Swan fabrics come in a wide range of colours and prints.

*Manufactured by*

**THE VICTORIA MILLS LTD., BOMBAY.**



**MANGALDAS  
GROUP MILLS**

**ATTENTION STEEL MILLS**

**&**

**FOUNDRIES**

**EXPORTERS OF WORLD FAMOUS SANDUR MANGANESE ORE**

**OFFER**

**EX-STOCK**

**VERY LOW PHOS. PIG IRON**

**AND**

**LOW ALUMINIUM FERROSILICON**

**PRODUCED IN THEIR PLANT AT VYASANKERE**

*Please Contact*

**THE SANDUR MANGANESE & IRON ORES LIMITED**

**"LOHADRI BHAVAN"**

Yeshwant Nagar-583124

Via Sandur, Bellary Dt

Karnataka INDIA

*Cable* SMIORE, SANDUR (INDIA)

*Telephone* SANDUR 33, 61, 91

*Telex* BANGALORE 427

Bangalore 32175

28262 :

A complex, abstract collage featuring a variety of objects including a potted plant, a clock, a key, a teapot, a cup, and a small house, all rendered in a high-contrast, black and white style. The collage is composed of numerous small, detailed elements that form a larger, somewhat chaotic scene. The objects are arranged in a way that suggests a narrative or a specific setting, though the details are too intricate to discern clearly. The overall effect is one of a dense, layered composition.



Hydroquinone.  
ne.Metol.-1.  
rechrom  
Purechro  
-3. Sodi  
me-4. Sod  
Sulphite.  
Bis  
Sodium  
ulphite.Sod  
Carbon  
um Anhydr  
ate SodiumCa  
ous.SodiumC  
ous Monohydr  
Monosulphid  
onate Metasulphate (HY  
Sodium Thiosulphate Thio  
te. Sodium Ammonium Crystals.S  
Sodium Anhydrous and Crystals.S  
te. Anhydrous Benzene Bisulphite.S  
po) Anhydride Hydroxy Benz  
sulphate Formaldehyde Chloranil.2:5  
Sodium Acetate.2:5 Dimethoxy Anilin  
Sodium Acetate.Benzene.N.N Diethyl Sodium  
odium Acetoxy Benzene.N.N Tolidine. Mangan  
e.2:5 Diethoxyl n-Toluidine. Mangan  
Diethoxyl Aniline.n-Toluidine. Ace  
ne.N.N Diethyl Anhydrous. P  
n Sulphate Manganese Sulphate.P  
n Carbonate. Manganese Sulphate.  
ese Manganese Butyl Metha  
tate. Manganese Hydronin  
henidone. Hydroquin  
crilate.

Paper  
Electronics  
Ceramics  
Polymers  
Leather  
Jute  
Textiles  
Detergents  
Fertilizers  
Paints  
Dyestuffs

Manufactured by

**S SATYADEV CHEMICALS LTD.**  
Pratapnagar Road, Vadodara-390 004.

SEMINAR, OCTOBER 1982

agricultural labour and the tribal movements for re establishing rights over forest products and land, although at present seemingly at odds with each other, are a part of the larger contradiction. They represent similar tendencies for struggle against the established economic and political macro structures controlled by the small urban-industrial, bureaucratic and technocratic ruling elite.

**I**t is this growing social contradiction — between the middle and the poor classes and between urban and rural India — which has exposed the fact that the forces of the market and claims of citizenship are progressively getting irreconcilable in contemporary Indian politics. What was started as the politics of defence and expansion of citizenship rights, wherever necessary by restraining the market forces, is now seen by the ruling elite as the source of all economic troubles. Now they have made a *volte face*.

Their economic policy and political practice is increasingly tilting in favour of undermining the citizenship rights (especially of the poor, the tribals, the *Haryans* and the several marginalized groups and workers in the unorganized sector disadvantaged by the market) *wherever they conflict with the forces of the market*. The new economic policy which has made the large IMF and World Bank loans possible aims not only at returning economic power to the market, but using the political power of the institutions including that of the State, to suppress claims of citizenship by groups on the periphery of the national polity and economy. Much of the strength and credibility of the movements and action-groups derive from the fact that they, against all the opposition from established macro-structures, fight for the political and economic rights of the poor at the micro-level.

Lastly, the educational and professional establishments are fast losing their credibility as instruments of modernization. The magic of the 'science of management' is fading away. What once looked like problems solvable by the proper application of social science know-

ledge and modern management now appear to lie beyond their ken. That formulation has precious little to offer by way of reforming the education system, making the health system accessible to the poor in the rural and tribal areas or of providing proper shelter to those living in slums and on footpaths.

There is a total loss of the earlier confidence in social science knowledge or in modern management or in the established institutions and practices of social work to come-up even with micro-level solutions to problems of hunger, destitution, social violence, communal conflicts, or in their ability to set up and then control and monitor appropriate systems of social service delivery, or to train social workers who can be effective in working with the people to develop their productive capacities in the framework of co-operation and self-reliance.

All the programmes and activities of the established institutions now look lustreless, they hold no promise of solving any real problem of the poor. Now the university graduates going out to work with the people acutely feel the need to *de-learn* what they have learnt in these institutions. They rely more on trial and error and devising their own experiments for developmental or transformative action. In that process they are proving themselves far superior in practice to the conventional practitioners of management and social work. Thus development has stimulated new experiments in the area of developmental change and social transformation, albeit at the local level, by small groups of activists.

**V**oluntary agencies, NGOs in international parlance, are not new on the Indian scene, nor are their activities unfamiliar. Their history is now over a hundred years old. Significantly enough, the basic Act governing the registered non-governmental bodies today was enacted in 1860. Several voluntary organizations were formed and functioned effectively especially from the 1860s onwards till the end of the nineteenth century which was the period of great social, cultural and economic reforms. For the first time a

debate on India's poverty was initiated by Dadabhai Naoroji.

That India was a poor country came as a big surprise to the newly educated Indians. India's social backwardness and lack of British-type education on the one hand and British economic policies towards India on the other were believed to be the reasons for her poverty. Several organizations began to be founded by social reformers of the time. The types varied from charity organizations to those which founded and led the new education movement (founding schools, especially for girls, libraries, debating societies, promoting literature on issues of social reforms etc.), the organizations devoted to specific social reforms such as abolition of child marriages, promotion of widow marriages etc., and also organizations addressed to reforming religious practices around birth, wedding and death that began to be considered archaic and harmful for 'progress'.

The growth of voluntary organizations was promoted and patronized by the British, for they catered to the material and social needs of the newly educated class of Indians which the British thought was the best instrument of their rule in India.

**H**owever, these organizations and movements began to subside at the beginning of the twentieth century. The emphasis was now on political change rather than social reform. More political and party-like organizations began to take their place, which also changed the nature and character of the Indian National Congress (This party was founded in 1885, but functioned in the initial years more as a debating society for the professionals; it was transformed into a full-fledged national political party in 1920 by Gandhi).

Thus, the voluntary organizations and movements addressed to educational and social reforms survived and functioned effectively for about sixty years, but their area of influence was limited around the Presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. Yet the awareness and structures they generated and left behind ushered India into a new

era of politics and political movements.

Although no specific parallels can be drawn — because history does not repeat itself in quite that sense — after about one hundred years since the 1860s, the Indian social and political scene is once again alive with voluntary organizations and movements. Once again a new debate on poverty in India has started. What is more, a new kind of debate (based on the specific and concrete experience of work by activist groups and of movements) on the models of social intervention and transformation has also begun. This, however, does not mean that the new debates which began in the late 1960s through the growth of activist organizations and micro-political and social movements will have consequences similar to those in the past.

The hard-to-answer question and probably a premature one as well then is what are the prospects and possibilities of these groups and movements for determining the politics — and hence the economic, social and cultural consciousness and organization — of the future.

**T**he scene of action-groups and movements in India today fills a wide spectrum of activities, organizations and ideologies. These include the old *philanthropic organizations*, the various voluntary *welfare organizations* in the networks of the central and the regional departments of social welfare, the *developmental agencies and groups* engaged in various projects of rural development, some of which are founded by young middle-class professionals interested in working out their ideas and experiments in the field of rural development and others as mini-bureaucracies administering development in specific areas — either old Gandhians or politicians and social workers working at the fringes of whichever is the ruling party. Also included in this category are some Christian church groups.

Then there are various *front-organizations of the political parties*. These are not only financially supported by them but are also politically managed by them. They work among students, young people gene-

rally, the workers, women etc.. But, by and large, these are confined to the urban areas.

Another category comprises the *non-party political groups* or groups claiming to be parties but which are small and localized in their operation. These do not participate in the electoral process. Many of these groups have come into existence either as the splits in the political parties of the Left (the communist and the socialist) or in reaction to the established leftist parties having engaged in electoral politics (and thus given up revolutionary politics).

Disaffection with the gerontocracy in the leadership and the lack of intra-party democracy in the Left parties is yet another reason for their coming into existence. These Left political groups inherit the ideological and organizational frameworks of the parent Marxist or the Social Democratic parties. What is different about them is not only that they are independent of and often hostile to their parent parties, but that they work directly among the people in specific geographical areas and address issues that no longer interest the Left 'establishment'. Their goal in politics, however, remains the capture of State power through revolutionary politics and movements.

**T**here are other struggle groups, political in nature, but not organized or functioning as party-like formations. We can call these the *semi-political action-groups*. Their ideology is the 'empowerment of people'. However vague an ideology and programmes they may have, their conviction and commitment to these is unflinching and total. Their work consists in raising the political consciousness of the people, setting up the people's own organizations, preparing them for direct action and confrontations with the local power structures.

These groups are usually and almost exclusively confined to the most poor and oppressed sections of the society and are concerned with the totality of the peoples' life — political, social, economic and cultural. Hence their activities dialogue with the people, training

the people and workers for struggles, participating in all popular events like traditional festivals, all form part of their activities. They are also open to the people themselves getting into and playing a part in their organizations. The capture of State power is not their goal; in fact, some of them believe this to be a limited and limiting goal that often brings about more oppressive structures into existence.

**S**ome other action-groups are difficult to classify as political or non-political. Like the semi-political groups, their primary concern is not the capture of State power. They are really concerned about problems of social and cultural transformation as also of fighting State power and political repression. They are engaged in raising a number of micro as well as macro-level issues and their resolution. The problems they choose are quite different from the ones that preoccupy the developmental, the political and even semi-political groups. These can broadly be called *non-political transformative groups*.

Included in this category are such varied groups as the human rights and peace groups, the ecological groups of dissenting young professionals fighting their professional establishments and working at the grass-roots, the legal-aid groups and so on.

It is tempting to classify the groups and movements in terms of their role as status-quoist and transformative or as those working around the institutions of conventional politics and those engaged in creating a new politics. For example, as between the political groups on the one hand and the semi-political transformative groups on the other, it can be said that the former are still within the framework of the conventional politics of power and the latter are working out a new politics for socio-cultural transformation.

But, the scene of action-groups and movements is so fluid and such changes are taking place within them that any definite classification will prove inappropriate, even misleading. Let us only note that the

old charity groups are turning into developmental groups. activists working in the developmental groups are turning to struggle-oriented political and semi political groups, and the developmental groups themselves are drawing new motivated and committed members from the professionals

The political groups are thinking more and more in terms of moving towards wider joint and united groups outside the existing political parties and the semi political groups are splitting with some members joining parties of the Left and others acquiring a clearer identity as transformative groups working with the people. However, the non-political transformative groups are beginning to see that their seemingly non-political activities do involve a confrontation with the power-structures. Such is the state of flux in which we find them today

**T**here is a serious internal self-evaluative process of work among most groups, whether of the developmental or transformative type. They are also debating with one another, the specific issues concerning their activities, organizations and ideologies and their role in shaping the future of politics. While some commonality of perspective is emerging among the developmental, semi-political and transformative groups, a divergence of perspective is also growing between them on the one hand and the pure political groups on the other.

The first set of groups are themselves undergoing significant changes. Some developmental groups have begun to question the effectiveness of conventional development programmes in solving the problems of the poor. This has two consequences. Firstly, they are outgrowing their role as voluntary bureaucracies in charge of implementation of the conventional development programmes of the government and the international agencies. Greater flexibility is being introduced in their working, providing a new scope for experimentation and innovation in the fields of development and welfare, e.g., housing, education, health, production activities, application of intermediate or

appropriate technologies. Due to their increased flexibility and innovativeness, these groups continue to attract motivated middle class professionals to their ranks.

Secondly, some of them have begun to view development as struggle, thus taking up new programmes of imparting relevant information, skills and knowledge to the people. Some of them have started even organizing the people with a view to compelling the government to implement its own schemes meant to benefit the poor and legislation meant to protect the people's economic and political rights. They are also working to ensure the people's participation in the decision-making bodies in charge of these schemes. Issues like bonded labour, minimum wages have begun to attract their attention. An awareness is growing among them that development is not possible if the problems of the power-structure are ignored.

Organizations not sensitive to these new issues are losing their workers to explicitly political groups. Similar stirrings are noticeable among the old Gandhian and the Church groups engaged in developmental action. Although such new thinking and activity has not yet reached many conventional developmental agencies and groups which continue to function as local substitutes of development bureaucracies, the process has started which makes it difficult to write off developmental groups as having no role in influencing the future of politics in India.

**S**imilarly, the non-political groups (ecological and groups of young professionals) are no longer in the network of Rotary and Lion Clubs. They are increasingly getting aware of the political and economic structures they have to confront to realize their seemingly non-political goals. Increasingly, as with other groups, they perceive the need for economic and political decentralization and that decentralization, like development, involves struggle.

The semi-political groups are recently expanding their struggles to the social and cultural spheres with greater vigour. One indication of

their movement towards wider transformative objectives is the growing hostility towards them both from the government and the Left parties. Similarly, the human rights groups are struggling to transform themselves from the present political coalitions that they are, to the more integrated existence of transformative groups, closer to the politics of movements and away from the politics of the parties.

**A**ll these recent changes within the various developmental, non-political transformative and the semi-political groups and the growing interaction among them, suggest their potentiality for moving towards a new politics for the future. However vague and inarticulated this conception is today, the commonality of perspective which has begun to emerge among them suggests that they will play a role in shaping an alternative to conventional politics.

Firstly, they clearly work outside and away from the established party structures and do not cast themselves in the image of a party. Politics for them is not a professional activity but only a means, an important one at that, of larger transformation.

Secondly, they work on issues and problems directly concerning the poor and the downtrodden and often not *for* them but *with* them. The very chemistry of working with the poor deepens their commitment to total transformation.

Thirdly, they share the perspective of democratic decentralization of economic and political power and integrate the hitherto neglected human and cultural issues in the process of transformation.

Fourthly, they do not view the 'non-proletariat', i.e., the poor peasants, the Harijans, the tribals, as having any less revolutionary potential than the working classes. Their view of the people is not *instrumental*, as an agency of revolution or of any other transcendental goal.

Lastly, they are not constricted by the narrow logic of capturing



State power. This allows them greater flexibility and open-endedness, experimentation and innovation in devising their programmes and picking up issues. Taken together, the potentiality of these several types of non-political groups lies in their growing recognition of the non-political and non-economic aspects of the contemporary structures of power and domination embedded in the culture of modern politics.

It is not that the political groups, both of Marxist and the social democratic variety, are totally immune to the processes of internal change. Indeed, some Marxists are moving towards the formation of joint united fronts within the non-party political organizations. As a result, the legacy of the gap between the cadres and the people is being overcome. Some social democrats, on the other hand, are moving away from electoral politics and closer to the semi-political groups. But, for both, the ultimate objective still remains the capture of power.

For the Marxists it is through revolution and for the social democrats it is through developing a new political formation for a social democratic party of the future. Consequently, their organizations and activities are still far from moving towards any alternative to conventional politics. Ideologically, they view the activities of the developmental, semi-political and non-political groups as 'reformist' which defuse class struggle, some call them the 'new strategies of the bourgeoisie'.

Issues like bonded labour or caste-domination are, for them, without any revolutionary potential. But, unlike the established Left parties, the activist groups work directly with the people, take up concrete issues of oppression and exploitation and in the process develop their consciousness of the structures that exploit and oppress. They have been able to organize oppressed groups in the rural and urban areas which were considered unorganizable by the Left parties and hence non-consequential for social transformations. In this sense, at the level of

the people, they are generating an ability to move beyond the conventional politics of transformation.

Am I suggesting that India is moving towards a new politics of the future? Not quite. My purpose is only to draw attention to a possibility which has been badly neglected so far in the literature on Indian politics.

In day-to-day terms, these groups and movements are facing numerous problems, some of which threaten their very existence and survival as micro structures of an alternative politics. They suffer from, among many others, the problems of fragmentation, splitting, isolation, finance, hostility both from governments and political parties and limited reach.

Given these problems but also given their potentialities to play a role in creating an alternative politics, these groups and movements may take one of the two possible courses in the future. One, they may turn out to be a phenomenon of a passing phase of intense pressure-group activities addressed to correcting anomalies of the current structures of politics. For, although they have evolved micro practices which can lead to a new politics, as yet there is no new social knowledge and, more importantly, no macro-structure of thought and institutions, operating at the national and international level, powerful enough to contend with the validity claims of the established macro structures.

Groups and movements are, after all, not alien to modern politics. They have come and gone. Some get absorbed and others survive as anachronisms. So, it is quite possible that the groups and movements active at present may get absorbed by the present parties or other existing macro-structures. And if one wants to be optimistic in this line of possibility these groups and movements may join together in a large party-like formation. Such a formation can, however, only change the *regime*, it will not change *politics*.

The second possibility is that the action-groups and movements will

continue to drift away from conventional politics and achieve a degree of coherence in their perspectives and practices for a new politics of transformation. This possibility is suggested by the increasing interaction among the action groups themselves and between the activists and concerned intellectuals. A new body of social knowledge is being slowly generated through the assessment of current micro practices of social transformation by the activists themselves as well as in cooperation with intellectuals.

The process of moving from micro-practice of transformative politics to a micro-conception of a new politics for the future has just begun. Much will depend on how sensitive and concerned are the intellectuals, particularly the social scientists, in India, about the need to abandon their received theories and methods to meet the new challenges thrown up by the stirrings at the grass-roots of their own society.

It is the dialectic between micro-practice and micro-thinking which will actualize a new politics of the future. The emergence of alternative macro-thinking, alternative institutions and even large-scale movements joined by activists and intellectuals at the national, regional and international level and addressed to the basic issues concerning the politics of the future can sustain, expand and agglomerate what at present are localized and isolated efforts of the grass-roots organizations and movements. This will also increasingly strengthen their 'counter-validity claims to legitimacy'. What is at present a vague conception of a new transformative politics will also acquire a clearer definition and concrete programmatic content.

In brief, a macro-vision is the prime need of these groups and movements and this can be filled only by a growing partnership between activists and intellectuals in the process of social transformation. The promise of a new politics is, thus, as much grounded in the objective forces of change as in the will and the capacity to intervene on the part of the activist-intellectual dyad.



# Books

## **THE GOD THAT LIMPS: Science and Technology in the Eighties** by Colin Norman A Worldwatch Institute Book, 1981

THERE is little need today to state that science and technology can be volatile stuff. The seventies and the eighties have witnessed substantial introspection on aspects of technology and, more than ever before, the grey areas in the wondrous fruits of science, tend to predominate. Colin Norman uses the picturesque metaphor of Hephaestus, the lame Greek god of fire and metalworking, to emphasise the ironic imperfection in science and technology. Quite expectedly, since Norman is a journalist, the book packs a wide array of examples that illustrate his point.

The inappropriate nature of the technological effort which has been pursued in the immediate past, and the need to reorganize the social impact of future technology options, are the themes that the author develops over the course of six chapters. The reason for inappropriate choices on the science and technology front range from ignorance about true social needs to the origins of R and D funds. Money talks loudly all the way and there is substantial evidence in the nexus between technology that is inappropriate to the needs of the vast majority of the world's population (concentrated as it is in the developing countries) and the fact that 'less than 3 per cent of the worldwide expenditure on R&D' is made by Africa, Asia and Latin America. Again, the fact that almost half the total global expenditure on R&D goes into defence, space and basic research rather than food, energy or shelter can only worsen the imbalance that funding has already created.

Another alarming feature in the pace of progress in science and technology which Norman points to is the slowdown in innovation that per se implies the weakening of the funds and findings chain which spurred the massive R&D efforts of the sixties. While some solace may be found in the Kondratiev cycle kind of explanation that believes in the cyclicity of economic business activity, there is reason to believe that the spectacular wave of innovation of the post-war period has lost its punch. And the reason seems to lie with the qualitative quantum jump in technology which the eighties have begun to witness.

Says Norman 'Just as advances in chemistry and materials technology sparked technological changes in a broad range of industries in the postwar era, microelectronics and biotechnology will have a pervasive impact in the decades ahead. As these technologies are developed and applied, they will lead to fundamental changes in industrial production and in the organization of work and daily lives. Moreover, unlike most technologies that underpinned the

postwar wave of innovation, microelectronics and biotechnology do not require the use of large amounts of energy and material resources. The evolution and potential use of these technologies illustrate many of the key issues surrounding technological change, productivity, and jobs.'

It is only towards the end that Norman points to the most encouraging sign of the times — the less obvious influence of society on technology. Where the book flounders is in the documentation of evidence on this aspect of change. But then, like many journalistic efforts, Norman's attempt painstakingly to document has confined him to what has happened already. Quite understandably, evidence of the kind we are looking for will only be available in those intractable signposts to the future — that even seasoned futurists have been known to miss from time to time.

As a guided tour of aspects of the evolution of science and technology in the context of social change, Norman treads a modest path. *The God That Limp*s is no tour de force but a definitely enchanting ramble. The woods are still further away.

Dilip Cherian

## **NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE: A Debate on International Economic Relations** edited by Shyam Ratna Gupta and L P S. Shrivastava. Allied Publishers, 1981

THE book is divided in two parts. The first consists of a set of five papers on the New International Economic Order and the North-South Dialogue. The second is a report of the proceedings of a seminar (and the discussions therein) held on 19th July, 1980. It was jointly organised by the Steering Committee for Research on International Economic Relations (SCRIER) and the Forum of Financial Writers (FFW). To my mind, the second part of the book has very little to contribute so far as the basic issues of the debate are concerned. They have been adequately brought forward in part one. However, it gives the reader a good set of opinions on the subject by a group of knowledgeable people, as the discussants include L K. Jha, Manmohan Singh, Balraj Mehta and K B Lall, to name a few.

The following major points emerge. What is needed today is an arrangement which will ensure, now and in the future, fair terms of trade and capital flows between the developing and the developed countries. The developed world however is still suffering from the hangover of colonialism and in an attempt to monopolise the riches of the world treats

the developing world as a mere footnote in its global economic strategy. Conferences like CIEC, UNIDO III and UNCTAD IV and V have all shown that the developed market economies are not reconciled to a radical restructuring of the current global economic system and institutions. It is these high priests of *laissez faire* who indulge in protectionism as soon as they face competition from abroad. What they need to recognise is the mutuality of interests. The developing world provides export markets to the affluent and therefore affects employment in the exporting sectors.

Given that there is little hope of any increase in the pure transfer of resources from the North to the South, the only possible answer is South-South co-operation aimed at collective self-reliance and functioning on the basis of collective bargaining vis-a-vis the rest of the world. The countries of the developing world should take advantage of the complementarities between them. The OPEC countries have surplus funds. They can diversify their portfolios by investing in other developing nations, and countries like India can provide technical knowhow and skilled manpower in various spheres. Measures like ECDC and TCDC should be further developed at all levels. But then, as always, there is another side to every story, and so also to this one. There is a major division of interests within the Third World. The interests of the OPEC countries are no longer similar to those of the Group of 77, nor are those of the so-called Newly Industrialised Countries like South Korea, Brazil, Mexico etc. It is possible that the major OPEC countries and the NICs are admitted to the membership of the 'Select Club' leaving a residual 'fourth world' behind.

It should not be forgotten that all these issues are closely related to the problem of energy. After all, it is the high price of oil which causes the non-oil producing developing countries to run into balance of payments' problems. Therefore, attempts should be made to intensify the search for oil in India, and to develop alternative sources of energy. In the transition period, the only answer seems to be coal.

It is equally important for the developing world to develop their own strength instead of trying to transfer the blame for their condition to the advanced countries. There are no international solutions to the problems of a country as big as India. International monetary reform would no doubt help, but an attempt should be made to tap more resources in international capital markets. This would require efficient choice of projects and management of the economy so that the rate of return from commercial borrowing is high enough enable debt servicing.

All books have misprints and so does this one — 'Report of the FFW-SCRIER seminar held on 19 July 1908.' Surprising indeed that two associations formed in 1966 and 1979 respectively sat down to discuss the development doctrine for the 80s in 1908!

Ashish Lall

## MAHATMA GANDHI : A Biography

B R NANDA

Few men in their lifetime aroused stronger emotions or touched deeper chords of humanity than Gandhi did. 'Generations to come, it may be,' wrote Einstein of Gandhi in July 1944, 'will scarcely believe that such a one as this ever in flesh and blood walked upon this earth.' While millions venerated Gandhi as the Mahatma, the great soul, his political opponents saw in him only an astute politician. Not until 1946-7 (when the transfer of power enabled them in their minds to disengage Mr. Gandhi the man from Mr. Gandhi the arch-rebel) were the British able to see him in a gentler light. This biography, widely acclaimed on first publication by Allen and Unwin in 1958, has stood the test of time and come to be regarded by many as the standard and fullest 'life' of Gandhi. Carefully researched, objective not compelling, capturing all the nuances of momentous events, it is not only the biography of a remarkable man but also a record and analysis of a critical period in South-Asian history. (1981) 542 PP Rs 80

### SOME PRESS OPINIONS

- 'an admirable account of the life of Gandhi, from which there emerges a full picture of this strange and attractive man' *Lord Attlee, The Spectator*
- 'well arranged and informed by a sense of proportion and relative value. It rescues Gandhi both from the sentimentalists and from the debunkers' *The Times*
- 'nobody who takes the subject seriously can afford to be without his (Mr Nanda's) book' *B B C Listener*
- 'a vivid picture of his personality and a comprehensive account of his activities. The style is simple and elegant' *The Hindu*
- 'an excellent account of Gandhi's life and of the movement for Indian Independence' *Times Literary Supplement*
- 'The reading of this book is an exalted kind of experience' *Deccan Herald*
- 'complete and readable. Mr B R Nanda makes the Father of Indian Independence a personality from the opening paragraphs' *New York Times*
- 'He wields a smooth pen. It is a pleasure to return to the atmosphere created by Mr Nanda' *Saturday Review*
- 'His well-designed and fascinating chronicle is also an interpretation, and therein lies its great value' *Birmingham Post*



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj,  
New Delhi 110002

Bombay Calcutta Madras

# Further reading

## BOOKS

- Abbott, David W.** and **Edward T. Rogowsky.** Political parties 2nd ed Chicago, Rand McNally Publishing Co., 1978.
- Anirudh Prasad** Presidential government or parliamentary democracy New Delhi, Deep & Deep, 1981.
- Bertsch, Gary K and others** Comparing political systems power and policy in three worlds New York, John Wiley, 1978
- Biswas, Dipti Kumar** Political sociology an introduction. Calcutta, Firma Klm, 1978.
- Blondel, Jean** The discipline of politics London, Butterworths, 1981
- Bryan, Frank M** Politics in the rural states people, parties and progress Boulder, Colo, Westview Press, 1981
- Day, Alan J (Ed)** Political parties of the world a Kessing's reference publication Harlow, Essex, Longman, 1980
- Etzioni-Halevy, Eva** Political manipulation and administrative power a comparative study London, Routledge, 1979
- Field, John Osgood** Consolidating democracy politicization and partisanship in India New Delhi, Manohar, 1980
- Grindle, Merilee S., (ed)** Politics and policy implementation in the third world N J, Princeton University Press, 1980
- Gupta, N S** Issues in political development and economic and social change. New Delhi, Light & Life, 1978
- Harrison, Reginald J** Pluralism and capitalism the political evolution of modern democracies London, Allen & Unwin, 1980
- Hermann, Margaret, G (ed)** A psychological examination of political leaders New York, Free Press, 1977
- Hinckley, Barbara** Coalitions and politics. New York, Harcourt Brace, 1981
- Hitchner, Dell Gillette and Carol Levine.** Comparative government and politics. New York, Harper and Row, 1981.
- Huntington, Samuel and Joan H. Nelson** No easy choice political participation in developing countries Cambridge, Mass, Harvard, 1976.
- Ippolito, Dennis S** Political parties, interest groups, and public policy. Englewood Cliffs, N J, Prentice-Hall, 1980
- Jakhar, Bal Ram.** The people, the parliament and the administration New Delhi, Metropolitan Book Co., 1982
- Kamath, M V (ed.)** India of our dreams the Fourth Estate speaks. Bombay, TBH publishing Co., 1982
- Kearney, Robert N (ed)** Politics and modernization in South and South-east Asia. New York, John Wiley, 1975
- Khanna, J K** Gandhi on recent Indian political thought New Delhi, Ess Ess Publications, 1982
- Kim, C I Eugene and Lawrence Ziring.** An introduction to Asian politics Englewood Cliffs, N J., Prentice-Hall, 1977
- Krishna, Daya** Political development a critical perspective Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1979
- Lawson, Kay (ed)** Political parties and linkage a comparative perspective New Haven, Yale, University Press, 1980
- Manbach, Richard W and John A Vasquez** In search of theory a new paradigm for global politics New York, Columbia University Press, 1981
- Middlemas, Keith.** Power and the party changing faces of communism in Western Europe London, Andre Deutsch, 1980.
- Morgenthau, Hans J** Politics in the twentieth century Chicago, University of Chicago Press, n d, New Delhi
- Mukherjee, Hiren** Under communism's crimson colours. reflections on Marxism, India and the world scene New Delhi, Peoples Publishing House, 1982
- Muller, Edward H** Aggressive political participation. Princeton, N J, Princeton University Press, 1979

- Naik, J A.** From total revolution to total failure New Delhi, National, 1979
- Paige, Glenn D.** The scientific study of political leadership New York, Free Press, 1977.
- Papworth John** New politics New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1982
- Potholm, Christian P** The theory and practice of African politics Englewood Cliffs, N J, Prentice-Hall, 1979
- Pylee, M V** Crisis, conscience and the constitution Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1982
- Ramaswamy, N S** The management of political systems New Delhi, Newman Group of Publishers, for Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, 1979.
- Ray Amal and others** Political development and constitutional change. New Delhi, Vikas, 1982
- Rose, Richard (ed)** Challenge to governance studies in overloaded politics. Beverley Hills, Sage Publications, 1980
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan.** Corruption a study in political economy New York, Academic Press, 1978
- Shack, William A. and Percy S. Cohen (eds).** Politics in leadership a comparative perspective. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979
- Smith, David Morton and others** Participation in social and political activities San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1980
- Somjee, A H** The democratic process in a developing society London, Macmillan, 1979
- Stankiewicz, W.J.** Approaches to democracy philosophy of government at the close of the twentieth century London, Edward Arnold, 1980
- Thapar, Romesh.** The waste and the want thoughts on the future New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1978
- Verba, Sidney and others** Participation and political equality a seven-nation comparison Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978
- Vyas, R N.** Creative leadership New Delhi, Ambika Publications, 1979
- Ware, Alan** The logic of party democracy London Macmillan, 1979
- Wesson, Robert** Modern governments, three worlds of politics Englewood Cliffs, N J, Prentice-Hall, 1981.
- White, Stephen** Political culture and Soviet politics London, Macmillan, 1979
- Wilson, Richard W and Gordon J Schochet (eds)** Moral development and politics New York, Praeger, 1980
- Aron, Raymond** Alternation in government in the industrialized countries 'Government and Opposition' 17(1) Winter 1982 3-21
- Ashcraft, Richard** Political theory and the problem of ideology. 'Journal of Politics', 42(3) August 1980 687-705
- Banerjee, Biswanath** Communism and democracy 'Radical Humanist' 45(12) March 1982 17-20, 32
- Benegal, Som.** Search for alternative to parliamentary democracy 'Mainstream' 18(48) 26 July, 1980 11 13
- Bollen, Kenneth A.** Issues in the comparative measurement of political democracy 'American Sociological Review' 45(3) June 1980 370-90
- Bollen, Kenneth A** Political democracy and the timing of development 'American Sociological Review' 44(4) August 1979 572-87
- Bose, Shankar** Political profiles an index for measuring similarity over time 'Comparative Political Studies' 12(4) June 1980 404 11
- The challenges to Indian democracy 1982-85.** 'Public Opinion' 27(2-3) November-December 1981. 3-5.
- Chazan, Naomi** The new politics of participation in Tropical Africa 'Comparative Politics' 14(2) January 1982 169-187
- Chutkow, Paul** Press freedom a joint dedication at Talloires 'Statesman' 23 May, 1981
- Danford, John W** The surest foundation of morality the political teaching of Hume's dialogues concerning natural religion 'Western Political Quarterly' 35(2) June 1982 137-80.
- Dang, Satyapal** What's wrong with parliamentary system 'Mainstream' Annual 1980 81-4
- De Calvani and others** Political participatory systems 'Quarterly Journal of the Local Self-Government Institute', 21(1): July-September 1981 1-41
- Deutsch, Karl W** Political research in the changing world system 'International Political Science Review', 1(1) 1980 23-33.
- Dixon, William J** The emerging image of U N politics 'World Politics', 34(1) October 1981: 47-61
- Dutta, Satyabrata.** Decline of legislatures. 'Amrita Bazar Patrika' 6 July. 1982
- Falk, Richard.** The global setting and transition to democracy, preliminary conjectures 'Alternatives A Journal of World Policy' 8(2) June 1982 159-74.
- Flood, Merrill M** Let's redesign democracy 'Behavioral Science' 23(6) November 1978 429-40
- Friedland, Roger** The local economy of political power participation, organization and dominance 'Pacific Sociological Review' 24(2) April 1981 139-74
- Godwin, Kenneth and Robert Camerson Mitchell** Rational models, collective goods and non-electoral political behavior 'Western Political Quarterly' 35(2) June 1982 161-92.
- Gunnell, John G** Political theory and the theory of action 'Western Political Quarterly' 34(3): September 1981 341-58

#### ARTICLES

- Adeigbo, F A** Majority rule and the alternative vote. a refutation of a decisional 'paradox' 'Indian Political Science Review' 16(1) January 1982 59-69
- Alam, Muhammad Badiul.** Recent literature on comparative political parties a review 'Indian Political Science Review,' 16(1) January 1982 49-58
- Appadorai A** Financing elections 'Hindustan Times', 6 April. 1982.

- Hariharan, A** The ethics of fund raising 'Hindustan Times' September 4, 1981
- Huckfeldt, R Robert** Political participation and the neighbourhood social context 'American Journal of Political Science' 23(3) August 1979 579-92
- Jaccard, James and Richard Knox** Designing political campaigns to elect a candidate toward a social psychological theory of voting behavior 'Journal of Applied Social Psychology' 10(5) September-October 1980 367-83
- Kalaycioglu, Ersin and Itler Turan** Measuring political participation a cross cultural application. 'Comparative Political Studies' 14(1) April 1981 123-35
- Kaplan Abraham** Moral responsibilities and political realities 'Policy Sciences' 14(3) June 1982 205-23
- Karwat, Mirosław** Political values as ideas of social needs 'International Political Science Review' 3(2) 1982 198-204
- Kolson, Kenneth** Party, opposition and political development 'Review of Politics' 40(2) April 1978 163-82
- LeBlanc, Hugh L and Mary Beth Martin** Parties, issues, and candidates another look at responsible parties 'Western Political Quarterly' 31(4) December 1978 523-34
- Mahajan, Krishan** Political judges 'Hindustan Times' 15 June, 1982
- Maheshwari, S R** Election Commission weakest pillar of our democracy 'Statesman' 18 June, 1982
- Marshall, Thomas R** Party responsibility revisited a case of policy discussion at the grass roots 'Western Political Quarterly' 32(1) March 1979 70-8
- Mathur, P C** Political parties in the contemporary world a synoptic analysis 'Political Change' 2(1) January-June 1979 62 81
- May, John D** Defining democracy a bid for coherence and consensus 'Political Studies' 26(1) March 1978 1-14
- Merkel, Peter H** Democratic development, breakdowns and fascism 'World Politics' 34(1) October 1981 114 35
- Misra, Revindra Nath** Some observations on democracy 'Indian Political Science Review' 16(2), July 1982 166-75
- Morgan, Roger** Social democracy in Europe a comparative examination 'Government and Opposition' 17(1) Winter 1982 22-34
- Nehru, B K** Western democracy and the third world a further comment 'Third World Quarterly' 2(1) January 1980 126-30
- Nandy, Ashis** The state of the state 'Seminar' (269) Annual, January 1982 57 61
- Noam, Eli M** The efficiency of direct democracy. 'Journal of Political Economy' 88(4) August 1980 803-10
- Olsen, Marvin E** Comparative political sociology 'International Journal of Comparative Sociology' 22(1 2) March June 1981 40 61.
- Paranjape, H K.** Dimensions of press freedom 'Mainstream' 20(48) 31 July, 1982 15-21
- Pedersen, Mogens N** On measuring party system change a methodological critique and a suggestion 'Comparative Political Studies' 12(4) January 1980 387-403.
- Rahi, A.L** Significance of elections in a democratic state 'Modern Review' 143(857) May 1979 300 4
- Rao, B G** Partyless democracy harm done by a casual experiment 'Statesman' 5 July, 1981.
- Rao, Amal and Vanita Venkatasubbiah** Political development and constitutional reform some recent trends 'Economic and Political Weekly' 16(3) 17 January, 1981 81-4
- Richards, Jeffrey.** Politics in small independent communities conflict or consensus? 'Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics' 20(2) July 1982 155-171
- Ridley, F F** If the devil rules, what can political science achieve? 'Government and Opposition' 15(3 4) 1980 471 85
- Sen, Prafulla Chandra** Partyless democracy the only way out of an impasse 'Statesman' 6 April, 1981
- Seth, S C** An outlook for India's future (1980-2000 A.D.) a discussion paper 'Indian Review of Management and Future' (3) 1982 1-18, 46
- Singhvi, G C.** Towards a model of democratic government 'Administrative Change' 7 (1) July-December 1979 88-95
- Smith-Lovin, Lynn** Individual political participation the effects of social structure and communication behavior 'Pacific Sociological Review' 22 (1) January 1979 23-50
- Stemberger, Peter J** Political participation and community a cultural/inter-personal approach 'Rural Sociology' 46 (1) Spring 1981 7-19.
- Suri, Surinder S** Corruption of political life lack of public philosophy main cause 'Times of India' 23 February, 1981
- Sushil Kumar** The concept of political development 'Political Studies', 26 (4) December 1978 423 38
- Thapar, Romesh** Crumbling political institutions. 'Seminar' (277) September 1982 14-16
- Unger, Arveh L** Political participation in the USSR YCL and CPSU. 'Soviet Studies' 23 (1) January 1981 107-24
- Whitt, J Allen** Towards a class-dialectical model of power an empirical assessment of three competing models of political power 'American Sociological Review' 44 (1) February 1979, 81-99.

#### SEMINAR ISSUES

30	Our Democracy	February 1962
74	Money in Politics	October 1965
80	Elections & Power	April 1966
95	Power Patterns	July 1967
104	Future of Asia	April 1968
107	Politics & Society	July 1968
259	The Politicians	March 1981
276	Our National Character	August 1982

# Communication

THE issue of the SEMINAR on 'Our National Character' (August, 1982) raises some questions of vital interest. Unfortunately, however, the insights of modern social science have not fully been brought to bear upon them.

Hardly any social scientist would deny to-day that national character is subject to social change. This, however, has not been fully recognised, leading to facile generalizations. Thus, Jai B P Sinha refers to the 'Indian's disposition to invest too much of emotionality to the categorization of in-groups'.<sup>1</sup> He does not examine the actual or potential change in this disposition, over time or space. To take a crude example, he does not note that caste has a less significant role in Punjab today than what it has in Bihar, or than what it had in Punjab, say, half a century ago. If he had noted changes such as these, he might have considered the role of socio-economic development in the context of national character, which otherwise might appear to be static.

Sinha maintains that the Indian situation is 'special'. However, in the United States also, 'One of the consistent findings of recent voting studies is that an individual's political preference is likely to be the same as that of his closest associates. There is ample evidence in the Elmira study that the individual voter tends to choose the same party his father customarily prefers: that people tend to vote like others of the same socio-economic status and religious affiliation'.<sup>2</sup>

This inference was drawn on the basis of studies made mainly in the 40s. However, studies in the 70s indicated that a change had taken place. 'A marked change has occurred in American electoral politics. Party loyalty is less prevalent throughout the electorate, less constant within and between generations, and less rooted in the underlying group life of the nation'.<sup>3</sup> What we need is a theoretical framework, followed up by empirical studies, for a proper understanding of the process of modernization in our settings.

Our present conceptual framework needs examination. To take an instance, Sinha maintains that 'an Indian at times subconsciously draws upon the *bhakti marg* to idealize one's superior and to express his devotion, loyalty and complete surrender to those who are in authority'.<sup>4</sup> A real follower of the

*bhakti marg* might consider this to be a caricature of his faith. He might maintain that the upward mobile sycophants of today were faithless self-seekers, whose behaviour had nothing to do with the concept of *bhakti*. In any case, explanations such as this miss the chief social, economic and political factors which make for similar phenomena in a large number of under-developed countries.

Several of the writers have referred to Hindu mythology and sacred literature. One of the problems here is that one can infer whatever one chooses to from the diverse elements of Hinduism. Thus, K.F. Rustamji can say that 'Qualities such as passion, compassion and social idealism do not find much favour in the Indian ethos',<sup>5</sup> while any keen student can cite many a chapter and verse referring to *kama*, *daya* and *dharma*, and their great significance.

Another problem arises through a confusion between 'Indian' and Hindu. Thus, Rustamji says that, 'The Indian has tested victory during the Hindu period, and defeat in medieval times from Islam, and from Christianity in the modern period'.<sup>6</sup> There are really two confusions here: one resulting from the imputation of the feeling of nationhood during ancient and medieval periods, and the second from the description of foreign invaders or powers as 'Islam' or 'Christianity'. As is well known, the feeling of nationhood arose in Europe around the 18th century and in India only in late 19th century. The reasons for foreign invasions and imperialism were diverse and complicated, to treat the processes as mere religious expansionism is a great mistake.

Studies of 'culture and personality' were once much in vogue, however, it has recently been realised that this 'slogan' 'favours a dangerous simplification of the problems of personality formation'.<sup>7</sup> This applies with even greater force to 'national character,' for, character may not respect political boundaries. Also, the term 'national' carries with it some stereotypes and prejudices which we would like to avoid. Thus, while India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are now distinct nation States, their people have affinities, including those of character, which can help in the maintenance of peace and goodwill.

**Satya Deva**  
Department of Public Administration,  
Panjab University,  
Chandigarh

1 Jai B P Sinha, 'The Spirit and the Frame', *Seminar*, August, 1982, p. 16.

2 Henry W Riecken, 'Primary Groups and Political Party Choice' in E Burdick and A J Brodbeck, *American Voting Behaviour*, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), p. 162.

3 Gerald Pomper, *Voters' Choice* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 31.


4 Loc cit, p. 16.

5 K F Rustamji, 'Profile of an Indian', *Seminar*, (August 1982), p. 31.

6 *Ibid*.

7 Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A Murray, 'Personality Formation: The Determinants,' in Edwin P Hollander and Raymond G Hunt (eds) *Classic Contributions to Social Psychology* New York: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 44.

# **the art of good management...**




**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**

**Shriram seminars and courses are part of  
this moulding process... which involves  
executives in a ceaseless interchange of  
ideas, discussion of modern techniques,  
evaluation and reconsideration of policies.  
So that the Shriram organisation is const-  
antly infused with fresh dynamism .. and  
our resources are utilised to the optimum.**



**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**



## Want a ride to the Gulf?

**On my 747s, Airbuses and 707s**  
Over 30 fast, direct flights every week.

DAY	FLT NO	DEP	
Mon	AI 901 AB	0500	Bombay-Abu Dhabi-Dubai
Mon	AI 921 AB	1540	Trivandrum-Dubai-Abu Dhabi
Mon	AI 861 747	1055	Bombay-Dhahran
Mon	AI 801 747	1315	Bombay-Delhi-Kuwait-Baghdad
Mon	AI 881 AB	1430	Bombay-Muscat
Mon	AI 821 707	2330	Bombay-Sharjah
Tue	AI 903 AB	0600	Bombay-Abu Dhabi-Dubai
Tue	AI 923 AB	1640	Trivandrum-Dubai-Abu Dhabi
Tue	AI 863 AB	0830	Bombay-Muscat
Tue	AI 823 747	1000	Bombay-Delhi-Dhahran
Tue	AI 883 AB	1725	Bombay-Bahrain-Doha
Wed	AI 905 AB	0530	Bombay-Dubai-Abu Dhabi
Wed	AI 925 AB	1610	Trivandrum-Abu Dhabi-Dubai
Wed	AI 805 747	1800	Bombay-Doha-Kuwait
Wed	AI 825 747	1700	Bombay-Dhahran
Thu	AI 907 707	0700	Bombay-Ras al Khaymah-Sharjah
Thu	AI 927 707	1700	Trivandrum-Sharjah-Ras al-Khaymah
Thu	AI 827 747	0900	Bombay-Delhi-Kuwait-Jeddah
Thu	AI 857 AB	0815	Bombay-Dubai
Thu	AI 867 747	0940	Bombay-Muscat
Thu	AI 807 747	1030	Bombay-Dhahran
Thu	AI 887 747	1830	Bombay-Dubai-Abu Dhabi
Thu	AI 877 AB	1915	Bombay-Doha-Bahrain
Fri	AI 809 747	0600	Bombay-Jeddah
Fri	AI 909 707	0700	Bombay-Abu Dhabi
Fri	AI 929 707	1615	Trivandrum-Abu Dhabi
Fri	AI 829 747	0730	Bombay-Dhahran
Fri	AI 889 747	0900	Bombay-Dubai-Muscat
Sat	AI 911 707	0130	Bombay-Kuwait
Sat	AI 931 707	1700	Trivandrum-Kuwait
Sat	AI 831 AB	0530	Bombay-Sharjah-Muscat
Sat	AI 811 747	1340	Bombay-Abu Dhabi-Dubai
Sat	AI 851 AB	1630	Bombay-Doha-Bahrain
Sun	AI 915 AB	0500	Bombay-Dubai-Abu Dhabi
Sun	AI 935 AB	1540	Trivandrum-Abu Dhabi-Dubai
Sun	AI 815 747	0800	Bombay-Kuwait-Jeddah
Sun	AI 855 747	1630	Bombay-Dhahran

**एअर इंडिया**  
**AIR-INDIA**




# seminar

279

November 1982

PLAYING  
SPEAKING



## Can aluminium get into the pro tennis racket?

Sure It can. Because aluminium is the most versatile industrial metal in the world. It is being used, more and more, for things we had never imagined. And in India, Indian Aluminium has been the catalyst of this change.

The first to produce aluminium in this country, Indal has introduced almost the entire range of alloys in which rolled and


extruded aluminium products are made in India. In its constant drive towards diversification, Indal has pioneered the use of aluminium in aircraft, currency, power transmission, irrigation tubing, transportation, packaging, housing and a host of other applications.

Indal pioneering. Putting aluminium in the pro league.



**Indian Aluminium Company, Limited**  
**Anything's possible**

HTC IAL 4075



Two leading automotive manufacturers in the world have come together Peugeot of France and Mahindra of India. A magnificent association. The famed XDP 4 90 diesel engine is now being manufactured by Mahindra.


This is the first time that this fuel-efficient and noise-free engine will be manufactured outside of France. To power Mahindra vehicles that span the length and breadth of India.

Running reminders of ruggedness and reliability. Nor do they stop there.

In 21 countries round the globe, Mahindra vehicles are proving their worth. Beyond a doubt. Proudly putting India on the world map of efficient, dependable transport.



**PEUGEOT**




**Mahindra and Mahindra Limited**

Gateway Building, Apollo Bunder  
Bombay 400 039 India



TEXTILES, SUGAR,  
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS,  
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,  
VANASPATI, PVC, RAYON TYRE CORD,  
FERTILIZERS,  
ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS,  
IRON CASTINGS

**IN THE  
SERVICE OF  
THE NATION**



**DCM**

THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD, DELHI



**FOUR  
SWAN  
FABRICS**

**FOR ENCHANTING SHADES  
IN COTTON AND BLENDED TEXTURES**

Pamper your every whim and fancy with Four Swan Fabrics  
in cotton and Polyester/cotton blends. Crease-resistant  
Four Swan fabrics come in a wide range of colours and prints.

*Manufactured by*

**THE VICTORIA MILLS LTD., BOMBAY.**



**MANGALDAS  
GROUP MILLS**

REGD. TRADE MARK

# **the art of good management...**



**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**

Shriram seminars and courses are part of this moulding process, which involves executives in a ceaseless interchange of ideas, discussion of modern techniques, evaluation and reconsideration of policies. So that the Shriram organisation is constantly infused with fresh dynamism and our resources are utilised to the optimum.



**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**

# SALEM STEEL PROJECT

FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY




*General view of the Cold Rolling Mill complex with the balancing reservoir in the foreground*

With the decision to install instead an alloy and special steels plant at Salem, DASTURCO was again commissioned in 1971 to prepare a feasibility report. This was followed in 1973 by the detailed project report and subsequently, DASTURCO as consultants to Salem Steel, has provided the design and engineering services.

Eventually, for integrated operations, Salem Steel will utilize the magnetite ores of Kanjamalai. DASTURCO has carried out extensive beneficiation and ironmaking tests in India and abroad on the Kanjamalai ores.

With the commissioning of the initial cold rolling mill complex in September 1981, Salem Steel has commenced rolling out stainless steel sheets/strip needed for India's chemical, fertiliser, pharmaceutical, food processing and other industries. From concept to reality—the dream of the people of Tamil Nadu has come true.

DASTURCO has been intimately associated with the Salem Steel project from its very conceptual stages. In 1963, it had prepared for the Government of India a detailed project report for a steel plant based on Kanjamalai ores and Neyveli lignite.



*Annealing and Pickling Line No.1—Stainless strip under processing*

**DASTURCO**


*Total Engineering—  
Concept to Completion*

**M. N. DASTUR & COMPANY (P) LIMITED**


CONSULTING ENGINEERS  
CALCUTTA

9-MND 35


# Elegant looks




## Versatile features




Attractive Sleek Two-toned USHA Streamlined—the sewing machine that outclasses any other in its price range With features that others can't match And a 5-year guarantee too




Patch Darning for easy darning and quick adjustment of pressure on cloth



3-position drop feed for easy adjustment of feed-dog position



Dial-type stitch regulator with lever for forward and reverse stitch control and locking arrangement



Thread tension adjuster for regulating proper thread tension.

**USHA Streamlined** feature for feature a better machine

*Ahmed S. Moloobhoy & Sons*

Established : 1910

**SHIPCHANDLERS**

Government Approved Manufacturers of  
Safety Appliances

'Anchor House', 1st Quay Street, Mazagoan, Bombay-400 010

A note from

**seminar**

Dear Subscriber,

We post SEMINAR on the 1st of every month. If your copy does not reach you by the fifteenth of that month, please inform us immediately so that we can send a replacement. Complaints of non-receipt of copies at a later date makes it impossible for us to do anything in the matter.

Circulation Manager  
SEMINAR, P.B. No. 338  
New Delhi-110001



# Cancer is curable

## if detected early

If you're over 30, check up for cancer. Now.

Every year, hundreds die of cancer. This dreadful disease is curable, if detected early. Unfortunately, patients come for treatment only when symptoms

are observed. Or, discomforts are felt. By then, it may become too late and reach the point of no cure.

If you are over 30 years old, you could be a likely victim. The best thing is to make sure. So why don't you go in for a check up? It wouldn't cost you anything because it's absolutely FREE.

Take an appointment with the Indian Cancer Society. Today.

### 3-pronged drive to control cancer

#### Cancer control

From Page 8

to some extent the known and simpler metabolic pathways of the cancer cells.

An offshoot of this vigorous programme of trials, Dr. W. J. Jussawalla, who was the welcome development of collaborative control on a global basis to evolve these compounds. In addition to the screening of screening cancer drugs, an active screen indigenous to have effects of

J. Jussawalla, the Indian Cancer Society, in a speech that cancer was in the country should be on the to attack and destroy them in a course of image

#### Cancer curable in early stages

**BANGALORE, Nov. 6.** The four-day international cancer congress concluded here today, emphasising that cancer was a dreadful disease if it was detected in early stages. President of the Indian Council for Medical Research, Dr. P. M. Wahi, told newsmen after the concluding session that the deliberations of the conference would have far reaching effects on prevention and control of cancer. He said that studies of different countries, which were discussed at the conference, showed that cancer of oral cavity in the cervix, breast and oesophagus were preventable. The congress called for an integrated approach of various service organisations to check cancer. It also stressed the need for setting up regional research and treatment centres. An idea of forming a federation of Asian anti-cancer organisations was also mooted at the congress. An idea of forming a federation of Asian anti-cancer organisations was also mooted at the congress. An idea of forming a federation of Asian anti-cancer organisations was also mooted at the congress. An idea of forming a federation of Asian anti-cancer organisations was also mooted at the congress.

#### Majority Of Cancers Are Preventable

**PROFESSOR BANGALORE** Dali believes that a high proportion of all human cancers is due to agents in the environment and therefore capable of prevention, in principle. These carcinogenic agents range from sunlight to agents in heavy industry to tobacco.

#### Anti-cancer vaccine in offing

**BANGALORE, Nov. 7.** An anti-cancer vaccine to immunise people from the dreaded disease is on the cards of research workers, all over the world, including India.


This came up for detailed examination at the National Cancer Conference which concluded here yesterday.

Bringing newsmen here today, doctors M. Gurudas and M. Miral of the Mysore Medical Association said immunotherapy was still in an experimental stage. It was successfully tried on animals at Tata Memorial Hospital, Bombay. Further studies were continuing.

TATA ENTERPRISES

---

# PRODUCT QUALITY



Satyadev Chemicals are widely used in the processing of Colour and Black and white Motion Picture Films, and in the Textile, Jute, Leather and Chemical Manufacturing Industries. Also in the manufacture of Paints, Pharmaceuticals, Dyestuffs, Polymers

Our customers include some of the world's leading manufacturing and trading concerns. The secret of this world-wide acceptance lies in our policy of product quality—the only sacred cow in our fast developing organisation.



**SATYADEV CHEMICALS LIMITED**

Pratapnagar Road, VADODARA, 390 004, India

# **FERODO** **BRAKE LININGS**

## **For sure stopping power**

**Hindustan Ferodo Limited**  
Ghatkopar, Bombay 400 086.

### **Sales Offices:**

**West Region:** 'D' Block, 4th Floor  
Shivsagar Estate  
Dr Annie Besant Road  
Worli, Bombay 400 018.

**North Region:** Hamilton House  
'A' Block, P O Box No 268  
Connaught Place  
New Delhi 100 001  
Inder Palace  
117/232 Pandunagar  
Kanpur 208 001

**East Region:** 20 A, Camac Street  
Calcutta 700 016  
G N Bordoloi Road  
Chandmari, P O Silpukhuri  
Gauhati 781 003  
59 New Rajendranagar  
Sakchi, Jamshedpur 831 001

**South Region:** Meco House, 3rd Floor  
47 Mount Road,  
Madras 600 002  
14/1 Langford Town  
Bangalore 560 025.

OBM/2976

# SEMINAR

THE MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI

Journal which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every  
level of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single  
theme is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions.  
Opinions expressed have ranged from Janata to Congress, from  
Vodaya to Communist to Independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it has  
been possible to answer a real need of today, to gather  
the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people  
arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity  
facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture

Editor/ROMESH THAPAR

Managing Editor/RAJ THAPAR

Production/TEJBIR SINGH

Circulation/C B KUMAR

Published from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1 Telephone 46534 Cable Address Seminar New Delhi Single copy Rs  
10 pence; \$ 1.50. Yearly Rs 40, £ 7, \$ 16, Three yearly, Rs 100 £ 20, \$ 40 Reproduction of material prohibited unless permitted

## EXT MONTH: A CONFUSED WORLD

# 279

## PLAYING GAMES

a symposium on  
some problems of  
sport in our country

symposium participants

### THE PROBLEM

A short statement of  
the issues involved

### SPORTING ATTITUDES

Ranjit Bhatia, received his Oxford Blue  
as a 'Miler', teaches mathematics in  
Delhi University

### FINANCE AND FACILITIES

Novy Kapadia, football player and coach,  
lecturer in English, Delhi University

### THE ORGANISATIONAL SCENE

K. R. Wadhwaney, Sports Editor,  
'Indian Express'

### THE PROFESSIONAL

R.N. Mirdha, Member of Parliament, a  
Deputy Chairman of the Asian Games  
Special Organising Committee

### WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE

Ashwini Kumar, formerly Director General  
of the Border Security Force and President of  
the Indian Hockey Federation, now member  
of the Executive of the International  
Olympic Committee

### WHO'S BEING TAKEN FOR A RIDE

Pankaj Butalia, table tennis player  
and coach, teaches economics at the  
Shri Ram College of Commerce, Delhi

### THE CASE FOR GULLI-DANDA

George Thomas, student, sports journalist and  
presently working with the Asian Games Special  
Organising Committee

### FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography  
compiled by Devendra Kumar

### COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury Associates

# The problem

THIS month, we are going to be deluged with sporting events, mainly in the Capital now boasting an infrastructure on which over one thousand crores of rupees have been spent — that is, if you include the cost of luxury hotels, flyovers, re-surfaced roads and pavements, ASIAD villages, and the elaborate electrical and water systems to support this expansion of the city's capacities. The ultimate 'fall-out' is not easy to assess, but it would be worthwhile during this month to keep our minds fixed on the raw realities of sports in India. Let's list some of them.

- \* Despite various forms of State sponsored efforts, the extent of progress in sports has been not as encouraging as in other third world nations.
- \* Each effort to boost sporting activity has fallen short at the implementation stage.
- \* There is a tendency to cling to a somewhat outdated notion of sports organisation as a preserve of rather amateurish enthusiasts.
- \* The coaching schemes, except in States like Kerala, are geared towards the preparation of State or national level teams for championships rather than to impart training to youngsters.
- \* Sport has not been considered a worthwhile recreation in urban and semi-urban situations.

- \* Development of sports programmes are in complete isolation, ignoring the educational and employment situations.
- \* The only sport to become acceptable everywhere is cricket. Its success may be attributed not only to the increase in the number of Testmatches/local tournaments but also to the role of the media.
- \* We have to somehow get out of the gladiatorial approach.
- \* The role of national sports federations in India has been a negative one. The system that allows such organisations to flourish can only be counterproductive to any scheme to improve sports.
- \* There is no coordination between the federations, the government agencies dealing with sports and the national coaching scheme.
- \* The role of sports to improve the overall health situation of the young and the old has not been understood at any level.
- \* In our obsession with success at the international level, we have ignored the most vital sector — junior sport.
- \* More effort is needed to develop playing fields in schools and in corporation grounds.

This issue of SEMINAR attempts a focussing on several facets of the problem.

# Sporting attitudes

RANJIT BHATIA

THE sporting fever is upon us. Almost everyone and everybody wants to talk sport these days. Normally this would happen on the eve of a Test series at home. But this is not really the year of cricket, although a very tough Indo-Pakistan series is billed in the coming winter, on the very Pakistani wickets where the Australian visitors have just had a very thin time. Cricket, our most important pastime, has suddenly found a rival in the IX Asian Games. And what an extraordinary talking point the Asiad has become! We appear to associate virtually anything with it. Even the arrival of the mosquito, which has played havoc with our daily lives bringing in the dreaded Dengue virus to our doorstep, has been attributed in certain quarters to the Asiad.

Seriously though, we do seem to be overdoing it in this business of blaming a sports extravaganza for all that ails us, unwittingly conveying the impression that something terrible is about to befall dear old Delhi. Equally significant international meetings such as the Non-aligned Conference, Commonwealth Conference and the International Olympic Committee's World Congress, have attracted relatively less attention in this context. This is partly because the Asian Games movement has yet to gain acceptance in the Indian syndrome as an important catalyst for any future

development of the sports sector in the country.

Sport has as yet not quite blended with our thinking in the manner that it should, as a meaningful activity. Any discussion with economists, sociologists, environmentalists or health specialists on the subject of sports is likely to receive lukewarm response, since our sports policy and planning have been evolved in isolation from other related fields. We continue to suffer from the Victorian notion of sport being something frivolous, in a general sense, but an activity through which occasionally highly talented human beings can emerge, the kind that can put us on a pedestal in international competition.

Like everyone else, we too pine for success in sports, and have attempted in so many ways to attain that all important winner-status. More often than not, we have been unsuccessful, and have then gone through the motions of looking for alibis — and occasionally — scapegoats. This is understandable in present day international politics where a nation's sporting prowess is its best advertisement. It is what makes both East and West, North and South, strive continuously to produce world class performers in the various forms of competitive sport.

Quite apart from that, sport has suddenly become a very vital meet-



ing point of differing ideologies. The superpowers make ugly noises about each other, and when things get really out of hand, propagate embargoes of various kinds. But even at the height of any international crisis, they actually look forward to meeting friend and foe alike in sport. The US-Soviet Union Track and Field Athletics, and Swimming Meets, are superb examples of this phenomenon. It is perhaps this aspect of sports that Jimmy Carter failed to fathom when, as President, he made his historic effort to persuade most countries to boycott the Moscow Olympics in 1980. International sport passed its greatest test of survival when it overcame this, thanks largely to the sports federations of some member nations which refused to accept his advice and, in some cases, that of their own governments, and pressed on regardless with their plans for participation in the Olympic Games. The desire for success in sports surpassed all other considerations. Home-made products, in the guise of Sebastian Coe and Steve Ovett, became the world's most important people as a result of this effort. And the process goes on.

The question naturally arises where do we stand in all this? Do we continue to preach and practice sports as we have always done and just hope for the best. Or do we give up all attempts to catch up with the best in the world and put our resources to other use than sports development. If the need of the hour is to have problems of poverty, malnutrition, ill health fought on a war footing, then sport cannot possibly be ignored, since it is very much an integral part of environment and recreation situations which confront societies in both the rural and urban sectors. The founding fathers of independent India were obviously aware of this, and sport was given a very appropriate place as part of the nation's health building programme.

The first ever national sports coaching scheme was run through the Health Ministry and, in fact, named after the then Minister, Rajkumar Amrit Kaur. Few have

realised its pioneering role in the country. It was the implementation of this scheme that brought organised training for competitive sports to India. The coaching programmes grew over the years and, by 1961, we had a full fledged National Institute of Sports. The leading lights of today, at every level, are far better trained under coaches than ever before. The base is getting bigger. Not all, however, are going to be stars, even at the national championships stage. Training and competitions has propped them up, and it is up to us to utilise their special talents.

The bulk of these sports people in the country hail from the lower economic strata. Participation in sport has done no more than ensure them a clerical job. What is required is a scheme through which they can be fed back into the system, not only to improve their own credentials but also to be able to guide and train future generations in their various disciplines. Ideas of this kind cannot be implemented overnight. They work with incentives. The first Asian Games in 1951 laid the foundations of sports consciousness of the kind that had not existed before. It brought, through the media, knowledge of many new sports. The Games of 1982, if carefully handled, could achieve much more. The newly constructed facilities for the different games are not just for the IX Asiad. They should provide our young and old, rich and poor in and around the capital, an opportunity to participate in physical recreation at any time of the year. In the very complex world of today this is a must. It may seem hard to believe this but no society can now do without mass sport of one kind or another. If we play our cards right, almost certainly other parts of the country would, within a course of time, plan for similar facilities for sports.

If cricket has acquired a unique status in India, it was not through sports coaching alone, but because of the frequency of Test matches that have been played each year, in the various centres, and the crucial part played by the media in spreading the gospel of the game. Cricket planning in the country is not half

hearted, but that in most other sports is most certainly so. Sport today needs to be organised by experts. In the era of specialisation there is little room for amateurish management by incompetent hands. It would be like asking a compounder to perform the duties of a surgeon. The stadia and other sophisticated equipment which have become available for the Asian Games would, in future, have to be maintained by sports technocrats. Those who are scrambling for a place in the sun at any of the newly prepared sports venues would be well advised to tread gently in the environs which might well be alien to them.

The current hysteria associated with the Asiad has a parallel in the 1976 Olympics at Montreal which also ran into rough weather on account of a number of problems, both political as well as financial. But there was a difference. The critics in Canada strove hard towards the ultimate success of the Games. Not once was there a suggestion from either French or English speaking Canadians of abandoning the plans or discouraging those who were working round the clock, until the night before the start of the Games, to ensure smooth sailing all round.

In India we have a bizarre situation where, while the rest of the country anxiously awaits the start of the IX Asian Games, tickets or no tickets, a section of Delhi continues to sulk almost as if their privacy had been intruded upon by a bunch of sports people. Maybe it isn't even that. It is perhaps just that while we had all along wanted to play host, we had not quite realised what a mammoth task it would prove to be. We were really thinking of the Asiad as we did at school about our annual sports. Modern competitive sport has come a long way from that kind of status. Today it is a serious business involving professionally trained people striving for honours in professionally organised events. It is no longer a question of putting up tents and *shamianas* at the last minute and hoping for the best.

Sport in India has been organised for far too long in that haphazard

manner It has managed, over the years, to survive as a kind of informal wedding ceremony, with a strong section of sports officialdom operating no differently from the good old *baratis* When the government decided to go full steam ahead to see that something really worthwhile was organised to boost sport in the country, it had to call upon the services of all available talent, certainly not the easiest of tasks in our system where everybody firmly believes that he or she is the person most suited to run sports There have been teething troubles which have made the task more complex than it needed to be But one has reason to believe that the worst is over and, through trial and error, we may be moving in the right direction

**M**uch of what has been discussed is concerned with the hardware aspect of sports organisation in the country. There is yet another side of the scene that needs careful scrutiny The reference is to the kind of premium that we have put on success in national or international championships A new phenomenon has entered Indian sport which one could well do without Every time one reads reports of Indian performance in international meetings one gets the impression, no matter how indirectly put, that one's opponents are less than fair-minded, especially those of the winning sides

Nowhere is this more evident than in sports like hockey and boxing where we harbour a kind of grouse against the umpires and referees for depriving us of our rightful place as a leading nation Granted that we have been outstanding hockey people ever since we first appeared on the international competitive scene in the 1920s, but over a period of time others too have made steady progress to the extent that by the sixties there were a number of member nations at par with us By the seventies it was no longer a question of India vs Pakistan but one of survival against the onslaught of West Germany, Holland, Australia, New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Argentina

While there were some who were willing to concede that the Indo-Pakistani monopoly was under severe threat, thanks to the steadily improving outfits from these countries, there were others who continued to harp on past glories For them it was a case of biased umpiring every time we fared badly, an attitude that certainly did nothing to help the cause of the sport Hockey suddenly became ugly and many who had been part of its syndrome tried to wean their own offsprings to the greener pastures of cricket and tennis

**L**ast year, the international hockey fraternity was shocked when of all teams, India walked out of a friendly match with Holland because it was felt that the umpires chosen were not exactly neutral The situation was embarrassing enough since the incident occurred on Dutch soil No amount of coaxing by officials of the Indian Embassy made any difference, and the three thousand odd enthusiasts who had come to watch the game had to leave the stadium greatly disappointed Some months later similar protests, although not walk outs, about unfair umpiring came from team officials of other national squads in tournaments abroad This kind of thing has now permeated local sport as well, and often one hears of misbehaviour of players and officials during and after matches

These are sad reflections on a country which is reputed to have produced some of the most sporting personalities of all time Indians have won very few world championships but our representatives have over the years earned praise for bringing remarkably sane attitudes to competitive sport The nation that earned credit for Ranjitsinhji and Ramanathan Krishnan in the past and continues to gain kudos through the ideal sportsman-like approach of Vijay Amrithraj and Prakash Padukone, not to mention Kapil Dev, should not in the heat of the moment forget that in the development of sports in the country, sporting attitudes are as much, if not more important, as this sector is to survive in a sane manner.

# Finance and facilities

NOVY KAPADIA

ACCORDING to K.T. Satarawala, Vice Chairman and coordinator of the Asian Games Special Organising Committee (AGSOC) the disparity between the initial estimates of staging the IXth Asian Games and the actual figure could well nigh be staggering. From a modest Rs 10 crores, current projections point to something a shade under Rs. 700 crores.

Viewed in this context, it would seem that finance and facilities for

Indian sport are in abundance. Whatever shortcomings existed would seemingly be adequately recompensed by the extravagant expenditure for the IXth Asiad. However, an appraisal of contemporary Indian sport will reveal that Asiads may come and go but the overall conditions remain abysmal. Sport like any other creative human activity is intrinsically dependent on the amount of finance available and the prevailing facilities for improvement. After all, you cannot learn

the guitar. or sitar without easy availability of the instrument

Similarly, sporting consciousness and mass participation in sports cannot be attained unless playfields are available in abundance for the recreation of children. Ultra modern stadia, like the 17 constructed or renovated in Delhi for the Asiad, are only the tip of the iceberg. They serve the finished product only, that is the international sportstar or an aspirant to that status. International sports stars will albeit be limited in number and quality because facilities do not exist for mass participation in sports. After all, from quantity comes quality is an old adage vindicated in countries all over the globe from China to East Germany and from Australia to Brazil (in the case of football).

Sadly, this universal maxim for sports development gets only lip service in India. Thus, the base for Indian sports remains fragile as the schools which should be consistent conveyor belts of sportsmen and women of potential have no outlet for sports as facilities are deplorable and finance albeit limited is invariably, when not embezzled, mismanaged.

**T**he basic defect of Indian sports is that there are no systematic and scientifically planned programmes for games in the schools all over the country. About four and a half years ago a paper was written by four legislators forming a golden plan for sports in our country. So remiss is statistical information in India, that there is no complete compendium of the number of schools in the country. Just taking high schools into account, the number is about 500,000. There is uncertainty of the number of middle and primary schools in India.

An apt illustration of the negligible sports facilities available at the school level, the base for future champions, is the discomfiting fact that out of the 500,000 high schools in India, only 1.8 per cent have playgrounds. Most of these 1.8 per cent high schools with playgrounds, have just a 200 metres by 100 metres sports arena which is used for play-

ing organised sports like football, hockey and cricket and recreational games like 'gooli danda' and marbles as well as let out for weddings and extravaganzas like fetes, musical nites and, occasionally, 'Ram Leela' and other such festivities.

**A** survey of playing facilities in schools in Delhi, the hub of all activity for the Asiad, is a potent indication of the paucity of playing space for the youth of India. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi runs 1500 primary schools. Five hundred and forty of these schools do not possess anything resembling a playground while many more have just the barest infrastructure. Again, less than 10 per cent of these schools have physical instructors.

The New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) covers an area of a little over 42 square kilometres. About 4,00,000 people live here. In this entire area there is only one large and well equipped children's park at India Gate. The NDMC runs 16 nursery schools of which only six provide playing space with swings, slides, seesaws or piles of sand. The NDMC also controls 79 primary schools. They have playfields ranging from 50 square yards to less than half-a-dozen with 1.5 acre plots. Some of these schools have a concrete playing surface of a mere 25 square yards.

There are 700 middle and higher secondary schools run by the Delhi Administration. For every 1200 students there is just one physical education teacher. Just six gymnasiums serve 700 schools. Only 6 schools have swimming pools. 'Catch them young (!)' is a pious homily mouthed by administrators of sport and politicians alike for over 30 years now but as a policy it has just remained in the formulatory phase as the very basic infrastructure of sport, the playfield, is available to so few.

Again, it must be stressed that in Delhi, like in all other urban areas of the country, spacious playing fields only exist in elitist public schools, which the children of affluent families attend. In such schools, children of the pampered rich indulge in sport for leisure but

are more intent in training for a career in the civil services or the private sector. Rampant apartheid exists in the availability of sports facilities amongst, for instance, the students of the elitist Modern School in Delhi and the rat infested government school in Sewa Nagar or Mongolpuri.

Sports facilities like everything else in a class society is only for those who are the privileged. Yet, it is the children of the lower middle classes mostly who take to sports as a career for the sake of social advancement. Ironically, in their youth they have limited facilities and money available for serious practice of a particular sport. Hence, the non existence of organised coaching in sports for young adolescents. Thus, Indian sport is trapped in a vicious, self-defeating circle from which it is difficult to extricate unless money is channelised in the proper directions like increased playing areas for the young in their colonies and schools.

**U**nfortunately, in India even existing facilities are not fully utilised. Elitist schools and colleges which do possess playgrounds and indoor sports facilities allow them to be used by their own students and that even for the limited duration of the sports season. For the remainder of the year, especially during the big summer break, the grounds lie fallow and are preserved like museum pieces. Indoor sports stadia all over India are only partially used during the year for different games. Invariably, their use or 'mis-use' is for non-sporting ventures like Kishore Kumar Nites and other such musical extravaganzas, jamborees, political rallies and conventions, exhibitions and meetings. If there is nowhere to play, the very idea of sports coaching and all subsidiary factors is self defeating as children will just not develop an aptitude towards sports.

It is imperative that State governments make diligent efforts to ensure that as many school children as possible participate at a young age in athletics, at least in running and jumping events, basic gymnastics, swimming where possible and at least one game. To a certain extent,

this has been undertaken by the Left Front Government in West Bengal which allocates Rs 2.4 lakhs annually to sponsor the Calcutta District Inter School Athletic Meet, in the age-group of six to eleven years for both boys and girls. Competitions are held first at the area level, for convenience. Schools are divided into fourteen circles in which children from over one thousand five hundred schools participate. The first three in each event are then eligible for participation in the Inter Primary Schools Meet. Last year, about 1,200 children from 840 primary schools participated in the final phase of the Inter Primary Schools Meet. West Bengal is allocating finance to sports in the right direction — children in the primary school phase

Already such an investment is proving beneficial. Bula Chowdhury, the 12 year old swimming sensation of the recently concluded 39th National Aquatics Championship, part of the National Trial Games at Delhi, is a discovery of Bengal's version of the Spartakiad movement, popularised in East Germany and the USSR. As a child, Bula Chowdhury had never seen a swimming pool. She had learnt her swimming in a nearby 'talaab'. Today, she is the national women's champion in the 100 and 200 metres butterfly event having clipped the national record by 10 seconds in both races. According to Bernd Johnke, the East German coach in charge of the Indian probables for the Delhi Asiad, 12 year old Bula has the potential to aspire to world standards if she can maintain an exacting training schedule. Bula's potential and talent would have remained untapped or would have surfaced at a later age when improvement could only be marginal if not for the age-group competition organised by the West Bengal State government.

**S**o, amelioration in sports standards is possible if finance is allocated to sports at the proper age-level and not just for extravaganzas like the Asiad. After all there must be so much untapped talent and potential like that of Bula Chowdhury in different areas of the country, unable to bloom as the finance

and facilities for organised sport is practically non-existent.

In all schools in India, there is allocation in the annual budget for sports. Every State government provides for allowances for sport to educational institutions. Yet, in most cases this financial allocation is not used for development or providing adequate equipment and facilities for children to play. In the capital city of Delhi, it is surprising to observe annually that the most brisk sale of sports equipment is between the 20th and 31st March, the closing of the financial year. Goods are sold on paper only. When the inspector comes he is told that all the equipment purchased has been utilised. The newly purchased equipment is then resold at a lower rate, either to the shop or to unsuspecting children supposedly being favoured.

In this unseemly transaction, both the sports dealer and the P.T. instructor in school or the more grandiose director of physical education in colleges take their share of the spoils. This corrupt state of affairs is an annual feature in the sports circles not only confined to Delhi but prevalent in every area of this vast country. So, the financial allotment for sports, albeit limited in a developing country like India, is not fully and properly utilised. Children, the supposed beneficiaries of this grant receive benefits in the form of equipment and facilities in small doses only.

**E**ven the programmes chalked out for sports promotion in the country are impressive only on paper. In actuality they are just a facade to cover up rampant corruption, stagnation and overall inactivity at school level. For instance, in a State like Punjab, where hockey once had a fervent following, the state of the game at the school level is near shambles. On paper the programme seems impressive, as a schedule of six months is chalked out. In reality, just the opposite occurs. Over eighty per cent of the schools take the hockey schedule non-seriously by forming a team just a week prior to inter-school tournaments. They then lose in the first round, the kit including the sticks is taken from the

players and hockey practice for the year is wound up.

The result is inevitable — the flow of talent in the game is on the decline. In the recent past, Punjab has rarely figured in the last four stages of the Junior National Hockey Championship. In fact, Uttar Pradesh has been the junior hockey champion for the past three years, and in the current junior Indian hockey team there are nine players from there while from Punjab there is just one representative.

**H**ockey standards in Uttar Pradesh have risen recently because of systematic grooming of talent at the school stage. At Lucknow, there is a sports hostel where young hockey talent from the State is assembled for specialised coaching. Boys attend school in the hostel premises and undergo coaching twice a day. There are stipends for the talented and those unable to afford the fees. As talent is being nurtured at the correct young age, many of the youngsters blossom into prominent internationals. The sports hostel, a legacy of the late and legendary inside right K D Singh Babu, has already produced two international stars of the highest repute. They are Mohammed Shahid, inside left and considered the best in the world in his position and Syed Ali, the speedy left winger. Other products from this institution who have donned Indian colours in hockey in the recent past, have been centre half, Ravinder Pal Singh and right half, Jaswinder Singh. The sports hostel scheme in U.P. is a vivid example of constructive and productive utilisation of finance and facilities in Indian sport.

Kerala's rise to fame in athletics in the last decade can also be traced to the numerous sports schools which have been put up in many districts of that State. The scheme followed is that which has proved so beneficial in East Germany. Children with sports potential are spotted from the age of 12 and made to attend the special sports school. Here, besides the usual academic curriculum, emphasis is on specialised coaching so that the adolescents are groomed into players of repute. Unfortunately, such exam-

ples in the context of Indian sport are few and far between.

The biggest drawback in spotting potential is that even at the childhood stage, because of the lack of colony playgrounds as a result of the faulty priorities of our urban planners, there are few children playing games. Hence, there is no mass base for sports and so choice is restricted from a limited few, often those with family connections or interest in the game. Mass sport as a popular means of recreation for all age groups has never been part of the Indian milieu. Unfortunately, the finance and facilities available in Indian sport are all geared to the competitive sports syndrome and have done little to sustain or generate mass participation at a physical rather than a voyeuristic level.

Consequently, Indian sport continues to remain in the doldrums not only because of paucity of resources but primarily because of erroneous attitudes. Parents often discourage non-academic activity. A primary malady which hinders development of sports consciousness in India is that there is hardly any social acceptance of sport. The only exceptions are cricket and tennis because of the support they generate from the elite upper classes. The prevalent notions for those sports which need vigorous exercise, body contact and use of strength like football, hockey, weightlifting, boxing and athletics is that they are disciplines for the unintelligent. Persistence with such sports after a certain age leads to parental disapproval because of the prevailing social stigma. Such an attitude is an offshoot of contemporary notions that manual labour, even when skilled, is degrading. So, sport is considered to be the occupation of brainless people, or of the lower strata of society.

The exam-oriented education system which exists in India leads to further disenchantment with sports. There is never time enough left over after cramming for the annual examination for the child to continue his or her sport interests. Consequently attempts to obtain compensatory jobs, thus, becomes a hazar-

dous task. Teachers also view physical education periods in school as easily dispensable, quickly cancelled for extra teaching of a particular subject. Sports teachers are, with a few exceptions, poorly trained to cope with large numbers of children. They are often casual, dispirited and occasionally downright lazy. Only a few outstanding athletes, invariably developed by chance, get specialised coaching. The others just drift from one sports period to another, casually playing a game if the equipment is available.

Again, school administrators tend to judge the success of their sports programmes by the success of their teams in competition. This implies that a few children have money spent on them for a few months, before a major tournament. Even sports days are not the result of a normal athletics programme, but a couple of months of intensive training, while for the rest of the year the children remain out of touch with sports. So, even in our elite public schools, most children get tardy opportunities to participate in, or enjoy sport.

It is in this context that finance and facilities if generated at the proper sources, like school sports, will augment the current impasse. A sports consciousness or sports culture which generates mass participation must be created in the country. Finance for sport must be channelised for creative use. For talented children there must be easily available coaching facilities run by sports organisations. Ultra-modern stadiums like Indraprastha Indoor Stadium or the Nehru Stadium, may have the requisite amenities but are not conducive to creating mass consciousness for sport. The need of the hour is finance to create simple facilities. In neighbourhood parks, the penchant for beautification must be curbed and they should be converted into playfields only. Informed clubs can then be set up in each colony for most games. Waste land can be cleared for impromptu games of cricket, football, volleyball and badminton.

School curriculums should also be altered giving greater emphasis to

sports. At present, in some schools physical education as a subject is mostly taught in a haphazard manner and it is a subject for those with restricted academic pretensions. In this context, the GDR is an example to emulate. Since 1950, swimming lessons have been part of the compulsory sports courses for schools there. Their ministry of education, in the specified curriculum of sports lessons, made the learning of certain strokes compulsory. These are the breast stroke and crawl exercises, starting dive and turning, diving exercises in shallow water, popular dives, etc. This leads to mass participation in swimming. Statistics reveal that out of school-leavers of the 10th Form, 97 per cent are swimmers and in the 12th Form the figure is as high as 99 per cent. From such depth of talent emerge swimmers of the calibre of Rica Reinisch, the 15 year old school girl who set world records in winning both the 100 and 200 metres backstroke events at the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Contemporary East Germany provides the epitome of mass sports participation, the maximum utilisation of existing facilities.

Such concrete steps for the encouragement of Indian sports are urgently required. Priorities must be altered. Finance and facilities should be so geared as to create mass participation. Otherwise Indian sports will remain in the doldrums. The Rs. 700 crores on modern amenities and gigantic, sophisticated stadiums, cannot produce champions. There should be no misgiving about such money spent on creating mass participation in sports. For, above all, sports are very democratic. A labourer or mechanic's son can beat a minister's son in a race but rarely in anything else in contemporary India. Also, sport is ultimately entertainment. A world record by Sebastian Coe, a goal by Paulo Rossi or Mohammed Shahid or a tennis victory by Borg is as valid and satisfying a human endeavour as any other. Mankind's most popular 20th century diversion, organised sport, needs a proper base in India, which can only be provided by the creative and proper utilisation of finance and facilities.

# The organisational scene

K R WADHWANEY

- 1 A square peg in a round hole.
2. 'Catch 'em young' is a slogan all over the world but in India that is *Bharat*, the theme is 'Throttle them young'
3. Over lapping authority
- 4 Wrong priorities
- 5 Total lack of concept regarding value of food.
6. Lack of facilities.
- 7 Faulty education pattern
8. Ignorant parents.
- 9 Manipulation of age.
10. Defunct sports bodies

These ten observations, based on continuous and constant study, just about sum up India's pathetic and dismal display in the international arena of sports despite its abundance of natural resources and tremendous strength in man power.

Unlike other countries where eminent and retired sportsmen foster, promote, administer and manage sports with dedicated effort, in India sports is controlled by ill-informed politicians, shrewd government and semi government officials and social climbers who do not possess any basic, and fundamental knowledge of sports

Taking calculated advantage of the unhealthy state of sports bodies, government advances money by

way of grants-in-aid or pays air fare for participants and teams only to gain a firm and decisive command over sports. While conceding that 'one who pays the piper calls the tune' may be understandable, what is shocking is that the government under-secretaries and joint secretaries in the Education Ministry (now, of course, Sports Ministry) should dabble and interfere in the selection of teams and prune the list of participants scrutinised and submitted by the Indian Olympic Association (IOA). The government comes down with a heavy hand on federations and participants after its being advised by the All-India Council of Sports (AICS), which has so far been headed by either retired and pompous Service chiefs for whom sportsmen and sports officials are like a bunch of jawans in the army or by politicians whose knowledge about sports is no more than dismal nought.

Government, on the basis of illogical advice from the AICS, refused to sanction coaches and managers in different disciplines, for Brisbane's Commonwealth Games. It cleared the barest minimum of four for the relay teams in swimming, not realising that if one fell ill, the remaining three would be deprived of participation and the tax payers' money would go down the drain. While those who ought to have been in Brisbane were summarily rejected, the AICS chief,



Vidya Charan Shukla, undertook the trip as a 'Government observer'. Shukla's expenditure in Brisbane was more than the expenditure that would have been incurred on three athletes!

If one has a close and dispassionate look at the secretariat of the Asian Games, one will be quick to observe that it is not the Asian Games Special Organising Committee (AGSOC) but the Asian Games Sikh Organising Committee. This is indeed an 'uncharitable' observation, but unfortunately it is nothing but one hundred per cent correct and this becomes more obvious since most of these bureaucrats are doing precious little for the betterment or organisation of the Asian Games which are to be held in Delhi.

I can write volumes on the wrong and illogical doings of the AGSOC. But I will point out only one instance which will highlight the functioning of the AGSOC and the sports knowledge of S S Gill, who was the then secretary-general. At a press briefing, a senior journalist suggested to AGSOC officials that they suitably honour those who had played a pioneering role in bringing the Asian Games to India. While elaborating on the subject, he mentioned the name of Anthony D'Mellow, who was not only the father of Indian sport but played a pioneering role in the first Asian Games. The pint-sized Gill jumped to the suggestion and immediately appointed Melville De Mellow Poor. Anthony must have turned in his grave where he was buried about 20 years ago. Can there be any greater example of ignorance in an official than this?

Who coached Milkha Singh, Balbir Singh, Digvijay Singh (Babu), T.N. Seth, Nandu Natekar, Meena Shah, C K Nayudu, Vijay Merchant, Bishan Singh Bedi and many others? No one in particular but they were helped and guided by dedicated teachers and officials.

Coaching is indeed important to widen the base and umbrella for selection because quality always emerges from quantity. Knowing the importance of coaching, it

should be imparted by those who have learnt and acquired the basic knowledge of the game. But unfortunately the training in this country is being imparted by coaches who need to be trained on the fundamentals of sports. All these coaches are produced with monotonous regularity by the government sponsored body called the National Institute of Sports (NIS) which in reality should be called 'Nothing Inside' and 'Never in Shape'. The NIS has done precious little for the cause of sport although crores of rupees have been spent during its existence of about 30 years. Such is the stranglehold of the government that no team can engage any coach other than one 'rubber stamped' by the NIS.

The NIS, headed by R L. Anand, is an institution where the atmosphere is surcharged with uncertainty, intrigue and suspicion. Trainees are lodged like a 'herd of cattle', clumped into rooms and served sub-standard food. Even national stars are given no better treatment than this. The coaches are involved in their own politics trying to outwit each other while Anand Sahib, a non-technical bureaucrat, is more often in Delhi and East Germany than in Patiala! This is indeed a sad state of affairs.

The NIS indeed has some competent coaches. Take, for example, C M Muthiah. A fine decathlon athlete, he is an able coach and has been to East Germany more than thrice for refresher's courses on the art and subtlety of coaching. He should have been actively engaged in coaching India's probables for the Asiad. Instead, he has been given administrative work. As a director (technical), he should have visited various stadia, planned out a comprehensive programme, and other technical details. But Muthiah took advantage of Gill's ignorance and Shankar Nair's generosity and kept on going abroad trying to oblige this Member of Parliament (MP) or that politician.

The result was that defects in various stadia remained unattended until a section of the media pointed out shortcomings in the swimming pool, the Indraprastha indoor

stadium and national stadium. Luckily, all the defects are said to have been remedied and the stadia are now fully functional. But following repeated criticism in newspapers, Muthiah's wings have been clipped and he has been ordered by the AGSOC Chairman, Buta Singh, to concentrate on the Asian Games instead of wangling foreign jaunts.

The bane of Indian sports is that there is no centralised agency which coordinates the functions and organisation of sports at the national, State, district and city levels. Each one is for himself, over-ruling and defying other agencies. There are sports bodies, States sports councils and the like but there is total lack of rapport. In fact, more often than not, all these bodies — government and non-government — are functioning at cross purposes. It is time the Sports Ministry applied its mind to this problem in earnest and evolved a national policy to help promote sports throughout the country.

The first and foremost task of the Sports Ministry will be to fix 'priorities'. Take, for instance, Pakistan. They are aware of their limitations. They have fixed their priorities on only three games — hockey, cricket and squash — and they have a much bigger international reputation and image than India which has foolish ideas of taking cricket, golf, tennis and other games to rural areas.

If one studies the sports structure in this country, one will find that certain areas specialise in certain sports. The South, for example, produces tennis players, the East, footballers and swimmers, the West, cricketers, the North hockey players and the U P badminton players.

Keeping all these aspects in mind, it will be worthwhile if the Sports Ministry confers with national sports bodies, State associations and others to evolve a system of spreading sport and the concept of sport on scientific lines and systematically, step by step, utilising the budget and finances in a prudent and judicious manner.

Unfortunately, no one has taken effective steps to improve the health



of the youth in this country. There is also complete lack of concept regarding the importance of food. Not only are children ill-informed about the value of food, but even teachers and parents have no concept about the importance of diet in sports. While conceding that the masses are under-fed because of low incomes, in cities like Delhi, Bombay, Madras and other places, a sizeable sum of money is wasted on needless food like *chaat*, which has no nutritive value. Shocking as it may appear, I have watched trainees eating bread *pakor*as after strenuous training at the national stadium. Can India produce internationally renowned sportsmen with sub-standard diet like dal, *subzi* and bread *pakor*a? Even the NIS serves food which is sub-standard in quality. It is time that the authorities concerned put their heads together and educated sportsmen and their parents on the important role that food plays in developing muscles, tissues and general health.

It will be quite in order if food is introduced as a subject in schools and colleges. Children have to be educated. It is not what one should eat but what one should not eat. Athletes and swimmers require a different type of food from wrestlers and weight lifters. Specialists should work out details and spread the importance and value of diet which is full of protein and nutrition. Sportsmen are generally intelligent and would understand that a nutritive diet is more useful than just filling their bellies with *chaat*, *pakor*as and the like.

**T**he education pattern and system throughout the country is faulty, cumbersome and incapable of developing the all-round personality of children. Most of the schools are without even a patch of ground while those affluent schools which have more than one playing field do not use them nor do they allow others to use them. It is a dog in the manger policy. The fee collected from every student in the name of sports is seldom utilised in full on the promotion of sports and buying of equipment. More often than not, the fee is diverted to projects other than sports. The physical education

teacher does precious little for his own school children but he dabbles in politics of various sports associations because they provide him facilities to make money under the table, undertake *Bharat darshan* and also help him secure foreign jaunts. There are physical education teachers in Delhi doing nothing for their schools but they have all the time for the Delhi State Athletics Association, etc.

**T**here is yet another unholy alliance between physical education, teachers and the sports dealers. It is not difficult to prove that teachers either don't buy equipment or buy substandard material and bloated bills and vouchers are secured for the gain of both dealers and teachers. The time has come when all out efforts should be undertaken to prevent the mal-practices plaguing the sports establishments in schools and colleges which are really nurseries for the development of sports. The Sports Ministry must exercise its control over schools and colleges through State bodies to see that there is optimum use and utilisation of facilities available. If one school has a swimming pool, it should be made available to other schools on payment of some fee. After all, no child can swim for more than two hours. For the remaining time, the pool may be allotted to other children for the good of the nation. Let us realise that narrow minded attitudes will help no one prosper. The stiffer the competition, the better will be the achievements and this is possible only when equal opportunities are provided to children of different schools.


Sportsmen are no longer a neglected lot as they were some two or three decades ago. Now most sportsmen and sportswomen are being provided with lucrative jobs in the public and private sectors, banks and other departments. Parents should realise that it is better to be a good sportsman and average scholar rather than a third class student and end up with a job of a clerk. If a survey is undertaken, it will be found that most of the sportsmen are well placed in life at present. They may be a negligible

percentage who are struggling. But that is in all walks of life. Take, for example, an average journalist. How much he works and what does he get in return?

**T**he idea behind starting the age group competitions is laudable indeed. But, unfortunately, the rules are being violated in most cases. Deserving under-age children are being pushed into the background by over-age entries. All this violation is being done with the connivance of teachers, officials and parents. There are instances when the manager of a Delhi university team (now a government official in the Delhi Administration) made a rubber stamp of the concerned university official to submit eligibility certificates to certain sportsmen to prevent them from being disqualified. The evil has spread all over the country with each one blaming the other. No one is willing to set his own home in order. The evil can be considerably minimised if the teachers, principals, officials and parents realise that obeying rules is more important than violating them for quick gain and false achievement, for the school and the individual.

Most of the sports bodies from district to national level are defunct because of their own lethargy, malfunctioning and corrupt practices. Money is collected through donations, flag day collections and advertisements in souvenirs but it is invariably spent on purposes other than sports and sports promotion.

There are yet many firms, individuals and sports promoters, who will willingly contribute to the cause of sport provided they are assured that the money donated by them will be utilised on the cause for which it is collected. The time has come when government should warn the associations and federations to be self sufficient in all respects otherwise they will be replaced by another bunch of officials in the interest of sports in the country. Most of the associations and federations are dominated by thoroughly useless persons lacking in knowledge, administrative ability and character. A clean and strong broom will have to be used to get rid of these impediments in the path of the future.



# The professional

R. N. MIRDHA

THERE are references galore in our mythology and history to sports of various types. Whether the mention in our epics of Arjuna as an archer or Bheema as a wrestler or the portrayal of polo in a Mughal miniature, we seek to search the fount of our sports consciousness in those remote and somewhat ethereal sources.

The concept of sports as recreation is of recent origin. In primitive society and in pioneer communities, sports were not so much a diversion as a means of obtaining food supply and part of training for the struggle for existence. Later, the hunt and the chase as well as combats between men served as preparation for war. The chariot races of ancient Rome grew out of the annual spring preparations of the Roman cavalry for the season of battles.

The modern distinction between amateur and professional has a long history. What was a diversion for

the upper classes often became a serious business for the masses, many of whose members, qualified by superior strength and physical prowess, took up the pursuit of sports as a means of livelihood. To prevent their eclipsing the records of their social betters, rules were framed forbidding them to compete with the amateur or aristocrat to whom sport was merely a pleasurable pastime.

The Olympic movement is resorting to a lot of sophistry to preserve this amateur status of the participants in the various games but it is a hopeless exercise in the face of gross commercialism which has become a feature of modern sports as of most of the other good things in life. Sports is not only big business but a tool in the ideological warfare raging in the world. International sports meets are no longer friendly contests between teams conducted in consonance with norms of sports.

manship but do-or-die battles which bring out the worst chauvinistic instincts in the participants. One can take solace in the thought that this release of pent up emotions is in any case better than a proper shooting war. The aggressive instinct of man has been given a fig leaf

In all this clash and clang, in this confusion, where does India stand? Whatever might have been the situation in the past, one has to admit that sports are not really a part of our ethos to-day. That cricket attracts more crowds in our country than anywhere else in the world is not because of our sports-mindedness but due to a quirk of events that has made it part of our notions of social snobbery. It is a longish picnic in the sun where people can display their modish clothes and ill-deserved affluence. Big blocks of tickets are bought at fantastic prices and distributed to friends and benefactors.

One aspect of the feudal attitude is an aversion to physical exertion. Those who do most of the physical exertion are at the lowest rung of society. A simple norm is not to do something that can be got done from others. Sports means physical exertion and competitive sports means unremitting physical exertion. Our tennis star, R. Krishnan, has beaten at one time or other most of the great names of the game, but never made it to the top. Early in his career, he was sent to Australia to get coaching under Harry Hopman but came back because he could not stand the physical rigours of the training schedule.

It is not that our players lack the killer instinct, the simple fact is that they are not tough enough to outlast the opponent in sheer physical stamina. What good is technique, the dexterous dribbling, if you cannot out-run, out-pace the other fellow. In the latter part of the matches we find our players visibly wilting before our very eyes while the other side is fresh and fit. This is the problem we are facing for coaching our teams for the Asiad. When they come to the next coaching camp, their physical fitness is not as good as it was when they left

the previous camp. They did no homework.

The administrators of the game and the persons who look after the technical side are very important in any scheme of things for the promotion of sports. The Trial Games for the Asiad held recently brought to light many shortcomings, not only in the provision of proper physical facilities in the stadia but also in the actual conduct of the games. It was found that some of the officials were not familiar with the latest rules in many events. Some of them could not even fill the score-sheets properly for the simple reason that they were not used to working these score-sheets.

Modern sport has become a complicated and very technical affair. There is need for highly trained professionals who should constantly upgrade their knowledge and skill by theoretical study and actual experience of judging in international meets. Sports journalists who write and comment on the various events should also continually keep their knowledge up-to-date.

A large number of senior civilian and police officers are occupying important positions in various sports associations. In order to preserve their positions in an elective system, they see that the lower formations of the associations are also controlled by their men, who generally are their subordinate officers.

There are arguments for and against this type of organisation which need not be gone into now. But there is one aspect of this system which has to be taken note of. Most of the players in our national teams belong to one government organisation or the other and most of them belong to the subordinate cadres and therefore suffer from what we may call the 'I.G.P. — Constable Syndrome'. There are serious psychological barriers between the I.G.P. and the constable. The moment the constable, who may be the top player in the team, meets his senior officer who is also an official in the association, he instinctively clicks his heels as if he is on the parade ground. How can you build a good team in such an atmosphere?

The educational standards and social standing of most of our medal winners is not such that they can meet and talk to the chiefs of their associations freely or frankly. Such a situation calls for very delicate and tactful handling on the part of officials who unfortunately are not attuned to this. Psychological factors play a very important and in some cases crucial role in the performance of players who have to operate in an atmosphere of intense international competition. The extra ounce of thrust to the performance of Syed Modi which brought him the gold medal in the recent Commonwealth Games in Brisbane was probably provided by the inspiring presence of his fiancée, Ameeta Kulkarni.

Whenever Bjorn Borg, with his workmanlike style and showing no emotion, wins a grand rally or is completely outmanoeuvred, he sneaks a look at the gallery where coach Bergelien sits watching every move. They all need a father figure to console or encourage them as the moment requires, or someone with whom they feel on the same wavelength. Such respect or intimacy hardly exists between our players and coaches or between our players and sports officials. Commissars are too stiff to stoop and conquer.

The bane of Indian sports is that professionals are not to the fore. It somehow happens that they never get the top positions nor the respect which is due them. It all starts with our administrative culture which gives the predominant position to the generalist rather than the specialist. This 'amateurish' approach was probably an inevitable phase in the promotion of sports in our country. May be, it could not have been done otherwise. Undoubtedly, the sports administrators did a pioneering job, at times with great dedication and sincerity, for which they should get due credit.

The future of sports in our country would have to be built on a different footing. Sport would have to be recognised as a distinct discipline for whose development different scientific specializations have to contribute. The surface on which players perform is not grass or cinder but

synthetic material with its highly complex chemistry and whose maintenance cannot be kept up by the old *mafi*. To run on this surface strains the tendons and the muscles in a particular way which has to be studied.

To study the strain of strenuous practice on the human system, sophisticated instruments have been devised. Sports injuries are different to common injuries and, therefore, have to be treated by a specialist in sports medicine. To size up an athlete, one has not only to see how developed are his muscles or how efficient his respiratory system. The mental make-up and the emotional condition of the athlete are no less important and therefore the sports psychologist has to be brought in to see that the competitor has the proper attitude and motivation which would enable him to win.

Whether he is first or second would be decided by electronic devices which are capable of recording the time to the minutest part of a second. The results of the game would be displayed on a score-board through a system which involves proper operation of computers and other sophisticated machines. Whatever is happening on the field would be viewed by millions round the country and the world through a satellite stationed thousands of kilometers away. We need trained cameramen and technicians to do this for us.

After the Asiad is over, it cannot be business as usual. The specialists of various sports have to be given due importance. The technical conduct of the games has become a highly specialised matter. Those who have grown up and prospered with the finishing tape have to give place to others with more up-to-date knowledge. The constables would still be there but the I G P should give place to others, so should the politician and businessman unless he has something substantial to contribute by way of expertise and commitment.

The Asiad marks a watershed in the development of sports in our country. The time has come when the professional has to be brought in.

## What needs to be done

ASHWINI KUMAR

WHEN one observes the stupendous building activity which has created some of the most beautiful sports installations in the world for the IX Asiad in Delhi, one is apt to be carried away by the architects' euphoria into feeling that perhaps the Golden Age of Indian sports has now arrived, and India will soon be a world power in sports. Unfortunately, flyovers and stadia in one city, with a population of six million but in a country of 700 million, and where

sports planners knowledge is limited and restricted to observations and inspections of a number of international sports meets abroad in the last couple of years, and who at home have not even organised a district sports meet, one realises the hiatus which exists between what has been promised and what has to be done.

If these worthies who, because of their particular clout have been elevated to positions which ensured for them material advantages at home and distractions abroad, had experience in sports organisations, they would have known that fifty metres is 5000 centimetres, and could have avoided the scraping of the end walls of the swimming pool, which after construction was found to be 4998 centimetres!

They would also have avoided the construction of the otherwise beautiful indoor stadium, the largest in the world, on the bed of the Jamuna, which the German architect, who made the colossal sports installations in Munich in 1972, rejected as a site for reasons that a heavy facility of the size we needed would sink within 10 years, imperilling the entire built-up super structure. How sad the whole episode sounds, and one only prays that the experts for once are wrong and the 'pseudo' gentlemen who control the fate of the IX Asiad are right

**P**erhaps it would be in the fitness of things to bring into focus the elementary factors so essential in being considered a nation which wants to stamp on the international scene its identity as a sports power. To begin with, I wish to declare emphatically that the whole approach to this problem in our underdeveloped country, which has taken on the colossal task of organising a regional sports competition for more than half of the population of the world, has been a bit lop-sided. To build sports facilities in only one city and expect results all over the nation sounds a little obtuse

Even in Delhi where this challenging task of construction of stadia and flyovers has been successfully tackled, the results will be visible

only after several years. Priority should have been given to mass sports all over the country, so far as distribution of the crores which have been expended to build stadia for the forthcoming sports extravaganza are concerned. I do not wish to state that competitive sport should be neglected—the whole project of completion could have been successfully tackled by an outlay of less than 30 crores

**O**ur country has shown a growing participation in international games but we should not get involved in a big way in the medals race, which is a vicious circle indeed. We will be lucky if we distinguish ourselves so far as the medal tally in the forthcoming Asiad is concerned. If results are to be obtained, they will come in due time when we are ready for them after a mass participation base has been forged. Giving priority to competitive sport is unthinkable in a country which has only 2% sports fields in high schools, hardly any swimming pools of international dimensions, and less than half a dozen fully equipped gymnasias!

Perhaps the most crippling and deleterious single factor which has militated against the growth of a healthy sports picture in India is the poor standard of living of its 700 million citizens. As is well known, the rise in the standard of living has a much greater impact on health in a poor country than in the affluent nations, where the level is already so high that a change in them can have no effect on health and sports performance. The calorific value of our food is so low that it generally impairs the health, vigour and attitude towards games

If inequalities stay, they would certainly be detrimental to the growth of sports, for India is still stricken with acute poverty, inequality between the rural poor and the urban rich and has a social climate plagued by caste, creed, discrimination and nepotism. The vicious circle of cumulative interrelation and causation is thus perpetrated, thereby dwarfing the development of sports. The lack of present organisational arrangements for the spread of sports is impeding the growth of a healthy population.

In this context, where huge sums have already been expended, countless man-hours invested in the construction of sports structures, citizens naturally want to know what needs to be done, so as to ensure that a reasonable return accrues from this stupendous investment.

The government initially took a very sagacious step in announcing the formation of a Sports Ministry. However, the Ministry recently declared that a National Sports Plan drawn up sometime ago would soon be implemented. I have not seen the final draft of this plan, but the one I saw about a year ago did not merit a single reading. To call it a 'plan' would not be wise. It is an odd mixture of ill-assorted, misleading facts, and makes no mention of the existing sports facilities in India, or of the formation of a strong sports base, and admits of total ignorance about the number of schools in India! It seems to be obsessed with competitive sport for producing world champions.

**P**erhaps you may be interested to know how other countries which are leaders in sport have scaled the ladder of better health and success in games. Recently, one of our leading sports organisers, Ranjit Bhatia, commented that sport was not really part of the Indian ethos, and that an obsession with sporting achievement was being confused with sports consciousness. Now, how does one generate this interest and consciousness in an atmosphere which is completely alien to sport and is subject to various pulls, both political and cultural?

Politically our country has witnessed the complete erasure of a colonial power system. Today, various pressure groups endeavour, with varying success, for a share in State planned development in a nation which has no ideological base. In this scenario, sports programming and development figures insignificantly. A Central Sports Ministry will remain ineffectual so long as this subject remains a part of the 'transferred' list meant only for the federating States, and where the concept of sports is confused with a lot of *khel-tamasha*. Our

major national problem is how to lift the nation out of stagnation and poverty. This is important because the standard of living is concomitant with the development of sports and depends entirely on the economic well being of the local population.

There is a wide-spread belief in our country that the powers that be are really not interested in games, but would like to put up an occasional sports extravaganza to keep the public 'doped', and are quite oblivious to any real aspirations for improving sports standards. All that the powers that be want is for any success in a particular discipline of sport to be considered virtually synonymous with that of government policy in general.

In a country which is surviving with much of its population below the poverty line, sports may be a prestigious issue but is not likely to become a mass activity as it is elsewhere. To face the challenge from the best in Asia, a 'gladiatorial' approach has been adopted; a handful of talented sportsmen have been selected and provided with comprehensive facilities to enable them to perform with excellence. The infrastructure, however, remains stunted and there is no visible growing interest in sports?

**A**s I posed the question earlier, how have other countries, which were not so well endowed initially to build a sports infrastructure, tackled this problem?

First and foremost is to make a comprehensive study of the facilities already existing. This is how some countries like Germany, USSR, China, England, Italy and Spain began. Then a plan of development was drawn up showing the minimum standard necessary for such development. By standard I mean the size most appropriate for the sports site under consideration. This is a conventional method and generally expressed in per capita terms.

For example, in West Germany under their Sports Golden Plan, it has been laid down that open spaces for children and adults to play in

should be in the ratio 1.5 sq metres per inhabitant. Covered facilities should be provided at .5 sq. metres per inhabitant. Gymnasiums and swimming pools are a 'must' for every community at .2 sq metres per inhabitant. Thus it becomes logical to adopt the concept of a 'minimum standard' for sports planning per inhabitant with which, in accordance with climate, habits, and demographic social structure, a given community could be provided its recreational requirements. Should not our National Sports Plan cater for all this? Who has formed this plan?

Dame rumour has it that a glorified section officer, and a much pampered athletic coach, working in the relevant Ministry drew up this monstrosity which will not be forced down our throats. It is still not too late to 'begin from the beginning', forge an ideal plan, initiate a pilot plan, trim it according to your financial capacity with only one target in view — the building of a mass base for sports, rather than for competitive sport.

**T**o give another example of how the Asiad has missed a glorious opportunity is that of running the Sports Torch. Every country in the world which has hosted an international competition of the magnitude that we are attempting has organised a torch relay to enthuse its inhabitants with the value of the games, and to highlight the integration of an entire country. Imagine the tremendous impact it would have had if it had been run from Kanya Kumari to Delhi, from Bombay to Delhi, from Kohima to Delhi via Calcutta and from Srinagar to Delhi via Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Every athlete in these States would have carried the Torch for about 200 metres and cherished the memory for years to come. Millions would have thronged to see its passage through their respective areas. And now the torch is being carried for a total distance of about 2 to 3 kilometres from the National Stadium to the Nehru Stadium! The original plan was shot down by a bureaucrat on grounds of security. A huge joke has been perpetrated on the nation.

The grip of the 'all knowing' bureaucrats is so paralysing that they have alienated all the national sports federations, who are in fact the only ones well-versed to run the games. The spectre of the Section Officer and the coach looms large here again. The entire programme of the games has been ill-conceived and not in accordance with the format laid down in the guiding Charter. Why?

**T**he games are essentially for young athletes, and it should be clearly understood that organisers should do nothing to estrange the young sportsmen who are, after all, going to harvest the laurels, so necessary these days for boosting national prestige. Sport in modern society has been developing at a frightening speed over the last 10 years, and it is our bounden duty to provide the players with the assistance they need in order to attain and maintain the high standards we call for. It is an established fact that whether eligibility rules permit or not, sportsmen put more than 30 hours a week of training to attain the top most rung of fitness. They are all working people — are we giving them the necessary diet for sustaining such a rigorous programme? If you ask the individual athlete, then it is a big No. For a long time a measly Rs 26 a day for a 5000 calorie diet has been doled out to them. No matter how resourceful a chief may be, this small amount can cater for no more than 2800 calories. So much for the subsidised training which has been given to the top stars.

Again, we must face the reality that many international athletes are being financially assisted to allow them to take time off from their normal work in order to train or, indeed, give up work altogether, for what can amount to a long period, before the actual competition begins. In the case of top international athletes still studying at college or university, they too are often at a disadvantage compared to their fellow students because of the regime of intensive training and absence from studies. In all our sports, however, progress and development have proved to be relentless.

In this context, what permissive practices have the organisers embodied in their training programmes? My information is that here again the 'sponsorship' has been a complete zero. Some of our top athletes have not only been starved, emaciated and worn out before the big day, but have been reduced to impecunious straits. Their demoralisation has been so thorough and complete that they have no heart to face a stiff challenge. The 'killer' instinct instead of being re-kindled has been snuffed out. If all the money that has been expended on the opening and closing ceremony extravaganza, (ceremonies which abroad have incurred the wrath of sportsmen) had been invested in athletes, I am positive we would have finished amongst the first two nations in Asia.

Perhaps you may want to know why the opening and closing ceremonies have been curtailed? The athletes get so bored by the long wait during the march past, that they have officially expressed their anger in international forums. And we on the other hand will spend lakhs on something which at least will not only tire out the athletes, but I am sure will make most of the top performers 'shy' away from filing past the spectators.

Now, reverting back to Ranjit Bhatia's cry in the wilderness about how alien sports is to our ethos, it cannot be denied that present-day parents are definitely anti-sports, which is perhaps one of the basic reasons for this phenomenon. Why should sports be shunned in our country? Obviously, it's the lack of education in this particular human activity. Is any sportsman told that he is not merely a mass of muscles and a pack of nerves? He is certainly all of that, but dominated by, mastered by, and put into the service of a moral ideal which is the very basis of all sport.

In Greek times from where the modern games have stemmed, to win games was not simply an individual affair, nor was it a banal physical performance. It was homage to the gods and a means by which to realise and excel oneself. To play was not an end in itself but a means to

the achievement of an ideal. Even Baron De Coubertin, who founded the modern games, wrote that athleticism should be preserved in order that it might continue to play an effective role in the education of modern peoples. It is, therefore, a question of developing values — and one must strive for them through education in schools and colleges.

To sum up, let us not create 'white elephant' sports installations. Let us have an integrated sports plan, let us not forget that it is the athlete with a five thousand calorie diet who needs promotion and not bureaucrats and contractors, and that what is essential is a mass-based sports plan, rather than a competitive-cum gladiatorial approach.

I can do no better than conclude by quoting from a recent article of mine: 'Today sports plays an important role in our lives. Not so long ago, it was the hobby of the idle rich. Today millions of people under modern circumstances participate in it; and sports has got woven into the fabric of modern life, providing a counter-weight to the excessive comforts and indulgences of today. National health programmes can promote sports as an aid to both physical fitness and mental well-being. It is a proven fact that leisure time physical activity promotes better health. Also, in the poorer countries it helps to fight the frustration of youth, who otherwise become easy victims to boredom because of the lack of opportunities in life. If we today deny the social importance of sports we do it at our own peril.' It is not essential to base all this on exotic gymnasia and stadia.

Saint Paul, someone one would least likely suspect of an outrageous fetish with regard to the games, in his first Epistle to the Corinthians wrote: 'Do you know in a race all the runners compete, but only one receives the prize?' So, run that you may obtain it. Every athlete exercises self-control in all things. They do it to receive a perishable wealth, but one that is imperishable. Well I do not run aimlessly. I do not box as one beating the air, but I pummel my body and subdue it, lest after preaching to others I myself should be disqualified.'

# Who's being taken for a ride

PANKAJ BUTALIA

A LOT of people believe that now that the Asiad is here, the 'Golden Era' of Indian sport cannot be far behind. It is as if a new age has been ushered in and as if overnight one will witness Indian players shattering world records by the dozen.

But those who think this miss the point completely. What they do not realise is that the state (and health) of Indian sport has got very little to do with the organising of major sports events in the country. The latter aspect is a relatively simple job requiring a major burst of energy (and money) once in a while with a very tangible end in view, an end both glamorous and profitable. On the other hand, the first aspect is an ongoing, thankless job with no overt goal and this requires hard work, tremendous stamina and a sense of conviction.

It is a sad tribute to the organisation of sports in this country that it has only managed to touch the second aspect but has succeeded in casting it in the image of the first—making it seem that its secondary activity is actually geared towards the fulfilment of the primary one.

Let us go back to the Asiad for a moment. We are continually told that the creation of an infrastructure for the Asiad will be a boon to Indian sport. We are asked to

believe that facilities built in one city will benefit the entire population (and this in Delhi which is by no means the nerve centre of sports in India). We are asked to believe that construction of massive stadia equipped with the latest gadgetry constitute facilities for the sporting masses (actually they do in a sense — the 'masses' can relate to these facilities — but only as spectators. However, nobody mentions this). We are asked to believe that if a dynamic leadership has the capacity to build massive stadia in record time, surely it must have in it the capacity to take Indian sport forward—also in record time.

And having been told all this, we are told we must now wait for the next event once this is over only to be told the same thing all over again. Anon.

In the meantime, that miserable creature, Indian sport, takes a back seat. Nobody really expects much of it. Nevertheless, people cannot understand why it does not die. Because, in spite of the rhetoric, everyone knows that the people who talk about the emergence of Indian sport are the one's who have been responsible for its destruction.

To illustrate, let us take a few words from Aslam Sher Khan's





To  
**ALL BOOK AGENTS**

Seminar Annual  
**INDIA 1982**  
will be out on January 1, 1983  
Price Rs 10.00

Please send your orders to  
us immediately at the  
following address

Circulation Manager

Seminar

Malhotra Building

Janpath

P. B. No. 338

New Delhi-110 001

**ATTENTION STEEL MILLS  
&  
FOUNDRIES  
EXPORTERS OF WORLD FAMOUS SANDUR  
MANGANESE ORE  
OFFER  
EX-STOCK  
VERY LOW PHOS. PIG IRON  
AND  
LOW ALUMINIUM FERROSILICON  
PRODUCED IN THEIR PLANT AT  
VYASANKERE**

*Please Contact*

**THE SANDUR  
MANGANESE & IRON  
ORES LIMITED**

**"LOHADRI BHAVAN"**

Yeshwant Nagar-583124

Via Sandur, Bellary Dt

 Karnataka INDIA

*Cable . SMIORE, SANDUR (INDIA) °*

*Telephone . SANDUR 33, 61, 91*

*Telex BANGALORE 427*

*Bangalore 32175 28262 : 1111*

## **MAHATMA GANDHI : A Biography**

B R. NANDA

Few men in their lifetime aroused stronger emotions or touched deeper chords of humanity than Gandhi did 'Generations to come, it may be,' wrote Einstein of Gandhi in July 1944, 'will scarcely believe that such a one as this ever in flesh and blood walked upon this earth' While millions venerated Gandhi as the Mahatma, the great soul, his political opponents saw in him only an astute politician Not until 1946-7 (when the transfer of power enabled them in their minds to disengage Mr Gandhi the man from Mr Gandhi the arch-rebel) were the British able to see him in a gentler light This biography, widely acclaimed on first publication by Allen and Unwin in 1958, has stood the test of time and come to be regarded by many as the standard and fullest 'life' of Gandhi. Carefully researched, objective but compelling, capturing all the nuances of momentous events, it is not only the biography of a remarkable man but also a record and analysis of a critical period in South-Asian history. (1981) 542 PP. Rs 80

### **SOME PRESS OPINIONS**

'an admirable account of the life of Gandhi, from which there emerges a full picture of this strange and attractive man'  
*Lord Attlee, The Spectator*

'well arranged and informed by a sense of proportion and relative value It rescues Gandhi both from the sentimentalists and from the debunkers'  
*The Times*

'nobody who takes the subject seriously can afford to be without his (Mr Nanda's) book'  
*B B C Listener*

'a vivid picture of his personality and a comprehensive account of his activities The style is simple and elegant'  
*The Hindu*

'an excellent account of Gandhi's life and of the movement for Indian Independence'  
*Times Literary Supplement*

'The reading of this book is an exalted kind of experience'  
*Deccan Herald*

'complete and readable Mr B.R. Nanda makes the Father of Indian Independence a personality from the opening paragraphs'  
*New York Times*

'He wields a smooth pen It is a pleasure to return to the atmosphere created by Mr Nanda'  
*Saturday Review*

'His well-designed and fascinating chronicle is also an interpretation, and therein lies its great value'  
*Birmingham Post*



**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj,  
New Delhi 110002

Bombay      Calcutta      Madars

life story, *To Hell With Hockey*. Aslam has been one of India's leading international hockey players. One might not agree with his politics (God knows which sports politicians drove him into the arms of full time politicians) but there is no doubting his sentiment and anger at those bosses of Indian hockey who treated him so shabbily. In an obvious reference to Ashwini Kumar, the then chief of the Indian Hockey Federation who was also a senior official in the police, Aslam says: 'Generals in politics are bad. Policemen in sports even worse. In India, hockey or any other sport is just a lucrative pastime for officials. It is a gravy train that catapults you to popularity and power faster than any other profession.' In another place he is disillusioned almost to the point of giving up the sport very early in his life because 'I argued with him that hockey was in the hands of clubs and every club was as bad as the other.'

Within these two statements lies the truth of the organisation of sports activity in India and its malaise. On the one hand, it is the basic unit — 'the club' which is the source of power to the pyramid of hierarchy in sports and, on the other, it is the desperate search for fame and glory by those in power that makes them seek the shortest way into the limelight, irrespective of whether it is the best or not.

**S**porting activity in India starts in schools and neighbourhood parks. Most schools have scarce funds for sports, which is seen as an extension of whatever little physical training the school might impart to its students. Neighbourhood sport is at best makeshift. While it can throw up the potential contained in a player, there is no way that it can systematically help develop this potential beyond a point. Those schools and neighbourhood areas which provide the initial supply of players and activity do not have much place in the sports hierarchy. The basic power unit of sports is 'the club'. This club is really a mysterious creature. Clubs are supposed to cover all areas where a particular sport takes

place and this should include all such schools and neighbourhood clubs.

But it does not. For the purpose of building an organisational hierarchy, only those clubs and institutions which get together at one point in time and form an organisation get to be members of that organisation. Further, many such organisations in different towns get together to form a State body. A collection of State bodies then forms a National Federation. This national body controls the game throughout the country. It frames the rules and regulations of the game as it is to be played in the country. Once this becomes the recognized National Body no new body of a similar nature is allowed.

**N**ow, the interesting thing is that there may be as many as a thousand clubs in an area where a particular sport is played and as few as twenty clubs which are members of any State level organisation that presents itself as the guardian of the game. The rest of the clubs will have no say in the running of the game for one reason or other, the main one being that these entrenched clubs do not maintain open house. They have the power to 'recognize' clubs as members. By being selective they ensure that very few clubs and institutions are admitted into their fold. These member clubs get to wield great power, as the only 'recognized' sports activity is that which takes place under their jurisdiction. Thus, a large amount of sports activity is kept outside the purview of 'official sport'. This is the source of Aslam Sher Khan's complaint that 'hockey was in the hands of clubs'.

The only sanction that these entrenched clubs seem to have is of being there first. A lot of them later become defunct but carry on being members of the sports organisation with more say than clubs which might be very active sports centres but which are not members of this privileged lot. In a large number of cases, most of these clubs have been in the hands of one or

two individuals for decades. Selective entry into clubs and later of clubs into the parent organisation, ensures that the effective control at each level does not go out of the hands of those who have once made it. One has only to look at the various sports associations in India or at the various Indian Olympic Association constituents to realize that these bodies have had the same individuals in places of power for decades.

**T**he primary objective of these bodies becomes that of maintaining themselves — of keeping their officials in power. Manipulation of the worst kind becomes the order of the day. The interests of sports and sportsmen are not important. Personal power is. This is the source of complaints of people like Aslam Sher Khan. The player, the basic playing unit in sports, has no say in the running of it.

Such bodies perpetuate themselves at different levels. If petty sports officials have been in control of recognized sports bodies at club and State level for long periods, so have major sports officials at the national level. For example, the Indian Olympic Association seems to have become the personal property of Raja Bhalindra Singh. He has been in control of it for so long that one has lost track. It is not as if the IOA is a very active body which promotes sports all over the country or as if Bhalindra Singh is so indispensable that Indian sports will disintegrate with his departure. The reality is that the IOA is the only body in India affiliated to the international olympic body (the IOC) so that no participation in the Olympics or any other event 'recognized' by the IOC can take place without the 'good offices' of the IOA. Hence the source of the IOA's power.

Now, the IOA does almost nothing to help develop sport in India, yet it is more or less the only authority through which certain sports events can be approached. It therefore enjoys power far beyond its due. Similar is the case in each individual sport. There the National Federations are the important bodies through which the 'official' link with

their international events is maintained. Again, almost all such federations are controlled by single individuals for long periods.

This is such a dominant pattern in almost all sports that one is forced to come to the conclusion that these people are in it not for what they can contribute to sports but for whatever financial or social benefit they can derive from it. A lot of these officials are people without any mark of distinction in life and they clutch on to whatever office they can manage in an effort to get into, and stay in, the limelight.

With their own survival being the primary concern, such officials can have little time to give to the development of sports.

However, those in power in the sports hierarchy, do have to provide some justification for their existence. Day to day sports activity is beyond their capacity, so they turn to the easiest way out — the organisation of sports events. Such events attract publicity and project these officials into the public limelight for short periods. This activity takes up much of the time which sports officials are willing to devote to the game. The result is that any planned expansion of the game, of providing more sporting facilities, of providing better training, etc., gets forgotten. One has only to look at the proceedings of any such body over a period to discover that most of its time was taken up in the routine organisation of sports events and in passing its own TA/DA bills.

34 Little wonder that there is no improvement in Indian sport. The State, for its part, is a passive observer. Its role is limited to that of financing a bit of activity here and there. It provides funds for some teams for international participation once in a while and provides some funds for sports activities in schools and colleges. But these funds are hopelessly inadequate. They are barely sufficient to maintain the poor facilities which exist in these institutions (which is why one is so surprised that the State should suddenly be able to find Rs 361 crores to finance the Asiad). The one

positive role the State has played has been the creation of the National Institute of Sports. While the concept of having an institute to produce coaches for all games is a very laudable one, in practice its effectiveness is reduced to almost zero by it not being able to attract the best players because of the poor salaries offered to these coaches, the lack of proper facilities with which the training can be imparted, the unimaginative running of the institute, etc.

Given such a climate in which Indian sport is expected to grow, one can only be amazed that it has at least managed to survive. How then can one expect a sports revolution to be around the corner when it has to operate within the same set-up?

Over the last few years a new development has started taking place. Realizing that sports is an easy way to get into the limelight, senior bureaucrats and big time politicians have started moving in. Using whatever leverage they have at different levels, they have managed to entrench themselves in positions of power in sports organisations. They now project themselves as the saviours of Indian sport. But, lacking any understanding of what sports is all about, they find the solution in aiming for more glamorous events, in bigger splashes in the media. The Asiad is a manifestation of this tendency which is now going to grow without making any difference to Indian sport. One has only to look at the composition of the Special Organizing Committee of the IX Asian Games to realize that except for a few minor functionaries, it is full of politicians.

Neither will the superficial creation of a sports ministry help. After all, it is not as if overnight the Planning Commission will be able to find the massive funds required to carry out any long term programme to revolutionize Indian sport. Nor is it the case that a superficial replacing of a few top sports officials is going to touch the corrupt structure that exists at the bottom. So, the sooner one stops having any illusions about it the better.

# The case for gulli-danda

GEORGE THOMAS

पढ़ोगे लिखोगे बनोगे नवाब

खेलोगे कूदोगे बनोगे खराब

'IF you read and write you will become a *nawab*, if you play around, you will end up a rotter'

Every Indian child, sometime or the other in his childhood, will have heard this damaging rhyme which more than anything reveals the attitude of most Indians towards sport. This adage is at the root of the malaise that afflicts Indian sports—the dearth of participation, the lack of professionalism, etc

This is the year of the Asiad, a high water mark in the history of Indian sport — at least, most of us presume that it is. But have we reached a level where we can claim to be a sporting nation, where sports is considered an integral and vital part of our lives? The answer, in spite of the new Sports Ministry, has definitely to be in the negative

Since all the good that transpires in this country has of necessity to trace its roots to '*My Experiments With Truth*,' let us examine if Gandhiji was interested in propa-

gating a sound physical culture. Take 'Tolstoy Farm' near Johannesburg in South Africa, where Gandhiji ran an experimental school. Besides the three R's, Gandhiji placed a premium on exercise and labour, not merely to induce a sense of dignity in physical labour, but also because he realised the invigorating effect of exercise on the body and mind. Take another example where Gandhiji saw two men playing billiards and exclaimed 'Ah! Table Tennis' When he was corrected, he replied 'Same thing, same thing, two men play!'

Even to those of us who swear by Gandhi, the meaning in these two illustrations has been lost

To the Indian, sports never mattered. We as a nation have always been too deeply involved in transmigration of the soul and nirvana to contemplate life here and now. An enterprising person may yet search and find instances of our sporting abilities way back to the Rig Vedic period. But, again, this 'golden' past is best tucked away into the darkest labyrinth of our thinking because the harsh reality

of the present may make us search for the fig leaf.

Let us examine the problem a little deeper. Have we considered sport to be a part of our culture? Yamini Krishnamurti, Nirad Chaudhuri or M F Hussain certainly do command a better press than our wrestler, Satpal. At the same time, none can deny that, especially in North India, the *akhada* is an important centre in the rural areas. Satpal would perhaps be more acceptable if he related to the urban elite in any way — existentialism, Pierre Cardin, ecology or some such fashionable little knick-knack we love to flaunt.

The intelligentsia has never been able to relate to sport largely because sport was never accepted as part of our culture. We saw a little earlier how our definition of culture was restricted to academics, literature, art, music and the 'off beat cinema'. To an extent the problem stems from the fact that we have not had our fair share of Courbetins who could champion the cause of sport in India.

Let us look at the problem from another angle. A very cliched way of denigrating Indian sports is by seeing the number of Olympic gold medals won in comparison to the size of our population. Very often it is Indians who treat us to these caustic nuances. But is this denigration justified? Bertrand Russell in his essay entitled 'In Praise of Idleness' made out a case for an equitable distribution of leisure among the various sections of society. Sports and recreation flow out of leisure and in India, the majority of the 683 million people have never really been able to afford leisure. In a country where statutory compulsory education cannot be enforced, where unemployment reaches crisis proportions, where three square meals depend on many back-breaking hours spent on the field or in the factory, sports is bound to take the back seat.

In other words, by compulsion, most Indians could not indulge in sports even if they so desired. Even if the industrial worker is covered by the 8 hour work day law it becomes

economically quite imperative to seek part-time employment to make ends meet. It is this economic necessity of the part-time job or the overtime that prevents leisure. The solution to the problem of 'creating' leisure lies to a certain extent in increased mechanisation especially in the agricultural sector so that the present imbalance which gives some people all the leisure and the majority none at all could be resolved equitably.

Another related factor, that has also been the bane of Indian sport, has been the failure to develop a 'mass' culture in sports. Do we have anything in India that could measure up to the Boston Marathon? Do as many people go for a jog in the morning or evening in New Delhi as in New York? Although this question becomes redundant in the light of the relative absence of leisure, it still has relevance since jogging is a very basic exercise and a good index of the health consciousness of the people.

Why is it that in India, sports has not been able to go 'janata'? Largely because we have not been able to transcend the cantonment culture or forget our colonial hangovers and take pride in being Indian. *Gulli-danda*, which requires the same precision and skill as cricket, would be taboo for children, just as perhaps a host of other games like *kabbadi*, *kho-kho*, *khushiti*, etc., in Adayar (Madras), Golf Links (New Delhi), and Pali Hill (Bombay). These children who are made to believe that *gulli danda* is the game of *chokias* or that the cry '*chal! kabbadi*' sounds obscene, find it much simpler to sample a cigarette in some quiet alley than risk being caught playing *gulli-danda* or *kabbadi*.

A more important question than the one now being raised — 'Should sport be given a place in our list of priorities' — is 'what kind of sport should be given priority?' The first point to note is that since sports provides a meeting point at an international level, certain sports like cricket, hockey, football, squash, billiards, etc., have to be encouraged. On the other hand,

those sports which tend to foster a sense of national identity, or which are distinctively 'Indian' should be given priority. If India has to develop a mass culture in sport, it would be essential to realise this dichotomy and act accordingly without injuring the developed (pampered) sports in any way. It must however be noted that in order for our 'Indian' sports to develop, it is very essential to provide a 'system' or an organisational framework — which at the moment is sadly lacking. The task is monumental and in the foreseeable future, there is no one to take up the challenge.

Let us now examine the attitude of political leaders to sports. Firstly, the present government does not have much of a record in aiding the development of sport. Appu is at best a (heavy) feather in the cap for the Congress (I). Charan Singh's Lok Dal stoned the cars participating in the Himalayan Car Rally largely because the political mileage that would accrue from it and not because they felt more strongly for 'Indian' sports. And anyway most of the children of the elite study in public schools, playing baseball and cricket in their games period. Before the Asian Games Special Organising Committee was constituted, the Asiad Virodh Samiti was up in arms raising questions on the ecological balance, the poverty of the nation, etc. Any attempt to foster sport in this country has always met with stiff opposition.

Who is to blame for this? To a certain extent, it is the sportsmen who are to blame. Why is it that the sportsmen are not able to develop their own leadership and keep political control to the minimum? Why must a N.P.K. Salve be foisted over Indian cricket or for that matter a V.C. Shukla preside over the All India Council of Sport? Would not a sportsman be able to understand the problems of his fellow players better than a political boss who has to weigh things in his political balance sheet before acting?

The youth adjuncts of the various political parties, whether it is the Youth Congress or the ABVP, have never contemplated organising any

activity that would generate a sustained interest in sports. If the large amounts that are spent on the university elections (including the amount spent in the cleaning-up process) were channelised into the sports arena, we would have been able to create the very basic amenities required for pulling Indian sports out of the woods long ago. The truth is that the entire political system is such that the party at the higher level has no real interest in training future leaders from among the student body. The student 'activists' are merely pawns who are used as weathercocks to gauge the direction of political winds.

Also, the various political parties, even in the pre-regional party phase, did not have 'Indianism' on their minds. We've touted 'socialism', 'capitalism', 'communism' and so many other 'isms' at so many levels without ever meaning a thing. It is now time to reassert ourselves as Indians, proud of an heritage that is thousands of years old. And within this resurgence, we must resurrect 'Indian' sports — *gulli-danda*, *ghudsavari*, archery, *malkham* and everything that an Indian can relate to in terms of a cultural unity built up over the millenia. Cricket, golf and the traffic island were what the British left behind. Does it then not make more sense to campaign for something broader like Indian culture, in its totality, rather than for something as stupid and divisive as Hindi?

Although there is no harm in playing cricket, soccer or squash, the important thing is that we must not be deluged by the cultural invasion from the West. Have we tried exporting *kabaddi* to the USA? And, can one conceive of the British taking to *gulli-danda* in the same way as we have absorbed their cricket? India's 'greatest cultural juggernaut', the festival of India in London, incidentally does not put our wrestlers on display. The emphasis then should be to strike a balance between games that are alien in origin to India and sports that have some kind of a tradition in India.

This becomes all the more relevant in the light of the fact that our

record in most of these 'videshi' games is dismal. Take cricket, the blue-eyed darling of the urban Indians and the press that caters to them. Where do we rank? Gavaskar is good, Vishwanath is swashbuckling, Kirmani is 'world class' but the rubbers that come our way are few and far between. Football, well the less said about it the better. Tennis, after Vijay Amritraj who? Squash, the Pakistanis are more than a match for our Manchanda and Nayak. Boxing, Kaur Singh is our National Champion, so was Teofilas Stevenson in Cuba and it would be safest never to contemplate a comparison of capabilities.

If we are to stimulate a mass culture, which is central to the development of sports in India, we have to apply ourselves to certain areas which at the moment lie under the morass of benign neglect.

- (i) Generating interest in traditional Indian sports and giving them a good press abroad. This of course involves a cultural efflorescence of the sort that India saw during the Independence struggle.
- (ii) Elevating sports from the level of 'useless' activity and, thus, helping to redeem it of those old adages that condemn it as a waste of time.
- (iii) Recognising sports as a part of our physical culture and encouraging the growth of a sports intelligentsia to propagate and nourish it.
- (iv) Allowing the various sports to develop their own leadership through their own internal dynamics and reducing political interference.
- (v) Exploiting the advantage that we have in certain sports like polo, swimming (we see so many children of rural India swimming in ponds and rivers developing stamina but never acquiring skills), archery (where there is much promise among the tribal population), wrestling, etc.

Finally, since there is nothing so Asian about the Asian Games, any-one for *gulli danda*?

# Further reading

## BOOKS

**All India Council of Sports** National sports policy  
New Delhi, Ministry of Education and Culture,  
1980

**Arlott, John** The Oxford companion to sports and  
games London, Oxford University Press, 1976

**Armbruster, David A and Musker, Frank F** Basic  
skills in sports for men and women Louis, MO  
Mosby, 1975

**Atkinson, George and Bengtsson, Hans** Orienteer-  
ing for sports and pleasure Greene, Stephen  
Press, 1977

**Bale, John R.** Geographical perspectives on sport.  
London, Lepus, 1981.

**Ball, Donald W. and Loy, John W.** Sport and the  
social order contributions to the sociology of  
sport Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 1974.

**Bennett, Bruce L.** Comparative physical education  
and sport Philadelphia, PA, Lea and Febiger,  
1975

**Butt, Dorcas S.** Psychology of sport Cincinnati,  
OH, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1976



- Coakley, Jay J.** Sport in society issues and controversies Louis, M O. Mosby, 1978
- Espy, Richard.** Politics of the Olympic games. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979
- Goel, R G** Vikas encyclopaedia of sports and games. New Delhi, Vikas, 1980
- Hawkey, Roy** Sport science London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1981
- Ibrahim, Hilmi M** Sport and society an introduction to sport sociology Los Alamites, CA, Hwong Publishing, 1976
- India, Ministry of Education and Culture** All India Council of Sports, State Sports Councils and grants to State Sports Councils New Delhi, 1980.
- India, Ministry of Education and Culture** National Sports Federation of India Coimbatore, 1980
- Kauss, David R** Peak performance mental game plans for maximizing your athletic potential Englewood Cliffs, N J, Prentice-Hall, 1980
- Llewellyn, Jack A.** Psychology and practical application in sport Atlanta, GA, Burgess, 1979
- Louis, Victor Eugene** Sport in the Soviet Union London, Oxford, 1980
- Machol, R E. and Ladany, S P** (eds) Management science in sports New York, Elsevier-North Holland, 1977
- Nixon, Howard L** 111 Sport and social organisation Indianapolis, IN., Bobbs, 1976
- Noll, Roger G** (ed) Government and the sports business Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1974
- Oglesby, Carole A** Women and sport from myth to reality Philadelphia, Lea and Febiger, 1978
- Riordan, James** (ed) Sport under communism the U.S S R, Czechoslovakia, the G D R, China, Cuba London, C Hurst and Company, 1978
- Scully, Gerald W.** The professional sports economy Cambridge, M A, Schenkman, 1977
- Sivia, G S** Sports management in universities proceedings of sports management course, New Delhi (May 21-26, 1980) New Delhi, Association of Indian Universities, 1980
- Snyder, Eldon E and Spreitzer, Elmer.** Social aspects of sport Englewood Cliffs, N J, Prentice Hall, 1978
- Taylor, Albert W** (ed) The scientific aspects of sports training Springfield, IL, C C Thomas, 1975
- Walker, Stuart H** Winning the psychology of competition New York, Norton, 1980
- Zeigler, Earle F** Personalizing physical education and sport philosophy Champaign, IL, Stipes, 1975
- . Our starving sportsmen 'Sportsweek': (612) 6 July, 1980 5
- . Umpires spoil India's image 'Sportsweek': (593) 24 February, 1980 5
- Azavedo, Marie.** Sports in Goa need serious attention. 'Goa Today' 11(1) August 1976 36
- Bannerjee, Sanjai** How well do we treat our sportsmen. 'Caravan' 41(682) 2 October, 1980 57-58
- Barua, B N** National sports policy better late than never. 'Assam Tribune' 10 October, 1979.
- Bedi, Kiran.** Woes of sportswomen. 'Sportsworld' 18 April, 1979: 8.
- Bhagat, Ajay.** Medical help for sportsmen 'Statesman': 25 May, 1980
- Bhatra, Ranjit** Elitist patronage a root cause of failures 'Democratic World'. 6 May, 1979 16.
- . Soft state of sports 'Democratic World' 27 August, 1978 18
- . Sports in the Indian ethos 'India International. Centre Quarterly' 9(2) June 1982 89-94
- . What's wrong with Indian sports. 'Democratic World' 19 March, 1978 18
- Bose, A** School Games Federation of India origin, development and silver jubilee 'Assam Tribune' 10 October, 1979
- Butalia, Pankaj** The politics of sports 'India International Centre Quarterly' 9(2) June 1982 131-5.
- Catching up in sport** (editorial). 'Hindu' 10 April, 1978
- Chandgadkar, M V** When the Board was launched 'Sportsweek' (591) 10 February, 1979 25-29.
- Chhibber, Kavita** National games little fun, all confusion 'Youth Times' April 1979 46-47
- Crasto, Joe** Sports aid foundation needed. 'Economic Times'. 31 August, 1980
- Dalal, Udgit** Sports ministry essential 'Himmat' 15(17) 23 February, 1979 20-21
- . Sports and politics do not mix 'Himmat'. 12 August, 1977 23, 27
- De Mellow, Melville** Will sport become our way of life? 'Times of India' 23 May, 1982
- Dixit, D K** Only sports museum 'National Herald' 30 August, 1981
- Draft national sports policy: an exercise in words.** 'Sportsweek' (569) 26 August, 1979. 5.
- Federation fiasco** 'Sportsweek' (605) 18 May, 1980 11-13
- Gherda, K M** Sports sponsorship. 'Economic Times' 31 August, 1980.
- Gough, Patricia** Sports facilities utterly inadequate in India 'Mail' 29 March, 1981
- Harihar, T V** More politics than power 'Hindu'. 23 September, 1979.
- Hendricks, Ron** Establishment up against players. 'Indian Express' 1 October, 1977
- . Princes' ransom for sports. 'Onlooker' 16 March, 1978 35
- Inam** IHF penchant for petty politics. 'Onlooker'. 1 October, 1978. 44

#### ARTICLES

- Ansari Khalid** Are we a sporting nation? 'Illustrated Weekly of India' 98(33) 14 August, 1977 48-53
- . Disgraceful IHF. 'Sportsweek' (548) 1 April, 1979 5.

- India's neglected sports** 'Sportsweek' (454) 12 June, 1977 34-35.
- Jankidass** Games and politics over the years personal experiences 'Tribune' 20 July, 1980
- Kamath, Ashok** National games a national headache? 'Sportsworld' 18 July, 1979 5
- Kapadia, Novy** The psychology of sports coaching 'India International Centre Quarterly' 9(2) June 1982 107-117.
- . Defeated by their diet 'Hindustan Times' 26 July, 1980
- . What ails Indian football? 'Link' 4 November, 1979 41-42
- Kapur, P.C.** Sports coaching makes rapid progress 'Indian and Foreign Review' 1 June, 1977 18-19
- Kaul, Sumer.** Shocking world of Indian sports 'Indian Express' 11 April, 1980
- Khan, Matin.** IHF Indian high-handed federation? 'Sunday' 15 October, 1979 57.
- Kumar, Ajay** Board vs cricketers 'Sportsworld' 11 April, 1979 8-9
- Kumar, Ashwini.** The haves and the have-nots 'India International Centre Quarterly' 9(2) June 1982 118-123.
- . Philosophy for sports 'Man and Development' 1(1) May 1979 55-60.
- Layakare, Arvind** The Indian sports scene today 'Economic Times' 31 August, 1980.
- . No goals in Indian sports. 'Indian Express' 26 November, 1978
- Mani, Gomathi** Games as a method of adult learning. 'Journal of Indian Education' 7(2) July 1981 54-57
- Mann, C.S.** What ails our sports? 'National Herald' 6 July, 1980
- Mathiah, S** Speaking out on sport some random reflections on how a game or two is ruining Indian sport 'Indian Review' 74(12) March 1979 27-31
- Mathur, Madhu** Women and sports 'Education Quarterly' 27(2) July 1975 26-28
- Mehra, Ved Prakash** Games in ancient India 'National Herald' 27 April, 1980
- Menon, P V R** Playing politics with sports 'Patriot'. 31 August, 1980.
- Menon, Rajendar** Mess that is Indian hockey 'Youth Times' 1 September, 1979 46-47
- Mital, A K** Role of RVC in equestrian sports 'Times of India' 14 December, 1979
- Mitchell, Brian** We all take part, through a looking glass 'India International Centre Quarterly' 9(2) June 1982 95-100
- Mohlahee, K N.** Clouds over Indian goals. 'Statesman' 30 May, 1982
- Moraes, Dom.** Thoughts on sports. 'Indian Express' 25 August, 1980
- Moye, Ajit K** Ten years of sports in Goa 'Goa Today' 11(1) August 1976 39
- Naik, S P** Hypnotherapy in sports 'Sportsweek' (569) 19 August, 1981 21.
- Nandy, Ashis** Other politics of sports 'Times of India' 21 January, 1979
- New AICS working** 'Link' 10 September, 1978. 33.
- Nigam, P C.** Make 'catchem young' slogans practical 'Hindustan Times' 20 May, 1979
- . What ails our sports 'Hindustan Times' 13 August, 1980
- Pardivala, Jal D** Fashioning a champion 'Illustrated Weekly of India' 9(28) 13 July, 1980 22-27
- Playfair** Whims and fancies of the Indian Hockey Federation 'Himmat' 9 March, 1979 19-20.
- Politics and sports;** editorial 'Indian Express' 5 July, 1979
- Prasad, A S.V.** Andhra Pradesh Sports Council 'Telugu Vani': 3(8) August 1978 39-44
- Rahul, D** Mutiny in the AICS Field Marshall under attack 'Sportsworld' 8 August, 1979 10
- Roy, Khiren** Sport in North-East tale of despair and hope 'Assam Tribune' 29 October, 1981
- Sen, Arijit** Do refs read rule books? 'Sportsworld'. 25 July, 1979 34-35
- Sengar, M S** Master plan for sports development in M.P 'M P Chronicle' 18 January, 1981
- Seshadri, S V** Sports federations war against A I C S 'National Herald' 30 December, 1980
- Sharma, Ramu** The competitive syndrome 'India International Centre Quarterly' 9(2) June 1982 101-106.
- Shome, M.N** Devalued Arjuna award 'Deccan Chronicle' 22 February, 1981
- . Games glamour and politics 'Deccan Chronicle', 13 July, 1980
- Shukla, Ravindra** What is wrong with Indian sports? 'Deccan Herald' 9 July, 1979.
- Singh, Balbir** Indian hockey needs long term planning 'Link' 22(50) 20 July, 1980. 13-14
- Singh, Surjeet** Players lack dedication, 'Sportsweek' (594) 2 March, 1980 30
- Soni, I M.** Indian sports whither sportsmanship? 'Caravan' March 1979. 2 69.
- Speaking of sports;** editorial 'Statesman' 25 August, 1978
- Sporting policy;** editorial 'Democratic World' 28 May, 1978
- Sriman, R** Responsibilities of the sports reporter 'Vidura' 17(3) June 1980 199-201
- . Rounding up 'India International Centre Quarterly' 9(2) June 1982 124-130
- Strange the ways of our selectors** 'Sportsweek' (574) 7 October, 1979 35
- Sud, S K** Sports promotion yields good results. 'Haryana Review' 13(12) December 1979 5-6
- Talyarkhan, A F S** Big money in sports. 'Imprint' 18(3) December, 1978 57-60.
- Verma, Brij Mohan** Politics in sports 'Tribune': 23 December, 1979
- Verma, M P** Encouraging progress in sports. 'Haryana Review' 13(7) July 1979 28-29, 39
- Vijayakar, Pradeep.** Wooing sports fans 'Times of India' 12 November, 1978
- Wankhede, S K** The role of the state 'Economic Times' 31 August, 1980
- Whither Indian sport** 'India International Centre Quarterly' 3(4) October 1976 304-6
- Wilson, Rosalind** Children's sports the greatest joy for the greatest number 'India International Centre Quarterly' 9(2) June 1982 141-5.

# Benefit from our widest range of compressors, backed by the world's foremost air power technology.

## New additions to CP's expanding range

**TB-20½ x 13**

Lubricated/Oil-less Horizontal, Reciprocating  
Compressors

**500-RO-2**

Rotary Portable Diesel Compressors

**'TU' & 'TJO'**

Lubricated/Oil less Vertical, Reciprocating  
Compressors

## Plus 25 other proven and trusted models

Compressors of every description Portable  
and Stationary Electric motor/Diesel engine-  
driven Rotary and Reciprocating Single-  
stage/Two-stage Air-cooled/Water cooled.  
Lubricated/Oil less Horizontal/Vertical  
Single-acting/Double-acting Balanced-  
opposed & tandem In capacities from  
3 m<sup>3</sup>/min (108 c f m ) to 114 m<sup>3</sup>/min.  
(4000 c f m )

Together, our widest range for every need.


## Why CP Compressors?

CP Compressors are crafted to the highest  
standards of quality and workmanship and  
incorporate international designs and know-  
how And they're backed by prompt and  
efficient service, both before and after sales.  
No wonder CP-India are today the largest  
exporters of compressed air equipment to  
over 15 countries


Now, what can we offer you?

### CAUTION


Insist on genuine CP spares to keep  
your CP compressed air equipment  
working efficiently



Class TU



Class TB



Class FE

Please contact our nearest branch for literature.


## CONSOLIDATED PNEUMATIC

CONSOLIDATED PNEUMATIC TOOL CO. (INDIA) LTD.

301 L.B. Shastri Marg, Mulund, Bombay 400 080. Branches at: 30  
J. Nehru Road, Calcutta 700 016. Eros Apartments, 55 Nehru Place,  
N. Delhi 110 024. Finance House, Pattulua Road, Madras 600 002.  
Jamshedpur - Secunderabad - Goa - Bangalore.



The power of air harnessed for higher productivity.



## Want a ride to the Gulf?

**On my 747s, Airbuses and 707s**  
Over 30 fast, direct flights every week.

DAY	FLT NO	D-P	Route
Mon	AI 901 AB	0500	Bombay Abu Dhabi Dubai
Mon	AI 921 AB	1540	Trivandrum Dubai Abu Dhabi
Mon	AI 861 747	1055	Bombay Dhahran
Mon	AI 801 747	1315	Bombay Delhi Kuwait Baghdad
Mon	AI 881 AB	1430	Bombay Muscat
Mon	AI 821 707	2330	Bombay Sharjah
Tue	AI 903 AB	0523	Bombay Abu Dhabi Dubai
Tue	AI 923 AB	1640	Trivandrum Dubai Abu Dhabi
Tue	AI 863 AB	0930	Bombay Dhahran
Tue	AI 923 747	1030	Bombay Dhahran
Tue	AI 883 AB	1725	Bombay Sharjah Doha
Wed	AI 505 AB	0530	Bombay Dubai Abu Dhabi
Wed	AI 925 AB	1610	Trivandrum Abu Dhabi Dubai
Wed	AI 805 747	1800	Bombay Doha Kuwait
Wed	AI 825 747	1700	Bombay Dhahran
Thu	AI 907 707	0700	Bombay Ras al Khaymah Sharjah
Thu	AI 927 707	1700	Trivandrum Sharjah Ras al Khaymah
Thu	AI 827 747	0500	Bombay Doha Kuwait Jeddah
Thu	AI 857 AB	0515	Bombay Dubai
Thu	AI 867 747	0340	Bombay Muscat
Thu	AI 807 747	1000	Bombay Dhahran
Thu	AI 897 747	1830	Bombay Dubai Abu Dhabi
Thu	AI 877 AB	1810	Bombay Doha Bahrain
Fri	AI 809 747	0800	Bombay Jeddah
Fri	AI 909 707	0700	Bombay Abu Dhabi
Fri	AI 929 707	1615	Trivandrum Abu Dhabi
Fri	AI 829 747	0730	Bombay Dhahran
Fri	AI 809 747	0900	Bombay Dubai Muscat
Sat	AI 911 707	0430	Bombay Kuwait
Sat	AI 931 707	1700	Trivandrum Kuwait
Sat	AI 831 AB	0530	Bombay Sharjah Muscat
Sat	AI 911 747	1330	Bombay Abu Dhabi Dubai
Sat	AI 851 AB	1330	Bombay Doha Bahrain
Sun	AI 915 AB	0600	Bombay Dubai Abu Dhabi
Sun	AI 935 AB	1540	Trivandrum Abu Dhabi Dubai
Sun	AI 815 747	0800	Bombay Kuwait Jeddah
Sun	AI 855 747	1630	Bombay Dhahran

**एर इंडिया**  
**AIR-INDIA**

SEMINAR

**A**

confused

**Confused**


confused

**World**

280

December 1982

# Technology...a continuous effort for development



L&T provides design, engineering and fabrication capabilities in collaboration with Caterpillar, F. L. Smidth, Gutehoffnungshütte, Sterkrade, J. M. Voith, Niro Atomizer, Pöclain, Serck, Struthers Wells, Swenson, Ujelec.


and supplies plant and equipment for chemical, petroleum, petrochemical, fertilizer, cement, paper, dairy, steel, power, earthmoving and construction industries



**LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED**

*where technology moves with time*

P O Box 278 Bombay 400 038




Two leading automotive manufacturers in the world have come together Peugeot of France and Mahindra of India. A magnificent association. The famed XDP 4 90 diesel engine is now being manufactured by Mahindra.

This is the first time that this fuel-efficient and noise-free engine will be manufactured outside of France. To power Mahindra vehicles that span the length and breadth of India.



**PEUGEOT**



Running reminders of ruggedness and reliability. Nor do they stop there.

In 21 countries round the globe, Mahindra vehicles are proving their worth. Beyond a doubt. Proudly putting India on the world map of efficient, dependable transport.


**Mahindra and Mahindra Limited**  
Gateway Building, Apollo Bunder  
Bombay 400 039 India




# Elegant looks




## Versatile features




Attractive Sleek Two-toned USHA Streamlined—the sewing machine that outclasses any other in its price range With features that others can't match And a 5-year guarantee too




Patch Darning for easy darning and quick adjustment of pressure on cloth



3-position drop feed for easy adjustment of feed-dog position



Dial-type stitch regulator with lever for forward and reverse stitch control and locking arrangement.



Thread tension adjuster for regulating proper thread tension.

**USHA Streamlined** feature for feature a better machine






## Split-second stopping. A life could depend on it

Ferodo's superior 'fade-resistance' helps  
split-second stopping—everytime

Ferodo brake linings are specially manufactured  
to resist high temperatures for longer periods of  
time. This means surer stopping power.  
Depend on Ferodo Brake Linings. A life could  
depend on it.


Safer, surer stopping Over and over again



**Δ FERODO**  
BRAKE LININGS

Hindustan Ferodo Ltd Ghatkopar, Bombay 400 086 AS

OBM/1262



## **Tower by tower, we are satisfying a worldwide need for more power**

People in cities, towns and villages, around the world, switch on power transmitted by Kamani Transmission Towers.

Pioneer of power transmission line industry in India, and Asia's largest producer of transmission towers, Kamani Engineering Corporation has put a transmission girdle around more than 20 countries.


Energised by a high-powered professional management, Kamani Engineering Corporation is organised to play a positive and dominant role in international power transmission.

**KAMANI ENGINEERING  
CORPORATION LIMITED**

Kamani Chambers 32, Ramjibhai Kamani Marg, Ballard Estate, Bombay 400 038.

CHAITRA-KEC-74

Providing efficient road transport  
is one way of expressing  
our responsibility...



the other way is by  
creating more employment.

Over 3,00,000 public carriers on the road today are Tata vehicles. Carrying essential commodities to the remotest parts of the country, extending communication links, doing duty on vital project sites.

Each Tata vehicle provides employment to no less than 10 people. Creating over 4 lakh new job opportunities every year.

These are but two of the most striking facets of our multi-faceted outlook in serving the country. Now and in the future.

**Telco**

*helping build a strong and self-reliant nation.*

TATA ENGINEERING & LOCOMOTIVE CO. LTD.  
BOMBAY • JAMSHEDPUR • PUNE

CHAITRA-T-663

# Ahmed S. Moloochoy & Sons

Established : 1910

## SHIPCHANDLERS

Government Approved Manufacturers of  
Safety Appliances

'Anchor House', 1st Quay Street, Mazagoan, Bombay-400 010

Hydroquinone  
Metol  
Purechrome-1  
Purechrome-3  
Sodium Sulphite  
Sodium Bisulphite  
Carbonate  
Anhydrous Sodium Sulphate  
Sodium Thiosulphate  
Sodium Ammonium Sulphate  
Anhydrous and Crystals  
Formaldehyde Benzene  
2:5 Dimethoxy Aniline  
Sodium Acetate  
N.N. Diethyl Aniline  
Toluidine  
Manganous  
Diethoxy Aniline  
Manganese Acetate  
N.N. Diethyl Aniline  
Manganese Sulphate  
Manganese Carbonate  
N-Butyl Methacrylate  
Hydroquinone

Paper  
Electronics  
Ceramics  
Polymers  
Leather  
Jute  
Textiles  
Detergents  
Fertilizers  
Paints  
Dyestuffs

Pharmaceuticals  
Processing of Photographic  
and Motion Picture Film  
(Black & White and Colour)


Manufactured by

**S SATYADEV CHEMICALS LTD.**  
Pratapnagar Road, Vadodara-390 004.

Suppliers to some of the world's leading manufacturing and trading concerns.

TEXTILES, SUGAR,  
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS,  
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,  
VANASPATI, PVC, RAYON TYRE CORD,  
FERTILIZERS,  
ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS,  
IRON CASTINGS

**IN THE  
SERVICE OF  
THE NATION**



THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO LTD, DELHI

**ATTENTION STEEL MILLS  
&  
FOUNDRIES**

**EXPORTERS OF WORLD FAMOUS SANDUR MANGANESE ORE  
OFFER  
EX-STOCK**

**VERY LOW PHOS. PIG IRON  
AND**

**LOW ALUMINIUM FERROSILICON  
PRODUCED IN THEIR PLANT AT VYASANKERE**

*Please Contact*

**THE SANDUR MANGANESE & IRON ORES LIMITED**

**"LOHADRI BHAVAN"**

Yeshwant Nagar-583124.  
Via Sandur, Bellary Dt  
Karnataka INDIA

*Cable* SMIORE, SANDUR (INDIA)  
*Telephone* . SANDUR 33, 61, 91

*Telex* BANGALORE 427  
Bangalore . 32175 .  
28262 :

# **the art of good management...**



**moulding our varied resources — human,  
natural, technological — for the  
common good.**

**Shriram seminars and courses are part of  
this moulding process... which involves  
executives in a ceaseless interchange of  
ideas, discussion of modern techniques,  
evaluation and reconsideration of policies.  
So that the Shriram organisation is const-  
antly infused with fresh dynamism . and  
our resources are utilised to the optimum.**



**SHRIRAM FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS**



## Dennis Lillee's aluminium bat upsets test match at Melbourne.

The English captain protested "It's not cricket", the purists said. But the fact is that aluminium is being used, more and more, for things we had never imagined. And in India, Indian Aluminium has been the catalyst of this change.

The first to embark on aluminium production in India, Indal has introduced almost the entire range of alloys in which

rolled and extruded aluminium products are made in this country. In its constant drive towards diversification, Indal has pioneered the use of aluminium in aircraft, currency, power transmission, irrigation tubing, transportation, packaging, housing, and a host of other applications.

Indal pioneering. It's not cricket. But it's progress.



**Indian Aluminium Company, Limited**  
**Anything's possible**

HTC IAL-4073

# seminar

THE MONTHLY SYMPOSIUM POST BOX 338 NEW DELHI

Journal which seeks to reflect through free discussion, every aspect of Indian thought and aspiration. Each month, a single theme is debated by writers belonging to different persuasions. Opinions expressed have ranged from Janata to Congress, from Gandhian to Communist to Independent. And the non-political

specialist too, has voiced his views. In this way it has been possible to answer a real need of today, to gather the facts and ideas of this age and to help thinking people arrive at a certain degree of cohesion and clarity in facing the problems of economics, of politics, of culture.

editor/ROMESH THAPAR

managing editor/RAJ THAPAR

production/TEJBIR SINGH

circulation/C B KUMAR

Published from Malhotra Building, Janpath, New Delhi-1 Telephone 46534 Cable Address. Seminar New Delhi Single copy Rs 100 pence; \$ 1.50 Yearly Rs 40, £ 7, \$ 16, Three yearly, Rs 100 £ 20, \$ 40 Reproduction of material prohibited unless permitted

NEXT MONTH: INDIA 1982



# 280

## A CONFUSED WORLD

a symposium on  
global contradictions  
and perspectives

**symposium participants**

### THE PROBLEM

A short statement of  
the issues involved

### THE MORE IT CHANGES

S. Gopal, Professor of Contemporary History,  
Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi

### AGONY OF NATIONALISM

Girilal Jain, Editor, The  
'Times of India'

### INTERDEPENDENCE

Bharat Wariawalla, working on a  
research grant from the Indian Council  
for Research on International Economic  
Relations

### THE NORTH-SOUTH PARADIGM

S. Guhan, working at the Madras  
Institute of Development Studies

### PEOPLE'S SECURITY VERSUS NATIONAL SECURITY

Giri Deshingkar, Fellow, Centre for the  
Study of Developing Societies, Delhi

### NON-ALIGNMENT AND BEYOND

Soedjatmoko, Rector, United Nations  
University, Tokyo

### BOOKS

Reviewed by Pushpesh Pant, Brij Mohan,  
Rajen Harshe and S K. Roy

### FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography  
compiled by M.S. Limaye

### COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury Associates

# The problem

TO state the problem is indeed easy. it's a bewilderingly complex world, moved by heroes and non-heroes, simple folk and pretentious academics, forces of global destruction and concerns for global regeneration. To understand such a world is difficult enough, but to foresee if any order could be brought to it would require divine insight, indeed.

Let's begin with the simplest part of the problem—a description. One useful way to describe the present complex and turbulent international system is to look at the vast numbers of actors who move our world and compare it to the few actors who moved the relatively simple and tranquil world of the past. Just look at the nineteenth century, for instance, and one finds that there were really only two actors who moved that world—the soldiers and the statesmen. One fought the wars and the other negotiated the peace. These were the two who largely figured in history.

To be sure, the ubiquitous figures of the soldier and the statesman still move, as imperiously as before, on the international stage. But they feel a little uncomfortable at the appearance of other actors who now perform on the international stage. These are the non-heroes, ordinary folk—Lech Walesa, Ayatollah Khomeini (a simple man of faith till he sat on the Peacock throne), J.P. and scores of defenders of human rights in the Soviet Union, Chile, El Salvador and many other countries governed by tyranny. These non-heroes today count on the international stage in a way they never did in the past. Poland has seen many Lech Walesas but why does this trade unionist command so much international attention? Emile Zola, too, brought the Dreyfus case before the eyes of the French, but in no way did his exposure upset France's foreign relations. Today, the writings of a Solzhenitsyn and others do upset US-USSR relations. The Bolsheviks and their generals are not the only spokesmen of the Soviet Union.

There is another actor on the international stage who is loathed by the chanceries and the war minis-

tries the world over—the journalist. Those American journalists who brought the Watergate affair into the open greatly complicated Kissinger's statecraft, as he notes in his *Years of Upheaval*. Nothing unnerved this practitioner of secrecy and guile more than having to conduct his diplomacy before the TV cameras. And here too it's only a matter of time before our Swami Trivedis (winner of PUCL and *India Today* award for the best writing on human rights issues) tear apart the mask of secrecy under which our soldiers and statesmen conduct foreign policy. Then India too will speak with many voices abroad, as the United States, Holland, Denmark and other democracies do today. There is also the multinational, the chief vehicle for the transmission of technology, modern management skills and capital. The question for most States is not whether to keep the multinational out but how to let it in on acceptable terms.

The appearance of so many new actors on the international stage—labour leaders, multinationals, dissidents, peace marchers, hijackers, terrorists and simple folk—point to a major change, if not transformation, of the State-centric system which we have had for over four centuries. What is the role of the new non-State actors in the international system?

This profoundly changed, or transformed State-centre system is more than a simple multi-polar system. The world has always been multi-polar. Bi-polarity or the Soviet-American world was in that sense an aberration which lasted from the end of World War II until the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and which was confined to a small area of the world, Europe. Large parts of Asia and Africa, since their birth as nations, chose non-alignment and thus either stayed out of the bi-polar world or played the bi-polar rivalry to their advantage.

Bi-polarity has now distinctly waned with the emergence of many new centres of power. Apart from the economic power of Japan and Western Europe, there are today what Brzezinski called the 'new influentials'—Brazil, Mexico, India, Nigeria,

Saudi Arabia and some others. What are the regional aspirations of some of these 'new influentials' and will their search for regional status (India or Brazil, for example) invite counter reactions from small regional countries (Pakistan, Nepal against India, small Andean countries against Brazil, Laos and Kampuchea against Vietnam)?

But the world that has emerged in the last quarter of the century is something more than multipolar. Two changes have come about in the old State centric system: one, the importance and relevance of military power has declined and, two, the old distinction between domestic and foreign policy has been blurred. Nicolo Machiavelli advised his Prince that if he had the choice between buying soldiers or wheat he would buy the soldiers because with soldiers you can always take over someone else's wheat fields. Machiavelli assumed, and the assumption was correct until now, that not only was military power the most important form of power but that military power could be traded with other forms of power.

The 1973 event has put a question mark over Machiavelli's assumption. In 1973 a group of oil producers with hardly any military power defied the rich, militarily powerful, industrial world. Of what use was the superior American military power at the time of the oil embargo in 1973, during the internal crisis in Iran in 1979 or today, in the face of turbulent internal changes in Nicaragua and El Salvador? What can the Soviet Union with its vast military power do in Poland? Yes, it can militarily intervene but that won't suppress the forces of change which Lech Walesa has set into motion. Thus, the military power which largely determined relations between sovereign States in the past is today losing its importance. Other forms of power, economic, technological and, most important of all, the power derived from the strength of a just domestic order (Holland and Denmark, the two most developed welfare democracies exercise great influence in NATO today) are clearly becoming important.

The distinction between domestic and foreign policy is getting blurred. In the old State centric system, what went on within the boundaries of nations had little relevance for relations between them. Foreign policy was something distinct from domestic policy. But that world is now gone. At their yearly summits, the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Germany and Japan discuss each other's domestic policies — energy, trade, social welfare, etc. No longer are the summits of the western powers confined to discussing the issues of Berlin, European security or East-West *detente*. Welfare has today emerged as one of the most important international issues.

The North-South debate, dialogue or confrontation, now basically revolves around the domestic structures of States. True, many countries of the South would like to keep what they do at home out of the North-South dialogue. But how long can one go on espousing the cause of a new economic order without doing anything new at home? The very appearance of the North-South dimension in world politics today symbolises the sweeping change or transformation which has come about in the international system.

Complexity and interdependence are the two principal characteristics of the present transformation. Reassertion of multipolarity (appearance of many centres of power and influence) largely accounts for the complexity but not the interdependence of the system. It's the erosion of the sovereignty of the nation-State that explains the growing global interdependence. The appearance of many non-State actors on the international stage, the declining utility of military power, the emergence of global welfare as one of the important international issues (this in turn has blurred the distinction between foreign and domestic policy) are some of the factors which explain the slow but sure demise of the nation-State and the consequent growth of global interdependence. As Stanley Hoffmann has said, 'the shell of the nation-State is broken and the world has become a huge omelette.'

# The more it changes...

S. GOPAL

IT is a truism to say that the world today is bewilderingly complex, it is incorrect to claim that this is a new development. Soldiers and statesmen were not the only ones who determined events in the past. Beliefs and ideas have always played a large, and sometimes a crucial, role in national and international politics. Not to go way back into ancient history, the clergy were a prime influence in the Crusades; Voltaire was a major figure in European courts, the Encyclopaedists gave the impetus to the French revolution; and Mazzini was at the heart of 19th century nationalism.

Outside Europe, too, the intellectual origins of resistance to colonialism are not to be underestimated. 'Non-heroes' have never failed to function on the international scene — even the journalists from the time that the press has become a recognized institution. A.J.P. Taylor has a whole book on 'the trouble-makers' — the men who criticized British foreign and imperialist policies in the 19th and 20th centuries and made life difficult for

the war-mongers and the empire-builders

The new feature of the current world is that, with the shrinkage of distance and the expansion of communications, developments which earlier would have been of local interest now get world-wide publicity, and actors previously in the wings are now prominent on the stage. Kossuth, who led the Hungarian revolution in 1848, was a personality as courageous as Walesa, but while Kossuth was unknown outside central and western Europe, Walesa, thanks to the world press, is a celebrity everywhere. Herzen, an exile from Czarist Russia, was both a more striking personality and a more formidable intellect than Solzhenitsyn, but Herzen and his group of 'romantic exiles' are hardly known outside specialist circles while Solzhenitsyn has become a cult-figure. But this is not a personal achievement of Solzhenitsyn, nor is it the beginning of a new trend

If others apart from soldiers and statesmen have throughout history

been influential figures, these two categories are still of vital importance. Admittedly, power in world affairs is exercised at various levels and these are not always synchronized. Although Japan and Saudi Arabia have no military power, their affluence gives them international significance. But this is not basic. The two super powers owe their position to their military strength and the axis of the global situation is still the relations between these two countries.

Bipolarity has been the consistent feature of the world crisis since 1945. Sometimes the picture may be blurred and the cold war may seem to be in thaw, but the picture has not changed. China has set out to alter the picture and to force herself on the attention of governments by claiming equality with the United States and the Soviet Union. In the fifties Moscow used this to strengthen her own hand just as Washington is now attempting to embarrass the Soviet Union by aligning herself with Beijing. But China is yet to make the grade, there is no triangle or multi-polarity at the global level, there is only a 'China card' played by one side or the other.

The reality of the situation is that, so long as there are only two powers who can bring about a nuclear catastrophe, the ultimate decisions depend on them, and it is their reactions to issues which are of relevance. The government which can precipitate the 'final solution' of a nuclear holocaust also has the ultimate responsibility for every step which may either culminate in that event or retard it.

Of course, within the broad challenge of bipolarity, there is scope for multi-polarity — a scope which has been enabled by the fact that the super powers have naturally no desire to bring on themselves a mutually assured destruction. They are so heavily armed and armoured as to be virtually inert. They can hardly move and have thus created an arena where the intermediate powers are mobile. These are the effective States in the world today; each can grab and keep what it can and no super power can stop them.

Ours is the age of little wars — it is in this sense that the world is multipolar. Argentina walks into the Falklands — and everyone watches. Britain sends a task force to eject the Argentines — and no one stops her. Israel drives her tanks through the Lebanon and pounds West Beirut with impunity. The Arab States, bloated with oil revenues, are helpless and even the Soviet Union merely splutters. Because the soldiers and statesmen of the United States and the Soviet Union would be lunatic to go to war with each other and are trying to preclude any lapse from reason with a 'nuclear freeze', the soldiers and statesmen of all other countries have free play.

This lesson India learnt twenty years ago. Nehru had developed non-alignment on the premise of bipolarity. Refusal to inherit the quarrels of the European powers or to take sides in the cold war had given India the chance to exercise an influence which was far beyond what her military strength justified. But this did not prevent her from working for her own interests in matters of direct concern. Indeed, Nehru wished to have minibipolarity in India's relations with Pakistan and a constant theme of his policy was that the cold war should be kept out of South Asia. This was not possible and soured relations with the United States, Soviet intervention in the dispute as an arbiter coming only after Nehru's time. But, on the whole, Nehru manipulated with skill the split level of international relations.

On the bipolar, super power level, he created with artifice a role for India as an interpreter of the United States and the Soviet Union to each other, as a broker operating in the interstices of big-power politics. At the multipolar level, he asserted India's rights as against Pakistan and was unwilling to relinquish any part of India's traditional territory to China.

The weakness of such positive diplomacy in his own region was that it was not poised on military strength; and this inadequacy was shown up by China. The super

powers were willing either to assist India with equipment or to restrain China by reducing supplies; but neither was prepared to go to war on India's behalf. 1962 showed that not only are statesmen and soldiers still important, but both have to function effectively and together if a nation-State is to be a factor in world politics, even for its own defence. Statesmanship without strength could well be the epitaph on Nehru's China policy.

The general posture of attitudes in foreign affairs has not changed much since then. Domestic problems may influence a country's foreign policy; but they do not have any bearing on the relations between countries. President Carter's stress on human rights was at best marginal, and the United States has hastily shaken off even the conceptual aberration. Governments are judged not by what they do within their countries, but by their relations to the super powers or their usefulness in furthering their own interests. The friendship of China and Pakistan or of China and Chile has nothing to do with the domestic policies of these countries.

The United States and the countries of Western Europe, so staunchly liberal at home, have a romantic view of China, where in recent years millions have been liquidated, because for the moment China fits into their anti-Soviet alignment. But perhaps the unimportance of domestic development in foreign relations and their exploitation by other countries for their own advantage is best shown by recent events in Poland. British conservatives encourage Solidarity while sponsoring stringent anti-union legislation at home; and countries which fanned dissent in Poland do nothing to prevent its suppression.

There is talk, of course, of problems like health, energy, labour and the environment; such talk there has always been and the lines even here are drawn up on cold war patterns. Voting in all the specialized agencies of the United Nations is almost always on political grounds and never on the merits of the cases.

The North-South dialogue does not conform to this because the Soviet Union has kept away; but this dialogue has nothing to do with the domestic policies of the countries concerned. Nor does it show any signs of becoming much more than a paper exercise.

So, as the French would say, the world, the more it changes, the more it remains the same. Military strength is still important, and international relations are still basically bipolar, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Disarmament, detente, control of nuclear weapons — these are the fundamental problems of the day. The role of other countries, never decisive, has become even less than it used to be, for non-alignment has become weaker by becoming more diffuse.

So many countries have joined the non-aligned group that the criteria have been forgotten. Non-alignment, as Joad said of socialism, is like a hat which has lost its shape because everybody is wearing it. But, within the compass of world-wide bipolarity, non-nuclear countries with conventional strength are more effective than ever before in their own spheres.

India, wiser since 1962, is now better respected because of her increased military strength and her success in the Bangladesh campaign. Even, therefore, as bipolarity spreads into the Indian Ocean and Soviet and American navies stalk each other, India can set out to be the predominant power in the region. Clearly, India's policy in the coming years should be to strengthen her non-aligned status, draw nearer to both the United States and the Soviet Union than they are to each other, and reinforce her position and influence in South Asia. But, here again, she has to contend with the fall-out from the cold war, in the shape of F-16s which we all know Pakistan only desires in order to strengthen her hand against India and which weakens India's capacity to press the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. Multipolarity, in other words, can, even in a particular area, never break away from the bipolarity which pervades the world.

## Agony of nationalism

GIRILAL JAIN

TWO deeply contradictory developments have characterised the post-World War II scene. The rise of an unprecedented number of independent States as a result of the inability of former West European imperial powers to hold on to their colonies has been accompanied by the rise of the two super powers

which must by their very nature seek to encroach on the freedom of all other countries. The interaction between the two super powers and between each of them and the forces of nationalism has to a large extent shaped international relations and our approach to them.

The two super powers could not and have not acted in unison. They have, on the contrary, been engaged in a relentless and fierce competition with each other. On the face of it, one of the central objectives of this competition — popularly known as the cold war — has been to win over as many newly independent countries as possible to one's side. This has been especially so since the mid-fifties. By then the great central European divide had more or less become stable and the post-Stalin Soviet leadership was ready to take active interest in Asian affairs.

The Hungarian uprising and the Polish crisis in 1956 demonstrated that the people in Eastern Europe were by no means reconciled to Soviet domination. But the two events also demonstrated that Soviet domination could be shaken but not eliminated, short of a full-scale war which the West was not at all willing to contemplate. Despite all their talk of rolling back communism, the Americans stood idly by as Soviet tanks moved into Budapest and crushed the rebellion.

**O**n the face of it, this competition between the two super powers should have increased the room for manoeuvre of third world countries and helped promote the cause of nationalism. In fact, except in rare cases like India's and briefly of some others like Egypt, it has done no thing of the kind. If anything, the competition has led the two super powers to intervene in the affairs of even countries which they might otherwise have left alone; much of Africa, for instance. Indeed, there is hardly a third world country which has not suffered on account of this super power rivalry. Not even a country of the size and potentiality of India. It, too, has had to divert enormous resources to defence on account of US military assistance to Pakistan.

Third world countries would, of course, have fared better than they have if the competition between the two super powers was not so unequal and/or if their own leaders were not so short-sighted and self-centred, and their management of the affairs of their countries so incompetent. As it happens, all these preconditions for the success of the third world countries have been missing.

**T**he Soviet Union has at best been half a super power in that it has not been in a position to match America's not to speak of the western alliance's, economic strength. In fact, even in terms of military power it has, for much of the post-war period, not been in a position to check US interventions outside Europe, only in recent years has it acquired the necessary naval capability.

As a result of its economic weakness, the Soviet Union and its allies have at the best of times — in the 'sixties — provided only about 10 per cent of the total aid the third world has received. And this assistance has largely been limited to heavy and basic industries, that is, to industries which newly liberated countries could not have managed properly for want of experience even if (it is a big if) it is assumed that they were justified in giving high priority to these industries. Inevitably, even countries distrustful of the US such as Egypt under Nasser have had to turn to it and its allies for assistance.

Equally significantly, unlike the US, the Soviet Union has not sought to build a world economic order under its auspices. Whether we have liked it or not, all of us have lived and operated in a West-dominated economic order with GATT, IMF and the World Bank as its principal instruments. Not to speak of challenging it, Soviet bloc countries have gradually sought accommodation with this system, if not always within it. The figures of the debts they owe to western banks and the lengths to which they have gone to gain access to western capital, know-how and markets speak for themselves.

As for the leaders of the third world, the less said about them the better. The venality of many of them cannot possibly have any precedent in human history. Imagine the Indonesian oil company, Petromin, piling up a debt of some \$20 billion, or oil-rich Nigeria being unable to balance its current trade account and having to borrow from western banks, or one Thai prime minister after another presiding over drug traffic. These may be the worst examples. But there is hardly a third world country whose rulers have not engaged in open loot.

Then there have been plain thugs and murderers such as Dada Amin in Uganda, Bokassa in the Central African Republic, Pol Pot in Cambodia. The list will be endless if we include in it tinpot dictators who have abused their authority and tyrannised their peoples. Inevitably these marauders have discredited the cause of nationalism in the third world.

**F**rom the long-term point of view, even more dangerous has been the keenness with which leaders of third world countries have sought military assistance from one super power or the other in the vain hope of scoring a permanent advantage over their neighbours. In our sub-continent, for example, Jinnah began seeking U.S. military assistance within months of the establishment of Pakistan with consequences which need not be detailed.

As already noted, India has had to divert scarce resources to arms at the cost of its economic development. But the principal sufferer has been Pakistan itself. It has not succeeded in seizing Jammu and Kashmir. Instead it has lost its eastern half. Indeed, it may not be much of an exaggeration to say that, with the exception of the brief Bhutto interlude, it has been landed with military regimes largely on account of the imbalance of forces which the U.S. military aid programme created in its body politic in the 'fifties and the 'sixties.

Iran and Iraq in the gulf and Somalia and Ethiopia are among

the best known and recent victims of the follies of their leaders. These and many other countries have suffered enormous damage because their leaders have not had the ordinary intelligence to recognise two self-evident propositions. First, that their primary task is to overcome the ravages of colonialism, build their economies and integrate their societies. And, secondly, that the super power extending military assistance to them could not possibly be interested in helping them achieve their objectives. For, it must seek to promote its own. The two may converge on certain occasions but mostly they do not.

It is a sad fact of history that one of the three topmost leaders of the non-aligned world in the 'fifties and 'sixties, too, was a victim of this failure of imagination. No bet for guessing his name. He was Nasser. He allowed himself to be manipulated by the Russians in 1967 and thus brought on his country and fellow Arabs a catastrophe so large as to wipe out much of the advantage which their enormous oil reserves would have given them, especially in the 'seventies when the world faced an energy crisis and the prices of crude shot up.

It is open to question whether Nasser and his Soviet friends ever recognised the nature of the stakes involved in the success or failure of the radical Arab nationalist movement which was nothing short of the power balance in the whole world. For, there cannot be the slightest doubt that a successful assertion of independence by the Arabs would have ended for ever the U.S. hegemonistic ambitions which the defeat in Vietnam has not, and could not have done. For, whatever might have been said and written all these years, the fact remains that while southeast Asia as a whole is of peripheral importance to the international power balance, West Asia is central to it.

Similarly, it is open to question whether Nasser and his Soviet friends recognised that the main obstacles in the success of this grand enterprise were the weakness of the

Egyptian economy which reduced the country's appeal to other Arabs, and the suspicion of Egypt among fellow Arabs, pro-western Kings and sheikhs as well as the radicals. Even more staggering was their failure to appreciate what kind of foe they were faced with in Israel, the firmness of the U.S. commitment to its security and the weakness of the Arab military machines.

The tragedy of it is that in 1967 when the Soviets built up a massive anti-Israel propaganda on the spurious plea that Tel Aviv was planning to attack Syria and when Nasser ordered the U.N. emergency force out of Sinai and put his troops there in disregard of Israeli warnings, neither was in fact thinking in terms of an actual war. So, they delivered Israel an opportunity its leaders could not have dreamt of. What has followed is common knowledge.

The Arab world recovered from this blow in 1973 when, taking advantage of the initial Egyptian victories in the war with Israel and the anticipated shortage of oil, they quadrupled the prices of crude, exposing in the process the West's vulnerability and inability to cancel out the deadly oil weapon. But almost immediately they abandoned this leverage. Instead of using the enormous oil revenues to compel a genuine transfer of resources from the West to the third world, they took steps which made them even worse prisoners of the West than they were before.

They have been squandering their resources on importing luxuries from the West and undertaking expensive and unviable 'development' projects to run which they are totally dependent on the West and its Japanese allies. They have followed it up with a worse folly. They have been importing from the West, mainly the U.S., highly sophisticated arms worth billions of dollars which they cannot possibly use on their own, except against one another as in the case of Iran and Iraq. On top of it all, the money that has escaped this squandermania on the grandest possible scale, they have put in western banks, assets and securities. And, as if this were not enough, they

have wilfully excluded from the affairs of the region the only country which could have provided some kind of countervailing power against the America-backed Israel, the Soviet Union.

The Arabs have also played havoc with the economies of scores of oil-importing third world countries. These countries have piled up enormous debts to finance their oil imports. They cannot service these debts except — and that only partially — at the cost of slowing down their growth rates and, in the process, aggravating social tensions at home. This has made it necessary for them to retain and win western goodwill so that some little aid is available to them. It may be harsh judgement to say that the Arabs have made possible the arrogance the United States under President Reagan has come to display in its dealings with the third world. But it is a just assessment which it would be extremely difficult for anyone to contest.

If the follies of the Arabs could be matched, which is not easy, China has done fairly well. By picking up a quarrel with Vietnam and attacking it, it has legitimised America's return to south-east Asia and brought in the Soviet Union as well. Beijing's actions are of a piece with its inexplicable attack on India in 1962.

Let us accept for the sake of argument the Chinese proposition that in the excitement of their victory over the Americans and the U.S.-backed Saigon set-up, the Vietnamese were trying to lord it over in the whole of Indo-China. Surely, by maintaining friendly ties with Hanoi, the Chinese would have retained the capacity to influence its policies. And what do they have to gain by supporting the maniacs in Kampuchea who in the name of socialism had virtually come close to exterminating the Khmer race?

Let us also accept for the sake of argument that the Vietnamese are an impossible people to deal with and would have tried to frighten the whole of south-east Asia into submission if Beijing had not made



common cause with Washington and compelled them to recognise the rights of other countries. Surely the Chinese could have waited for this to be demonstrated. Then they could have acted with the support of well-meaning people all over the world

The opportunities in Africa for genuine independence have been more limited than in West Asia or south-east Asia. But the Africans cannot claim that they have made the most of such opportunities as have existed. They have certainly not developed cooperation among themselves to reduce their dependence on the West and the detestable regime in South Africa. As things stand, no one need be surprised if South Africa backed by a rightwing nationalist America emerges as a kind of imperial power in the region

Latin America is a world in itself. Hardly any country there can claim to have used its resources to improve the lot of its people. And many of the regimes there are frighteningly cruel, inhuman and arbitrary. So, it is not difficult to predict that the region will move from one crisis to another as far into the future as we can see

All in all, the hopes that were aroused with India's independence in 1947 have not been fulfilled. But it will be absurd to conclude that the nationalist revolution in the third world has failed. It has not. On the whole, the third world has not done too badly in the economic field and the desire for self-assertion has not died out

The fifties were an age of innocence. Most of us in the newly liberated countries had no idea of the complexity of the tasks we had taken upon ourselves: economic development, social integration and change and preserving and developing the State. Disillusionment was bound to follow and it has. But independence is to a society what air is to a human being — its very life breath. Some will fall by the wayside and some will continue the arduous journey towards the 'heaven of freedom' of which Tagore spoke half a century ago. Nationalism is not going to be superseded whatever else might happen in the coming years and decades

# Interdependence

BHARAT WARIAVWALLA

ADDRESSING the World Food Conference in Rome in November 1975, the U S Secretary of State, Kissinger, said 'we are stranded between the old conceptions of political conduct and a wholly new environment between the inadequacy of the nation-State and the emerging imperative of a global community'. The statement is not profound but revealing. It is revealing to know how the perceptions of a person who has been wedded to the 'old conceptions of political conduct' have changed

Kissinger represents that school of politics which has decisively influenced thinking on international politics since the emergence of the State system after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Now this worthy heir of Metternich and Bismarck recognizes that the kind of international politics emerging in the last quarter of the twentieth century no more wholly corresponds to the Metternichian or Bismarckian conceptions. We are stranded between the old and the new, between the reality of the nation-State and communities of nations, between autarchy and interdependence, between national preoccupations and global concerns.

Let us begin with one key element of the old politics, military power, and see what its utility is today. It is the State's possession of the instruments of force which alone distinguishes the State-centric international system from any other systems, economic, political (within a national polity no individual or groups have instruments of force, except during a state of civil anarchy or civil war) or religious. Machiavelli, who witnessed the formation of the nation-States and the kind of politics that grew up then, believed in the primacy of military power over all other forms of power. Using force to seize someone's wheatfields

was one dominant logic on which the international system operated since its birth in Europe and its subsequent extension to the non-European part of the globe as that liberated itself from colonial rule

**T**wo others who profoundly influenced the thinking and practice of international relations were Hobbes and Locke. Both argued from different perspectives that only the state of war truly reveals the essence of the game that nation-states play. States are continuously at war (not actual warfare), simply because, like individuals, they live in anarchy and, in anarchical times, survival is the only concern of the State or of the individual. As Hobbes conceptualized, every man (or every State) is by nature the other's wolf and war punctuated by truce (for peace is inconceivable) is the principal characteristic of competition among wolves.

For Locke, competition among wolves could be moderated by self-restraints, international treaties, balance of power and concern on the part of the competing wolves to keep the international system going rather than to destroy it. Of course, Locke differed from Hobbes on two other points: his view of man was more benign and his view of the world less horrid. This was natural, for Hobbes was the product of a war-torn England without civil authority, while Locke was the great legitimizer of the Glorious Revolution that laid the basis for a parliamentary democracy in 1688.

But, for Hobbes and Locke the State's ability to influence another State depended entirely on its possession and willingness to use military power. A State's power ranking in the world entirely depended on what it could ultimately show at the moment of reckoning, war. Basically, the international system since the end of World War II has been more Lockean than Hobbesian while the international system between the two world wars was more Hobbesian than Lockean.

Today we could return to Hobbesian anarchy if competition among the two big wolves, the US and the

USSR, gets out of hand, or if one principal wolf, the USSR and its empire, is faced with the prospect of internal dissolution. The second possibility and its grim implications for international stability is little understood.<sup>1</sup> If the Soviets come to believe, which indeed they will, that the West is conspiring to bring about their internal dissolution (Poland) then they might embark on a more adventurous policy, with all the attendant consequences for international stability. Foreign policy would then become an instrument for internal survival. The first world war came about largely because the polyglot Austro-Hungarian empire feared that the tide of nationalism sweeping through Europe would dissolve the empire from within.

**B**arring these possibilities, the international system is likely to remain largely Lockean — peace based on the balance of terror and competition among the principal actors of the system, moderated by their fear that unrestrained competition could end in collision. But, the contemporary system is something more than Lockean, though what that 'something' is, is difficult to define precisely. The present patterns of international relations do not quite conform to the past patterns and this is because a number of new elements have appeared in the present State system.

One way to look at how different the present is from the past is to re-examine the very foundation on which the system of the past has rested — the possession and use of military power. I think the utility of military power in the past few years has declined and will continue to decline.

To say this at a time when Britain has triumphed over Argentina in the Falklands war, Israel over the PLO and the Soviet Union over Afghanistan, may sound absurd. But in all the three cases the apparent victory of the militarily strong still does not show decisively that military power has the same importance today as it had in the past. The utility of military power depends entirely on the policy context in which it is used and it is my contention that today there are fewer and fewer policy con-

texts in which force can be profitably used.

**T**ake, for example, the policy context of the Falklands war. Argentina first used force to seize the islands which in turn made the British use of force perfectly legitimate. The successful use of force by Britain in the Falklands would lead many to conclude here that in the final analysis it is force alone that decides the outcome of international conflicts. The conclusion is misleading and dangerous. Policies based on such a conclusion may turn out to be futile. The question to ask is whether the use of force which produces a favourable outcome in one policy context will also produce favourable outcomes in other policy contexts.

Let us assume for the sake of discussion that the Falklands had been inhabited by 1,00,000 Argentines, besides the 1,800 Falklanders of English origin, and that these Argentines had threatened to take to arms (or wage peaceful civil disobedience) in case Britain were to refuse their demand for a reunion with Argentina. The setting is perfect for an insurgency war. Would Britain have risked the cost, economic, military, and social (domestic dissensions at home) of a counter insurgency war, far away from her shores? Probably not. Except for the short and limited counter insurgency operations in Kenya and Malaya, Britain has not engaged in such operations since 1945. France did so in Algeria and with disastrous results.

The Falklands situation was unique: only 1800 inhabitants, united in their wish to stay with Britain, the impetuosity of the Argentine military junta and the absence of any effective international support for Argentina. Such situations rarely obtain today. More common are popular resistance, guerilla wars, civil wars, messy local situations, etc. It is these types of situations which determine the policy contexts in which a would be user of military power has to assess its utility.

In his path blazing work, *Force Without War*<sup>1</sup>, Bleechman comes to

<sup>1</sup> Barry M. Bleechman, *Force without War*, Brookings Institute, 1978.

conclusions which must shock the military establishments the world over. In the 215 incidents involving the use of armed force — this roughly works out to once every month between 1945 to 1973 — the United States was able to secure, in the short term, favourable results in 73% of the cases. However, this proportion declined substantially when the objectives were evaluated over the longer term and the favourable rate dropped to less than one-half. And in most of the instances where the outcomes were favourable in the short and long terms, force was demonstrated but not used — that is the use of force to support diplomacy rather than to substitute it.

Again, the use of force proved to be productive in instances where force was used to deter or assure rather than compel or coerce a target. Bleechman ends his empirical study by saying what Montesquieu or Mill would have perhaps said without the aid of computerized data — that force is only useful in the case of a target, which can be reached without force, but force can help to speed the process.

One wishes the Soviet Union had a Bleechman who could have warned them of the folly and the ultimate futility of their Afghan venture. The old dictum that the soldier loses if he does not win and the guerilla wins if he does not lose is as valid for the Soviets in Afghanistan as it was for the Americans in Vietnam. Time is on the side of the guerilla; time is against the soldier. The soldier has to demonstrate all the time that he is winning, the guerilla has merely to frustrate the soldier's advances.

With about 85,000 soldiers, all that the Soviets control after two and half years since the intervention are a couple of cities and those, too, during the day. The choice before Moscow is whether to increase its military commitments or seek a political solution. In the recent writings of Soviet military men, both choices are frankly discussed and interestingly enough it is the US experience in Vietnam that provides the backdrop for much of these discussions.

Force is relentlessly used by only two States in the world today, Israel and South Africa. Both are unique. Israel's international legitimacy is in question; South Africa's domestic legitimacy is challenged by all. For States without legitimacy, foreign policy has no other aim but survival and, obviously, for survival one would use any amount of force, regardless of the cost. Now Israel has succeeded in amputating the military arms of the PLO. But is the PLO military disabled for good? In the Black Septemberists' operation in 1970, Jordan did the same thing to the PLO, just to see it revive its strength in the next few years. Yet, it would be wrong to say that because Israel and South Africa have 'succeeded' in using force, it follows that the utility of force is not declining. There are just no States like Israel and South Africa in the present State system.

The purpose behind this somewhat lengthy discussion on the utility of military power is to discern whether the Hobbesian or the Lockean international system, which has held force to be the only arbiter of relations among States, is changing. The utility of force has declined and the causes and factors which have brought about this decline suggest the appearance of new elements in the old State-centric system.

It is the technology and progressive integration of national economies into one single global economy which is changing the old patterns of inter-State relations. Even in the 19th century, the spinning jenny, the steamship and the East India Company penetrated State barriers but, today, this penetration is deeper and stronger than ever before.

Obviously, the changes in the pattern of inter-State relations is more pronounced in the industrial North, where the industrial revolution first began, than in the largely agrarian South, where this revolution is just beginning to make its impact. The economies of the United States, Western Europe and Japan have become interdependent to a point where not one can go it alone. As Charles Kindleberger says, the

nation-State as an economic unit is just about through.

This high degree of interdependence among the countries of the North (the OECD area) is largely a post-war phenomenon made entirely possible by the persistent efforts of the United States to create a single world economy. The IMF, the World Bank and the Marshall Plan were the institutions America created to construct a global economy from the wreckage of the second world war. America benefited from the new arrangement, but others even more. Japan and Western Europe grew at such rapid pace that they became America's economic rivals by the mid-sixties.

Economic interdependence has brought about interdependent relationships that greatly inhibit, if not preclude, the use of military power. To be sure, interdependence does not eliminate competition among nations, but the competition is conducted along lines very different to those of the past. The devaluation of the American dollar in August 1971 and, with it, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods economic order clearly illustrates the new ground rules for the old rivalry between nations.

The mighty United States with its nuclear weapons attempted in 1971 to influence non nuclear Japan and West Germany to reappreciate the yen and the mark, so that America could avoid the odium of devaluing the dollar. In this important encounter of strength, it is the militarily stronger United States that gave in.

Thucydides' saying that the weak must give what the strong exact sums up the essence of the old game, and many steeped in this school of power politics would have expected a different outcome to the August 1971 encounter — American victory and German and Japanese defeat. However, after the event all the industrial nations met to devise a new monetary arrangement.

Anyone who ranks military power above all other forms of power would have believed that the immense disparity in military power between the United States, on the

one hand, and Germany and Japan on the other, would express itself politically. This line of reasoning assumes that America's possession of a thousand or so intercontinental ballistic missiles would give her power sufficient to coerce the nations which do not have them. To believe that military power can be readily translated into influence, economic, political, ideological, is to miss the central point of the declining utility of military power in an interdependent setting.

Of course, one ought not to misread the August 1971 encounter either — that is, those economically strong prevail over those militarily strong, or that economic power is more important than military power. It is the very high level of interdependence between Germany, Japan and America on so many issues — trade, tariff, environment, investments and, of course, security — that really prevents any one of them from fully exercising power. In 1971, for instance, the United States could have used its military superiority to hurt Germany and Japan, but only at the risk of bringing about the collapse of the western security alliance. Similarly, Germany and Japan could have used their superior economic strength to hurt America, but again at the risk of bringing about a total disruption of the world economy.

Again, it is the interdependence between OPEC and OECD that really prevents either from using its strength to the fullest — OPEC from withholding oil to the OECD countries and OECD (primarily the US) from militarily seizing the oil fields. Both have opted for interdependence after that dramatic trial of strength in October 1973. Then, a group of Arab oil producers, OAPEC, with no military power to speak of, successfully carried out the oil embargo against the friends of Israel, the United States and Holland. So shocked was Hans Morgenthau, one of the foremost exponents of the power politics school, that he described the 1973 event as an historic severance between political, economic and military power.

neither can today afford to disrupt it. OPEC and OECD are dependent on each other for their prosperity. It is their common interest in each other's well-being that prevents either from using its power to the maximum — OPEC the oil and money power (embargo or substantial cuts in production) and the West from using its military power. Of course, today, the big question mark is whether the interdependent OPEC-OECD relationship will survive in the face of declining oil demands in the OECD countries

Interdependence has profoundly changed the rules of the competition for power and influence among States. In the old game of the nations, A's power was its ability to make B do something B would have preferred not to do or to stop B from doing something B would have otherwise done. A's gain was B's loss. But in an interdependent relationship, A cannot fully use all its power to make B do something or stop B from doing something without A hurting itself in the process of exercising its power. In such a game, neither A nor B completely gains or loses and both stand to gain somewhat if both use their power with more restraint.

This is the kind of game in which the premium is more on cooperation, however limited, than on conflict, as in the old game.<sup>2</sup> Thus, America cannot fully use its power asset, the military power, against the gulf countries, nor can the gulf countries fully use their power assets, oil and money, without both hurting each other in the process. Nor for that matter would any country of the industrial North opt out of the many interdependent links (monetary, energy, trade, tariffs, technology, security) without hurting itself.

In the meliorative vision of the world, which still dominates global thinking, wars between nation-States would disappear, or at least the chances of their occurrence greatly reduce, if they were knit together

by extensive economic interactions. Once nations are committed to the idea of progress, wars would become a thing of the past, a hangover of the 'dark ages'. This meliorative vision of the world was shattered twice, in 1914 and 1938. Yet, the victorious America precisely set out to create such an order. The creation of an integrated world economy and liberal political order were the two American objectives at the end of World War II. It came close to realizing the first, but never seriously attempted to realize the second.

In the first three decades after the war, the countries of the North grew at about 5% a year, with about that much inflation and little unemployment. The developing countries grew faster than the developed ones and world trade expanded at an annual rate in excess of 7%, well above the 5% rate of growth of the world product. History has yet to record such an unprecedented period of prosperity.

Now the game is up. The chart of economic ill health of the OECD countries shows 28½ million unemployed, half-per cent rate of growth and about 10% inflation. Few see any signs of recovery from the decade old enormous recession in the North.

It is possible that interdependence among the northern countries could degenerate into autarchy, mercantilism, protectionism. Beggar my neighbours, competitive devaluations, trade war and finally the resurgence of militarism could follow, as they all did in the thirties. The North would then return to the Hobbesian State of anarchy, as it did in the inter-war years.

The end of interdependence in the North would snuff out any hope — it has never been very high — of North-South interdependence. Interdependence rests on the progressive integration of national economies into a global one, globalisation of the industrial revolution and the rise in global productivity, accompanied by reduction in inequality within and between nations. The breakdown of the interdependent order in the North would end the hopes of many northern liberals like Brandt,

2. See Stanley Hoffmann, 'Notes on the Elusiveness of Power', *International Journal* xxx, (Spring 1975).

Heath, Mitterand, for a world order based on North-South inter-dependence

But, regardless of what happens in the North, parts of the South or the third world display patterns of inter-State relations which are unique. Iran-Iraq enmity, Egypt-Syria merger or paper unions between Libya and Tunisia and Iraq-Syria, reveal patterns of inter-State relations in the Islamic world which are different from the patterns of inter-State relations in Europe. The concept of international relations, as we understand it today, originated in Europe and there the State and, later, the nation-State was the corner stone on which was constructed the edifice of the State system. The nation-State is perhaps not regarded as sacrosanct an entity in the Islamic world as it is in the western world (most certainly including the 'socialist' world of the Soviet Union and East Europe).

**D**oes the Iranian revolution pose a challenge to the State centric order? One ought to be as patient as Zhao in evaluating the significance of a revolution. In response to a question by Kissinger as to how he saw the French revolution of 1789, Zhao is reputed to have replied that it was too early to assess it. Whatever little information we have on revolutionary Iran suggests that the State apparatus is as freely and arbitrarily used by the Ayatollahs as it was by the Shah, to bring about desired social changes. Like all third world elites, the Ayatollahs too use the State as an agent of social transformation

Again, whatever may be Iran's ultimate war aims — creation of a Shia community or the overthrowing of the non-Shia elites in West Asia — the Ayatollahs make calls for war sacrifices in the name of the Iranian State. History records how great social experiments, the Republic of Virtue of Robespierre, the Calvinist Republic or the Cultural Revolution, eventually returned to old ways. But what the Iranian revolution unmistakably demonstrates is the rejection of indiscriminate import of the western consumer culture — the kleenex, coca-cola culture.

In all other parts of the third world, where statehood is barely three decades old, the State reigns supreme. The State apparatus is used for economic development, for oppression and for aggrandisement and the perpetuation of elite rulers. There are only a few countries who have developed economically by the vigorous intervention of the State — South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, India. But, many third world countries are basically national security States. Military rule (not always), a siege mentality and high 'defence preparedness' generally characterise the national security States. The third world has many such

**S**ince the State reigns supreme in the third world, it is the inter-state relations that dominate all other patterns of interactions. People, journalists, legislatures or intellectuals have very little role — often their role is in opposition to the State's role. Here it is only the soldier and the statesman who dominate the international stage. In the advanced industrial, democratic North, on the other hand, there are a number of non-State actors — people, peace movements, the multinationals, journalists, etc. — who significantly influence inter-State relations.

Intense rivalry, sometimes ending in wars, largely characterise the relations among the countries of the South. Here there are few viable regional communities or binding inter-dependent ties. The dominant pattern of inter-State relations in the third world approximates to the Hobbesian Lockean model — competition without an element of co-operation, my gain, your loss. But those involved with the idea that history only moves in the direction of progress, would say that the new States of the South will also overcome their national rivalries and eventually settle for cooperative regional communities and inter-dependence. After all, that is what the old States of the North have done. But the cruel fact is that history never moves in the direction in which the philosophers of history think it will. The movement of history is always marked by zig-zags, steep dips and even abrupt reversals.

# The north-south paradigm

S. GUHAN

IN a wide range of international economic issues, North-South relations have attracted the centre of attention since about the mid-seventies. It may suffice merely to recall the series of developments which have been responsible for this. With decolonisation, the poorer countries belonging to the South have acquired a numerical majority in the United Nations where each country enjoys an equal vote. The non-aligned movement has helped to unify the South on a political plane and provided a basis for joint action. Five sessions of the UN Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and its regular activities from 1964 onwards have focussed attention on a gamut of North-South issues.

The emergence of OPEC in the early 1970s provided a dramatic demonstration of Southern bargaining power. In turn it led to two major milestones in the adoption of the UN Resolution on the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974 and the holding of

the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in 1975 between a group of countries drawn from the North and South. Most recently, the Report of the Brandt Commission (1980) and the Cancun Summit of 22 Heads of States and of Governments (1981) have provided some further impetus to the North-South debate.

A vast and varied literature on international economic relations generated since about the late 1970s has considerably fuelled the North-South form of analysis. The wealth and poverty of nations, and the wide and widening disparities between rich and poor countries are intrinsically grand themes. Besides, the 'North-South' dichotomy seems capable of encompassing a large number of issues as well as of actors within its ambit. It seems possible to group most countries in the world under the 'North' or the 'South'.

Similarly, a number of features of the international economy can be

related to North-South questions, either directly or at one remove. Accordingly, the North-South framework has been used, where necessary through some enlargement, to discuss several major global crises: the arms build-up, the energy transition, world monetary disorder, the widening gap between rich and poor nations, the population explosion, world hunger and ecological depredation. Titles such as 'Reshaping the International Order', 'Facing the Future', 'A Programme for Survival' have tried to convey a sense of crisis, the urgency and possibility of reform, and ultimate goals for world welfare and development, *inter alia*, through a re-alignment of North-South relations.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the North-South paradigm has gained acceptance both at operational and analytical levels in its application to a wide range of international economic questions. It has served, as never before in history, to raise the awareness of the unequal and inequitable relationships that hold between developing and developed countries. Apart from improving an understanding of the history, nature and dynamics of these relationships, the processes of the North-South debate have resulted in some tangible gains for the developing countries. But, like any other paradigm, 'North-South' has also not been without its cost and limitations. It is necessary to introspect on whether the costs, as demonstrated in experience, in the continued pursuit of this paradigm are likely to be justified by, or might rather outweigh, possible benefits in the future. This is necessary lest what began as a useful paradigmatic tool should acquire the stranglehold of an *idée fixe*.

The North-South paradigm consists of three inter-related elements: (a) a set of North-South issues with reference to which (b) groups of countries identified as the North and South stand in protagonist-

antagonist relations, which it is premised can be solved through (c) processes of 'dialogue', 'debate' and 'negotiation'. It will be useful to examine the validity of each of these elements.

On the issues themselves, definitive articulation is to be found in the UN Resolution on the NIEO. One way of introducing them will be to point out, as the Brandt Commission has done, that what is involved is that (p 32) 'fundamental structural changes must be made' in the markets in which developing countries are suppliers — of commodities, of manufactures, of labour — and in which they are customers — for capital and technology. Such changes are also required in the mechanisms and institutions which generate and distribute international finance, investment and liquidity.<sup>2</sup>

In these 'markets', the concrete issues that have emerged mainly relate to the following:

(a) *Primary commodities*: stabilisation of prices and earnings, assistance for diversification and processing, and access to exports markets for developing countries.

(b) *Trade*: access to markets to developing countries, through the reduction, on a non-reciprocal basis, of tariff and non tariff barriers.

(c) *Technology and Private Investment*: greater access, on better terms, to technology, the regulation of transnational corporations, and recognition of the right to nationalise foreign investments on the part of host countries in the South.

(d) *Money and Finance*: improvements in the quantum and quality of concessional aid, with special attention being paid to assistance for food and agriculture, industrialisation, reducing the debt-burden and for the least developed countries; and the creation and distribution of international liquidity in conformity with the need of developing countries.

The identification of countries in the 'North' and in the 'South' has come about as a result of the alignments that have formed themselves

in the UNCTAD and, following that, in other UN fora. The North in this parlance consists of Group B or the OECD countries — the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and 19 countries in western Europe. Although relatively small, this is a varied group of countries in terms of sizes, populations and per capita incomes. Excluding the smaller (Iceland and Luxembourg) and the poorer (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey) among them, one is left with 17 industrialised countries with an average per capita annual income of nearly \$ 11,000 and a combined GNP of about \$ 7,200 billion which is 63.4 per cent of the global product.<sup>3</sup> These 17 countries also 'constitute the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, in that sense acknowledging their status as the indisputably rich.

Before one can move on to the South, one has to refer to Group D in UNCTAD consisting of the USSR and 6 countries of Eastern Europe, viz, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Except for the GDR which has a per capita income comparable to that of New Zealand or the UK, the rest of them are poorer than the countries in the DAC but not much more so. Their average per capita income is around \$ 4,500 which is also the level in the USSR. The 'East' is also 'industrialised', 'developed' and distinctly richer than the South. In UNCTAD, Group D has generally sympathised with, and supported, the South but has exempted itself from any of the obligations, which with its endorsement, the South has urged upon the North.

The largest group is the residual Group 77 in UNCTAD, now consisting of about 120 countries, China, although not a member of the Group of 77, is also to be considered as part of the South. As can be imagined, there is much heterogeneity in sizes, endowments, incomes and growth patterns within the South. Populations range from a few thousands in the South Paci-

1. See Jan Tinbergen: *Reshaping the International Order. A Report to the Club of Rome*, Dutton, New York 1976, OECD *Interfutures: Facing the Future*, Paris 1979; Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Brandt Commission) *North-South. A Programme for Survival*, 1980.

2. GNP and per capita income figures relate to 1980 and are from *The World Bank Atlas 1981*.



fic to nearly a billion in China, per capita incomes from less than \$ 100 to \$ 30,000 in the United Arab Emirates, and outside of OPEC to \$ 4,500 in Singapore; there are the newly industrialising 'success stories' of South East Asia and of Latin America; the least-developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, not to speak of Bangladesh, the populous and poor mass of South Asia, and so on.

**H**eterogeneities in the South have tended to be both exaggerated and under-played. Southern protagonists have believed in the latter on the ground that to admit heterogeneity will be to play into the Northern tactics of *divide et impera* that aims at undermining the political unity of the South. Yet, it will be unrealistic to ignore three basic points

One is that some countries of the South are much richer than the others, some among them being richer than the richest countries in the North Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar among the surplus OPEC countries have, for instance, per capita incomes in the range of \$ 11,000 to \$ 30,000 and have acquired combined foreign assets of the order of \$ 300 billions. This has not gone unrecognised by OPEC itself which has emerged as a significant aid-giver, although largely in a bilateral and 'Islamic' framework.

Secondly, it is quite clear that interest involvements in the range of North-South issues vary quite widely among groups of the countries in the South. The poorest countries are primarily interested in concessional aid in the form of official development assistance (ODA) and in commodity price stabilisation while the more advanced developing countries are largely interested in trade, technology and commercial borrowing. The situation of some countries (notably India) may be such as to straddle a number of interests but the fact remains that the South has quite distinct constituencies within it

Thirdly, it is not as if there are no conflict of interests within the South. The most important of them is the effect that oil price increases

have had on the oil-importing developing countries, leading to the impoverishment of one part of the South to the benefit of another

**T**he heterogeneity of interests and circumstances within the non-South have not always been to the advantage of the South. A good illustration is the serious difficulty that the South, and its enlightened supporters, have had in developing a rationale for ODA that can be sustained on a wide front. Various arguments have been tried such as the moral argument of justice and solidarity enjoining the rich to help the poor, the historical argument that aid is a form of reparations for colonial exploitation, and the economic argument that aid is in the 'mutual interests' of the North and the South (an euphemism for the enlightened self-interest of the North). The difficulty is that none of these arguments fits, or finds a response in, all of the North.

The moral argument, which is the strongest, loses force since the South does not apply it to the East, or within its own fraternity, nor internally within its domestic economies. The colonial argument does not cover the richest countries of the North (viz., the USA, West Germany and Japan) and has given a handle to the East for evading the aid obligation. 'Mutual interest' carries some conviction, but only to the major capital-exporting countries, and it does not fit capital-importing but rich countries like those in OPEC to whom the moral argument should have some application. The danger of multiple rationale is that recalcitrant countries in the North, or the East, or the richer segment of the South, are able to rationalise their positions with reference to one or another of the arguments supplied by the South itself

The overlay of convergence and conflict of interest subsists not only within each group but across them as well. The stabilisation of commodity export prices is, for instance, of great interest to many of the developing countries but by no means to all of them or to the more advanced among them. Nor are commodity producers only in the

South; they are in the North as well (e.g., the USA, Canada, Australia). In reverse, there are many commodity consumers in the South itself and in the East, besides, the North OPEC is an exporter of a primary commodity the rising, rather than the falling, prices of which have created a serious problem not only to the North but also to oil-importers in the South. Access to markets is important not only to the South vis-a-vis the North but to many countries in intra-North markets (e.g., exports from, and to, Japan for the rest of the OECD). Access to commercial borrowings and to technology has as much interest to the East as to the South. OPEC's imports include manpower from the South but issues connected with human migration, unlike those of merchandise exports, have not been adequately brought into any international debate, North-South or South-OPEC.

**I**t is from such a tangled thicket of issues that the North-South paradigm seeks to find ways out through processes of dialogue, debate and negotiation. The word 'negotiation' suggests economic bargaining to achieve reciprocal gains. In the North-South context it has however taken the form of non consensual resolutions secured through majority voting in UN bodies, preceded by a prolonged use of rhetoric, arguments and other means of attrition. There have been some gains through these processes but the notion that 'fundamental structural changes', such as those contemplated in the NIEQ, could be secured by a non-reciprocal process of so-called negotiation, without threat or sanction behind it, is fanciful and far fetched. It is not surprising that it has led to frustrating exercises in the art of the impossible. The Fifth Session of the UNCTAD (Manila, 1979) which devoted itself to 'Restructuring the Global Economy' is one example. The proposed 'Global Negotiations' on North-South issues will be another, that is, if it succeeds in being held at all.

In actual fact, exercises in negotiations within a North-South framework have entailed heavy costs in



terms of retardation and obfuscation. In the interests of Southern solidarity, the South has had to pursue a variety of issues as an integrated, equally urgent, minimum programme. Understandably, movement along such a phalanx has been glacial. As the Brandt Commission pointed out, somewhat diplomatically, (p. 262) 'the Group system has been criticised as tending to crystallize extreme positions on either side which delays and sometimes defeats practical progress in resolving conflicting interests. The process of reconciling differences within each Group has often led to extreme positions driving out moderate ones; maximum demands elicit minimum offers. the negotiating process becomes unwieldy, cumbersome and time consuming'

Obfuscation has resulted because the East and OPEC, neither of whom fall neatly within the North-South dichotomy, have successfully evaded crucial issues — aid and commodity prices in the case of the East and oil price accommodation and migration in the case of OPEC. The South has been unable, rather than unwilling, to press these issues because of the constraints and the distractions inherent in the North-South framework.

**R**esults, at least in the immediate future, from pursuing the North-South mode of action are, if anything, likely to be less fruitful from a Southern point of view than in the last decade. The North itself is in disarray with recession, inflation and unemployment. Along with these, monetarism and revivalist philosophies of private initiative give clear signals that further gains from the kind of negotiations as have occurred in the past are likely to be quite limited. Secondly, the OPEC-spectre, which in the first instance brought the North to the negotiating table in 1974 (NIEO) and 1975 (CIEC), is fast losing its threat with increasing conservation and domestic production of oil in the North. And OPEC's own role has not clearly been as a force behind the South in the intervening years.

In these circumstances, the North-South paradigm might best fulfil its

contribution if it were to yield gradually to other modes of action that need not be constrained by its rhetoric, rigidities and unrealistic expectations. It is difficult to elaborate what such modes of action could be in the abstract for they will have to work themselves out with reference to the opportunities and potentialities which exist and might open up in the field of international economic relations. But some priorities and lines of approach seem to indicate themselves.

One possibility is to give greater concentration to securing further reforms, from a Southern point of view, in the existing international institutional structures. The resources of the IMF need augmentation, continued quota increases and SDR allocations will have to be secured, and conditionalities liberalised. IDA will have to be safeguarded from Reaganite onslaughts and more lending promoted from the World Bank and the Regional Development Banks for energy exploration and development. The Common Fund will have to be strengthened by the conclusion of more international commodity agreements but even outside of such agreements, it might be possible to secure financing for commodity stock holdings through the IMF. Pressure against protectionism can be kept up through GATT and UNCTAD. Valuable incremental gains have been obtained through institutional means in the past. There is no reason to think that this route will not yield further dividends in the longer run, although immediate prospects do not seem promising.

**T**he case for larger volumes of ODA could be pressed more strongly, and less shyly, on straightforward humanitarian grounds. It is the continued use of the moral argument that can draw in the East and OPEC besides the recalcitrant North. The force of what Paul Streeten has underlined with reference to the North is equally valid for Southern espousal: 'It is odd that a moral, disinterested concern by rich countries for the development of the poor is hardly ever conceded. As hypocrisy is the tribute vice pays to virtue, so professions of nation-

nal self-interest in the development of poor countries may be the tribute that virtue has to pay to vice. Let us, in the present fashion for stressing common and mutual interests, not underestimate the power of moral appeals. Holland, Sweden and Norway, which have put international cooperation squarely on a moral basis, have hit the 0.1 aid target. It is the countries in which aid has been sold to the public as in the national self-interest where the effort is sadly lacking.'<sup>3</sup>

**T**he transfer of resources from the rich to the poor has been argued so far mainly on grounds of 'justice'. A surer foundation may be 'solidarity' and a better framework one in which even the upper-poor and the lower-rich would give their mite. As the Brandt Commission has pointed out (p. 226), 'the time has come to consider a universal system of contributions based on present targets for the richest countries but also providing for contributions from all other countries, except the poorest, on a sliding scale related to income. This would be an expression of shared responsibility for international development'

Thirdly, an intra-South dialogue with OPEC will have to be promoted on issues of re-cycling oil surpluses, if not oil price accommodation and a long-term approach to migration, allowing for planned assimilation and orderly return migration. A large number of developing countries are interested in these issues. Together they should be in a position to initiate a free, frank and friendly dialogue with OPEC.

All this involves not necessarily an abandonment but rather an orchestration of the North-South paradigm. Its indisputable usefulness at rhetorical, hortatory and educative levels can be preserved, but only through a more selective and sophisticated use of it. Background music should accentuate the action. It need not be allowed to distract from, or get confused with, action itself.

<sup>3</sup> Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Ed) *Towards One World? International Responses to the Brandt Report* Temple Smith, London 1981, p. 157.

# People's security versus national security

GIRI DESHINGKAR

AT any time of their choosing and in the interests of their own 'national security', the leaders of the super powers can unleash a thermo-nuclear war which could exterminate not only the Americans and the Russians but also the rest of us. According to the reigning concept of national security, the two leaders will not be threatening our national security. They will not be violating our territorial integrity or sovereignty. Nevertheless, we will be either dead or maimed. Where then lies our security even in conventional terms?

With the spectre of a thermo-nuclear war looming large, most peoples in the world have already been deprived of security, even while the national security of many States remains juridically intact. Clearly, something is terribly wrong with the reigning definition of national security in the age of nuclear weapons. But it is not only the atomic age which makes nonsense of our inherited idea of security. Such other global phenomena as atmospheric or oceanic pollution — the degradation of what can be called the 'world commons' — have been eroding the security of the people everywhere for decades. And yet the nation-States of the world continue to give the highest priority to guarding their

borders, air-spaces and territorial waters with high-technology weapons costing billions.

Even if we were to accept the increasingly hollow concept of national security, the billions spent on weaponry are today demonstrably producing more insecurity rather than security. This is because more 'national security' simply means more military power and such power *ipso facto* engenders insecurity in other nation-States who then proceed to acquire more military power, thereby threatening the 'national security' of the State which thought it was enhancing it. It is a vicious circle in which the marginal and temporary 'security' of some States inevitably increases the insecurity of all States absolutely and permanently.

This is not a new discovery. The vicious circle has been there long enough for everyone to be aware of it. Why then do the ruling elites of nation-States go on clinging to the prevailing notion of 'national security'? The answer is simple: the marginal and temporary 'security' achieved through the incremental acquisition of sophisticated weapons contributes towards the 'security' of the elites themselves. It is not in

their interests to admit that lasting and stable security can only be conceived in terms of the people. The two securities are not only distinct but often in opposition to each other. It is natural that the ruling elites should want to confuse the two, to enhance their own security at the cost of that of the people. The ruling elites cannot survive unless they 'sell' their security as if it were identical with people's security.

That project of the elites has been partly successful so far. There are historical reasons for this. The European State-system which had maintained peace in Europe and the rest of the world for one hundred years, through a set of shared elite values, began to break down in 1914. The old order crumbled under the impact of modern technology and communications, forces which brought about the disintegration of the earlier stable and secure communities and under the impact of the impersonalisation of social relationships.

The individual insecurity engendered by this process produced the quest for a new unifying ideology. The nationalist ideology fitted the bill. Nationalism offered new substitutes for the lost familiarities. It also offered the promise of improving the collective chances of the nation's members. No wonder that the narrow new nationalism of the new elites rapidly spread to most parts of the world.

Nationalism, however, was an ideology which substituted competition in the place of cooperation. So, the new national collectives could improve their chances only at the cost of other national collectives. This produced the need for a new kind of leadership which could handle competition in all spheres of life — economy, trade, military power, even sports, and scientific discoveries. And that need was met by new, secular, modernizing elites. The people and the elites of one nation-State always seemed to share — and did often share — the same competitive goals against those of other nation-States. National defence was one of those collective goals which was actually shared by

the people and the elites. (For reasons which we need not now discuss, public opinion is usually somewhat homogeneous about external issues. Even, today, the people normally support their governments in their foreign policies, particularly those relating to defence.)

In the course of time, however, there took place a conceptual shift from 'national defence' to 'national security'. All the collective goals of a nation-State came to be reified in the notion of 'national interest'. So vague was the concept of national interest that any ideas could be combined and recombined to suit the immediate needs of the ruling elites. And the defence of elite needs and interests and, indeed, their furtherance came to be included within the equally vague notion of 'national security'.

In the minds of the ruling elites, 'national interest' and 'national security' could be threatened by the people of the nation-State itself. Where such a threat was seen by the elites to be endemic, the 'national security State' came into being. Today's world has a large number of such 'national security States'. They exist in a permanent state of emergency. The State is always mobilized and ready to react, often against its own citizens.

Even in States where the elites have not gone quite that far, 'national security' still remains the main *raison d'etat*. This has given rise to multi-State alliance systems, nationally produced and controlled weapon-systems, economic policies aimed at maximizing political power, ideologies to strengthen one's State and to subvert others, and the use of diplomacy for control of the inter-State systems. All policy debates within the nation-States revolve around these aspects.

It can be readily seen that such a notion of national security has no place in it for people's security. For, people's security must encompass all levels of social existence in such a manner that the enhanced security of one level or group does not mean insecurity for others *including those beyond the borders of the nation-*

*State*. The people need security against violence and against the denial and disruption of the vital necessities of a life of dignity. This means their assured access to food, clean water, clean air, minimal shelter, basic clothing, physical security, affection and respect.

The 'welfare State' does seek to achieve this for its own citizens but usually at the cost of the security of the peoples of other countries. In any case, there are only a few welfare States in the world. The other States promote economic development for maximizing political and military power, usually at the cost of the security of their own citizens.

The vast majority of the nation-States never have served and do not still serve the security of the peoples as defined above. The nation-State routinely subordinates the people to the State. It deprives the peoples of the authority to use violence even to ensure their own security and vests that authority in itself. And since the political elites identify themselves with the nation-State, their immediate security, prestige and glory are preserved by the use of coercion, violence and, sometimes, regular warfare against whole groups of people. A careful reading of the 'emergency' clauses in the constitutions of most States will show how such a spectrum of actions can be undertaken by the State in a perfectly 'legal' way.

When the colonized peoples were struggling for independence, the nation-State seemed to hold the promise of security against hunger, oppression, exploitation and indignity. But this promise has never been fulfilled. The nation States which came into existence as a result of decolonization have been found to be just as incapable of meeting the demands of the people as were the empires. This may be partly because the process of struggle for independence heightened the expectations of the people from the State which did not have the ability to cope with the heightened demands.

At the same time, the value-system of the nation-State remained much weaker than that of self-governing communities of the past.

The inability to cope with the people's demands for security has led to a decline in the legitimacy of the State and the weak value-systems have produced the temptation to use repression on an increasing scale. All States, whatever their social systems, find themselves in this predicament today

What is more, nation-States have also got themselves locked into an inter-State system where the security of one *ipso facto* creates insecurity for others. Such a system can never be transformed to subserve human purposes — no one even talks about such a transformation any more — because the institution of the nation-State is specifically designed to maximize the political, economic and military power of one entity vis-a-vis others in a competitive way. Enhancement of one's power very often requires the weakening and even subversion of other entities. Hence, diplomacy in the inter-State system has to serve these ends rather than seek to 'impractically' enhance the security of all

## II

Thus, the institution of the nation-State can neither preserve its security in the inter-State system nor ensure the people's security. This has another implication. Concretely speaking, the non-State actors who have the maximum potential to transform the existing inter-State and domestic systems are those who can establish strong international links in an organized manner. They are the workers, intellectuals, religious institutions, peace-movements, ecological ('green') movements, 'grass-roots' movements, and the already transnational institutions of the United Nations system. For a beginning, they must make concerned efforts to take away from the nation-State the monopoly of security and at the same time devise ways in which the people can have the reality of security through non-military means

This involves a whole spectrum of actions. And since most human actions are of a non-violent nature,

they can and should be extended to the task of conflict resolution and transformation. Examples of such actions within the country are the establishment of people's tribunals for fact-finding and settlement of disputes, concluding peace pacts between communities, political and social ostracism of elites who ignore people's security, participative and self-reliant development based on community interests, concerted demands on the ruling elites that they live up to their promises, non-violent resistance to oppression and injustice, building up grape-vines to make available to the people information denied by the government (e.g., the inefficiency of high-technology weapons and wasteful expenditures on the military) — generally, actions which redistribute the powers usurped by the State and those which take the 'security' monopoly away from the State

Internationally, such actions can take the form of delegitimizing the nuclear deterrence theory on which the nuclear arms-race has been based, demanding nuclear weapon-free zones, transnational linkage of peace movements, organized expressions of goodwill towards the people of neighbouring countries, exerting pressures on governments to resort to diplomacy rather than military power in conflict situations, working for strengthening transnational institutions — in short, actions conducive to the enhancement of security for all. Only the people can rise above the zero-sum game in which the nation-States have trapped themselves. In the past, the people have demonstrated their power in anti-imperialist struggles. There is no reason why they cannot do that in the struggle for people's security today and in future

This is not a sentimental plea for human solidarity. Nowhere does this analysis appeal to the goodness of human nature. Instead, what it attempts to do is to point out the everyday truth that burgeoning national security establishments have demonstrably failed to produce more security, either for the nation or for the people. Unquestionably, the people must defend their territory and independence against ex-

ternal attacks but this obligation must not take the form of permanent mobilization and the highest state of preparedness with enormously expensive high-technology weapons and nuclear weapons of mass-destruction

The objective fact is that the more militarily powerful a nation, the stronger is the temptation to resort to hegemony, coercion and armed force. But an equally objective fact is that even the best of friends have some conflicts. What friends do to resolve conflicts can be extended to broaden the area of cooperation between enemies. It is a plea to begin by regulating inter-State conflicts with a view to eliminating them altogether

Europe, as I have pointed out earlier, did enjoy one hundred years of peace. That was based on the shared values of the elites. The new elites of the vastly expanded world of nation-States today have no shared values on which to base an enduring peace. On the contrary, their narrow nationalisms have produced more insecurity for all nations as well as their peoples. In this atmosphere of increasing insecurity, the national elites, particularly the political elites, seek to buy security for themselves, at the cost of people's security. The people are only now beginning to become aware of the link between their insecurity and 'national security'. Hence the rise of peace movements and, more importantly, the linkages between peace movements and those movements which are struggling to have security against hunger, violence and injustice

Such linkages are now burgeoning and they are increasingly getting involved in generating and strengthening non-State institutions. The maturation of these institutions will be a long and slow process because of the impediments put in their way by the institution of the nation-State. But the process will go on and it can be hastened by the people. The nation-State may today appear to be the natural and final political organization in history. So did the institution of the empire, not too long ago

# Non-alignment and beyond

SOEDJATMOKO

THE notion of non-alignment — of rejecting the concept of a world in which it was necessary to ally oneself with one of two rival blocs — was a novel one, and often seen in its initial stages as hostile to the interests of the major power blocs that emerged after World War II. To espouse this cause at the United Nations during its early years, as Nehru has observed, was 'to plough a lonely furrow.' The very structure of the United Nations itself, he noted, was one which, as it came into being at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, seemed to imply two orders of nationhood — the Security Council, with veto power for the strong, and the General Assembly for the weaker

The Bandung Conference in 1955 was really the take-off point for

non-alignment. I attended that Conference as adviser to my country's delegation and there again I had the honour of meeting Nehru. This regional conference of 29 Asian and African countries was an attempt to develop a programme for active international cooperation in helping to bring about national freedom and decolonization. The Bandung Charter, containing the five *Panchsheel* Principles and the peaceful co-existence principles, provided the non-aligned movement with its essential blueprint.

The movement became truly worldwide with the Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned Countries in 1961 at which Presidents Tito of Yugoslavia and Nasser of Egypt, along with the early Asian leaders, played significant roles. Between Bandung and Belgrade a number of nations, particularly in Africa, had become independent; and the ranks

---

\* Extracted from the Sixteenth Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Lecture, 1982.

of the non-aligned at the UN were swelling; they no longer had to plough Nehru's lonely furrow. Political patterns within the UN began to change as bipolarization was increasingly challenged. One could also argue, I believe, that the non-aligned movement was influential, at least indirectly, in helping to dampen polarization in Europe.

The third great theme of the non-aligned was economic equity (after decolonization and peaceful co-existence). It came to the fore in the Cairo Conference in 1964. The mid-1960s, however, also witnessed the beginnings of the strains within the non-aligned that have increasingly plagued the movement ever since. As domestic disorders brought serious internal problems to light, so too did the differing national interests of the various members of the movement.

Thus, with many signs of fragmentation and loss of dynamism within the movement, it was not until 1970 at Lusaka that another non-aligned conference took place. A major new thrust of this meeting was South-South collaboration. Following this, the notion of a new international economic order (NIEO) as a means of breaking the South's reliance on the North arose. The blueprint for the NIEO was drawn up at the non-aligned conference in Algiers.

Yet, for all the specific steps taken, the over-all drive and collective enthusiasm has continued to flag — in evidence with the lack of great accomplishment at the Colombo Conference and the divisions that displayed themselves at the 1979 meeting in Havana. The need to cancel the planned 1982 meeting in Baghdad because of the war between Iraq and Iran — two of the original participants in the first coming together in Bandung — was further melancholy evidence of the acute fragmentation, disagreement and disarray that had come to afflict the non-aligned. It is a sad fact that more than 100 wars have been fought in the third world since the end of World War II, and most of them have been due to our own internal disagreements and tensions.

For all the divergent tendencies and conflicts that have reduced the effectiveness of collaboration within the non-aligned movement, there is little question of the very positive contributions that it has made to world peace and equity.

Certainly, first would have to be the whole decolonization process to which it imparted such impetus and drive. At the time of Bandung, vast reaches of Africa were still under colonial domination, and a number of Asian nations were only just emerging into the light of independence. While many vestiges of colonialism still afflict our lives, there are today only a few scattered patches on the globe still formally designated as colonies.

Credit must also be given to the movement's moral stance on the necessity for peace — a stance most eloquently expressed by Nehru in defining the concept of *Panchsheel* after the Bandung Conference.

This idea of *Panchsheel* lays down the very important truth that each people must ultimately fend for itself. I am not thinking in terms of military fending, but in terms of striving intellectually, morally, spiritually, and in terms of opening out all our windows to ideas from others, and learning from the experience of others.\*

The concept of peaceful co-existence was seen at first by many of the strong and cynical as almost a laughing matter, but it came ultimately to be the foundation for the spirit of *détente*.

The non-aligned have also figured prominently in UN efforts at conflict resolution and peace-keeping. India played a central role on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at the end of the Korean War, and troops of various non-aligned nations have served the cause of peace in the Congo, Suez and other scenes of conflict.

A third major contribution has been in the non-aligned efforts to draw attention to and demand action

on the inequities in the international economic picture, epitomized in the call for a more just international economic order at the Algiers Conference, from there it went to the United Nations where it led to two special sessions of the General Assembly which gave birth to the UN Declaration and Programme of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order.

Now, however, many of the major thrusts and inspirations of the non-aligned nations have come to a halt. In part, of course, this is because a number of their aspirations and strategies have become smothered by the current global economic crisis, in which they are really not the major villains but its chief victims. In part, too, they are victims of the inability of all of us — North and South — to cope with the enormous and rapidly changing complexities of the world crisis, at a time when interdependence, however unjustly asymmetrical, has become total.

But, beyond that, it must be admitted that we of the non-aligned too easily fell prey to the old game of playing off one major power against the other for one's own economic or political interests. When one camp would not provide the arms to supply perceived security needs or aid for development, we turned to the rival camp. Here too the end result has been that the non-aligned have been the victims — this time of their own game. We first opened our doors to ideological salesmen from the super-power bloc, and in the process the third world became a battleground for rival global forces.

When the salesmen found that they could not sell ideology — as has become the case — they turned to marketing arms. In the years 1973-1977 — or roughly the period between the Algiers Conference giving form to the NIEO and the Colombo Conference at which our cross-purposes were becoming clear — something on the order of \$50 billion in arms were imported by third world countries, most of it from the industrialized world. Armed conflicts have also led to the

\*Speech in Lok Sabha, 17 September, 1965.

proxy involvement of third world military forces

What essentially happened, in my view, was that the non-aligned lost confidence in their own pluralistic vision of global solidarity which had first brought them together. As the vision collapsed, we gave vent to our fears of each other — our brethren in suffering and inequity. We began to build walls. India and China, the two most populous nations on earth who together could have given great force to the movement, split and fought over the contours of a wall between them — an event Nehru correctly termed 'a misfortune for all of us and for the world'

We cannot escape responsibility for this loss of vision. It is we, the non-aligned, who failed to evolve a common strategy to respond to today's worsening crisis of an increasingly complex world setting. It is we who failed to prevent the penetration of super power interests into the non-aligned movement, undermining the very rationale of the movement. Our tendency to play off one super power against the other or to wait for the major powers to agree among themselves served primarily to paralyze our will to act together.

A further failing was in not sufficiently evolving regional solidarities which could have helped to reduce our common economic and political dependencies on the super powers and former metropolitan powers. 'Non-alignment' was never translated into a design for an alternative course of socio-economic transformation, and a commensurate design for the State. The result was the worst of both worlds on the one hand, being torn between the capitalist and the State socialist models and, on the other hand, subject to the worst manifestation of the world market forces.

## II

**B**efore one can make any rational determination of the present challenge to the non-aligned movement, it is essential first to consider the nature of the global crisis that now confronts the world and impacts on

us in the South in particularly devastating fashion.

The present situation is a vastly changed one from that with which we had to deal in the early years of the non-aligned movement. Today, the whole international system itself is in a state of crisis and the cohesions — political, economic, social and otherwise — which have held it together are coming unstuck at an alarming rate.

Economically, the world is in a state of deepening recession. The international financial system has become separated from the economic system and has made rational management almost impossible — a three trillion Eurocurrency is virtually beyond control. Nations stricken by hunger and poverty must pay as much as \$ 125 billion a year on their debts despite stagnating economies, declining incomes and starving populations. Seeking economic relief, millions of people are pouring into already overcrowded slums of cities, those who stay behind ravage the environment as they engage in a desperate search for more fuel wood or more land to till. Three-quarters of a billion people are hungry in a world economy which, for all its present afflictions, still has the productive capacity to produce sufficient food for all. Much of the industrial capacity of the North lies idle while the development process in the South is stagnating. All of these problems are severely straining political systems everywhere.

**T**he world has lost political control over the nuclear arms race and the arms trade. A labour force of more than one hundred million people is paid directly or indirectly by defence ministries. Globally, more than 50 billion dollars is spent annually on military research and development, and nearly half a million scientists and engineers are engaged in the arms industry or weapons related research.

The cost of the arms race must be measured not only in the annual 600 billion dollars — itself accepted only as a rough approximation by many experts — but also in the lost opportunities, the possibilities that

are foregone for improving economic and social conditions throughout the world. Both in the North and South, governments keep buying ever more sophisticated arms for security, only to increase the globe's insecurity and vulnerability as well as their own. The militarization of whole societies is occurring. In short, humankind has allowed science and technology to serve its fears rather than its better creative impulses.

**G**overnments everywhere show an increasing incapacity to make the hard choices that have to be made to implement the difficult policies needed. We are in a situation in which the rate of change, fuelled by economic, but also profoundly political, social, cultural and especially technological factors, outpaces and outstrips the capacity of governments, but also of the political and social institutions that undergird them to absorb and adjust to these changes.

Beyond all these manifestations of present human folly of wrong priorities and limits to our collective capacity for governance, we will have in addition to deal with some new problems just around the corner, from which it will be very difficult to escape.

First, even if we assume that the present recession will be overcome in the next few years, it is only realistic to also assume that the rate of economic growth of the OECD countries will be very low for a very long time.

Secondly, this long period of slow economic growth is likely to be accompanied by continuing high levels of unemployment. This will be essentially structural in nature, resulting from efforts by these countries to move into a much more knowledge intensive post-industrial stage with still unpredictable impact on unemployment and life-styles. It is estimated that in western Europe alone, by 1990 there will be 12 million unemployed, affecting particularly the young and women.

Third, we will have to bear the consequences of the aging of popu-



lations, consequences we cannot yet read fully. It is already one of the contributing factors to the present crisis of the welfare State.

In the South, the graying of the population is also becoming a new factor that will have to be taken into account in our social and development strategies. And, for us, the age question has yet another dimension. The lowering of the median age in most of our countries, at a time when the development process may well continue to stagnate, will put tremendous pressures on the employment market; these pressures could in turn trigger political convulsions irrespective of ideological orientations and different development strategies.

Automation and robotization in the North are bound to create new problems for the South. The South can no longer assume, as it has in the past, that the further industrialization of the South will take place through the gradual movement of marginal industries of the North to the South, closer to the sources of cheap labour. Especially the late-comers in industrialization in the South will have to begin to rethink their patterns of industrialization that will enable them to compete on different terms with the North and at the same time to take care of their own massive unemployment problems.

**F**rom many points of view, therefore, the economic and financial future points to the need for new policies that take into account our inescapable interdependencies in this modern world, as well as the urgent requirements for social change that could provide all sectors of the society access to the benefits of economic improvement, social services, and participation in the political process.

For this to come about, however, certain long-term needs must be met:

— Real income, in all nations, must be increased — not only as measured in per capita income but also by other external factors that affect living conditions,

— Income disparities between rich and poor nations must be reduced over a reasonable period of time;

— Income disparities and inequities within countries, particularly in the third world, must be reduced,

— High priority must be given to education, health, housing and urban environment problems,

— Improved communications need to be put in the service of strengthening cultural diversity.

In the short term, a solution must be found to three very basic economic problems faced by the third world — the high cost of money and credit, falling prices for its primary and industrial products, and access to markets. It is the only way to avoid even higher levels of resource transfer from the North to the South to prevent economic collapse in a number of countries and a further breakdown of the international economic system.

**W**e cannot hope, however, to solve the present economic and financial crises within the framework of existing international structures. What is needed now is a second Bretton Woods that would establish international financial institutes that could more effectively handle, on the scale required, the closely interconnected problems of adjustment, development and structural change. This is the only way we can hope to reverse the present trend to the bilateralism that failed us so badly in the 1920s and 1930s and return to the multilateralism that served the world so much better after World War II.

We also need such new financial and economic institutions domestically — particularly in the third world. We will have to alter the ways we think about ourselves. The rapidity of the economic development of the NICs has led to regional and social disparities of great magnitude within the South — even though the economies of the NICs have now shown themselves to be highly vulnerable. We now realize that maldevelopment or notions of 'instant' development have been an enormous waste and misdirection of resources. We need to fashion insti-

tutions that reduce rather than aggravate inequalities and lessen social tensions, not add to them.

**N**one of the world's economic or financial problems, however severe they may be, poses as serious a threat to continued survival as does that of nuclear warfare — for there lies the route to extinction of all human life and all civilization. We would do well to remember in the South that there is no safe haven from nuclear war — its ravages would not spare our societies nor our peoples.

It seems unlikely that the super powers will consciously and deliberately opt to launch a nuclear war. But that is really rather small solace when we begin to factor in a number of other strategic considerations arising from the present state of the world's weaponry, nuclear and otherwise:

- \* The new generation of nuclear weapons now being produced, or likely to be produced shortly, are not deterrent weapons, but fighting weapons — thereby increasing the temptation to fight a nuclear war;

- \* Technical malfunctions, miscalculations, or accidents increasingly threaten to trigger nuclear war in a fearful world stockpiled with 50,000 nuclear warheads;

- \* The flashpoint of nuclear war could well lie in the instabilities of the third world. An international system as unpredictable as the present one puts great pressures on the threshold countries to go nuclear;

- \* The incapacity of the super powers to agree on effective arms reduction denies them the moral right to demand non-proliferation on the part of others; the non-nuclear powers will have to restrain themselves from using that option, for the sake of human solidarity;

- \* Technological innovation in the nuclear weapons field poses a great future threat. The technology of miniaturization in the nuclear weapons area, along with increased precision, makes any semblance of a nuclear balance all the more difficult to maintain;

- \* While concentrating on nuclear weapons, we must not overlook the



much greater destructive capacity of present conventional weapons — demonstrated all too well in recent conflicts,

\* The present seeming predominance of conventional defensive weapons should not lull us into a false sense of security which ignores the lessons of military history where the defensive-offensive superiority cycle has been inexorable,

\* And let us not forget the new weapons that are only a step away — in lasers, in chemical warfare, and in further development of 'smart' conventional weapons — and are only further testimony to the modern world's capacity for violence and destruction

The confluence of the growing political resistance to the emplacement of nuclear weapons and changing political orientations in various countries with the technological innovations in weapons systems may very well lead to basic shifts in military strategies — away from the land to the oceans or to space

We also need to take into account the fact that what may now seem safe alliances could easily be swept away in the next 20 years by these changing political tides, leading to new political configurations

All the evidence tells us one thing with great clarity — we simply cannot go on living for the next 20 years or so with the present terrifying levels of armaments, in such fragile balance and living at the brink of nuclear holocaust. Already now a whole generation has grown up who do not believe they will live out their natural lives — and that is already affecting behaviour and life-styles.

### III

**W**hat conclusions might be drawn from this look at the present troubled world situation and the implications of these newly emerging problems?

First, we must all of us — North and South, East and West — attempt to stop this drift into international anarchy which threatens all our lives and those of all our

children. We must act to make science and technology more socially and politically accountable, devise more effective means for the governance of our various international systems, and create the institutions that can be responsive to the global society's continuing and new needs and changing values, and to accommodate and integrate the many new political forces everywhere, reflecting these changes in this very profound process of social and global transformation. We must ready a world that is a viable one for the six billion people who will inhabit it as we reach the 21st century

**S**ome 80 per cent of that global population will be living here in the South and so the non-aligned cannot afford to be paralyzed just because the super powers and the North in general are unable to act. To avoid this paralysis, we will have to take stock of our own collective condition more honestly than we have done so far, and look into the causes of our present weakness, disarray and fragmentation. Failing to do so may well doom us to increasing insignificance and irrelevance. In the first place we will have to devise ways to make more effective use of our own material and human resources on a regional and sub-regional basis that will reduce our vulnerabilities and our security and economic dependencies on the super powers and the metropolitan powers

At the same time, we will have to continue the struggle for a more decent and equitable international order capable of overcoming the structural inequities that now exist between North and South. And we must do so without losing sight of the ultimate global context in which we will have to work out our difficulties

The situation calls for a common strategy from the non-aligned to deal with the crisis of the international system and to adjust the terms of its dialogue with the North as well as for the global negotiations to the new conditions, integrating the security and economic and financial as well as the developmental aspects of these problems through a set of regional approaches

within a common global perspective. As a first step this will require the clear identification and broadening the margins of independent decision making.

**O**ne other thing that seems clear is the need to revive the non-aligned movement as a popular movement. The North-South dialogue has become too much the preserve of the bureaucrats — not the millions once stirred by its banner of freedom and equity. Compounding matters, the various bureaucracies have claimed possession of its issues in very fragmented fashion. Its various elements are now under the purview of foreign, finance, agricultural and other ministries with very little coordination between them, even in the Group of 77

The movement has also lost the popular constituencies in a number of countries in the North on which it formally could count — the youth, the clergy, trade unions and the liberals. The young have become mainly interested in single-issue politics which they have yet to relate to other domestic or international issues. The clergy are mainly concerned with human rights. Unemployment has driven all other concerns from the trade union agenda. The great ideologies that shaped our thinking and our institutions in the early part of this century have exhausted themselves. They are now fragmented and incapable of dealing with the complex interlinkages between domestic problems and their international dimensions. We have nothing to replace these ideas

We badly need a change, I believe, in our categories of thought about North-South relationships, the phraseologies of the 1950s and 1970s will no longer do. Increasingly, many of the South's problems are shared by a number of small and medium countries in the North. In attempting to consolidate our strength, we may have to think of new coalitions of small and middle powers in the North and South as well as in the West and the East. In that context, we may regain some of the support of our old constituencies — and also begin to relate to new emerging political forces in

the industrial world and broaden their concerns to embrace similar issues in the South.

**B**ut, to accomplish all this, we very much need to put our own houses in order first. We will have to learn to deal more effectively with the central problem of inequality in our own countries. With a few exceptions, we have failed to overcome the structural dualism of our societies inherited from our colonial and pre-colonial past. We need to do something about the consumptive life styles of our elites which helps perpetuate this dualism. We must find ways to revitalize the countryside. It is entirely possible, in my view, that we could use the effort to overcome inequalities by developing our own internal markets better, as a means of stimulating and reviving our economies, reducing the paralyzing social and political tensions, and using the revolution in science and technology to serve those ends rather than falling victim to it.

We need to gird ourselves for the coming technological revolution which will impact so sharply on all of humankind but could have particularly negative effects and create new dependencies in the third world unless we are better prepared to become part of that revolution. I am talking here about the enormous implications for future human growth in the revolutionary developments in fields like biotechnology, communications and micro-processors, energy technology, material technology, sea bed technology and space technology.

Regional arrangements will be essential to our effort to build up the collective strength of the South, particularly in the area of security, so that we may reduce the dependencies on the super powers and metropolitan powers which have so sapped our vision. To reduce the possibility of countries within a region to make war on each other would involve regional agreements on conflict resolution mechanisms, confidence building measures, reduction and verification of arms, and new mechanisms for the settlement of border disputes and the prevention of armed conflicts.

We also need to construct the regional economic and social architecture for peace through such measures as the scrambling of national interests, harmonization of development plans emphasizing complementarity rather than competition, co-operative development and use of nuclear power, harmonization of defence plans and, to the extent necessary for minimum regional security, the regional production of arms. These would help to ensure the transparency of the intentions and capabilities of any nation within a region. Regional arrangements could also be made to assure food securities and promote environmental cooperation.

**O**ur efforts to consolidate strengths on a regional basis will inevitably force us to look with new eyes at our development strategies. This could lead to more effective inter-regional cooperation and the building of better economic and social infrastructures for really meaningful South-South cooperation. All of these will need to be evolved in ways that benefit and not impede global negotiation.

The efforts will force us to look at our own innermost values, the cultural wellsprings for creative social action. This would most likely take us in new directions leading to different patterns of industrialization and social development, more in line with our basic cultural values. To do this, however, we will have to work out different concepts of growth that are not limited to the economic field but enable us to deal with social growth as well and new concepts of productivity and value, again not exclusively measured in economic terms but using social and cultural productivity as additional yardsticks of growth.

All of this will require social innovation on an unprecedented scale. If we can do this, I don't think it is a utopian vision to visualize the emergence of alternative, non-western modern civilizations capable of dealing with the challenge of the 21st century — the Sinic, Hindu, Islamic and others — to take their rightful place on the basis of rough parity alongside those of the West.

# Books

## SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION

edited by Satya Murthy The Institute of Asian Studies, Hyderabad.

## NON-ALIGNMENT FRONTIERS AND DYNAMICS

edited by K P Mishra Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982.

IN his foreword to *South Asian Regional Cooperation*, L.K. Jha repeats lest we forget that 'In the context of the ongoing debate on the North-South issues, economic cooperation among developing countries has acquired a special significance.' We are also reminded that the Andean group and the Assam group have made substantial progress towards intra-regional cooperation and have moved forward towards a degree of integration. This should presumably inspire the South Asian countries to emulate them.

When resources and technical know-how are limited, with the gulf between the rich and poor ever widening, regional cooperation becomes imperative. It may be added that, for regional cooperation, a certain level of homogeneity is required. This too is not lacking in South Asia. The logic of South Asian regional cooperation is inescapable. One can easily pronounce that the need is urgent and the scope vast. Regrettably, logic does not often dictate the behaviour of neighbouring States and considerable effort and goodwill are required to make the desired progress.

This has never inhibited well meaning persons from inquiring and analysing the prospects for South Asian regional cooperation. Comprising papers presented in a seminar jointly sponsored by the Institute for Asian Studies, Osmania University and the Standing Committee for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, the present volume is the outcome of such concern.

The organisers of the seminar included out-of-power politicians, retired but active bureaucrats and

academicians from different disciplines. The seminar was obviously conceived as a 'big show' by the co-sponsors. The consent of Narasimha Rao was received for the inauguration (though he could not be present) and contributions from Y B Chavan and B R Bhagat are included.

B.R. Bhagat exerted only to generalize 'The study of regional Cooperation anywhere has been a sign of a tortuous journey.' To this Y B Chavan dutifully added the exhortation, 'From ideas we have to move to models, to schemes and, finally, to work and action programmes systematically. This is both a challenge and an opportunity for us. We must not falter.'

But politicians are a breed apart. One should discreetly leave them alone. If unavoidably they have to be invited to inaugurate or participate in a seminar, no effort should be wasted in making sense out of their pronouncements.

The quality of contributions is quite uneven, indicating once again that not all seminars have in them the seeds of a book. It seems that no seminar is considered as one till its proceedings are published. The ritual is by now well established and it would be churlish to hold this slim, vaguely relevant and marginally useful book against the distinguished and eminent participants.

One wishes though that some Indian participants had not glossed over obstacles and proclaimed little less proudly that India ranks tenth among the largest industrial powers and is leading in achievements among developing countries. True, the presence of foreign delegates must have been tempting but then this is the kind of talk that raises eyebrows in the neighbourhood about the real intentions of the big brother. It would serve better the cause of regional cooperation in South Asia if the lead were given a little less assertively.

Not all papers are without any merit though. Some do accomplish a rather simplified digest of

conventional wisdom. As Jagjit Singh notes: 'Indian transformation of agriculture from a traditional and, to some extent, subsistence farming to modern agriculture based on up-to-date science and technology during the sixties and seventies now universally known as the Green Revolution should be of interest to regional countries' Search for alternative sources of energy too can be a shared endeavour. There is great scope for popularising science. Only if a beginning can be made, the task of cooperation in the scientific and technological fields can grow apace to the benefit of all countries concerned.

To which Lavakare adds, 'But this can be done only in the overall context of the socio-economic development of the countries of this region' The economic cooperation, which is foremost in the minds of the policy makers, can be ultimately achieved not only through specific trade, business, mutual financial assistance etc., but only if other human endeavours which clearly lead to the development of the societies of those countries, are considered in their totality

However, identifying the need for collaboration and having indicated possible areas in which such collaborative ventures could be undertaken, it is also necessary to examine briefly what kind of institutional mechanism would be necessary. The need for non-governmental bodies to undertake specific studies in the field is conceded but specific and detailed suggestions are missing. Much more rigorous work than this is needed at the academic and intellectual level to prepare the ground for regional cooperation in South Asia

THE Dean and the Senior Members of the Faculty had obviously a plan for celebrating the Silver Jubilee of the School of International Studies (now a part of the Jawaharlal Nehru University). And, as its founding father has since disclosed, an address by him was obviously part of their plan. It should have been obvious to every one that the commemorative Seminar's proceedings would sooner rather than later be published as part of the celebrations. This has now been done in *Non-alignment: Frontiers and Dynamics*

Scholars in the field of international studies, it seems, can never have too much of a good thing. And what can be better than good old non-alignment — the theme chosen for this seminar. No one in the preparatory enthusiasm remembered that '*Non-Alignment in Contemporary International Relations*' had already provided grist to the scholarly mill as recently as May 1980. (Proceedings published by Vikas, edited by K. P. Mishra and K. R. Narayan). The School, it appears, has decided to continuously issue forth its scholarly contributions in the Collected Papers from a Seminar format

The professionals once again indulge in semi-theological semantics. Is non-alignment a negative concept? Is it neutrality? Is it equi-distance from the two super powers or equi-proximity? What is

tragic is that instead of getting tired of cliches coined decades back, almost everyone seems to be in a hurry to discover and propagate yet another platitudinous profundity. Persevering through stretches of arid prose one is tempted more than once to borrow the title 'Chronicles of Wasted Time'. A certain amount of repetition in an enterprise of this size, mounted at short notice, is perhaps unavoidable but only a certain amount.

There are, one must confess, a few pieces — blissfully short and useful for a reader not hard to please. Here too one can hear resonances of earlier pronouncements. It is perhaps not necessary to illustrate the obvious flaws of futility but it would be dishonest to shut one's eyes to glaring incongruities. Some contributors did not obviously consider it worth their while or time to get interested in the subject or to work adequately on their contributions. Cuban non-alignment by Professor Narayanan — one presumes an interesting and important topic — is disposed off in a little more than a couple of printed pages in a Revise-Night-Before-The-Examination manner.

Professor Zuberi in 20 plus pages carefully avoids mentioning the words non-alignment even once. It may be mentioned in passing that this essay titled 'Nuclear Safeguards and the Developing Countries: The Servitudes of Civilian Nuclear Technology' does seem obviously out of place in the collection. (This I hasten to add is no reflection on its intrinsic worth.) Vaidik's narration of Afghan non-alignment has reassured me that most of the valuable journalistic writing is confined to the vernacular press and not an insignificant volume is being contributed by my good friend himself. He seldom finds it necessary to cite anyone else either as a source or as an authority.

Dr. Zafar Imam offers the reader the thought provoking perspective that the Soviet Union has been 'supporting the movement in order to phase it out and ultimately transform it'. This may seem contradictory but not when we remember as we are told that 'once the movement is seen as an integral part of the overall socio-economic transformation of the societies of the Third World it becomes a social process in itself destined to undergo quantitative and qualitative change. In other words, even this social process is transient... In other words, as an important form of class struggle it must exist and move ahead.'

While most academics are burdened with justifying the Indian brand of non-alignment and its metamorphosis over the years, it is left to a retired diplomat to provide a refreshing insight without sounding apologetic. 'One final and definitive factor makes it impossible for India to escape the non-aligned destiny even if its leaders wish it to do so. We are too large, too complicated, too populous a country to be an asset to any bloc of like minded countries. We would be much more welcome to our friends in both Washington and Moscow as



To  
**ALL BOOK AGENTS**

**Seminar Annual**  
**INDIA 1982**

will be out on January 1, 1983

Price Rs 10.00

Please send your orders to  
us immediately at the  
following address

Circulation Manager

Seminar

Malhotra Building

Janpath

P. B. No. 338

New Delhi-110 001



**FOUR  
SWAN  
FABRICS**

**FOR ENCHANTING SHADES  
IN COTTON AND BLENDED TEXTURES**

Pamper your every whim and fancy with Four Swan Fabrics  
in cotton and Polyester/cotton blends. Crease-resistant  
Four Swan fabrics come in a wide range of colours and prints.

*Manufactured by:*

**THE VICTORIA MILLS LTD., BOMBAY.**



**MANGALDAS  
GROUP MILLS**


**When you need high quality controls,  
remember...**

***Danfoss***

**Manufacturers of  
Controls for Domestic/Commercial  
Refrigeration and Air Conditioning.**



**Automatic Controls**



**Helping to save energy. Silently.**

**Registered Office : 706-707 Surya Kiran, 19 Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi 110 001.**

friendly outsiders, not embarrassing members of the family' (p. 214)

'Towards Understanding Non-Alignment', 'Prospects of the Non-Aligned Movement', 'Non-Alignment and the International Economic Order', 'Transnational Corporations and Non-Alignment' are the exceptional pieces — readable, succinct and substantial. But these can hardly be considered adequate compensation by the reader who toils through the book. For a volume exceeding 500 pages and priced at Rs 150, *Non-Alignment Frontiers and Dynamics* provides quite disappointing fare

Pushpesh Pant

**REASONS OF STATE: Political Development and India's Foreign Policy under Indira Gandhi, 1966-1977** by Shashi Tharoor. Vikas, New Delhi, 1982

THERE is something wrong with the discipline of political science in India. It has not shown any perceptible sign of growth despite its independent existence in Indian universities for more than four decades. (On the other hand, sociology — a comparatively late-comer — has grown remarkably well during the last three decades.) The problem is more acute in the field of international relations which has been treated as an autonomous discipline, a sub-discipline in India since at least 1955 when the school of International Studies was established in New Delhi. India's foreign policy has not been subjected to rigorous scholarly treatment except by a few of scholars. What has generally been produced is confined to a study of India's bi-lateral relations with various countries during a specified period of time, largely based on newspaper clippings. Such studies are alright inasmuch as they are meant to train the researcher. But they cannot be anything more than that.

While the credo 'publish or perish' has been given up in the country where it originated, the United States, we in India have taken to it rather too seriously. Consequently, not only the doctoral dissertations but even the M. Phil ones are generally published as books without any effort on the part of their authors to adapt them to book form. Worse still, even senior scholars seem to be in a hurry to bring out books of uneven quality. They are aided and abetted by the proliferating publishing business in India. The editorial departments of most of the publishers here are in poor shape — they do not do justice either to the authors or to the readers.

In such an overall situation, one cannot blame Tharoor for rushing to print his doctoral dissertation which he wrote at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He claims it to be a revised version of his Ph. D. thesis which is only partially true. He has no doubt added an Epilogue, 64 pages in length, on the foreign policy under the Janata/Lok Dal interregnum, but that is all by way of 'revision'.

The difference in styles of his thesis as a student and that of the *Epilogue* as a writer is obvious. Had

Tharoor had a little more patience to re-write the main body of his book, the result would have been excellent. Instead of abbreviating footnotes, making it difficult for the reader to discern the sources adequately, he could have reduced their number. And there is no justification for a book of this nature to be published without a bibliography. The production of the book does not bring any credit to the name of Vikas, editing and proof-reading are inadequate.

But that does not reduce the value of Tharoor's book. As a Ph. D. dissertation it is a commendable effort. His deserting the academic field is a loss to the Indian academic community. The epilogue shows promise. Given the constraints, the book is a welcome addition to the meagre literature on India's foreign policy. It is not Tharoor's drawback to use the 'political development' approach to the study of India's foreign policy, he obviously was 'guided' to do so by his professors in the United States. The framework developed in the sixties, especially at Princeton, is no more in vogue even there. Yet the poor lad (Tharoor is only 26) was directed towards that path. This reviewer is of the view that given an opportunity to re-write the book on the subject, Tharoor would have avoided the 'approach' he had adopted for his doctoral dissertation.

There is hardly any point on which one can disagree with Tharoor. He rightly points out that Mrs. Gandhi 'had indeed, no foreign policy, only an inchoate collection of foreign policy decisions, emerging from a world-view that was an uneasy blend of predilection and principle. Indira Gandhi was unable to reconcile her twin values of "independence" and "power" because she conceived of them only in relation to the super powers and yet applied them inconsistently elsewhere. Her own perspective confined her' (pp. 350-51).

There is a general impression here that Mrs. Gandhi has managed India's foreign policy well. It is a mis-conceived impression sold to the unsuspecting people because of an inadequate articulation of foreign policy issues by Indians. For instance, the Pokharan explosion of 1974 was generally welcomed by the people in India because they had been conditioned into believing in the need for such an act. In 1971, even Atal Behari Vajpayee called Indira Gandhi the 'Durga'. M. F. Hussain took his cue from Vajpayee when he depicted Mrs. Gandhi as 'Durga' during the Emergency. Nobody questioned, as Tharoor has rightly done, that in 1971, 'diplomacy could not back up defence' (p. 351).

India went in for the Indo-Soviet treaty before embarking on the Bangladesh venture. Was it really necessary? According to Tharoor, 'the military triumph (in Bangladesh) occurred side-by-side with a failure of Indian diplomacy epitomized both in unnecessary commitment of the Indo-Soviet treaty and the lop-sided vote against India in the UN General Assembly' (p. 348). Tharoor is right in

reaffirming that 'Bangladesh failed to result in any creative affirmation of regional political or diplomatic dominance' Given the present predilections of India, one is dismayed at those who, in early 1971, called the situation in East Pakistan as one representing for India 'a life-time's opportunity' We are not questioning the act *per se* but we would like to know whether all the imponderables had been taken into account before we did what we did in 1971 Does the decision stand up to a cost-benefit scrutiny? This is what happens in a centralised system like the one Mrs Gandhi operates

Brij Mohan

### **STORM OVER THE CONGO by D N Chatterji.**

Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980

D N CHATTERJI, 'ex' Indian ambassador to the Congo (Zaire) has fluently narrated the story of the most turbulent phase that the Congo passed through during the initial years of its independence The withdrawal of Belgium saddled the Congo with a number of problems A handful of university graduates along with totally inadequately trained manpower in every field hindered the process of nation building Vastness of size, disharmony among multiple ethnic, tribal and linguistic groups and perpetual struggle for leadership among warring factions began to threaten the Congo's integrity

The Congo's immense richness in mineral resources such as copper, cobalt, zinc, industrial diamonds etc, has attracted western investments in terms of capital as well as trained manpower. The magnitude of involvement of Belgium and France in particular have often promoted these erstwhile colonial countries to hold on and consolidate their gains by propping up pro-West leadership in the Congo (now Zaire)

The Congo arrested the attention of the world when the Katangan secessionist movement broke out under the pro-West leadership of Moise Tshombe in 1960. The crisis flared up when the Katangan gendarmerie accelerated the movement with the support of French and Belgium mercenaries The mineral rich Katanga province was contributing the lion's share in the foreign exchange earnings of the Congo As the secessionist movement gathered some momentum, the nationalist forces also strove to damn the tide of separatism by seeking support from outside powers In the process, the United Nations also intervened to protect the Congo's territorial integrity and independence

During this crucial phase, the Nehru government sent Chatterji as India's emissary to the Congo he stood by the U N endeavours that attempted to save the Congo from disorder, disintegration and collapse The author, while reflecting over this assignment, in retrospect, comments that it 'was more of an adventure than an ambassadorial post within the framework of orthodox diplomacy' The Indian mission seemed to have been preoccupied with two

objectives The first one was to reunite the Congo and protect its independence both *de facto* and *de jure* Secondly, it was also involved in posing a counterweight to Chinese activities in Africa Probably, the Sino Indian border dispute of 1962 compelled India to adopt such a stance (p 124)

In the inter-State relations of Africa, the Congo crisis in a way accelerated the formation of the groupings of African States into radical (Casablanca group) and moderate (Monrovia group) States. While the radical leaders like Nkrumah (Ghana) and Sekou Toure (Guinea) supported all the nationalist forces under Patrice Lumumba, the moderates refrained from taking a stand that would undermine the western interests. The domestic problems of the Congo have divided the African States in the past. What is more, the Sahba crises (1977 and 1978) in Zaire (previously Congo) also, to an extent, contributed to the polarization among African States However, the book tends to take the 'storm' in an isolated manner without putting it into the perspective of the inter-State politics of Africa.

The author has vividly portrayed the domestic political scene by narrating the character and styles of different leaders who were contenders for responsible positions, e.g., Prime Minister Adoula with a trade union background and yet anti-communist, Mobutu — a stern diplomatic general, President Kasavubu who knew the art of keeping himself in power, and Gizenga with radical pretensions He has also touched upon an ephemeral rebellion that was organized in the Eastern Congo by the Comite Nationale de Liberation (1964)

From 1960 till the rise of Mobutu to power in 1966, the Congolese polity witnessed a continuous transition which allowed a number of groups to walk in the corridors of power For example, the Binza group constituted by Mobutu, Nendaka, Bomboko and Adoula were at the helm of affairs for a short while The domestic politics reached a climaxing point when pro-West Moise Tshombe swung back to power and began to project himself as the sole champion of Congo's national unity One thoughtful observation of the author regarding the entire episode might hold true for a number of developing countries He writes, 'When this messianic figure (Lumumba) disappeared, the intelligentsia engaged themselves in futile internecine quarrels while the great powers fought in the Congo vicariously through them These gentlemen, potential leaders, imported their ideologies from their foreign patrons, being guided by shrewdness rather than fervour, but their real aim, as far as I could see, was not to restore the society but to participate in the prestigious and profitable business of government and its agencies' (p 160)

This book is certainly an important addition to the existing literature on the Congo The timing of its publication has made it all the more invaluable

Rajen Harshe



**GREAT POWER RELATIONS, WORLD ORDER  
AND THE THIRD WORLD** Essays in Memory  
of Sisir Gupta, edited by M.S. Rajan and Shivaji  
Ganguly Vikas Publishing House Private Ltd.,  
New Delhi, 1981

THE 'Essays in Memory of Sisir Gupta' in the book *Great Power Relations, World Order and the Third World* are appropriately centred around themes to which he had devoted a major portion of his life's work. Those of us who liked him and respected his ability and integrity, know that he would have been embarrassed and surprised by the genuinely admiring tributes paid to him — as an intellectual who had successfully crossed the divide between academic and operational involvement in foreign affairs, and as a human being. Unaware of the reaction he evoked among the wide cross-section of national and international experts with whom he came in contact, he would have been pleased to find just how much impact he has had on his contemporaries.

The book is divided into six parts on a very practical and well organised basis — International Order, Institutions and Law, Great Power Relations, The Third World, The Asian Setting, India in World Affairs. Inevitably, the range of authors results in considerable variation in quality, but most of the papers deserve attention. Some are so well researched and the data base so comprehensive, that they will always be valuable for reference. One or two are almost unconsciously revealing of the almost naive US pursuit of its interpretation of its national interest at a given time, making the Soviets appear more suave and sophisticated than they are in reality. The papers on India's international role, and on its relations with the super powers, provide useful background and some insights into its potential as a middle power despite its internal preoccupations — Sisir Gupta was many years ahead in anticipating this.\*

The pressure of events is such that many of the formulations would take a different line if written now as the global situation has changed so dramatically. That the result is still meaningful is a tribute to the efforts of the editors who persisted and quite logically decided to omit anything unduly delayed. The change in the international context serves to highlight the very sharp deterioration, economically and politically, since the papers were conceived. The UN Secretary General's current annual report gives the dimensions of the global crisis 'perilously near to a new international anarchy'.

There is painful recognition of the absence of any international order in given situations — from Bokassa's massacres through Idi Amin's 1/2 million exterminations in Uganda, and Pol Pot's systematic deliberate elimination of 1/3 of the populations of Kampuchea, but it would clearly have been impossible to foresee the current total breakdown. In

a sense, it provides emphasis to the view that 'international law seeks to protect and promote the interests of States and Governments more than the welfare of the people at large'. It also makes clear that from the outset, the handful of developed countries who established first the League of Nations, and then the United Nations, did so primarily with the objective of maintaining the existing status quo. Acknowledging that there were higher aspirations for the United Nations, the flow of events still demonstrates that its founders 'did point to the moon, but their eyes were all the time set on their vested interests'.

The hopes for a constructive dialogue between the North-South have faded as they have for the emergence of a New International Economic Order. These are phrases which the participants use, though aware that there is likely to be little progress. The South-South dialogue still has possibilities, but it has yet to take concrete shape. The base is so narrow. The development process itself has resulted in steady impoverishment of all except a tiny minority of privileged elements in developing countries.

Simultaneously, the crisis of global capitalism and socialist planning, and the massive build-up in armaments, including in the developing countries, raise fears that dangerous external remedies may be sought for internal problems. The relationship between the super powers is a long way from SALT II, and the then limited overflow of their power rivalries into the Indian Ocean have expanded beyond anything thought possible. The threat to the security and stability of the littoral countries has increased in proportion to their insistence that the Indian Ocean remain a zone of peace.

One concept recorded by Sisir Gupta towards the end of his life has increased in validity in this period. He considered that the changed character of India's democratic institutions was directly related to the emergence of larger and larger numbers of political functionaries with their social and cultural roots in India's soil. They are belatedly breaking the monopoly of the westernised elite who 'borrowed the Westminster model, lock, stock and barrel, but also hoped that this will constitute the permanent law of the land'. He would also have little cause to change his estimate of the Third World 'poor, unstable, new, non-white and weak' whose 'foreign policies reflected their elites' views of their own natural interests, rather than some concerted view of the interests of the Third World as a whole'.

Many more examples could be added of his pre-science, underlining what a loss his early death is to his field of study, to his students and his potential to influence the evolution of Indian foreign policy. It is unfortunate that the book does not include a brief biography, as readers unfamiliar with the range of his contributions would have more readily understood the eulogistic references to him, and to his very significant contribution.

\* Seminar, June 1969, page 17.

# Further reading

## BOOKS

- Alford J** (ed) Sea power and influence old issues and new challenges. England, Gower, 1980
- Attar Chand** Disarmament, detente and world peace a selected abstract 1916-1981 New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1982
- Ayoob, Mohammed** Southwest Asia beginning of a new cold war Canberra, Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1981
- Bajpai, U S** (ed) India's security. New Delhi, Lancers Publishers, 1982
- Baker, David** The shape of wars to come. Cambridge, Patrick Stephens, 1981
- Beer, Francis A.** Peace against war the ecology of international violence San Francisco, Freeman & Co, 1981
- Bertram, Christoph.** (ed) Third world conflict and international security London, Macmillan Press, 1982.
- Bhasin, V K.** Super power rivalry in the Indian Ocean New Delhi, S. Chand and Co, 1981
- Birla Institute of Scientific Research, Economic Research Division** India and the atom New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1982
- Burt, Richard** (ed) Arms control and defence postures in the 1980s London, Croom Helm, 1982
- Calder, Nigel** Nuclear nightmares, an investigation into possible wars New York, Penguin Books, 1981.
- Cottrell, Alvin J.** Sea power and strategy in the Indian Ocean Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1981
- Edmonds, Martin.** (ed) International arms procurement new directions New York, Pergamon Press, 1981
- Goodwin, Peter** Nuclear war the facts on our survival New York, Routledge Press, 1981
- Grant, Bruce** Security of South-East Asia London, I I S S, 1978 (Adelphi Paper No 142)
- Hackett, John** Third World War the untold story London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982
- Hagiwara, Yoshiyuki** (ed) Asia in the 1980s interdependence, peace and development Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economies, 1982
- Harrison, Paul.** Inside the Third World the anatomy of poverty Brighton, Sussex, The Harvester Press, 1980
- Hayter, T** The creation of world poverty an alternative view to the Brandt Report London, Pluto, 1981.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies.** Third World conflict and international security, London, The Institute, 1981.
- Jabber, Paul.** Not by war alone security and arms control in the Middle East Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981
- Kaul, Rajnish** West Asian cancer New Delhi, Pulse Publishers, 1981.
- Kennedy, William V** (Col) The balance of military power New York, St Martin's Press, 1982
- Lebow, Richard Ned** Between peace and war the nature of international crisis London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.
- Levi, Werner** The coming end of war Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1981
- Luttwak, Edward N** Strategy and politics collected essays New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1980
- McGreevey, W P** Third world poverty Farnborough, England, Lexington, 1981
- Nandelbau, Michael** The nuclear revolution international politics before and after Hiroshima Cambridge University Press, 1981
- Mathur, Y S** International control of the seas conflict and co-operation New Delhi, Sharda Prakashan, 1982
- May, Brian** The Third World calamity. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981
- Millar, T B** East-West strategic balance London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981.

- inha, S K Third world must learn to be self-sufficient 'Indian & Foreign Review' 20 (1). 15 October, 1982 10-11
- Whose global 2000 A D 'Financial Express' 4 June, 1982.
- Socialist International Study Group.** Analysis of disarmament problems. 'Janata' 37(1); 7 February, 1982. 39-53
- Solomon, Richard H.** East Asia and great power coalitions 'Foreign Affairs' 60(3) 1982 686 718
- Stephens, Robert.** It's been a good year for wars. 'Amrita Bazar Patrika' 3 November, 1982.
- Subrahmanyam, K.** India and the super powers 'Illustrated Weekly of India' 103(38) 24 October, 1982 6-9
- Subramanian, R R.** India's nuclear policy 'Mainstream' 21(8) 23 October, 1982 11-13, 26
- Suri, Surindar.** Super powers tug-of-war. 'Times of India' 17 January, 1982
- Vaz, Norman K.** World government and global anarchy a theological projection of the future 'Alternatives' 7(3) September 1981 291-316
- Sweezy, Paul M.** Economic crisis in the United States 'Monthly Review' 33(7) December 1981 1-10
- Fellis, Ashley J.** Limited N War debate dangerous U S doctrine 'Times of India' 13 November, 1982.
- Thapar, Romesh** Moscow and after 'Economic and Political Weekly' 17(40) 9 October, 1982 1639
- Thompson, Kenneth W.** The cold war the legacy of Morgenthau's approach 'Social Research' 48(4) Winter 1981 660-676
- Vanaik, Achin** Rise of Western Europe limits on new cold war 'Times of India' 8 November, 1982
- Vas, E A.** Third world nations pawns of super powers 'Sunday' 10(17) 31 October, 1982 37
- Venkataraman, R.** Third world economic development challenges of the eighties 'Indian and Foreign Review' 19(4) 1 December, 1981 13-15.
- Swamy, S.** Disarmament for world peace and development 'Indian and Foreign Review' 19(18) 1 July, 1982 9-11, 13
- Vohra, A M.** The military threat, 'U.S.I. Journal' 111(463) January-March 1981 14-22
- Wilson, Andrew.** Big powers ignore new war rules 'Amrita Bazar Patrika' 3 November, 1982
- Zuberi, M.** Nuclear safeguards and the developing countries the servitudes of civilian nuclear technology 'International Studies' 29(1-2) January-June 1981 173-189

#### SEMINAR ISSUES

55	India's Defence	August	1962
42	India & Pakistan	September	1963
65	The Bomb	January	1965
96	Asian Security	August	1977
0	Our Security	November	1968
7	Pakistan	May	1969
45	China Today	September	1971
146	Nuclear India	October	1971
25	Defence and Detente	May	1978
10	Arming a Subcontinent	February	1982

#### An Evolutionary View of Economic Growth

ASHOK S GUHA

This pioneering work draws not only on economics and history but also on anthropology and ethology. It is about the survival of the fittest economic societies. Its theme is that economic growth is an extension of organic evolution. Growth is the best interpreted as the adaptation of structures inherited from the past—whether political, economic, social or psychological—to the pressures, of a changing environment arising from the relationship of a society with nature, the population, natural resource balance—or with other societies earning opportunities, military competition or demonstration effects

Rs 60

#### World Development Report 1982

The Guardian has called the annual World Development Report 'the nearest thing to having an annual report on the present state of the planet and the people who live on it'. The themes of this year's Report are continuing agricultural progress and increased food production in the developing countries. The Report's longer-term analysis stresses the problems of low-income countries with declining concessional aid prospects, and points to possible paths for the 1980s. Numerous tables and multicolour maps, graphics and figures supplement the main body of the Report and case studies are interspersed to provide analyses directly related to the substance of the text

Spl Indian Price Rs 25

#### Data Collection in Developing Countries

D. J. CASLEY AND D. A. LURY

This book covers the range of inquiry techniques from the case study to the census but gives major emphasis to data collection by sample survey. The development of sampling theory is comparatively new and provides a logical conceptual framework by which estimates of the characteristics of a population can be inferred from the results of an examination of only a sample of that population. The authors look at the problem of non-sampling errors and discuss the practical aspects of carrying out a sample enquiry with regard to the special difficulties encountered in conducting surveys in developing countries. One of the major aims of this work is to enable investigators to combine theory and practice in a simple and practical way

Rs 45

#### Poverty and Famines

An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation

AMARTYA SEN

The main focus of this study is on the causation of starvation in general and of famines in particular. The traditional analysis of famines, concentrating on food supply, is shown to be fundamentally defective—theoretically unsound, empirically inept, and dangerously misleading for policy. The author uses an alternative method of analysis—the 'entitlement approach' concentrating on ownership and exchange. Besides exploring the underlying theory, the approach is used in a number of case studies of recent famines such as the Great Bengal Famine of 1943, the Ethiopian Famines of 1973 and 1974, and the Bangladesh Famine of 1974, to mention a few



Rs 50



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj,  
New Delhi 110002

Bombay Calcutta Madras



## THE SKY NEEDN'T BE THE LIMIT FOR YOUR CHILD'S FUTURE.

Your chirpy five year old of today may well be tomorrow's woman cosmonaut or space doctor.

It is all a question of enabling your child to realise her or his full potential. Providing the right opportunities at the right time.

Which calls for planning and saving the right way.

To meet the educational needs, or for start-in-life or profession or marriage.

There are many life insurance policies to help you meet these needs.

Talk to your LIC Agent to decide which plans are the best for you and your family. Act today.



### Life Insurance Corporation of India

**There is no substitute for Life Insurance**

[ NPS-LIC-82


# Back to Baghdad.



**Bombay to Baghdad every Monday on our 747s.**

You have a date every Monday — Bombay-Delhi-Kuwait-Baghdad.  
 Enjoy the special comfort and hospitality on our 747s — palaces in the sky!  
 Experience our First Class with its luxurious Slumberettes And our Executive  
 Class in the exclusive upper deck cabin

For more details, contact your travel agent or Air-India.



**AIR-INDIA**

Indian hospitality across five continents.



MTB AIR 8700

# SYMBOLS OF RELIABILITY



## DIGEPLEX

For disturbed digestion

## RALCRIZYME

The Total digestive

## MEDICREME

For sprains & strains

## TENOPHOS

The health restorative

## IMFERON

Rapid, reliable  
replenishment of iron

## LOMODEX

The specific flow improver

## HYALASE

The spreading factor

## BENOGEN

The comprehensive  
multihaematinic

**RALLIS INDIA LIMITED PHARMACEUTICAL DIVISION**

21, D. SUKHADVALA MARG, BOMBAY-400 001